0010 Verse 12

Original

अकार्यातिशयं यत्तु नीरूपमविकारि च ।
विकृतावात्महान्याप्तेस्तत्क्रियेत कथं नु तैः ॥ १२ ॥

akāryātiśayaṃ yattu nīrūpamavikāri ca |
vikṛtāvātmahānyāptestatkriyeta kathaṃ nu taiḥ || 12 ||

“That to which no peculiarity can be attributed, which is eormless and unmodipiable,—how could such a thing be produced by causes,—when any modification would involve the loss of its very essence?”—(12)

Kamalaśīla

[Says the Opponent to the Sāṃkhya]—“Who has said that causes produce effects which they are not efficient to produce,—that you are denying it here? All that is said is that they also produce such effects as have been non-existent; and that such previously non-existent effect is quite amenable to the potency of the cause”.

To this the Sāṃkhya makes the following reply:—[see verse 12 above]

The Sāṃkhya reasons as follows:—“The acceptance of the view that the Effect produced has been non-existent implies that causes produce an effect which is incapable of being produced by them. For instance, that which is non-existent is formless—i.e. characterless;—that which is formless is, like the Hare’s Horn, something to which no peculiarity can be attributed,—i.e. which cannot be. regarded as having any characteristics;—and that to which no peculiarity can be attributed must be unmodifiable, immutable,—like Ākāśa;—how can such a thing, which has not acquired a specific form, be produced by any cause?—It might be argued that ‘from the fact of its being perceived in its existing state (after being produced) it follows that it does become modified—The answer to that is that any modification would involve the loss of its very essence. If modification is admitted, then its very essence,—essential character, which is described as consisting of formlessness,—would become lost. As a matter of fact, unless the non-existent thing has relinquished its essential character (of formlessness), it cannot become existent; and if it does relinquish the essential character, then it would not be true that the non-existent (formless) thing has become existent (with form); the form of the Existent is entirely different from the form of the non-existent,—the two being mutual contradictories. Hence what is non-existent cannot be produced. If it be admitted that a Cause can produce such ang—then It would be admitted that Causes actually produce only suchngs as are incapable of being produced! Certainly what is incapable of being produced can never be produced; as we find in the case of the Sky-lotus. From all this it follows that the Sāṃkhya argument (the fourth in the Kārikā) is unanswerable.”—(12)