Original
स्थित्वा प्रवृत्तिरण्वादेर्न सिद्धा क्षणभङ्गतः ।
व्यभिचारश्च तेनैव तस्यापि क्रमवृत्तिता ॥ ८३ ॥sthitvā pravṛttiraṇvāderna siddhā kṣaṇabhaṅgataḥ |
vyabhicāraśca tenaiva tasyāpi kramavṛttitā || 83 ||‘Intermittent action’ of atoms and other causes is not proven (admitted); as there is ‘perpetual flux’, all things are undergoing destruction every moment; it is also ‘inconclusive’ in reference to that same (god), as hls activity also is consecutive (hence intermittent).—(83)
Kamalaśīla
Another reason has been put forward (by the Theist, under Text 50)—“because they operate intermittently [all such Causes as Merit, Demerit and Atoms must be controlled by an Intelligent Being]”,
Against this an additional objection is put forward in the following Text:—[see verse 83 above]
As a matter of fact, all things (according to us) disappear immediately on appearance, and they do not remain in existence even for a: single moment; how then can the action of these be ‘intermittent’? This Reason therefore is one that is ‘unproven, inadmissible’, for your Opponent. It is also ‘inconclusive’, in reference to the same—God; as God also operates only intermittently over things which appear consecutively; and yet He is not controlled by an Intelligent Being; for if He were, then there would be no need to posit such Intelligent Controllers.—If the Reason be meant to be qualified by the qualifying phrase ‘being insentient’,—as has been actually done by Praśastamati,—even so the ‘inconclusiveness’ remains unavoidable; as the exclusion of the contrary of the Probandum remains doubtful. That Reason alone can be regarded as logical which serves to exclude the Probans from the contrary of the Probandum; that however which does not entirely set aside all doubt of the presence of the Probans in the contrary of the Probandum,—even if put forward,—is as good as not there (i.e. ineffective). Further, even with the said qualification, the Reason remains open to the aforesaid defects of being ‘unproven’ and the rest.—(83)