आगमे विश्वासटिप्पन्यः

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This book introduces readers to Indian philosophy by presenting the first integral English translation of Vaiśeṣikasūtra as preserved by the earliest canonical commentary of Candrānanda (7th century AD) on the old aphorisms of the Vaiśeṣika school of Indian philosophy.

The present monograph offers a canonical description of the fundamental categories of ontology and metaphysics, among which the category of ‘particularity’

(viśeṣa) plays a major role in the ‘problem of individuation’ of the ‘nature’ of substance in both Indian as well as Western metaphysics. This commentary should be read primarily in relation to Aristotle’s Categories. It is structured in 3 parts.

Chapter 1 contains a general introduction to Indian philosophy and the Vaiśeṣika system. Chapter 2 is a textual-philological discussion on the commentary itself, since its first publication in 1961 by Muni Jambūvijayaji up to the present day.

Chapter 3 is a ‘philosophical translation’ that reads Vaiśeṣika in the global context of Comparative Philosophy and aims to render this text accessible and comprehensible to all readers interested in ontology and metaphysics.

A new reference work and a fundamental introduction to anyone interested in Indian and Comparative Philosophy, this volume will be of interest to scholars and students in Classical Studies, Modern Philosophy, and Asian Religions and Philosophies.

Ionut Moise is a British Academy Postdoctoral Fellow at the University of Exeter, UK, and a Research Fellow at The Oxford Centre for Hindu Studies, UK, where he teaches Comparative Philosophy. He is the author of Salvation in Indian Philosophy, which is also published by Routledge (2020).

Ganesh U. Thite is Emeritus Professor at Tilak Maharashtra Vidyapeeth, Pune, and former Head of the Department of Sanskrit and Prakrit languages at the University of Pune.

*Acknowledgements *

*Preface *

viii

*List of Abbreviations *

*List of Appendices *

xiii

*List of Tables *

xiv

*Note on transliteration *

1 Introduction to Indian philosophy and Vaiśeṣika

2 Sources and resources on Vaiśeṣikasūtra

3 Vaiśeṣikasūtra: Transliteration and translation

*Appendix 1: Vaiśeṣika and world philosophy *

265

*Appendix 2: Vaiśeṣika scholasticism *

271

*Appendix 3: New Manuscripts on Vaiśeṣika *

273

*Bibliography *

278

*Index *

285

Acknowledgements

Many journeys back and forth, stretching from the shores of the Indian Ocean down the Adriatic Sea have been made since I began to work on this text. First, I would like to thank my Sanskrit guruji, Professor Ganesh U. Thite, who taught me most of the Sanskrit I know, and for his pleasure and patience in revising this translation, as well as for the innumerable readings we had on various textual traditions such as Vyākaraṇa, Vedānta, Jaina, Raghuvaṃśa, Pañcatantra, and Vaiśeṣika, no name but a few. Many teachers played an important role during my Indian studies. Professor Julius Lipner is indeed the first teacher who, while at Cambridge, introduced me to the study of Comparative Theology and Hinduism.

He allowed me to attend his lectures during Easter Term 2009, and assisted me selflessly, with a bibliography and then wrote academic references at various transitional stages of my career (Cambridge, Oxford, and Exeter). A wonderful human being whose help I shall never forget. Vincenzo Vergiani’s reading sessions on Sanskrit were the first impact I had with Sanskrit. Then, at Oxford, Gavin Flood, Alexis Sanderson, Shrikant Bahulkar, James Benson, Christopher Minkowski, and Elisabeth Tucker. The pursuit to understand the Commentary of Candrānanda on Vaiśeṣikasūtra brought me to Italy where I had a long and fruitful meeting with Professor Leonardo Vittorio Arena in a coffee shop by the Adriatic Sea. The handicap I had with languages in general, forced me, however, to start again, this time in India, where I attended very useful summer schools, workshops, and group and individual courses on written and spoken Sanskrit with ‘grammar through exercises’ organised by Saṃskṛta Bhāratī. In Pune, Wai, Sawantwadi, and Sringeri, I talked to many teachers and pundits, young students and experienced academics alike, but perhaps the most unforgettable experience was the series of 9 daily lessons (āhnika) I had, deep in the jungle in Goa, with Mahāmahopādhyāya Pundit Devadatta Patil. I wish to acknowledge the generous support of the European Union and the scholarship granted to me through the Erasmus Mundus programme (Experts4 Asia) (December 2015–October 2016).

It was the time when, as the UK went to the polls to vote Brexit, my methodological focus changed for good, mostly under the influence of Wilhelm Halbfass’

works ‘On Being and What There Is’ and ‘India and Europe.’ Finally, I wish to praise Ms Jacquie Rawes, who looked over the problematic English of this translation. Her insights were so intuitive that she was able to spot when a word choice

*Acknowledgements * vii

in the translation was wrong. A token of gratitude to Ms Dorothea Schaefter of Routledge Hindu Studies Series, for making all this published work possible, and my English friends, Professor Sir David Winkley and his good wife Dr Linda Winkley, as well as Ranjit Sondhi (OBE) under whose encouragements I began work on a new project, a comparative philosophy of difference.

Ionut Moise

British Academy Postdoctoral Fellow,

University of Exeter

Preface

It is a matter of great delight that we present to all philosophy students the first integral English translation of Candrānanda’s Vṛtti, the oldest commentary available on the sūtras of the Vaiśeṣika school of Indian philosophy. The system is a robust ontology that presents, in 6 major categories, a complete picture of the world. Its description goes through a set of definitions that define substances from their concrete condition to their abstract state. A full draft of the current translation was made during the summer of 2019, in the Sackler Library at Oxford, but, given uncertainties concerning syntax, I had to call on the help of my Sanskrit guruji, the eminent Professor Ganesh U. Thite of Pune University, for a revision.

Thus, in the course of the spring of 2020, I returned to Pune to revise the whole of the translation, and following the dramatic deterioration of a global pandemic, Professor Thite and I were forced to continue working on this revision through the medium of WhatsApp video calls, both in India and the UK (March to June 2020).

As we were both under lockdown, we kept on meeting online and while I was reading to him my rough draft, he judiciously stopped to correct me, each time when my reading went wrong. This is the fruit of a wonderful and unforgettable Indo-European collaboration, and I am delighted to publish it in co-authorship with my Sanskrit mentor, Professor Ganesh Thite.

The introductory chapter seeks to provide a textual reading of the ‘editio princeps’ of Vaiśeṣikasūtra edited by Muni Jambūvijayaji at Baroda 1961, the very edition which this translation has used. I discuss the MSS on which this edition is based and other MSS on which Isaacson and Ruzsa have improved upon, as well as other 5 new MSS on the Sūtrapāṭha, which the editor Ionut Moise photographed at Wai, Mysore, Bombay, and Madras while in India with an Erasmus Fellowship (December 2015–September 2016). This is, of course, an incomplete contribution to the reconstruction of the ‘independent transmission’ (Wezler, 1982) of the Vaiśeṣikasūtra, for more MSS work must still be done in due course, mainly because the recent description of the entry ‘Vaiśeṣikasūtras,’ which the New Catalogus Catalogorum, vol. 32, published recently (2013), gives us important clues concerning locations of MSS on Sūtrapāṭha. Here, I should like to highlight the importance of a second Vaiśeṣika commentary, Bhaṭṭa Vādīndra’s Vyākhyā

*Preface * ix

(VSv) (short and long version, respectively) – again not available in English –

whose glosses shed new light on both the early and later history of Vaiśeṣika tenets, at least prior to the Navya-Nyāya period when the Vaiśeṣika system is inflated with additional concepts or becomes simply assimilated by the Nyāya scholastic tradition. Both texts – VSc and VSv – are of paramount importance, but the current translation aims to disseminate Indian philosophy in a global context, through the discipline of comparative philosophy. Indeed, if there is any originality that this edition carries, then it lies in the attempt of the editors to read Indian philosophy in the context of world philosophy, and following an Indian academic tradition, to bring Indian philosophy in conversation with world philosophy at large.

Before reading this translation, the student needs to learn the lists of 9 substances and 24 qualities indicated often briefly by the particle ‘ādi’ (‘and so forth’). The knowledge of substances and qualities is of chief importance for understanding Vaiśeṣika’s ontology, as well as the broader picture of ‘reality’ (metaphysics); for that matter, I have marked all 9 substances and 24 qualities in commas, mostly when these are used in the nominal form. In this darśana, nouns and entities seem to be more important than verbs. I have translated the overwhelming use of the particle ‘-ādi’ (etc.) by the expression ‘and so forth.’ For example, the student needs to read ‘dravyādi’ with the whole list of 9 substances in mind. Another thing to bear in mind when reading the Sūtras (Vaiśeṣikasūtra, Sūtrapāṭha) is to recollect the subject stated in the previous aphorisms because Sanskrit syntax is condensed, and the subject is not repeated but rather assumed and ‘hidden’ as it were in the preceding sūtras. For Roman transliteration, although, I initially followed the conventions set by the Baroda 1961 edition, I decided nevertheless to keep compounds (guṇa and vṛddhi) united and apply word division whenever necessary.

Within scholarship, there have been other translation attempts of Candrānanda’s Vṛtti from Vaiśeṣika scholars, which I had initially consulted. Such fragmentary translations can be found at Nozawa (chapters VSc 1, VSc 2) and Halbfass (fragments VSc 1.2, VSc 9), as well as several passages discussed and translated by Thakur (2003), Arena (Sūtrapāṭha), and Miyamoto (fragments), to name but a few. Although Thakur (2003) provides a translation of Sūtrapāṭha, it does not correspond to the Sūtrapāṭha preserved by Candrānanda. The student must be aware that the synopsis Thakur provides is an eclectic compilation of several commentators on Sūtrapāṭha: it is not a translation of Candrānanda’s commentary.

The reason for the first integral English translation of Candrānanda’s Vṛtti (VSc) is 2-fold: (1) VSc is the oldest commentary on Sūtrapāṭha (VS) available at present; and (2) the fragmentary and incomplete translations we have on VSc transmitted by the scholars mentioned earlier seemed rather old-fashioned, or, from my point of view, simply incomprehensible. Since this translation developed in several stages over the past four years, I wish to acknowledge the support of several important European, English, and Indian trusts: the Spalding Trust, the Teape Trust, the Infosys Foundation, and the Oxford Centre for Hindu Studies.

x * Preface*

Finally, I wish to express my gratitude to Bjarne Wernicke-Olesen for having kindly granted me his elegant Oxford study office where I could meet online with Ganesh Thite for the first revision of this work.

11 July 2020, Oxford

Ionut Moise

Research Fellow, Oxford Centre for Hindu Studies

Ganesh U. Thite

Emeritus Professor, Tilak Maharashtra Vidyapeeth, Pune

Abbreviations

ALMOIB

Alphabetical List of Manuscripts in the Oriental Institute,

Baroda.

**Arist Cat. **

Aristotle’s Categories (ed. J. L. Ackrill.).

Asiatische Studien/Études Asiatiques.

Car

Caraka Saṁhitā.

Corpus Christianorum, Series Graeca and Series Latina,

Brepols Publishers.

CSPM

Catalogue of Sanskrit and Prakṛti Manuscripts, Ahmedabad.

Daśapadārthaśāstra of Candra, H. Ui ed. 1917.

GIP

Geschichte der Indischen Philosophie. Frauwallner, Erich.

GOS

Gaekwad’s Oriental Series.

GRETIL

Göttingen Register of Electronic Texts in Indian Languages.

HIP

History of Indian Philosophy. Frauwallner, Erich. (English).

HSPCIC

History of Science Philosophy and Culture in Indian Civilization.

IBS

Indological and Buddhist Studies.

JAOS

Journal of the American Oriental Society.

JIP

Journal of Indian Philosophy.

JOIB

Journal of the Oriental Institute, Baroda.

Kir Udayana’s Kiraṇāvalī. In PD.

Loeb

Loeb Classical Library (online).

LSJ

A Greek-English Lexicon. Eds. H.G. Liddell, R. Scott, 1968 (online).

LXX

The Septuagint. Rahlfs/Hanhart. Eds. (online).

MBhV

Vyākaraṇa-Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali

MBhD

Mahābhāṣyadīpikā of Bhartṛhari

Monier-Williams Sanskrit Dictionary (online).

Mysore N.D

A New Descriptive Catalogue of Sanskrit Manuscripts,

Mysore, 1984.

Śrīdhara’s commentary on PD.

OHHAP

Oxford Handbook of the History of Analytic Philosophy.

Praśastapāda’s Bhāṣya in GOS.

Bibliotheca Patrum Graeca, J. P. Migne 1865

xii * Abbreviations*

PGL

PGL Patristic Greek Lexicon. Lampe, G. W. H. 1961 (online).

SII

Studien zur Indologie unt Iranistik

Śivāditya’s Saptapadārthī.

VIJ

Vishveshvaranand Indological Journal.

Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari

Sūtrapāṭha of VSc (with tentative reconstruction from the

‘independent transmission’).

VSc

Candrānanda’s Vṛtti, GOS 136.

VSi

Il Vaiśeṣika Sūtra Di Kaṇāda. Trans. Leonardo V. Arena

VSś

Vaiśeṣika aphorisms of Kaṇāda, trans. Gough, A.E.

VSv

Vādīndra’s Vyākhyā. Darbhanga 1957.

Vyo

Vyomaśiva commentary on PD.

**Wai D. II. **

Descriptive catalogue of MSS Prājña Pāṭhaśālā Maṇḍaḷa, Wai.

WZKS

Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens.

Note: For another list of abbreviations, especially on the primary sources, see the Bibliography.

Appendices

Vaiśeṣika and world philosophy

265

Vaiśeṣika scholasticism

271

New Manuscripts on Vaiśeṣika

273

Tables

1.1 MSS on Candrānanda’s Vṛtti (VSc)

1.2 Themes and topics in VSc by chapters

1.3 Major subjects in VSc

Note on transliteration

Transliteration. For the Roman transliteration of VSc, although I initially followed the canon set by Muni Jambūvijayaji, I decided to follow instead the advice of Bjarne Wernicke-Olesen by keeping compounds united (guṇa and vṛddhi), and apply whenever possible the appropriate word division. Inconsistences may occur. Since the gloss is too brief, I have decided not to capitalise the beginning of sentences in either transliteration or translation. For variant manuscript readings, I recommend a comparison between Jambūvijayaji’s footnotes with other valuable contributions of new manuscripts reading brought forth by Harunaga Isaacson (in his PhD unpublished thesis, 1995), as well as Ferenc Ruzsa’s transliteration on VSc that is available online (academia .e du). I do really hope that my transliteration will spare students’ time and will encourage them to use and quote from Candrānanda’s commentary more often in any Indian philosophical study henceforth.

In this edition, I have not followed the convention of putting either Sanskrit, Greek, or Latin in italics. Since this edition addresses both philosophy and Indology scholars, engaging with both Greek philosophical and Sanskrit

sources, given its accuracy and widespread acceptance, I decided to follow IAST

(International Alphabet of Sanskrit Transliteration) for Sanskrit. More generally, in the Bibliography, I have consulted and used the diacritics for the Sanskrit authors and works referred as these appear in the Bodleian Libraries Catalogue (SOLO). Whenever I have referred to a particular Sanskrit term in brackets, I have opted for the ‘stem form’ of MW Dictionary (e.g. for karma, karman). When I have not done so, I gave a portion of the quotation. I have also used Sanskrit terminology more colloquially (‘theory of karma,’ or the plural form ‘dravyas’), not least because such concepts are already established within scholarship. The most striking feature perhaps is the ‘excessive’ use of commas for all ontological categories (substance, quality, motion, universal, particular, inherence). As this introduction explains, Vaiśeṣika is a substantialist philosophy, therefore, the reader must be alert when a word used in its nominal form occurs, and whenever categories occur in the text. For the same reason, I put only the uncertain terminological translations in brackets, for example, ‘substance’ (dravya). Sometimes, I analysed terms without even supplying a translation for these (e.g., saṃskāra), as I consider their English rendering controversial. The Index with the Glossary

xvi * Note on transliteration*

at the end will help in this respect. For Greek literature, however, given the different styles of Romanisation, and in order to leave any ambiguity out, I found it straightforward to render the quotation in the Greek script itself, as is printed in most bilingual and critical editions. For the same reason, such an approach may be followed when dealing with other Oriental languages as well (Arabic, Syriac, etc.). The Sanskrit transliteration of Candrānanda’s Vṛtti commentary has been made by Ferenc Ruzsa (academia.edu). However, the shortcoming of his feat is that he worked on the 1982 edition, which Isaacson recommends avoiding as it contains a sprinkle of new misprints. Hence, in all my work, I have relied on Jambūvijayaji’s first edition (1961), which I have referred and quoted throughout.

The electronic transliteration that Ruzsa made used different electronic diacritics, which made their reproduction very difficult. I had to reread and retype it all, both against the Baroda 1961 edition, as well as in comparison with a new but incomplete transliteration available at DCS (Digital Corpus of Sanskrit; available at www .sanskrit -linguistics .org /dcs /index .php ?contents =texte). Nevertheless, I have fruitfully used the philological material of my Vaiśeṣika predecessors: Isaacson and Ruzsa, who are best equipped to supply a new critical edition of Vaiśeṣikasūtra.

Referencing. In both footnotes and bibliography, I have used an abbreviated form of the Oxford referencing system with only the author’s surname, year, and the page (e.g., Halbfass, 1992, p. 234), and no brackets for the year. An exception to this rule has been in the footnotes where I have recommended a title for the readership mentioning only surname, title and year (Quinton, The Nature of Things, 1973). For English, I have used English grammar and spelling (e.g. realise, instead of realize). The first section of the introductory chapter addresses a worldwide philosophical audience providing a brief overview of what Indian philosophy is and where Vaiśeṣika stands in this overall picture. This sort of explanation continues in the footnotes of the translation. The second part of the chapter is more technical for it aims to put forward preliminary material for a future critical edition on Vaiśeṣikasūtra (Sūtrapāṭha). Illustrations on Vaiśeṣika manuscripts and their location is a good starting point. For the benefit of philosophy students, I have appended 2 charts/illustrations: ‘Vaiśeṣika and world philosophy’ and the 2

charts ‘Vaiśeṣika and world philosophy’ and the ‘Vaiśeṣika scholasticism.’

1 Introduction to Indian philosophy and Vaiśeṣika

One question that Western philosophers usually ask is whether there is such a thing as ‘Indian philosophy’ and, if so, what are the topics, questions and problems it raises. Philosophy is hard to delineate in general, yet there are typical questions it poses, and knowing them, rather than laying down its definitions, is perhaps a better way to understand it. The second set of questions raised more recently is whether ‘Comparative Philosophy’ constitutes a genuine method or a self-subsisting discipline in the vast field of World Philosophy. If philosophy must go global, being as it were an universal domain of inquiry that transcends all temporal, geographical, and cultural boundaries, then the response is in the affirmative, hence Indian texts must supply both a contribution as well as a precise account of their own standing point and research questions. The most fundamental and, at the same time, most difficult problem in comparative philosophy remains ‘translation,’ for readers must not only understand the unique nature of the Indian philosophical concepts themselves, free of any Western bias, but they also must be able to translate them properly into the general World philosophical language. For that to happen, scholars need to expand and build a new philosophical glossary, with input from all known forms of linguistic contexts, including Sanskrit. Things have more than one meaning-definition, therefore, translations must do justice to each shade or layer of meaning an object carries. However, there are instances when Indian philosophical concepts are harder, if not impossible to comprehend; thus, one must go about such conundra by simply looking at fundamental and idiosyncratic research questions, which define the general philosophical inquiry. Philosophy is impermanent not because of its solutions, but rather through its questions. The scholastic Sanskrit tradition has demonstrated that new inquiries arise always in respect to the ancient texts and through their translations, fresh interpretations and change of meaning does occur in the history of Indian philosophy, albeit sluggishly. Thus, there is arguably scope for creative progress, even here. One such change is the one that the commentators on various Sūtra texts had brought, which consisted mainly of bringing new shades of meaning, and together with it a new school of interpretation, all this by claiming to offer either a hidden meaning unexplained by the founder of the school, or by simply extending the list of categories (padārtha) in view of strengthening and defending their own tradition, now under attack.

*Introduction to Indian philosophy and *

Vaiśeṣika

2 * Introduction to Indian philosophy and Vaiśeṣika *

To introduce Indian philosophy to readers of Western philosophy, we should recall the old naturalist questions posed by the Pre-Socratics, those who coined the term. Therefore, what defines ‘philosophy’ is not the propositions taken to be true, but rather the constant perennial questions that lie at the basis of any fundamental description of the fabric of the world. To put it differently, philosophy develops first from realistic premises, with ontology, rather than logical inferences, with intuitions rather than justified reasons, with questions rather than definitions and presuppositions. Indeed, when one looks at the theories put forward by the first Pre-Socratic thinkers, namely the questions that Ionian, Pythagorean, and Eleatic physicists addressed, and then, when we compare these with the first Vedic philosophical speculations, one cannot but be struck by the seemingly analogous questions the early Vedic and Pre-Socratic philosophy gave rise to.1 Such questions lie in the zone of ‘ontology.’ Thus, Zeller differentiates 2 stages in the development of Pre-Socratic thought. The first is marked by questions on ‘substantial causes’

(Thales, Anaximander) and ‘essential natures’ (Pythagoras, Anaximenes), while the second stage raises questions related to the ‘origin,’ ‘decay,’ and ‘change’ of the world (Heraclitus), as well as the laws that cause such phenomena (Empedocles). 2

One may see in the latter a maturation of inquiry from the fundamental questions about ‘being’ and a shift to those regarding ‘becoming’ for these take into account the importance of oneness and multiplicity (Xenophanes), and rationality in the framework of a philosophical realism (Parmenides, Zeno). Questions on the substantial cause of the world, the stuff out of which everything came to be, or what is the essential nature of which the ‘world’ (one being) or ‘things’ (many beings) consist of, are examples of naturalist types of inquiry.

The second stage of Greek Pre-Socratic thought, one that resembles the Vedic and Upaniṣadic philosophy, raises questions about substantial ‘change’, apparent ‘transformation’ of the world, and what are the laws and principles behind these. These were explained by postulating the laws of combination and separation of ultimately imperishable substances. This stage includes atomic theories (Leucippus) and explanations about the cyclical and disintegrating nature of the world, primordial elements, which are qualitatively different from each other, limited in number, and infinitely divisible (Empedocles), questions about one universal cause such as a primordial ‘mind’ (νοῦς)(Anaxagoras), and questions about the essence of the world spoken of in terms of either ‘Being’ (Parmenides) or ‘numbers’ (Pythagoras).3 The rationale of this preliminary survey on the Pre-Socratic Greek philosophy is important because of their conspicuous resemblance with the problems raised by the early Vedic and Upaniṣadic seers. The point made

1 Filliozat 1970: 7.

2 Zeller 1895: 35.

3 A good introduction to Greek philosophy is R. P. Appleton, The Elements of Greek Philosophy, 1922 (for A levels and baccalaureate readers); and for a richer presentation, see Edward Zeller.

Outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy, 1895 (for graduate scholars).

Introduction to Indian philosophy and Vaiśeṣika * 3

here is that the first philosophical questions in philosophy lie in the zone of ontology (nature of things) and its broader domain, metaphysics (relation of things).

Now, regarding the difference between ontology and metaphysics, one conceptual and methodological distinction must be made, one that is not always clearly drawn in modern analytic philosophy, because both terms are often used interchangeably. It is, it seems, that the Aristotelian corpus determines a terminological difference between the two, for it articulates a science of ontology that inquiries about ‘ontic beings’ (τὰ ὄντα) (Categories 1a20) and the formulation of a ‘science of being-as-being’ (ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη τις ἣ θεωρεῖ τὸ ὂν ᾗ ὂν) (Metaphysics, Book Γ, 1003a). Heidegger too seems to follow a distinction between ontology and metaphysics in his ‘Being and Time’ (1927) where he distinguishes an ‘ontological’ inquiry of a most general concept ‘Being’ (Dasein) from a more specific ‘ontic’ inquiry regarding beings caught in temporal existentiality.4 If we are to take into account both ancient and modern understandings, ontology is, and should therefore be, the ontic inquiry into the nature of beings and their essential and existential nature. Its purpose would then be to elucidate as far as we can the meaning of ‘Being’ (a most elusive concept in metaphysics) and its multifarious components, manifestations, real and mental events. Furthermore, it is important to mention that ontology implies a taxonomic agenda, whereas metaphysics is a broader domain that takes into consideration and elaborates upon the causal and logical relations between the ontic categories, putting them all in a broad ‘picture of the world.’5 Quinton goes as far as to say that any metaphysical system must arrange its categories into a sort of hierarchy, and that such an arrangement is ‘ontology.’ As we shall see, in Indian philosophy such a vertical display is characteristic of the Sāṃkhya school with its own successive stages of evolution derived from a primaeval elemental nature (prakṛti), whereas Vaiśeṣika, another important school, exemplifies a horizontal form of ontology, where categories are displayed synchronically, standing as they were in a relation of inter-dependence. 6

If metaphysics is – within the context of modern analytic philosophy – a domain that presents, by rational means, a general ‘picture of the world,’7 this should not be confused with a mere encyclopaedic account of the elements of such a picture, for metaphysics must include the domains of knowledge and language too. In Indian philosophy, taxonomy and enumeration is important, for as Vyomaśiva,

4 The difference between ‘Being’ (ontological domain) and ‘beings’ (ontic domain) has been revived more recently by Heidegger in Being and Time. (1962 English trans).

5 Quinton 1973: 237.

6 Halbfass 1992: 48–9. The order is, of course, a simplification; as far as Vaiśeṣika is concerned, its ontological categories are related both vertically, into a system of supervenience, as well as horizontally, for the category of particularity (viśeṣa) is a horizontal derivation of the quality of distinctness; as I shall argue later, the Vaiśeṣika ‘picture of the world’ is a realistic immanent pluralism. The synchronic arrangement is most telling when we analyse the nature of abstract substances, time, space, vacuum, and soul, which are said to be all-infinite and all-pervasive, which implies the assumption that these can co-exist as the same time and space.

7 Quinton 1973: 235.

4 * Introduction to Indian philosophy and Vaiśeṣika *

a 9th century Vaiśeṣika commentator explains, philosophy intends to enumerate everything in the world that has the character of being.8 Another important characteristic, which is relevant for the study of Vaiśeṣika, is that metaphysics is not the simplification of Parmenides’ axiom ‘thinking is being’, or the Socratic thought-form dualism (Timeous 51d-e), but as Vaiśeṣika illustrates, thought is indeed only one component of reality, in the complete ontological framework, which stands on 3 important levels which are recognised even by modern analytic philosophy:9 (1) the basic or the ultimate; (2) the derived, or dependent level; and (3) the illusory or the fictitious. 10 As to how Vaiśeṣika presents its 6 categories, 11

this tripartite pattern is most visible in the description of the chief category, namely ‘substance’ (dravya), upon which the whole edifice of the system’s metaphysics stands, for it is spoken in relation to adjacent categories, such as ‘qualities’ and ‘motion’ that substance relates to and is defined by. ‘Sub-stance’12 is the

most basic category (point 1), particularly when it is regarded as a genus-universal (sāmānya), that is to say, as a simple all-pervasive essence in which the multitude of qualities are inherent. Between them, the latter represents the ‘species’

known by ‘lower universals’ (point 3), while the derived, or the dependent ontic level discussed previously stands in Vaiśeṣika philosophy for the ‘ultimate particularity’ (antyaviśeṣa) (point 2); its existence is infinite due to its inter-dependent nature within the universal. Point 3 of Vaiśeṣika metaphysics, this edition argues, could forcefully complement the controversial and dualistic matter-form (later on essence-versus-existence) tension and debate that pervaded the history of Scholastic philosophy from the post-Aristotelian age down to Duns Scotus and

8 Vyomaśiva’s Vyomavatī (vol. 1, p. 21), and Udayana’s Kiraṇāvalī (GOS, p. 148) talk about an ambitious intention of Kaṇāda, the founder of the system, to ‘enumerating everything in the world that has the character of being,’ via Halbfass, 1992, p. 69.

9 Anthony Quinton, The Nature of Things 1992, I shall refer to this work throughout.

10 Quinton 1973: 242. In Indian philosophy, we see the tripartite grades of metaphysics in Candramatī, who distinguishes between highest universality (sattā) and a specific universality (sāmānyaviśeṣa), both of which are part of the category of universal (sāmānya); if we analyse these 2 universals alongside particularity, as both Candrānanda and Praśastapāda do, then we obtain 3 levels of reality. The tripartite classification fits well with analytic philosophy, and Indian thought as well.

11 Each Indian philosophical system (darśana) must be approached through the list of its ‘categories’

(padārtha), for a list of these, see the Grimes dictionary 1996: 235–8. It is recommended, however, with great caution, for this dictionary, though a starting point, contains entry definitions that do not discuss divergent contradictory padārthas, which occur among commentators inside 1 school.

One should be aware of the difference between the categories preserved in the founding sūtra texts, and the inflated list, which the subsequent commentators added. For example, if we look at Vaiśeṣikasūtra in its independent form, it seems to have had originally only 3 basic categories: substance (dravya), quality (guṇa), and action (karma), yet the commentarial tradition begins to discuss 6 categories, appending to these another 3: universal (sāmānya), particularity (viśeṣa) and inherence (samavāya). It worth mentioning that the ‘addition’ of 3 categories does nothing but characterise and elucidate the nature of the 3 fundamental categories, in particular, the substance category, and its relation to qualities, and more generally, cosmic ‘karmic’ motion.

12 Substance is a notoriously fuzzy translation for dravya, for a discussion of this, see the fifth chapter of Wilhelm Halbfass, On Being and What There Is, 1992.

Introduction to Indian philosophy and Vaiśeṣika * 5

Neo-Scholasticism.13 By contrast, metaphysics, as considered by Vaiśeṣika, has 3 descriptive levels: (1) a vast universality (sāmānya); (2) a specific universality (sāmānyaviśeṣa); and (3) an ultimate particularity (antyaviśeṣa). These are all characterised by ‘existence’ (sattā), which has an ontological universal status as well. This tripartite metaphysical model would be challenged further by later

Vaiśeṣika scholastics, for instance, Śivāditya14 and Candramatī.15

Ontological categories (padārtha) undergo a considerable change under Praśastapāda (6th century AD). His work, not a ‘commentary’ (vṛtti), but rather an innovative ‘digest’ (bhāṣya), introduces, under the influence of Pāśupata

Śaivism,16 a new theistic interpretation of the world and the origin of its constituent parts.17 His stress lies on epistemology more than on the ontology of being, as had been taken in its nominal, substantial form by Candrānanda. The nature of being is narrowly linked with that of thinking. As in the tripartite metaphysics mentioned earlier, the categories of Praśastapāda have 3 major basic features: they possess existence ‘existentiality’ (astitva), ‘knowability’ (jñeyatva), and

‘nameability’ (abhidheyatva), and correspond to the 3 major areas of philosophical inquiry: ontology, epistemology, and language, respectively.18 The change Praśastapāda brought into the system is a subordination of ontology to epistemology, a fact that singles him out within the overall canonical tradition. Though Vaiśeṣika is usually regarded as an ontological system (Halbfass 1992), the textual evidence we have illustrates that we are dealing with something more than just an ontic enumeration. It puts forward a complex system of descriptive metaphysics, which combines elements of physics (natural philosophy), and draws different distinctions. Such distinctions are for instance between ritual actions and moral intentions, between perception, and inference, and intuition; relational distinctions between inherence and conjunction; between names, definitions, and abstract objects; between substance and essence; between quality and substratum; between laws and motions; between mind and mental states; between values and

13 See Francis A. Cunningham, Essence and Existence in Thomism. A Mental Versus the Real Distinction, 1988.

14 Śivāditya SP p. 9 (he classifies universal in ‘near universal,’ ‘remote universal,’ both ‘near and remote universal’); we come across this tripartite gradation of metaphysics in Candramatī, who distinguishes between highest universality (sattā) and a specific universality (sāmānyaviśeṣa), both of which are part of the category of universal (sāmānya). If we analyse these 2 universals alongside particularity, as both Candrānanda and Praśastapāda do, then we obtain 3 levels of reality, which is accepted by both analytic philosophy and Indian thought.

15 Candramatī DP 1.1. mentions 10 categories, but interestingly enough, he enumerates, alongside universality and particularity, a 9th category called commonness; it is worth asking what the difference and relationship are between commonness and universality; could it be that commonness is that lower universal that links particularity with universality as in the case of Candrānanda?

16 Jayanta Bhaṭṭa’s Āgamaḍambara (a satirical play critical to various traditions in Kashmir) mentions a certain Dharmaśiva as a teacher of the philosophies of Kaṇabhakṣa and Akṣapāda Gautama, via Thakur 2003: 383.

17 See the article Johannes Bronkhorst, God’s Arrival in the Vaiśeṣika System, 1996.

18 For the relation with the 3 major domain of philosophical inquiry, see Shashiprabha Kumar, Classical Vaiśeṣika in Indian Philosophy: On Knowing and What Is to Be Known, 2013.

6 * Introduction to Indian philosophy and Vaiśeṣika *

goals; and, last but not least, between karmic transmigration and ontic liberation. 19

These are only some problems and questions addressed by Vaiśeṣika in particular, and Indian philosophy in general.

The aim of this edition of Vaiśeṣikasūtra is, therefore, to introduce students of Western philosophy to some of the categories of Indian philosophy, and by way of this to demonstrate the necessity of conceptual correlation between Indian philosophy (particularly Vaiśeṣika) and the perennial and insoluble questions of today’s World philosophy. Despite the hurdles we face in translation, both textual-philological and philosophical-conceptual, nevertheless, the authors of this edition highlight that philosophical understanding lies in relations and correlations, a fact shown by Vaiśeṣika’s own categories bound by logical interconnections, 20 tele-

ological goals, and value-related implications. 21 Moreover, the project of comparative philosophy is arguably the continuation and confirmation of Strawson’s proposition that there is such a thing as a ‘central core of human thinking’ beyond history, and that there are categories and concepts of fundamental character that remain undiminished throughout time. 22 This present edition argues that by matching unrelated systems of thought (Indian, Greek, analytic, and so forth), our knowledge rebuilds and reconstructs while the ontic definitions of the world gain more clarity than has ever been possible. This work supports the idea that philosophy is a counterpart of history and that understanding comes not only through philological and empirical archaeological data, but also from relations, comparisons, and epistemic intuitions.

One simple way to understand Indian philosophy is by looking into the research questions that a Vaiśeṣika student addresses in the opening dialogue of gloss VSc 1.1.1, on the one hand, and to the fundamental ontic categories of gloss VSc 1.1.4–6 on the other hand. The opening discussion between a teacher and a student is characteristic of the conversational mode of transmission of classical and early medieval Indian philosophy, a mode of teaching that was widespread in both Classical Greece (see Plato’s Dialogues) as well as in the Upaniṣads (see Dialogue between Uddālaka Āruṇi and Śvetaketu). At origin, the aphoristic style of Indian philosophy is either Śramaṇic or Buddhist. The second section of the Pāli canon known as Sutta Piṭaka comprises a vast number of ‘threads’ of thought (‘sutta’ in Pāli, ‘sūtra’ in Sanskrit) recognised to be the sayings of the Buddha himself. Sūtras, however, should not be confused with either ‘mantras’ (in the Vedas), or with ‘ślokas’ (poetical verses that follow a precise meter used in the

19 I have shown recently that enumeration and knowledge in Vaiśeṣika, quite unsurprisingly, have, like other Indian philosophical systems, a soteriological goal. See Ionut Moise, Salvation in Indian Philosophy, 2019.

20 Strawson 1959: 10.

21 I have contextualised the metaphysics of Vaiśeṣika in relation to modern analytic philosophy.

Contrary to post-colonial theory, comparative philosophy argues that philosophical conversation should not make any judgements of superiority, or inferiority, nor the conversion and domination of thought over and above the reality of being, to which philosophy is committed.

22 Strawson 1959: 10.

Introduction to Indian philosophy and Vaiśeṣika * 7

epic literature). The preservation of the sūtras is problematic, not least because they – unlike mantras and ślokas – lack in rhyme and beauty, which otherwise render them easier to memorise and transmit. These sūtras became the ‘founding

texts’23 of certain scholastic schools: Mīmāṃsāsūtra, Vaiśeṣikasūtra, Nyāyasūtra, Yogasūtra, Pāśupatasūtra, Kāmasūtra, Sāṃkhyasūtra, 24 and Brahmasūtra are only a few examples of texts that generated subsequently a scholastic commentarial tradition. Yet readers should be cautious when interpreting these fundamental sūtra texts because their preservation in their current state is most probably inflated.

A closer reading of their thread of thought shows that they contain not only the fundamental tenets of their own school, but the counter-arguments of opponents as well, which a careless reading would take to be the system’s own views. Thus, the reconstruction of the basic tenets of the sūtra-text must come from a thorough knowledge of the commentarial tradition, internal and external, as well as from further archaeological work (textual-critical collation on manuscripts). Hindu orthodox philosophical systems (āstika), that is to say, those that take the Vedas and Upaniṣads as authoritative for their tenets, developed to counter the forceful Buddhist rise, particularly the highly effective sūtra-style of philosophising.

Teaching was heavily oral, hence, the style of these aphorisms had a mnemo-technic role in preserving such philosophies. The aphoristic style helped boost the spread of new currents of thought that had been common in other parts of the world, for instance, in ancient Greece among the Pre-Socratic thinkers25 and in

Europe down to Nietzsche.

Indian philosophy developed in a scholastic manner and current readers who study it are usually equipped with skills similar to those that European Classicists and Medievalists possess.26 Indian scholasticism presents many problems related to authorship, doctrinal change, and time of composition. Indeed, these are highly contentious issues in the history of Indian thought and have much to do with the way in which orthodox Hindus usually view their Vedic and philosophical thought: as an authorless, changeless, and timeless revelation handed down to sages from a remote past. Although conceptual or philosophical change does happen in the history of Indian thought, its progression is very slow indeed. Unlike Sanskrit scientific works (astrology and mathematics), the colophons of Sanskrit philosophical manuscripts hardly mention any date, and very little is known about

23 It is debatable whether all the sūtra texts listed here can be considered founding texts.

24 Sāṃkhyasūtra is not the earliest text of Sāṃkhya philosophy; see Iśvarakṛṣṇa’s Sāṃkhyakārikā.

On an approximate date of the sūtra texts composition, see Hermann Jacobi, On the Dates of the Hindu Philosophical Sūtras, 1911.

25 Heraclitus (c. 475–535 BC) seems to have handed down his thought in ‘pregnant, picturesque sentences which were often oracular and laconic to the point of obscurity,’ a fact that gained him the surname of ‘The Obscure,’ Zeller 1895: 66.

26 Yet, more recently, Indian philosophy has been approached in a more creative manner (logics and epistemology), for instance, the school of Bimal Krishna Matilal and his pupil Jonardon Ganeri; an even bolder and creative approach combining ancient and modern perspectives on ancient and modern philosophy is found in Richard Sorabji, Gandhi and the Stoics: Modern Experiments on Ancient Values, 2012.

8 * Introduction to Indian philosophy and Vaiśeṣika *

the founding fathers and authors.27 In order to either reconstruct an author or a concept, internal bibliographical references within one school, as well as external ones (rival schools), must be traced and taken into account ahead of others, as the latter ones might be free of bias and speculative change of mind. Once again, fresh textual and archaeological material is highly useful but insufficient; understanding Indian philosophy requires not only painstaking philological effort, but also wide-

ranging knowledge of Sanskrit language and literature.28

A common trunk of origin for the ramification of various systems is sometimes easier to pinpoint in Indian thought and literature, for unlike in the Western thought where philosophical insurrections and original ideas have been deeply sought, in the context of Sanskrit scholasticism, such insurrections and ideologi-cal ‘-isms’ hardly arise. With the exception of unorthodox systems (for instance, Jaina, Buddhist, Cārvāka), the function of Indian thought, particularly the Hindu one, is to justify, expand, and complement the original authoritative texts, not to criticise them. 29 However new an Indian philosophical system is, the tendency Brahmin philosophers have is to call on the authority of the Vedic and Upaniṣadic corpus to justify its orthodoxy.

The history of Indian philosophy developed around ‘3 tensions,’ which may be classified as philosophical, religious, and social. Regarding the first, monistic interpretations about an ‘ultimate essence’ of reality often clashed with pluralistic worldviews that defined substance by ‘difference’ not simplicity (Vaiśeṣika, Sāṃkhya, Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika, Jaina), facts which brought an inevitable tension between ‘idealism’ and ‘realism.’ A second type of tension is felt among influential religious traditions (Śaiva, Vaiṣṇava, Smārta, and Śākta) of the second millennium AD that assimilate various orthodox ‘classical philosophies’

(darśana) into their own unified theologies. The result is a binary amalgamation (e.g. Vaiśeṣika with Nyāya; Sāṃkhya with Yoga; Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā with Vedānta), or the creation of further conceptual tensions between ‘immanent’ and ‘transcendent’ (in Śaivism). New theological doctrines such as the nature of knowledge or god would create further religious tensions, splits, and dissensions within the great Vedānta philosophy. There is also a more recent (modern) tension in Hindu philosophy, one that concerns modern Indian culture and society and produced new interpretations of Hinduism. This is a tension that only flourished recently (19th–21st centuries), chiefly as a response to the Western colonial challenge. Its interpretations revisit perennial philosophical themes concerning ‘freedom’ (individual and collective) (Aurobindo) as well as social and religious Indian ‘inclusiv-ism’ and ‘pluralism’ (Ambedkar, Gandhi). These new contributions are not in the

27 Kaṇāda is the founder of Vaiśeṣika, Kāpila the founder of Sāṃkhya, Jaimini of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā, Akṣapāda Gautama of Nyāya, Bādarāyaṇa of Brahmasūtra (Vedānta), and Patañjali of Yoga. This is by no means a complete list.

28 See Maurice Winternitz, A History of Indian Literature, 1927, for a start; as for philosophy, see Karl Potter, Encyclopaedia of Indian Philosophies, 25 vol. (ongoing).

29 A view aptly expressed by Nirmala R. Kulkarni at a conference on ‘Critics and Criticism in Indian thought,’ February 2020, at the Sanskrit Department, University of Pune.

Introduction to Indian philosophy and Vaiśeṣika * 9

least negligible, for their general outlook is comparative and synthetic, drawing

upon and balancing traditional with modern views.30

Given the previously discussed definition of metaphysics in analytic philosophy, as a ‘picture of the world’ (Quinton) explicitly, it is striking that when one looks at the classical orthodox Hindu systems, each of these individualises itself by putting forward a distinct view of reality, a worldview for which the term ‘darśana’

is a case in point. The term derives from the first-class stem √ dhṛ, which gives the past participle dhṛta meaning ‘uphold, maintained.’ The stem gave the Vedic concept of Ṛta, as well as dharma, the latter of which developed significantly into a multitude of meanings and usages. Of these, only 2 basic connotations will be discussed, one ontological, the other epistemological. When a philosophical darśana31

focuses on the ontological, then the system deploys various ontic taxonomies and its defining feature is generally realistic pluralism. From this point of view, Sāṃkhya, Vaiśeṣika, Jaina, Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā, and Nyāya might be considered realistic philosophies. When, on the other hand, such philosophies subordinate ontology to a form of ultimate knowledge, then a form of monistic idealism prevails. In this category, one may see Vedānta philosophy with all its subdivisions: Advaita, Bhāmatī, Vivaraṇa and Sureśvara’s Advaita, Viśiṣṭādvaita, and Bhedābheda,32 with the exception of

Dvaita Vedānta. Within Brahmanical thought, that is to say, its scholastic orthodox traditions, there are, however, other ‘pictures of the world,’ namely cosmological descriptions such as those of the Śaivite-Śāktic and Vaiṣṇava-bhakti movements of the second millennium AD. Śaivism, in particular, accommodates various tendencies (monistic and dualistic) but manages to offer a unified immanent-cum-transcendent theology with tremendous success across the whole spectrum of Hindu darśanas, not least the Vaiśeṣika system.

Other philosophical schools may not fit into the category of the ‘orthodox picture’ (āstika darśana) of the world. As in the course of classical Greek philosophy, in classical Indian thought, revisionist Śramaṇic movements continue to grow in the post-Upaniṣadic era. Greek heterodox movements that threaten the religious or political establishment (see Socrates Trials, Plato’s political fiasco in Syracuse, Aristotle’s flight from Athens) have parallels in the Indian śastric movements, whose founding authors initiate new interpretations of the world (in sūtra texts) and supply solutions for liberation that conflict with the old Vedic descriptions (saṃsāra, loka). These movements would generate, in turn, lasting scholastic traditions. The Classical world abounds in ‘heterodox’ creativity. In the Greek world, such new philosophies are categorised in various currents: the Pythagorean thought, Sophistic

30 For a view on Indian philosophical literature, Potter’s Encyclopaedia is a good starting point, as it offers translation excerpts from the whole spectrum of Indian philosophy.

31 Sometimes confused with śastra (‘science’), darśana stands for a ‘worldview’ or ‘philosophical school,’ while śastra stands for a ‘discipline’ that encompasses authors from different traditions.

32 The tradition has several variations: Bhāskara (Aupādhika Bhedābheda) (8th and 9th century AD), Yādava and Nimbārka (Svābhāvika Bhedābheda) (13th century AD), and Caitanya (Acintya Bhedābheda) (1486–1534).

10 * Introduction to Indian philosophy and Vaiśeṣika* movement, 33 Cynic and Cyrenaic thought, Stoicism, Epicurism, Pyrrhonism, and the Peripatetic school, while in the Subcontinent, Cārvāka Scepticism,34 Ājīvika

Fatalism,35 Yogācāra-Mentalism, and Mādhyamika dialecticism are comparable examples. What all these may share in common is a natural craving for advancing new forms of descriptive metaphysics, substantiated in original and singular philosophical views (darśanas). The study of their tenets poses doxographical problems due to their marginalisation in relation to more established schools of thought privi-leged by the political, religious, and socio-cultural establishment. The ‘picture of the world’ of such movements varies; it inclines either towards idealistic and mentalistic elucidations or towards nihilistic and moralistic interpretations. Although these schools use analogous terminology, their semantics and hermeneutics differ considerably. Despite that, one prevalent aspect developed in their thought is to engage robustly with the elusive question of ‘being,’ either by refuting, marginalising, or simply redefining it entirely. They were all in one way or another critical of the then extant picture of metaphysics, hence they engaged themselves with ontology, which offered not only definitions but also existential solutions. The term

‘soteriontology’ that more recently Halbfass discussed concerning Advaita Vedānta and some Mahāyāna Buddhist schools is one such example.

It has been customary to limit the number of classical Indian philosophical systems to 6. This is the position that an important Jain commentator Haribhadrasūri (c. 5th–8th centuries AD) took in his ‘Compendium of Six Philosophies’

(Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya)36 and is a view taken for granted in the 19th century by Max Müller in a book with a similar title.37 The 6 systems discussed are the first teaching of Buddha, Nyāya, Sāṃkhya, Jaina, Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṃsā, and a separate one called Cārvāka (Lokāyata). That Lokāyata (a materialistic system that denies the reality of substance-essence) has not been listed among the 6 systems shows the bias of such doxographers but also indicates the necessary qualification that a darśana must meet, namely a knowledge that goes from an upper to a deeper physical description of the concrete materiality of the world. Haribhadrasūri’s canon, however, faces a challenge from a Lokāyata polemical work composed by a sceptical thinker known as Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa (8th century AD). His work, as the title ‘Lion of Destruction of Philosophical Theories’ (Tattvopaplavasiṃha) suggests, is one that deploys a major refutation of the validity of some of the doctrines

33 Socrates belongs to the Sophistic movement, but he was not a sophist himself, and the accusation cost him his life (Plato’s Apology 19a–20c).

34 Names associated with Cārvāka as gleaned from Buddhist and Upaniṣadic sources are Pūraṇa Kas-sapa, Pakudha Kaccāyana, and Ajita Kesakambalī.

35 For Ājīvika, Makkhali Gosāla is one such name. See more in A. L. Basham, History and Doctrines of the Ājīvikas, 1951.

36 About the number of 6 systems, see also Sarvamatasaṅgraha, written possibly by Rāghavānanda, and Mādhava Sarasvatī’s Sarvadarśanakaumudī (c. 1500 AD). For a discussion of the number of Indian systems, see Prem Pahlajrai, Doxographies – Why six darśanas? Which six? 2004 (available online).

