आगमे विश्वासटिप्पन्यः

Original

नीरूपस्य च नाशस्य कार्यत्वं नैव युक्तिमत् ।
अतो विशेषणं व्यर्थं हेतावुक्तं परैरिह ॥ १९४ ॥

nīrūpasya ca nāśasya kāryatvaṃ naiva yuktimat |
ato viśeṣaṇaṃ vyarthaṃ hetāvuktaṃ parairiha || 194 ||

It is not reasonable to regard ‘destruction’, which is formless, as a ‘product’; hence the qualification mentioned in the reasoning of the other party is entirely useless.—(194)

Kamalaśīla

Under the argument urged above (in Text 178) the phrase ‘while being entities’ has been introduced as a qualification;—this qualification is absolutely useless; as there is nothing that it can serve to exclude. This is what is pointed -out in the following Text:—[see verse 194 above]

If Destruction could be of the nature of a ‘Product’, then the qualification ‘being an entity’ would serve the purpose of excluding that; as a matter of fact however, as it is a non-entity, causes cannot do anything to it; how then could it have a Cause? This reasoning may be formulated as follows:—That which is a non-entity cannot be the product of anything,—e.g, the ‘Hare’s Horns’,—Destruction is a non-entity;—hence to speak of it as having a cause would be contrary to the said universal proposition—If it were a ‘product’, it would be an ‘entity’, like Pleasure, etc.—This would be an argument against the reasoning of the other party.

Further, what has been asserted also runs counter to your own doctrine. For instance, the name and the idea of ‘Product’ is due—(a) to its acquiring its character, or (b) to its subsistence (manifestation) in its Material Cause, or (c) to the subsistence therein of ‘Being’ (existence);—Destruction is not possessed of the character of Substance, etc., hence it cannot subsist in its Material Cause; nor, for the same reason, can ‘Being’ (Existence) subsist in it (Destruction), for the simple reason that it has no form (wherein the Existence could subsist). If it were otherwise, then, like Substance, etc., it would also be ‘contained’ in a receptacle, and be an ‘Entity’ also; and as such, it could not be excluded by the qualification in question; hence this qualification—‘being entities’—is absolutely useless.—(194)