Anumana

(“measuring after”) In Indian philosophy this is the term for an inference,
which is generally accepted as one of the
pramanas, the means by which human
beings can gain true and accurate knowledge. The word’s literal meaning reflects
the Indian conviction that any inference
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Anulepana
must be grounded in perception
(pratyaksha), the most direct means of
knowledge, and must ultimately appeal
to perception for evidence.
A classic inference includes three
terms: a hypothesis (pratijna), a reason (hetu), and examples (drshtanta),
each of which is made up of parts.
One part of the hypothesis is the idea
to be proved (sadhya), which is predicated on a certain class of objects,
called the paksha. In the statement
“there is fire on this mountain,” the
sadhya is the assertion that there is
fire, and the paksha is the particular
mountain. The object mentioned in
the paksha must also appear in the
second term, the hetu, along with the
stated reason. In the example cited
above, the hetu could be “because
there is smoke on this mountain.”
As proof, it was necessary to cite positive and negative examples, known as
the sapaksha and vipaksha, respectively.
An appropriate sapaksha could be “like
kitchen,” since ancient kitchens had
both fire and smoke; a vipaksha could be
“unlike lake,” since lakes contain neither
of these.
This general form of an inference
is subject to numerous tests for
validity; one of the most important of
these is vyapti, the requirement that
the reason given must account for
all cases of the idea to be proved. For
further information see Karl H. Potter
(ed.), Presuppositions of India’s
Philosophies, 1972.