37 Max Müller. The Six Systems of Indian Philosophy, 1899.

Introduction to Indian philosophy and Vaiśeṣika * 11

(soul, sound, non-existence) or categories (perception, inference, comparison) that orthodox and non-orthodox systems propound. Yet, by the 14th century, Mādhava of Śringerī38 would expand the list of philosophies to 16 in his ‘Compendium of

all philosophies’ (Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha).39

What is then the place of Vaiśeṣika in Indian philosophy? For the sake of simplicity and clarity, we shall say that its distinctness becomes evident only when contrasted with the whole panorama of the main classical systems. Sāṃkhya stands for a dualistic cosmology. Mīmāṃsā (Jaiminīya) is a form of hermeneutics based largely on the relationship between sound-language and act-ritual in view of a precise classification and performance of the Vedic ritual and mantras. Cārvāka is a nihilistic and materialistic system that denies the reality of the essence of world constituents (e.g. Tattvopaplavasiṃha). Buddhism is a dialectical philosophy of mind, which developed several variations: either mentalist (Yogācāra) or dialectic (Mādhyamika) and so forth. Nyāya is a system of logic with an enlarged theory of perception. There are Pāṇini’s grammar and the philosophy of language that generated subsequent important philosophical commentaries (Patañjali’s Mahābhāṣya and Bhartṛhari’s Vākyapadīya). Jaina is a dualistic-cum-pluralistic philosophy in its ontological, epistemological, and soteriological descriptions. Vedānta is largely a transcendental philosophy with a dualistic epistemology that differentiates between a ‘lower’ (vyavahārika) and an ‘absolute’ (pāramārthika) reality. As far as the absolute reality is concerned, the Vedāntic sub-schools range from absolute monism (Śaṅkara’s Advaita) to qualified monism (Rāmānuja), and even dualism (Madhva, Pūrṇa-prajña system). Between these, there lie divergences of opinion in relation to the origin and nature of the world, which is either the product of a form of transformation (Bhedābheda) or just the manifestation of Brahma (Bhāmatī and Vivaraṇa

Advaita).40 Śaivism – with its enormous rise and varied traditions (Nakulīśa-Pāśupata, Śaiva System, Pratyabhijñā, Raseśvara System)41 – represents, broadly speaking, an attempt to accomplishing an harmonious synthesis between transcendent and immanent explanations of reality, a fact that brought many of the classical darśanas under its spell and devotional allegiance. With several exceptions, the vast majority of these classical and early medieval systems deal with the soteriological

38 Though contemporary, Mādhava-Vidyāraṇya (c. 1296?–1386?) should not be confused with Madhva of Dvaita Vedānta (1238–1317), the former is a monist Vedāntin, whereas the latter a dualist.

39 Each of the following systems is discussed in a separate chapter in the following order: Cārvāka, Bauddha System, Jaina, Rāmānuja System, Pūrṇa-prajña, Nakulīśa-Pāśupata, Śaiva System, Pratyabhijñā, Raseśvara System, Vaiśeṣika, Nyāya, Jaiminīya System, Pāṇinīya System, Sāṃkhya, Patañjali or Yoga System, and Vedānta of Śaṅkara. Other classifications of classical Indian philosophies can be found in doxographical works: 32 systems in Dvātriṃśikā of Siddhasena Divākara (5th–7th centuries AD), 12 systems in Sarvasiddhāntasaṃgraha (authorship debated), and 10 systems in Sarvamatasaṃgraha (authorship unknown); Thakur 2003: 427–35.

40 For a table of conceptual variations of Indian philosophies, see Potter’s Presuppositions of India’s Philosophes, 1963.

41 For a classification of Śaiva traditions see Sanderson, History through Textual Criticism in the study of Śaivism, the Pañcarātra and the Buddhist Yoginītantras, 2001. Although the work is focused on method, it nevertheless contains a wealth of information about important Śaiva authors.

12 * Introduction to Indian philosophy and Vaiśeṣika* questions that have finality in an ontological irreversible state; in fact, the ontology somehow moves from a differentiated condition of becoming to a static state of being. In short, Indian philosophies begin, change, and challenge the scope of ontology. While the history of Western thought had shifted from the essentialist and naturalist ontology of the Pre-Socratics to the phenomenology and existentialism of the 20th century, in Indian philosophy, however, there has been a different type of development, a tendency towards a continual sharpening of the Upaniṣadic view on the nature of the world and the ultimate reality. Quite often, as the Śaivist tradition typifies, its description is the synthesis and interplay between an immanent and transcendent nature of being and ontology.

1.1 Vaiśeṣika

What is the originality of Vaiśeṣika within the broader picture of classical Indian thought? What are its main ontological categories and what purpose do these serve to? In a preface to one important voluminous work on the system, Anantalal Thakur places Vaiśeṣika alongside Pāṇini’s grammar, as one of the fundamental aids for the study of all Indian systems of knowledge. 42 The significance of this statement stems from the fact that any knowledge system lies on both a precise

‘language’ and the ontological reality of ‘object.’ In other words, without an interdependence between a science of language (pada) and a science of word-object (padārtha), there is no possibility for the knowledge of any real objects. Indeed, as Praśastapāda points out in his Bhāṣya, the objective ‘existentiality’ (astitva) and

‘nameability’ (abhidheyatva)43 of the world’s constituents (categories) go hand in hand with their own ‘knowability’ (jñeyatva), all 3 representing core domains of knowledge: ontology, epistemology, and language. Can any word exist without a reference to object? Is there any hierarchy among the 3 major philosophical domains: ontology, language, and knowledge? If Aristotle knew Vaiśeṣika, his view would probably be that this Indian ontological system is of a more fundamental value, and, in a way, a most necessary one. As he put it in his Categories (7b15), the ‘knowable’ must be prior to the ‘knowledge’ itself, and as a rule, it is unlikely that a ‘knowable thing’ and the ‘process of knowledge’ are simultaneous, for otherwise, when ‘knowledge’ disappears that would lead to the destruction of the ‘knowable thing’ itself as well; but this is not so. 44 The point Aristotle makes

42 Thakur 2003: xxv (preface to HSPCIC).

43 Praśastapāda PD, 11: ṣaṇṇām api padārthānām astitvābhidheyatvajñeyatvāni; Halbfass 1992: 75–6, 154.

44 Arist Cat 7b15: τὸ γὰρ ἐπιστητὸν τῆς ἐπιστήμης πρότερον ἂν δόξειεν εἶναι· ὡς γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ

προϋπαρχόντων τῶν πραγμάτων τὰς ἐπιστήμας λαμβάνομεν· ἐπ᾿ ὀλίγων γὰρ ἢ ἐπ᾿ οὐδενὸς ἴδοι

τις ἂν ἅμα τῷ ἐπιστητῷ τὴν ἐπιστήμην γιγνομένην. Ἔτι τὸ μὲν ἐπιστητὸν ἀναιρεθὲν συναναιρεῖ

τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ἡ δὲ ἐπιστήμη τὸ ἐπιστητὸν οὐ συναναιρεῖ· ἐπιστητοῦ γὰρ μὴ ὄντος οὐκ ἔστιν

ἐπιστήμη, – οὐδενὸς γὰρ ἔτι ἔσται ἐπιστήμη – ἐπιστήμης δὲ μὴ οὔσης οὐδὲν κωλύει ἐπιστητὸν

εἶναι· οἷον καὶ ὁ τοῦ κύκλου τετραγωνισμὸς εἴ γε ἔστιν ἐπιστητόν, ἐπιστήμη μὲν αὐτοῦ οὐκ ἔστιν

οὐδέπω, αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ ἐπιστητὸν ἔστιν.

Introduction to Indian philosophy and Vaiśeṣika * 13

is that the knowable thing endures even after knowledge is no longer there, and that an object is prior to language, whence the priority and paramount importance of the ‘knowable thing’ that Aristotle defines in 10 forms of predication.45 The

difference between the 6 categories of Vaiśeṣika46 and Aristotle’s 10 categories is that the former do not represent ‘forms of predication’ whose existence depends on language and predication, but rather exist independently from language, being real objects, having as they should, well-established ontological states interconnected and immanently derived from each other.47 Besides states, the substances in Vaiśeṣika can undergo conditions; such as, for instance, soul (ātman), whose nature can have ‘essential characteristics’48 in its ontological state, and ‘accidental characteristics’49 in its embodied condition. The particularity of Vaiśeṣika is a recurrent analysis of entities (substances) that have a fixed order and value, a focus on the knowledge of their intrinsic nature, and a description of the trans-mutation of their conditions that harness impurity and corruption to their nature.

It is a system focused on entities (nouns) rather than actions (verbs). The construction of Pāṇini’s grammar seems to follow the same pattern of thought; both Vaiśeṣika and Pāṇini depart from the early etymologist and linguist Yāska, whose work Nirukta defines ‘verb’ (ākhyāta) as ‘consisting mainly of becoming’

(bhāvapradhānam ākhyātām) (Durga com. Nirukta 1.1.9). By that, Yāska places a heavy stress on the importance of action and verb, which he sees as a ‘continuous series of momentary becoming of bhava,’ whereas noun represents the ‘stagnation or solidification of the verb.’50 The universe of Vaiśeṣika stands in sharp contrast to Yāska’s view and his early re-interpretations. Vaiśeṣika is a substantialist philosophy at heart, a fact demonstrated by its Sūtrapāṭha, which lists 3 basic categories: substances (dravya), qualities (guṇa), and motions (karma), of which the first category represents the rock-bottom foundation on which other categories

45 The 10 categories are in fact ‘modes of predication’ that point to the reality of things beyond language. It is an attempt to provide a theory of individuation about the existence of a substance. The categories are enunciated by Aristotle in Cat 4.1.b.25: (1) substance; (2) quantity; (3) qualification; (4) relation; (5) location; (6) time; (7) position; (8) possession; (9) acting; and (10) being-affected (Τῶν κατὰ μηδεμίαν συμπλοκὴν λεγομένων ἕκαστον ἤτοι (1) οὐσίαν σημαίνει ἢ (2) ποσὸν ἢ (3) ποιὸν ἢ (4) πρός τι ἢ (5) ποὺ ἢ (6) ποτὲ ἢ (7) κεῖσθαι ἢ (8) ἔχειν ἢ (9) ποιεῖν ἢ (10) πάσχειν).

46 The standard numbers of Vaiśeṣika categories are: (1) substance (9 in total); (2) quality (17 initially); (3) motion (5); (4) universal (2); (5) particular (2); and (6) inherence (between substance and quality). Later Vaiśeṣika work Śivāditya’s Saptapadārthī adds ‘abhāva’ as the seventh padārtha (SP 3).

47 One such example is the derivation of the category of ‘distinctness’ (viśeṣa) from the older category of quality of ‘separateness’ (pṛthaktva).

48 The essential characteristics of the soul – known as generic qualities sāmānyaguṇa – are number, dimension, separateness, conjunction, and disjunction (VSc 3.2.17).

49 The specific qualities of the soul are cognition, pleasure, pain, volition, aversion, effort, merit, demerit, and latent impetus (VSc 3.2.17). They constitute the psychological apparatus, a sort of subtle body – equivalent to what Praśastapāda calls ‘ativāhikaśarīra’ (PD 359) – that undergoes transmigration.

50 Singh 1987: 191.

14 * Introduction to Indian philosophy and Vaiśeṣika* (quality, action, universality, particularity, and inherence) reside. Among these, the substance-category is the most important of all.

Substance is one of the most controversial topics in philosophy and demands much elucidation not only in the Western thought but also in Indian philosophy as well. Problems of translation abound for at least 2 reasons. First, because our modern vocabulary is of the second order: terms like ‘essence’ (via Cicero) and

‘existence’ (via Marius Victorinus) are Latin adaptations and interpretations from Greek ‘ousia’ (οὐσία) and hyparxis (ὑπάρξεις), respectively.51 A second reason is the very problem of clarifying what substance means in both Greek and Scholastic philosophical contexts, the semantic shifts it has undergone throughout history, beginning with Aristotle’s first interpretations of Plato’s theory of forms, then under Islamic Neo-Platonist translations and re-interpretations, as well as during the debate on real distinction (essence versus existence) within the Thomist scholasticism. 52 It is, therefore, imperative that a new methodology of analysing the theory of substance should be sought with input from a comparative philosophical reflection that engages Indian (Sanskrit) ideas and literature. Philosophy is global, contextual, and cross-cultural. With Dilthey and Halbfass, the method of comparative philosophy argues that Indian philosophy can indeed live in the medium of Western thought and that, as a result, can challenge and change our old assumptions on the elusive topic of being, essence, and substance. 53

As mentioned, one of the chief characteristics of Vaiśeṣika philosophy is the reference and preference for individuality and individuation for the description of substance. It is an aspect by which the system contributes to some unanswered questions in Western philosophy. Thus, if we look again over Aristotle’s Categories, particularly the first chapters, we find several important directions, which may act as starting points to understand Vaiśeṣika in a comparative programme.

1) Aristotle distinguishes a 2-fold nature of substance: on the one hand, a ‘primary substance’ that is its individual nature (e.g. one individual man), and on the other hand, a ‘secondary substance,’ which is its specific genera (e.g. man) (Cat 2a11). He goes as far as to say that the individuality of a substance (the primary substance) is ‘more of a substance than genera’ (Cat 2 b7), a view that agrees with Vaiśeṣika’s view, according to which, an ultimate particularity defines the essence or nature of a ‘substance’ (dravya). A comparable classification is how Vaiśeṣika system differentiates between ‘permanent’ (nitya) and ‘impermanent’ (anitya) substances; given the character of substances as being wholes and compositional, as well as simple and universal, the usual translation of nitya by ‘eternal’ is unsatisfactory. The classification of the system in relation

51 Chapter 1 ‘The Question of Being’ in Halbfass 1922: 1–20.

52 See previous reference to Cunningham, 1988.

53 Halbfass 1992: 12, f. 43.

Introduction to Indian philosophy and Vaiśeṣika * 15

to its 9 substances,54 is not according to their intrinsic state, but rather to their condition. What ‘nitya’ presumably means is the state of being

‘indivisible,’ ‘indestructible,’ and a ‘simple whole’ (unitary oneness).

The classification is problematic because all 9 substances are placed in the category of ‘permanent’ substances, when these are in a unitary state (time, space, vacuum, and to a certain extent, soul) or an atomic state (mind, earth, water, lustre, wind). In the second category of impermanent substances, Vaiśeṣika places some of the substances in ‘impermanent’

(anitya) (earth, water, lustre, wind), which can alternatively refer to the condition of being ‘divisible’ and ‘destructible.’ It is a category marked by the laws of motion, which is karma theory. The problem of this classification increases as regards the condition of the soul in this diagram. Is soul, that is to say (ātman), permanent or impermanent? Candrānanda’s commentary – which this edition puts forward – does not always specify when soul (ātman) refers to an embodied soul or when it refers to a pure eternal and essential dis-embodied soul. Its intrinsic nature is devoid of motion and activity (VSc 5.2.23), therefore, the question reoccurs as to how it is

possible to acquire embodiment and transmigration.55

2) A second important complementarity between Aristotle’s Categories and Vaiśeṣikasūtra’s is the valorisation of the individual ahead of the universal. Although Aristotle did not put differentiae (διαφοραί) into the list of his categories (as Vaiśeṣika, and later on Dvaita Vedānta does), he consistently maintains that a substance is primarily an individual, and not a genera (Cat 2b20), although he seems to contradict himself later in Cat 15a4–7, where he states that genera are always before species.56 Aristotle aims to safeguard the reality of individual nouns and subjects, for all knowledge and predication seems to point to these. As he puts it, ‘the primary substances stand to everything else…and all the rest are predicated of these’ (Cat 2b29). 57 Aristotle provides an epistemic or scientific method that runs from the individual to the universal and not vice-versa. Genera do not have value if they are not grounded on individuality first, which explains why he is in favour of the reality of the nouns and subjects ahead of the reality of verbs, actions, and processes. The stress Vaiśeṣika places here reminds of one of Śākaṭāyana and

54 VS: 1.1.4. pṛthivī āpas tejo vāyur ākāśaṃ kālo dig ātmā mana iti dravyāṇi (earth, water, lustre, air, vacuum, time, space, soul, mind – these are the substances).

55 Transmigration of humans happens according to Candrānanda in relation to everything that has

‘body’ (śarīra) (VSc 4.2), in which sense the term of ‘transmigration’ (saṃsāra) is used (VSc 5.2.19).

56 Cat 15a4–7: τὰ δὲ γένη τῶν εἰδῶν ἀεὶ πρότερα· οὐ γὰρ ἀντιστρέφει κατὰ τὴν τοῦ εἶναι ἀκολούθ

ησιν· οἷον ἐνύδρου μὲν ὄντος ἔστι ζῷον, ζῴου δὲ ὄντος οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἔνυδρον εἶναι. The example Aristotle gives here is that of the fish; if there is a fish, then we can indicate by that there is an animal, but we cannot say that if there is an animal, we can necessarily indicate a fish.

57 This is a shortened translation of a passage from J.L. Ackrill ed. Aristotle Categories, 2002: 8, with reference to Cat 2b29.

16 * Introduction to Indian philosophy and Vaiśeṣika* Yāska’s linguistic speculations, which shifted the lexicographic and semantic Vedic focus from nouns to verbs. The affinity of Vaiśeṣika with Aristotle lies primarily in the area of ontology and the theory of perception.58 Aristotle believes that if the primary substances did not exist initially, it would be then impossible for any of the other things to exist (Cat 2a34; 2b7). Aristotle like Vaiśeṣika, begins the inquiry of substances as the fundamental ingredients of the world; he employs a realistic method akin to that of a botanist,59 who collects the ingredients of the world, names and defines them so as to present a differentiated picture of reality (made of substance) in its both intrinsic and extrinsic totality.

3) The view of generality is one other important aspect in which Vaiśeṣika completes the missing dots within the dualistic cosmological framework of both Plato’s theory of forms and Aristotelian predication between ‘primary substances’ (what ‘is’ in something) versus secondary substance (what is said ‘of’ something). When Aristotle talks about combination and combined things (Cat 1a16), he points not to the universal interweaving of all things of the world – but, relatively faithful to the dualistic Platonic tradition – speaks about the combination between noun and verb, object and predication. 60

Philoponus – one Aristotelian commentator of Late Antiquity – endorses this dualistic definition of being as either substance or accident with no inter-mediaries between them. 61 Indeed, as Ackrill justly noted more recently, in Cat 1b10, Aristotle does not seem to make a tripartite distinction between

‘individual,’ ‘species,’ and ‘genus.’ When Aristotle, for instance, uses the conjunction ‘or’ (ἤτοι) in Cat 2b29, 62 while referring to the species or genera, he does not necessarily talk about 2 universals, lower (species) and higher (genera), respectively, but rather about one and the same.

Quite to the contrary, however, Vaiśeṣika differentiates between an ‘ultimate individuality’ (antyaviśeṣa) inherently bound in the ‘universal’ (sāmānya) and the medium of a real ontological linking knot called ‘lower or specific universality’ (sāmānyaviśeṣa), which may stand for the category of ‘species.’

58 The theory of perception in Vaiśeṣika is the combination of a ‘contact’ (sannikarṣa) of 4 main ontic entities: self, mind, senses, and objects. The combination is thus between not only noun and verb but implies other entities and qualities such as buddhi, a quality that is common to both mind and soul.

59 Botany, an alleged profession of both Aristotle and Kaṇāda (the legendary founder of Vaiśeṣika).

60 See Notes by Ackrill 2002: 73; see further Aristotle, De Int. 16a9–18; 17a17–20; Plato’s Sophist 262.

61 Philoponus, On Aristotle Categories 66. 11–12 (trans. Sirkel, R., Tweedale, M., Harris, J. ed.

2015). See Mateiescu 2018: 5, where the author traces the concept of differentiae in the context of the debate between ‘substantial quality’ and ‘part of substance’ in early Byzantine philosophy.

62 Cat 2b29. εἰ γὰρ κατὰ μηδενὸς τῶν τινῶν ἀνθρώπων, οὐδὲ κατὰ ἀνθρώπου ὅλως· – πάλιν τὸ

χρῶμα ἐν σώματι, οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐν τινὶ σώματι· εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἐν τινὶ τῶν καθ᾿ ἕκαστα, οὐδὲ ἐν σώματι

ὅλως· ὥστε τὰ ἄλλα πάντα ἤτοι καθ᾿ ὑποκειμένων τῶν πρώτων οὐσιῶν λέγεται ἢ ἐν ὑποκειμέναις

αὐταῖς ἐστίν.

Introduction to Indian philosophy and Vaiśeṣika * 17

Reality – and the problem of ‘being’ – stands in Vaiśeṣika on 3 sub-levels of reality, which constitute a graded system of supervenience. 63 Substance can have 3 ontological conditions: general universal (sāmānya), specific universal (sāmānyaviśeṣa), and ultimate particularity (antyaviśeṣa), all of which possess an ontological reality. Halbfass claims that Vaiśeṣika exemplifies a horizontal form of descriptive metaphysics – perhaps an observation adduced in comparison with what Analytic philosophy calls to be a system of ‘supervenience.’ In fact, what we notice is a vertical system of conditions that substance stands on, and where the connection between the 3 levels of supervenience follows the laws of ‘entailment.’ Vaiśeṣika enacts this entailment better in its ‘ontological’ epistemology, namely, the theory of perception where the inferential induction is that by which an observer (a yogi) can grasp the particularity in universality, both simultaneously, and successively. 64 ‘Time’ and

‘space,’ ‘soul,’ and ‘vacuum’ – all of which are highly abstract substances –

are entities that can be intuited in both their successive conditions of particularity and plurality (unit), as well as in their universal, all-pervasive, infinitely extensive, infinite plurality (oneness). The substance soul, for example, has a differentiated and numerical-pluralised nature in both a ‘pre-existential’ state (before birth embodiment) and an ‘existential’ condition (after the body’s disintegration), and that is indicated by the difference that exists between the 2 sets of qualities it possesses: generic qualities (pre-existential) and specific qualities (existential), the latter being evanescent. When the soul is embodied, it acquires specific qualities, a kind of subtle body (which is the vehicle of karmic bondage and transmigration) – one condition that grants soul a concrete ‘plurality’. When, however, soul possesses only generic qualities in its pre-existent state, then soul is essentially ‘differentiated.’ The shift of ātman from its essential state and to ātman of its existential condition, does not change the nature of its plurality, but rather impregnates it with a specific concrete form. Plurality and identity of a substance that perdures through change and time do not disappear, but rather re-asserts. Individuation means to identify the addition of a new singularity added to the essential characteristic of substance. The generic qualities of ‘number’ (saṃkhyā) and ‘separateness’ (pṛthaktva) that characterise soul in its pre-existential ontological state should not be confused with the condition of the plurality of the souls that are both diverse and plural as Sūtrapāṭha 3.2.16 states. 65 The difference between

63 If we add sattā, which is the highest form of generality, then Vaiśeṣika could point out a 4-level reality, sattā being the beyond-differentiation level of a substance, or perhaps the totality of the reality; it defines any real ontic being.

64 See VSc 9.27, ārṣajñāna is a form of ‘intuition’ (prātibhā) that comprehends things beyond temporal and spatial conditions.

65 VS: 3.2.16 nānā vyavasthātaḥ/VSc: anyasya sukhādiyoge’nyasya tad abhāvād anayā vyavasthayā

nānā ātmānaḥ (trans. VS 3.2.16: because [soul] is plural, [therefore] is diverse/VSc: because one

[individual] is connected with pleasure, and so on, another [individual] is not connected [with pleasure], indicates that souls are diverse and plural).

18 * Introduction to Indian philosophy and Vaiśeṣika* the 2 states and conditions is like that between ontology and existentiality, whence philosophical-religious existentialism (mokṣa) as well as metaphysics (ontology) derive, diverge, and depend. The concept of ‘soteriontology’

coined by Halbfass is indicative in this respect.66

4) The category of viśeṣa and/or antyaviśeṣa represents one of the major Vaiśeṣika contributions to the problem of individuation in both Indian and Western metaphysics. 67 The system derives its name from the term ‘difference’ (viśeṣa), which is indeed the most peculiar aspect and where its originality lies. It seems that Western philosophy has not yet answer satisfactorily the problem of either differentiae,68 or individuals, even though the history of scholastic philosophy from John Philoponus to Duns Scotus and Gilles Deleuze had continued to offer emendations and clarifications to Aristotle’s fuzzy views on the differentiated nature of the substance. 69 His theory of individuation (predication) has several shortcomings, precisely because it begins from linguistic premises, rather than ontological ones. Of course, all these 10 forms of predication (categories) aim to define the reality of ‘things,’ the knowable objects that exist prior to the reality of knowledge and language itself. However, Aristotle’s predicative theory of individuation does not go as far as to differentiate the particularity in a species itself, because for him

‘species’ and ‘genus’ of a substance seem to be the same. If he did so, he should have been able to differentiate it, or at least mention it in relation to the puzzling question regarding the status of individual instances of colour in a universal colour (e.g. redness).70 However, he did not. In so doing, he could have averted the problem of universals, deemed by Nominalists as a

66 Halbfass 1992: 234.

67 Halbfass has pointed out that antyaviśeṣa is neither a number nor a ‘principium individuationis’; but what is it? A ‘reference’ that identifies the nature of a substance as ultimately distinct? Or is it a real entity that exists in the nature of the substance itself? Such questions and possible new answers may come from Dvaita Vedānta philosophy where viśeṣa has been defined not as an independent entity (for that would have compromised the dualism of this school), and neither as a relation nor even as a new quality, Sharma 1962: 50.

68 Regis (1976: 157), for instance, argues that there is no principle of individuation in Aristotle, who talked about the matte in a very elliptical or implicit manner; for Regis, an entity is an individual par excellence and it is not necessary to put forward a principle of individuation, nor to see one given by Aristotle.

69 Ackrill (2002: 77) suggests that Aristotle’s last sentence of Cat 1b15 (animal should be predicated of the individual man also for the individual man is both a man and an animal) should be emended because The Philosopher refers only to ‘differentiae divisivae’ (and not to differentiae constitutivae as well). Yet, I believe that Aristotle has a slip of the tongue intuition, for he distinguishes between 3 ontological levels, but he did not elaborate further, for he did not wish to contradict the dualistic theory of predication.

70 See Notes in Ackrill 2002). Duns Scotus made one step to clarification when he argues on the perceptivity of accidentals: we do not comprehend the individuating difference ‘per se,’ but rather the accidental features that define the essences of objects, which we perceive, see Duns Scotus Lectura 142–3, Early Oxford Lecture on Individuation ed. Wolter, Allan B., 2005.

Introduction to Indian philosophy and Vaiśeṣika * 19

fallacy. However, Aristotle wishes only to clarify and avert the confusion between synonyms, homonyms, and paronyms, but more importantly, aims

to safeguard the reality of forms and nouns and their ultimate meaning that lies in the individual instances of linguistic expression. 71 The urgency of this task was to surmount the slippery confusions that the Sophists brought into Greek philosophical thought, and he eventually aimed to counter their highly popular, and to a certain extent, dangerous, influence that went too far. 72

Vaiśeṣika solves the problem of individuation in several ways: (1) by propounding the existence of an ‘ultimate particularity’ (antyaviśeṣa); (2) it grants the ‘lower universal’ an ontological reality comparable to that of species; and (3) ascribes a quality of dharma (dharmaviśeṣa) to any particular object. The latter cognitive faculty (dharmaviśeṣa) encroaches a sort of informative data upon our senses, and upon the soul, which is the ultimate receptacle of knowledge (not the mind). This type of impingement leads to a form of inferential induction, a form of intuition about the essence and the reality of the very ultimate thing-object, which is not evanescent (like in Yogācāra), but real and inter-woven, 73 forming as it were,

first a species and second a genera. Yoga is an intellectual practice – though not directly a soteriological one – for it comprises a yogic perception (yogipratyakṣa) that grasps the reality of dharmaviśeṣa, and through it, an ‘ultimate particularity’ (antyaviśeṣa). What constitutes liberation (mokṣa, niḥśreyasa) in Vaiśeṣika is not the achievement of these cognitive stages of ultimate substances and their essences, but rather their transcending and renunciation. Knowledge and cognition are only fleeing accidental qualities ultimately discarded. Pleasure, bliss, and knowledge are no longer part of the ontological liberated state; the only beauty that remains is the beauty of the infinite difference and the plurality of the 9 fundamental substances. 74

71 Synonyms may correspond to particularities, homonyms may correspond to genus, whereas paronyms may correspond to species; the problems unsolved by Aristotle’s theory of predication are mostly related to the dubious nature of paronyms.

72 The first Sophistic movement cost Socrates’ his own life, for among the accusations, there was the allegation of being a Sophist (Plato’s Apology 18a–20c).

73 About the real yet non-existential character of ‘ultimate particularity,’ see Bhaṭṭa Vādīndra VSv (long version) 1985: 70, who speaks of an inter-dependent reality of the antyaviśeṣa, which do not have their own nature, but they stand on the nature of the substratum which is the universal; their reality is inferred and connected with the general nature of generality. The theoretical reality of antyaviśeṣa derives from several concepts: ‘inclusion’ (aṅgikāra), ‘concomitance’ (vyāptihānyā), and with another ‘real thing’ through a relation of ‘dependency’ (prāsaṅga), all these concepts demonstrate the grip, which by the 13th century AD, logic had on Vaiśeṣika, until its total assimilation by Nyāya. This is what in modern philosophy of physics is considered ‘structural realism’ where bottom-rock reality is relational. See Brigitte Falkenburg, Particle Metaphysics. A Critical Account of Subatomic Reality, 2007.

74 What is substance for Vaiśeṣika? It is a question to which arguably the system’s answer is that, as its nature or ultimate essence indicates, substance is differential and relational. This, however, should not be seen in an essentialism characterised by simplicity, but quite the opposite, a complexity that is indeterminately expanded horizontally, without mingling and confusion.

20 * Introduction to Indian philosophy and Vaiśeṣika* The Commentary: Candrānanda’s Vṛtti

There is a large consensus among scholars that Candrānanda’s Vṛtti (VSc for gloss; VS for Sūtrapāṭha) is the oldest extant Vaiśeṣika commentary, and, as Isaacson states, the Sūtrapāṭha (VS) it contains is ‘quite probably the earliest one now available.’75 Though an older Sūtrapāṭha could still be reconstructed from an

‘independent transmission of Vaiśeṣikasūtras,’76 this edition argues that before new major MSS are uncovered, and before any critical edition on VS becomes available, it is necessary to put forward an English translation with Roman transliteration. As far as Vaiśeṣika philosophy and its literature is concerned, and judging the previous editions and several manuscripts we have on this system, these aphorisms Vaiśeṣikasūtra – which Candrānanda commentary preserves – give us with a better and older version of its core tenets. We do not have sufficient reasons to doubt the reasonable reliability of sūtras as preserved by Candrānanda’s commentary. When I traced Wezler’s ‘independent transmission of Sūtrapāṭha,’

and after looking at more than half of the MSS catalogues, but more specifically at 5 new MSS that I have personally seen and photographed at Wai, Mysore, Bombay, and Madras, I likewise came to concur with Thakur, that the MSS we have on Sūtrapāṭha largely give us the Mithilā version (Śaṅkaramiśra‘s Upaskāra).

After Vaiśeṣika’s amalgamation with Nyāya (11th century AD), it seems that, with the exception of Bhaṭṭa Vādīndra’s Vyākhyā (‘short’ and ‘long versions’) and Śaṅkaramiśra’s Upaskāra, the Vaiśeṣika system has been transmitted in MSS

collected in the Nyāya and Jaina sections of manuscript catalogues. For instance, this is the case of MSS from Baroda and Ujjain, both of which are combined manuscripts (Sammelhandschrift).

This second introductory section is addressed principally to scholars of Indology familiar with Sanskrit textual criticism and philology, and aims to offer an overview on the state of the Baroda 1961 edition, but more importantly, to pave the way and facilitate future scholars with a much expected critical edition on Vaiśeṣikasūtra by collating all MSS that I have located and identified in Appendix

During my epic tour and fieldwork to South India (2015-2016), I had the fortune to access several manuscript collections, with the aim to complement the work of my predecessors: Kaviraj, Thakur, and Isaacson’s philological criticism on both VSc and Sūtrapāṭha. To those students not yet familiarised with Sanskrit, this section also offers a thematic synopsis of the commentary itself. A comparable synopsis had already been given by Thakur (2003) but is rather an eclectic summary, for it presents the topics of Sūtrapāṭha and the system itself based on glosses extracted from other Vaiśeṣika commentaries, and sadly overlooks key portions of Candrānanda’s commentaries on topics that are important, such as mokṣa (e.g. VSc 10.21). The synopsis I offer here focuses on Candrānanda’s

75 Isaacson, PhD, 1995, p. 140.

76 This project that Wezler propounds aims to trace an even earlier Sūtrapāṭha than that offered by VSc.

Introduction to Indian philosophy and Vaiśeṣika * 21

interpretation exclusively. As for Sūtrapāṭha, which will be briefly discussed in the second part of this chapter, I have brought into the discussion parallel passages that confirm that Candrānanda’s version of Vaiśeṣika aphorisms is as old as the 2nd century AD.

Candrānanda’s’ commentary – whose editio princeps has been published at Baroda in 1961 by the eminent Jaina savant monk Muni Jambūvijayaji – is the oldest Vaiśeṣika commentary available at present,77 and its publication represents a landmark in Vaiśeṣika studies. Its importance has already been highlighted numerous times by both Indian scholars (e.g. Thakur, Jambūvijayaji) and Western ones (e.g. Wezler, Isaacson, and Halbfass).78 Though republished in 1982, the edition of 1961 should be used first as it does not contain the misprints of the second edition (1982). 79 The 1961 edition provides a more reliable basic mūla-text, so much so that since its publication, it replaced scholars’ reliance on a later and vastly popular Vaiśeṣika commentary: Śaṅkaramiśra’s Upaskāra (VSs). The latter is an inflated version of the Sūtrapāṭha as well as a late (Navya-Nyāya) interpretation on Sūtrapāṭha. 80 Yet, the reception of Candrānanda’s commentary among Vaiśeṣika students is still poor, partly because a fully annotated translation has not yet been available in English. 81 To my own surprise, there are still scholars in today’s India who either are not familiar with the Candrānanda commentary or are simply not aware of the early composition of it, a fact partly due to the assumption that the ‘earliest text’ is not of much relevance to a living tradition such as Brahmanism. This only proves how familiar and close to heart the old philosophical reflection is to modern Indian scholarship.

77 The edition of Baroda Oriental Institute, 1961 (Gaekwad’s Oriental Series no 136) is the printed edition I only use.

78 I refer primarily to Isaacson’s ground-breaking textual critical work, his PhD thesis, ‘Materials for the study of Vaiśeṣika system,’ 1995, while Ferenc Ruzsa has provided a transliteration for the whole Vṛtti with multiple notes providing MSS variations (his webpage is on academia .e du).

79 I have had this edition in my own hand, at Wai, but here I rely on Isaacson’s expertise, 1995, p. 355.

80 I am grateful to Alexis Sanderson who – during my DPhil transfer examination – drew attention to this important matter; at the time, October 2013, I had little training in textual criticism and Sanskrit philosophy. This aspect is indeed important, for even today there are still scholars who keep on referring to Upaskāra as the main primary sources for Vaiśeṣika (e.g. Gajendragadkar, 1988).

We thus recommend that – for a genuine study of the system – Candrānanda and Bhaṭṭa Vādīndra commentaries on Vaiśeṣikasūtra must be consulted and referred first.

81 One interesting exception is the Italian translation of Arena, 1982 (VSa); but he only translates the sūtras; while for Candrānanda’s commentary, he provides his own summary and commentary.

22 * Introduction to Indian philosophy and Vaiśeṣika*

1.2 MSS on VSc82

When Jambūvijayaji published the edition of 1961, he used only 2 MSS. 83 He probably did not know that each of those 2 MSS had a further copy – preserved in Pune (the MSS library of Bhandarkar Institute) and another MS that has a copy preserved at Ujjain. Thus, there are 5 extant MSS on VSc, classified into 2 groups: those of a Jaina Devanagari Script and those of Śāradā script. Here, I only wish to list the MSS that have been used and already described by Jambūvijayaji (J , Ś

marked in the edition with ‘P’ and ‘O’ ), and the additional 3 MSS (J , Ś , Ś ) that 2

have been laudably collated and compared by Isaacson and Ruzsa.84 Table 1.1

gives a detailed and up to date description of all MSS on Candrānanda’s commentary. For a full description, readers are encouraged to consult not only Thakur’s introduction to Baroda edition 1961 but various descriptions extant in MSS catalogues (see Illustration 3 in the Appendix), as well as the technical doctorate research of Harunaga Isaacson (1995, pp. 145–7). Though still improvable, the edition of Baroda 1961 is reliable and, as Isaacson puts it, ‘a most impressive

achievement, an example of scholarship of a rare order.’85

The point of this introduction is to trigger students’ interest in putting together a critical edition of Vaiśeṣikasūtra. It is only then can we state with certainty about the system’s own tenets on various doctrines and concepts and the place of these into the broader picture of world philosophy. One example of a widely misunder-stood doctrine – due mostly to the poor preservation of Sūtrapāṭha – is the nature of soteriology, which, for example, Frauwallner negated because the system is a pure

82 The Jain savant Muni Jambūvijayaji took an interest in Vaiśeṣika while he was working on Nayacakra of Mallavādin. He saw in the text he was revising that there were many Vaiśeṣika sūtras, which could not be found in the then extant Sūtrapāṭha of Śaṅkaramiśra (15th century AD).

Intrigued by the sūtras present in the Nayacakra, Jambūvijayaji decided to trace their origin. From Jaisalmer, he received an MS from the collection of Muni Puṇyavijayajī, which proved of great value due to the many different sūtras it contained. Jambūvijayaji thus became the scholar responsible for the editio princeps of the oldest Vaiśeṣika commentary, and his edition was improved by Isaacson and Ruzsa collated and compared 3 additional MSS of various scripts, as follows: MS no 1831h (Śārāda script) from Baroda Oriental Institute, which in the footnotes of 1961 Baroda edition is designated with the siglum ‘O.’ A similar MS at Baroda Oriental Institute bears the number 403 and is from about 1875–6. It is also in Śārāda script and has 33 folia (size 26.5 + 17 cm). A final MS of the Scindia Oriental Institute, Ujjain, no. 4635, contains first the Tarkasaṁgraha text and the commentary (Tarkadīpikā), followed by the Sūtrapāṭha beginning on folio 22r15 and ending on folio 35r.106.

83 Thakur Introduction to VSc 1961.

84 Puṇyavijayajī edited VSc in 1982, but as Isaacson warned, the text ‘has been reset’ due to ‘a sprinkling of new misprints added,’ p. 144, f14. Isaacson (PhD) provides only a portion of a proposed Devanāgarī critical edition (without translation) of VSc (1.1 to 2.1 including). His represents a good beginning of what the whole of the edition might look like, while the Hungarian Indologist Ferenc Ruzsa carried on the same task for the whole of VSc (in roman transliteration). Since my work is not textual critical or philological, nor am I fully equipped to compete with their technical competence, I shall henceforth refer to their philological reading of the MSS.

85 Isaacson, 1995, p. 140.

Introduction to Indian philosophy and Vaiśeṣika * 23

within

again

sūtras

ṛtti follows

the

contains

part

Tarkadīpikā gloss, V contained within f22r15–f35r)

second

the

Ś 3

No alternative symbol

‘Sammelhandschrift’ (after Tarkasaṃgraha with

Śāradā script 35 folios

Ujjain (SOI) No. 4635

(Date: Tuesday 11 September 1888)

whereas ṛti Manuscripts, Ahmedabad, 1963, pp. 18–24.

PS,

with

symbol

× 17

only)

Ś 2

No alternative

Single Śāradā script

33 folios Size: 26.5

Pune (BORI)

No. 403 (of 1875–6) Undated

MS;

Sūtrapāṭha

(contains ṛtti, see Catalogue of Sanskrit and Prak

ṛtti is contained

MSS

within f6r–f41v

, Ś

our V

Thakur)

, Ś

part

Ś 1

(‘O’)

‘Sammelhandschrift’

Śāradā script 41 folios

Baroda (OI)

No. 1831h (year: ‘not very old’

Undated

When all Śāradā MSS agree between them

Note: Ruzsa’s shortenings Śāradā MSS ac, pc, Ś 1

first

the

ṛtti (VSc)

J 2

VSc

marks

1961,

× 31.5

J 2(copy of J1)

J 2

VS Jaina Devanāgarī script

20 folios Size: 18.5

Pune (BORI)

No. 99 (of 1873–4)

edition

and J

J 1

VSc

between them

his in

J 1 ‘P’

Jac VSc

MSS on Candrānanda’s V

s refer to separate Sūtrapāṭha portions 2

× 8.3

When all Jaina Devanāgarī MSS agree

script

uncatalogued yet.

s and J

commentary, with ‘P’. For a description of Vaiśeṣika MSS of the V

Table 1.1

J 1

J 1 ‘PS’

Js VS Jaina Devanāgarī

34 folios Size: 23.0 Ahmedabad (L.D. Institute)

Most probably

13th–14th century: Jambūvijayaji

Jaina Devanāgarī MSS

J 1

Isaacson, 1995, p. 148; Ruzsa, 2010, p. 173. Puṇyavijayajī

Jambūvijayaji informs that the MS was donated to Baroda Institute by its owner, Muni Shri Puṇyavijayajī. Dated by Prof Yano from colophon, (Isaacson, 1995, p. 147, footnote 19).

24 * Introduction to Indian philosophy and Vaiśeṣika* philosophy of nature incompatible with any religious and theological concerns. 86

Liberation in Vaiśeṣika is gnostic, centred primarily on an essentialist ontological knowledge of all 6 categories (padārtha), including the substance soul (ātman).

This knowledge is achieved through the medium of a certain ‘qualitative power’

(dharmaviśeṣa), which flashes out from each entity under scrutiny during the process of perception. A certain form of yogic intuition plays a role here. Thakur’s view is that ‘dharma’ from the opening sūtras (VS 1.1.1–2) refers to a quality that characterises all the world constituents and categories (padārthadharma).87 That

is to say, ‘dharma’ is the means of knowledge that stands between the external objective world (sattā) and the mental and cognitive domain (of mind and soul).

The mental inner domain and the objective external domain are bridged by the qualitative power of dharma (with all its ramifications) that stands for a third domain of reality. One may recognise in these 3 domains (external-objective; inner-mental; and dharma) the 3 important domains of Praśastapāda, which says that all world categories possess ‘existentiality,’ ‘nameability,’ and ‘knowability.’

What glues the 3 domains is dharma, which is the domain of knowability (jñeyatva) that is attached to any of the world’s constituents. It is the reason for which dharma is expressed with either capitals (the sum of all knowledge VSc 1.1.1–2) as well as a mere fleeting quality (VSc 1.1.5).88 It is also important to note that,

although knowledge plays an important part, the system is not in the least ‘gnostic,’ (in the Hellenistic sense) for although ‘knowledge’ (buddhi/jñāna) represents a means by which liberation is achieved, nevertheless, at a certain point, because it is only a fleeing specific quality (vaiśeṣikaguṇa), it would be fully castoff from the nature of the soul. Both knowledge and dharma are not ontologically part of the soteriological state, but only the means by which an embodied self would achieve its free and pure nature. Nature is the state of potential infinite plurality of

86 See discussion on this interpretation in Ionut Moise, Salvation in Indian Philosophy. Perfection and Simplicity for Vaiśeṣika, 2019.

87 Thakur, Introduction to VSc 1961, p. 3.

88 In Candrānanda’s commentary, dharma is employed in a whole variety of ways ranging from ritualistic connotations (VSc 6.2.1–2) to the most subtle psychological underpinning, such as to be that ‘fine quality born of yoga’ practice (yogajadharma VSc 9.13). These different usages show the richness and problems of systematising the definition of the term. Among the different meanings received in Vaiśeṣika, a few can be mentioned. (1) Dharma (in opposition to adharma), a quality among the 24 (VSc 1.1.5; 7). (2) ‘Teaching instrument’ (instrumental case) leading to niḥśreyasa (VS 1.1.2; VSc 1.1.6; VSc 6.2.11). (3) ‘Teaching instrument’ leading to abhyudaya (VS

1.1.2; VSc 10.20). (4) Ethical, āśramic and ritualistic implication (VSc 6.1.4–6; VS 6.1.15, VSc 6.2.17–18). (5) Type of ‘yogic dharma’ (yogajadharma) (VSc 9. 13). (6) ‘Collection’ (sañcita) of dharmas/adharma associated with the ‘doctrine of karma’ (VSc 5.1.15; VSc 6.2.18; VSc 9.28). (7)

‘Teaching’ of śruti and smṛti texts and their injunctions (VSc 6.1.1; VSc 10.19–20). (8) ‘Corpus of teaching’ (VS 1.1.1). (9) The teaching about Īśvara, who is the authority on which āmnāya texts lay (VSc 1.1.3). (10) Related to ‘knowledge of true nature of padārthas’ (VSc 1.1.6), or to things

‘small,’ ‘hidden,’ and ‘remote’ (VSc 9.28). (11) ‘Defining characteristic’ (VSc 2.1.7–8; VSc 3.1.7; VS 4.2.5; VSc 9.8). (12) ‘Mental category’ sometimes related to transmigration (saṃskāra) or involved in connecting soul with mind (VSc 9.24–25; 9.28). For more, see Moise 2019: 85–93.

Introduction to Indian philosophy and Vaiśeṣika * 25

the cosmos, whose beauty lies in complete difference and distinction, unaffected and undissolved.

1.3 Synopsis of VSc (Baroda ed. 1961)

Table 1.2 shows the dominant preoccupation of the Vaiśeṣikasūtra with certain themes and topics. A clear-cut differentiation between these might not be possible, because each ‘daily lesson’ (āhnika) discusses more than 1 topic. There is a great deal of overlap in the chapters (adhyāya) too, for themes and arguments intertwine continuously. In VSc 9, for instance, one cannot say that all the chapter is concerned with only epistemology because various topics crop up, such as the theory of the pre-existence of a product (asatkāryavāda), yoga, soul (ātman), canonical means of knowledge such as sound (śabda-pramāṇa), traditional recollection (smṛti), state of sleep (svapna), and mental residue (saṃskāra), all of which bound together. For another synopsis of Sūtrapāṭha, one may refer to Thakur (2003), but his presentation is eclectic and neglects certain key soteriological passages of Candrānanda. My synopsis presents only Candrānanda’s view on Vaiśeṣika doctrine.

Since the Baroda edition is a Sanskrit edition, to those students not yet familiar with the language, here now I provide a summary of its contents. Immediately after the first pages, we see Jambūvijayaji’s Sanskrit eulogy (samarpaṇa) to his guru followed by an English foreword by B.J. Sandesara (pp. vii–x). A Sanskrit summary of the contents (viṣayānukrama) (pp. 11–14) follows, as well as a Sanskrit bibliographical list of the works used (pp. 15–17). Furthermore, an English bibliographical list with abbreviations (pp. xix–xxi); an introduction (prastāvanā) in Sanskrit by the editor Muni Jambūvijayaji (pp. 1–16); a series of photocopies from the MSS used (Jaina Devanagari and Śāradā, Sanskrit, and Tibetan scripts); the English introduction of Anantalal Thakur (pp. 1–23); the Sanskrit text of VSc with a variant reading of the ‘P’ and ‘O’ MSS and the emendation by the editor (pp. 1–76); a Sanskrit comparative 10-fold appendix (pariśiṣṭa), which compares variations between VS and VSv (‘short’ and ‘long version’), and VSs (pp.

77–224);89a new Sanskrit comparative appendix (navam pariśiṣṭa) (pp. 225–6); a section on MSS variations in Sanskrit (vṛddhipattraka) (pp. 227–34); an errata (śuddhipattraka) in English and Sanskrit (pp. 235–7); and a handwritten photocopy of the Tibetan sources discussed under Appendix 1 (pp. 153–219). A swift survey over the whole of VSc content can be made with the summary given by Jambūvijayaji (pp. 11–14). Table 1.2 shows the main concepts classified by chapter and daily lessons.

89 The seventh section in this appendix (pp. 153–219) contains an English presentation of the Tibetan sources adduced in support of the reconstruction of the VS. I have not had the chance to dwell on this aspect here.

26 * Introduction to Indian philosophy and Vaiśeṣika* ṛti)

VSc 10

pleasure (sukha) + pain (duḥkha) + doubt (saṃśaya) + decision (nirṇaya) + afflatus (śruti) + recollection (sm + liberation (niḥśreyasa) VSc 9

theory of effect (asatkārya vāda) + inference (anumāna) + yogic perception (yogipratyakṣa) + knowledge (vidyā) + ignorance (avidyā) VSc 8

cognition (jñāna)

VSc 7

7.1 qualities (guṇa) + atoms (paramāṇu) + vacuum (ākāśa) + soul mind spatiality time 7.2 number (sāṃkhya) + proximity (aparatva) + conjunction (saṃyoga) + disjunction (vibhāga) + universal (sāmānya) theories of knowledge qualities

Guṇa

VSc 6

6.1 dharma (merit)

6.2 life stages (cātur āśrama) + specific

(vaiśeṣika guṇa) + liberation

ethics

ṛṣṭa)

Karma

VSc 5

5.1 motion (karma) + bodies (śarīra)

5.2 motion (karma) + unseen force (ad + mind (manas) yoga

+ liberation (mokṣa)

terna

VSc 4

4.1 eternal (nitya) + non-e (anitya)

4.2 elements + bodies (śarīra)

bodies

VSc 3

3.1 soul (ātman)

3.2 mind (manas) + knowledge (jñāna)

soul

VSc 2

2.1 elements (mahābhūta)

2.2 time (kāla) diś (spatiality) sound (śabda)

Themes and topics in VSc by chapters

and categories

(sādharmya)

Table 1.2

Dravya

VSc 1

1.1 similarity

+ differentiation (vaidharmya)

1.2 universal (sāmānya) particular (viśeṣa)

differentiation bet. substances

Introduction to Indian philosophy and Vaiśeṣika * 27

VSc 1.1 (29 sūtras)

VSc begins with a discussion between a Brahmin student and a teacher whose name is Kaṇabhakṣa. The Brahmin requests some clarification on a quote from Chāndogya Upaniṣad (8.12.1) and asks about the means for the removal of pleasant and unpleasant affections in an embodied self, the meaning of dharma, its characteristic marks, as well as its purpose, the means by which dharma is achievable, and the prerequisites needed by a pupil to obtain it (1). A short explanation about the difference between ‘mundane elevation’ (abhyudaya) and ‘liberation’ (niḥśreyasa) is given (2), as well as the divine authorship of the Vedas (3), the list of 9 substances (4), and the list of 24 qualities (5). According to Candrānanda, the number of categories is 6 (6). Since the knowledge of these categories is paramount to produce merit (dharma), which leads to absolute liberation (niḥśreyasa), the whole lesson is concerned with listing and briefly describing the categories by 2 epistemological procedures: drawing ‘similarities’

(sādharmya) (7) and ‘differentiations’ (vaidharmya) (8–16). Within differentiations, the characteristics of dravya (14), quality (15), and motion (16) follow.

