आगमे विश्वासटिप्पन्यः

Original

क्षणिकेष्वपि भावेषु ननु चार्थक्रिया कथम् ।
विशेषाधायिनोऽन्योन्यं न ह्याद्याः सहकारिणः ॥ ४२८ ॥
जातौ सर्वात्मना सिद्धेरजातौवस्त्वभावतः ।
निर्विशेषाद्विशेषस्य भावे कार्यं न किं भवेत् ॥ ४२९ ॥
नचान्यतो विशिष्टास्ते तुल्यपर्यनुयोगतः ।
सहकारिकलापानामनवस्था च ते भवेत ॥ ४३० ॥
क्रमेण युगपच्चापि यतस्तेऽर्थक्रियाकृतः ।
न भवन्ति ततस्तेषां व्यर्थः क्षणिकताश्रयाः ॥ ४३१ ॥
सहकारिकृतश्चैवं यदा नातिशयः क्वचित् ।
सर्वदा निर्विशेषैव तदा सन्ततिरिष्यते ॥ ४३२ ॥
विनाशे यद्यहेतुः स्यादादावेव भवेदयम् ।
सम्भवो यदि नास्यादावन्तेऽपि स कथं भवेत् ॥ ४३३ ॥
स्वहेतोर्यदि भावानामिष्यतेऽन्यन्न कारणम् ।
विनाशस्य कथं तेषां क्वचिदेव विरुद्धता ॥ ४३४ ॥

kṣaṇikeṣvapi bhāveṣu nanu cārthakriyā katham |
viśeṣādhāyino’nyonyaṃ na hyādyāḥ sahakāriṇaḥ || 428 ||
jātau sarvātmanā siddherajātauvastvabhāvataḥ |
nirviśeṣādviśeṣasya bhāve kāryaṃ na kiṃ bhavet || 429 ||
nacānyato viśiṣṭāste tulyaparyanuyogataḥ |
sahakārikalāpānāmanavasthā ca te bhaveta || 430 ||
krameṇa yugapaccāpi yataste’rthakriyākṛtaḥ |
na bhavanti tatasteṣāṃ vyarthaḥ kṣaṇikatāśrayāḥ || 431 ||
sahakārikṛtaścaivaṃ yadā nātiśayaḥ kvacit |
sarvadā nirviśeṣaiva tadā santatiriṣyate || 432 ||
vināśe yadyahetuḥ syādādāveva bhavedayam |
sambhavo yadi nāsyādāvante’pi sa kathaṃ bhavet || 433 ||
svahetoryadi bhāvānāmiṣyate’nyanna kāraṇam |
vināśasya kathaṃ teṣāṃ kvacideva viruddhatā || 434 ||

“Even if things are momentary,—how can there re any effective action? The initial auxiliaries could not be productive of peculiarities in one another; because if they have come into existence, they must be there already in their complete form; if they have not come into existence, as the entities would not be there, as this absence would be without differentiation, wherefore could not the effect itself be produced therefrom (for the bringing about of which the auxiliaries are posited)? Specially as they could not be differentiated from anything else, being equally open to question. Thus too there would be an infinite regress of auxiliaries for you.—Then again, as they could not have an effective action either successively or simultaneously, it is useless to regard them as ‘momentary’; specially when no peculiarity can be brought about by any auxiliaries, the entire series is rightly held to be wholly undifferentiated (uniform). If then the destruction were without cause, it should come about at the very beginning; and if there be no possibility of it at the beginning, how could it come at the end also?—If again, no cause is admitted except the cause of the entities themselves,—then why should there be any incongruity in their destruction coming about in certain cases only (not always)?”—(428-434)

Kamalaśīla

In the following Texts, the author sets forth the view of Bhadanta-Yogasena (a Buddhist writer):—[see verses 428-434 above]

Yogasena has argued as follows:—“Even if things were momentary, any activity of theirs, either successive or simultaneous, would be incompatible.—Because, by themselves, they could be either capable, or incapable, of such action. If they are capable, then they cannot need auxiliaries; as what is itself capable does not need anything else.—If the things are themselves incapable, then any need for auxiliaries is all the more baseless. For instance, the things that fall within the scope of the first series cannot acquire any peculiarities from one another; because things that are produced and not produced being existent and non-existent, cannot stand in the relation of Helper and the Helped. Hence at the initial stage, they being all undifferentiated, they could not produce any particular ‘moment’; for, if such a ‘moment’ could be produced from the undifferentiated things, wherefore could the effect in question also not be produced? Nor can it be right to say that they are produced out of what is different from the initial ‘series’; as it is entirely on this ground that there is no differentiation among the components of the ‘series’ themselves. If these also were ultimately to bring about particular entities, then there would be an infinite regress.—Thus, there being no differentiation, how could any effect be produced from an undifferentiated ‘series’ of Causes? If there were to be production out of the undifferentiated Cause, then all things would be produced from all things.

“Thus then, even when there is an incongruity in effective action, coming either successively or simultaneously,—things do have effective activity,—and in the same manner, even though they are permanent, they could have the necessary effective activity. Hence it is needless to have recourse to the theory that things are momentary.

“Thus the Reason put forward (by the Buddhist)—‘because things exist (therefore they must be momentary)’—is found to be Inconclusive.

“Nor can it be said that—‘the production of the effect is due to the “series” in a particular condition, and not always’;—because in accordance with the reasoning explained above, there being no peculiar condition brought about by Auxiliaries, the series would remain always undifferentiated.—Nor can it be right to assent that—‘the series itself is only a peculiar feature connected with its own constituent cause’;—as this would be contrary to a. perceived fact. For instance, the effect is actually found to appear and disappear at the appearance and disappearance (respectively) of the Auxiliaries, If then, the peculiar condition were connected only with its own constituent cause, then the productivity would belong to theng independently of auxiliaries.

“Further, in accordance with the reasonings adduced above, the series remaining always undifferentiated, such particular products as the Potsherd and the rest could not be produced out of the Jar.

“Then again, if the Destruction of a thing, consisting of the cessation of the series of its homogeneous moments, were without Cause,—then, as independent of all else, it should come about at the very outset; and if it does not come about at the initial stage, it could not come at a later stage either; because it would, even then be as undifferentiated as before.—If then, for the destruction ofngs, no such Cause is admitted as another ‘series’ distinct from the Cause of the things themselves,—then why should Fire be the destroyer of Gold? because what is ineffective cannot be a destroyer,—simply because it is incapable of doing anything; and even so if it were regarded as an effective destroyer, it would be an absurdity; and everything would be the destroyer of everything. Thus it would be impossible to explain such phenomena as the use of the term ‘non-apprehension’ and the ‘destroying of life’—as being due to opposition (or destruction).”—(428—434)

The above arguments are answered in the following—[see verses 435-436 next]