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नित्यालम्बनपक्षे तु सर्वाहङ्कृतयस्ततः ।
सकृदेव प्रसूयेरन् शक्तहेतुव्यवस्थितेः ॥ २७८ ॥
अनित्यालम्बनत्वेऽपि स्पष्टाभाः स्युस्ततः परे ।
आलम्बनार्थसद्भावं व्यर्थं पर्यनुयुञ्जते ॥ २७९ ॥nityālambanapakṣe tu sarvāhaṅkṛtayastataḥ |
sakṛdeva prasūyeran śaktahetuvyavasthiteḥ || 278 ||
anityālambanatve’pi spaṣṭābhāḥ syustataḥ pare |
ālambanārthasadbhāvaṃ vyarthaṃ paryanuyuñjate || 279 ||If the said notion (of ‘I’) had an eternal thing for its basis, then all ‘I-notions’ would come about all at once, as their efficient cause would be always present.—if it had a non-eternal basis, then all these notions would be equally clearly manifest. hence (it follows that) the other parties needlessly raise questions regarding the existence of the basis of the said I-notion.—(278-279)
Kamalaśīla
It might be urged that—“There may be such restriction; but how is the fact of its having no real basis proved?”
The basis (background) of this ‘I-notion’ could be either eternal or non-eternal;—if it is eternal, then all ‘I-notions’—‘I-consciousness’—would come about (appear) simultaneously, as their cause would be present in its perfect condition; nor can the said basis be without cause; as such an idea would lead to absurdities;—nor can an efficient cause stand in need of auxiliary causes;—all this has been discussed more than once.—Nor can it be urged that “there is only one I-consciousness”, because its multiplicity is clearly proved by its appearing only occasionally. For instance, during the states of deep sleep, or of intoxication, or of swoon, there is no ‘I-consciousness’ felt, and yet at other times, it is actually felt; and this non-apprehension of it at certain times shows that it appears only occasionally; and because it appears only occasionally, therefore it must be regarded as many also. Thus it is clear that all these ‘I-notions’ would come about simultaneously, as their coming about is dependent upon the presence of the said cause only.
If then the other view be accepted that the basis of the ‘I-notion’ is non-eternal, then all I-notions should be all as clearly manifest as the Visual and other Cognitions; as they would be directly apprehending the specific individuality of the thing concerned.
For these reasons, we conclude that ‘other people’—other philosophers, like Kumārila and others—needlessly raise questions regarding the basis of the I-notion in question,—in such words as (those under Text 232)—“Of that notion, what cognitive-moment is assumed to be the object?” and so forth.—(278-279)
In this connection, it has been asserted by the Buddhist that the ‘I-notion’ is entirely baseless, and it appears only as an Illusion due to the beginningless Dispositions of the “Vision of the Body of Being—As against this, Kumārila has raised an objection, which is set forth below:—[see verses 280-281a next]