Common cause (17–19; 29) and common effect (22–8) are equally taken into consideration. The importance of this lesson is that it shows not only the nature of soteriology but also the function to attain it by a dualistic epistemological method of inquiry (with sādharmya and vaidharmya) whereby once afflictions (doṣa) are exposed, detachment from these becomes a necessity, after which the achievement of merit that leads to niḥśreyasa is achieved (6). Among all categories, substances are paramount. They are related to both mundane elevation (abhyudaya) (on which knowledge depends on the performance of a series of rituals and sacrifices) and liberation (niḥśreyasa) (where the soul is subject to). In both cases, dharma, which is the teaching of this ontology, represents an important tool.

VSc 1.2 (18 sūtras)

This lesson deals with the Vaiśeṣika’s metaphysics, particularly with 2 more categories, ‘universality’ (sāmānya) and ‘particularity’ (viśeṣa); after a brief discussion about the precedence of cause ahead of effect (1–2), the VS and VSc deal with the category of ‘universality’ and ‘particularity,’ both of which depend on a ‘cognition’ (buddhi) (3). Within universality, the ontological category of existence (bhāva) is defined as universal only (4). It seems that universality and particularity are 2 categories that explain the nature of the 3 preceding categories: ‘substantiality’ (dravyatva), ‘qualitiness’ (guṇatva), and ‘motionness’

(karmatva), which are both universals and particularities (5). An ‘ultimate particularity’ (antyaviśeṣa) is also discussed (6). ‘Being’ (sattā), which is not a separate category, nor a substance, motion, or quality, is that from which the notion of ‘existence’ (‘sat sat’) arises (7–11). After another explanation of dravyatva, guṇatva, and karmatva (12–17), this lesson ends with the doctrine of the ‘unity of existence’ (eka bhāva) (18).

28 * Introduction to Indian philosophy and Vaiśeṣika *

VSc 2.1 (28 sūtras)

As stated in its introductory line, the programme of this lesson is to ‘differentiate’

between various basic elements (mahābhūta), namely ‘earth’ (pṛthivī) (1); ‘water’

(ap) (2); ‘lustre’ (tejas) (3), ‘wind’ (vāyu) (4); and ‘ether’ (ākāśa) (5; 20); and their relationship with qualities and defining ‘marks’ (lakṣaṇa) such as ‘fluidity’

(dravatva) (6) or ‘touch’ (sparśa) (9). Various opponents’ views (VSc 15; 16; 20; 21; 23) are exposed and rejected. Though sound-word is not mentioned in the list of the qualities (VS 1.1.5), in VS 2.1.16, however, it is said to be a quality of substances such as ākāśa. As in the case of bhāva, which again appears in (28), sound-word is a quality not mentioned by Kaṇāda’s classification. In fact, Kaṇāda’s Sūtrapāṭha did not specify a fixed number of categories as his commentators (Candrānanda and Praśastapāda) would do later; it could well be that they were ‘categories of knowledge’ intrinsic, or subsumed within categories, or within substances.

VSc 2.2 (43 sūtras)

An extended lesson, this represents a continuation of the discussion on ‘discernment’ (vaidharmya) begun by the previous lesson, with a focus on substances like kāla, diś, and ākāśa, and on a specific characteristic of qualities such as ‘touchiness’ (‘sparśavadviśeṣaguṇa’) mentioned in the introductory line of the first sūtra.

Other ‘characteristics of qualities’ are discussed, such as ‘hot’ (uṣṇa) (2), ‘smell’

(gandha) (3), and ‘coolness’ (śīta) (5), which are not usually mentioned in the canonical list of qualities. Similarly, certain characteristic marks (liṅga) of substances such as ‘time’ (kāla) (6; 8; 11), ‘wind’ (vāyu) (7), and ‘direction’ (diś) (12–

18) are also discussed. But the second part of this lesson (from 19 onwards) turns to more epistemological topics such as ‘doubt’ (saṃśaya) (19), which arises from vidyā, and avidyā (23), or sound-word which, as maintained by Candrānanda, is a non-eternal quality (29; 42–3); Vaiśeṣikas’ view on sound-word is refuted here most probably by Mīmāṃsā critics (38–41).

VSc 3.1 (14 sūtras)

The third chapter mainly deals with the substance ‘soul’ (ātman), whose reality is proved in the first lesson with a description of inferential probans and pseudo-probans. One way by which Candrānanda demonstrates it is by ‘differentiating’

between ‘sense-objects’ (indriyārtha) (1) and the ‘sense-organs’ (2). These are established (prasiddha) to be different from each other. For example, here ‘sense-object’ is sound-word, whereas ‘sense-organ’ is ‘ear’ (śrotra) (VSc 3.1.2). Based on the differentiation between ‘senses’ and ‘objects,’ Candrānanda postulates the existence of a ‘knower to be inferred beyond these’ (paro grahītātmānumīyate).

The soul, not the senses, is the ‘grasper’ (grahītṛ) of the objects (VSc 2, 3). Like in VSc 2.2, here too, we have some objections to the view expressed (3; 7) and it is for this very purpose that Candrānanda offers a list of 10 logical relations (out

Introduction to Indian philosophy and Vaiśeṣika * 29

of which 8 are inferential probans) that Vaiśeṣika’s epistemology is based on, and which serve the purpose to prove the existence of soul (8–9). 90 There is also a

discussion about several types of ‘non-established’ (aprasiddha), ‘contradictory’

(virodha), or ‘invalid arguments’ (anapadeśa) (10), a ‘doubtful reason’ (sandigdha) based on a non-existing (asat) cause (11), or ‘variable reason’ (anaikāntika) (12). Towards the close of this lesson, VSc explains the existence of soul through a categorisation of what is commonly called ‘ordinary knowledge’ (jñāna), produced out of a ‘4-fold contact’ (catuṣṭayasannikarṣa) (13). Ātman is also proved from the capacity of ‘propensity’ (pravṛtti) and ‘antipathy’ (nivṛtti) of and towards the body (śarīra); the motions in the body prove that, what ultimately exists, is a different grasper of perception, identified as the soul (14).

VSc 3.2 (17 sūtras)

The 2 main substances discussed in this lesson are ‘soul’ (ātman) and ‘mind’

(manas). The proofs for the existence of soul derive from the theory of ‘knowledge’ (jñāna), which is produced through the ‘contact’ (sannikarṣa) between

‘soul,’ ‘senses,’ and ‘sense-objects’ via the mediating role of ‘mind’ (1). The mark that proves the existence of mind is not only the ‘contact’ between objects, senses, and soul, but also because of the obvious ‘manifestation’ and ‘non-manifestation’ of knowledge (jñānasyābhāvo bhāvaś ca) (1). Twelve ‘physical marks’

(ātmaliṅgāni) for the existence of the embodied soul are described (4), against which an objection is raised (6) because a ‘seen mark’ (dṛṣṭaliṅga), like ‘breathing’ (prāṇa), cannot prove the existence of soul, but at most, it can be proved only

‘on the basis of tradition’ (āgamika) (8). Candrānanda counters this view with the argument that the ‘I’ (ahaṃ) consciousness is real because, although in apposition with wind, it is, however, different from it, as well as from entities like ‘earth’

and so on (9). The lesson continues with a series of epistemological arguments, by which Candrānanda responds and refutes the opposite views raised against Vaiśeṣika’s tenets on the nature of soul and its number (10–17).

VSc 4.1 (14 sūtras)

The analysis of substances goes into more minute detail. In judging the ‘permanent’ (nitya) nature of substances, VSc discusses the existence of atoms that are eternal, and their knowledge is equally important. Candrānanda deals with a 2-fold epistemology enunciated in the opening line, namely ‘comprehensibility’ (upalabdhi) and ‘non-comprehensibility’ (anupalabdhi),91 as referred to the

90 Among which, the third proban (ekārthasamavāyi) is 2-fold (kārya kāryāntara; kāraṇa kāraṇāntara), while the virodha proban is 4-fold. See the section on epistemology (fifth chapter of this thesis).

91 Ganesh Thite (personal communication) translates upalabdhi with ‘obtainment,’ and anupalabdhi with ‘non-obtainment’; other options can be ‘perception,’ ‘non-perception,’ ‘recognition,’ and

‘non-recognition,’ respectively.

30 * Introduction to Indian philosophy and Vaiśeṣika* existence of atoms (1–5), their triadic composition (6–8), and qualities (9–14).

After a brief definition of ‘permanence’ (nitya) (1), a whole section on cognitive comprehension (upalabdhi) follows (2–6). This is the first epistemological part of this lesson, in which the knowledge of effects (kārya) that are impermanent (2–3) contrasts with the impermanent character of causes (4). Default knowledge or ignorance (avidyā) is the ‘impossibility’ (abhāva) of conceptualisation atoms beyond senses. But in the second part (7–14), 92 both Sūtrapāṭha and Vṛtti deal with the non-comprehension (anupalabdhi) of ‘atoms’ (paramāṇu) (7), or qualities like ‘number’ (saṃkhyā), ‘dimension’ (parimāṇa), ‘separateness’ (pṛthaktva),

‘conjunction’ (saṃyoga), ‘disjunction’ (vibhāga), ‘farness’ (paratva),93 and ‘nearness’ (aparatva)94(12). The rationale behind this description is to establish whether things can be known, whether things have form, or can be perceived by eye (13).

Things that have ‘form’ (rūpa) make knowledge possible (6), while things without form are not knowable by eye (13). This is the case in ordinary knowledge and perception. However, there are other things of an atomic form, which would be known only by forms of ‘extraordinary knowledge’ (ārṣajñāna) as mentioned by VSc 9.28.

VSc 4.2 (19 sūtras)

From the knowledge of atomic substances (in VSc 4.1), this lesson takes the reader to the knowledge of basic elements (mahābhūta) that congregate to form various cosmic ‘bodies’ (śarīra), the main topic of this sub-chapter. It deals with the ‘perception’ (pratyakṣa) or ‘non-perception’ (apratyakṣa) of elements because not all elements are graspable. The bodies form out of 5 elements (pañcātmaka), of which only 3 are perceptible (1). VSc 4.2 offers a picture of the whole of Vaiśeṣika’s cosmology: the discussion runs from the abstract atomic elements to concrete bodies, which are ‘composite.’ These bodies are of many sorts: according to their substantial composition, earth, water, and so on (3), according to the

‘variety of regions’ (anekadeśa), and their atomic composition to which these belong (4), according to their own ‘specific merit’ (5), and according to their

‘particular effect, function’ (kārya) (6), which as a result bear a specific ‘name’

(samākhyā) (7–9). 95 These bodies are compounded from different types of atoms, where the birth composition determines the different regions in which their own subtle bodies will dwell after the decomposition of concrete bodies (Varuṇaloka for water) (3), such as Aṅgiras for the world for fire (7–8); as the Vedas indicates, there are also bodies ‘not born of womb,’ such as ‘moths’ (śalabha)(6), as well as

‘sensorial body of the moon’ and ‘aqueous body’ (9).

92 With the exception when upalabdhi is proved through ‘inherence’ (samavāya).

93 ‘Remoteness’ (trans. Kumar, 2013, p. 27); ‘priority’ (trans. Halbfass, 1992, p. 208).

94 ‘Proximity’ (trans. Kumar, 2013, p. 27); ‘posteriority’ (Halbfass, 1992, p. 208).

95 This refers to the type of birth of bodies: for example, bodies not born out of the womb, VSc 4.2.7: aṅgārebhyo jāto’ṅgirā ity evamādisamākhyābhāvād manyāmahe santyayonijāni.

Introduction to Indian philosophy and Vaiśeṣika * 31

VSc 5.1 (18 sūtras)

The fifth chapter largely deals with ‘motion’ (karma), which is the third among Vaiśeṣika categories as mentioned in VSc 1.1.6. In the first lesson, motion is 2-fold: caused by effort (‘prayatna’) (1–12), and not caused by effort (13–18), both of which may, or may not, concern soul. 96 Motion is possible because of a certain ‘conjunction’ (saṃyoga), and there are several kinds of such motions:

‘hand-motion’ (1), ‘pestle-motion’ (musalakarma)(2), ‘stroke’ (ābhighātā) (3),

‘soul-related-motion’ (6), ‘inertia’ (gurutva) (7), ‘impulse’ (nodāna) (8–9), ‘throwing up’ (udasana) (10), womb-child-motion’ (dārakakarma) (11), ‘spreading’

(visphoṭana) (12), ‘falling-during-sleep motion’ (13), ‘grass-motion’ (tṛṇakarma) (14), ‘gem-thief-motion’ (15), ‘arrow-motion’ (16), and ‘saṃskāra-motion’ (18).

VSc 5.2 (28 sūtras)

It contains the soteriological doctrine of Vaiśeṣika, an event that takes place among other cosmological motions such as ‘earth-motion’ (1), due to an unseen force (adṛṣṭa), which is the cause for other cosmic motions such as ‘earthquake’

(2), ‘water-motion’ (3–12), and ‘crops-motion’ (4). Other motions discussed are

‘fluidity’ (dravatva) (5), ‘ray-wind motion’ (nāḍyāvāyusaṃyoga) (6), ‘pushing’

(nodana) (7), ‘water-tree motion’ (vṛkṣābhisarpaṇa) (8), ‘freezing’ (saṃghāta) and ‘melting’ (vilayana) (9), ‘sky-water motion’ (divyāsu) (10), and ‘thunder-motion’ (stanayitnu) (12). Other cosmic motions enumerated are those between

‘earth-water-wind’ (13), the motion of the ‘upward flaming of fire,’ the ‘motion of wind’ (obliquely, zigzag), the ‘first motion of atoms,’ or the ‘first motion of mind’ (14). On a more metaphysical level, other motions being mentioned are

‘mind-motion’ on which yoga focuses on (15–17), ‘body-motion’ (kāyakarmaṇa) (18), motions triggered by adṛṣṭa within various effected actions (kārya) like ‘eating,’ ‘drinking,’ ‘going away,’ or ‘going near’ (19), and realisation of liberation (mokṣa) (20). After the list of motions (physical and metaphysical), the meaning of ‘darkness’ (tamas) (21–22), as well as the doctrine of the motionless nature of all-pervasive substances like ‘space’ (diś), ‘time’ (kāla), ‘ether’ (ākāśa), and soul (23–28) are given too. The fifth chapter is of particular importance for understanding the soteriology of the self, karma theory, and transmigration (saṃsāra). Being defined in a chapter on karma, liberation is to be read as being brought about at the moment when the soul is separated from all cosmological ‘relations’ (saṃyoga), which triggers motion (‘theory of karma’).

96 Ātman being all-pervasive cannot have motion, cannot move. Here I am referring to volition (prayatna), which engages the embodied self with the external world.

32 * Introduction to Indian philosophy and Vaiśeṣika *

VSc 6.1 (18 sūtras)

This chapter returns to qualities of which merit and its religious-ethical implications represent a chief topic, as the introductory line shows.97 Merit (dharma) is a quality with important relevance to both ethical and religious problems, as well as the Vaiśeṣika cosmology, and Candrānanda counts it among the specific qualities (VSc 1.1.5; 3.2.17) and other qualities. 98 Dharma is predominantly the subject of both lessons of the sixth chapter. The discussion of Vedas as a ‘composition,’

‘creation’ (racanā) by Bhagavān Maheśvara, makes it an ‘authoritative pramāṇa’

because of the ethical injunctions contained in the sacred texts (Śāstras) (1). In this lesson, 3 forms of knowledge are distinguished. First, the knowledge of the common people (asmadvijñāna); second, the knowledge which is only able to grasp the present things (vartamānāvyavahita sambandhārtha viṣayaṃ); and third, god’s knowledge, which is beyond our sense-organs. The ethics, to which the second lesson alludes in VSc 6.2.2, are built on the authority of the Vedic texts.

Various ethical prescriptions and restrictions are discussed, such as ‘almsgiv-ings’ (dadāti) (4), ‘accepting’ (pratigraha) (5), ‘fellowship’99 (samabhivyāhāra) with good Brahmins (8), or restrictions of fellowship with impure Brahmins (9).

Further ethical explanations are prescribed with regard to ‘violence’ (hiṃsa) (10), or ‘impure conversation’ with non-qualified persons (11), prescriptions, or restrictions in relation to the purity of ‘space,’ ‘time,’ ‘knowledge,’ and ‘behav-iour’ (13). In addition, there is a moral classification of Brahmins according to their ‘moral quality’ and Candrānanda differentiates between inferior (hīna) (14), mediocre (sama) (17), and qualified (viśiṣṭa) (18) types of Brahmins.

VSc 6.2 (19 sūtras)

The second lesson is a continuation of the discussion on dharma enunciated in VSc 6.1, and deals with specific types of merit, mainly stipulated in the śruti and smṛti texts, all of which are conducive to elevation. These are of 3 kinds: (1) performances (prayoga) clearly expressed in the Vedas (dṛṣṭa); (2) acts where the purpose is mentioned (dṛṣṭaprayojanāna) in those texts; and (3) acts where the purpose is not mentioned in the sacred texts (dṛṣṭābhāva) (1). Candrānanda discusses 12 forms of ritualistic acts that lead to merit: sprinkling water (abhiṣecana),

97 Candrānanda agrees with Praśastapāda, by recognising dharma as a quality of the self: karmāṇi vyākhyāya guṇā vyākhyāyante/tatra dharma ādau vyākhyāyate/śāstrādau tasy’oddiṣṭatvāt (‘having explained the motions, now qualities will be described; here dharma will be explained first, as this is intended by the śāstra’). The orthodoxy of Vaiśeṣika is here proved by its allegiance to the Vedas, whose injunctions are a ‘means’ (sādhana) of soteriological knowledge (tasya vaidiko vidhiḥ sādhanaṁ; vedasya satyatā kuta iti cet yataḥ… see VSc 6.1.1)

98 For the list of vaiśeṣikaguṇas, see VSc 3.2.17: tasya guṇāḥ buddhi sukhaduḥkh’ecchādveṣa prayatnādṛṣṭa saṁskārā vaiśeṣikāḥ. Like Praśastapāda, Candrānanda also recognises in adṛṣṭa, 2

vaiśeṣikaguṇas: dharma and adharma VSc 1.1.5.

99 A literal translation might be ‘bringing together’ or ‘companionship,’ which could include feeding and speaking with the Brahmins.

Introduction to Indian philosophy and Vaiśeṣika * 33

ablutions (snāna), fasting (upavāsa), celibacy (brahmacarya), apprenticeship with a guru (gurukulavāsa), forest-dwelling (vānaprastha), sacrifice (yajña), offerings (dāna), aspersion (prokṣaṇa), direction restriction (diṅ-niyama), lunar station restriction (nakṣatra-niyama), mantra restriction (mantra-niyama), and time restriction (kāla-niyama) (2). These injunctions correspond and differ according to the 4 ‘stages of life’ (āśrama); they are also classified 2-fold: when performed

‘with break’ (upadhā) they lead to default, when performed ‘without break’

(anupadhā) they lead to merit (3). Within their respective categories, explanations are given related to ‘defect’ in a situation (bhāvadoṣa), for instance, ‘hypocrisy’

(abhisandhi) (4–5) and states of ‘purity’ (śuci) and ‘impurity’ (aśuci) (6–8). The lesson also contains an objection to the role of ‘effort’ in ritual performance, about which VSc responds that without ‘effort’ (prayatna) there is neither performance of yoga, nor mundane elevation (10–11). There is a turning point with sūtra 12, where merit turns out to be conductive to ‘liberation’ (niḥśreyasa). Though as a

‘specific quality,’ dharma can act as a burden upon the self, here both VS and VSc describe it as dependent upon a chain of affections, ‘pleasure’ (sukha), ‘passion’ (rāga) (12–13; 16), and ‘satisfaction’ (tṛpta) (14), all of which seem to determine a ‘particular birth’ produced from a ‘particular passion’ (16). ‘Propensity’

(pravṛtti), which might be related to ‘effort,’ is produced by ‘volition’ (icchā) and ‘aversion’ (dveṣa), and subsequently produces an ‘accumulation’ (sañcita) of merit and default (17), which, because of the other 2 qualities, conjunction (saṃyoga) and disjunction (vibhāga), would lead to the emergence of a returning

‘jantu’ trapped in a cyclical process called ‘birth condition’ (janmākhya) (18). It seems that the accumulation of merit and default is triggered by a chain of specific qualities. The last sūtra (19) concludes that mokṣa has been explained and should further be understood within the discussion of motion and soul, an obvious reference to VSc 5.2.20.

VSc 7.1 (32 sūtras)

In the seventh chapter, the major topic of discussion is the category of qualities, some of which have already been explained (7.1–3). The first lesson deals with various qualities in relation to various basic elements and the question to which it responds is whether qualities are permanent or not. The impermanent nature of qualities is determined by the nature of elements, which can be impermanent too, due to their composite character (4); 100 as qualities reside in substance-elements, their production and dissolution depend on the state of these substance-elements.

Another section of this lesson deals with the nature of qualities like ‘colour,’

‘taste,’ ‘smell,’ and ‘touch’ in the substance-mahābhūta ‘earth.’ Touch (sparśa) is not permanent because its ‘substratum’ (āśraya) is not permanent either (4).

100 Candrānanda quotes sūtra 1.1.15 as one which elucidates the relationship between dravya and karma. If the ordering of the Sūtras was correctly made by the Baroda 1961 edition, Candrānanda must refer here, in fact, to 1.1.16 (karmalakṣaṇa) not 1.1.15 (guṇalakṣaṇa).

34 * Introduction to Indian philosophy and Vaiśeṣika* The impermanence of ‘earth’ (pṛthivī) refers to the composite state of earth (compounded by atoms – paramāṇu) and the state of an earthly product such as pot (ghaṭa) that is prone to ‘destruction’ (vināśa). In the second part, however (6–18), the question of permanence and impermanence of qualities shifts towards that of atoms (paramāṇu). The nature of qualities like colour, taste, and touch is discussed in relation to substances like ‘water,’ ‘fire,’ and ‘air’ (7–8); when discussing the elements ‘water,’ ‘fire,’ and ‘wind,’ Candrānanda looks at the state of their atomic composition (8–10).101 Thakur (2003), classifies 9–13 as dealing with the

‘origination of the first five qualities.’ Qualities are born of heating, hence they are not co-eternal with substances because substances pre-exist qualities (12).102

The question of ‘permanence’ (nitya) seems to be coeval with the ‘understanding’ (anupalabdhi) of dimension (15–31). ‘Eternal’ (nitya) is whatever is ‘atomic’

(aṇu) or ‘gross’ or ‘large’ (mahat) (15).103 Universal concepts like ‘magnitude’

(mahattva) and ‘smallness’ (aṇuttva) are also considered (21–23). Valid knowledge (vidyā) is defined in relation to what manifests (saṃbhava), whereas ‘ignorance’ (avidyā) is defined in terms of ‘non-existence’ (asaṃbhava) (27). 104 The third part, finally (28–32), deals with the dimension of various substances such as ākāśa, which is ‘boundless’ (paramamahattva) (28), and more importantly, that of ‘soul,’ which is ‘exceedingly big’ (paramahān) (29). Mind is atomic and Candrānanda defines its function not as simultaneous, but rather as a sequential (30). Time, similarly, is ‘all-pervasive’ (vibhū) (32).

VSc 7.2 (31 sūtras)

In this lesson, 4 sections can be distinguished: the first part is focused on the analysis of further qualities such as distinctness (pṛthaktva) (1–14). In order to explain it, both VS and VSc put forward a discussion of other conceptual or abstract categories: oneness (ekatva) (1), smallness (aṇuttva) and grossness (mahattva) (4), conjunction (saṃyoga) (10), and disjunction (vibhāga) (11–12), which are explained in juxtaposition to further characteristics such as ‘small’ and ‘gross’

(12). The second part (15–24) is epistemological. Though sound-word is not listed among the 17 qualities (VS 1.1.5), according to Vaiśeṣika’s theory of language, sound-word is disconnected from meaning (artha) (19). This section presents and rejects some opposing views, and supplies Vaiśeṣika’s theory of semantics, according to which, meaning is established by mutual conventional agreement (sāmayika) (24). Other qualities discussed are ‘proximity’ (paratva) and ‘remoteness’ (aparatva) (21–24), which have both a temporal and spatial connotation (25–27). The third part (29–31) shifts back to a discussion of another category:

101 On atoms: VSc 7.1.6–10; 15–18; 26.

102 This doctrine is important because ātman in its liberated state is divested from its own vaiśeṣikaguṇas.

103 Atom is eternal because is circular (parimaṇḍalya) (VSc 7.1.26)

104 This could raise the question of whether for the Vaiśeṣikas, vidyā is the science of everything that so daringly both Vyomaśiva’s Vyomavati (p. 47) and Kir GOS (p. 148) put forward.

Introduction to Indian philosophy and Vaiśeṣika * 35

inherence (samavāya) (29), a category with which Candrānanda explains how qualities are inherent in substances (e.g. cloth inherent in threads). The lesson ends by discussing the ontological concepts of ‘existence’ (bhāva) (30) and ‘suchness’ (tattva) (31).

VSc 8 (17 sūtras)105

The eighth, ninth, and tenth chapters deal with Vaiśeṣika’s epistemology. Since knowledge (buddhi; jñāna) is a cognitive faculty, a quality (as per VS 1.1.5), its nature is impermanent, as it is caused by substances such as soul and mind (2).

This lesson presents the Vaiśeṣika’s theory of knowledge (or perception) that is explained primarily in relation to the substance-category, an aspect that shows the capital role of this category in the ontological and epistemological structure of the system (1). As Nozawa describes, this lesson has a 3-fold structure. The first part (1–3) is an introduction dealing with knowledge, which Candrānanda says is produced from a contact (sannikarṣa) between substances (1–2),106 yet not in relation to qualities, which are not ultimately in contact with the sense-organs, therefore, they are not knowable perceptually (3). Cognition (buddhi) refers to that form of ‘perceptual knowledge’ (as in VS 3.1.13) that engages both mind and soul, being as they were, causes for the production of knowledge (2). The second part (4–13) deals with objects of perception, namely the first 3 categories: substance, quality, and motion. Candrānanda distinguishes between ‘substance padārtha’ as knowable through direct contact with the sense-organs, on the one hand, and quality and motion categories, which are known through an ‘inherence’

(samavāya) with the conjunct, which is substance (4), on the other hand. It seems that knowledge of ‘substance padārtha’ is the basis that the whole edifice of the

‘theory of perception’ or ‘knowledge’ is based upon.107 Such epistemological discussion extends over other categories as well: ‘generality’ (sāmānya), which does not possess another generality; and ‘specificity’ (viśeṣa), which does not possess its own specificity (5). It is only substance (tat eva) that possesses ‘generality’

and ‘specificity.’ The knowledge of the 3 basic categories depends (āpekṣate) on another 2 categories: universality and particularity (6). The knowledge of the 3 categories, substance, quality, and motion, seems to depend on the knowledge of substance (7). Thus, substance is the foundation of Vaiśeṣika ontology, even though the Vṛtti mentions that there is no rule as to whether the substance category

‘should be first’ (8). Inherence is defined as the co-existentiality between cause and effect, and in relation to a ‘specifier’ (viśeṣaṇa) and a ‘specified’ (viśeṣya) thing (9). There is no cause-effect relationship between substances as well as between the first categories (10–11). In the same context, mind is described as atomic (aṇutva), therefore, the chain of perceptual thought would be a line of

105 A presentation of the eighth chapter, see Nozawa’s article, 1993a.

106 On 4-fold contact that produces perceptual knowledge, see also VSc 3.1.13.

107 Nozawa, 1993a, p. 1155.

36 * Introduction to Indian philosophy and Vaiśeṣika* minute details being produced ‘in sequence’ (jñānānāṃ krameṇāpi). The example given is the phrase ‘gauḥ śuklā gacchatī,’ where cow is a substance (or noun),

‘śuklā’ is a quality (adjective), and ‘gacchatī’ is a motion (verb); although they are produced in sequence, Candrānanda says that there is no cause-effect relationship between them (11). Other examples are given in order to explain the various relations between ‘near things’ (sannikṛṣṭa) and ‘distant things’ (viprakṛṣṭa) (12), or between ‘seen things’ (loc. dṛṣṭeṣu) and ‘unseen things’ (loc. adṛṣṭeṣu) (13).

The third part of this chapter (14–17) deals with sense-organs (artha). These are proved in a consequential manner: for example, each of the sense-objects corresponds to a sense-organ, which subsequently corresponds to the 5 basic elements, out of which an object is produced. The sense-organs have a ‘fixed function’

(pratiniyata) in accordance with the specific elements (15). An example is given in sūtra 16 where earth relates to smell and nose, through co-existentiality; and, in sūtra 17, where there is a relationship between form, touch, and colour, corresponding to substances like water, lustre, and wind.

VSc 9 (28 sūtras)108

The subject of inquiry in this chapter is ‘inference’ (anumāna). This lesson may be classified into 3 sections. The first part inquires into the nature of reality (1–12).

The theory of asatkāryavāda comes into the first sūtra and its gloss. A real product (sat) is not extant prior to its actual physical production (prāg utpatter asat) because there is no ‘function’ (kriyā), ‘quality’ (guṇa), and ‘designation’ (vyapadeśa) of it (1). The word ‘sat’ refers to a current existing effect (sadbhūta)(2) and it is defined by a comparison with non-real (asat); the difference between them is that ‘sat’ has capacity to affect quality and designation, whereas ‘asat’ does not (3). In the continuation of this, non-real (asat) is furthermore defined (4–10). It is with the help of logical and epistemological reasoning that the ‘non-real’ is proved: these refer to ‘differentiation’ (5), the absence of the perception of a past thing (6), negative terms like ‘non-pot,’ ‘non-cow,’ and ‘default’ (7), absence of different meanings (9), special and temporal entities (10), and universality (11), as well as inferential reasoning (12). In the second part of the ninth chapter, we have yogic perception (yogipratyakṣa) (13–17), a superior form of perception produced out of a specific contact (saṃyogaviśeṣa) between mind and soul (13). Like soul, other substances are proved through this perceptual type of contact (14), but categories like quality and motion are known through co-existentiality (16). The third and last part (18–28) deals with various forms of knowledge. The inferential (laiṅgika) form of knowledge (18), ‘testimony’ (śabda) (19), ‘reason, agent’ (hetu), ‘pretext’

(anapadeśa), ‘mark’ (liṅga), and ‘efficient cause’ (nimitta) are considered synonymous (20–1). The production of ‘recollection’ (smṛti) is caused by a latent impression (saṃskāra), and a particular relation between mind and soul (22). Similar factors produce surface dreams (svapna) and ‘sub-conscious’ ones (svapnāntika)

108 For a translation of VSc 9.1–12, see Halbfass, 1992, pp. 242–6.

Introduction to Indian philosophy and Vaiśeṣika * 37

(22–3) as well. It seems that a ‘specific dharma’ plays a role in dream functions (24). Ignorance (avidyā) and impure knowledge (duṣṭa jñāna) can arise because of certain ‘impurities’ (doṣa) in the embodied soul, and because of a ‘dormant impetus’ (saṃskāra) (25–6). The opposite of it is the ‘pure knowledge’ (aduṣṭa vidyā) (27), on which Candrānanda does not say more; he only says that it is of 2 types: perception (pratyakṣa) and inference (anumāna). He nevertheless discusses 2 unusual forms of knowledge – ārṣa and siddhadarśana – both produced from a ‘particular dharma’ (28).

VSc 10 (21 sūtras)

The last chapter continues to deal with the system’s epistemology, and given its eclectic nature, a classification is needed. The first part (1–3) deals with a series of binary qualities such as pleasure (sukha) and pain (duḥkha) that inhere in soul (1); pleasure and pain relate to desired and undesired things (2). 109 There is also an elucidation about the difference between doubt (saṃśaya) and conclusion (nirṇaya) (3–4). The second part takes up the discussion of perception explained through various types of argument; cognition (buddhi) an equivalent term for pratyakṣa is explained as being produced through a cause-effect relationship, between a specifier (viśeṣaṇa) and ‘specified object’ (viśeṣya) (5–6), or between a ‘dependent’ (sāpekṣa) and ‘non-dependent’ (anāpekṣa) thing (7), 110 or explained through the concept of ‘destruction’ (vināśa) of body limbs, a section relevant to body and eschatology (8–10). Cognition – a specific quality of the embodied soul – is also proved in relation to ‘inherence’ and ‘contact’

(12–18). Finally, the third part concludes with the restatement of soteriology, based on several assumptions already discussed in the previous chapters. (1) The inferential type of knowledge (laiṅgika pramāṇa) by means of which inference has been explained (19); (2) the Vedic prescriptions, ‘seen’ or ‘unseen,’ in the sacred texts (āmnāya) (20); and (3) a restatement of Vaiśeṣika theism, with at least ‘4 stages’ in which absolute liberation (niḥśreyasa) can be realised (21).

For a more simplified synopsis of all chapters in both VSc and VS, in Table 1.3,

I present an alternative thematic classification that should be of better use.

1.4 Author and date of VSc

About the author of VSc, we know very little.111 From the internal evidence, like that given by the colophon, we know that the name of the author is Candrānanda,

109 Though Candrānanda does not mention aniṣṭa in its gloss, we may assume that aniṣṭa refers to duḥkha.

110 The simile used by Candrānanda is the ‘threads’ (tantu) that symbolise their interdependence from each other in a piece of cloth; the simile is also used to express the relations of precedence and successiveness.

111 I have little to add on Candrānanda as the author; yet, differently from Isaacson’s conjectures (PhD

38 * Introduction to Indian philosophy and Vaiśeṣika *

Table 1.3 Major subjects in VSc

Ontology

Metaphysics

Epistemology

Psychology

Ethics

Physics

1.1

7.1

4.1

3.1

6.1

5.1

1.2

7.2

4.2

3.2

6.2

5.2

2.1

2.2

910

and the etymology of his name indicates the emphasis on knowledge he lays of his teaching. ‘Candra,’ whose masculine noun designates ‘moon’ while its adjectival form means ‘glittering’ or ‘shining,’ must illustrate the gnostic and philosophical allegiance of the author, for ‘moon’ in Indian thought is the symbol of ‘mind.’112

The simile used here resembles the author’s name with the moon, whose name Candrānanda bears. A somehow problematic translation of the colophon could mean that knowledge comes from the author himself, and spreads over the cosmos, for the moon acts as spelling out the darkness during night-time. It is not a knowledge that comes as an inspiration from the cosmos (like revelation in Christianity), but quite the contrary, it is the author himself who is being praised as the bestower of this cosmic and cosmological knowledge (Vaiśeṣika system).

Colophon: jagato’113 syānandakaraṃ vidyāsarvayāḥ114 sad’aiva yaś candram/

āndayati sa vṛttiṃ candrānando vyadhāt115 etāṃ. 116

Gloss: like the moon produces bliss always in the night of knowledge/

Candrānanda composed this commentary to delight the moon.

The New Catalogus Catalogorum gives information of a certain Candrānanda

‘writer on medicine and medical lexicography,’ ‘son of Ravinandana, and grandson of Mahānandana,’ whom, according to the genealogy of Dhallaṇa, was originally from Kaśmīr. 117 Regarding the location of his activity, Isaacson states that the indications we have (Śārāda script MS, and Abhinavagupta’s 1995), here I only aim to discuss the colophon and the probable location of VSc composition.

112 Grimes, dict., p. 102. It also represents ‘that subtle structure within the body that oozes the nectar of immortality.’

113 jagato: all; jāgato Jac (according to Ruzsa reading of MSS).

114 The older MS (siglum ‘P’ or ‘J’), however, reads ‘vidyāsarvayāḥ’ for which I have opted here; Baroda MS (siglum ‘O’ or ‘Ś’) reads ‘vidyāyāḥ sarvathā.’ VSc 1961 provides ‘vidyāśarvaryāḥ,’

which might complicate the reading; but Ruzsa, who used the 1982 ed., makes a conjecture with

‘vidyāsavayāḥ’ (metre, requires āryā).

115 etāṁ: J; kaścit Ś (according to Ruzsa reading of MSS).

116 etāṁ: J; kaścit Ś (according to Ruzsa reading of MSS).

117 NCC, 1971, vol. 6, pp. 355–6.

Introduction to Indian philosophy and Vaiśeṣika * 39

reference to Candrānanda)118 point clearly to Kaśmīr, though as he says, his remarks are ‘not conclusive.’119 Although I have no objection to the location and the date of Candrānanda put forward by Isaacson, yet, I do have a few reservations regarding Isaacson’s ‘impression’ of Candrānanda’s commentary as being ‘deeply influenced by Praśastapāda,’ not least because his assertions are grounded on secondary literature (e.g. Nozawa readings), rather than a direct comparative reading with PD. 120 Indeed, a certain doctrinal relationship with Praśastapāda has often been too much emphasised by scholars, such as Nozawa, who in his translation of the first 2 chapters provides extensive comparative footnotes with PD, and with later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika works through the lenses of which Candrānanda is read. The case I make, however, is that though Candrānanda might have been contemporary with Praśastapāda, he does present an older and more traditional and canonical view on Vaiśeṣika doctrine, for the following reasons. (1) The number of specific qualities in VSc is smaller (9) than in PD (16). (2) The role of god is not so greatly emphasised in the cosmogony and eschatology of Vaiśeṣika. Candrānanda, for instance, ascribes adṛṣṭa as the cause and role for the formation of the world, and the gloss VSc 5.2.14 does not mention about god as operating adṛṣṭa, though it is true, both VSc 1.1.3 and VSc 10.21 acknowledge Bhagavān Īśvara as the creator of cosmos. (3) The religious affiliation of Candrānanda is Brahmanical, not explicitly Śaivist, whereas Praśastapāda is Śaivist; this may confirm the existence of various schools in Vaiśeṣika in the second half of the first millennium. (4) Candrānanda provides an older version of Sūtrapāṭha, and an older interpretation of the system than Praśastapāda. The hypothesis that we can launch is that, even if Candrānanda may not have been earlier than Praśastapāda, it is beyond doubt that his brevity and more conservative exegesis is older, hence more reliable than Praśastapāda’s innovative approach. As for the date of VSc, Aklujkar has dated VSc has having been composed between the 7th and 10th centuries AD. The ‘terminus post quem’ for Candrānanda is 600 AD, on the grounds of a reference he makes (in VSc 3.2.4) to Uddyotakara’s Vārttika. The

‘terminus ante quem’ is the 10th century AD. Aklujkar says that Helārāja quotes from VSc, 121 whereas Isaacson identifies another reference to Vaiśeṣika in the Abhinavagupta’s commentary on Īshvarapratyabhijñāvimarshinī of Utpaladeva (10th century AD). The importance of Candrānanda’s commentary, however, resides not in the composition time, but rather in the conservative interpretation on the Sūtrapāṭha and the integrity of its version and the commentary it preserves.

118 Isaacson 1995, p. 141, (via Shah, 1957, 7) refers to Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarshinī of Utpaladeva with commentary by Abhinavagupta.

119 Isaacson, 1995, p. 141.

120 Isaacson, 1995, f. 7 on p. 141, who relies here on the readings of Werba, Chemparathy, and Frauwallner, rather than on his own comparative readings.

121 Aklujkar, 1970, p. 340. Vergiani, 2016, p. 547.

2 Sources and resources on Vaiśeṣikasūtra

Two major assets are presented by VSc (ed. 1961). One is the very early date of the commentary itself, and the second is the Vaiśeṣikasūtra (Sūtrapāṭha), which contains 7 different sūtras ‘nowhere quoted in the entire philosophical literature.’1

These ‘new’ sūtras are: VS 2.2.33 (abhāvāt); VS 5.2.4 (tad viśeṣeṇādṛṣṭakāritam); VS 7.1.6 (guṇāntaraprādurbhāvāt); 7.2.2 (tayor nityatvānityatve tejaso rūpasparśābhyāṃ vyākhyāte); 7.2.3 (niṣpattiś ca); 7.2.22 (tathā pratyayābhāvaḥ); and 7.2.23 (saṃbaddhasaṃbandhāt iti sandehaḥ). 2 So far, VS of Candrānanda stood the test of time and all the challenge of textual-criticism. When comparing VS with ‘A’ (Ahmedabad MS), Isaacson confirms that A is ‘clearly closer to VS’

(shortened ‘C’).3 Before Isaacson’s new MSS readings (unpublished PhD dissertation), we knew from Thakur about 16 MSS, most of which supply the Mithilā

version (of Upaskāra). New ones (‘A’ and ‘T’) read by Isaacson, as well as the recent publication of volume 32 of the New Catalogus Catalogorum (henceforth NCC), gives new locations for ‘all’ MSS on Vaiśeṣikasūtras (see Appendix 3),

and bodes well for a fresh reading of both Vaiśeṣika’s tenets and a forthcoming critical edition. With my current research, I have begun the task of inventorying all such MSS, and a descriptive list may be found in Appendix 3 of this edition.

Starting from the ‘Vaiśeṣikasūtra entry,’ we must make all effort in collecting all MSS descriptions on Vaiśeṣika, principally its Sūtrapāṭha, all of which are currently extant and available in Indian libraries as per NCC description.

2.1 MSS on Sūtrapāṭha

In 2013, the University of Madras finally published volume 32 of NCC, which reached the letter ‘v’ and has provided the entry for ‘Vaiśeṣikasūtra.’ So we can finally identify various locations where Vaiśeṣika MSS on the mūla text could be found and photographed, some of which had already been visited and explored

1 Thakur, 2003, p. 131.

2 Ruzsa offers a different emendation than Thakur (sambaddha: Ś1, Ś3; saṁbandha JS, J, Ś2; cet: all; cat JS). Here I offer Thakur, 2013 version, p. 131.

3 Isaacson, 1995, p. 256.

*Sources and resources on *

*Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

Sources and resources on Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 41

by certain scholars (at Trivandrum, Pune, Jodhpur, Darbangha). 4 Beginning from the textual-philological evidence provided by Isaacson (PhD), here I should mention briefly the MSS on Sūtrapāṭha, which I have been able to look at, as well as additional ones that I had the chance to photograph during my Erasmus research field-work to India (2015–2016). To my knowledge, 3 scholars before myself had

looked at MSS containing Sūtrapāṭha alone.5

Gopinath Kaviraj (1929)6 provides information about ‘an apparently very old manuscript (undated) of the Vaiśeṣikaūtras, from a private collection in Benares.’

This MS (henceforth ‘Be’) contains several differences from the Sūtrapāṭha of Upaskāra. It is still not published, and, as per 1995, Isaacson could not trace its

location.7

Anantalal Thakur is by far the scholar who looked most extensively over the Vaiśeṣika MSS, but sadly, he does not give a thorough description of these. In an article published in 1963,8 he indicates having ‘collated the sūtra-readings from six printed editions and sixteen Manuscripts preserved in different Manuscripts Libraries.’9 Among them, Thakur also notes ‘two’10 that have been used for the publication of Vyākhyā (Darbangha 1957) and Vṛtti (Baroda 1961).

Harunaga Isaacson, in his PhD thesis, brings further contributions by consulting 2 additional MSS containing Sūtrapāṭha alone, and provides a ‘diplomatic edition’ for each one of these, as well as a ‘tentative reconstruction of the presumed hyparchtype of both, followed by an attempt at evaluation.’11 This MSS is (1) the Ahmedabad MS (henceforth ‘A’) and (2) a second MS from Trivandrum (henceforth ‘T’). A is a ‘Sammelhandschrift’ (a collated MS consisting of several heterogeneous MSS, in this case, the Nyāyasūtra first, second Sūtrapāṭha of

4 For the ‘Vaiśeṣikasūtra’ entry, see NCC vol. XXXII, p. 65–68. I say ‘could’ because some MSS are almost impossible to obtain, even though they are mentioned in NCC. Two MSS (140 and 183), for instance, are mentioned in the entry; these are supposed to be in the Sanskrit Pāṭhaśālā of Rajapur (South Maharashtra). When I visited the site, the young pundits had no knowledge of any (handwritten) list of the MSS, which obviously they should have possessed. All MSS (presumably not yet classified) were preserved in about 20 big bags on the roof of the main building. The pāṭhaśālā

most probably belonged to the Vedānta tradition, because many MSS I looked at, randomly, belonged to that tradition and were not very old (paper, 18th and 19th century, approximately).

5 I should add Ferenc Ruzsa, though he looked at improving the VSc Baroda edition, and only took into consideration the MSS related to VSc, not to VS.

6 Kaviraj, 1929, pp. 71–6. I have not consulted this article. Here I rely on Isaacson description, 1995, p. 200.

7 MSS in private collections are very hard to consult. From my own experience (in Udupi and Shra-vanabelagola), I was not permitted any access to MSS, nor even basic preliminary information about these.

8 Already quoted: by Thakur, 1963a.

9 Thakur, 1963a, p. 187.

10 Isaacson points out that 3, not 2, MSS have been used for the 2 editions mentioned (Darbhanga 1957 and Baroda 1961), because the Baroda edition of 1961 is based on 2 MSS, see Isaacson, 1995, PhD, p. 201.

11 Isaacson, 1995, PhD, p. 202.

42 * Sources and Resources on Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

Vaiśeṣika, and then Nyāyavatara, a Jaina treatise on logic). 12 T is a palm-leaf manuscript, and represents an independent recension and is located in the Kerala University Manuscripts Library, Trivandrum (no 22615). Like ‘A,’ ‘T’ also con-

tains Nyāyasūtra without commentary.13

2.2 New MSS on Sūtrapāṭha

Finally, this edition takes into consideration new MSS and begins from the first-hand reading of 5 new different MSS (paper) that only contain Sūtrapāṭha, collected by Ionut Moise from Mumbai, Wai, Mysore, and Madras. These are not old ( post ante quem: 18th century, approximately); all of them well preserved. These are as follows.

Prajñapāṭhaśāḷā Maṇḍaḷa (Wai, South Maharashtra). I have photocopied 3 MSS: numbers 6108, 6109, and 6110. 14 I marked them as follows: W (6108), 1

W (6109), and W (6110). When there was an agreement in the MSS collation, 2

I refered to these as ‘W.’ All of these present more or less the Sūtrapāṭha version of Upaskāra with its chapters, classified in a further 2 lessons each (which is not the case with VSc, where the last chapters 8, 9, and 10 have no lesson-division).

They all begin with a devotional salutation (‘Śrī Ganeśāya namaḥ’: W , W and 1

‘śrīmad sadgurucaranābhyāmānamaḥ’ W ). They are preserved and wrapped in 2

used newspaper (Marathi) on which another serial number is given. The sūtras are separated by simple and double slashes (/). Each lesson is marked, and a prior reader highlighted each one of those signposts in pencil: W (paper) is 25.3 ×

9 size, Devanagari script, 4 folios with approximately 13–15 lines per page, and 51 letters per line; it is complete, in good readable condition, and the year provided by Wai MSS catalogue vol. II (p. 777) is 1813. W (paper) handwriting is 2

slightly bigger, in Devanagari script, 30.5 × 10.7 size, 4 folios, 12 lines per page, 45 letters per line, it is complete, good condition, not dated, but judging by the size and writing style it could be the same age or perhaps slightly earlier, end of the 18th century. Among the 3 Wai MSS, this looks the most ‘archaic.’ W like 3

the other 2, bears the title ‘Vaiśeṣikasūtrani’ on the newspaper cover (Devanagari script) paper, 24.2 × 12.6 size, 7 folios with 10 lines per page, and 47 letters per line; it is complete and in a wonderful condition, with tidy handwriting. It is the best preserved among the 3 and has no date, but it is possibly from the 19th century. Like all others, this MS provides the Upaskāra version of the Sūtrapāṭha.

The catalogue lists another MS (no 6111, with 119 folios), which presents the Vaiśeṣikasūtras with Upaskāra commentary, but since my goal was to trace back only the ‘independent transmission’ of VS, I have not taken a photocopy.

12 For description, Isaacson, 1995, PhD, p. 205.

13 For an MS description of what Isaacson describes as ‘T,’ see PhD, 1995, p. 258; or MSS Catalogue: Trav. Uni. Sup. 1988, Vol. 5 Bhaskaran, pp. 103–5 (a catalogue he could not consult).

14 See further description in MSS Catalogue (Wai D. II) pp. 776–7.

Sources and resources on Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 43

Oriental Research Institute Mysore. From a large collection of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika MSS, I have selected only MS no E 37153 (alternative no: C 4416/1). 15

I shall refer to it with ‘M.’ It bears the title ‘Vaiśeṣikasūtram’ and the author (not the scribe) is ‘Kaṇādaḥ.’ Paper with Devanagari script, 32 × 10 size, 9 folios with approximately 48 letters per line. It is complete and in good condition. Like

‘W,’ ‘M’ seems to give the Sūtrapāṭha version of Upaskāra (split in the exactly the same lesson as others). It begins with a salutatory devotional greeting (‘Śrī

Ganeśāya namaḥ’). The writing is small, with pencil highlighting after each lesson. Sūtras are separated by a simple slash, and only rarely by double slashes.

The Royal Asiatic Society of Bombay presents us with a slightly different version of the Sūtrapāṭha (henceforth ‘B’). In this MS, some sūtras are not separated by a slash (/), e.g. VS 6.2.18. Here we deal with an older MS, dated 1715 Śake, in Sanskrit (Sk.), no 1934 (but in Velankar’s Catalogue no 1059); it has 9 folios, on paper and is preserved at the Asiatic Society of Bombay in the collection of Bhau Daji Collection (BD – 30/4). 16 One interesting addition regarding Sūtrapāṭha is that it does not follow the Sūtrapāṭha of Śaṅkaramiśra, as it omits to mention

‘padārthānāṃ’ from VS 1.1.4.

