Original
सात्मकत्वे हि नित्यत्वं तद्धेतूनां प्रसज्यते ।
नित्याश्चार्थक्रियाऽशक्ता नातः सत्त्वादिसम्भवः ॥ २१९ ॥sātmakatve hi nityatvaṃ taddhetūnāṃ prasajyate |
nityāścārthakriyā’śaktā nātaḥ sattvādisambhavaḥ || 219 ||If the things in question were connected with the soul, then the things caused by that (soul) would have to be regarded as eternal; and being eternal, they would yet be powerless for effective action. consequently it would not be possible for them to have the properties of ‘existence’ and the rest.—(219)
Kamalaśīla
Question—“In what way is this invariable concomitance (Premiss) established?”
The answer is provided in the following Text:—[see verse 219 above]
If the things in question are connected with the Soul—if the Body and the rest were controlled by the Sou’,—then this Soul would be their ‘Cause’; as what is not a Cause cannot be a controller; as otherwise there would be an absurdity.—And the Body and other things caused (produced) by that Soul, having their Cause always present in its perfect form, would have to be regarded as eternal,—i.e. not successive.
The following might be urged:—“If they are held to be eternal,—even so they retain their character of being things and so forth”.
The answer is given in the words—‘And being eternal, etc. etc.’;—i.e. being eternal, the Body and the rest would have to be regarded as powerless in bringing about any effective action. The word ‘prasajyate’ (singular) of the first line being transformed, in this construction, to the plural form [‘Prasajyate’ as applied to the second line being construed as ‘Prasajyante’].—The sense is that in the case of an eternal thing, any effective action,—either successive or simultaneous—is incompatible. And on the cessation of the power for effective action, they cease to be ‘things’ (entities); because ‘capacity for effective action’ is the characteristic of all Entities (Things’, And when the character of being Entities has ceased, there is cessation of the other characteristics of Entities also,—such as having existence and the like; and thus the invariable concomitance becomes duly established.—(219)
Uddyotakara argues as follows;—“What is it that is meant by [the Living Body] being not connected with the Soul?—(a) If it means that the Body does not serve any useful purpose for the Soul,—then, there can be no Corroborative Instance (such as would be accepted by both parties); as (according to us) there is nothing that does not serve a useful purpose for a Soul.—(b) If again, what is meant is simply the denial of the Soul, the meaning of the proposition being that ‘the Soul is not the Body’, then our answer is—who is there that regards the Body as the Soul? Then again, the negative preposition ‘nis’, ‘not’ (in the term ‘nirātmakam’ ‘no-Soul’, signifies the negation of what is expressed by the following term ‘ātman’ (i.e. of something with Soul). So that it behoves you to explain what is that which is ‘with Soul’; for in no case do we find the negative Preposition ‘nis’ prefixed to a term denoting a non-entity; for instance, in the expression ‘nirmakṣikam’, ‘without flies’, the preposition is added to ‘makṣihā’ (denoting the Fly, a positive entity).—(c) Again, if the statement ‘the Body is not with Soul’ is meant to deny the Soul in the body, then the reasoning proves only what is already admitted by all; for who is there who holds that the Soul subsists in the Body?—(d) If then the statement means that ‘the Body has no connection with the Soul’, then there can be no Corroborative Instance.—Lastly, all the aforesaid four cases would mean the denial of a distinctive character in regard to the Soul; and this would imply the tacit admission of the Existence of the Soul itself, in a general way; so that what was sought to be denied becomes admitted.—If what is meant is that ‘the term Soul, being a verbal entity, is transient, it must denote something that is transient’,—then, in the first place, in view of the term ‘eternal’, the premiss of the above reasoning is found to be ‘inconclusive’, doubtful; and secondly, [the term ‘soul’ in your argument can stand either for the Body or for something other than the Body]; if it stands for the Body and such things, then the argument becomes superfluous; and if the term stands for something other than the Body, etc. and your proposition declares it as denoting something transient, then the existence of something other than the Body, etc. becomes admitted; and this goes against your doctrine.”—[This is an exact quotation from Uddyotakara’s Nyāyavārtika on 3. 1. 1, Bib. Ind. Edn., p, 346, line 18 to p. 347, line 10.]
The above is answered by the Author in the following Text:—[see verse 220 next]