आगमे विश्वासटिप्पन्यः

Original

अन्यैः प्रत्यक्षसिद्धत्वमात्मनः परिकल्पितम् ।
स्वसंवेद्यो ह्यहङ्कारस्तस्यात्मा विषयो मतः ॥ २१२ ॥

anyaiḥ pratyakṣasiddhatvamātmanaḥ parikalpitam |
svasaṃvedyo hyahaṅkārastasyātmā viṣayo mataḥ || 212 ||

Others have assumed that the ‘soul’ is proved by perception; because ‘i-consciousness’ is self-cognisable, and the soul forms the object of that consciousness.—(212)

Kamalaśīla

With the following Text, the Author again introduces the view of Uddyotakara, Bhāvivikta and others:—[see verse 212 above]

These people argue as follows:—“Soul is proved by Perception itself; for instance, the notion of ‘I’, which is independent of any remembrance of the connection between an Inferential Indicative and that which has that Indicative, is of the nature of ‘Perception’,—like the cognition of Colour and other things. Of this notion of ‘I’, Colour, etc. do not form the object; as what appears in that notion is different from the cognition of Colour, etc.; hence the object of that notion must be totally different [and that is the Soul]”.—[Uddyotakara has stated this view under 3. 1. 1; see Nyāyavārtika, p. 345.]

This view is answered in the following texts:—[see verses 213-214 next]