Madras. Governmental Oriental Manuscripts Library. Finally, this is most probably a 20th-century MS, and I have photocopied it from the Governmental MSS Library of Madras, yet I will not count it among the Sūtrapāṭha MSS discussed because it is more of a digest of Vaiśeṣika tenets. I shall refer to it as ‘C.’

The title it bears is ‘Vaiśeṣikavastunirṇayaḥ’ by an author called Nṛsiṃha, it is paper Devanagari script, it is complete and bears 2 numbers: 20432 and R 3092b (accession and serial), the latter being the one that is inscribed on the front page.

It is a ‘Sammelhandschrift’ (composite manuscript) and as a result collated in the shape of a ‘book-note,’ not on separate folios like all others. 17

Note. As a concluding remark, and based on my fresh efforts to bring something new, I must point out with Thakur and Isaacson, that, with meagre exceptions, the majority of these sūtras of the MSS present us with the Mithilā version (of Śaṅkaramiśra). Nonetheless, one should still keep an eye on the possibility of a ‘few interesting exceptions.’18

This list represents only the beginning of an exhaustive task to inventorying all the descriptions of Sūtrapāṭha MSS. Now, with the publication of NCC, volume 32, we are in the position of undertaking such a task, which may be considered the inauguration for a forthcoming critical edition. Forthcoming researchers, however, must be warned that some of the MSS are to be found in ‘Sammelhandschrift,’

therefore, they should look up for Vaiśeṣika MSS at different sections in the catalogues; other traditions could have well preserved the Vaiśeṣika sources for

15 MSS Catalogue (Mysore N.D. vol. X), pp. 608–9.

16 MSS Catalogue (Ed. Meena Vaishampayan, 2012) p. 140.

17 MSS Catalogue (part 2, ed. V. Vidyavicaspati), 2015, p. 771.

18 Isaacson, 1995, p. 202.

44 * Sources and Resources on Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

different reasons either to combat its tenets or to profitably make use of its doctrine, as Jaina scholars did.

2.3 Locating and identifying the Vaiśeṣikasūtra MSS

The description given by the entry Vaiśeṣikasūtra that NCC vol. 32 supplies and enables us to now trace the location of all known MSS on Sūtrapāṭha (VS

or Vaiśeṣikasūtra), as well as all MSS on Vaiśeṣika commentaries that have been catalogued.19 The Illustration 3 (Appendix) has been made on the basis of the bibliography of MSS catalogues offered by NCC volume 28, pp. i–lxxxiv (unless otherwise specified in the footnotes). In addition, or, in the absence of these (some of which I could not trace), I have consulted other catalogues (not mentioned by NCC vol. 28) that give useful descriptions of Vaiśeṣika MSS

that preserve Sūtrapāṭha both independently, as well as attached to different commentaries (e.g. Tarkabhāṣā, Upaskāra) or catalogued under other sections (e.g. Nyāya). The list of NCC abbreviations, locations, and serial numbers is a preliminary guide and incomplete, for I could not access all such catalogues.

Yet, Indian readers with research in such centres and MSS libraries would do well to complete the table, read, photograph, and collate all such MSS, in view of what should become of the first critical edition of Vaiśeṣikasūtra (Sūtrapāṭha). The author of this edition possesses at present 6 such scanned MSS on Sūtrapāṭha. Should a forthcoming Vaiśeṣika scholar venture to collect and undertake such a critical edition of VS, then I would be more than happy to offer the MSS I collected from Bombay, Wai, Mysore, and Madras (see their

description in Section 2.2 of this introduction), which will eventually spare the time and travels to South India. As far as Candrānanda’s Vṛtti is concerned, its 5 MSS on which it is based are indicated with bold. As for the reconstruction of Sūtrapāṭha, the approximate locations of such MSS are to be found in Illustration 3 (see Appendix).

The list of MSS that has been given here represents only a point of departure. The Vaiśeṣikasūtra entry also includes ‘printed’ editions of Sūtrapāṭha (Ptd.) transmitted or included as it were in various ‘un-orthodox’ commentaries (Sanskrit, Hindi) of classical and post-colonial commentators, 20 most of which do not necessarily bother to preserve the ‘original’ Sūtrapāṭha, but rather supply, like Praśastapāda, their own personal interpretation of the system and its original Sūtrapāṭha tenets.

19 For an expanded list of such catalogues, see volume 28 of NCC. This is, of course, incomplete, and represents only a starting point, as many other catalogues have been published since or simply have not been consulted by the Madras editors. Researchers should consult many other private and handwritten catalogues that are not open for viewing or consultation (e.g. Srimaccarukirti Pandi-tacarya Jaina Bhandara Mutt, Śravaṇabeḷagoḷa; when I visited the site in August 2016, as a young decorate researcher, no permission had been granted for me to visit the MSS library).

20 Among classical and medieval commentators, the NCC entry mentions Praśastapāda,

Sources and resources on Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 45

Such published commentaries are identifiable under various titles, 21 which are

commentaries on either Sūtrapāṭha, Bhāṣya, or Independent (eclectic) tradition of Vaiśeṣika interpretation.22 Many such titles (e.g. Padārthadharmasaṃgraha, Kiraṇāvalī) send us to ‘additional descriptions’ (Addl. MSS) and refer to MSS

on the commentaries themselves, not necessarily to an ‘independent Sūtrapāṭha tradition,’ which as I discussed here, must be traced and reconstructed in view of a forthcoming critical edition.

2.4 Date of Sūtrapāṭha

The main contention upheld by Frauwallner and the Austrian school has been the many additions the Sūtrapāṭha suffered in the course of time. It has been repeat-edly maintained, even after the publication of VSc and its Sūtrapāṭha (1961), that the opening sūtras, as well as those sūtras related to mokṣa, did not exist in the original version of Sūtrapāṭha,23 and that they are a later addition to VS. More recently, this view has been challenged by scholars from the French and Japanese schools, 24 showing that the ancient form of VS we have in VSc, should not be regarded as unreliable. Houben, for instance, shows that Bhartṛhari (5th century AD) who chronologically preceded Praśastapāda (6th century), does indeed refer to the beginning sūtras of all known versions of the Sūtrapāṭha (dharmaṃ

vyākhyāsyāma iti). 25 On the doctrine of the dimension of the soul, which changed in the early phase of the history of the system, Adachi points that these changes must have taken place very early, because Āryadeva’s Catuhśataka (the ninth chapter) (c.225 and 250 AD) rejects the Vaiśeṣika doctrine of the activity in the eternal and all-pervasive soul, and reproduces accurately the sūtras 7.1.28–29

from Sūtrapāṭha. Furthermore, in relation to this, VS 5.2.18–20 are sūtras that prove that both liberation (mokṣa) and transmigration (saṃsāra) are old concepts in the Vaiśeṣika system and that the sūtras in question had existed in the

21 The following titles: Bhāṣya (or Padārthadharmasaṃgraha) by Praśastapāda, Bhāṣyaratna, Bhāṣya by Candrakānta Tarkālaṅkāra, Sugamā by Paṇḍita Tātācarya, Vivaraṇa by Ḍhuṇḍhirāja Śāstrin, Parīkṣara by Pañcānana Tarkaratna Bhaṭṭācārya, Guṇabhāṣya, Kiraṇāvalī by Udayanācārya, Prakāśa by Vardhamāna, Padārthatattvanirṇaya (or Sūkti) by Jagadīśa Tarkālaṅkāra, Phakkikā

(or Vivṛti) by Mathurānātha, Rasasāra by Mahādeva, Dīdhiti (or Vivṛti) by Ragunātha Śiromaṇi Bhaṭṭācārya, Vivṛti (or Vivaraṇa) by Rucidatta, Nyāyakandalī by Śrīdhara, Guṇasāramañjarī by Mādhvadeva, Pradīpikā by Lakṣmaṇācārya, Vaiśeṣikasūtropasakāra by Śaṅkaramiśra, Tarkasāgara (or Kaṇādasūtranibandha) by Bhaṭṭa Vādīndra.

22 For a classification of the 3 Vaiśeṣika traditions, see chapter 1 in Moise, 2020.

23 Wezler, 1982, pp. 663–74.

24 Nozawa seems to be an exception within Franco-Japanese school; according to him the doctrine of an all-pervasive character of the soul is a late addition in Vaiśeṣika; he goes as far as to say that the whole of the seventh chapter of VS is a later addition, Nozawa, 1981, pp. 464–5.

25 Houben, 1994, p. 718, informs us that Mallvadin, c. 550 AD, quotes a sutra, VS 9.12, which is traceable only in the Sūtrapāṭha of Candrānanda, therefore its Sūtrapāṭha must be the oldest we have.

46 * Sources and Resources on Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

Sūtrapāṭha at least from the same time. 26 In philological studies, the external evidence discussed by Adachi and Houben represent solid proof for dating MSS.

If Houben and Adachi are both right, then we have reason to suppose that the opening sūtras (VS 1.1.1–3), the soteriological sūtras (VS 5.2.18–20), and the ones about the all-pervasive soul (VS 7.1.28–29), all of which are fully preserved by Candrānanda’s commentary, are sufficient ground for the conjecture that most portions of Sūtrapāṭha we have are as old as the second century AD. This confirms once more the date of Jacobi on VS, which he supposes to be ‘as old as, or rather somewhat older than Nyāyasūtra and Brahmasūtra.’27 Hence, the date of some of the sūtras, the one we rely on for the doctrine of Vaiśeṣika’s soteriology, could be as early as 200 AD or even earlier.

2.5 Textual problems

Although the style of VS and VSc is simple and straightforward, with a medium level of difficulty for translation, while the grammar and syntax do not pose major problems for translation, 28 the 1961 edition and its Sūtrapāṭha, as Thakur says, are based on MSS that ‘abound with scribal mistakes.’29 These have been dealt skilfully by Jambūvijayaji in the footnotes where he provides variant readings, and since then more work has been done by Ruzsa and Isaacson, who compared the variant reading of VS with other MSS, ‘A’ and ‘T,’ respectively.30 Since the

materials on which they are based are rather poor, critical editions are always

problematic.31 Since I am not fully trained in manuscriptology, nor is my method of research philological-historical, I should like to leave the ‘section of textual problems’ in the hands of more skilful scholars such as Isaacson and Ruzsa, who would take the trouble to compare the VS with other newly discovered MSS.

Isaacson comes up with findings that are ‘interesting exceptions.’32 As far as this edition is concerned I will not deal with providing variant readings from the Sūtrapāṭha MSS I have photocopied and read throughout my trip to South India, 33

but only philosophical and comparative conceptual observations. The philological discussion of this chapter only wished to follow the desideratum of Wezler

26 Adachi, 1994, p. 659.

27 Jacobi, 1911, p. 29, dates NS and BS composition between 200 and 450 AD.

28 Working on this translation, I came to the same conclusion as Isaacson does, 1995, p. 156: ‘the text is on the whole far less problematic than Bhaṭṭa Vādīndra’s commentary, dealt with in the previous part: the language is simpler, the thought is less convoluted and the textual transmission somewhat less defective.’

29 Thakur, Introd. VSc, 1961, p. 1.

30 For a reading of VSc commentaries, see Ruzsa’s critical ed., who looked over all 5 MSS available.

See the table, under the MSS on VSc section.

31 Thakur, 1963, and Wezler‘s article on yoga, 1982.

32 Isaacson, 1995, part III of this PhD, pp. 200–300.

33 Although I have undergone a similar inquiry, by consulting 5 new MSS (plus 1), which I found and photographed at Wai, Mysore, Madras, and Bombay, yet none of them can provide a substantially different reading of the Sūtrapāṭha, particularly regarding those sūtras related to soteriology.

Sources and resources on Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 47

and Isaacson, who urged the need to unearth and reconstruct a full picture of a possible ‘independent transmission’ of the Sūtrapāṭha.34 Despite difficult textual readings, as for instance VSc 5.2.14, fortunately, the 1961 Baroda edition is a good one. In the words of Isaacson:

MSS affiliations of Vaiśeṣika are easily determined and clear-cut; a fact that is indicative of a rather slender transmission, i.e. one with a relatively small number of manuscripts, and freedom from contamination. It should be noted in this connection that the manuscripts can be associated with a rather limited geographical area beyond which we have no evidence that Candrānanda’s

commentary ever spread.35

Indeed, though Thakur says that none of the available versions of the sūtra-text is ‘absolutely correct,’ still he recognises that Candrānanda offers ‘a better text generally.’36 Nonetheless, any Vaiśeṣika scholar is required to look up the sources and must provide alternative MSS readings, as these could shed new light on our system’s doctrine. For the present edition, these alternative versions will be restricted only to Sūtrapāṭha which refer to the soteriology of the system.

2.6 Conclusion

This 2-fold introductory chapter has provided, on the one hand, a short introduction to Indian philosophy and Vaiśeṣika to a non-specialist audience, and on the other hand, gave Indologists a thematic overview of VSc and its MSS preservation. Although a great deal of textual critical work has been done so far by Jambūvijayaji, Thakur, Nozawa, Honda,37 Isaacson, and Ruzsa, a new critical edition of VSc remains a desideratum. This is more urgently the case because Jambūvijayaji did not take into consideration for his edition the publication of 3 extant MSS on VSc: J (J s, J ) and Ś both of which are from BORI, as well as 2

another MS from Ujjain (Ś ). Among these, the most important, however, remains 3

J with its own 2 parts (J s and J ) that have been dated to be fourteenth century 1

AD. It belonged to the eminent Jain scholar Muni Shri Puṇyavijayajī. All my critical textual observations will be made on the basis of their reading of such MSS

made by my predecessors (Ruzsa, Isaacson, etc.), while for Sūtrapāṭha, I shall bring into the discussion reading variations of my own newly photographed MSS, described earlier. Whatever the variations might be, it is unlikely they can change

34 Wezler, 1982, p. 643. Isaacson, 1995, p. 300 ‘the search for Sūtrapāṭha Manuscripts remains, in my view, among the most urgent priorities.’

35 Isaacson, 1995, PhD, p. 148.

36 Thakur, 1963, p. 188 (reproduced in Thakur, 2003).

37 I could not find Honda’s valuable study ‘A reading in the Vaiśeṣikasūtras’ (1990) mentioned by Isaacson; instead, I have been able to trace Nozawa’s ‘Comparative Table of the Vaiśeṣikasūtras’

(1982), which proved very useful for the variations offered between the sūtras of Candrānanda, Vādīndra, Sena Court, and Śaṅkaramiśra.

48 * Sources and Resources on Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

substantially the current understanding we have on the Vaiśeṣika system or its

‘controversial’ doctrines such as soteriology. What follows, however, is a translation with notes that pertain to World philosophy at large and aims to illuminate the problems related to ontology from a Western–Eastern comparative perspective.

As mentioned in the first section of this introduction, philosophy is a global affair, therefore, Indian philosophy must play a clarifying role in this.

3 Vaiśeṣikasūtra Transliteration and translation

Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 51

// ॐ //

Vaiśeṣikasūtra

composed by Kaṇāda

arranged and adorned

with the ancient commentary

of Candrānanda

52 * Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

// ॐ //

Candrānandaviracitayā prācīnayā vṛttyā samalaṅkṛtaṃ

Kaṇādapraṇītaṃ

Vaiśeṣikasūtraṃ1

1.1.

/ prathamasyādhyāyasya prathamam āhnikam /

1.1.1. athāto dharmaṃ vyākhyāsyāmaḥ

kasya cid brāhmaṇasya vedābhyāsavaśena vyapagatakalmaṣasy

edaṃ pratibabhau ‘aśarīraṃ vāva santaṃ priyāpriye na

spṛśataḥ’ [Ch. Up. 8.12.1] iti / tata idaṃ vākyam ālocya

kaṇabhakṣaṇam ājagāma / tato’ bhyuvāca bhagavan anena vākyena

apahataśarīrasya kṣemasādhanatā kathyate tad ucyatāṃ ka upāya

iti / tato’ munir abhyuvāca dharma iti / tato’ jagāda brāhmaṇaḥ ko

dharmaḥ kathaṃ lakṣaṇaḥ kānyasya sādhanāni kiṃ prayojanaṃ

kāṃś ca pratyupakarot īti / atha ebhyaḥ praśnebhyo’nantaraṃ

dharmavyākhyānapratijñāyām ‘atha’ śabda ānantaryam

abhidhatte / ‘ataḥ’ śabdo ’pi vairāgyaprajñākaṣāya paripākādikāṃ

śiṣyaguṇasampadaṃ hetutvenāpadiśati yasmād ayaṃ śiṣyo

guṇasampadā yuktas tato’smai praśnebhyo’nantaraṃ dharmaṃ

vyākhyāsyāmaḥ / ko dharma ityāha -

1 I have amended the compound conventions printed by Muni Jambūvijayaji and decided to follow instead the advice of Bjarne Wernicke-Olesen by keeping compounds united (guṇa and vrddhi) and elsewhere to apply word division, however, possible inconsistencies may occur. Since the gloss is too brief, I have decided not to capitalise the beginning of sentences in either transliteration or translation. For variant manuscript readings, I recommend a comparison between Jambūvijayaji’s footnotes and other valuable contributions of new manuscript readings by Harunaga Isaacson (in his PhD

unpublished thesis, 1996) and Ferenc Ruzsa, whose ‘critical edition’ and transliteration on VSc is available online (academia .e du).

2 this is one of the several alternative names by which Kaṇāda, the founder of the Vaiśeṣika system is mentioned in Sanskrit literature; others include Ulūka, Kaṇābhuj, and Kāśyapa. Kaṇabhakṣa may be translated as the ‘atom-eater.’

3 it may refer to the question of whether upahataśarīra refers to liberation during the lifetime (jīvanmukti) when ātman has a body.

Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 53

Translation

1.1.1 now, therefore, we shall explain dharma

a certain brahmin dedicated to the Vedic practice [having] fallen away from [all]

impurity [he] was now struck by a Vedic sentence: ‘feelings of pleasure and pain cannot touch one without a body at all’ [Chāndogya Up. 8.12.1]; then, having pondered on this sentence, he went to Kaṇabhakṣa; 2 therefore [he] said: ‘Oh, Blessed, by this sentence it is indicated that the means for release belong to the one who is afflicted in body’; 3 so, tell me, what is the means [for it]? then, the sage responded: Dharma4 is; then the brahmin went on: what is Dharma? what are its defining marks? what are the other means for its achievement? what is

[its] purpose? and whom does it benefit? now, regarding the explanation about the definition of Dharma, following these questions, the ‘atha’-word indicates

[a discussion to follow] afterwards; likewise, the word ‘ataḥ’ indicates that [the teaching] is imparted, therefore, [only] to a pupil endowed with such qualities:

‘detachment,’ ‘ability to address questions’, ‘intelligence’, which explain the grounds [for achieving dharma]; therefore, whosoever [pupil] is gifted with [such]

qualities, following the questions raised [by him], consequently to such a pupil, we shall afterwards explain Dharma; [on the question of] what is Dharma, thus

[Kaṇāda]5 replies –

4 due to the many turns this concept takes, in this gloss it refers to Dharma – spelt with a capital ‘D’ – which is the ‘unified knowledge,’ the ‘soteriontological’ teaching that liberates man from all shackles of cosmos and ignorance; given that there is a whole variety of dharmas that characterise the entities in the cosmos, as well as the cognitive functions of the soul and mind (see VSc 1.1.5), Dharma with a capital letter would designate the ‘knowledge and the sum of all infinitesimal dharmas as expounded by Vaiśeṣika philosophy.’

5 ‘iha’ translated sometimes with ‘it says’ or ‘he says,’ whereby ‘he’ refers to either Candrānanda, the author of the commentary, or Kaṇāda the author of Sūtrapāṭha (Vaiśeṣikasūtra).

54 * Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

1.1.2. yato ’bhyudaya niḥśreyasasiddhiḥ sa dharmaḥ

yāgadevatāpūjādikriyāṇām ājyapuṣpādi nirvartyānāṃ tadaiva

vinaṣṭatvād uttarakālaṃ phaladānāśakter yasmād dhetor

abhyudayaniḥśreyase bhavataḥ sa ‘dharma’ iti boddhavyaḥ /

abhyudayo brahmādilokeṣu ceṣṭaśarīraprāptir anarthoparamaś ca /

niḥśreyasam adhyātmano vaiśeṣikaguṇābhāvarūpo mokṣaḥ / kuta

evaṃ lakṣaṇo dharmo jñāyata iti cet, āmnāyāt / tasya prāmāṇyaṃ

katham ityāha -

1.1.3. tad vacanād āmnāya prāmāṇyam

tad iti hiraṇyagarbhaparāmarśaḥ hiraṇyaṃ reto’syeti

kṛtvābhagavān maheśvara evocyate / āptenoktatvasya

satyatāvyāptatvād ādihāptena hiraṇyagarbheṇ’oktatvād āmnāyasya

prāmāṇyaṃ sādhyate / īśvaraś ca sādhitastanubhuvanādīnāṃ

kāryatayā ghaṭādivad buddhimat kartṛkatvānumānena / uktaṃ

dharmasvarūpaṃ tal lakṣaṇaṃ ca / sādhanāny asyedānīṃ

dravyaguṇakarmāṇi vakṣyāmaḥ / tatra -

6 ‘abhyudaya’ refers to both ‘worldly and outwardly elevation,’ ‘heaven,’ or ‘mundane elevation’; it is a cosmic concept and should not be confused with the irreversible state of liberation (mokṣa or niḥśreyasa).

7 ‘niḥśreyasa’ represents the ‘absolute state of liberation’ in Vaiśeṣika, which is the ontological state of the ‘soul’ devoid of its ‘specific qualities’; VSc 1.1.2. is the gloss that seems to summarise such an irreversible state: ‘niḥśreyasamadhyātmano vaiśeṣikaguṇābhāvarūpo mokṣaḥ’ (‘salvation is liberation of the nature of ātman devoid of (its) specific qualities’).

8 ‘loka’ in Vedic cosmology is an unstable dwelling region, room, or cosmic or heavenly layer, where the subtle selves go as a result of a righteous life spent on earth; different from liberation (niḥśreyasa), loka is an impermanent state (associated with elevation

‘abhyudaya’), therefore, those who wish to conclude their existence have the option of aspiring to niḥśreyasa.

Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 55

***1.1.2. Dharma is that from which there is achievement ***

of elevation6 and liberation7

because activities such as ‘sacrifice,’ ‘oblation to god,’ and so forth, which are brought about with ‘ghee’ and ‘flowers’ and so on, dissolve at the very time of their execution, and because they are unable to bring [dharmic] fruits at a later time, therefore, dharma is that [instrumental quality] out of which both elevation and liberation arise, thus one should understand [it]; elevation is the removal of sorrows and the achievement of a desired body in [a] world of Brahmā and other intermediate heavens; 8 liberation is mokṣa whose nature lacks [ātman’s] own specific qualities; thus, if you asked by which characteristic marks Dharma is known,

[then the response would be] from the sacred texts; [about] how authoritative are these? [he] says –

***1.1.3. the authority of sacred texts is because [these] ***

represent the speech of ‘that’9

‘tat’ refers to Hiraṇyagarbha, the Great Ṛṣi, and is [identical with] Bhagavān Maheśvara, 10 having been himself made from the golden embryo, thus it is described; the sacred-texts are established as authoritative means of knowledge because they have been stated by a righteous person [Ṛṣi] and these are true, since they have been uttered [primordially] by Hiraṇyagarbha; and Īśvara is the intelligent agent proved to be the creator of the effect-products, because the body, worlds, and so forth, are [his] products, just as the pot is [in relation to pot-maker]

and so forth; having stated dharma’s own nature and definition,11 [now] we shall speak about substances, qualities, [and] motions, which are [knowable] through Dharma; there [we] are –

9 scholars such as Frauwallner debated whether ‘tat’ refers to ‘god,’ ‘that’ as a previous something (sūtra), or somebody (Kaṇāda ‘himself’). The prevalent scholarly view has been that the Vaiśeṣikasūtra is atheistic in ambit, for god is a concept borrowed only later from the Pāśupatas.

10 the concept of god in Vaiśeṣika should not be read in the key in which Aristotle ‘unmoved mover’ left it (Met 12. 6, 7, 9; Phys 7. 1; 8. 4–5; De Mot Ani 2–4); we know that soul is unmoved by nature, but as far as the golden embryo is concerned, God in Vaiśeṣika has an intrinsic effect or action (kriya), a fact which draws it closer to Anxagoras’ view on Logos from which all logoi derive; logoi have been translated by ‘seeds’ by a later post-Aristotelian byzantine philosopher named Maximus the Confessor.

11 definition plays an important role in Vaiśeṣika, so much so that Praśastapāda’s nameability, existence, and knowability form an essential part of it; for a comparative look at Aristotle’s view on definition see An Post. 2.1–13; Top 1.5–6; Met 6. 4. 10–12; 8. 2.

6; De Part Ani 1.2–3.

56 * Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

***1.1.4. pṛthivī āpas tejo vāyur ākāśaṃ kālo ***

dig ātmā mana iti dravyāṇi

dravyatvābhisambandhād dravyāṇi / pṛthivītvābhisambandhāt

pṛthivī / evam eva abādisaṃjñāḥ / ‘navaiva dravyāṇi nādhikāni’

ityevam artham iti śabdaḥ / evam uddiṣṭāni dravyāṇi / ke punar

guṇā ityāha -

***1.1.5. rūpa rasa gandha sparśāḥ saṅkhyā ***

***parimāṇāni pṛthaktva saṃyogavibhāgau ***

***paratvāparatve buddhayaḥ sukhaduḥkhe ***

icchādveṣau prayatnaś ca guṇāḥ

ete saptadaśa kaṇṭhoktā rūpādayo guṇāḥ ‘ca’ śabdasamuccitāś ca

gurutva dravatva sneha saṃskāra dharmādharma śabdā gṛhyante /

ete yathāvasaramuttar atra vakṣyante / kāni punaḥ karmāṇī ityāha -

12 although ‘diś’ has been rendered here by ‘space,’ its meaning is broader as it often designates ‘direction’ as a different concept from ‘spatial location.’

13 what is substance in Indian philosophy in general and in Vaiśeṣika in particular is a difficult question to answer and that is due to the eclectic list given by Kaṇāda; once again we must look into other traditions, for instance, Aristotle Cat 5; Met 7. 1, 16, 17.

14 substantiality is the essence of a substance and contains 2 sets of qualities: (1) a set of generic qualities that do not change (sāmānyaguṇa), and a set of qualities that are accidental and perishable (viśeṣaguṇa); this classification applies predominantly to abstract substances: time, space, soul, and vacuum; accordingly, one also needs to distinguish between ‘essence-substantiality’ and ‘existential-substantiality.’

15 what does meaning mean in Vaiśeṣika? See also Aristotle Cat 1; De Int 1–4, 8; Top 1.15; Met 4.2.1003a33–b15.

Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 57

***1.1.4. ‘earth,’ ‘water,’ ‘lustre,’ ‘air,’ ‘vacuum,’ ‘time,’ ***

‘space,’12 ‘soul,’ ‘mind,’ these are the substances13

substances are connected with essence-substantiality; 14 ‘earth’ is connected with earthiness; and in likewise manner, there is the designation of [water] and so forth; [as for] the manner in which the meaning15 is [being indicated] in [the sentence] ‘only nine substances and no more,’ the meaning of this is because the word ‘iti’ is [used]; thus, substances are described; again, on the question which are the qualities? [Kaṇāda] says –

***1.1.5. ‘form-colour,’16 ‘taste,’ ‘smell,’ ‘touch,’ ‘numbers,’ ***

***‘dimensions,’ ‘distinctness,’ ‘conjunction,’ ‘disjunction,’ ***

***‘proximity,’ ‘remoteness,’ ‘cognition,’ ‘pleasure,’ ‘pain,’ ***

‘volition,’17 *** ‘aversion,’ and ‘effort’ are the qualities***

these 17 qualities [beginning with] ‘form-colour’ and so forth, have been mentioned here; [but] because of the ‘ca’-word [other qualities must] also be included:

‘weight,’ ‘fluidity,’ ‘viscosity,’ ‘impetus,’18 ‘dharma,’19 ‘adharma,’ ‘sound’; these shall be discussed later at the right time; concerning how many motions are there, again [Kaṇāda] says –

16 ‘rūpa’ may be rendered by ‘colour’ and ‘form-colour,’ respectively, but other alternatives such as ‘shape’ and ‘figure’ are to be considered too, Halbfass 1992: 104; for a discussion on form in relation to substance and matter see Aristotle Met 7.7–9, 11, 17; 8.2–3; 9.7; 12.1–5.

17 ‘volition’ (icchā), which may be interchangeably translated with ‘desire,’ has been cho-sen in this context because it is an initial form of ‘desire,’ whereby ‘desire’ may be standing between the low level of propensity and the higher level of ‘effort’ (which is another quality of soul).

18 ‘impetus’ (saṃskāra) can be of several types; elsewhere it has been translated by

‘mental impetus,’ but it can be a ‘cosmic impetus’ too, depending on the phenomena involved; like ‘dharma’ and ‘adharma’ (jointly designated with ‘adṛṣṭa’), saṃskāra is a specific quality that plays at least a 2-fold role – mental and physical.

19 dharma, as the infinitesimal ‘quality’ of the substance (soul) should be analysed in relation to and distinct from Dharma as discussed in VSc 1.1.1.

58 * Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

***1.1.6. utkṣepaṇam avakṣepaṇam ākuñcanaṃ ***

prasāraṇaṃ gamanam iti karmāṇi

etāny eva pañca karmāṇi draṣṭavyāni / gamanagrahaṇāt

bhramaṇarecanādīnāṃ grahaṇaṃ / evam uddiṣṭāni

dravyaguṇakarmāṇi / tad anuṣaṅgāt sāmānyaviśeṣasamavāyā api

vakṣyante / evaṃ ṣaṇṇāṃ padārthānāṃ sādharmya vaidharmya

parijñānaṃ viṣayadoṣadarśanadvāreṇa vairāgyotpattau

satyāṃ niḥśreyase sādhye dharmahetuḥ / abhyudaye sādhye

dharmahetutvaṃ punar amīṣāṃ ‘same yajeta’ […] iti pṛthivyāḥ

‘adho’ṃbūni nayati’ […] ityādi yathāsvam anyeṣāṃ dravyāṇāṃ

/ guṇānāṃ tu ‘kṛṣṇam ālabheta’ […] ityādi / karmaṇāṃ tu ‘vrīhīn

avahanti’ […] ityādi / vijñāta sādharmyavaidharmyāṇāṃ ca

dravyādīnām abhyudaya niḥśreyasa hetutvāt sādharmyaṃ tāvat

kathayati -

20 for a discussion about action at Aristotle, see EN 3.1–5; 6 2.4; 7.3; MA 6–7; De An.

3.9–11.

21 the 6 categories are substance, quality, motion, universality, particularity, and inherence; the word padārtha occurs here for the first time in the commentary of Candrānanda; in Sūtrapāṭha, there is no indication about the number 6 but here the commentator seems to settle the matter; Categories in VSc may not have the linguistic motivation which Aristotle seems to have ascribed by his 10 categories (see Cat 1–5, 6–9; Top. 1.9; Met 5.7; 7.1; An Post 1. 27.43a25–43).

22 possible locations of the quotes about these injunctions could be traced in the Brāhmaṇas (SB 8.16.51–52), see, for instance, Maurice Bloomfield concordance.

Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 59

***1.1.6. ‘upwards motion,’ ‘downwards motion,’ ‘pressing,’ ***

‘expansion,’ ‘going,’ these are the motions20

these motions should be seen as only 5; due to [our] perception of motion, [and]

because of the conceptualisation of ‘movement’, the ‘rotation’ and ‘evacua-tion’ and so forth [have been included too]; substances, qualities, motions are enumerated; universality, particularity, and inherence will also be mentioned, because of their connection with ‘tat’-word; thus, the true discernment between the 6 categories, 21 their similarity and dissimilarity lead to seeing corruption in objects, [and] the detachment from these is the instrumental cause of dharma which leads to liberation; ‘he ought to sacrifice on an even ground’22 this [injunction] refers to the substance ‘earth,’ ‘he brings water downwards’ and so forth, each according to its type [such injunction refers] to the substances that produce the knowledge of dharma, [and] that is conducive to elevation; yet, regarding qualities, there are [injunctions] like: ‘he should immolate a black animal’ and so forth; [while] in relation to motions there are [injunctions] like ‘they thresh rice’

and so forth; and, as a result of the discernment23concerning substances, their similarity and dissimilarity, this is the cause of elevation and liberation, for which

[reason Kaṇāda] explains universality24 [first] –

23 discernment plays a crucial role in Indian philosophy, but also among the neptic fathers (Canévet 2014) for it is a tool by which man distinguishes the good and evil in abstract things and events that come under human senses; a concept that may be useful here is εὐδαιμονία on which Aristotle speaks several times: EN 1.1–5, 7–12; 10.6–8; EE

1.1–5; 2.1; 7.3; Pol 7.1–3.

24 ‘commonness’ is expressed in sūtra 1.1.7 as ‘aviśeṣa’ (‘indistinct’).

60 * Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

***1.1.7. sad anityaṃ dravyavat kāryaṃ kāraṇaṃ ***

sāmānyaviśeṣavad iti dravyaguṇa karmaṇām aviśeṣaḥ

‘sad dravyaṃ san guṇaḥ sat karma’ eti sattā trayāṇām aviśeṣaḥ / tathaiv ānityatvam anyatrākāśādibhyaḥ / dravyavad iti samavāyikāraṇavattvamaviśeṣaḥ

paramāṇv ākāśādivarjam / kāryatvamabhūtvā bhavanaṃ tathaiv āviśeṣo’nyatra nitya dravyebhyaḥ / kāraṇatvaṃ kāryajanakatvaṃ trayāṇāmaviśeṣaḥ

kṣityādīni dravyaguṇakarmaṇāṃ samavāyikāraṇaṃ ākāśādīni guṇānāṃ

mano’ntyāvayavidravye guṇakarmaṇāṃ / guṇās tu rūpa rasa gandhānuṣṇa

sparśa saṃkhyā parimāṇaika pṛthaktva sneha śabda asamavāyikāraṇam, buddhi sukha duḥkh’ecchādveṣa prayatna dharmādharma bhāvanā nimittakāraṇam,

saṃyogavibhāgauṣṇya gurutva dravatva vegā ubhayathā kāraṇam /

paratvāparatvadvitva dvipṛthaktva pārimaṇḍalyādayokāraṇam / karmāṇi

saṃyogavibhāgeṣu asamavāyikāraṇaṃ / sāmānyāni ca tāni dravyatvādīni viśeṣāś ca ta iti sāmānyaviśeṣāḥ tad vattā trayāṇām aviśeṣaḥ / trayāṇām ekatve prāpte vaidharmyam ucyate / tathā hi -

25 on causes in Aristotle, see Phys 2.3–7; Met 6.2; Met 1; An Post 2.2; Met 5.2, 30.

26 notable are the new concepts, ‘reality’ (sat) and ‘eternity’ (nitya), respectively; when it is said that the whole ‘category of substances’ is ‘impermanent’ (transitory), Kaṇāda refers to the ‘state’ and ‘composition’ that the substances can take; when, for example, a substance earth exists in its atomic state, that is ‘permanent’ because the atoms cannot be further divided, but when the substance earth is in the state of a ‘pot,’ then obviously earth is ‘impermanent,’ ‘perishable,’ because the earth-pot is dissolvable. The same reasoning may be applied to the categories of qualities (for example, the ‘generic qualities’

of the ‘soul’ are permanent, while the ‘specific qualities’ of the self are impermanent, and removable); presumably motions (as different from activities, kriyā) may follow a comparable pattern, for it is said in the sūtra, that they too are ‘permanent.’

27 substances that are composed of atoms, say the mahābhūtas (earth, water, lustre, wind), are composed of atoms and represent the chemical composition of various objects (pot), biological bodies (jantu), and cosmic phenomena (e.g. thunder).

28 order of substances as this emerges in the aphorisms (sūtra) is very important; for instance, when the commentator’s enumeration states ‘vacuum and so forth,’ readers should go to sūtra 1.1.4, where the substances are enumerated and see what other substances follow after it, for these too are included in the definition of Candrānanda.

29 when Nozawa translates ‘in a state of final whole,’ his understanding is probably that whatever exists as non-composite must be a ‘simple whole’; my view is that when a substance is said to be non-composite it means that it cannot be divided further, not that it is ‘simple whole’; the view of ‘whole’ as ‘simplicity’ is characteristic of Latin and Islamic views on ‘essence’; there are 2 concepts in Vaiśeṣika (pṛthaktva and antyaviśeṣa) that could prove that the ‘essence’ of a substance in its pre-existential state is both many and one, both ‘particularised’ as well as ‘holistic.’ The system argues, through a network of webs and connections, both the unity and particularity of the visible and invisible world.

30 By ‘one-distinctness’ (eka pṛthaktva), the commentator clarifies what pṛthaktva is, namely the ‘quality’ of an eternal substance that is exclusively ‘pluralised’ by a series of ‘infinite unique distinct entities’ (antyaviśeṣa). Distinctness is present not only at the ultimate, infinitesimal level, but at higher levels too, for instance, ‘double-distinctness’

(dvipṛthaktva) and so forth.

Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 61

***1.1.7. substance, quality, [and] motion, are not different ***

***when: they possess existentiality, impermanence, ***

substantiality, and [are subject to] cause25 *** and effect, ***

and when they possess particular universal.26

‘substance is real, quality is real, motion is real’ this [sentence indicates] that reality is a characteristic of all 3 [categories]; similarly, the other [substances] except for

‘vacuum’ and so forth, are impermanent; except for atoms,27 ‘vacuum,’ and so forth

[time, space, soul, mind], 28 these are similar in that they have essence-substantiality, and have inherent causality; to be product means to ‘be coming out of a non-existent,’ likewise [the 3 categories] are similar except for the eternal substances; the 3 categories [also] do not differ because they are causative [in nature] and [are]

capable of engendering an effect, such as ‘earth’ and others which are the inherent cause of substance, quality, motion; [correspondingly] ‘vacuum’ and so forth are [inherent cause] of qualities, for instance, ‘mind’ is the inherent cause of [the knowledge of] qualities and motions of the substances when in their non-composite state; 29 as for the qualities ‘colour,’ ‘taste,’ ‘touch,’ ‘smell,’ cool-‘touch,’ ‘num-

ber,’ ‘dimension,’ one-’distinctness,’30 ‘viscosity,’ [and] ‘sound,’ [these] are non-inherent causes; 31 [whereas] ‘cognition,’ ‘pleasure,’ ‘pain,’ ‘volition,’ ‘aversion,’

‘effort,’ ‘dharma,’ ‘adharma,’ ‘mental creative energy’32 are instrumental-causes; 33

‘conjunction,’ ‘disjunction,’ hot-‘touch,’ ‘weight,’ ‘fluidity,’ velocity are both

[instrumental and non-inherent] causes; non-causes are: ‘remoteness,’ ‘proximity,’

duality, double-distinctness, circularity, and so forth; motions are the non-inherent cause of ‘conjunction’ and ‘disjunction’; the aspect in which the 3 [categories]

are indistinguishable is when they have a particular universality, and [each of the 3 categories] have generality; 34 once the similarity of the 3 categories is established, dissimilarity will be stated [too]; 35 hence, [Kaṇāda] says –

31 the verbs ‘to be’ and ‘to have’ are not always clearly differentiated in Sanskrit, therefore, when it is said that such ‘qualities are non-inherent cause,’ it means that ‘they do not inhere’ in something or that ‘they do not have inherence in something’.

32 here Candrānanda seems to replace saṃskāra with bhāvanā, which is possibly a synonym for saṃskāra. For him, saṃskāra possesses 2 sub-guṇas called vega and bhāvanā; in Praśastapāda’s PD 85, however, we have what appear to be 3 different sub-guṇas (vega, bhāvanā, sthitisthāpaka), where bhāvanā ‘cognitive faculty’ is a sub-guṇa of saṃskāra that defines the ‘non-corporeal’ (amūrta) entities such as ‘ātivāhikaśarīra’ as referred to by Praśastapāda (PD 359).

33 these are the specific qualities of the soul, which ātman possesses while in the embodied state; when it is said that they are ‘instrumental causes,’ the commentator perhaps refers to their capacity to bind the pure ‘soul’ into the cosmos. They are the instruments for any activity that the soul undergoes. Soul by nature is motionless, ‘passive,’ yet it can be affected or polluted by ‘active’ forces, such as these qualities are.

34 the commentator argues that alongside universality and particularity there is genera too.

35 ‘similarity’ and ‘dissimilarity’ imply each other not only from an ontological point of view, but also from an epistemological point of view; in fact, ontology pre-exists and is the ground onto which the epistemology develops, and it is this stress that distinguishes Vaiśeṣika (ontology) from the Nyāya (epistemology) system.

62 * Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

1.1.8. dravyāṇi dravyāntaram ārabhante

dravye ca dravyāṇi ceti vigrahādekam anāraṃbhakaṃ /

samavāyikāraṇāni dravyāṇi svātmavyatiriktaṃ kāryadravyam

ārabhante / ākāśādyantyāvayavidravyāṇi tu dravyaṃ nārabhante

tulyajātīyānāṃ mūrtikriyārūpādimatāṃ dvayor bahūnāṃ vā

kāraṇānāṃ kāryārambhakatvāt / na c’aivaṃ vidhānyākāśādīni /

manasosparśavattvād dravyākāraṇatvam antyāvayavidravyāṇāṃ

cādṛṣṭatvāt /

1.1.9. guṇāś ca guṇāntaram

guṇau ca guṇāś ceti pūrvavat / yathā tanturūpādayaḥ

svāśrayasamavete paṭadravye rūpādiguṇānātmavyatiriktān

ārabhante /

1.1.10. karma karmasādhyaṃ na vidyate

na karmaṇā karma janyate karmaṇām uparama darśanāt /

karmārambhe hi karmaṇāṃ niṣkarmaṇo dravyasyānupalambhaḥ

syāt / evaṃ ca kānicid dravyāṇi ārambhakāṇi kānicin naiva / guṇāḥ

kecit kāraṇaṃ kecin naiva / karmāṇi naiva karmakāraṇam ity etad

vaidharmyam / vaidharmyāntaram āha -

36 ‘has no support’ in the sense that ‘it does no longer make sense at all.’

37 allusion is being made here to the theory of asatkāryavāda, which acknowledges the accumulation of something new due to the creative power of a substance to multiply or expand.

38 ‘wholistic’ means ‘to have parts,’ therefore, limitless, all-pervasive; it refers to a state of absolute ‘complex simplicity’ that is unaffected by the danger of composition and decomposition (birth and death), such as the intrinsic nature of the substance ‘soul,’

‘space,’ ‘time,’ ‘vacuum,’ and to a certain extent, the ‘atomic mind.’

39 Thakur (2003: 28) translates: ‘two or more causes of similar characteristics, having finiteness, motion, colour etc. can originate the effect’; effect may refer here to the newly shaped substance, and to sum up, the substance can ‘produce’ other substance, only regarding its shape not its intrinsic nature; ‘activity’ and ‘effects’ are the appropriate translation for ‘kārya’ insofar as an effect is changeable and impermanent.

40 these are the ‘subtle substances’ that exist in their pre-existential, pre-manifested, and pluralised state, and can be perceived only by a form of induction that uses

‘antyaviśeṣa’ as a factor for their real ontological and cognitive determination (through a dharmaviśeṣa).

Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 63

1.1.8. substances generate other substances

if you maintain [the existence of] both a [singular] ‘substance’ and [plural] ‘substances,’ then one substance cannot generate the separate diffusion [of a different

substance];36 because substances are inherent causes, and they can produce an effect that is different from their own nature;37 but the substances that are holistic38 such as ‘vacuum’ cannot produce [another] substance, [but only those substances] that have a similar class, or have 2 or many ‘forms,’ ‘concrete shape,’

‘motion,’ and so forth, cause the production of effects;39 and ‘vacuum’ and other

[substances] are not of this kind; since ‘mind’ does not possess ‘touch,’ it is not the cause for [another] substance, for a holistic substance40 is imperceptible. 41

1.1.9. and quality [generates] other qualities

like the previous [gloss runs], quality is both dual and many; for example, the colour of thread is inherent in the substratum42 of the substance-cloth [and] cannot produce [itself other] colour[s] and qualities indistinguishable from its own

[substratum]. 43

1.1.10. no motion is known to set up [another] motion

motion does not engender another [motion], we notice the cessation of the [subsequent] motion;44 the perception of substances which are devoid of motionness would be impossible, if motion engendered motions; 45 thus, certain substances are fabricators, and others are not like that; some qualities are [the] cause [of others], others are not the cause [of others]; motions are never the cause of motion, 46 this is a [form] of dissimilarity; concerning another dissimilarity, [Kaṇāda] says –

41 Thakur (2003: 28) translates: ‘the mind, since it has no touch, cannot be the cause of a new substance and the final embodied substances are also found to be unable to originate a new substance, because the case of origination in this connection is not seen.’

42 Thakur (2003: 28): ‘the qualities colour etc. of the yarn produce colour etc. in the cloth which is inherent in their substratum; the qualities of the yarn are not the same with the qualities of the cloth.’

43 Vaiśeṣika stresses further the difference between substance and quality.

44 See VSc 1.1.2. where Candrānanda presumably maintains that the effects of some ritualistic motions cannot produce new karmic results at a later time.

45 To avoid ‘infinite regress’ (groundless logics), and in order to argue for the possibility of ultimate knowledge and liberation (which is the ground or the static state), the system denies the permanent multiplication of action; here a new reference is given to those substances that are ‘devoid of motion’ see VS 3.2.27.

46 motion has distinct reality, and the fact that it cannot produce another motion shows that what glue and amalgamate entities are the qualities: conjunction (saṃyoga) and disjunction (vibhāga) which are attached to substances (e.g. soul); this gloss draws attention to the ambivalent nature of substances and qualities.

64 * Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

1.1.11. kāryāvirodhi dravyaṃ kāraṇāvirodhi ca

vināśo virodhaḥ pratibandhaḥ kvacid dravyādinā kāryeṇa

kāraṇadravyaṃ samavāyyasamavāyikāraṇābhyāṃ ca na virudhyate

/ tathā hi aṅgulidravyaṃ kāryam dvyaṅgulaṃ janayiṣyat tad

arthena karmaṇā tat kṛtena saṃyogena tato’ jātena dvyaṅgulena

na virudhyate nāpi samavāyyasamavāyikāraṇābhyāṃ purva tat

saṃyogābhyāṃ vā mano’ntyāvayavidravyāṇi guṇakarmabhiḥ

kāryair ākāśādīni guṇair nityatvād eṣāṃ na kāraṇavirodhaḥ /

1.1.12. ubhayathā guṇaḥ

kāryakāraṇobhayānubhayair avirodhī virodhī ca / paramāṇu

dvyaṇukādy antyāvayavidravyeṣu rūpādayaḥ kāryobhayakāraṇair

avirodhino yathā sambhavaṃ / rūpa rasa gandha sparśā

akāryakāraṇabhūtā avirodhinaḥ paraspareṇa / virodhina

ādyamadhyāntya śabdāḥ kāryobhaya kāraṇaiḥ adṛṣṭaḥ kāryeṇa

sparśavad dravyasaṃyogena vegaprayatnau saṃyogavibhāgau

sukhaduḥkhe, icchādveṣau parasparatokāryakāraṇabhūtau

virudhyete jñānaṃ saṃskārasantāna pratipakṣaiḥ saṃskāro

jñānamad duḥkhādibhir iti yathāsambhavam etad draṣṭavyam /

47 Thakur (2003: 29): ‘Candrānanda furnished the example of two individual fingers [substance] producing a unit [substance] of two fingers through “conjunction” where there is no contradiction between two substances. Some more examples have also been cited to show the non-contradiction between effect and cause. We can observe the simple application of the rule in the following fact: cloth cannot be contradictory to its cause, the yarns, i.e. cloth cannot destroy its yarns, and yarns also cannot be contradictory to its effect, cloth i.e. yarns also cannot destroy the cloth.’

48 this gloss mainly describes the various types of ‘non-contradiction’ or ‘non-obstruction’ between a cause and an effect, which otherwise are connected by a union.

Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 65

1.1.11. substance is neither obstructed by effect, nor by cause

obstruction is destruction, suspension; at any rate, a certain substance and so forth cannot be obstructed by an effect, nor by [any] substance-cause [be it] inherent or non-inherent; when the substance finger is an effect that would produce 2 fingers united, 47 then the union produced with the motion of the motion, [the effect produced] does not obstruct the 2 fingers substances and also does not obstruct the inherent and non-inherent substance-causes; and similarly the inch does not obstruct the union between inherent and non-inherent substance-causes, or their relation; mind does not obstruct the substances in their ultimate wholistic state, when there are activities of qualities and motions; ‘vacuum’ and other [substances] do not obstruct the qualities because they are permanent and not obstructive causes.48

1.1.12. quality is both [obstructable and non-obstructable]

both cause and effect are both obstructable and non-obstructable; ‘form-colour’

and so forth are existential [qualities] as follows: they are not obstructed by both cause and effect in the state of substances utterly devoid of parts, in the atom, atomic dyads, and so forth; [qualities] ‘form-colour,’ ‘taste,’ ‘smell,’ [and]

‘touch’ do not obstruct mutually when they are not the product49 of cause and effect [process]; when there are words like first, middle, and last, adṛṣṭa produces effects through the contact with speed50 and ‘effort’ in relation to a substance possessed by ‘touch’; while in the case of existential things51 ‘conjunction,’ ‘disjunction,’ ‘pleasure,’ ‘pain,’ ‘volition,’ ‘aversion’ these are not mutually obstructed by cause-effect [relationship]; ‘cognition’ [forms] by a continuous ligature with a ‘latent impetus,’ with [various] adversities such as impressions in intellect,

‘pains’ and so forth, thus is how [things] should be understood concerning their

existential becoming.52

49 bhutā is the existential of the ‘past tense form,’ a product produced a priori.

