0171 Verse 206

Original

सङ्केतमात्रभाविन्यो वाचः कुत्र न सङ्गताः ।
नैवात्मादिपदानां च प्रकृत्याऽर्थप्रकाशनम् ॥ २०६ ॥

saṅketamātrabhāvinyo vācaḥ kutra na saṅgatāḥ |
naivātmādipadānāṃ ca prakṛtyā’rthaprakāśanam || 206 ||

[The use of] terms being based entirely on convention,—what is there to which they cannot be applied?—In the case of terms like ‘soul’ also, there is nothing in their very nature which is expressive of anything.—(206)

Kamalaśīla

Question—“How can the declensional names we applied to nonentities, which are absolutely characterless?”

The answer is supplied in the following Text:—[see verse 206 above]

‘Convention’ proceeds from the independent desire of men (to give a certain name to a certain thing); and Terms also are expressive of that alone; wherefore then could there be any restriction of their use?

If the meaning of the Opponent’s Reason be that “because it is an unconventional single term”,—and by that means its Inclusiveness be sought to be avoided,—then the answer is—In the case of terms like ‘Soul’, etc.—that is, apart from Convention, terms, by their nature, are not expressive of anything; for, if it were so, then even unlearned persons (not conversant with Convention) could understand the meaning of words; there would also be no independent instruction as to the meaning of words; also because all Convention would, in that case, be useless. From all this it follows that such terms as ‘Soul’ and the like, by their nature, are not expressive of anything; so that the Reason put forward is ‘unproven’, ‘Inadmissible

If (in order to avoid these difficulties) it be sought to add a further qualification—to the effect that ‘it has for its objective a cognisableng which is included under a category which cannot be specified’,—as has been asserted by Bhāviveka,—even so, inasmuch as such a qualification would be ‘unproven’, the Reason itself would be ‘Inadmissible’,—as also ‘Inconclusive’, on account of the absence of the necessary invariable concomitance.—(206)