Original
विरुद्धधर्मसङ्गे तु भेद एकान्तिको भवेत् ।
पुंसामिव स्वभावेन प्रतिस्वं नियतेन ते ॥ २६९ ॥viruddhadharmasaṅge tu bheda ekāntiko bhavet |
puṃsāmiva svabhāvena pratisvaṃ niyatena te || 269 ||If there be presence of contradictory properties, then there should be absolute difference; just as in the case of your souls which are absolutely different from each other, through the distinctive character belonging to each of them.—(269)
Kamalaśīla
The following Text shows that the Reason just put forward is not ‘Inconclusive’:—[see verse 269 above]
If it be held that destruction and origination pertain to the States only, not to the Soul,—so that the two (the States and the Soul) have two contradictory properties—of ‘origination’ and ‘non-origination’,—then there must be difference between them; just as in the case of Souls, which are many,—each has its own character restricted to himself,—and hence they are regarded as distinct from each other; that is, this much alone serves as the basis of difference.
The qualification ‘distinctive character belonging to each’ has been added for the purpose of avoiding the fallacy of the ‘absence of the Probandum’ in the Probans, due to the fact that in the case of the Souls also, there is no difference in their own pristine forms. As a matter of fact, the form belonging to each of the individual Souls is entirely different from each other; if that were not so, as there would be no restriction regarding the apprehensions and remembrances of different persons, there would be confusion in all matters.
The argument may be formulated as follows:—When one thing is not subject to the same vicissitudes as another, there cannot be non-difference between them;—e.g. among Souls, each having its own distinctive form restricted to itself, they are not subject to the same vicissitudes,—the States of Happiness and the rest also are not all subject to the same vicissitudes;—hence, inasmuch as the wider condition is not found in them (they cannot be non-different).—(269)