50 speed, which is a sub-guṇa of the latent impetus (saṃskāra) may refer to a ‘unconscious motion’ effect, whereas effort may refer to a ‘conscious effort.’

51 Thakur (2003; 29): ‘now, where there is no cause-effect relation, we see some qualities contradictory to each other, such as “conjunction” and “disjunction,” “pleasure” and

“pain,” “volition” and “aversion.”’

52 the large taxonomy that the system develops around the concept of ‘obstruction’

(virodha) shows the Vaiśeṣikas’ urge to systematise the ontological ‘difference’ that characterises the whole of reality.

66 * Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

1.1.13. kārya virodhi karma

saṃyogavibhāga saṃskārāṇāṃ kāryāṇāṃ madhyāt saṃyoge naiva

karma virudhyate na vibhāgasaṃskārābhyām saṃyogānutpatti

prasaṅgāt / vaidharmyāntaram api /

***1.1.14. kriyāvad guṇavat samavāyikāraṇam ***

iti dravyalakṣaṇam

utkṣepaṇādikaṃ karma kriyā yathāsambhavaṃ yasmin yat

samavāyena vartate tat kriyāvat anyatrākāśakāladigātmabhyaḥ

/ guṇā rūpādayo yatra yathā sambhavaṃ vartante tad guṇavat

/ ayutasiddhānām ādhāryādhārabhūtānām iha iti yataḥ sa

samavāyaḥ sa yasyāsti tat samavāyi kāraṇaṃ ca tadeva

samavāyino vā kāryasya kāraṇam / tatra kṣityādīni trayāṇāṃ

dravyaguṇakarmaṇāṃ samavāyikāraṇam ākāśādīni guṇānāṃ

mano’ntyāvayavidravye guṇakarmaṇām /

53 virodha is sometimes translated as ‘obstruction,’ but in the context of vaidharmya, the scope of this daily lesson (āhnika) is to describe what is different (vaidharmya); the sūtra stresses the radical ontological difference that exists between ‘motion’ and ‘effect’

(product). For example, consciously throwing a stone into a pond is very different from the unconscious effect of the motion of pebbles.

54 Thakur (2012: 29) translates saṃskāra with ‘tendency,’ see the index for pravṛtti.

55 ‘prasaṅga’ has been generally translated as the ‘context of an earlier discussion,’ an argument previously discussed, either in the written text or in an oral taught lesson (āhnika).

56 ‘saṃskāra’ is translated as ‘latent impetus’ (when it refers to cosmic events) and at other times as ‘mental impetus’ (when it is used in the context of mental and psychological laws under which ātman is submitted).

57 Thakur (2003: 29): ‘the effects of motion are “conjunction,” “disjunction,” and tendency; among these three conjunctions alone and not “disjunction” and tendency can contradict the motion.’ Thakur adds the following commentary ‘if the motion were contradicted by the other two, “conjunction” could not appear.’

Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 67

1.1.13. motion is contrary53 to effect

among activities there are ‘conjunction,’ ‘disjunction,’ ‘latent impetus,’54 [but]

motion is antithetical only to ‘conjunction,’ thus, it follows from this situation, 55

that ‘conjunction’ is not produced, because ‘disjunction’ and ‘latent impetus’56 do

not [obstruct motion]; 57 also another differentiation is –

***1.1.14. defining characteristics of substance are: to be ***

***possessed by activity, to be possessed by quality, ***

to be an inherent cause [of another entity]58

possessed by activity refers to that substance which has something inherent in it,

[and] whose manifestation is exemplified by an effect caused by the first motion of an upwards motion, from this [type of manifestation] ‘vacuum,’ ‘time,’ ‘space,’

‘soul’ are exempt; 59 that [substance]60 which has quality occurs in the manifestation as exemplified by a quality ‘form-colour’ and so forth;61 inherence, indicated

by the word ‘iha’62 means [that entity] because of which [these things] happen which is the existential that is always united with, such as the sustainer is tightly united with the holded [thing], and that in which [inherence exists] is called inherent [thing]; cause is only that which is the cause of an inherent effect; in this respect, [the concrete substances] ‘earth’ and so forth represent the inherent cause of the 3 categories substance, quality, motion, [while the abstract substances]

‘vacuum’ and so forth, represent [the inherent cause] of qualities; regarding [substance] ‘mind’ and those holistic substances [are inherent cause of] qualities and

motions.63

58 Thakur (2003: 30): ‘the characteristic features of a substance are that it becomes the substratum of motion and the substratum of quality and it becomes the inherent cause.’

59 That ‘vacuum,’ ‘time,’ ‘space,’ and ‘soul’ are substances ‘devoid of motion,’ see VSc 5.2.23.

60 ‘guṇavat’ must refer here to a substance, see definition of substance in VS 1.1.14.

61 Thakur (2003: 30): ‘qualities are existent in each and every substance according to their capacity.’

62 elsewhere ‘iha’ has been translated by the Latin idiom ‘hic and nunc’ widely used in psychology.

63 discussion of this gloss demonstrates the classification of the substances in a tripartite taxonomy: (1) concrete substances (the mahābhūtas); (2) abstract substances (‘vacuum,’ ‘time,’ ‘space,’ ‘soul’); and (3) atomic substances (mind and mahābhūtas in their atomic state).

68 * Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

***1.1.15. dravyāśrayī aguṇavān saṃyogavibhāgeṣvakāraṇam ***

anapekṣa iti guṇalakṣaṇam

dravyam āśrayat īti dravyāśrayī aguṇavān nirguṇaḥ

saṃyogavibhāgeṣvakāraṇam anapekṣa iti sāpekṣaḥ kāraṇaṃ

/ tathā hi aṅgulyorākāśasaṃyogo dvyaṅgulākāśasaṃyoge

kartavye dvyaṅgulotpattim apekṣate aṅgulyoḥ parasparavibhāgo

dvyaṅgulākāśavibhāgaṃ prati kāryavināśamapekṣate evaṃ

saṃyogavibhāgalakṣaṇa eva guṇaḥ saṃyogavibhāgeṣu sāpekṣaḥ

kāraṇam /

***1.1.16. ekadravyam aguṇaṃ saṃyoga vibhāgeṣvanapekṣaṃ ***

kāraṇam iti karmalakṣaṇaṃ

ekam asya karmaṇo dravyamāśrayaḥ na dve ekam eva

vā dravye vartate ity eka dravyam / nāsya guṇāḥ sant īty

aguṇam / saṃyogavibhāgeṣu kāryeṣu svasyāśrayasyānyato

vibhajyāśrayāntareṇa saṃyojanād utpādyavināśyānapekṣayā

saṃyogavibhāgeṣvanapekṣaṃ kāraṇam iti / vaidharmyāntaram api /

1.1.17. dravyaguṇakarmaṇāṃ dravyaṃ kāraṇaṃ sāmānyam

‘sāmānya’ śabdaḥ samānaparyāyaḥ / kṣityādīni trayāṇāṃ

kāraṇaṃ samānam / ākāśādīnāṃ kevalaguṇakāraṇatve’pi

ekaikasyāneka guṇatvādākāśādīni samānaṃ guṇeṣu kāraṇam

mano’ntyāvayavidravye guṇakarmaṇām /

64 ‘quality is cause’ only in a dependent manner; alternative reading: ‘quality does not become a cause without expecting another thing in conjunction and disjunction.’

65 quality can become ‘cause’ only with the medium of ‘conjunction’ and ‘disjunction,’

plus other quality, or qualities; the chain of specific qualities that cause the birth (janman) of a new body is a case in point, see VSc 6.2.17–18; one may further note how such specific qualities are arranged in doubles of duality, one quality presupposing a conflicting one (dharma and adharma, icchā and dveṣa, ‘conjunction’ and ‘disjunction’

and so forth)

66 in relation to its capacity to act as a cause, motion is just the opposite of quality, because it is an ‘independent’ not a ‘dependent cause’ such as quality; it does not require something else in order to create something by the medium of ‘conjunction’ and ‘disjunction.’

Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 69

***1.1.15. defining characteristics of quality are these: to be dependent on ***

***a substance, not possessed by [another] quality, [and] not to be ***

an independent cause without ‘conjunction’ and ‘disjunction’64

‘dravyāśrayī’ means to depend on a substance-substratum, ‘aguṇavan’ means to be devoid of quality; independent [quality] is that which is not a cause of [another] ‘conjunction’ and ‘disjunction’;65 for example, the ‘conjunction’ between ‘vacuum’ and 2 fingers requires the [subsequent] production of 2 fingers when the ‘conjunction’ of 2 fingers and ‘vacuum’ must be done; the ‘disjunction’ and mutual ‘disjunction’ of fingers expect the [subsequent] destruction of the effect for the sake of the ‘disjunction’ of 2 fingers and ‘vacuum’; thus, the quality [‘conjunction’] becomes cause for

‘conjunction’ and ‘disjunction’ only when it requires something else.

***1.1.16. defining characteristics of motion are these: it has [only] one ***

***substance [as its substratum], is devoid of quality, and is an ***

independent cause of ‘conjunction’ and ‘disjunction.’66

‘eka’ means that motion has one substance as a substratum, not two, or [it means]

that there exists only one activity in the substance, this is how oneness of substance

[is being explained]; ‘aguṇam’ means that motion has no qualities; motion is an independent cause in relation to ‘conjunction’ and ‘disjunction,’ this means that when

‘conjunction’ and ‘disjunction’ are about to happen, having separated their own substratum from another thing, when they are joined with another substratum, they are independent of anything produced [and] destroyed; another dissimilarity as well [is] –

***1.1.17. essence-substantiality is common ground to [categories] substance, ***

quality, motion

word ‘sāmānya’ is a synonym for ‘genera’;67 ‘earth’ and so forth are the common

cause of the 3 [categories: substance, quality, motion]; the ‘vacuum’ and so forth are the common causes of qualities because in each substance there can be many qualities, therefore these [essences] are being the common cause of qualities; ‘mind’

becomes the cause of the qualities and motions in the substances which are partless. 68

67 Candrānanda offers here a ‘general’ and ‘metaphorical’ exegesis; likewise, the following sūtra 1.1.18 refers to generality as ‘similarity’ and ‘repetition,’ not as commonness and identity.

68 ‘mind’ becomes the cause of qualities and motions in the substances that are partless. It is an important statement for understanding the theory of transmigration in Vaiśeṣika, as explained in VSc 5.2.14 and VSc 5.2.19; passages that explain how manas (with the quality ‘effort’) is instrumental in the formation of a new body; yet, elsewhere manas shares with soul several specific qualities such as saṃskāra, which is presumably responsible for the transformation of the ‘soul’ from its all-pervasive ‘partless state’ (possessed by generic qualities only) down to its ‘embodied state’ (possessed by specific qualities too).

70 * Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

1.1.18. tathā guṇaḥ

‘saṃyogānāṃ dravyam’ [1.1.25] iti ‘agnisaṃyogād

guṇāntaraprādurbhāvād’ [7.1.5,6] ity ‘ātmasaṃyogaprayatnābhyāṃ

haste karma’ iti vākyebhyaḥ saṃyoga eva dravyaguṇakarmaṇāṃ

samānaṃ kāraṇaṃ nānyo guṇaḥ / tathā hi tūlapiṇḍasya vegavatā

tūlena saṃyogāt karma dvitūlakadravyaṃ tatra ca parimāṇaṃ

mahad utpadyate anye guṇā yathāyogam /

1.1.19. saṃyogavibhāgānāṃ karma

svāśrayam anyato vibhajyāśrayāntareṇa saṃyojayati ataḥ saṃyoga

vibhāgānāṃ samānaṃ kāraṇaṃ karma /

1.1.20 na dravyāṇāṃ vyatirekāt

yadi khalu dravyasya kāraṇaṃ karma bhavet tathā sati

kṛtvāpi saṃyogaṃ na nivarteta nivṛtte tu karmaṇi kevalasya

saṃyogasyopalambhāt manyāmahe na dravya kāraṇaṃ karma /

1.1.21. guṇavaidharmyān na karmaṇām

gurutva dravatva nodanābhighaṭa saṃyukta saṃyogāḥ svāśraye

parāśraye ca karma kāraṇam prayatnādṛṣṭau tu parāśraya eva / tatra

tāvat karma na svāśraye karmakāraṇaṃ niṣkriyadravyānupalabdhi

prasaṅgāt / nāpi parāśraye tat saṃyogenaiva nivartitatvāt / tasmād

etaiḥ karmakāraṇair guṇair vaidharmyān na karma karmakāraṇam /

aparaṃ vaidharmyam /

69 this sūtra follows the definition of the previous one, to be the ‘essence cause’ to the 3 categories.

70 the gloss refers to a snowball effect, whereby motion does not produce another action, but rather its role is to impact the dimension (e.g. mahat) of substances and qualities.

71 ‘substratum’ may refer here to substance and its essence; ‘conjunction’ and ‘disjunction’ can only change the substance (seen as a substratum) but not its ‘essence’ (which is unchangeable).

Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 71

***1.1.18. similarly, the quality is [defined as common ***

ground for the 3 categories]69

‘substance is conjunctive’ [1.1.25], so it is said [in the sentence] ‘from a conjunction with fire other qualities are produced’ [7.1.5–6] thus it is said, ‘motion in hand’ is because of a connection between ‘effort’ and soul’ [5.1.1], such sentences show that only ‘conjunction’ is the common cause of substance, quality, motion, and no other quality can be a cause; for example, motion happens when a ball of cotton becomes conjoined with a cotton in speed, then the 2 cottons come into existence as [1] substance, whose dimension being produced is called ‘mahat,’70

similarly other qualities are being produced mutatis-mutandis.

1.1.19. motion is [a common ground] of ‘conjunction’ and ‘disjunction’

motion is a common cause of ‘conjunction’ and ‘disjunction’ because of its combination with a substratum after having been separated from its own substratum. 71

***1.1.20. because of being [absolutely] distinct72 there is ***

no essence-ground among substances73

if indeed motion were to cause another substance, then the existence of ‘conjunction’ after [motion] was made would not re-occur; by [the sentence] ‘motion is not cause for substance’ then we recognise only the comprehension of ‘conjunction,’

when motion does not exist [therein].74

***1.1.21. [but] motions are not like qualities [because ***

they cannot cause other motions]

motion is the cause for ‘weight,’ ‘fluidity,’ impulse, [and] stroke [and all are] connected with ‘conjunctions’ in either their own substratum or another substratum, but ‘effort’ and the ‘unseen force’ [are qualities that occur] only in another substratum; as such, motion cannot cause motion’s own substratum because from an earlier discussion we know about substances that are devoid of [intrinsic] activity; nor does motion reside in another substratum, because it ceases to be in conjunction with ‘tat’; therefore, motion is not the cause for motion, because motions are different from qualities which are the causes of motion; another differentiation is –

72 substances are ‘absolutely distinct’ because of the category of viśeṣa and antyaviśeṣa, which characterise their intrinsic nature.

73 ‘motion may not be common cause to substances’ because some of them (‘soul,’ ‘time,’

‘space,’ ‘vacuum’) do not possess intrinsic activity.

74 although ‘conjunction’ and ‘motion’ – as we have seen in 1.1.16 – are dependent, they do not overlap, and must not be confused with each other; one happens, the other does not.

72 * Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

1.1.22. dravyāṇāṃ dravyaṃ kāryaṃ sāmānyam

sajātīyānāṃ dvayor bahūnāṃ vā dravyāṇāṃ dravyaṃ tantūnām iva

paṭaḥ samānaṃ kāryam /

***1.1.23. dvitvaprabhṛtayaś ca saṃkhyāḥ ***

pṛthaktvaṃ saṃyogavibhāgāś ca

dvayordravyayor dvitvaṃ sāmānyaṃ kāryaṃ trayāṇāṃ

tritvam ityādi / tathaiva dvi pṛthaktvādi / dvayor dravyayoḥ

saṃyujyamānayoḥ saṃyogo vibhajyamānayor vibhāgaḥ / eṣām

anekāśritatvāt samānatvam /

1.1.24. asamavāyāt sāmānyaṃ kāryaṃ karma na vidyate

anekasmin dravye ekasya karmaṇaḥ samavāyaniṣedhād na

dravyāṇāṃ dvi-bahūnāṃ karma samānaṃ kāryam asti /

1.1.25. saṃyogānāṃ dravyam

dvayor bahūnāṃ vā asamavāyikāraṇānāṃ saṃyogānāṃ dravyaṃ

samānaṃ kāryaṃ tantu saṃyogānām iva paṭaḥ /

1.1.26. rūpāṇāṃ rūpam

dvayor bahūnāṃ vā kāraṇarūpāṇāṃ kāryadravyāśritaṃ rūpaṃ

samānaṃ kāryam yathā ghaṭarūpaṃ kapālarūpāṇām evaṃ

rasādīnām /

75 ‘common effect’ refers here to the repeatability of a substance, its capacity to extend, or create a ‘universal,’ ‘commonness,’ or ‘generality.’

76 more importantly for the understanding of the ‘philosophy of difference’ is the following fact: that number is a quality that begins only from the digit ‘2’ onwards, which means that it is not to be confused with either digit ‘one’ (zero) or ‘1’ (the unit), which are not counted as numbers, but are rather different concepts altogether.

77 the quality ‘number’ is being analysed as different from the concept of ‘oneness’ and

‘unit,’ namely by looking into the ‘general causality’ (resemblance) that exists between various ontological categories, and to show, in fact, the difference between the categories.

Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 73

1.1.22. one substance is a common effect75 of [many] substances

common effect [causality] is like the cloth [being the effect] of threads, where a substance shares an essential-genus with either a substance, 2, or many substances.

***1.1.23. ‘numbers’ beginning with duality76 [onwards] have ***

‘distinctness,’ ‘conjunction,’ and ‘disjunction’77

‘dvitva’ is the common effect of duality of substances, ‘tritva’ is [the common effect] of triad and so forth; similarly, in the case of dual ‘distinctness,’ and so forth; ‘conjunction’ takes place in the combination between 2 substances; ‘disjunction’ is after separating the duality [of substances], [and] because these subsist in many78 [such qualities presumably] have ‘commonality.’

***1.1.24. common motion is not known to have effect because ***

of the non-inherence [of motion in substance]79

because there is negation of co-existence of one motion in many substances, there is no common motion in 2 or many substances. 80

1.1.25. substance [is subject to] conjunctions

cloth is [the common effect] of thread conjunctions; a common effect refers to a substance whose conjunctions are an inherent cause of 2 or many [substances].

1.1.26. ‘colour’ is [is subject to] colours

such as the potsherds’ colour is from the colour of a pot, the common effect is the colour which has the substratum of 2 or many substances, colour [being both]

cause and effect, thus [other qualities] ‘taste’ and so forth are [explained].

78 the qualities mentioned subsist in many substratums, substances, or essences; if qualities have ‘commonness’ it follows that they can form ‘universals’ just as substances do.

79 there is a difference between motion and quality, the former being transitory while the latter being permanent – such a difference being translated in respect to ‘common effect’; it is partly due to the fact that while qualities can repeat themselves, thus able to form a ‘universal’ or ‘generality’ (e.g. redness), motions are always successive, thus transitory, and cannot form a ‘permanent whole.’

80 there are substances that do not have intrinsic activity (VSc 5.2.23); if substances had intrinsic activity, they would be dissolvable as a result, but motions cannot have other motions inherent in them because they are units, and successive in motion, not simultaneous.

74 * Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

1.1.27. gurutvaprayatnasaṃyogānām utkṣepaṇam

ādityaraśmīnāmagurutvāt parvate tathābhūtaprayatnābhāvāt

loṣṭasya ca hastenāsaṃyuktatvād anutkṣepaṇam iti gurutvādīnām

utkṣepaṇaṃ samānaṃ kāryam /

1.1.28. saṃyogavibhāgāḥ karmaṇām

ubhayakarmajā ye saṃyogāvibhāgāś ca te karmaṇāṃ samānaṃ

kāryam /

***1.1.29. kāraṇasāmānye dravyakarmaṇāṃ ***

karmākāraṇam uktam iti

yasmin prakaraṇe dravyādīnāṃ kāraṇaṃ samānaṃ varṇitaṃ tasmin

kāraṇasāmānye dravyakarmaṇāṃ yataḥ karmākāraṇam uktam

ataḥ tānyapy asya kāryaṃ sāmānyaṃ na bhavant īti / evaṃ nānā

dravyaguṇakarmāṇ īti siddham /

/ prathamasyādhyāyasyādyam āhnikam /

81 ‘upwards throwing’ motion is caused by all 3 qualities mentioned.

82 gloss gives here the metaphor of the ‘beams of sun on a mountain’ to illustrate the haphazard movement of the beams, which presumably do not follow the usual pattern of the law of gravity; in other words, the movement is caused, not a cause of something else.

*Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 75

1.1.27. ‘conjunction,’81 *** ‘effort,’ and ‘weight’ are [the ***

effect-activities] of ‘throwing upwards’

when the beams of the sun having no ‘weight’ [are seen] on a mountain, 82 and

this [in another example] is because of the absence of ‘effort’ of mud-clay since it is not connected with a hand, [then] there is no ‘throwing upwards,’83 therefore

‘throwing upwards’ is a common effect of ‘weight’ and so forth.

***1.1.28. ‘conjunction’ and ‘disjunction’ are [the effect-activities] ***

of motions

whatever ‘conjunction’ and ‘disjunction’ are produced from both types of motion these are the common effect of motions.

***1.1.29. as far as essential cause is concerned, it has been stated that ***

motion is not the cause of substance or [other] motion

in the discussion where the common cause of substances and so forth is described, it has been said that motion is not the cause of [other] substances and motions, therefore these [substances and actions] do not become a common effect of

[motion] either; in this way, substance, quality, and motion are established to be

variegated84 [in nature].

// the first lesson of the first chapter //

83 a second metaphor given is how the blisters such as ‘lump’ can emerge, say on the skin, without having been triggered by scratching; thus, as in the previous metaphor, the upwards movements are triggered by different separate causes; Thakur (2003: 33) translates the simile on ‘loṣṭa’ as follows: ‘and as there is no “conjunction” between pebble and hand, there can be no throwing up of the pebble.’

84 ‘nānā’ should not be translated by ‘numerous’ for this would imply number; it should, perhaps, be translated with ‘pluralised,’ ‘variegated,’ because several items can exist as identical, whereas ‘nānā’ refers to difference or uniqueness of identity.

76 * Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

1.2

/ prathamasyādhyāyasya dvitīyam āhnikam /

1.2.1. kāraṇābhāvāt kāryābhāvaḥ

kāryakāraṇaśabdau pūrvam uktau tan nirūpaṇārtham āha /

yasyābhāvāt tantvādeḥ samavāyikāraṇasya tat saṃyogānāṃ vā

asamavāyikāraṇānāṃ kāryadravyaṃ na jāyate paṭādi vināśe vā

vinaśyati tat kāraṇaṃ, anyat kāryam /

1.2.2. na tu kāryābhāvāt kāraṇābhāvaḥ

na punaḥ paṭāder anutpattau dravyasya tantūnāṃ tat saṃyogānāṃ

vā’nutpattiḥ / uktā ānuṣaṅgikāḥ sāmānyādayastryaḥ padārthāḥ tatra

sāmānyaṃ kathayati -

1.2.3. sāmānyaṃ viśeṣa iti buddhyapekṣam

bhinneṣu piṇḍeṣvanuvartamānāṃ ‘gaurgauḥ’ iti buddhimapekṣya

ebhya eva ca parasparato vyāvartamānām ‘ayam asmād anyaḥ’

iti tad anuvṛttibuddhyapekṣaṃ sāmānyaṃ vyāvṛttibuddhyapekṣo

viśeṣa iti /

1.2.4. bhāvaḥ sāmānyam eva

bhāvaḥ sattā sāmānyam eva triṣvapi dravyādiṣvanuvartamānatvāt

na viśeṣaḥ /

85 as the gloss will make clear, the cause is prior and more important than the effect, and can exist independently, whereas effect is secondary and has dependent existence (due to asatkāryavāda theory).

86 the 3 categories referred to are ‘universality’ (sāmānya), ‘particularity’ (viśeṣa), and

‘inherence’ (samavāya).

87 if these real categories are dependent on mind and cognition, the philosophical question that arises is actually to what extent these categories are real; are these compositional elements? Balcerowicz suggested that they should not be equated with mental objects as Brentano might have suggested; in my opinion, here we are dealing with ‘dependent existentials,’ see Bhaṭṭa Vādīndra’s notion of antyaviśeṣa, as being real, yet possessing, nevertheless, only a ‘dependent reality’; this translation has drawn a distinction between cognition and knowledge; on knowledge in Aristotle see Met 13.10.1087a10–

25; De An 2.5.417a21–9; on identity and unity De Int 2; Top. 1.7; Met 6.2; 10.1.

Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 77

Translation

/ the second lesson of the first chapter /

1.2.1. absence of the effect presupposes absence of cause

the 2 words ‘kārya’ and ‘kāraṇa’ have been previously explained, [now] he examines [their] meaning; in the absence of that thread and so forth, the substance as an effect say cloth and so forth is inherently caused either because of a ‘conjunction’

or because of an inherent cause; when the cause dissolves, the cloth and so forth dissolves [too]; effect [on the contrary] is of a different kind.

1.2.2. but the absence of effect does not [presuppose] the absence of cause85

again, the non-production of a garment’s ‘conjunctions’ is not because of the non-production of a substance thread and its ’conjunctions’; having stated the association between the 3 categories, universal, and so forth, 86 therein [he] explains the universal.

1.2.3. universal and particular depend on a ‘cognition’87

different cases of sacrificial piṇḍa as deriving from the ‘bull-bulls’ sequence are depended on [Vedic] knowledge and does occur in the reciprocal differentiation between ‘this one is other than ours’ which is [the kind of reasoning that] universality requires an ‘inclusive cognition’88 while particularity depends on an ‘exclu-

sive cognition.’89

1.2.4. ‘existence’90 is only a universal

‘existence’ is ‘reality’ and is only universal because it occurs in the 3 categories, substance and so forth, this is not [to be confused with] particularity.

88 ‘anuvṛttibuddhi’ implies repetition, hence the possibility of knowing the repetition of a quality ‘red’ in many substances; as such, it can grasp the reality of the lower universal

‘redness’; Thakur (2003: 35) says that ‘anuvṛttibuddhi’ is the type of cognition of “this is a cow,” [identical with] “this is a cow,” in different cases, and the nature of this very knowledge of inclusion is that it is repeated in like manner.’ The question of repetition and difference has been a difficult topic in Western philosophy beginning with Duns Scotus up to modern times with Gilles Deleuze.

89 ‘vyāvṛttibuddhi’ on the other hand, implies non-repetition, identity, and focuses on what is unique, hence the designation of ‘exclusive cognition’; it is the analytical characteristic of the human brain to identify ultimate particularities and exclude ontological repetition; it is associated by mutual complementarity with ‘anuvṛttibuddhi,’ in the same way as sāmānya and viśeṣa are.

90 in this context, ‘bhāva’ can translate with both ‘reality’ and ‘existentiality’ (a state, or a condition, respectively).

78 * Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

***1.2.5. dravyatvaṃ guṇatvaṃ karmatvaṃ ***

ca sāmānyāni viśeṣāś ca /

kṣityādiṣu yato ‘dravyaṃ dravyam’ ity anuvṛttibuddhī rūpādiṣu

ca ‘guṇo guṇaḥ’ iti utkṣepaṇādiṣu ‘karma karma’ iti tāni

dravyatvaguṇatvakarmatvāni sāmānyāni parasparataś ca vyāvṛtter

viśeṣāḥ /

1.2.6. anyatrāntyebhyo viśeṣebhyaḥ

nityadravyeṣu paramāṇvākāśādiṣu samavāyena

vartamānāstulyākṛtiguṇeṣu ‘ayam anyo’yamanyaḥ’ ity atyanta

vyāvṛttibuddhihetavas tad darśināṃ viśeṣakatvād viśeṣāḥ / evaṃ

viśeṣā vyākhyātāḥ / sattā tu /

1.2.7. sad iti yato dravyaguṇakarmasu

bhinneṣu dravyādiṣu triṣu yato jāyate ‘sat sat’ iti buddhiḥ sā sattā /

āśrayavināśādasyā vināśa iti cet, na, yataḥ -

1.2.8. dravyaguṇakarmabhyorthāntaraṃ sattā

yasmād dravyādibhyo vyatiriktā sattā tasmān na dravyādivināśe

sattā vinaśyati iti / dravyādi vyatireke yuktiḥ /

91 in Sanskrit there is often no clear indication between ‘have’ and ‘be, are’; nevertheless, sometimes ‘have’ is indicated by the suffix ‘vat.’

92 to have ‘universal’ and ‘particular’ means to possess a ‘lower universal’ which designates a ‘genus’ or ‘genera,’ which, in Vaiśeṣika scholarship, is designated by one single term ‘sāmānyaviśeṣa’; thus, 3 concepts are here: universality, particularity, and universal particularity (lower universal, or species).

93 in order to avoid infinite regress, or contradicting itself, the Vaiśeṣika system locates reality of an ‘entity in itself,’ in its own unique identity; some scholars translate this sūtra as ‘viśeṣas reside somewhere else’ (other than the categories universal and particularity previously discussed), this translation would put the reality of antyaviśeṣa under doubt; the sūtra draws a distinction between the category of ‘particularity’ and the ‘ultimate particularity.’

Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 79

***1.2.5. substantiality, qualitiness, motionness, are ***

[or have]91 *** a universal particularity. 92***

inclusive cognition is that [expressed in the sentence] ‘substance has essence-substantiality’ in relation to ‘earth’ and so forth, it occurs in [the expression] ‘quality has qualitness’ in relation to colour and so forth, it occurs in [the sentence]

‘motion has motionness’ in relation to upwards motion and so forth, these are

[all] universals [of] substantiality, qualitiness, motionness, and are both mutual and exclusive ‘particularities.’

1.2.6. ‘universal particularity’ exists except in the ultimate particularities93

‘particularities’ are from particularitiness94 [and exist] through co-existence, in the eternal substances, ‘vacuum,’ and so forth, and atoms, and are the cause of the knowledge of ultimate difference [as in the sentence] ‘this one is different from that’ in relation to qualities having similar form due to illustrating this [particularity]; thus, particularity has been explained; but regarding ‘reality’ [Kaṇāda] says –

1.2.7. ‘real’95 *** is that which subsists in substance, quality, motion***

‘that because of which’ there is a ‘cognition’ of ‘real, real’ in the 3 differentiated

[categories] substance, and so forth, that reason96 is ‘real’; if it is said that its destruction follows from the dissolution of [its] substratum, then [the answer is]

no, because,

1.2.8. ‘reality’97 *** is a completely other [category] ***

than substance, quality, motion98

since ‘reality’ is separate from substance, and so forth, therefore ‘reality’ is not destroyed when substance is destroyed, and so forth; as for the argument of substances as being differentiated [from each other] –

94 ‘particularitiness’ may be equivalent to ‘universal particularity’ (sāmānyaviśeṣa).

95 although ‘sat’ and ‘bhāva’ may be synonymous, for precision’s sake, in translation we shall differentiate between ‘real’ (sat) and ‘existential’ (bhāva).

96 ‘that reason’ refers to the difficult translation marked with commas in the gloss (‘that because of which’).

97 for ‘sattā,’ this edition proposes the translation ‘reality,’ for it is a broader concept than the nominal ‘sat’ (real).

98 this staunch realistic system builds upon the view that reality exists beyond the visible substances, qualities, and motions.

80 * Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

1.2.9. eka dravyavattvān na dravyaṃ

paramāṇvākāśādi dravyamadravyam kāraṇadravyābhāvāt

anekadravyaṃ vā ghaṭādi samavāyikāraṇadravyayuktatvāt sattā

punaḥ pratyekaṃ parisamāptyā vartamānā eka dravyavattvān na

dravyaṃ /

1.2.10. guṇakarmasu ca bhāvān na karma na guṇaḥ

guṇānāṃ guṇeṣvavṛtteḥ karmasu ca karmaṇāṃ guṇeṣu karmasu ca

sattāyā vartamānatvān na guṇakarmaṇī sattā /

1.2.11. sāmānyaviśeṣābhāvāc ca

yadi sattā dravyādīnāmanyatamā syād evaṃ dravyādiṣv iva

sattāyām api dravyatvādayaḥ sāmānyaviśeṣā varteran / na caivaṃ /

tasmān na sattā dravyaguṇakarmāṇi /

1.2.12. eka dravyavattvena dravyatvam uktam

yathā pratidravyaṃ sākalyena vartamānatvān na dravyaṃ sattā

tatha eka dravyavattvān na dravyaṃ dravyatvam /

99 although ‘bhāva’ and ‘sattā’ are slightly different concepts, the Sūtrapāṭha overlaps

‘sattā’ with ‘bhāva’ by using them interchangeably; that is noticeable in this translation too, chiefly because the subject of the whole discussion here is ‘sattā’ (VS 1.2.8) while the subsequent sūtra replaces it with ‘bhāva.’

100 obviously, reality cannot be confused with qualities and motion because their ‘existence’ is already there (vartamānatva); when it is said that ‘reality’ subsists in qualities and in motions, the system defines reality as ‘immanent’; in other words, reality is unfolding, and is not transcendent as in ‘idealistic’ or ‘mentalistic’ systems of thought.

Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 81

***1.2.9. [reality] is not a substance, because of the ***

[reality of] oneness of substantiality

because there is no substance-cause for [another] substance such as atomic-substances, ‘vacuum,’ and so forth, because of the connectivity between substance and an inherent cause, a pot, and so forth, has either one or many substances,

‘reality’ again is comprehended in each of the present things, it has manifold substantiality, [but] is not a substance.

***1.2.10. ‘reality’99 is not a motion, is not a quality, ***

because it exists in quality and motion

because no qualities occur in qualities, and no motions in motions, ‘reality’ subsists

in qualities and in motion, [therefore] qualities and motions are not ‘realities.’100

1.2.11. and [reality] is/ has no ‘universal particularity’101

[objection] if ‘reality’ were one among substances and so forth, then ‘universal particularity,’ like in [the universal] substantiality, would occur in ‘reality’ too,

[such as] substantiality, and so forth are; [but] this is not so; therefore, ‘reality’ is not a substance, quality, motion.

1.2.12. substantiality is stated as having one essence-substantiality

such as substance is not ‘reality’ because [this ‘reality’] abides collectively in each substance, similarly substance is not essence because of the individuality of substantiality. 102

101 apart from the ‘universal’ and ‘particularity,’ the system seems to acknowledge the existence of a ‘middle reality,’ namely that of ‘universal particularity’ (sāmānyaviśeṣa); while revising this translation, Thite insisted on translating ‘sāmānyaviśeṣa’ as ‘universal and particularity,’ a view with which the author of these footnotes disagrees.

102 the fact that a substance (air, lustre, water, earth) has a reducible essence (atoms), as well as no continuous essence does not preclude its ontological status of substance; both abstract and concrete substances are to be considered substances; only their definition differs.

82 * Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

1.2.13. sāmānyaviśeṣābhāvena ca

dravyādiṣvava dravyatvādīnāṃ madhyāt kaś cit sāmānyaviśeṣo

dravyatve varteta yadi dravyaṃ guṇaḥ karma vā syāt / tasmān na

dravyādīni dravyatvam /

1.2.14. guṇe bhāvād guṇatvam uktam

guṇeṣu guṇānāṃ vṛtteḥ guṇatvaṃ ca guṇeṣu vartate tasmān na

guṇaḥ /

1.2.15. sāmānyaviśeṣābhāvena ca

yadi guṇatvaṃ dravyaṃ karma vā syāt tasmin dravyatvaṃ

karmatvaṃ vā sāmānya viśeṣau syātām / na caivaṃ / tasmān na

dravyaṃ karma vā guṇatvaṃ /

1.2.16. karmaṇi bhāvāt karmatvam uktam

karmaṇi karmatvasya vṛtteḥ karmaṇaḥ karmaṇi cā vṛtter na karma

karmatvaṃ /

1.2.17. sāmānyaviśeṣābhāvena ca

dravyatvaṃ guṇatvaṃ vā karmatve syātāṃ yadi dravyaṃ guṇo vā

syāt / tasmān na dravyaguṇau karmatvam /

103 VS 1.2.13 may be read in relation to VS 1.2.11.

104 substance is not substantiality, which refers to the fact that substantiality may be a type of essence of the category of substance, such as qualitiness is the essence of quality.

Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 83

1.2.13. because [substantiality] is no ‘universal particularity’103

if ‘universal particularity’ subsisted in substantiality like something which has essence in substance, and so forth, the essence would be either substance, quality, motion; but essence is not [the same as] substance, and so forth. 104

1.2.14. it is said that qualitiness exists in quality

because of non-occurrence of qualities in [other] qualities, [and] ‘qualitiness’

occurs in qualities, therefore [‘reality’] is not a quality.

1.2.15. because [qualitiness] is/has no ‘universal particularity’105

if qualitiness were either substance or motion, then there would be a ‘universal particularity’ existing in substantiality or motionness; [but] this is not so; therefore, qualitiness is neither substance nor motion.

1.2.16. it said that motionness106 is in motions

due to the existence of motionness in motion, and because of the absence of motion in motion, motion is not motionness.

1.2.17. because [motionness] is/has no ‘universal particularity’

if motionness were a substance or quality, then there would be substantiality or qualitiness in motionness, therefore motionness is neither a substance nor a quality.

105 ‘reality is only a universal’ or at any rate something that exists only in a ‘holistic,’

‘indivisible’ state. VS 1.2.13 and VS 1.2.15 insist on the same idea; the subject throughout these glosses is ‘sattā,’ but VS 1.2.13 sattā is not a quality.

106 ‘karmatva’ may be translated in this context as ‘capacity of activity’ but in order to avoid a confusion with kārya, which elsewhere has been translated with ‘activity,’ we shall now render ‘karmatva’ with ‘motionness.’

84 * Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

1.2.18. sal liṅgāviśeṣād viśeṣaliṅgābhāvāc caiko bhāva iti

‘eka’ śabdenābhedaḥ kathyate, na tu saṅkhyā / liṅgayate’neneti

liṅgaṃ pratyayaḥ yena liṅgena ‘sat sat’ iti pratyayena pratīyate

sattā tasya sarvatrāviśiṣṭatvād viśiṣṭasya ca pratyayasyābhāvād

abhinnā sattā /

// prathamo’dhyāya //

2.1

/ dvitīyasyādhyāyasya pratham āhnikam /

evaṃ dravyādīnāṃ nānātve siddhe pṛthivādīnāṃ

dravyalakṣaṇāviśeṣād ekatve prāpte lakṣaṇadena vaidharmyam āha -

2.1.1. rūparasagandhasparśavatī pṛthivī

ete’syā rūparasagandhasparśā viśeṣaguṇāḥ anye tu saṃkhyā

parimāṇa pṛthaktva saṃyoga vibhāga paratvāparatva gurutva

naimittika dravatva saṃskārāḥ / rūpaṃ śuklādi raso madhurādiḥ

gandhaḥ surabhirasurabhiś ca, sparśosyā anuṣṇāśītatve sati

pākajaḥ, kāryaṃ bāhyam ādhyātmikaṃ ca /

107 ‘one’ (eka) refers to a substance state of ‘oneness’; yet, the concept is rather fuzzy, because although ‘eka’ is not a number, yet it is not clear whether the author refers to ‘oneness’ or a ‘unit’; it is also alleged that Kaṇāda may have referred to 2 marks:

‘absent’ (abhāva) and ‘qualified’ (sa), respectively.

108 if there is a term that indicates the ‘essence’ of a thing, then ‘sattā’ may be taken to be one of the most powerful candidates; there are many possible translations for ‘sattā’ as

‘abhinna’: whole, uninterrupted, undivided, unchanged, unbroken, not different from, integral numbers, unaltered; all substances have both an essential and differentiated state. In VSc 1.2.18, it refers to the essential nature of categories and substances.

109 the difference in defining something derives from the difference of the characteristic marks, which ultimately leads to the cognition of the ultimate differentiated nature of the substances and their essences.

Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 85

***1.2.18. ‘existence’ is one, because of the absence of a particularity of ***

an existing sign, and because of the absence of a specific sign107

word ‘eka’ indicates non-differentiation, but [does] not [indicate] ‘number’; the perception of mark, is that by which mark is indicated by the usage of liṅga indicated by [sentences such as] ‘sat sat,’ whereby ‘reality’ is recognised because of not being always differentiated, and since there is absence of conceiving the

‘particularity,’ ‘reality’ has no differentiation.108

// the second chapter//

Translation

/ the first lesson of the second chapter /

thus, when the manifoldness of substances and so forth has been proved, and when the oneness of the earth and so forth is indicated, because of the indistinct definition of essence it is [then] said that there exists a differentiation because of the difference of defining characteristics [of each substance]. 109

2.1.1. ‘earth’ has ‘form-colour,’110 ‘taste,’ ‘smell,’ ‘touch’

concerning these, ‘form-colour,’ ‘taste,’ ‘smell,’ [and] ‘touch’ are specific qualities, but the other [qualities]111 are ‘number,’ ‘dimension,’ ‘distinctness,’ ‘conjunction,’ ‘disjunction,’ ‘proximity,’ ‘remoteness,’ ‘weight,’ accidental-‘fluidity,’

[and] ‘latent-impetus’; ‘form-colour’ [such as] white and so forth, ‘taste’ [such as]

sweet and so forth, ‘smell’ [is] fragrant, and repellent, while ‘touch’ has coldness and hotness when produced by cooking; and its activities are both external and internal [as stated in 2.1.1].

110 translation of ‘rūpa’ with ‘form-colour’ is left to the discretion of the reader; in Vaiśeṣika context, the term has the potential to explain the ‘diversity-in-unity’ of a substance due to its intimate inherent relation with the substance; it can be translated as ‘shape,’ ‘form,’ and ‘colour’ depending on which substance and which sense-organ the context refers to; each quality usually corresponds to one particular sense-organ, and as Ganesh Thite pointed out, this relation between quality and sense-organ can be determined only if an initial perception has taken place.

111 by the locative ‘anye,’ Candrānanda refers to the list of ‘generic qualities’

(sāmānyaguṇas).

86 * Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

2.1.2. rūparasasparśavatya āpo dravāḥ snigdhāś ca

śuklamadhuraśītā eva rūparasasparśāḥ / dravā iti sāṃsiddhikaṃ

dravatvaṃ / snigdhā ity āsām eva snehaḥ / saṅkhyā parimāṇa

pṛthaktva saṃyoga vibhāga paratvāparatva gurutva saṃskārāś ca /

kāryaṃ pūrvavat /

2.1.3. tejo rūpasparśavat

rūpaṃ bhāsvaraṃ śuklaṃ ca sparśa uṣṇa eva / saṃkhyā parimāṇa

pṛthaktva saṃyoga vibhāga paratvāparatva naimittika dravatva

saṃskārāś ca / kāryaṃ pūrvavat /

2.1.4. vāyuḥ sparśavān

anuṣṇāśītopākajaḥ sparśaḥ / saṅkhyā parimāṇa pṛthaktva saṃyoga

vibhāgaparatvāparatva gurutva saṃskārāś ca / kāryaṃ pūrvavat /

bhaumādi dehā bhūmyādi lokeṣu /

2.1.5. ta ākāśe na vidyante

te rūpa rasa gandha sparśāḥ na santyākāśe / tasya guṇāḥ śabda

saṃkhyā parimāṇa pṛthaktva saṃyoga vibhāgāḥ /

***2.1.6. sarpirjatu madhūcchiṣṭānāṃ pārthivānām ***

agni saṃyogāt dravatādbhiḥ sāmānyam

madhūcchiṣṭaṃ sikthakam / sarpiṣo jatuno madhūcchiṣṭasya cāgni

saṃyogād dravatā sañjayāyate tadabhiḥ samānatvaṃ pṛthivyāḥ /

112 Nozawa, 1993, says that the word ‘previous’ refers to the ‘previous substances’ such as earth and so forth have been explained in 2.1.1.

113 lustre is a substance that is more than fire, for it includes other intrinsic properties such as glow, golden shining, and many forms of light.

114 vāyu will be translated with ‘wind’ and ‘air,’ respectively, although ‘wind’ is a smaller category than the substance ‘air’ which encapsulates various ‘winds.’

115 the expression ‘kāryam purvavat’ has been encountered already in several places; it sends the reader to the discussion of gloss VSc 2.1.1. where activities are said to be external and internal.

Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 87

***2.1.2. concerning ‘water,’ it [has] ‘form-colour,’ ***

‘taste,’ ‘touch,’ ‘fluidity,’ and ‘viscosity’

‘form-colour,’ ‘taste,’ ‘touch’ is like white, sweet, and cold; flowing means natural fluidity; viscid means viscosity of these [waters]; and ‘number,’ ‘dimension,’

‘distinctness,’ ‘conjunction,’ ‘disjunction,’ ‘remoteness,’ ‘proximity,’ ‘weight,’

and ‘latent-impetus’ [these are the qualities of water]. 112

2.1.3. concerning ‘lustre,’113 it possesses ‘colour’ and ‘touch’

‘form-colour’ refers to glittering and white, ‘touch’ refers to hot, only; and [other qualities in relation to this substance are] ‘number,’ ‘dimension,’ ‘distinctness,’

‘conjunction,’ ‘disjunction,’ ‘remoteness,’ ‘proximity,’ ‘weight,’ [and] ‘latent impetus’; their activity is [stated] earlier [as both external and internal, 2.1.1].

2.1.4. ‘air’114 has ‘touch’

‘touch’ is not produced by baking, which is neither hot nor cold [other qualities of ‘air’ are] ‘number,’ ‘dimension,’ ‘distinctness,’ ‘conjunction,’ ‘disjunction,’

‘remoteness,’ ‘proximity,’ ‘weight,’ [and] ‘latent impetus’; [their] activity [is stated] earlier115 [in 2.1.1, as external and internal]; the bodies belonging to earth

and so forth subsist into the terrestrial worlds, and so forth.116

2.1.5 these [qualities]117 are not known in relation to ‘vacuum’

these [qualities] ‘form-colour,’ ‘taste,’ ‘smell,’ [and] ‘touch’ do not exist in

‘vacuum’; its [other] qualities are ‘sound,’ ‘number,’ ‘dimension,’ ‘distinctness,’

‘conjunction’ and ‘disjunction.’

***2.1.6. fluidity of the earthly things like ghee, wax, ***

***honey, when in ‘conjunction’ with fire have ***

common [characteristics] with ‘water’118

‘madhūcchiṣṭaṃ’ refers to beeswax; whatever fluidity of ghee, honey, wax is produced from ‘conjunction’ with fire, that is common in earth and ‘water.’119

116 as VSc 4.2. would clarify, there are cosmic layers, or worlds that have a different substantial or chemical composition: for instance, there is a world of fire or wind, and so forth; this is a Vedic cosmology to which Vaiśeṣika subscribes.

117 presumably ‘ta’ refers to the doctrine as regards the qualities and the substances discussed by previous sūtras (‘earth,’ ‘water,’ ‘lustre,’ ‘wind’).

118 not only water, which makes clay and can be fluid and melting, but also earth and things made of earth, thus with a certain extent, water properties are common and similar to the properties of earth.

119 in other words, ‘fluidity’ is common to earth and water.

88 * Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

***2.1.7. trapu sīsa loha rajata suvarṇānāṃ taijasānām ***

agni saṃyogād dravatādbhiḥ sāmānyam

eṣāṃ ca taijasānāṃ yad agnisaṃyogād dravatvamupajāyate

tadadbhiḥ sāmānyaṃ tejasaḥ /

***2.1.8. viṣāṇī kakudmān prāntevāladhiḥ ***

sāsnāvān iti gotve dṛṣṭa liṅgaṃ

dṛṣṭāntarthaṃ sūtram / ‘gotva’ iti gotvāvacchin nā vyaktiḥ /

viṣāṇaṃ kakudaṃ sāsnā ca asyāst īti viṣāṇī kakudmān sāsnāvān /

prānta śabdena kaṭibhāgaḥ vālā asmin dhīyante iti vāladhi śabdena

puccham prānte vāladhir asyeti prānte vāladhiḥ / viṣāṇyādibhiḥ

śabdaiḥ tadvat pratipādakair api arthavyāpārād dharmā eva

vyapadiśyante / yathā apratyakṣāyāṃ govyaktau kathañ cid

gṛhyamaṇa viṣāṇādayo liṅgaṃ dṛṣṭam anumāpakās tathā /

2.1.9. sparśaś ca

sparśa upalabhyamāno nirāśrayasyānupapatter vāyum

anumāpayati /

2.1.10. na ca dṛṣṭānāṃ sparśa ity adṛṣṭāliṅgo vāyuḥ

yadi khalvayaṃ kṣityādisparśo bhaviṣyad gandharasarūpaiḥ

sahopalabhemahi na c’aivam tasmāt pṛthivyādi vyatiriktasya vāyor

liṅgam /

120 all these metals, when in conjunction with fire, become lustre; therefore, fluidity is a quality that characterises them all.

121 ‘gotva’ is the essence of a bull.

122 ‘rump’ is the hind part of a mammal’s body or the lower back of a bird.

123 dharmaviśeṣa is the cognitive property that reveals the inner meaning and essence of the things, whereas words indicate the visible properties of things; in this way we understand both the essence and the feature of things; in Latin scholastic philosophy, we see a comparable theory of perception, known as individuation (Duns Scotus)’; in this gloss, ‘essence’ would be a universal (e.g. gotva), whereas the property would be, as Scotus indicates, the only thing that is known by our sense-perception; essence

Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 89

***2.1.7. lustry things: tin, lead, copper, silver, gold, possess common ***

fluidity when [they have] a conntact with fire120

because of a relation between fire and those which belong to lustre, because it relates to these, it follows that ‘fluidity’ shares a common nature with ‘lustre.’

