Original
सरोजकेसरादीनामन्वयव्यतिरेकवत् ।
अवस्थातिशयाक्रान्तं बीजपङ्कजलादिकम् ॥ ११३ ॥
प्रत्यक्षानुपलम्भाभ्यां निश्चितं कारणं यदा ।
किमित्यन्यस्तदा हेतुरमीषां परिपृच्छ्यते ॥ ११४ ॥sarojakesarādīnāmanvayavyatirekavat |
avasthātiśayākrāntaṃ bījapaṅkajalādikam || 113 ||
pratyakṣānupalambhābhyāṃ niścitaṃ kāraṇaṃ yadā |
kimityanyastadā heturamīṣāṃ paripṛcchyate || 114 ||As regards the lotus and its filaments, etc., it is definitely ascertained through perception and non-apprehension that they have their ‘ cause ’ in the seed, clay, water and the rest under certain peculiar conditions,—with which latter they are positively and negatively concomitant ;—such being the case, what other ‘ cause ’ can there be of those, which you are asking about ?—(113-114)
Kamalaśīla
By this Text, the Author shows that the Reason adduced by the other party is ‘unproven’ and ‘inadmissible’, and the conclusion put forward is contrary to perceived facts.
It has been asserted (under Text 111) that “of such things as the Lotus, its Filaments and the like, no Cause is perceived—This is ‘not admitted’; as through Perception and Non-apprehension, such ‘Cause’ is definitely cognised to consist in the Seed, Clay, Water and such things, with which the said things are positively and negatively concomitant. To explain; when it is found that a certain thing is produced only when another thing is present, and it becomes modified by the modifications of this latter,—then this latter thing is said to be the ‘Cause’ of the former thing. Such a ‘Cause of the Lotus and its Filaments, etc.’ is found in the shape of the Seed, etc.,—which under certain peculiar conditions,—such as becoming swollen under moisture and so forth,—serves as their ‘Cause’, with which they are positively and negatively concomitant;—i.e. the Lotus, etc. come into existence only when the Seed, etc. are present, and they do not come into existence when these latter are absent;—that these are the ‘Cause’ of the Lotus, etc. is definitely ascertained through Perception and Non-apprehension.—Thus the Reason (Premiss) put forward by the other party is ‘inadmissible’, not true.
Then again, it has been urged that “the definition of ‘Causal Relation’ is not true (fallible)—This Reason also is ‘unproven’, not admissible; as, in the instance cited, as Touch also is a cause of Colour, it is admitted to be the cause of Visual Cognition also. To explain,—the term ‘touch’ (in this connection) stands for the material substance; and it is only by associating with these substances that Colour subsists; hence in regard to Visual Cognition, Touch does serve as a ‘Cause’; the only difference is that while one (Colour) is a direct cause, the other (Touch) is only an indirect one.
Further, mere negation (Absence) is not regarded by us as determining the causal relation;—“what then?”—It is a particular kind of absence that is so regarded; for instance, when it is found that, even though other efficient agents are present, yet in the absence of some one agent, the thing in question is not produced,—then this latter agent is regarded as the ‘Cause’ of that thing; and not when there is simple negation in the form that ‘it is not produced while the other is absent’, Otherwise (if such mere negation were to determine the causal relation) the Date growing in the country where one’s mother may have been married would not be produced if the mother’s marriage had not been there [as ex hypothesi, by mere negation the ‘Mother’s Marriage’ would be the ‘Cause’ of the growth of the Date].
The negative Premiss in the qualified form that we have shown is not ‘fallible’ (untrue) in regard to Touch. For, if it could be shown that, even in the presence of Colour and other conditions (of visibility), there is no Visual Cognition on account of the absence of Touch alone,—then there might be ‘fallibility’ in our premiss. Nothing like this however can be shown. Hence there can be no ‘fallibility’ in the definition of the ‘Causal Relation’ (as stated by us).—(113-114)