(early 9th c.) Founder of the Bhamati
school of Advaita Vedanta, who is traditionally held to be a contemporary of
Shankaracharya, the Advaita school’s
greatest figure. The Advaita school
upholds a philosophical theory known
as monism—the belief that a single
Ultimate Reality lies behind all things,
which are merely differing forms of that
reality. Advaita proponents claim that
reality is non-dual (advaita)—all things
are nothing but the formless, unqualified Brahman (the highest reality in the
universe), despite the appearance of difference and diversity. For the Advaitins,
the assumption of diversity is a fundamental misunderstanding of the ultimate nature of things, a manifestation
of avidya. Although often translated as
“ignorance,” avidya is better understood
as the lack of genuine understanding
that ultimately causes human beings to
be trapped in karmic bondage, reincarnation (samsara), and suffering.
Mandana suggests the vivarta (“illusory manifestation”) causal relationship
to show how the unchanging Brahman
is connected with the world as it is perceived. The concept of superimposition
(adhyasa) shows how humans project a
mistaken understanding onto the correct understanding. For example, a
piece of rope is mistaken for a snake.
Although this judgment is erroneous,
one is actually perceiving something
real, in this case the rope, but “superimposing” a different and mistaken identity
on it, thus “transforming” it into something it is not. In the same way, it is
argued, human consciousness begins
with the existent reality (Brahman),
which is actually there, but superimposes
onto it something which is not (the
judgment of a diverse world).
Mandana also differed from
Shankaracharya on several points, posing problems for his later followers. One
of these judgments was that the locus of
ignorance was in the Self, since it was
absurd to conceive of Brahman as subject to ignorance; another was that there
were multiple Selves, since the liberation of one person did not cause the liberation of all. Mandana’s comments
presuppose the existence of a common
(if illusory) world, upon which he felt
called to render a judgment; he ended
up describing it as anirvachaniya—“that
which cannot be described.” In his
analysis, Mandana also distinguished
between two kinds of ignorance—a primal “covering” that keeps one from perceiving the truth, and a “projective”
ignorance through which human beings
actively obscure things.