***2.1.8. possessed by horns, possessed by hair at the [tail’s] end, ***

possessed by dewlap, these are the visible marks of bullness

the purpose of this sūtra is to exemplify; ‘gotve’121 aims to indicate an individual characterised by bullness; because it has horns, hump, and dewlap, [bull] is therefore called ‘viṣāṇī, kakudmān, sāsnāvān’ [possessing horns, possessing hump, possessing hump]; the word ‘prānta’ [refers to] a portion of rump, 122 hair is kept in

it, therefore the word ‘vālā’ means tail; because there is a tail at the end, therefore a bull is described as ‘prānte vāladhiḥ’; by means of words it indicates things, but the indication of the inner meaning of things comes from dharma;123 concerning an individual bull which is not recognisable, its perception, for example, is from

marks such as horn and so forth, which are those that cause [us] to infer it.124

2.1.9. and ‘touch’ [too, is a visbile mark of a substance]

because it is impossible to have something without a substratum, the comprehension of touch causes [us] to infer [the existence of] ‘air.’

***2.1.10. because [usually] visible things have ‘touch’, we cannot say ***

that ‘air’ [which is invisible] is something which has marks

if ‘air’ were indeed an object of touch like ‘earth’ and so forth, its grasp would go together with ‘smell,’ ‘taste,’ [and] ‘form,’ [but] this is not so, therefore [touch] is

a mark of wind which is separate from earth and so forth.125

cannot be known directly, but qualities can; on individuation, see Aristotle Met 5.6.1016b31–5; 7.8.1034a5–8; 8.1.1042a26–31; 10.9.1058b5–12; 12.3.1070a9–13; De An 2.1.412a6–9; De Caelo 1.9.277b27–278b8.

124 perception is a mediated process, and that mediation comes through the perception of visible marks on the one hand, and from the perception of dharma properties that identify the nature of abstract things, on the other hand; likewise Duns Scotus, an abstract substance has not only an intrinsic essence (unknowable) but also an essence that has something added to it, which in the case of Vaiśeṣika is dharma.

125 Candrānanda wishes to distinguish the touch of wind from the touch of earth; each touch has its ‘particularity’ – its specific dharmaviśeṣa.

90 * Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

2.1.11. adravyavattvād dravyam

yaḥ paramāṇusvabhāvo vāyuḥ sa khalvadravyavattvāt

samavāyikāraṇa rahitatvād dravyam dravyaṃ hyadravyam aneka

dravyaṃ ca /

2.1.12. kriyāvattvād guṇavattvāc ca

‘kriyāvad guṇavat’ [ 1.1.14] iti dravyalakṣaṇād yatra kriyā guṇāś

ca samavetāḥ so ’pi mahān vāyur dravyam /

2.1.13. adravyavattvena nityatvam uktam

paramāṇulakṣaṇasya vāyor adravyavattvena samavāyi kāraṇa

rahitatvena nityatvam uktam /

2.1.14. vāyor vāyusaṃmūrchanaṃ nānātve liṅgam

tiryag gāmino vāyor vāyusaṃmūrchanena vāyvantarasaṃśleṣeṇa

ūrdhvagamanaṃ pravarte tata ūrdhvagamanāt saṃśleṣaḥ saṃśleṣād

vāyor anekatvam anumīyate / nanu ca /

***2.1.15. vāyur iti sati sannikarṣe pratyakṣābhāvād ***

dṛṣṭaṃ liṅgaṃ na vidyate

yathā ‘ayaṃ gauḥ’ iti goś ca kṣuṣāsannikarṣe sati pratyakṣeṇa

viṣāṇādīni tad yogitayā dṛṣṭāni kadācil liṅgaṃ naivaṃ tvacāvāyoḥ

sannikarṣe sati ayaṃ vāyur iti pratyakṣeṇa tadguṇatayā sparśa

upalabdho yenānupalabhyamānaṃ kadācid vāyum anumāpayet /

kṣityādisparśavidharmatvādasya sparśasya nirāśrayasya cābhāvād

vāyurāśraya iti cet,

126 there are atoms of wind, such as there are atoms of fire, atoms of earth, and atoms of water; all these 4 elemental substances differ from the abstract substances (time, space, soul, and vacuum) because these are reducible to a fragmented nature (atoms), by contrast with the latter abstract substances which are irreducible, for they cannot change substantially; Candrānanda indicates the difference between 2 types of substances by the sentence: ‘substance can be without substance and [can] have many substances.’

Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 91

2.1.11. [air] is a substance-essence because possesses immateriality

‘air’ is that which has atoms126 as a ‘constitutive essence,’127 it exists because it is a

substance devoid of an inherent cause and because it is not possessed by substantiality; substance indeed, can be without substance and [can] have many substances.

2.1.12. and [air is a substance] because has effect-activity and quality

when the definition of substance says that ‘it has motion, possessed by quality’

[1.1.14] it means that [substance] has motion and quality inherent [in it], [therefore] that [air] is a large [substance]

2.1.13. permanence [of air] is defined by [its] immateriality

permanence is described by lacking an inherent cause, by not having substantial-

ity when ‘air’ is defined in the atomic [state].128

2.1.14. wind-wind collision is the mark of [air’s] manifoldness

because the collision of wind with a horizontal wind, there is a friction of wind whereby it goes up and then, because it is going up there is a collision, because of

[such a] collision, the manifoldness of air is inferred; and now [Kaṇāda adds] –

***2.1.15. the visible mark of air is not known because of the absence of ***

perception129 of air [even when] there exists a contact [with air ]

when for instance [in the sentence] ‘this is a bull,’ [what you have implied are] horns and so forth united with the perception which exists in the contact between bull and the eye, therefore these are sometimes visible marks, yet this is not the case with the skin when it is in contact with the air because the perception of this ‘air’ is grasped through the perception with that ‘touch’-quality, therefore, that which is comprehended as quality [the comprehension] may cause us to infer a non-comprehended

‘air’; if it is said that [this is so] because of the absence of the substratum of this touch, this is due to it being different from the touch of earth and so forth, [then]

127 svabhāva; in Vaiśeṣika there might be 2 terms to designate ‘essence,’ whereby svabhāva may indicate ‘changeable essence,’ whereas svarūpa might be ‘static essence’ (equivalent to antyaviśeṣa, as Vādīndra defines).

128 difference between permanence and infinity may be considered here; on infinity at Aristotle see Phys 3.4–8; De Caelo 1.5–7.

129 ‘perception’ refers to the 4-fold contact between ‘soul,’ ‘mind,’ senses, and objects.

92 * Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

2.1.16. sāmānyato dṛṣṭāc cā viśeṣaḥ

ākāśādīnām api parokṣatvāt tat pratiṣedhena vāyor evāyaṃ sparśa

ity ayaṃ viśeṣa etasmāt sāmānyato dṛṣṭānāvagamyate / vibhūnāṃ

sparśavattve bhāvānāṃ pratighaṭa iti cet, evaṃ tarhi vāyor evāyaṃ

bhavat prasiddhasya sparśo na daśamasya dravyasyeti kathaṃ

jñāyate /

2.1.17. tasmād āgamikam

tasmād vāyur ast īti vākyamāgamikaṃ pravādamātram ity arthaḥ /

naitat,

2.1.18. saṃjñākarmatvasmad viśiṣṭānāṃ liṅgam

asmadādīnāṃ sakāśād yo bhagavān vijñānādibhir viśiṣṭo

maheśvaras tadīyaṃ saṃjñāpraṇayanaṃ navānām eva dravyāṇāṃ

bhāve liṅgaṃ daśamasya saṃjñānabhidhānāt / tasmān navaiva

dravyāṇi / ato vāyor eva sparśaḥ / ‘asmadviśiṣṭānām’ iti pūjāyāṃ

bahuvacanam / sa kathaṃ jñāyata ity ucyate /

130 one of the temptations of superficial and harmful knowledge is the obviation to the details; the Vaiśeṣika system is the exponent of an analytical mode of thinking where divisions and differentiation must be made prior to any form of generalisation; in this gloss, an opposing philosopher denounces Vaiśeṣika’s theory of differentiation by pointing out the visibility of the universal, but the Vaiśeṣikas do not deny the reality of the universal, they only posit that the particular is the ‘real’ lying at the foundation of any ontological description of reality.

131 The act of ‘naming,’ alongside that of ‘designation’ and ‘knowing’ occupies a major place in Vaiśeṣika. Praśastapāda speaks about the creation of mahābhūtas and the Great Egg that proceeds simply from Maheśvara’s act of

Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 93

2.1.16. [air seems to be] indistinct because is seen generally130

because ‘vacuum’ and so forth are imperceptible [substances], because of the negation of ‘air,’ this particular touch is not known from that which is perceived

[only] generically; [response] if you say that there is an obstruction between touchability and all-pervasive beings [vacuum], how then do you know that ‘touch’ is established as that ‘existential’ which belongs to the elastic ‘air’ only, and is not to be [considered to be] a tenth substance?

2.1.17. therefore [we prove air] from tradition

[objection] therefore, [some] declare that ‘air exists’ based on tradition and this subject is only a hearsay; [but] this is not so,

2.1.18. but [air] has been indicated by the act of naming131 *** ***

[made by seers] superior to us

Great Lord is more superior to us, and so forth, due to his knowledge and so forth, the activity of giving names done by Him is the mark for the [existence] of the 9 substances;132 because the tenth [substance] is not named, therefore there are only 9 substances, and as a result, in the expression ‘superior to us’ the touch belongs to ‘air’ only, [and the use of] the plural form133 is for the sake [of devotional] glorification; on the question of how is that known, this is said –

naming (maheśvarasyābhidhyānamātrāt); as it is known, abhidhyāna is one of the 3 powers of speech, according to Praśastapāda’s PD 11: ṣaṇṇām api padārthānām astitvābhidheyatvajñeyatvāni; the ‘categories’ (padārtha), Praśastapāda informs us, have 3 major basic features: they possess existence ‘-isness’ (astitva), ‘knowability’

(jñeyatva), and ‘nameability’ (abhidheyatva).

132 in Vaiśeṣika, substances are 9 in number because they been defined by the Lord Īśvara.

133 as in some modern languages, e.g. French and German, the plural number is used to express a polite form of address.

94 * Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

2.1.19. pratyakṣapūrvakatvāt saṃjñākarmaṇaḥ

pratyakṣeṇa hi padārthamālocayantaḥ saṃjñāḥ praṇayanti dṛṣṭa

ca dārakasya nāmakaraṇe praṇītāścemāḥ khalu saṃjñāḥ tasmān

manyāmahe asti bhagavān asmadviśiṣṭo yo’smadādi parokṣāṇām

api bhāvānāṃ pratyakṣadarśī yen’edaṃ saṃjñādi praṇītam iti /

2.1.20. niṣkramaṇaṃ praveśanam ity ākāśasya liṅgam

yad etad niṣkramaṇaṃ praveśanaṃ ca puruṣasya dvārādinā bhavati

na bhittyādau tad ākāśakṛtam ato niṣkramaṇa praveśane ākāśasya

liṅgam iti / mūrtābhāvo hyākāśaṃ / tan na /

2.1.21. tad aliṅgam ekadravyavattvāt karmaṇaḥ

niṣkramaṇādi karma puruṣe vartamānam ‘ekadravyaṃ karma’

ityuktatvāniṣkriyatvāc cākāśasya ākāśāvṛtti kathaṃ tad gamayed

asambandhāt / yathā loṣṭavṛtti patanaṃ gurutvasya liṅgam evaṃ

puruṣavṛtti niṣkramaṇam ākāśasya liṅgam iti cet, na,

2.1.22. kāraṇāntarānukḷṛapti vaidharmyāc ca

gurutvaṃ karmaṇosamavāyikāraṇam uktam tad

anumīyatām na tvākāśasyāsamavāyikāraṇatvaṃ yujyate

nityatvadravyatvānāśritatvair ākāśasya gurutvādinā

asamavāyikāraṇena vaidharmyāt / yad uktam ‘niṣkramaṇam cākāśa

kṛtatvād dvārādinā’ iti, etan na,

134 glosses VSc 2.1.18–19 elucidate the system’s philosophy of language, namely that language, even though it is sacred – for it derives from the Great Lord – yet it is arbitrarily designated by God and those superior seers who resemble Him; yet, VSc 2.1.19 says that ‘giving names’ is based on a prior perception; one may ask – if the Lord’s divine language is based on prior perception – is language in Vaiśeṣika eternal?

135 there is not sufficient evidence to draw the conclusion that the origin of names and language is conventional and that meaning is ‘created’; the term used by the commentator here is ‘praṇīta’ (past participle), which means ‘given’ but that should not necessarily imply that such names have been ‘created’; ‘creation of language’ is not

Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 95

2.1.19. [the seers’] act of naming is from a prior perception134

observing the categories through direct perception, they [the superior seers] keep

[secret] the names which have been seen when naming a child and when these names are given, therefore we think that there is a Lord who is superior to us who directly perceives the things which are not seen directly by us, and this naming is done by Him [for] He has seen all things directly [even] those things not directly seen by us, and He has instituted these names. 135

2.1.20. marks of ‘vacuum’ are these: exiting and entering

[objection] whatever departure and entry of a man that happens through the door, and so forth, not through the wall, and so forth, that is done by the ‘vacuum,’

therefore exit and entry are the mark of ‘vacuum’; 136 [refutation] if you say that

‘vacuum’ means absence of [something] ‘concrete’ indeed; this is not so,

***2.1.21. those [2: exiting and entering] are not the inferential mark of ***

the [vacuum] because action subsists in one substance [only]

act of exit and so forth which exists in regards to a man, for it is said that ‘motion has one substance’ and there is motionness of ‘vacuum,’ how is it that [motion of exit and entry] which is not in the ‘vacuum’ will lead to [inffer vacuum] since there is no connection [between vacuum and motion]; if you say that just as the act of falling which is sign of heaviness exists in cloth, in the same way, the exit of a man is the sign of ‘vacuum,’ then this is not so,

***2.1.22. because of the difference [of exiting and entering] ***

is coordinated with another cause137

it is said that ‘weight’ is the non-inherent cause of motion, then, let it be inferred in the case of ‘vacuum,’ however, that it is not proper to say that ‘vacuum’ is not an inherent cause, because there is a difference between ‘vacuum’ as a permanent substance, and the absence of substratum of ‘vacuum’ concerning ‘weight’ and so forth, which is a non-inherent cause; 138 what has been said [in the sentence] ‘the exit by door and so forth’ that is caused by ‘vacuum,’ this is not so,

one and the same with ‘arrangement of language,’ one is usually the work of a god, the other is the ability of a bard, poet, or seer.

136 in other words, the non-corporality is the intrinsic characteristic of ākāśa. Arena (1987:92) provides his own Italian commentary on VS, refers here to Sāṃkhyakārikā

38–39.

137 the alternative translation: ‘“vacuum” is different in property because it results from another cause.’

138 the difference between ‘weight’ and ‘vacuum’ is that while ‘weight’ is a non-inherent cause of motion, ‘vacuum’ is a permanent substance and is without substratum.

96 * Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

2.1.23. saṃyogād abhāvaḥ karmaṇaḥ

bhittyādinā sparśavad dravyeṇa śarīrādeḥ karmādhārasya

saṃyogād niṣkramaṇaṃ nivartate na tvākāśābhāvāt tasya

sarvagatatvāt tatrāpi bhāvaḥ tasmāc chabda liṅgam evākāśam /

bheryādīnām eva nimittānāṃ śabdo guṇa iti cet, na,

***2.1.24. kāraṇaguṇapūrvaḥ kārye guṇo ***

***dṛṣṭaḥ kāryāntarāprādurbhāvāc ca ***

śabdaḥ sparśavatāmaguṇaḥ

iha ye sparśavatāṃ viśeṣaguṇā ekaikendriyagrāhyās te

kāraṇaguṇaiḥ kārye niṣpādyante / na ca bheryavayaveṣu

rūpādaya iva kaścic chabda bhāgaḥ samaveta upalabhyate

/ tasmād akāraṇaguṇapūrvatvān na bheryādeḥ sparśavato

viśeṣaguṇaḥ śabdaḥ / yaś ca sparśavato viśeṣaguṇaḥ sa kārye

yāvat kāryam upalabhyamāno dṛṣṭaḥ / na c’aivam śabdaḥ

tato na sparśavad viśeṣaguṇaḥ / kiṃ ca sparśavad viśeṣaguṇa

ārabdhe kārye kāraṇaguṇair ārabhyate na ca yadā śabdena śabda

ārabhyate tadā kiñcit kāryam utpannaṃ paśyāmaḥ / tasmāt

kāryāntarāprādurbhāvāc ca na śabdaḥ sparśavato viśeṣaguṇa iti /

***2.1.25. paratra samavāyāt pratyakṣatvāc ca ***

nātmaguṇo na manoguṇaḥ

paratra bahir ity arthaḥ / ye khalvātmaguṇās te sukhādaya

ivāntaḥ śarīramupalabhyante / na caivaṃ śabdaḥ bahirbahubhir

upalabhyamānatvāt / na cātmaguṇo bāhyendriyagrāhyāḥ ayaṃ

tu śrotra pratyakṣaḥ tasmān na ātma guṇaḥ / ata eva bahir

upalabhyamānatvād bāhyendriya pratyakṣatvāc ca na manoguṇaḥ /

śrotrapratyakṣatvāc ca na dik kālayoḥ / tasmād guṇaḥ san /

139 the mark of ‘sound’ is not the mark of the entry and exit; ‘vacuum’ exists even inside the wall, not only in the door or the ‘space’ indicated by door; this is because ‘vacuum’ however little it might be, is all-pervasive – it is very minute as well as very large; like ‘soul,’ ‘vacuum’ – being all-pervasive – can pervade everything; for example, body cannot go through the wall, but ‘soul’ [and ‘vacuum’] does, because it is subtle in nature and all-pervasive means it can pervade the wall.

140 śabda stands in Vaiśeṣika not only for ‘sound’ as translated here, but for ‘word’ too.

Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 97

2.1.23. absence of motion is because of a ‘conjunction’

exit takes place in connection with [the subtle] body and so forth which is the substratum of motion and is connected with a tangible substance such as wall and so forth, and not because of the absence of ‘vacuum’ which because it goes everywhere exists there also [in exit], therefore ‘sound’ is the only mark of ‘vacuum’;139

if you say that ‘sound’ is a quality performed by causes such as drum and so forth, the answer is no.

2.1.24. quality of a cause is seen prior to the quality of effect-

product, [thus] sound has not other manifestation140 *** ***

because is not a quality of tangible things

concerning the specific qualities of tangible things, these can be perceived by each corresponding sense-organ, [and] are perceived once the cause-effect production

[takes place]; concerning qualities form and so forth, no portion of ‘sound’ is perceived in a certain section of the drum’s [music]; therefore, sound is not a specific quality previously produced by a cause [such as] the tangible drum and so forth; and the specific quality of a tangible [substance] is the proof of the cognisance of a product as long as it is effect of a cause; but141 ‘sound’ is not like this, therefore it is not a specific quality of tangible things;142 moreover, the specific quality of touchability is produced as long as the qualities exists as effects of a cause, and an effect is not when we see ‘sound’ being produced by [another] ‘sound’;143 as a result, due to the non-production of another effect, ‘sound’ is not a specific quality of something tangible.

***2.1.25. because [sound] inheres elsewhere, because is perceptible, ***

***[sound] is neither a quality of ‘soul’ nor a quality of ‘mind.’ ***

‘elsewhere’ means it is ‘external’; those qualities of ‘soul,’ such as ‘pain’ and so forth are comprehended by many externally; a quality of the ‘soul’ is comprehensible by an external sense-organ, the [sound] however, is directly perceived by ear, therefore is not a quality of the ‘soul,’ consequently, due to eternal comprehensibility and because of the perceptibility through external sense-organ, [sound]

is not a quality of mind; and due to the perceptibility through ear it [sound] is [not a quality] of ‘space’ and ‘time’; hence, being a quality, [Kaṇāda] says –

141 particle ‘ca’ has been translated here with ‘but.’

142 the commentary makes that case that ‘sound’ has its origin not in concrete tangible things; sound is a quality of the substance ‘vacuum.’

143 this sentence ‘the specific quality of having touch is produced through the qualities of the cause once the effect is produced, and not when “sound” is produced by “sound”

we see any effect being produced’ will be referred again by Candrānanda in the introduction to the āhnika VSc 2.2.

98 * Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

2.1.26. liṅgam ākāśasya

tasmād upalabhyamānaḥ śabda ākāśaṃ gamayati /

2.1.27. dravyatvanityatve vāyunā vyākhyāte

yathā adravyavattvāt paramāṇubhūto vāyurdravyaṃ nityaś ca,

evam ākāśaṃ kāraṇa dravyābhāvād dravyaṃ nityaṃ ca /

2.1.28. tattvaṃ bhāvena

yathā sal liṅgāviśeṣāt viśeṣaliṅgābhāvāc caiko bhāva evaṃ

śabdaliṅgāviśeṣād viśeṣaliṅgābhāvāc ca ekam ākāśam /

// iti dvitīyasyādhyam āhnikam //

2.2.

/ dvitīyasyādhyāsya dvitīyam āhnikam /

yad uktaṃ ‘sparśavad viśeṣaguṇā ārabdhe kāryadravye

guṇānārabhante śabdastv anārabdhe dravye śabdamārabhata’

iti tad ayuktam anārabdhe’pi puṣpavastrābhyāṃ dravyāntare

puṣpagandhasya vastre gandhārambhāt tathāpsūṣṇatāyāḥ / ucyate /

***2.2.1. puṣpavastrayoḥ sati sannikarṣe ***

gandhāntarāprādurbhāvo vastre gandhābhāvaliṅgam

puṣpeṇa khalu saṃyukte vastre na puṣpagandhena gandha

ārabhyate vastragandhasyāpi sadbhāvāt puṣpavastragandhābhyāṃ

dvābhyāṃ vilakṣaṇagandhāntaram upajanitam upalabhemahi

na c’aivam, api tu puṣpagandham evopalabhāmahe / tasmād

anārabdhe kārye puṣpagandhena gandha ārabhyate ity ayuktam

gandhāntaraprasaṅgāt /

144 ‘suchness’ (tattva) is that which exists temporally, and as such the sūtra equates it with ‘existence’; Heidegger once coined a specific ontological term, namely ‘the existential’ (‘existenziell,’ the ‘what’ of a material ‘real’ is), and refers to the entity that exists in temporality; it is worth asking whether this ‘suchness’ is equivalent with the 72 temporal dharmas as propounded by Vaibhāṣika Sarvāstivāda (Buddhism) or the ‘specific quality of dharma’ which once extirpated, man acquires ‘liberation’; on existence in Aristotle, see Met 5.7; 7.1–2; De Int. 16b19–25, 21a18–33.

Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 99

2.1.26. [sound] is a mark of ‘vacuum’

because is being perceived [sound] causes [us to infer] ‘vacuum’.

***2.1.27. immateriality and permanence [of vacuum] ***

are explained by [means of] air

just as air is permanent and is a substance due to its atomic nature, lacking possession of essence-substantiality, in the same way, ‘vacuum’ is also a substance and permanent because of the absence of anything that causes it.

2.1.28. by existence [vacuum’s] essence [is explained]144

just as such an existence [is proved] through the particularity of proper mark and through the absence of a specific mark, in the same way, because of the absence of the mark of sound and because of the absence of specific mark, ‘vacuum’145 is one.

// this is the end of the first lesson of the second chapter/ /

Translation

/ the second lesson of the second chapter /

it has been said [in VSc 2.1.24] that ‘a specific tangible quality is produced through the effects or qualities that originate from a cause, and that, each effect is produced like “word” is produced by “sound,”’ [but] that is not correct because a substance is not produced by another substance such as flower or a cloth is, however, the [quality] smell of flower originates in [the case] cloth, and such is the case of ‘heat’ in relation to ‘water’; [hence] it has been said –

***2.2.1. smell subsists in a contact between a flower and cloth, and does not manifest ***

in another cloth [because] has no inferential marks of smell [in that cloth]146

if you say that in the cloth connected with a flower no [other] smell is produced through the smell of [a] flower because we experience the smell of cloth also,

[then] another smell different from both the flower-smell and cloth-smell would be produced, then this is not so, [for] we rather comprehend the smell of [the]

flower alone, therefore [to say that] ‘smell is produced [by another] smell without the inception of an effect,’ this is wrong, because according to this argument, there would be another smell [produced].

145 ‘vacuum’ is only one and like ‘soul,’ ‘time,’ and ‘space,’ its ontological nature is not mixed, divisible, or composed, yet it can subsist in different shapes and states, and only in such states can it be said that it is varied and diverse; this explains the doctrine of one in many, but the many cannot form one; one that has complete essential ontological unity has oneness as its nature.

146 the specific smell of a flower on cloth proves that cloth has no smell, for smell belongs only to the flower, not to the cloth.

100 * Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

2.2.2. etenāpsūṣṇatā vyākhyātā

apāṃ tejasā saṃyoge sati vilakṣaṇasparśānutpattir auṣṇyābhāvasya

liṅgam ayāvad dravyabhāvitvaṃ ca salile auṣṇyasya / sūkṣmāṇāṃ

puṣpāvayavānāṃ vastre tejo vayavānāṃ cāpsu saṅkrānteḥ

saṃyukta samavāyād gandhasparśopalabdhiḥ / nanv ayāvad

dravyabhāvino rūpādayo vastrodakayoḥ puṣpagandhoṣṇa

sparśopalambhakāle svagandhaśītasparśānupalabdheḥ / na,

2.2.3 vyavasthitaḥ pṛthivyāṃ gandhaḥ

pārthive vāsasi vyavasthito’pi svagandhaḥ puṣpagandhābhibhūto

nopalabhyate / kiṃ ca,

2.2.4 tejasyuṣṇatā

tejasy evoṣṇatā vyavasthitā nāpsu saṃkrāmati / tatha

uṣṇyopalabdhikāle /

2.2.5 apsu śītatā

tejovayavānupraveśāt saṃyuktasamavāyād uṣṇopalabdhāv

api anupalabhyamānāpi salile śītatā vyavasthitaivābhibhavān

nopalabhyate / kāla idānīṃ kathyate /

147 Qualities are accidental and perdurant by contrast to substances, which are durable.

148 we do not comprehend the smell of the cloth – for cloth is made of earth – and because the smell of the flower is more powerful.

Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 101

2.2.2. in this way, heat in ‘water’ is explained

there is no specific ‘touch’ produced when ‘water’ is connected with ‘lustre,’ and regarding the absence of heat, the non-manifestation of touch which is variable is the proof that heat in water does not last as long as the parts of substance last;147

because small particles of flower are transmitted in cloth and small particles of lustre are transmitted in ‘water,’ [and] because there are co-existent with something connected there, there is a comprehension of smell and touch; [objection]

now, if you say that ‘colour’ and so forth do not exist other substances such as cloth and water, [it follows] then that the comprehension of smelling flowers and hot touch is at the same time with the recognition of smell of cloth and cold-touch,

[but] this is not so,

***2.2.3. ‘smell’ is invariably situated in ‘earth’ ***

although cloth’s own smell resides in the cloth which consists of earth, this is not comprehended because it is superseded by the smell of flower, 148 moreover,

2.2.4. heat [is invariably situated]149 *** in ‘lustre’150***

heat is situated in lustre only, it does not pass over in ‘water,’ like when [we]

apprehend heat.

2.2.5. coolness subsists in ‘water’

because [coolness] has entered in the particles of ‘lustre,’ because of [its] co-existence with the joint thing, even though there is comprehension of heat, the coolness in water is not comprehended even if it is situated in the water dominated by heat; now [he] explains ‘time’ –

149 Presumably here is locative; Candrānanda prefers using saptamī vibhakti a lot.

150 ‘lustre’ (tejas) as a substance is a broader concept, therefore, it should not be confused with ‘fire’ (agni).

102 * Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

***2.2.6. aparasmin paraṃ yugapad ayugapac ***

ciraṃ kṣipram iti kālaliṅgāni

etāny aparatvavyatikarādīni kāla liṅgāni / tatra pareṇa

dikpradeśena saṃyukte yūni paratvajñāne jāte sthavire cāpareṇa

dikpradeśena saṃyukteparatvajñānotpattau kṛṣṇakeśādivalīpali

tādiparyālocanayā yena nimittena yūni aparatvajñānaṃ sthavire

ca paratvajñānaṃ jāyate sa kālaḥ / tathā tulyakāryeṣu kartṛeṣu

‘yugapat kurvanti ayugapat kurvanti’ iti yataḥ pratyayo jāyate sa

kālaḥ / tathaikaṃ kriyāphalam uddiśya odanākhyaṃ bhūyasīnām

adhiśrayanādikriyāṇām prabandhapravṛttau tulye kartari

‘ciram adyaṃ kṛtam kṣipram adhya kṛtam’ iti yataḥ pratyayau

bhavataḥ sa kāla iti / tasya guṇāḥ saṃkhyā parimāṇa pṛthaktva

saṃyogavibhāgāḥ / kiṃ ca,

2.2.7. dravyatvanityatve vāyunā vyākhyāte

adravyavattvāt paramāṇuvāyor iva dravyatvanityatve kālasya /

151 for what is time at Aristotle, see Phys 4.10–14.

152 latterness or subsequentness; the ability to form a chain or emerge randomly later in future.

153 description of ‘time’ goes hand in hand with that of ‘space’; in fact, time here is not time, but rather ‘space-time,’ close perhaps to what is discussed in the ‘relativity theory’ (Minkowski diagrams) or what is being described are ‘pointers’ in the diagram of reality (e.g. one’s life), which represent a certain position in ‘space’ and ‘time’ called

‘event.’

154 latterness is produced in the young man, who becomes old through time; the gloss gives a series of similes in order to explain the nature of ‘time,’ which otherwise is a highly abstract substance.

Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 103

2.2.6. marks of ‘time’151 *** are remoteness, simultaneousness, ***

and non-simultaneousness, latterness,152 *** and quickness ***

in [relation to] another point of reference

these are the marks of ‘time’ to be associated as distinct from each other; in that respect, [time is] regarding the following part of ‘space,’153 and in regard to the production of the cognition of a ‘next’ young [individual]; [time is] in relation to an old [individual] connected with an earlier situation whence the knowledge of latterness154 is produced; then, through the consideration of black hair and so forth, wrinkles, grey hair, and so forth, the knowledge of some young being is produced in relation [and by comparison with] the knowledge concerning an old being, that is time; similarly, regarding the activities of agents [in the sentences] ‘they are doing simultaneously, they are not doing simultaneously,’ out of these [expressions] one experiences and conceptualises time; likewise, for the sake of achieving the abundant [karmic] fruit of a ceremonial action such as

‘cooked rice’ [time], it is known from a continuous progression of activities of the agent-priest who [decides] ‘today is done slowly,’ alternatively with ‘today is done quickly,’ and this is how the experience of time exists; the qualities of

[time] are ‘number,’ ‘dimension,’ ‘distinctness,’ ‘conjunction,’ and ‘disjunction’; 155 moreover,

***2.2.7. substantiality [and] permanence [of time] ***

are explained by [the simile of] ‘air’

[time] is not like the atoms of wind due to its immateriality, [on the contrary] time

has essence-substantiality and continuity.156

155 the qualities of time are the same as the generic qualities of the soul when it reaches the state of liberation; the infinity and diversity of time are the same as the infinity and diversity of soul; time is a parallel substance to soul; therefore, time cannot circum-scribe nor condition the fate of the soul.

156 time is compared with the atoms of air, perhaps because it moves sequentially, and fragmentary in all directions, but is not exactly like the air, because it lacks constituent parts as air does.

104 * Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

2.2.8. tattvaṃ bhāvena

yathā sal liṅgāviśeṣād viśeṣaliṅgābhāvāc caiko bhāvaḥ tathā

kālaliṅgāviśeṣād viśeṣaliṅgābhāvāc caikaḥ kālaḥ / kālasyaikatve

katham ārambhakālādi vyapadeśa ity atrāha -

2.2.9. kāryaviśeṣeṇa nānātvam

kāryaṃ kriyā kriyā viśeṣeṇāviṣṭasya vastunaḥ

ārambhasthitivināśakriyā dṛṣṭā ekasyāpi kālasya nānātvopacārād

ārambhakālādi vyapadeśaḥ / nanu kriyāmātraṃ kālaḥ / kutaḥ

kālaliṅgānāṃ /

2.2.10. nityeṣvabhāvād anityeṣu bhāvāt

yadi kriyāvyatiriktaḥ syān nityaḥ kāla evaṃ nityeṣv api ākāśādiṣu

kālaliṅgāni pratibhāseran / anityeṣveva tu bhavanti / tasmād

abhinirvartyamāneṣvevāvadhiḥ kālaḥ / tasmāt kriyaiva kāla iti /

naitat, vastuni nirvṛttiyuttarakālabhāvitvāt kālaliṅgānya nityeṣu

bhavanti na tu kriyāyāḥ kālatvāt / teṣāṃ tu /

157 ‘tattva’ may be translated as ‘essence’ and ‘tattvic’ may indicate an ‘essential’ or

‘pure’ entity.

158 ‘bhāva’ is an ‘existential’ (a term derived from Heidegger’s temporal categories) chiefly because the stem √ bhū has a dynamic implication that involves temporal change and activity; therefore, in tune with the broad philosophical terminology, I distinguish between ‘sattā’ (universal permanent reality) and ‘bhāva’ (temporal existential thing).

159 if ‘time’ has ‘oneness’ then its holistic nature would contradict its division in parts; philosophically speaking, ‘oneness’ should not be confused with ‘unit.’

160 here again we are confronted with the dilemma of understanding what ‘one’ could mean; the objection’s understanding may be if ‘one’ is either ‘o’ or ‘1’; if it refers to

‘o’ (holistic oneness), then it cannot have beginning, for oneness is a circle with no beginning; but if it is ‘1,’ it means that it has beginning in which case it is no longer eternal, for the unit is caused or produced by ‘o.’

Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 105

2.2.8. its essence157 is [explained] by existentiality158

because of the absence of a particular positive mark, and because of the absence of a specific mark, the essence of time is one existential, [but since] time is one,159

how do [you then] designate that ‘time’ has a beginning160 and so forth? to which

[Kaṇāda] says –

2.2.9. [its] diversity is [proved] by the particularity of activities

activity is the same as motion, because of the particularity of motion, after having seen the beginning, the endurance and the destruction of a thing, [then] there is the designation of the beginning of ‘time’ and so forth as regards the metaphorical plurality of ‘time,’ even though [time] is one; 161 [objection] no, [because] ‘time’ is

only motion;162 how? because of the marks of ‘time.’

***2.2.10. [diversity of time exists] because there is existence [of ***

particularity] in eternal [substances], 163 *** and because of ***

the absence [of particularity] in eternal [substances]

[objection] if ‘time’ is different from motion then in this way the permanent time is [proved] from the marks of ‘time’ which may appear even in the permanent

‘vacuum’ and so forth; [the marks of time] however, happen only in impermanent things; therefore those things which are changing have only periods of time;164

therefore activity itself is time; [response] this is not so, because the marks of time occur in permanent things after a thing has occurred, and not because the activities are time; in connection with them [Kaṇāda] says –

161 with ādi ‘so forth’ (at the end of a compound), Candrānanda presumably indicates sthiti, and vināśa as well.

162 the static aspect of ‘time’ as devoid of motion is denied by the opponent here.

163 here we have the cornerstone of Vaiśeṣika philosophy that puts forward its hard metaphysics, namely the possibility of knowing abstract things in their diverse, pluralised, and particularised state, which is made by a theory of individuation (antyaviśeṣa), with an ultimate factor (dharmaviśeṣa) that proves an absolute ontological pluralism, which applies to both the minute state of matter, as well as the all-pervasive state of infinitely extendable substances such as ‘time,’ ‘space,’ ‘soul,’ and ‘vacuum.’

164 like the earlier distinction between ‘oneness’ and ‘unit,’ Vaiśeṣika argues that ‘time’

as an absolute substance is different from its divisions or units, which can be said to be small ‘periods’ or ‘entities.’

106 * Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

2.2.11. kāraṇe kālākhyā

eṣāṃ kālaliṅgānāṃ nirnimittānām asambhavāt kriyānimittatve

‘kṛtam’ iti syāt na ‘yugapad’ iti / tasmād eṣāṃ yat kāraṇaṃ tasmin

kālākhyā /

2.2.12 ita idam iti yatas tad diśo liṅgam

mūrtadravyamavadhiṃ kṛtam yata etad bhavati ‘idam asmāt

pūrveṇa’ ity ādi pratyayas tad diśo liṅgam / guṇāḥ saṃkhyā

parimāṇa pṛthaktva saṃyoga vibhāgāḥ / kiṃ ca,

2.2.13. dravyatvanityatve vāyunā vyākhyāte

adravyavattvād vāyuvad dravyatva nityatve diśaḥ /

2.2.14. tattvaṃ bhāvena

digliṅgāviśeṣād viśeṣaliṅgābhāvāc ca ekā dig ity arthaḥ / saty

ekatve /

2.2.15. kāryaviśeṣeṇa nānātvam

pūrveṇa devayajanaṃ dakṣiṇena pitṛuyajanam ityādinā

kriyāviśeṣeṇa nānātvasya diśaḥ pūrvadakṣiṇāder upacāraḥ /

itaretarāśrayam iti cet, evaṃ tarhi /

165 ‘space’ or ‘direction’ is a highly abstract substance, and likewise ‘time’ and ‘soul,’

its generic qualities – that is to say, the qualities that define its existence in the non-corporeal, absolute, and simple state – are ‘number,’ ‘dimension,’ ‘distinctness,’ ‘conjunction,’ and ‘disjunction.’

166 the same observation as in the footnote on time (sūtra 2.2.7), space is here described similarly; space like time is sequentially and multi-dimensional, just as air is, for it which blows its winds in all directions, but always sequentially.

167 ‘tattva’ might be translated as the ‘essence’ of a thing, though in Sāṃkhya it could mean the ‘essential thing’; note that in Vaiśeṣika there no such thing as a radical distinction within abstract substances; further comparative study is needed about the possible contribution of Indian ontology to the Latin scholastic debate between ‘essence’ and

‘existence’ that has divided European philosophy since Aquinas; a comparative view on Aristotle’s thought of essence could be helpful (Met 7.4–6, 10–11, 17).

Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 107

2.2.11. [these marks] are called time in respect to the cause

concerning the marks of time, when [they] lack a cause [then] [the marks of time]

are impossible, then when an activity is caused [the effect] would be called ‘done’

and there will be no [use of the word] ‘simultaneous,’ therefore, whenever these

[marks] are caused, there the term of time [is used].

***2.2.12. the marks [of time] are in regard to ‘that is ***

from that,’ ‘this is obtained from this’

mark of ‘space’ [diś] is the conceptualisation of a concrete demarcated substance

[in sentences] such as ‘this is because of a previous one’; its qualities are ‘number,’

‘dimension,’ ‘distinctness,’ ‘conjunction,’ and ‘disjunction’;165 furthermore –

***2.2.13. regarding its essence and permanence [space] ***

is explained by [the simile of] ‘air’

like the ‘air’ [which] is has not materiality, [so also] ‘space’ is [like air] has [its own] essence and permanence. 166

2.2.14. its essence167 *** [is known] by its existence168***

meaning of ‘space’ is this: it is one due to the presence of specific marks of ‘space,’

as well as because of the absence of the specific marks of ‘space.’

***2.2.15. even though ‘space’ is one, [its] diversity is ***

[proved by] particular activities169

speech usages of ‘east,’ ‘south,’ and so forth as applied to ‘space,’ [show] the diversity of ‘space’ because of the diversity of specific [sacrificial] activities in respect to the offerings to gods towards the east, and the variety of place for offerings towards east, south, in this way there exists the diversity of ‘space’ like east, south, and so forth, [being] metaphorically explained by specific activities; [objection] if you say that there will be mutual dependency [between motion and space], thus [we say]

168 ‘bhāva,’ as Halbfass pointed out, has rather dynamic connotations; by extrapolation, one may see in such dynamism the role of karma at play; whenever an absolute being falls from its absolute state, in the context of Indian philosophy, it can be said to be an existential state of decomposition and corruption; a long-time ago, Indian existentialism expressed itself in a predominantly substantialist driven manner (Brahmanism) or as mentalist (Buddhism).

169 ‘particular’ is the proof that ‘diversity’ does not refer to the ontological status of the substance as one; here diversity must refer to the states that one substance can undergo; the state makes a stable entity diverse and plural, not rather its static oneness.

108 * Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

***2.2.16. ādityasamyogād bhūtapūrvād ***

bhaviṣyato bhūtāc ca prācī

savituraharādau yena kalpitadikpradeśena saṃyogo’bhūd bhavati

bhaviṣyati vā tasmād ādityasaṃyogāt ‘prācī’ iti vyapadeśaḥ prāñcat

yata ādityam iti /

2.2.17. tathā dakṣiṇā pratīcī udīcī ca

asmādevāditya saṃprayogād dakṣiṇādi vyapadeśaḥ /

2.2.18. etena digantarāṇi vyākhyātāni

anenaiva prakāreṇa pūrvadakṣiṇādīni digantarāṇi vyākhyātāni /

tatredānīm ātmā karaṇair adhigantavyaḥ karaṇāni śabdādibhyo

guṇebhyaḥ / nanu guṇatvam asiddhaṃ śabdādīnāṃ siddhaṃ

kṛtvocyate / nanu guṇatve kutaḥ saṃśayaḥ āha kiṃ saṃśayao ’pi

hetumān evam etat / ko hetuḥ tad āha -

***2.2.19. sāmānyapratyakṣād viśeṣāpratyakṣād ***

viśeṣasmṛteś ca saṃśayaḥ

sthāṇupuruṣayor ūrdhvatāṃ sāmānyaṃ paśyan viśeṣahetūn

pāṇyādikoṭarādīnapaśyan smarati ca viśeṣān ataḥ saṃśayaḥ

‘kim ayaṃ sthāṇuḥ syāt puruṣo na vā’ iti / sa dvividhaḥ bāhya

ābhyantaraś ca / bāhyo ’pi dvividhaḥ pratyakṣaḥ apratyakṣaś ca /

apratyakṣe tāvat /

170 the coordination of sun is measured by sense perception that can measure the changes, from past, present through future; thus, ‘time’ and ‘space’ can be perceived in connection with the changes of the sun.

171 ‘viśeṣahetu’ better translated by ‘grounds of differentiation.’

Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 109

***2.2.16. word ‘prācī’ [east] is used because of a ‘conjunction’ of the ***

***sun with a previous happening, a present happening, as well ***

as a happening that is going to happen [in the future]

whatever part of ‘space’ is conceptualised at the beginning of the day, [that is conceptualised] in past, present, and future relation with the sun; the designation

‘east’ [prācī] is made because of the relation with the sun, therefore [the sen-

tences] ‘it goes further’ designates [the direction of] the sun.170

2.2.17. similarly, [space uses the words] ‘south,’ ‘west,’ and ‘north’

as from our logical connection with the sun, the designation of south and so forth

[can be defined].

2.2.18. in this way, the other ‘space’-related [happenings] are explained

in the very same manner, only the other locations, south, east, and so forth are explained; now regarding ‘soul,’ it should be understood by means of causes, qualities such as ‘sound,’ and so forth; [objection] now, qualitiness which is not proved in connection with sound and so forth, having proved these, [a question]

is addressed: how there is doubt concerning the qualitiness [of sound]? [he] says: does doubt have any reasonable [standing]? [response] it has indeed; [objection]

what is that [good] reason? [response] that [Kaṇāda] says –

***2.2.19. doubt is [produced] due to the perception of ***

***generality, the non-perception of particularity, and ***

from an [uncertain] specific recollection

when there is a general gaze at a ‘man’ and a ‘tree,’ if there is no discerning of their particularities171 such as ‘hand’ [of man] and ‘cavity’ [of tree], then from memory172 of a specific detail there is henceforth a ‘doubt-knowledge’ [as expressed by questions] such as: ‘what could that be, a tree, or a man?’ [doubt]

is 2-fold: external173 and internal; 174 the external [doubt] is 2-fold: perceptive and non-perceptive; regarding the imperceptible [one], first [he] says, like that –

172 the knowledge produced is only a ‘reconstruction’ of such a gaze; yet, what Aristotle says about memory is only about the past, not the future or present, De Mem 1. 449b 10–20.

173 ‘external doubt’ that can be either imperceptible as per VSc 2.2.20 or perceptible as per VSc 2.2.21.

174 ‘internal doubt’ described in VSc 2.2.23 arises from vidyā and avidyā.

110 * Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

2.2.20. dṛṣṭam adṛṣṭam

prāpto manuṣya ity ukte kim imaṃ dṛṣṭaṃ paśyeyam adṛṣṭam iti

śravaṇamātrād eva saṃśayaḥ / pratyakṣe tu /

2.2.21. dṛṣṭaṃ ca dṛṣṭatvat

samprati dṛṣṭvā puruṣaṃ tam eva dṛṣṭamālocayataḥ kim ayaṃ

mayā dṛṣṭapūrvaḥ kadācid utādṛṣṭa iti saṃśayaḥ /

***2.2.22. dṛṣṭaṃ yathādṛṣṭaṃ ayathādṛṣṭaṃ ***

ubhayathā dṛṣṭatvāt

ādau kuntalī devadatto dṛṣṭaḥ madhye muṇḍaḥ tṛtīyasyāvasthāyāṃ

kuntalī / caturthyā mālāpādibhiravagate ārūpamātreṇa ca

sandhyādau ‘kim ayaṃ kuntalī syād uta muṇḍo vā’ iti saṃśayaḥ

/ pūrvasūtrenekārthānusmṛteḥ saṃśayaḥ anena tu ekārthe

viśeṣānusmaraṇāt / ābhyantaras tu /

2.2.23. vidyāvidyātaś ca saṃśayaḥ

vidyā samyagjñānam avidyā mithyājñānaṃ / daivajñena

śubhamādiṣṭaṃ satyam abhūt dvitīyam asatyaṃ tṛtīyasyām

avasthāyāṃ saṃśayaḥ kim ādyāvasthāvat satyam uta

dvitīyāvasthāvad asatyam iti / evaṃ kathitaḥ saṃśayaḥ / tatra śabda

eva tāvat kathyatām /

2.2.24. śrotragrahaṇo yo arthaḥ sa śabdaḥ

śrotreṇa gṛhyate yo arthaḥ sa śabdaḥ / sāmānyādīnām

arthaśabdasyāsaṅketi tat vāc chabdatvaṃ śabdo mā bhūd ity

arthagrahaṇam /

175 ‘whatever is seen’ resembles dṛṣṭa.

176 the problems posed by misleading recollections are 2-fold: on the one hand, these refer to the recognition of the universal, and on the other hand, to the recognition of the particular.

177 VSc 2.2.23. describes 3 conditions in which vidyā and avidyā knowledge exist: (1) a situation where a fortune-teller’s prediction of an auspicious event comes true; (2) a

Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 111

2.2.20. [is the dilemma between] seen and unseen

when for instance there is an indication of a man, there is the question as to what this gaze could be, [and] doubt [is when man’s arrival] is not seen, but only

[inferred] from hearing; but as regards [the perceptible doubt] [Kaṇāda] says –

2.2.21. [arises when] a ‘seen thing’ resembles a ‘visible thing’175

now doubt is when after having seen the same man [questions such as], ‘is this really the one I saw earlier, or not the one I saw earlier?’

***2.2.22. [doubt of] the visible thing [can be] likely visible, unlikely ***

visible, and both ways [likely and unlikely] visible

at first, there is the gaze of Devadatta with the lock of hair, gradually the gaze of

[him] with a shaved head, and in the third instance the gaze of the lock of hair sitting in its place [head]; in the fourth [stage of visibility], Devadatta is known by conversation and so forth, and doubt is in relation with [the] unspecified moment at the time of twilight [when such questions arise] ‘what could that be, a lock of hair, or a shaved head?’; in a previous sūtra, doubt was [defined] by recollecting

[too] many objects, here however, doubt is because of a specific recollection of

one and the same object;176 but, regarding the internal doubt [Kaṇāda] says –

***2.2.23. doubt is because of the [dilemma between] ***

valid knowledge and invalid knowledge

‘vidyā’ is perfect knowledge, ‘avidyā’ is deceiving knowledge; 177 when an astrol-

oger is asked for an auspicious [thing], [the first time] the thing is true, the second time [it] is non-true, [but] on the third time there is a doubt as to whether the real thing is true as in the first time, [or] true like in the second time; hence, that is how doubt is being described; in relation to that, ‘sound’ might be explained as such –

2.2.24. ‘sound’ is that whose meaning178 *** is grasped by ear***

‘sound’ is that whose subject-matter is perceived by ear; because ‘word’ has not been conventionalised in connection with universality and so forth, so that śabdatva should not be [understood to be the same as] śabda; [this is why] the word ‘artha’ [object] has been taken [for śabda].

situation in which this very prediction does not come true; and (3) a situation where there is a doubt about whether there is truth or not in the first and second situation enumerated (see trans. Nozawa, 1993, p. 109).

178 ‘artha’ may be translated as both ‘subject-matter’ (object-matter, or object-matter) as well as ‘meaning.’

