0106 Verse 120

Original

यस्मादर्थस्य सत्ताया व्यापकं न च कारणम् ।
प्रमाणं भेदसद्भावाद्व्यभिचारात्तदुद्भवात् ॥ १२० ॥

yasmādarthasya sattāyā vyāpakaṃ na ca kāraṇam |
pramāṇaṃ bhedasadbhāvādvyabhicārāttadudbhavāt || 120 ||

Inasmuch as ‘proof’ (means of cognition) is not pervasive of the ‘existence of the thing’; nor is it its ‘cause’,—(a) because there is difference, (b) because there is non-concomitance, and (c) because it proceeds from that,—[mere absence of proof cannot prove the non-existence of a thing].—(120)

Kamalaśīla

When one character is pervasive of (more extensive than) another, then alone does the absence of the former imply the absence of the latter; similarly the absence of the Cause implies the absence of the effect; and the reason for this lies in the fact that the less extensive is invariably concomitant with the more extensive one, because of the two being of the same essence,—and the effect is invariably concomitant with the Cause, being produced by this latter. In the case of ‘Proof’ and ‘non-existence of a Thing’ there can be no co-essentiality, as the two actually appear to be distinct;—nor can Proof be the ‘cause’ of the Thing, as there is no concomitance between them; the Thing existing even when the Proof is not there. For instance, there is nothing incongruous in admitting the existence of Things which are far removed in space and time and character and hence are not within reach of any Proof (Means of Cognition);—and when a thing can be there even during the absence of another thing, the latter cannot be regarded as the Cause of the former; for if it were, then it would lead to an absurdity. In fact, if the other party were to regard this as a ‘Cause’, he would renounce his own position.

Also because it proceeds from that,—Proof cannot be the ‘Cause’ of the Existence of Things. That is, the Proof arises out of the Thing itself—which forms its objective; and the cognisable Thing does not arise out of the Proof.—(120)