Original
अथाऽपि निश्चयोऽभूतस्समुत्पद्येत साधनात् ।
ननु तेनैव सर्वेऽमी भवेयुर्व्यभिचारिणः ॥ २५ ॥Athā’pi niścayo’bhūtassamutpadyeta sādhanāt |
nanu tenaiva sarve’mī bhaveyurvyabhicāriṇaḥ || 25 ||If, on the other hand, (it be held that) the definite cognition that would be produced would be one that has not been there,—then, this one instance (of the effect being non-existent) would invalidate all those reasons (that have been set forth by the sāṃkhya).—(25)
Kamalaśīla
If, in order to avoid the futility of the reasons, it be admitted that the Definite Cognition that is produced from the Means is one that did not exist before,—then, in that case, the entire set of reasonings—‘Because what is non-existent cannot be produced, etc. etc.’ (Sāṃkhyakārikā, 9),—becomes invalidated; because as there is nothing incongruous in the production, of the Definite Cognition (which has not been existent), so there would be no incongruity in the production of any other non-existent thing;—similarly, just as there is production of the non-existent Definite Cognition,—and the securing of the particular Means for the said production,—and as there is no possibility of the said Definite Cognition being produced from all sorts of Means (Wrong, Doubtful and the like),—and as even though non-existent, the Definite Cognition is brought about by only such means as are efficient for that purpose,—and just as these Means have the nature of the ‘Cause’,—so exactly could it be also in every other case [and the Premiss of the Sāṃkhya would thus become annulled].—(25)