आगमे विश्वासटिप्पन्यः

Original

अबोधरूपभेदं तु समानं सर्वबुद्धिषु ।
आरोप्य प्रत्यभिज्ञानं नानात्वेऽपि प्रवर्त्तते ॥ २६३ ॥

abodharūpabhedaṃ tu samānaṃ sarvabuddhiṣu |
āropya pratyabhijñānaṃ nānātve’pi pravarttate || 263 ||

The character of being different from non-cognition is one that is common to all cognitions; and the said recognition could proceed on the basis of the imposition of that common character,—even under the view of cognitions being many and diverse.—(263)

Kamalaśīla

It has been argued above (under Text 247), for the purpose of proving the one-ness and eternality of Cognition that—‘Cognition is always recognised as being of the nature of Intelligence, etc. etc?

This is answered in the following Text:—[see verse 263 above]

The ‘Recognition’ that has been put forward is Inconclusive; because the said fact of ‘Recognition’ can be explained, in regard to all Cognitions, as being due to the imposition of the character of being different from what is not-cognition;—i.e. such things as the Jar and the like;—and this would not be incompatible even with the view of Cognitions being many and diverse.—The following has to be definitely understood: It is only when Cognitions are many,—and not when they are not many,—that the said Recognition can be explained as being brought about by the ‘exclusion of all that is not homogeneous to it’. For instance, in the case of such superimposed (assumed) Cognitions as have no real background, even when a diversity among the objects is not admitted, there is no Recognition; e.g. there is no such recognition as that ‘this Cognition of the Horse and the Chariot is the same as what was the Cognition of the Elephant’;—and it has been already proved that all these Cognitions are without any real background; hence we are not asserting that here again. Thus the assertion—that “there is no nonrecognition of it as Cognition so long as notice is not taken of the diversity among the objects” (Text 248, above)—should be regarded as ‘unproven’ (untrue).—(263)

Then again, if the Soul is held by you to be enternally of one and the same form, then such diverse states as ‘Happiness’ and the like are not possible. If you do admit these diverse states, then the Soul cannot be eternally of one and the same form. As one and the same thing cannot have such contradictory characters as diversity and non-diversity.

This Objection has been sought to be answered by Kumārila; and what has been said by him is now introduced in the following Text,—for the purpose of refuting it (below, under Text 268 et. seq.):—[see verses 264-265 next]