Original
नैतौ हेतू द्वयोः सिद्धौ स्वतन्त्रे साधने मते ।
न विपर्ययबाधाऽस्ति प्रसङ्गोऽप्यभिधित्सिते ॥ ३०४ ॥naitau hetū dvayoḥ siddhau svatantre sādhane mate |
na viparyayabādhā’sti prasaṅgo’pyabhidhitsite || 304 ||If the reasons adduced are meant to be self-sufficient, then they are not admitted by both (parties); if the reasons are meant to be indirect, then there is nothing to annul the contrary conclusion.—(304)
Kamalaśīla
The reason that has been put forward,—is it meant to prove the conclusion directly or indirectly (per Reductio ad absurdum)?—If directly, then the Reason adduced is ‘not admitted’ by either one or the other of the two parties; for instance, the ‘producibility’ of things that the Buddhist admits is in the form of the production of something that did not exist before,—similarly, the ‘perishability’ of things that the Buddhist admits is of the nature of complete destruction,—while such is not the ‘producibility’ or ‘perishability’ that is admitted by you, the Sāṃkhya; as you regard them as being of the nature of ‘appearance’ and ‘disappearance’ respectively; and the form in which you admit these is not the one that is admitted by the Buddhist; hence the reason comes to be ‘not admitted’ by either one or the other party. The mere admission of the verbal expression does not prove the admission of the Reason; the admission of a fact is proved by a fact, as it is only a fact that can be the cause. This has been thus declared—‘In the case of such fallacies as Falsity and the like, even though the verbal expression may be quite correct, the Reason may be regarded as fallacious, as it is only a fact that can prove a fact.’
If it be held that the Reason adduced is meant to prove the conclusion indirectly; even so, inasmuch as no reason has been adduced which would annul (and make impossible) a conclusion contrary to the one intended, the two reasons adduced must be regarded as ‘inconclusive What is there, for instance, to obstruct the notion that ‘producibility’ and ‘perishability’ belong to Sentience?
As for the assumption of the Sāṃkhya in the following Kārika—“As the insentient milk flows out for the growth of the Calf, so does Primordial Matter act towards the liberation of the Spirit” (Sāṃkhya-Kārikā, 57),—this is not a sound assumption at all; because it is not independently by itself that the Milk flows for the Calf’s growth; what happens is that the milk is produced by particular causes functioning occasionally; and when produced, the milk becomes the means of the calf’s growth; and it is in this sense that it is said that ‘even the insentient thing acts No such activity however is possible for Primordial Matter; because, inasmuch as Primordial Matter is eternal, and there can be no other cause except itself,—it cannot be right to regard its Potency as only occasionally active, on account of being dependent upon certain causes operating only occasionally. Nor can it be right to regard the said Potency of Primordial Matter to be inherent in it; for, if that were so, then as the Cause in its perfect form would be always present, the entire purpose of all men, in the form ‘prosperity’ and ‘highest good’, would be brought about all at once.—(304)