Original
उत्पादानन्तरास्थायि स्वरूपं यच्च वस्तुनः ।
तदुच्यतेः क्षणः सोऽस्ति यस्य तत्क्षणिकं मतम् ॥ ३८८ ॥utpādānantarāsthāyi svarūpaṃ yacca vastunaḥ |
taducyateḥ kṣaṇaḥ so’sti yasya tatkṣaṇikaṃ matam || 388 ||That form of the thing which does not persist after its production is what is called ‘kṣaṇa’, ‘moment’; and that which has this form is held to be ‘kṣaṇika’, ‘momentary—(388)
Kamalaśīla
Uddyotakara has put forward the following argument:—“The term ‘Kṣaṇika’ (‘momentary’) contains the Possessive Affix (‘ṭhañ’, by Pāṇini 5-2-115); how does this affix come in? If, in accordance with the Nirukta, ‘kṣaṇa’ stands for kṣaya, Destruction, and the term ‘kṣaṇika’ means that which has destruction,—this cannot be right; because of the difference in time; that is, at the time that there is Destruction, the thing to which it belongs is not there (having ceased to exist); and the Possessive affix is never found to be used in connection with things that exist at different times. If (with a view to escaping from that difficulty) it be held that the positive entity itself, as qualified by its impending destruction, is what is spoken of as ‘kṣaṇika’, (‘momentary’),—oven so, it is not possible for the thing qualified by the destruction to be spoken of as possessing that Destruction; and thus also the use of the Possessive affix would be injustifiable. If what is meant by things being ‘kṣaṇika’ ‘momentary’, is that the time of their existence is only one moment; and that having posited the ‘kṣaṇa’, ‘Moment’, as the lowest conceivable measure of time, we call those things ‘momentary’ which continue to exist only during that point of time;—then this also cannot be right; because the Bauddha admits of Time only as a mere name (a hypothetical entity, without reality); and it is not right for what is a mere name to be regarded as the qualification of an entity.” (Nyāyavārtika on 3-2-14, page 418, lines 8-16, Bib. Indica Edition.)
This is answered in the following—[see verse 388 above]
What is called ‘moment’ is the character of the thing which is destroyed immediately after it has been produced; and that which has this character is called ‘momentary’, This has been thus declared—‘Moment is that which is destroyed immediately after theng has come into existence, and that which has this is called momentary—(388)
“Even so, as the ‘nature’ of ang is not-different from the Thing itself, there can be no such idea as that ‘this belongs to that’,—which idea is based upon the difference of the two factors concerned.”
The answer to this is provided in the following—[see verse 389 next]