pratyabhijJNA opinion
BhAskarI (BhAskara’s commentary on AbhinavaguptAcArya’s vimarSinI) on yogi-s and their powers -
एतेन योगिनां सदा सर्वविषयं प्रतिविषयं च ज्ञानं वर्तत इति भ्रमोऽपि निरस्त एव ज्ञातव्यः, देहोपाधिं तावत्तदसम्भवात् । - - - दिदृक्षाविषयीकृतेषु बहुषु वस्तुषु यादृशी सूक्ष्मस्पर्शमात्ररूपा व्याप्तिर्भवति तादृश्येव योगिनः सर्वविषयत्वेनोक्ता, न तु त्वदभिमता, ययासौ योगी महातृष्णाग्रस्तस्य तव समस्तदेशकालगतान् भावान् कथयेद्येन त्वदभिमतसिद्धिः स्यात् ।
“This puts to naught your delusion that yogi-s can have the knowledge of all things of all times, always. As long as they are embodied, they can never have such knowledge. - - - About the things (of the past and future) you wish to see, the yogi-s have a subtle knowledge (knowledge that everything that seems separated from the Consciousness is what is projected by the latter outside itself), not the sort of knowledge that you would want. They cannot tell you about phenomena pertaining to all times and all places, so you can benefit by gaining such information and fulfill your insatiable desires”
mImAMsaka opinion
न चावश्यं मन्वादयः सर्वशाखाध्यायिनः ।
ते हि प्रयत्नेन शाखान्तराध्यायिभ्यः श्रुत्वाऽर्थमात्रं स्ववाक्यैर् अविस्मरणार्थं निबध्नीयुः ।
Kumārilabhaṭṭa’s Tantravārttika (His Siddhānta portion, not Pūrvapakṣa)
From {EF}: “Basing on the same elements, the authors of the Mīmāṃsā elements altogether deny the possibility of omniscience. They explain that omniscience contradicts our experience, where knowledge always increases but never reaches on outmost limit.
Against the argument of repeated exercise, they observe that exercise does not need to be able to reach whatever result. For instance, no matter how much one exercises, one will never be able to jump until the moon. Nor will one’s smell be able to perceive sounds, even after an intense training. Thus, there are intrinsic boundaries to each faculty, including one’s intellect, which cannot directly grasp things, without the mediation of perception, inference and the other instruments of knowledge.
Moreover, no one could judge the omniscience of someone else. Thus, claim the Mīmāṃsā authors, the accounts about the Buddha’s omniscience cannot be trustworthy, since no one but an omniscient can vouch for someone else’s omniscience.
Why do Mīmāṃsakas insist so much on the impossibility of omniscience? From an internal and argumentative perspective, because of their commitment to common experience, which should not be contradicted without a valid reason. From an external and socio-philosophical perspective, because their defence of the Veda depends on its uniqueness as instrument of knowledge for knowing dharma `duty’. It is clear that no other human instrument of knowledge could compete with the Veda, since all human instruments of knowledge can only grasp what there is and not what ought to be. However, if there were an omniscient human or divine being, then they could reasonably compete with the Veda and possibly even falsify it.”
Reactions
“Jayanta Bhatta and some others have also pointed out .that in the end, the claim of the Purva Mimamsakas become self-stultifying. In Order to claim that no one can be omniscient, one has to know in some way. or other that the totality of things id such that it can never be known by any person But unless one can know all things, how can one make such a claim? If someone can thus come, to know of all things, how can the possibility of omniscince be denied without involving self-contradiction?” {DC}
“The third variety, however, comprises sentences that are neither opposed to what is known by other pranianas, nor can they be confirmed by other pramana-s. These bhutarthavada-s are as authoritative as the injunctive and prohibitive Vedic sentences on which the Mimamsakas put so much emphasis. Vedic statements confirming the existence of omniscience are cases of bhufarthavada, and thus, they cannot be explained away by the Mimamsakas” {DC}
advaita vedAnta
{EF} “Similarly, Advaita Vedānta authors stressed the identity of omniscience with complete knowledge of what is relevant, namely the only reality which is not illusory, the brahman. In this sense, omniscience has a very limited range of application, and yet covers whatever is not illusory.”
jaina-s
{EF} “Jaina authors tend to construe omniscience in the above way, namely as the knowledge of all possible states of affairs, attribute it to the Jinas and stress the innate potentiality of omniscience as being open to everybody (apart from God, given that they don’t believe in an absolute ultimate God).
buddhists
{EF}: “Different Buddhist authors held widely different opinions about this topic. The Theravāda commentator Buddhaghosa (who lived in Śrī Laṅka in the 5th c. and wrote or systematised commentaries on the Buddhist Pāli canon) describes the Buddha’s omniscience not as the simultaneous knowledge of all things at the same time, but as his possibility to know without any obstacle whatever he fixed his attention on. In other words, the Buddha would know everything about person X as soon as he tried, but he would not know at the same time anything about all possible people and states of affairs. Buddhaghosa could in this way avoid paradoxes such as way would an omniscient Buddha try to beg for food at houses where no one is home (as it happens in some Suttas of the Canon)
Later Buddhist authors such as Dharmakīrti would suggest that the Buddha does not know any possible thing, including irrelevant things. He rather knows whatever is relevant. In this sense, the “omni” in omniscience (in Sanskrit: the sarva in sarvajña) is understood in a selective way, just like the “omni” in omnivore, which does not mean that one eats books or musical tunes.””"
yoga
{EF} - “Most schools accepting omniscience deem that human beings could achieve it, although only with much effort. In this sense, omniscience is usually considered the result of yogipratyakṣa `intellectual intuition’, the immediate grasp of whatever content. … However, yogins are, unlike ṛṣis, not beyond human reach.”
क्षणमात्रमृषिस्तस्थौ सुप्तमीन इवह्रद:। of Vasishtha by Kalidasa.