0055 Verse 58

Original

चक्षुःस्पर्शनविज्ञानं भिन्नाभमुपजायते ।
एकालम्बनता नास्ति तयोर्गन्धादिवित्तिवत् ॥ ५८ ॥

cakṣuḥsparśanavijñānaṃ bhinnābhamupajāyate |
ekālambanatā nāsti tayorgandhādivittivat || 58 ||

Visual cognition and tactile cognition always appear differently; they cannot therefore have one and the same substratum,—just like the cognition of odour and other things.—(58)

Kamalaśīla

It has thus been shown that the Probans is essentially ‘unproven and Inadmissible’, on the ground of the qualification and the qualified being ‘unknown’; the following Text proceeds to show that it is ‘unproven’ also on the ground of the unproven (unknown) character of part of its substratum:—[see verse 58 above]

In the argument (put forward by the Naiyāyika, under verse 48, above) two kinds of things have been mentioned as the ‘Subject’—‘what is perceptible by two Sense-organs’ and ‘what is imperceptible’.—Now as a matter of fact, there is no object that is known (accepted by all parties) to be ‘perceptible by two Sense-organs’; for instance, both Visual Cognition and Tactile Cognition, are known to appear in different forms, respectively as manifesting the Blue and other Colours and as manifesting Hardness, Softness, etc. of the things touched; thus both these cognitions cannot have the same objective,—because they appear as different,—like the Cognitions of Odour, Taste and other things. The argument may be formulated thus:—Any two cognitions appearing in different forms cannot have the same objective,—like the Cognitions of Odour and Taste,—the Visual and Tactile Cognitions do appear in different forms;—hence the attributing of both to a single object would be a direct contravention of the said universal proposition.—If, even when appearing in different forms, Cognitions were to have the same objective, then the Cognitions of Colour, Sound and such diverse things also might be regarded as having the same objective; this is the reason that annuls the argument of the Naiyāyika.—(58)