आगमे विश्वासटिप्पन्यः

Original

पुद्गलादिपरीक्षासु द्वैराश्यप्रतिषेधनात् ।
द्विरूपोऽतिशयो नास्ति न वाऽप्यनुभयात्मकः ॥ ४०८ ॥

pudgalādiparīkṣāsu dvairāśyapratiṣedhanāt |
dvirūpo’tiśayo nāsti na vā’pyanubhayātmakaḥ || 408 ||

In course of the examination of the ‘pudgala’, etc. it has been explained that both alternatives cannot be accepted. hence the ‘condition’ cannot be both ‘different’ and ‘non-different’; nor can it be neither ‘different’ nor ‘non-different—(408)

Kamalaśīla

The other party now puts forward the view that the ‘Auxiliaries’ of the Permanent Thing become so by reason of their serving the same purpose as the latter [the second alternative suggested under Text 397]. To this effect, some people argue as follows: “The Permanent Thing does not require the Auxiliaries,—and yet apart from the Auxiliaries, it cannot bring about its effect; the fact of the matter is that its very nature is such that it produces its effect only when all its auxiliaries are close to it,—and never by itself, like the Final Cause, Hence even though the thing be always present, there is no possibility of all its effects being produced simultaneously.”

This is the view set forth in the following—[see verses 409-410 next]