112 * Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

2.2.25. tasmin dravyaṃ karma guṇa iti saṃśayaḥ

sādhāraṇarūpatvād dravyāditvena śabde saṃśayaḥ / tad āha -

***2.2.26. tulyajātīyeṣvarthāntarabhūteṣu ca ***

viśeṣasyobhayathā dṛṣṭatvāt

pṛthivītvaṃ sajātīyāt salilādeḥ pṛthivyā viśeṣo dṛṣṭa asajātīyābhyāṃ

ca guṇa karmabhyām / tataḥ śabde ’pi kim ayaṃ śrotragrāhyatvaṃ

viśeṣo guṇais tulyasyārthāntarabhūtasya veti saṃśayaḥ / naitat,

2.2.27. ekadravyavattvān na dravyam

ekasmin dravye ākāśe vartamānatvān na dravyam ayaṃ śabdaḥ

dravyaṃ hyadravyaṃ paramāṇvādy anekadravyaṃ vā ghaṭādi /

2.2.28. acākṣuṣatvān na karma

dravyaṃ karma vā yad indriyāntarapratyakṣaṃ tac cakṣuṣam api

dṛṣṭam ayaṃ tu śabdaḥ śrotrapratyakṣo ’pi san na cākṣuṣaḥ / evaṃ

sthito guṇaḥ / kiṃ tu -

2.2.29. guṇasya satopavargaḥ karmabhiḥ sādharmyam

karmabhir asya punar guṇabhūtasyāpi sādharmyam apavargo

vināśaḥ utpattyanantaram agrahaṇād vināśonumīyate / sato ’pi

nimittādagrahaṇam iti cet, na,

179 sūtra refers to different kinds of specificities, one that is presumably ‘different in different objects’ and one that is ‘common in many objects,’ namely sāmānyaviśeṣa; the first one may be said to be the ultimate particularity, whereas the second is the ‘universal particularity’ (a lower universal, such as genus and species, which is helpful to determine the ‘class’ of an object).

Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 113

2.2.25. doubt is when [sound] subsists in substance, quality, motion

[objection] doubt in regard to ‘sound’ is due to its generic base, such as substantiality, qualitiness, and so forth [motionness]; on this, [Kaṇāda] says –

***2.2.26. and [doubt is] when the particularity [of sound] is seen ***

***in both [ways], in the same [homogenous] species, ***

and in different [heterogeneous] objects179

the visibility of the particularity in ‘earth,’ ‘water,’ and so forth is because earthiness is homogenous as well as heterogeneous, of which quality and motion [are such examples]; therefore, doubt concerning ‘sound’ [raises the question] as to what is that particularity perceived by [the] ear in comparison with the qualities between different mutual subject-matters of things; this is not so,

***2.2.27. because it is possessed by one substance, ***

[sound] is not a substance

because [sound] exists only in one substance [such as] ‘vacuum,’ this ‘sound’ is not a substance like, for instance, the substance pot and so forth; atoms and so forth are not a substance, and there cannot be many substances like pot and so forth.

2.2.28. because it is not visually perceptible, [sound] is not a motion180

when substance or motion is perceptible by different organs, then that which belongs to the sight is visible too, but ‘sound,’ although it is perceived by [the]

ear, is that which does not belong to the sight; in this manner the quality [sound]

is firmly ascertained; however,

***2.2.29. even though it is a quality, [sound] is similar to ***

motions because it has a terminus point181

even though [sound] is a quality, it is similar with motions [in that it has] termination, [while] destruction is inferred because is not known after production; [objection] if you say that even though [sound] exists [but] not comprehended because of some cause, [then] no,

180 ‘sound’ is again proved as a quality not a substance or motion.

181 ‘śabda’ might be subject to destruction and creation, because, like any other entity subjacent to motion, it becomes prone to change.

114 * Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

2.2.30. sato liṅgābhāvāt

yat sad api nimittān na gṛhyate tasya liṅgaṃ sad bhāvagrāhakaṃ

bhavati śabdasya tūc cāraṇādūrdhvaṃ saṃyogāder

liṅgasyābhāvādasatta iva / kiṃ ca,

2.2.31. nityavaidharmyāt

uccaritapradhvaṃso nityairvaidharmyam tasmād anityaḥ / kiṃ ca,

2.2.32. kāryatvāt

kāryaś ca śabdaḥ saṃyogādibhya utpatteḥ / tasmād anityaḥ / kiṃ ca,

2.2.33. abhāvāt

prāgabhāvād ity arthaḥ / prāgabhāvavato vināśāt /

prāgabhāvaścāsya kāraṇebhya utpatteḥ / na ca tāni vyañjakāni /

kutaḥ ?

2.2.34. kāraṇato vikārāt

yasmād bheryādikāraṇebhyo śabdasya vikārovagamyate mahati

bheryādau mahān alpelpaḥ / abhivyaktau tu /

2.2.35. doṣāt

nityatvenābhivyaktau śabdonyena yajñe prayukto nānyena

prayujyeta darbhādivat yātayāmatvādi doṣāt / tasmād anityaḥ /

kutaḥ kāryatvam ityāha -

182 it may be yet another reference to the theory of asatkāryavāda.

183 it refers to the previous absence or non-existence of the effect; once again, the Vaiśeṣikas ascertain their asatkāryavāda doctrine.

184 the ablative has been translated here with an adjective.

185 Today, darbha, a herb used since Vedic times, can be seen being used by the Brahmin priests at various ceremonies; it is known by the name of kuśa (desmostachya bipin-nata) and is alongside Soma, a very important element in the Vedic sacrifice.

Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 115

2.2.30. because it has not real marks [sound is invisible]

that which is not comprehended although it exists due to some cause, its mark makes us comprehend its existence, [and] in the case of sound, however, after the articulation due to an absence of any mark connected, there is only the absence

[of sound, ascertained].

2.2.31. [sound] is dissimilar from continuity [hence is impermanent]

it is therefore impermanent by virtue of its dissimilarity to permanent [entities], and because of having been previously uttered [produced]

2.2.32. [sound exists] because it is produced182

and ‘sound’ is an effect, its production is due to ‘conjunction’ and so forth, therefore it is impermanent; furthermore,

2.2.33. [sound exists] because of [its inevitable] absence183

the meaning of this [sūtra] is that is [sound] has a previous non-existence; that which has prior non-existence is destructible; 184 and because sound is produced by causes, it has a prior non-existence, the causes are not indicative [of prior-existence], why?

2.2.34. because [it is subject to] changes from [its] cause

change of ‘sound’ is intelligible by [the simile] of a cause such as a drum, and so forth, [whereby sound is] big in a big drum, and small in a small one; but regarding [its] both manifestations,

2.2.35. because [is subject to] defect

if [sound] is manifested permanently, then the sound used by one person in a sacrifice will not be used by another person, in the same way as sacrificial grass like ‘darbha’185[is not used] due to its defect of staleness, 186 therefore, sound is

impermanent;187 why it is an effect-product? [to which] [Kaṇāda] says –

186 grass cannot be used by another person because that will not give a proper result, it will be stale; here dharmaviśeṣa shows that it arises in a uniquely individual way.

187 ‘sound’ functions differently from grass because of being impermanent; a man can use the same ‘sound’ that has been used by another person, so sound is newly produced.

116 * Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

2.2.36. saṃyogād vibhāgāc chabdāc ca śabdaniṣpatteḥ

bherīdaṇḍasaṃyogād vastradalavibhāgāc chabdāc ca śabdasya

vīcīsantānavan niṣpatter manyāmahe kārya iti /

2.2.37. liṅgāc cānityaḥ

‘tebhyas trayo vedā ajāyanta’ […] eti vacanād vaidikāl liṅgād

anityaḥ / nanu nityaḥ śabdaḥ /

2.2.38. dvayos tu pravṛttyor abhāvāt

kāryāṇāṃ hi bhāvānāṃ dve pravṛttī ekā nivṛtti anyā

kāryaviniyogarūpā / śabdasya

punar artha pratipattyartha iva pravṛttiruccāraṇākhyā nātmārthā

tasmān nityaḥ /

2.2.39. saṃkhyābhāvāt

uccaritapradhvaṃsitve śabdasya ‘dvir ayamāmnātaḥ’ […] iti

vinaṣṭatvāt saṃkhyābhyā vṛttir na bhaved asti ca tasmān nityaḥ /

188 Jambūvijayaji the editor, did not trace this quotation here. The quote may indicate that

‘sound’ is a channel through which the Vedas have been revealed; since meaning and language is conventional, so also ‘sound’ is.

189 Possibly the objection is raised by the Mīmāṃsākas, who hold that language and meaning are eternal (according to the Bhāṭṭās, the ‘particular is understood secondarily, or metaphorically, that is, via lakṣaṇā vṛtti; according to Prābhākaras, the particular is known at the same time as the universal. There is a logical concomitance between the two (vyāpti); personal communication: Marco Ferrante).

190 the natural conclusion would be that if a thing is simultaneous (it occurs in 2 places at the same time) it will then be eternal, for neither time nor space can contain it; in the case of ‘sound’ however, it is impermanent because it cannot occur in 2 places (at the same time), so it cannot be both ‘1’ and ‘many’ as eternal entities usually are (time, space, soul).

Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 117

***2.2.36. ‘sound’ is brought forth by ‘conjunction’ ***

and ‘disjunction’ and ‘sound’

because of a ‘conjunction’ between drum and stick, because of the separation of parts of cloth, and because of the production of sound out of [another] sound, just as there is a continuity of waves, we think that sound is an effect.

2.2.37. [sound] has no continuity, as its marks [show]

‘from these, Vedas are descended’ […]188 because of this [Vedic sentence] which is a Vedic mark, sound is impermanent; [objection] no, ‘sound’ is permanent. 189

***2.2.38. but [if sound were permanent-continuous] ***

it will not occur twice190

[Mīmāṃsākas’ view]191 the product-beings have 2 forms of activity: one is generative of effects, the other has the nature of division-distribution; however, ‘sound’

has only one function, [namely] that to ascertain meaning, which is pronuncia-tion, [but] ‘sound’ is not produced for the sake of itself, 192 therefore ‘sound’ is

permanent.

2.2.39. [sound is continuous] because of the absence of ‘number’193

the ‘sound’ is produced and is destroyed, ‘this word is mentioned twice’ [but] here because it has been destroyed, there is no repetition in number, but repetition of

‘sound’ does exist, therefore ‘sound’ is permanent. 194

191 Sūtrapāṭha rehearses the tenets, which belong to other orthodox and unorthodox schools for refutation without always specifying their name; we take it to be the Mīmāṃsākas’ view, which is expressed here and in the next sūtra, until end of VSc 2.2.42 where the Vaiśeṣika’s voice comes in again.

192 according to Mīmāṃsā sound is the vehicle that conveys the eternal meaning.

193 ‘number’ is a quality of eternal substances (e.g. time, space, souls); number is considered only from 2 onwards, thus, if it is said that number has no number, that means that ‘sound’ is impermanent for it occurs only once, after which it vanishes.

194 another feature of the impermanent nature of an entity is that it cannot be divided into parts; it is the reason why Vaiśeṣika insists that abstract substances such as ‘time,’

‘space,’ ‘vacuum,’ and ‘soul’ are ‘one’ even though we can see a certain diversity in them, this diversity should be seen only in metaphorical, not ontological terms.

118 * Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

2.2.40. prathamāśabdāt

prathamāśabdād iti ‘triḥ prathamām anv āha’ […] iti vākyam

uccarita vināśitve śabdasya prathamāyāṛco’bhyāvṛttigaṇanaṃ na

syād asti ca tasmān nityaḥ /

2.2.41. sampratipatti bhāvāc ca

vināśitve śabdasya ‘sa evāyaṃ gośabda’ iti sampratipattiḥ

pratyabhijñā na syāt tasmān nityaḥ / naitat, sāram /

2.2.42. sandigdhāḥ sati bahutve

pradīpādāvadvipravṛttatvaṃ dṛṣṭam dvirvidyun niḥsṛteti

saṃkhyābhāvaḥ sampratipattirjvālādau / tasmād anityeṣv api

bhāvād bahavopy amī hetavaḥ saṃśayaitāḥ / tasmād anityaḥ /

2.2.43. saṃkhyābhāvaḥ sāmānyataḥ

prathamāśabdaḥ saṃpratipatti bhāvaś ceti sa dṛśyadete draṣṭavyā /

// iti dvitīyo’dhyāyaḥ //

3.1.

/ tṛtiyasyādhyayasya adyam āhnikam /

evaṃ digantānāṃ vaidharmyamuktvātmānam upakramate /

3.1.1. prasiddhā indriyārthāḥ

śabdādayo yasmād guṇādisvabhāvāḥ prasiddhāḥ tebhyaś

cendriyāṇi / ata idānīm -

195 ‘gaṇana’ from the 10th class root √ gaṇ ‘to calculate.’

196 ‘but it does exist’ refers to the fact that although ‘sound’ terminates after an utterance, it re-occurs each time it is uttered.

Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 119

***2.2.40. [sound is continuous] because of the word ***

‘prathama’ [in the beginning]

because of the word ‘prathama’ [first], there is a sentence ‘he recites the first verse thrice,’ [which indicates] that the word first, and so forth […] after the termination of the utterance of the word there will be no calculation195[of the repetition] of the

first verse, but there is calculation,196 therefore [sound] is permanent

2.2.41. and [sound is continuous] because of the existence of recognition

if there were destruction of sound [then] the type of recognition [as expressed in the sentence] ‘this is the same sound “go” [cow]’ would no longer be possible, therefore ‘sound’ is permanent; 197 [Vaiśeṣika:] this [view] is not correct,

2.2.42. given the [sound’s] manifoldness [your arguments] are ambiguous

in a lamp and so forth, an activity198 is seen twice, the lightning came out twice, here there is absence of number, recognition is found in flames and so forth, therefore because many of these causes exist in impermanent things too, therefore, these reasons are ambiguous, therefore ‘sound’ is impermanent.

2.2.43. the ‘number’ [of sound] occurs generically

the word ‘first’199 and the existence of a recognition, these should be reflected upon by analogy.

// this is the second chapter //

Translation

/ the first lesson of the third chapter /

thus, having explained the differences between the substances up to ‘space,’ [now]

he undertakes [the inquiry] regarding ‘soul.’

***3.1.1. the objects of the sense organs have been well-established ***

because ‘sound’ and so forth are established as having the nature of quality, and so forth, and from them their sense organs [are established]; therefore, now

[Kaṇāda] says –

197 up to this point the commentary reproduced the strong arguments put forward by Mīmāṃsākas; now is the turn of Vaiśeṣikas to respond.

198 ‘twice-activity’ refers to the lamp that can be lit twice.

199 See VSc 2.2.40.

120 * Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

***3.1.2. indriyārthaprasiddhir indriyārthebhyorthāntaratve ***

hetuḥ

grāhyāṇāmarthānāṃ śabdādīnāṃ yeyaṃ prasiddhiḥ tayā ca

śrotrādīnāṃ karaṇānām anayā indriyārthaprasiddhyā ebhyo

grāhyagrahaṇebhyo indriyārthebhyaḥ paro grahītā ātma ānumīyate /

3.1.3. so’napadeśaḥ

grāhyagrahaṇaprasiddhyākhyo grahītṛ sadbhāve yo hetur uktaḥ

so’napadeśaḥ akāraṇam ity arthaḥ / kim ātmakalpanayā / katham

indriyāṇi grahītṛṇyeva na bhavanti / naitat,

3.1.4. kāraṇājñānāt

bhūtānām indriyakāraṇānām ajñānatvāt kāryāṇīndriyāṇy apy ajñāna /

bhūtājñānaṃ /

3.1.5. kāryājñānāt

anyasya bhūtakāryasya ghaṭāder ajñatvād bhūtāny apy ajñāni /

3.1.6. ajñānāc ca

bhūtānām ajñānād indriyāṇy api ajñāni ity upasaṃhārārtham idaṃ

sūtram /

200 for Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, a ‘hetu’ (liṅga) is discussed in relation to an ‘pakṣa’

(‘uncertain thing,’ e.g. ātman) and a probandum (sādhya). In the Vaiśeṣika context, Candrānanda deliberates between a probandum (śabda) and an ‘uncertain thing’ to be proved (where the pakṣa is ātman).

Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 121

***3.1.2. because the objects of senses have been established to ***

be different from senses, this is the proof200 *** that there ***

is something different [from the sense-object]201

‘soul’ [which is] beyond the graspable and the grasping [activity], sense-powers, and sense-object are inferred from the relation between the grasper and the grasped, which establishes [the existence] of a subject matter and of something other than the senses, for instance the existence of [the] ear is the basis established from the grasping of the meanings and of the words.

3.1.3. but this [proof]202 is invalid

[objection] having stated the argument according to which [soul] is the existential grasper based on the proposition concerning the relation between grasper and the act-of-grasping, the reason stated is invalid and is lacking any ground; why do you imagine ‘soul’ as real? how do the senses not become the graspers [of objects]?

this cannot be so,

3.1.4. because the causes [you mentioned: sense-

objects] do not have cognisance

[response] because elements are ignorant [lack consciousness] concerning the causes of sense organs, the sense organs which are effect-products lack therefore, consciousness; concerning the lack of consciousness of things [Kaṇāda] says –

3.1.5. [as well as] because effects do not have cognisance

due to the other effects of things such as pot and so forth, the elements lack consciousness too

3.1.6. [as well as] because cognisance [is impermanent]

this present sūtra is given in order to conclude that, because elements lack consciousness, the sense organs are also ignorant.

201 this is what we may call the ‘otherness argument’ (arthāntara hetuḥ) for the existence of the ‘soul.’ Other types of argument are designated in the following glosses.

202 ‘that’ (tat) refers to the argument expressed under 3.1.2.

122 * Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

3.1.7. anya eva hetur ity anapadeśaḥ

anyo hetulakṣaṇabāhya ity arthaḥ tathā hī indriyārthaprasiddhir

indriyārthadharmatvād ātmanā asambandhān na tam anumāpayet

ato’napadeśaḥ / naitat,

***3.1.8. saṃyogi samavāyi ekārthasamavāyi virodhi ca / ***

***kāryaṃ kāryāntarasya kāraṇaṃ kāraṇāntarasya ***

***/ virodhyabhūtaṃ bhūtasya bhūtam abhūtasya ***

abhūtam abhūtasya bhūtaṃ bhūtasya

dhūmogneḥś saṃyogi / viṣāṇaṃ goḥś samavāyi / ekārtha

samavāyi dvidhāś kāryaṃ kāryāntarasya, yathā rūpaṃ sparśasya,

kāraṇaṃ kāraṇāntarasya, yathā pāṇiḥ pādasya / caturdhā virodhi

abhūtaṃ varṣakarma vāyvabhrasaṃyogasya liṅgam, bhūtaṃ

varṣakarma vāyvabhrasaṃyogasyābhūtasya liṅgam, abhūtā

śyāmatā abhūtasyāgnisaṃyogasya liṅgam, bhūtaṃ kāryaṃ

bhūtasya kāraṇasaṃyogasya liṅgam / tasmād iha prasiddhānām

indriyārthānāṃ karaṇatā karmatā ca samavāyinī ātmaliṅgam / na te

ātmani samavāyinī iti cet, evam etat, anyathā tu prayogaḥ indriyāṇi

kartṛprayojyāni karaṇatvād, vāsyādivat iti / saṃyogyādīny eva

kathaṃ liṅgam ityāha -

3.1.9. prasiddhapūrvakatvād apadeśasya

prasiddho yaḥ saṃyogyādir nā sambaddho yena saha jñātaḥ sa

tasyārthāntarasyāpi liṅgam saṃbaddhatvāt nā sambaddhaṃ /

tathā hi -

203 see VS 3.1.3.

204 these may also be called relational ‘probans,’ or ‘probandums,’ as they are identified in Vaiśeṣika logics; one needs to distinguish between marks and probans; for instance, in the case of smoke and fire, smoke is the mark (liṅga), fire is the proban (hetu); Nyāya has a slightly different terminology hetu, liṅga (marks), on the one hand, and sādhya (probans), on the other.

Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 123

3.1.7. the argument [on difference, stated in sūtra 3.1.2] is invalid203

[objection] that there is another cause means that it is different from the definition of cause, thus, because the well-established object of sense-organs cannot cause [us] to infer [the existence of soul], because they have the property of being objects of sense-organs and are not connected with ‘soul,’ therefore it [such argument] is invalid; this is not so,

3.1.8. [valid arguments are]204 connected, inherent, inherent-w ith-one-

***and-the-same-object, and conflicting; [for example] one ‘effect’ ***

***causes ‘another effect,’ ‘one cause’ produces ‘another cause,’; ***

***conflicting [arguments are] one ‘past thing’ is [the mark] of an ***

***‘inexistent thing’, the ‘inexistent thing’ is [the mark] of that ***

***which‘never existed,’ ‘a past thing’ is [the mark] of that which is ***

‘a past thing’,[and] the ‘past thing’ is [the mark] of a ‘past thing’

smoke is connected with fire, 205 horn is inherent in cow; one which is inherent-with-one-and-the-same-object is 2-fold: effect of another effect, such as ‘form’ is the [cause] of touch, one cause leads to another cause such as hand is the cause of foot; conflicting argument is 4-fold: the rain that has happened is a mark of an air-cloud connection, rain that has happened is a mark of the connection between wind and cloud which has not happened; the blackness which has not happened is a mark of a connection with fire which has not happened, the effect that has happened is a mark of the connection with the cause that has happened, therefore, here the cause and motion [connection] are established by objects of senses inherent [in each other] and are the mark of the ‘soul’; if you say that they are not inherent in the ‘soul,’ this is thus, for [while] the usage is different, the sense organs are to be used by the doer, because they are the causes just as mouth and so forth is; [concerning] how conjunction and so forth are the mark, [Kaṇāda] says –

3.1.9. [these] arguments are established on the [principle of] precedence

that which is established like ‘conjunction’ and so forth is not separated from that which is known, that [connected thing] becomes a mark of some other thing too, because [it] is connected [with another thing] and therefore [it] is not disjoined; that is to say –

205 causative reason is called ‘saṃyogi’ when the object and senses are connected, but if these are not connected with the ‘soul,’ inference or valid argument cannot occur, for

‘soul’ is the substratum of perception.

124 * Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

3.1.10. aprasiddho’napadeśaḥ

aprasiddho viruddhaḥ yasya sādhyadharmeṇa saha naivāsti

saṃbandho api tu viparyayeṇā asāvanapadeśaḥ ahetuḥ /

3.1.11. asan sandigdhaś cānapadeśaḥ

asan yaḥ pakṣe nāsti tenārthād asan asiddha ity arthaḥ sandigdhaś

cānapadeśaḥ sandigdho anaikāntika ity arthaḥ / udāharaṇam āha -

3.1.12. viṣāṇī tasmādaśvo viṣāṇī tasmād gaur iti ca

‘ayaṃ padārthośva’ iti sādhye viṣāṇitvaṃ viruddham

aśvaviparyayeṇa viṣāṇitvasya vyāpteḥ / ‘ayaṃ padārtho gaur’

iti sādhye viṣāṇitvam anaikāntikaṃ sādhyaviparyayābhyāṃ

vyāptatvāt / ca śabdonukta samuccayārthaḥ ‘śaśo viṣāṇī’ iti sādhye

asiddhaṃ viṣāṇitvam pakṣe avartamānatvāt / prasaṅgād etad uktam

/ kiṃ ca,

206 ‘object of demonstration’ (sādhya).

207 in Indian syllogism (Nyāya) when an uncertain thing is inferred to be existing in some place, it is considered to be ‘probandum’ (sādhya), while the perceptible thing that aims to prove the uncertain thing is considered to be the proban (liṅga, hetu), see VS

3.1.2.

208 pakṣa, that is, the subject matter to be proved in VSc 3.1 is no other than ātman, as clearly stated by Candrānanda in his introductory line to this lesson (evaṃ digantānāṃ

vaidharmyamuktvātmānam upakramate).

209 the sūtra illustrates an invalid type of argument and is a continuation of the discussion of the previous sūtra and gloss.

210 likewise sūtra 3.1.8, the commas have been added here in order to signal the ‘probans’

that are under discussion; while building a logical argument, the student must be familiar with technical terminology (pakṣa, sādhya, liṅga), and needs to draw the

Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 125

***3.1.10. [but] the invalid arguments are not established ***

[on the principle of precedence]

that which is a conflicting reasoning is something which is not well established,

[for] it has no connection at all with the property206 which is to be proved, 207 therefore it is an inverted and invalid syllogistic argument.

3.1.11. [because] an invalid argument that is doubtful, is unreal [too]

‘non-existing’ refers to the absence of the subject-matter [pakṣa, soul], 208 ‘non-

existing’ means that which is doubtful, not proved, and not established, and doubtful [pakṣa] means it belongs to many things, this is the meaning of this

[sūtra]; [thus] he gives an example –

***3.1.12. [for example, the argument according to which, because ***

***a thing] has horns therefore it [must be] a horse; because ***

[a thing] has horns therefore [it must be] a bull209

‘this thing is a horse’ when such a ‘thing is to be proved,’210 to possess horns is a conflicting [fact] due to a concomitance211 between ‘possessing horns’ and a ‘different thing’ other than horse; when [the pakṣa] ‘this thing is a bull’ is to be proved [then] ‘possessing horns’ belongs to ‘more than one thing’212 due to a concomitance between one thing to be proved with its opposing [thing]; the word

‘ca’ means an accumulation of non-mentioned [things]; 213 when ‘hair has horns’

is to be proved, then ‘possessing horns’ is something not established in the thing to be proved because it is not present in the object, thus [it] has been said in the previous argument; furthermore,

difference between a ‘pakṣa’ which is an inferential statement previously stated (e.g.

the existence of a mountain or the statement ‘this is a horse’), a doubtful ‘probandum’ (fire, horse, bull), and the visible ‘mark’ (e.g. smoke, horns). In this gloss, for instance, the objects to be proved (sādhya) are ‘horse’ and ‘bull,’ respectively, in relation to the reality of universals (horseness, bullness).

211 in Vaiśeṣika and Nyaya, ‘concomitance’ is ‘vyāpti,’ which is the necessary linking knot between ‘reality’ and ‘appearance.’

212 ‘more than one thing’ refers to a class, genera, or species, which is usually characterised by a common feature (horns).

213 when there is an ‘accumulation,’ the reality of things in logic is proved as implied in the proposition through ‘concomitance’ (vyāpti); in ontology, that reality is implied through ‘inherence’ of things, which means that ‘immanent reality’ (hidden) is as valid as ‘visible reality’ (as shown by the visible marks, liṅga).

126 * Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

***3.1.13. ātmendriya mano’rtha sannikarṣād ***

yan niṣpadyate tad anyat

catuṣṭayasannikarṣād yad utpadyate jñānākhyaṃ karyam tad

anyad hetvantaram ātmajñāpakam asti iti / jñānasya samavāyi

kāraṇāpekṣitvaṃ kāryatvāt ghaṭavat /

***3.1.14. pravṛttinivṛttī ca pratyagātmani ***

dṛṣṭe paratra liṅgam iti

pratyagātmeti śarīraṃ / śarīre pravṛtti nivṛttī dṛṣṭe ātmānam

anumāpayataḥ / śarīraṃ prayatnavatādhiṣṭhitaṃ hitāhita pravṛtti

nivṛtti mattvād ghaṭavat /

// tṛtiyasyādyam āhnikam //

3.2.

/ tṛtiyasyādhyayasya dvitīyam āhnikam /

ukta ātmendriyamanorthasannikarṣo jñānahetuḥ / tat siddhyarthaṃ

manaḥ kathayati -

214 sūtra draws a distinction between ‘knowledge by perception’ and ‘knowledge by inference’; it is in fact the difference between ontology and logics; now the commentator passes on to a different demonstration, not by inference (logics as VSc 3.1.22) but rather through the theory of perception, the so-called ‘4-fold contact’ produced between ‘mind,’ ‘senses,’ ‘objects,’ and ‘soul.’

215 ‘cognition,’ of which we know from the list of qualities VS 1.1.5, is called ‘buddhi’

and is defined here by the synonym ‘jñāna’; it is a ‘product’ (kārya), and as such its nature is – from a soteriological point of view – transitory.

Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 127

***3.1.13. as for the other [kind of argument] that is produced because ***

of a contact between ‘mind,’ objects, senses, and ‘soul’214

that which is produced from the 4-fold contact, which is called the activity of

‘cognition’ [jñāna]215 that is something different from [inference], and it is another logical proof for producing the knowledge concerning ‘soul’; cognition depends on an inherent cause because it is an effect just as a pot is.

***3.1.14. propensity and antipathy noticed in individual ***

***selves are the inferential marks of the [existence] ***

of another [cogniser, the soul]

‘pratyagātma’ refers to the body [of the soul];216 propensity and antipathy are seen in the body, [and these] cause us to infer ‘soul’; [in the following inferential manner]: the body is inhabited217 by something which has ‘effort’ because it is the cause for propensity and antipathy towards [either] beneficial and non-beneficial

[things],218 just as a pot [is].219

// the first lesson of the third chapter //

Translation

/ the second lesson of the third chapter /

it has been stated [earlier] that the cause of knowledge is [explained] by the [4-fold perceptual] contact between ‘soul,’ ‘mind,’ senses, and object; in order to prove this probandum he explains ‘mind.’

216 ātman has been often used in the commentary to indicate either the ‘disembodied self’

(‘soul’) or the ‘embodied self’; here the explanation of Candrānanda is useful, but very often the lack of such an explanation confuses the reader particularly when he/

she analyses the nature of the ‘soul,’ the theory of karma and rebirth, or the soteriology of the system.

217 ‘inhabited’ or ‘dependent’ (adhiṣṭhita).

218 presumably, ‘beneficial’ and ‘non-beneficial’ refer to ‘auspiciousness’ or ‘non-auspiciousness’ of a pot that is broken by mistake or to be preserved for a long time.

219 pot also exists because it depends on the will of men to make and use it for beneficial and non-beneficial purposes.

128 * Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

***3.2.1. ātmendriyārtha sannikarṣe jñānasyābhāvo ***

bhāvaś ca manaso liṅgam

ātmendriyārthānāṃ sannikarṣe yad abhāvājjñānaṃ na bhavati yad

bhāve ca bhavati tad manaḥ / evaṃ jñānotpattyanutpattī manaso

liṅgam / guṇāḥ saṃkhyā parimāṇa pṛthaktva saṃyoga vibhāga

paratvāparatva saṃskārāḥ /

3.2.2. dravyatvanityatve vāyunā vyākhyāte

yathā adravyavattvāt paramāṇuvāyor dravyatvaṃ nityatvaṃ ca

evaṃ manasaḥ /

***3.2.3. prayatnāyaugapadyāj jñānāyaugapadyāc ***

caikaṃ manaḥ

bahuṣu kāryeṣu jñeyeṣu ca yugapat prayatnā jñānāni vā na

prādurbhavantī ity ataḥ prayatnajñānāyaugapadyād ekaṃ manaḥ

pratiśarīraṃ mūrtam asparśaṃ niravayavaṃ nityam aṇu āśucār īti /

220 here ‘mind’ (manas) is omitted from enumeration, but evidently, as Candrānanda says, it is an implicit indicator for the function and motion of mind.

221 ‘cognition’ is produced ‘with’ mind, and not ‘by mind,’ so it is because mind is only a component of the perceptual process; mind should not be seen as the ‘producer’ of knowledge – as is the case in Western philosophy; in Vaiśeṣika, mind is atomic, and as such it has only a mediating role to play, not a principal one.

222 mind is explained by the simile of wind; see also similar passages for wind as an explanatory tool (vāyunā vyākhyāte), for ‘vacuum,’ ‘time,’ and ‘space’ in VSc 2.2.23; 3.2.2; 3.2.5; 5.2.12.

Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 129

***3.2.1. characteristic mark of ‘mind’ is the [fluctuating] presence ***

***and absence of the knowledge [produced] when there ***

is a contact between ‘soul,’ senses, and object220

when there is a contact between ‘soul,’ senses, and object, [then] there is a ‘cognition’ being produced with mind, 221 and it is [sometimes] present [other times]

absent; thus, the production and non-production of ‘cognition’ is the mark for the existence of ‘mind’; [its] qualities [are] ‘number,’ ‘dimension,’ ‘distinctness,’ ‘conjunction,’ ‘disjunction,’ ‘remoteness,’ ‘proximity,’ [and] ‘latent impetus.’

***3.2.2. substantiality and permanence [of mind] are ***

explained by [the simile of] ‘air’222

substantiality and permanence of the atoms of ‘air’ are because they lack [another]

essence, 223 [and atomic] ‘mind’ is likewise.224

***3.2.3. ‘mind’ is one because of a non-simultaneous ‘effort,’ as ***

well as because of a non-simultaneous ‘cognition’

because of the non-simultaneousness of ‘effort’ and ‘cognition,’ ‘mind’ is one in each body, it is concrete and devoid of ‘touch,’ holistic [having no parts], atomic, permanent, and fast-moving, but because ‘cognition’ is simultaneous with ‘effort’

there is production of cognitions as far as the many activities are produced and known.

223 ‘not having substantiality’ meaning that they can exist fragmented, not necessarily aggregated in a large mass of a universal (e.g. substantiality – air-ness, water-ness); the accumulation of atoms, say in water, can form one large substance, for instance, a

‘large reservoir of water’ (see Praśastapāda’s Bhāṣya 57–9).

224 atoms are eternal too, even though they have no substance, because they are integrated into a substance; the comparison of mind with atoms is due to Vaiśeṣika’s peculiar view on the ‘atomic size’ of mind.

130 * Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

***3.2.4. prāṇāpānanimeṣonmeṣa jīvana ***

***manogatīndriyāntara vikārāḥ sukhaduḥkhe ***

icchādveṣau prayatnaś c’ety ātmaliṅgāni

prāṇāpānanimeṣonmeṣā manogatiś ca prayatna kāryatvād

ātmano liṅgam jīvanam adṛṣṭakāryatvāt indriyāntaravikārāḥ

smṛtiprabhavatvāt sukhādayo guṇatvāt / tiryakpavanasya

vāyor dehasthitasya yat prāṇāpānakarma tat prayatnakāryam

śarīraparigṛhīta vāyuviṣayatve sati vikṛtatvāt

bhastrāparigṛhītavāyukarmavat / nimeṣonmeṣa kriyāpi

prayatnakāryā nimeṣonmeṣa kriyāśabdavācyatvāt dāruyantra

nimeṣonmeṣakriyāvat / manasā saṃyoga ātmanodṛṣṭāpekṣo

jīvanam śarīravṛddhyādi tat kāryaṃ api jīvanam śarīraṃ

prayatnavat ādhiṣṭhitaṃ vṛddhikṣatabhagna saṃrohaṇa nimittatvāt

jīrṇagrhavat / indriyāntaraṃ prati manaso gamanaṃ manogatiḥ

prayatnakāryā abhimata pradeśa sambandha nimittatvāt

pelakakriyāvat sā hi dārakaprayatnakṛtā / rūpālocana saṃskāra

vyakti rasa smaraṇa prayatna manaḥ kriyā rasana manaḥ

sambandha rasanavikārāṇāṃ pūrvasya pūrvasya kāraṇatvāt

utpattiḥ jñaptis tu vaiparītyena uttarottarasmāt pūrvasya

pūrvasya smaraṇenātma ānumīyate / na smṛtir indriyāṇāmanyena

dṛṣṭerthenyasya / na śarīrāvayavasyāvasthābhedena

bhidyamānatvāt / ‘devadattasya rūparasagandhasparśapratyayā

ekānekanimittāḥ ‘mayā’ iti pratyayena pratisandhānāt

kṛasaṇketānāṃ bahūnām ekasmin nartakībhrūkṣepe

yugapadanekapratyayavad’ [Nyāyavārtika 1.1.20] iti Uddyotakaraḥ

/ sukhādayaś ca guṇisāpekṣāḥ guṇatvāt rūpavat /

225 for an analogy between Indian and Greek thought on pleasure, see Aristotle EN 7.11–

14; 10.1–5.

226 jīvana as a biological being, a ‘living entity’ and is formed not by matter as body (śarīra) is, but by something intermediate, equivalent to a ‘subtle body.’

227 ‘activated’ and ‘effected’ are the synonyms, as kārya designates both a product and an activity; all products might be active as opposed to abstract substances that are not products for they do not have intrinsic activity; it is important to remember that the definition of substance in Vaiśeṣika does not include a ‘principle of movement’ as Aristotle defined the nature of a substance in Physics 192b20.

228 body is resembled here with a house that is subject to deterioration.

Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 131

***3.2.4. characteristic marks of the ‘soul’ are ‘inhaling,’ ‘exhaling,’ ***

‘closing-eye,’ ‘opening-eye,’ ‘biological life,’ ‘mind-

***movement,’ ‘alterations in different sense-organs,’ ***

‘pleasure,’225 ‘pain,’ ‘volition,’ and ‘aversion.’

‘inhaling,’ ‘exhaling,’ ‘closing-eye,’ and ‘opening-eye,’ and the movement of

‘mind’ are the marks of the ‘soul’ because they are produced by ‘effort,’ similarly the biological being226 is being produced227 by the ‘unseen force,’ the different alterations in the senses arise from recollection, for instance of qualities ‘pleasure’

and so forth; the oblique ‘air’ situated in the body is that which sustains the activity of ‘inhaling’ and ‘exhaling’ as a result of ‘effort,’ as it is in the case of a bagpipe filled in with [the] motion of air which is subject to changes of air that fills in the

[whole] body; the activities of ‘closing-eye,’ ‘opening-eye’ are done by ‘effort,’

because the act of opening and closing of eyes is expressed by the word-kriyā, just as opening and closing of eyes of the ‘wooden puppet moved by strings’ is; the connection of ‘soul’ with mind based on unseen-force is life; the activity such as the growth of body and so forth is also called biological entity because it is subject for growth, wound, fracture, and sprouting, as for example a decrepit house;228

the act of going of mind towards another sense organ – that is, the movement of mind – is to be done with effort because it is caused by the connection with the intended region like the action of testicle229 [which activity] is done with the effort of the child; observation of the ‘form,’ ‘latent impression,’ memory of enjoyment,

‘effort,’ activity of ‘mind,’ connection of mind with enjoyment, modification of enjoyment, each of these preceding ones, [each such observation] is produced from an earlier cause, the knowledge however, is [produced] in a reverse order, after having remembered each preceding one, out of the subsequent one, [thus]

‘soul’ is inferred [as a result]; there is no memory of another sense-organ having seen another object; there is no part of the body that can remember because [it]

is different according to different stages of life; Devadatta’s conceptualisation of

‘form-colour,’ ‘taste,’ ‘smell,’ [and] ‘touch’ has one or more incidental causes,

[and] they are connected with the experience [as expressed in the sentence] ‘by me,’ just as many people who have done a convention have a different simultaneous experience with the movement of [the] eyebrow of a dancer’230 [Nyāyavārttika 1.1.10] this is Uddyotakara’s [statement]; ‘pleasure’ and so forth are dependent on an owner of qualities because they are qualities like [for instance] ‘form-colour.’

229 ‘pelaka’ (pela n. testicle) means ‘the doer of testicle’ and refers to the play of a child that can be taken either as a ball to play with in a game, or as an erotic self-gratification act that a brahmacarya stage of life forbids; in either way, the discussion between enjoyment and effort is emphasised here, and effort (either conscious or unconscious) plays a role in the normal function of the embodied soul and it is the inferential marks that prove the existence of an inner agent, or doer (pelaka).

230 the simile ‘eyebrow of a dancer’ is telling indeed, not only to students of Indian drama (who may recognise the mudrā and other facial expression rules typical to the Kathak dance) but also to students of Indian philosophy, particularly Sāṃkhya, where the dancer and the spectator are the canonical simile to express the difference between prakṛti and puruṣa.

132 * Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

3.2.5. dravyatvanityatve vāyunā vyākhyāte

adravyavattvāt paramāṇuvāyor iva dravyatvanityatve / nanu ca,

***3.2.6. yajñadatta iti sati sannikarṣe pratyakṣābhavāt ***

dṛṣṭam liṅgaṃ na vidyate

yathā cākṣuṣārthasannikarṣe sati yajñadattoyam iti pratyakṣaṃ

bhavati na tathā prāṇādi sukhādisambaddhoyam ātmeti jñānaṃ

jāyate / atha katham dṛṣṭa saṃbandhaṃ prāṇādy ātmano liṅgam tad

āha na prāṇādi dṛṣṭaṃ liṅgam /

3.2.7. sāmānyato dṛṣṭāc cā viśeṣaḥ

prāṇādīnāṃ nirnimittānāṃ sukhādīnāṃ cānāśritānām anutpattiḥ

ata eṣāṃ kenāpi nimittenāśrayeṇa bhāvyam ity ato ’pi sāmānyato

dṛṣṭākāśādīnāmanirāsād aviśeṣaḥ teṣām api hetutvasaṃbhavāt /

3.2.8. tasmād āgamikam

‘ātmāsti’ iti pravādamātram ity arthaḥ / naitat,

3.2.9. aham iti śabda vyatirekānāgamikam

aham iti śabdena kṣityādivibhinnātmadravyaviṣayeṇa

ekādhikaraṇyāt ‘ahaṃ prāṇādimān ahaṃ sukhavān’ iti / tasmāt

prāṇādiliṅgatvān nāgamikam /

231 this is presumably an objection that might have come from Vedānta.

Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 133

***3.2.5. permanence and substantiality [of soul] are ***

explained by [the simile of] ‘air’

permanence and substantiality are like the atoms of ‘air’ because [soul] has no

substantiality [of its own]; [objection] and now,231

***3.2.6. a contact with the ‘existence of Yajñadatta’ in the ***

***absence of [an] actual perception [of him] cannot be ***

***a visible inferential mark [of the reality of soul] ***

just as when there is contact between [the] eye and the object there is no direct perception that Yajñadatta exists, so also with ‘soul’ when it is connected to breathing and so forth, with ‘pleasure’ and so forth, such knowledge is not produced [either]; then, how can breathing and so forth, the connection of which is not seen, be a visible mark of ‘soul’? to this [he] says: breathing and so forth, are not a visible mark.

***3.2.7. [it is not a valid inferential mark] because what is seen ***

is the generality, not the specificity [of Yajñadatta]232

breathing and so forth which have no cause, and ‘pleasure’ and so forth, which have no substratum cannot be produced, therefore there must be some cause and substratum, because of this, that which is seen only generically, there is no

[knowledge] of the particularity of spatiality and so forth, which are not denied, because they also can be causes;

3.2.8. therefore [the proof of Yajñadatta’s soul is only] from tradition

‘soul exists’ this subject-matter [argument] is only a hearsay; [response] this is not so,

3.2.9. ‘ahaṃ’ is not from tradition [for it] is ontologically differentiated

because the word-‘ahaṃ’ – which refers to the substance ‘soul’ as something different from ‘earth’ and many objects, substances – is used in apposition with a self [expressed in the sentences] ‘I breathe,’ ‘I am happy,’ therefore, due to marks such as ‘breath’ and so forth, [soul’s reality] is not something known traditionally;

[response] and now,

232 when one sees only the generality, the mind fails to see particularity; for a discussion about the difference between the ‘perception of the universal’ and the ‘perception of the particularity,’ see VSc 1.2.3–5.

134 * Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

***3.2.10. yadi ca dṛṣṭapratyakṣohaṃ ***

devadattohaṃ yajñadatta iti

yadi khalvahaṃ devadattohaṃ yajñadatta iti

ātmani dṛṣṭapratyakṣam idaṃ bhaved evaṃ

yujyetāhaṃśabdasyātmavācakatvaṃ yāvatā śarīrābhidhāyaka

devadatta śabdaikārthādhikaraṇatvād ahaṃśabdo’pi śarīravācakaḥ

/ tasmān na prāṇādisukhādīnyātmanirṇayahetuḥ / devadatta śabdaḥ

kathaṃ śarīre ityāha -

***3.2.11. devadatto gacchati viṣṇumitro gacchati ***

iti copacārāc charīrapratyakṣaḥ

gamanavācinā ‘gacchati’ iti śabdena saha prayogād

devadattaśabdaḥ śarīra-vacano’vasīyateśātmano gatyasambhavāt /

tasmād ahaṃśabdo ’pi śarīra eva devadattaśabdena saha dṛṣṭatvat /

naitat,

3.2.12. saṃdigdhastūpacāraḥ

devadattaśabdenaikārthādhikaraṇatvād yoyam

upacārohaṃśabdasya śarīre sa saṃdigdhaḥ / kiṃ

śarīrasyātmopakārakatvād ahaṃśabda ātmābhidhāyaka upacarita

uta mukhyatayā śarīrasyābhidhāyaka iti na śarīrātmanor

ahaṃśabdasya niścayaḥ / svapakṣe niścayam āha -

233 It can be translated as direct perception, not mediated; the perception of ṛṣis.

234 in the following gloss (VSc 3.2.10), Candrānanda describes a further and opposing argument that seems to ascribe the function of breath and pleasure to the body, not the

‘soul’ (VSc 3.2.10).

235 ‘metaphorical expression’ (upacāra), to be taken indirectly, because ‘soul’ cannot move, but only the body.

236 Candrānanda agrees with that, to a certain extent, namely that it is the body of Devadatta that moves not the ‘soul’ (second line of VSc 3.2.11), since as stated in VSc 7.1.28–9, ‘soul,’ likewise ‘vacuum’ is all-pervasive in dimension (vibhū); it seems that the commentator argues for a paradoxical kind of argument, called ‘doubtful’

(sandigdha).

Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 135

***3.2.10. [it is ontologically differentiated] because whenever ***

***there is direct perception of ‘I’233 [in separate instances] ***

such as ‘I am Devadatta, I am Yajñadatta’

if indeed, the absolute ‘I’ [exists in sentences such as] ‘I am Devadatta, I am Yajñadatta’ [that indicates] their ‘soul’234 because such ‘soul’ is directly perceived, then such a manner of speaking should be linked with the word-‘ahaṃ’

which indicates the ‘soul’ [ātman]; the word-‘ahaṃ’ indicates the body also, because it has the same substratum expressed by the word-Devadatta which indicates [his] body, therefore, breathing, ‘pleasure’ and so forth are not a decisive reasonable argument; how is it that the word-Devadatta indicates [his] body? to this, [Kaṇāda] says:

***3.2.11. [soul is ontologically differentiated] in the metaphorical ***

***expressions235 ‘Devadatta goes’ and ‘Viṣṇumitra goes,’ ***

which indicate the perception of the embodied self236

‘gacchati’ is the expression for motion-going, therefore the word Devadatta is applied for the sake of expressing the body because of the impossibility of motion in the case of ‘soul’; therefore, the word-’ahaṃ’ is also used in connection with body only, because it is seen along with the word Devadatta; [objection] this is not so,

3.2.12. [no] the upacāra argument [as a proof of soul] is doubtful237

because ‘ahaṃ’ can be used in apposition238 to the word ‘Devadatta,’ the usage of the word-‘ahaṃ’ in connection with body is doubtful; does ‘ahaṃ’ refer to

‘ātman’ used [figuratively concerning body] because the body is auxiliary to the

‘soul’? or does it refer chiefly to the body? because [of such doubt] there is no clear determination as to whether ‘ahaṃ’ refers to ‘soul’ or ‘body’; regarding his own subject-matter [for expressing] a firm conviction, [Kaṇāda] says –

237 to distinguish this argument from others, this is what I define as the ‘otherness argument’ (VSc 3.2.13); what follows is a series of the 3 main counterarguments with which Candrānanda responds to those presented by the opponents so far; these are: (1) ‘sandigdha argument’ (VSc 3.2.12); (2) ‘otherness argument’ (VSc 3.2.13); and (3) ‘self-consciousness argument’ (VSc 3.2.14).

238 ‘apposition’ is a grammatical construction in which 2 elements, normally noun phrases, are placed side by side, with one element serving to identify the other in a different way; the 2 elements are said to be in apposition.

136 * Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

***3.2.13. aham iti pratyagātmani bhāvāt ***

paratrābhāvād arthāntarapratyakṣaḥ

pratyagātman īty ātmani paratreti śarīre / yady ahaṃśabdaḥ

śarīravacanaḥ syād evaṃ sati tasmin piṇḍe devadattaśabda iva

sarvaiḥ prayujyeta / na tvevam ata ātmani arthāntare ‘ahaṃ’ śabdaḥ

pratyakṣaḥ / śarīra ivātmany api parair aprayogān na syād iti cet,

ata āha -

***3.2.14. na tu śarīraviśeṣād yajñadattaviṣṇumitrayoḥ ***

jñānaviśeṣaḥ

yajñadattaviṣṇumitrayoḥ saṃbandhinaḥ śarīraviśeṣād yathā

dṛṣṭad na tadīye sukhādāv asmadādīnāṃ jāyate jñānaṃ tathaiva

na tadīyohaṃkāro asmābhiḥ saṃvedyate yatohaṃśabdaḥ

prayujyeta / śarīravācakatve tu yathā śarīraṃ dṛṣṭva tatra

devadattaśabdaṃ prayuñjate tadvad imam api prayuñjīran na tv

evaṃ / tasmān na śarīre / ātmavṛttitve tu parairaprayogaḥ / evam

ahaṃśabdenaikādhikaraṇatvāt sukhādaya ātmaviṣayāḥ prāṇādayaś

ca tan nimittāḥ / nanu,

3.2.15. sukha duḥkha jñāna niṣpattyaviśeṣād aikātmyam

yathā sal liṅgāviśeṣād viśeṣaliṅgābhāvāc caiko bhāvas tathaiva

sukha duḥkha jñānānāṃ niṣpattyaviśeṣād viśeṣeliṅgābhāvāc

caikātmyam / naitat,

3.2.16. nānā vyavasthātaḥ

anyasya sukhādiyogenyasya tad abhāvād anayā vyavasthayā nānā

ātmānaḥ /

239 ablative is translated with ‘despite’ because of the particle ‘tu.’

Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 137

***3.2.13. [upacāra is not a doubtful argument] because ‘ahaṃ’ ***

***refers exclusively to ‘soul’ and not to something ***

***else, and [also] because the direct perception refers ***

to another ‘subject-matter’ [e.g. body]

‘pratyagātman’ [self] refers to ‘soul,’ [whereas] ‘paratra’ refers to ‘body’; if the word-’ahaṃ’ were to refer to the body, then in that case the word would be used indeed by everybody regarding that particular flesh, the word ‘Devadatta’ would

[then] be used in a similar manner; but this is not so; therefore, the word-‘ahaṃ’

constitutes the [direct] perception with reference to the ‘soul’ as a thing different

[from the body]; if it is said that just as [the word-‘ahaṃ’] is not used in the sense of body, it is not used either by others in the sense of ‘soul,’ therefore, [he] says –

3.2.14. despite [the perception] of particular bodies,239 *** however, there is ***

no particular intuitive-knowledge of Yajñadatta, and Viṣṇumitra

specific bodies of both Yajñadatta and Viṣṇumitra are related to a knowledge produced concerning [a particular] pleasure, pain, which is not [the same as] ours, and at the same time, [their] word-‘ahaṃ’ would be conventionally connected with our ahaṃkara; but regarding the expression ‘śarīra’ after seeing the body in relation to the usage of the word Devadatta, then similarly that will be used for

‘him’; but this is not so; therefore, it does not refer to the body; but ‘ātman’ occurs

[only once] since it is not used by others; thus, ‘pleasure’ and so forth which are the subject matter of ‘soul,’ and breathing and so forth which are the instruments

[of one soul] these have the same substratum with the word-‘ahaṃ’; now,

***3.2.15. [no, there is no particularised intuition of soul] , because ***

***soul is only one [in number and nature] due to the indistinct ***

production of ‘pleasure,’ ‘pain,’ and ‘cognition’ [in all souls]

for example, because of the indistinct positive mark and absence of [a] specific mark, it is proved that there is only one existential, in the same manner due to the undifferentiated production of ‘pleasure,’ ‘pain,’ and ‘cognition,’ as well as the absence of a specific mark, oneness of ‘soul’ is proved; 240 but this is not so,

***3.2.16. [quite the contrary] the plurality [of soul] exists ***

because of the singularities [of its states]

because of one person’s connection with ‘pleasure’ and so forth, there is [an]

absence of these [pleasures and so forth] in connection with another person, due to this [diverse] arrangement, ‘souls’ are plural.

240 the gloss elucidates the flimsy character of the specific qualities (pleasure, pain) that come and go, and which are alternatively present and absent in each single ātman; this shows that oneness of soul should be understood in terms of units, and plurality, as the next sūtra 3.2.16 clarifies.

138 * Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

3.2.17. śāstrasāmarthyāc ceti

‘grāmakāmo yajeta svargakāmo yajeta’ […] ity ato

’pi śāstra sāmarthyād nānā ātmānaḥ / tasya guṇāḥ

buddhisukhaduḥkhecchādveṣa prayatnādṛṣṭasaṃskārā vaiśeṣikāḥ /

anye tu saṃkhyā parimāṇā pṛthaktvā saṃyogā vibhāgāḥ /

// tṛtiyo’dhyayāḥ //

4.1.

/ caturthasyādyāyasyadhyam āhnikam /

evaṃ dravyāṇyuktvā nityatvam upalabdhyanupalabdhī ca teṣu

kathayati prasaṅgād anyat -

4.1.1. sadakāraṇavat tannityam

adravyavattvād ity anena yat sat kāraṇa rahitaṃ tad nitya muktaṃ

paramāṇvādi / upalabdhau tu,

4.1.2. tasya kāryaṃ liṅgam

tasya paramāṇvāder indriyair agṛhyamaṇasyāpi śarīramahābhūtādi

kāryaṃ liṅgam / yataḥ -

241 the plurality of soul is proved from the unique varieties of ‘desires’ and ‘volitions’

that each soul has independently of others; souls are plural not only in their existential embodied condition, but in their pre-qualitness state as well, for soul has as a generic quality that never ceases to characterise it, ‘separateness’ (pṛthaktva).

242 what differentiates the ‘specific qualities’ of the soul from its ‘generic qualities’ is that the latter are those that define best the nature of the pure soul in its pre-embodied, intransitive, fixed state, the state of its liberation, where souls are differentiated not by happiness, sorrow, and so forth, but by calm and simplicity of an infinite number of different souls that through conjunction and disjunction are interrelated, forming as it were, a ‘one substance’ soul.

Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 139

3.2.17. [plurality of soul] is confirmed by the sacred scriptures [śāstras]

‘one who desires [heavenly] village should perform a sacrifice’ […], ‘one who desires heaven should perform a sacrifice’ […], these are from śāstras’ authority

[and show that] ‘souls’ are many;241 the [specific] qualities of it [soul] are ‘cognition,’ ‘pleasure,’ ‘pain,’ ‘volition,’ ‘aversion,’ ‘effort,’ ‘unseen force’ [dharma and adharma], [and] ‘latent impetus’; but the other qualities [of soul] are ‘num-

ber,’ ‘dimension,’ ‘distinctness,’ ‘conjunction,’ [and] ‘disjunction.’242

// the third chapter //

Translation

/ the first lesson of the fourth chapter /

thus, having explained the permanence, comprehension, and non-comprehension of the substances from the earlier discussion, he speaks now of another [concept]

4.1.1. permanent is that [thing] which is not caused243

that which is devoid of cause, non-substantiality, and so forth, that is called eter-

nal, such as the atoms, and so forth [are]; as for its comprehension244

4.1.2. effect is the mark [of its permanence]

even though atoms and so forth, are not comprehended by sense-organs, nevertheless, the body, the great elements and so forth, these products245 are their marks, because

243 the permanent thing has no cause, which is to say, is uncaused, but as the following sūtra 4.1.2. mentions, it does have effect, it produces effects.

244 Here is the externalist view of Vaiśeṣika’s ontology, regardless of whether these substances are perdurers (atoms of the mahābhūtas) or eternal and wholistic (vacuum, space, time, soul, and mind).

245 bodies (śarīra) and the elements (mahābhūta) (all of which are composed of atoms) are products only figuratively, these are the proof for the aggregation of atoms; creation and destruction are in fact in Vaiśeṣika, the composition and decomposition of the infinite and unique particularities that at one stage formed a whole.

140 * Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

4.1.3. kāraṇabhāvād hi kāryabhāvaḥ

yasmāt kāraṇebhyastantvādibhyaḥ paṭādi kāryam utpadyate ataḥ

kāryasya kāraṇapūrvakatvāt kāraṇasya kāryaṃ liṅgaṃ /

4.1.4. anityam iti ca viśeṣapratiṣedha bhāvaḥ

yathā khalu ‘sarvaṃ kāryam anityam’ ity ucyate tad anena

nityatvasya viśeṣapratiṣedhena kāryaviṣayeṇa kiṃcit kāraṇaṃ

nityam iti jñāyate /

4.1.5. avidyā ca

avidyā agrahaṇam atīndriyatvena paramāṇūnāṃ tad apy anityatvaṃ

nivārayati / adṛśyamane hy arthe tad gatamanityatvaṃ kena gṛhyeta

eta / tasmān na anityatā vaktuṃ śakyā / upalabdhiḥ katham iti cet,

4.1.6. mahatyaneka dravyavattvād rūpāc copalabdhiḥ

mahattvaparimāṇasamavāyini dravye

samavāyikāraṇadravyabahutvād rūpāc ca śuklāder jñānaṃ bhavati /

kuta etat yataḥ -

4.1.7. adravyavattvāt paramāṇāv anupalabdhiḥ

saty api rūpe paramāṇoḥ samavāyikāraṇadravyābhāvān

nopalabdhiḥ /

246 effect is the ‘mark’ of the cause.

247 ‘specificity’ or ‘particularity’ is an eternal quality of the substances; it is eternal by its inherence in the substance, such as pṛthaktva demonstrates the pre-existential plurality of one substance, say, ātman.

248 if substance has particularity as its intimate nature, then it would be absurd to deny the permanent nature of particularity too; particularity does not seem to be extrinsic to substance but is rather part of the substance.

249 in Vaiśeṣika, cognitive comprehension is possible even in the case of essence-substantiality; this view agrees with Aristotle but disagrees with John Locke; see Copi 1970: 292–300.

250 here rūpa is translated as ‘appearance.’

251 atoms do not have substances, but substances have atoms; atoms are minute and separated entities, and since they are defined by ‘antyaviśeṣa’ they cannot repeat like

Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 141

4.1.3. existence of the effect is indeed due to the existence of the cause

from causes such as thread, and so forth, [there is] the production of an effect, say cloth and so forth, which is because the effect is being preceded by cause, [which we understand] from the inferential marks of the product of the cause. 246

4.1.4. impermanence is the negation of the particular existentials247

when it is said indeed that ‘all effect is impermanent,’ then what is known is that some cause is permanent because of the negation of the permanence of particularity of a specific effect. 248

4.1.5. and [this negation of particularities] is a false knowledge

invalid knowledge is the non-comprehension of atoms because they are beyond senses, moreover it excludes [the perception of] impermanence; if an object is not seen, in what way can its impermanence be comprehended? therefore, impermanence is impossible to define; if [asked] how there can be comprehension [at all]?

***4.1.6. comprehension [of particularities] is in respect to ‘shape’ , ***

boundless [extension], multitude [of number], and essence249

comprehension takes place regarding substance due to the inherent boundless size, due to many substances inherent as a cause and because of the appearance250

such as white, and so forth; how is it so? because of [the following]

***4.1.7. if [a substance] has no essence, no comprehension ***

of [their] atoms [will be possible]251

even though atoms have ‘form-colour’ due to the absence of an inherent cause, the

substance,252 there is no comprehension of them [the atoms]

qualities as to form a ‘lower generality’ (sāmānyaviśeṣa); even though there are combinations of say, atoms forming one large reservoir of water (see Praśastapāda’s Bhāṣya

[57–9]) where we have a discussion about the formation of the atoms of the most subtle substance vāyu, which through a process of atomic composition (dyads, triads) form the ‘great air’ (mahān vāyuḥ); then, through the same mechanism, Brahmā brings into a similar composition the formation of the ‘great reservoir’ of water (mahān salilanidhi), then the ‘great mass of fire’ (mahāṃs tejorāśiḥ), and so forth.

252 VSc 4.1.7 incidentally gives the definition of what Vaiśeṣika means by dravya, namely

‘an entity’ which must have ‘generic essence’ as well as ‘particular essence’; although atoms have ‘particular essence’ they do not have ‘generic essence,’ therefore taking them separately from the mahābhūtas, atoms are not complete dravya because they lack the second fundamental characteristic of substance, namely ‘generic essence.’

142 * Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

4.1.8. rūpasaṃskārābhāvād vāyāv anupalabdhiḥ

satyapi anekadravyavattve mahattve ca rūpākhyasya

saṃskārasyābhāvād vāyāv anupalabdhiḥ / anekadravyatāyā viśiṣṭāyā

grahaṇāt tryaṇuke ’pi anupalabdhiḥ siddha / rūpe katham ?

***4.1.9. anekadravyeṇa dravyeṇa samavāyād ***

rūpaviśeṣāc copalabdhiḥ

mahatānekadravyasamavāyidravyeṇa paṭādinā rūpaguṇasya

samavāyād rūpaviśeṣāc ca rūpatvākhyāt sāmānyaviśeṣād

upalabdhiḥ /

4.1.10. etena rasagandhasparśeṣu jñānaṃ vyākhyātam

etenānantaroktena nyāyena anekadravyeṇa dravyeṇa samavāyād

rasatvādi sāmānya viśeṣebhyaś ca rasādīnām upalabdhiḥ /

4.1.11. tad abhāvād avyabhicāraḥ

paramāṇurūpasyānekadravyeṇa dravyeṇa samavāyābhāvān

nopalabdhiḥ tato’nekadravyeṇa [dravyeṇa] samavāyasya

rūpopalabdheś cā vyabhicāraḥ /

***4.1.12. saṃkhyāḥ parimāṇāni pṛthaktva saṃyogavibhāgau ***

paratvāparatve karma ca rūpisamavāyāc cākṣuṣāṇi

rūp īti viśiṣṭaṃ rūpi tenopalabdhi yogyena rūpiṇā samavāyād etāni

cākṣuṣāṇi sva sāmānya viśeṣebhyaś ca / kutaḥ ?

253 Candrānanda differs from the broader Vaiśeṣika tradition – which maintains that trayaṇuka can be perceived; see VSc 7.1.15, where the same view about the non-comprehension of tryaṇuka is re-asserted further.

254 ‘inherence of particularity’ in a substance and subsequently in many substances explains why – from an ontological point of view – particularity (viśeṣa) is co-extensive with universality (sāmānya); in other words, how the smallest is the grandest; if

Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 143

4.1.8. non-comprehension of ‘air’ is because it lacks ‘impetus’ of ‘form’

non-comprehension of ‘air’ is because it lacks ‘impetus’ which is called ‘form-colour’ in respect to the reality of the boundless and multiplicity of substances; it is established on the basis that the non-comprehension regarding the atomic

triad253 is due to the conceptualisation of the particularitiness of substances’ multiplicity; what about ‘form-colour’?

***4.1.9. [but] comprehension is possible when an essence subsists in many ***

substances due to the [intuitive perception of a] specific form254

comprehension [of whiteness] is due to a co-existence of the quality in [a]

pot and so forth, which is a gross substance inherent in many substances, and because of a specific ‘form’ which is called ‘rūpatva,’ and which is a ‘universal

particularity.’ 255

***4.1.10. in this way, the ‘cognition’ of ‘taste,’ ‘smell,’ ***

and ‘touch’ has been explained [too]

by this [above-mentioned logic] the comprehension of ‘taste’ and so forth, is possible due to [its] co-existence in substance having many substances, and because of the universality and particularity of taste ‘rasatva’ and so forth.

***4.1.11. [inherence with substance] is necessarily [even] ***

when these [qualities] are absent256

if there is non-comprehension of the atoms of colour inherent in one and many substances, nevertheless, perception is [possible] due to the transfer-concomitance which is the inherence of colour in one essence with many substances.

***4.1.12. ‘numbers,’ ‘dimensions,’ ‘distinctness,’ ‘conjunction,’ ***

***‘disjunction,’ ‘remoteness,’ ‘proximity,’ and motion ***

are perceptible by [the] eye because of [their] transfer-

concomitance in a substance which has ‘form’

‘rūpi’ indicates a particular ‘form’ and it is by this that the comprehension of the things which are visualised by eye is possible, through the jointness of inherence

[of colours in things] due also to the ‘particular universality’; why?

the smallest is known, then the grandest becomes capable of being known as well, the 2 concepts being in a way synonymic.

255 quality and specificity of quality are 2 distinct existentials; both can be perceived by a third existential called ‘universal particularity’ (sāmānyaviśeṣa).

256 ‘violation of the rule’ is the one mentioned above.

144 * Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

4.1.13. arūpiṣvacākṣuṣatvāt

yasmād rūparahiteṣu mahatsu dravyāntareṣu sthitāni na jñāyante /

***4.1.14. etena guṇatve bhāve ca ***

sarvendriyajñānaṃ vyākhyātam

yathaiva mahatyanekadravyeṇa samavāyād rūpādīnāṃ

samavetānām upalabdhiḥ evaṃ mahati samaveteṣu guṇeṣu

samavetayor guṇatvabhāvayos tais tair guṇaiḥ rūpādibhiḥ

samavāyād yathāsvaṃ cakṣurātīndriyair upalabdhiḥ na tu

sāmānyaviśeṣāsteṣūpalambhakās tad abhāvāt / evaṃ tattvādīnāṃ

svair indriyaiḥ dravye tu bhāvasya samavāyāt / karmaṇi

samavetasamavāyād guṇavat /

// caturthasyādyam āhnikam //

4.2.

/ caturthasyādyāyasya dvitīayam āhnikam /

idānīm ādhyātmikam eṣāṃ kāryam ucyate tatra -

***4.2.1. pratyakṣāpratyakṣāṇāmapratyakṣatvāt ***

saṃyogasya pañcātmakaṃ na vidyate

kṣityādipañcakena śarīrārambhe trayāṇāṃ pratyakṣatvād dvayor

apratyakṣatvād yathā tadvatā saṃyogo’pyapratyakṣa evaṃ śarīram

pratyakṣaṃ syāt pratyakṣāpratyakṣair ārabdhatvāt / pratyakṣatvāt

tu manyāmahe na pañcabhir ārabdham iti / nanu tribhiḥ pratyakṣair

ārabhyate /

257 quality and its repeatability in many substances, is a concept that stands in close relationship with the reality of universals.

258 inherence cannot be understood without the ‘genera’ or the ‘lower universal’

(sāmānyaviśeṣa) and should not to be confused with the ultimate particularity (antyaviśeṣa).’

259 Ganesh Thite: ‘because of the absence of that’ refers to the ‘absence of sāmānya and viśeṣa.’

260 the use of the preposition ‘adhi’ in the compound ‘adhyātmano’ points explicitly to ātman as the subject of this soteriological state’ ‘-adhi’ (which means ‘over’) is used in a prepositional compound, a governing compound possibly, to mean, ‘with respect to the self’ ‘concerning the self.’ Whitney, pp. 511–12, section 1310b.

Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 145

4.1.13. [but] those [entities] which have no form, are not visualised by eye

when they [qualities] are situated in other large substances devoid of ‘form-colour’ they are not known.

***4.1.14. this way, all sense-perceptual knowledge in relation to ***

qualities and [their] existentiality are explained

just as the ‘form’ and so forth are [qualities] comprehended because there are

inherent in one great substance and many substances,257 like [for instance] a ‘large’

is inherent with qualities, [and] because of a co-existentiality with colours, due their respective inherence, the qualities are both ‘existential’ and have ‘qualitiness’ which is comprehended by senses such as [the] eye and so forth, but in the absence of ‘particular universal’258 [these qualities] are not explained259 because this [particular universal] makes them comprehensible; like quality, motions are

[comprehended] by inherent-cum-inherence [type of] relation.

// the first lesson of the fourth [chapter] //

Translation

/ the second lesson of the fourth chapter /

now concerning those products related first and foremost to the ‘embodied soul’260

which have been mentioned, [Kaṇāda] says –

4.2.1. [soul] cannot be known from the group of 5261 *** because the relation ***

between the perceptible and imperceptible [entities] is imperceptible262

[objection] the body is formed by the group of 5 elements,263 [but] as ‘air’ is not perceptible, [only] the group of 3, ‘earth’ and so forth is perceived, for example the relation [between] the 2 is not seen [either], thus the body would not be perceptible because [it] is made by perceptible264 and non-perceptible265 [elements]; but because of the perceptibility, we think that [the body] is not made from the group of 5 elements; [response] this not so, [the embodied self] is made by 3 perceptible [elements]

261 ‘the group of 5’ refers to the 5 mahābhūtas, among which one needs to differentiate between those mahābhūtas that can form corporeal bodies (śarīra). See Garbha Upaniṣad (Section 1) edited by Paul Deussen, 1997.

262 saṃyoga (usually rendered as a ‘conjunction’) is indeed a quality, but its use must be read in broader grammatical terms, hence the translation as ‘relation’ and not ‘conjunction.’

263 This is the view expressed in Garbha Upaniṣad ed. Deussen 1997: 639.

264 ‘perceptible elements’ are ‘earth,’ ‘water,’ and ‘lustre.’

265 ‘non-perceptible’ elements are ‘wind’ and ‘vacuum.’

146 * Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

4.2.2. guṇāntarāprādurbhāvāc ca tryātmakam api na

kṣitisalilānalair ārambhe vilakṣaṇebhyo rūpādibhyaḥ kārye

vilakṣaṇāni rūpāṇi guṇāntarāṇi jāyeran / na tv evam / api tu

pārthivān eva rūpādīn upalabhāmahe / tasmān na tryātmakam /

4.2.3. ātmasaṃyogastvavipratiṣiddho mithaḥ pañcānām

ātmaśabdena svarūpaṃ svarūpeṇapañcānām api bhūtānāṃ

parasparasaṃyogo na pratiṣidhyate śarīreṇa ārambhakatvena

/ pārthive śarīre jalādīni saṃyogīni na samavāyīni / jalādibhir

ayonijam eva śarīram ārabhyate varuṇalokādau / kutaḥ ?

4.2.4. anekadeśapūrvakatvāt

anekadeśāḥ paramāṇavaḥ tair eva ārabhyate jalādiśarīraṃ na

śukraśoṇitābhyām / tac ca,

4.2.5. dharmaviśeṣāt

dharmaviśeṣāpekṣāḥ paramāṇava eva śarīram ārabhante na śukrādi

/ kathaṃ hi puṇyavatāṃ śukrādimayaṃ śarīraṃ syāt / itaś ca,

4.2.6. kāryaviśeṣāt

śalabhādiśarīrākhyāt kāryaviśeṣāt manyāmahe santy ayonijāni / itaś ca,

4.2.7. samākhyābhāvāt

‘aṅgārebhyo jātoṅgirā’ ity evamādisamākhyābhāvād manyāmahe

santy ayonijāni / kutaḥ ?

266 ātman refers here to the embodied ‘soul,’ and, as such, it is intimately related to the 5 mahābhūtas; their cohabitation may form an inherent relation.

267 each class of atom corresponds to a region.

268 knowledge of the cosmos at its most subtle level through the ‘ultimate particularity’

(antyaviśeṣa) is obtained by a ‘specific dharma’ that is born by the intellectual practice of yoga; to know the ‘specific dharma’ of each and any single entity, is an instrument

Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 147

***4.2.2. [this is so] because there is absence of comprehension ***

***of other [elements’] qualities as well as because ***

body is only [made of] 3-fold [elements]

[response] if [you say that] a product generates from ‘earth’ ,‘water’,‘lustre,’ and so forth, and from various ‘forms’ and effects, other qualities and shapes are produced, [then] that it is not so; for although we comprehend [the qualities] ‘shape’

of a thing made of earth and so forth, nevertheless [a product] is not 3 fold [only].

***4.2.3. because the mutual connection of 5 [elements] ***

with ‘soul’ is not excluded266

by the word ‘ātman’ [Kaṇāda] refers here to its own nature, and by means of it, the mutual connection between the 5 elements is not denied because it does not produce any [new] body; in the body made of ‘earth,’ ‘water,’ and so forth, [these]

are connected but not inherent; [for example] the worlds of Varuṇa and so forth is made of waters and so forth [elements] which produce bodies [accordingly], but these are not [bodies] born out of a womb; why?

***4.2.4. because [it is understood] from the previous [sūtra] that there are ***

many elemental regions267 [to which bodies belong ontologicall y]

atoms have many [corresponding] regions, of these, some of which are produced from moisture, but they are not of the nature of semen and blood; and [regarding]

that, [Kaṇāda says]

***4.2.5. because [each body] has a ‘specific dharma’ ***

atoms which depend on a ‘specific dharma’268 produce a body, but not the semen and so forth; [if you ask] how is it that those who possess dharma can have a body made of semen and so forth? [then the response] is the following

4.2.6. [dharma produces a body] because of a particular effect269

since there exists a body called mot and so forth due to their specific karmic activity, we think that these [bodies] are not born of a womb; and because of this

[reason]

4.2.7. [bodies are varied] because have a [specific] designation

because of appellation like ‘Aṅgira born of coals’ we think that there are [bodies]

non-womb born; why?

and prerequisite for ultimate knowledge and absolute liberation; in this gloss, the formation of the body is made by a ‘specific dharma’ (dharmaviśeṣa), which presumably varies from a being to another.

269 ‘kārya,’ the effect which presumably is alluded to here, takes effect as a result of a specific dharma (according to karma theory), which the dharma can be either auspicious or non-auspicious.

148 * Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

4.2.8. saṃjñādimattvāt

yataḥ pratyakṣeṇāṅgārajanmādikam arthaṃ dṛṣṭvā puruṣaiḥ

praṇīyante saṃjñā ‘aṅgirā’ ity ādayaḥ / ataḥ saṃjñānām ādimattvāt

samākhyā yathārthā / ataḥ

4.2.9. santyayonijāḥ vedaliṅgāc ceti

‘candramā manaso jātaḥ’ […] ity ādikāc ca vedaliṅgāt

santyayonijāḥ śarīraviśeṣāḥ / evaṃ jalādiśarīram ayonijam eva /

pārthivaṃ tu yonijam ayonijaṃ ca /

// caturtho’dhyāyaḥ / samāpto dravyādhikāraḥ //

5.1.

/ pañcamasyādyāyasya prathamam āhnikam /

evamukteṣu dravyeṣu guṇānul laṅghyālpavaktavyatvāt karmāṇy abhidhatte / tatra -

5.1.1. ātma saṃyoga prayatnābhyāṃ haste karma

svāśrayasaṃyogāpekṣitvāt prayatnasya kriyārambhe

ātmahastasaṃyogaḥ karmaṇaḥ kāraṇaṃ / sāpekṣakāraṇatvāt

saṃyogasya prayatno ’pi kāraṇaṃ / ato dvābhyāṃ haste karma /

5.1.2. tathā musalakarma hastasaṃyogāc ca

tatheti saṅkhyāmātrātideśaḥ tena hastamusalasaṃyogo

musalakarmaṇaḥ kāraṇam pūrvādhikṛtaś ca prayatnaḥ / na

tu ātmahastasaṃyogo samavāyikāraṇam musalakarmaṇi

ātmasaṃyuktahastasaṃyogād eva tat siddheḥ /

270 to ‘possess a beginning’ (ādimattvāt) means to have a compositional existence out of which the existential is emerging and exists.

271 reference is approximate; an effort should be made to trace the references that the editor Muni Jambūvijayaji could not find.

272 the substratum of the quality ‘effort’ is ‘soul.’

Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 149

4.2.8. [their fix designation] is because they possess signs-

references and other [particular characteristics]

it is on account of perception that the names are granted by men after seeing the object, such as the birth of Aṅgiras [from coal], it is [how] names ‘Aṅgiras’ and so forth are [given]; therefore, a proper noun is meaningful because of possessing

designations, names, and so forth;270 hence,

4.2.9. [bodies] not born of womb are referred by Vedic [scriptures]

there are particular bodies not born of womb because there is an indication in the Vedas: ‘moon is born of mind’ [Rig Veda 10.90]271 thus, the body consisting of

‘water’ is certainly not born of womb; however, the body consisting of ‘earth’ can be womb-born, as well as not womb-born.

// the fourth chapter / the section on substance is completed //

Translation

/the first lesson of the fifth chapter /

thus, having described the substances, [and] having sketched out the qualities [he]

speaks of motions for there should be little to be said [concerning these]; [and]

with regard to that, [Kaṇāda] says:

***5.1.1. motion in the hand is because of a ***

‘conjunction’ of the ‘soul’ with ‘effort’

motion is caused because of a ‘conjunction’ between ‘soul’ and hand at the beginning of an activity, [and it is] because ‘effort’ is dependent on a connection with its own substratum272; [and] since the cause is dependent on a ‘conjunction,’ ‘effort’

too is a cause; hence, motion in hand is because of these two [causes].

5.1.2. similarly, the motion of a pestle is due to a connection with a hand

such as ‘numbers’ have extension only, 273 so also the connection between hand and pestle is caused by a previous chain of [differentiated] activities which is

‘effort’; 274 in the activity of the pestle however, the connection of ‘soul’ and hand is not an inherent cause of the activity of [the] pestle, because [cause] is already proved from a connection of hand conjoined with ‘soul.’

273 in the sense that they point to a sequence: ‘atideśa’ (grammatical rule about the extension of properties).

274 The pūrvadhikṛta type of argument is meant to prove the argument for the existence of the souls, as derived from the doer of the effort.

150 * Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

***5.1.3. abhighaṭaje musalakarmaṇi vyatirekād ***

akāraṇaṃ hasta saṃyogaḥ

vegavad dravyasaṃyogo’bhighaṭaḥ ulūkhalābhighātād utpanne

musalasyotpātanakarmaṇi akāraṇaṃ hastamusalasaṃyogaḥ

pūrvaprayatnasyābhighātād vinaṣṭatvāt utpatatu musaladravyam

itīcchāyā abhāvāt prayatnāntarasyābhāvaḥ saṃyogasya

ca guṇakarmārambhe sāpekṣakāraṇatvāt prayatnarahito

hastamusalasaṃyogo na kāraṇam utpatanasya /

5.1.4. tathā ātmasaṃyogo hastamusalakarmaṇi

yathaiva hastamusalasaṃyogo musalotpatanakarmaṇi na kāraṇam

tathātmahastasaṃyogo’pi hastamusalakarmaṇi na kāraṇam

saṃyogasya sāpekṣakāraṇatvāt ‘musalena sahotpatatu hastaḥ’

ity abhisandher abhāvena prayatnasya cā bhāvāt / kutas tayor

utpatanam iti cet,

5.1.5. musalābhighātāt tu musalasaṃyogād dhaste karma

ulūkhalābhighāto musalasyotpatanakarmaṇaḥ kāraṇam /

hastamusalasaṃyogas tu musalagatavegāpekṣo hastakarmaṇaḥ

kāraṇam nābhighāto’samavetatvāt /

5.1.6. tathātmakarma hastasaṃyogāc ca

ātmeti śarīraikadeśaḥ yathā caitad apratyayaṃ haste musale ca

karma tathaiva hastāvayava saṃyogād hastagatavegāpekṣād

hastotpatanakāle’vayave tasmin na pratyayaṃ karma jāyate /

275 in other words, if we read the sūtra as a continuation of the preceding sūtra,

‘hastotpatanakarmaṇi’ are different from ‘ātmasaṃyoga.’

276 ‘then’ is missing here, but we can translate ‘cet’ with ‘then.’

277 saṃyoga refers to the involuntary and non-conscious motion produced by reflex, not by a connection with soul volition.

278 ‘soul’ cannot have motion in itself, for all motions are secondary and happen because of ātman being connected with other things such as the hand (one should also consider saṃyukta-samavāya ‘inferential induction’ by which things can be explained to happen).

Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 151

***5.1.3. [motion] produced by the stroke from the activities of pestle is different ***

from the ‘conjunction’ with hand which does not cause [motions]

when a speedy thing is connected with a stroke, the [impulsive] upwards activity of the pestle is produced because it strikes the mortar, [thus] the ‘conjunction’

of hand and pestle is not the cause [of that activity] because it vanishes [imme-diately] after the stroke of made by a previous ‘effort’; similarly, the absence of intention [as expressed in the sentence] ‘let the pestle substance go up’ [indicates] the absence of the relation of ‘intention-effort’ with generating a quality and motion, because the contact between hand and pestle is not dependent on

‘effort’ which is absent, therefore ‘effort’, is not the cause of upwards movement

[but rather the impulse].

***5.1.4. similarly, the motions of hand and pestle [is not ***

the cause] of the ‘conjunction’ with ‘soul’275

just as the connection of pestle and hand is not a cause [as expressed in the sentence] ‘the jumping up of hand is co-extensive with [the] pestle,’ similarly, the connection between ‘soul’ and hand is not a cause [of impulse] either, because connection is dependent on [something else] and because of the absence of ‘effort’

due to the absence of intention [as in the sentence] ‘let the hand go upwards with

[the] pestle’; if you ask why these 2 bumpings [happen], then276 [the answer is this]:

***5.1.5. but motion in hand is because of a stroke-with-pestle ***

[as well as] because of a connection-with-pestle277

the stroke of the mortar causes the jump-up motion of [the] pestle; the connection of hand with pestle however, is dependent on the activity of hand which is the cause of the pestle’s speed [but] the stroke is not the inherent cause [of hand activities]

***5.1.6. [that motion is] additionally due to a motion of the ***

‘self’ when in ‘conjunction’ with the hand278

‘ātman’ refers here to one part of body, 279 for just as the motion of the pestle in hand is not experienced [by soul], so also - because the connection with the parts of the hand [motion] is dependent on the speed of the hand at the time of the upwards going of the hand - motion is produced in that part without being [inten-

tionally] experienced [by soul].280

279 Candrānanda explains that in this gloss, ātman refers to the embodied ‘soul’ or that which is seen as forming a part with the body

280 the commentator draws a distinction between voluntary motions and involuntary motions; he draws attention to the fact that, when it is said that ātman moves, this refers to the ‘embodied self,’ not to the substance ‘soul’ which, as gloss 5.2.23 clarifies, is devoid of motion.

152 * Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

5.1.7. saṃyogābhāve gurutvāt patanam

vibhāganivṛtte hastamusalasaṃyoge gurutvāt patanaṃ bhavati /

5.1.8. nodanaviśeṣābhāvān nordhvaṃ na tiryag gamanam

nudyate’ neneti nodanaṃ vegaprayatnāpekṣaḥ saṃyogaviśeṣaḥ

prerakaprayatnābhāve nodanābhāvād nordhvaṃ tiryag vā kevalād

gurutvāt musalāder gamanakarma bhavati / kuto nodanaviśeṣaḥ /

5.1.9. prayatnaviśeṣān nodanaviśeṣaḥ

‘atr’edaṃ kṣipāmi’ īti icchāviśeṣajaḥ prayatna utpanno hastāder

dravyasya dravyāntareṇa saṃyogaṃ nodanākhyaṃ janayati /

5.1.10. nodanaviśeṣād udasanaviśeṣaḥ

dūradeśapreraṇecchāviśiṣṭāt prayatnāj jāto nodanaviśeṣo

dūradeśakṣepaṇaṃ karoti /

5.1.11. hastakarmaṇā dārakakarma vyākhyātam

yad garbhasya spandanādikarma tad ātmaśarīraikadeśa saṃyogāj

jīvana pūrvaka pūrvaka prayatnāpekṣād bhavat īti sapratyayam

mātuḥ kāryāvaskaropasarpaṇa karma garbhasyāpratyayam ātma

saṃyogād adṛṣṭāpekṣād bhavat īti /

281 a third form of motion, besides the conscious-voluntary and the unconscious-involuntary one, is the motion caused by the natural law of ‘gravitation,’ which again is not triggered by human will.

282 here the causality takes us from the physical to the psychological causes.

283 it refers to action-reaction type of forces, see Newton’s Third Law of Motion that explains that forces always come in pairs of action-reaction.

284 this shows the extent to which ‘the psychological’ can influence ‘the physical’; questions concerning the nature of this volition in Vaiśeṣika, and whether it has a free choice or deliberative connotation may be considered in relation to Aristotle’s thought (EN 3.2–4; EE 2.6–10; Rhet. 1.4–7).

Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 153

5.1.7. falling is due to the absence of [any] connection because of ‘weight’

falling takes place because of ‘weight’ when the connection between pestle and hand ceases due to [their] disconnection

***5.1.8. in the absence of a specific impulse, neither ***

upwards, nor oblique movement [can happen]

bouncing [happens] through a specific connection dependent upon an ‘effort’ with speed and impulse; and when there is no intentional stimulation there is neither impulse, nor upwards [motion], nor oblique [motion], [but] bouncing is due to

‘weight’ alone;281 how is [this] specific impulse [produced]?

5.1.9. a specific impulse is from a specific ‘effort’

when [I, for instance, say] ‘I throw this here’ that produces a ‘conjunction’ [with]

‘effort’ which is [in turn] produced by a ‘particular volition’ from which there is the production of a ‘conjunction,’ namely the pushing away or removal of the substance such as hand and so forth from another substance.282

***5.1.10. a specific upwards throwing [can happen] ***

because of a specific pushing283

specific pushing which is produced from the ‘effort’ which is characterised by

‘volition’ of throwing away produces the act of throwing to a remote place. 284

5.1.11. boyish activity has been explained in respect to a hand-motion

whatever palpitation in the womb and so forth, happens in accordance with [something] dependent on ‘effort’ that was previously co-experienced by the ‘biological life’285 in one part of the body; 286 but the group of activities of the mother, happens due to an ‘unseen force’ related to the ‘self’ [which force however is] not experi-

enced by the embryo.287

285 adṛṣṭa has therefore the power to influence the soul’s ‘effort’ and subsequently the individual ‘subtle body’ (śarīraikadeśa) which is forced to move out of the womb; here we might see an allusion to involuntary abortion, happened because of adṛṣṭa.

286 See VSc 5.1.6. where ātman is defined as a part of the body, or as simply the ‘embodied ātman.’

287 this gloss refers to the condition of bondage, which the womb of the mother and the word itself both represent; in both these two conditions the law that affects the beings is the inauspicious dharma (adṛṣṭa); reality and liberation would be to escape from the bondage condition of the womb which is the world itself.

154 * Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

5.1.12. tathā dagdhasya visphoṭanam

vyāsakte manasi yad dagdhasya hastāder vikṣepaṇaṃ tad api

jīvanapūrvakaprayatnāpekṣād ātmahastasaṃyogād bhavat īti na

āpratyayam /

5.1.13. prayatnābhāve gurutvāt suptasya patanam /

śarīra vidhāraka prayatnābhāve suptasyāṅgānāṃ patanaṃ gurutvād

bhavati tad ābhisaṃdher abhāvāt /

5.1.14. tṛṇakarma vāyusaṃyogāt

vegāpekṣād vāyutṛṇasaṃyogāt tṛṇādīnāṃ karma teṣāṃ

prayatnābhāvāt /

***5.1.15. maṇi gamanaṃ sūcy abhisarpaṇam ***

iti adṛṣṭa kāritāni

maṇīnāṃ taskaraṃ prati gamanaṃ sūcīnāṃ cāyaskāntaṃ prati

dharmādharma kṛtam ity arthaḥ /

5.1.16. iṣāvayugapat saṃyogaviśeṣāḥ karmānyatve hetuḥ

nodanād ādyaṃ karma saṃskārād bahūni karmāṇīṣāvutpadyante /

ekasmiṃastu karmaṇi prathameṇaivākāśa saṃyogena vinaṣṭatvāt

karmaṇa uttarasaṃyogavibhāgā notpadyeran tasmādiṣāvanekaṃ

karma /

288 Kaṇāda may refer here to the thunder noise produced from a flash-burning in the clouds.

289 sūtra presents types of actions that are by reflex not by ‘conscious activity’ or ‘effort.’

290 this is not due to a conscious motion but rather a physical realistic motion not caused by ‘effort.’

Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 155

***5.1.12. thunder [has been explained] from an eruption, ***

burning288 [has been explained] likewise289

when the mind is busy with something else, that act of going away takes place regarding the burnt hand, that happens also because of a relation between hand and ‘soul’ dependent on ‘effort’ [and] preceded by ‘life’;290 and this is not by [controlled] conscious conceptualisation.

***5.1.13. falling [of the body] during sleep is due to ‘weight,’ ***

[and] because of the absence of ‘effort’291

in the absence of the ‘effort’ of the body, the act of falling of some limbs [e.g.

hand, leg] of a sleepy person takes place because of gravity-‘weight,’ due to the

absence of [any] relation [between ‘effort’ and ‘self’].292

5.1.14. motion of grass [happens] due to a connection with ‘air’

motion of grass and so forth, is due to a connection between grass and ‘air’

dependent on speed, these [happen] without [the involvement of any] ‘effort.’

***5.1.15. going of a gem, the approaching of needle, these ***

are [motions] caused by the ‘unseen force’

the gem going towards thief and so forth, and the needle [movement] towards magnet, the meaning of this [sūtra] is that [they have been] made by ‘dharma’

and ‘adharma.’

5.1.16. the specific ‘conjunctions’ which are non-

***simultaneousness when an arrow [moves] is the proof ***

of other [kind of] motion [which is successive]

[one] motion [happens] first because of an impulse, [and] the many motions of an arrow are produced because of a ‘latent impetus’; 293 yet, because the first motions exist and are not connected with ‘vacuum,’ which [causes them to] disappear,294

therefore, the subsequent motions [formed] with ‘conjunction’ and ‘disjunction’

would not be produced later, therefore motion is many.

291 a clear indication about the ‘law of gravity’ that in Western philosophy would be discovered and formalised by Newton.

292 it refers to an action produced from an unconscious situation, in the absence of a

sense-object relation – for instance, the absence of conscious perception of the 4-fold contact between soul, mind, senses, and object.

293 although there is impulse at the beginning of a motion, however, the series of many movements are coordinated by another force, saṃskāra.

294 motion is not continuous but fragmented in successive fractions.

156 * Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

***5.1.17. nodanādādyamiṣoḥ karma karmakāritāc ca ***

saṃskārād uttaraṃ thatottaram uttaraṃ ca

jyāśara saṃyogaḥ prayatnāpekṣo jyāgata vegāpekṣo vā nodanaṃ

tata ādyamiṣoḥ karma nodanāpekṣaṃ saṃskāraṃ karoti

nirapekṣaṃ tu saṃyogavibhāgau / tataḥ saṃyogād vinaṣṭe karmaṇi

nodane vibhāgād vinivṛtte ādyakarmajasaṃskārauttaram iṣau

karma karoti tathā uttaram uttaraṃ paunaḥ punyenety arthaḥ /

5.1.18. saṃskārābhāve gurutvāt patanaṃ

sparśavaddravyasaṃyogena saṃskāravināśād gurutvaṃ tat patana

karma karoti

// pañcamasyādyam āhnikam //

5.2.

/ pañcamasyādhyāyasya dvitīyam āhnikam /

ādhyātmikeṣu tat sambandheṣu ca karmāṇy uktvā mahābhūtakarmāṇi vyācaṣṭe /

5.2.1. nodanādabhighātāt saṃyuktasaṃyogāc ca pṛthivāṃ

samastān vyastāṃś ca gurutvadravatvavegaprayatnān apekṣamāṇo

yaḥ saṃyogaviśeṣoḥ nodanād preraṇāvibhāgahetoḥ karmaṇaḥ

kāraṇaṃ [tad] nodanaṃ tathā hi pādādibhirnudyamānāyāṃ

paṅkākhyāyāṃ pṛthivāṃ karma jāyate / vegāpekṣobhighātād

abhihanyamānasya vibhāgahetoḥ karmaṇaḥ kāraṇaṃ

saṃyogo’bhighaṭaḥ tathā hi rathādibhir abhighātāt

pṛthivekadeśeṣu dṛśyate karma / saṃyuktasaṃyogāc ca

nudyamānābhihanyamānābhyāṃ ca saṃyukteṣu bhavanti karmāṇi /

295 the active ‘karoti’ has been translated by the passive.

Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 157

***5.1.17. [the] first motion of an arrow due to an impulse, and ***

***the motion effected [as a result], these subsequent ***

***[motions] are produced because of a ‘latent impetus’ ***

likewise a chain of subsequent [activities]

[the] first act of pushing is therefore explained as being produced by the ‘conjunction’ of a string with an arrow which necessitates ‘effort’ or the pressure of a bow string, [but] the spreading over [of the arrow’s first motion] is made by the

‘latent impetus,’295 being independent of ‘conjunction’ and ‘disjunction’; consequently, pushing comes to an end because of a ‘disjunction’ due to a relation with the motion, [and] the effect produced from the first motion is withdrawn [which shows] that the subsequent and the latter motions of [the] arrow are [all] operated by the ‘latent impetus’ [and] this [repetition] is being indicated by [this sūtra].

***5.1.18. falling is due to ‘weight’ [regardless] the ***

absence of a ‘latent impetus’296

when there is a loss of ‘impetus’ with [its] connection between substances possessed by touch, [then]the motion of falling has ‘weight’ as [its] cause.

// the first lesson of the fifth chapter //

Translation

/ the second lesson of the fifth chapter/

having stated the motions concerning the ‘embodied soul’ and those related to it, he comments upon the motions of the great elements –

***5.2.1. earth-motion is due to an impulse and a stroke, as ***

well as to a conjunction with the conjunct

a particular conjunction dependent on ‘weight,’ ‘fluidity,’ speed, [and] ‘effort,’

combined and manifold, is the cause of motions due to pushing that is impelling, being the cause for non-‘disjunction,’ that is the ‘impulse,’ such as, for instance, when ‘earth’ called mud is pushed by a foot and so forth; motion takes place in the earth; ‘stroke’ means a connection dependent on ‘speed’ [and] is the cause of motion which is the reason for the ‘disjunction’ of something which is struck by strokes, for example due to the stroke of a chariot’s [wheels] with different portions of ‘earth’ and so forth, motions are seen; due to the conjunction of something connected by something pushed and something struck, motions take place because of a conjunction with the conjoint.

296 Kaṇāda recognises 2 different forces: saṃskāra and gurutva (gravitation); see earlier gloss 5.1.17, where there is a difference between ‘impulse’ (nodana) and ‘latent impetus’ (saṃskāra) too; hence, there could be 3 motions: (1) first-motion-impetus; (2) ‘latent impetus’ (which happens after the first-motion); and (3) gravitation due to weight.

158 * Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

5.2.2. tad viśeṣeṇādṛṣṭakāritām

yat khalu viruddha kriyavāyusaṃyogāt sarvasyāḥ pṛthivyāḥ

kampādi karma prajānāṃ śubhāśubhasūcanāyotpadyate tat

sarveṣām eva śubhāśubhasūcanād viśeṣeṇādṛṣṭakāritaṃ /

5.2.3. apāṃ saṃyogābhāve gurutvāt patanam

vidhārakavāyvabhrasaṃyogābhāvepāṃ gurutvāt patana karma

bhavati /

5.2.4. tad viśeṣeṇādṛṣṭakāritām

sasyānāṃ smṛddhaye vināśāya vā sarvajanānām adṛṣṭena janitaṃ

patanakarma adṛṣṭakāritam ucyate /

5.2.5. dravatvāt syandanam

vidhārakābhāvād apāṃ syandanakarma dravatvād bhavati /

5.2.6. nāḍyāvāyusaṃyogād ārohaṇam

nāḍ īti raśmiḥ savituḥ dvau raśmī śuciś ca śukraś ca / śucir

apa ādatte śukreṇa vṛddhiṃ karoti / śucyākhyayā nāḍyā

vāyusaṃyuktayāditya prayatnāpekṣayārohaṇam /

297 cosmos in Vaiśeṣika is structured in layers of supervenience composed from the subtlest elements such as ‘wind’ to the grossest which is ‘earth.’ See Praśastapāda’

Bhāṣya 57–59 (Bronkhorst edition).

298 ‘sins’ is only a conjecture; it is not being explicitly mentioned here.

299 note that ‘flowing’ (syandana) is different from ‘weight’ (gurutva); ‘weight’ must be for solid things, while ‘fluidity’ (dravatva) could be for liquids or oily things.

Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 159

5.2.2. [all] these are caused by a specific ‘unseen force’

whatever motion such as an earthquake and so forth in the entire earth – because of a connection with ‘air’ having conflicting motion – is produced in order to indicate the auspiciousness and inauspiciousness of beings, that is caused by a specific ‘unseen’ force, for it indicates the auspiciousness and inauspiciousness of all [beings].

***5.2.3. falling of ‘water’ is because of ‘weight’ [and] due to the ***

absence of a connection [with something to contain it]

motion of falling happens because of the ‘weight’ of ‘water,’ in the absence of a connection between cloud and the sustainer air297

5.2.4. [all] these are caused by a specific ‘unseen force’ [too]

regarding the prosperity of crops, or [their] loss, [these] are produced by the

‘unseen force’ [demerit, adharma] of all people, 298 [so also] it is said that the motion of the falling is being caused by the ‘unseen force.’

5.2.5. flowing exists because of ‘fluidity’299

when waters do not have a force-sustainer,300 the motion of the flowing ‘water’

happens because of ‘fluidity.’301

***5.2.6. [waters’} ascension [happens] because of ***

a connection of ‘wind’ with rays

‘nādi’ refers to ‘rays,’ and sun has 2 kinds of rays: bright and shining; the bright one takes the ‘water,’ [while] the shining one causes growth; the ascension is dependent on the ‘effort’ of the sun, which is joint with the ‘air’ called pure vein

‘nādi.’

300 vidhāraka stands for a cosmic authority, either personalised or not, which derives from the first-class stem dhṛ (related to the concept of Ṛta and dharma); it is thought that each of the elements is kept unified by a cosmic law.

301 ‘water’ being an eternal substance can subsist in itself, and the unity of its parts is maintained by either the atomic law to which Vaiśeṣika ascribes, or by ‘ṛta’ (a ‘specific dharma’ that characterises all cosmic components, either concrete or abstract); thus, it not certain whether water is upheld because of a [transcendental] upholder, yet, Vaiśeṣika distinguishes between the physical motions and metaphysical motions.

160 * Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

5.2.7. nodanāt pīḍanāt saṃyuktasaṃyogāc ca

nodanāc citradaṇḍādibhir ārohaṇam pīḍanād vastrādibhiḥ

pīḍyamāna nudyamānābhyāṃ ca saṃyukte /

5.2.8. vṛkśābhisarpaṇamityādṛṣṭakāritāṃ

vṛkśamūle niṣaktānām apāṃ vṛkśopari gamanam ādṛṣṭeṇa

kriyata iti /

5.2.9. apāṃ saṃghāto vilayanaṃ ca tejaḥ saṃyogāt

apāṃ saṃghātaḥ kāṭhinyaṃ divyena tejasā saṃyogāt

divyabhaumābhyāṃ tu vilayanam /

5.2.10. tatrā vasphūrjathur liṅgam

‘asti divyāsu apsu tejaḥ’ ity atra tejasaḥ avasphūrjathur abhrān

niḥsaraṇaṃ liṅgam iti /

5.2.11. vaidikaṃ ca

‘tā agniṃ garbhaṃ dadhire vabhūṣa’ […] iti ca vaidikaṃ vākyaṃ

divyāsvapsu tejaso liṅgam iti /

302 presumably ‘ārohaṇa’ refers here to the ‘expansion’ of a garment during the process of knitting, rather than its ‘ascension’ as the Monier-Williams dictionary, p. 151 renders.

303 ‘that something which is pressed and pushed’ may refer to the action of a needle in the knitting process.

304 ‘water circulation’ in this context goes against the law of gravitation (weight), which has been discussed in gloss 5.2.3.

Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 161

***5.2.7. equally [ascension is possible] because of pressing and pushing, ***

and because of a ‘conjunction’ with the conjoint [thing]

from pushing, expansion302 of a garment made of cotton and so forth is possible due to the pressing of the garment and so forth and when conjoint with [something]303 being pressed and pushed.

5.2.8. upwards movement in a tree is caused by the ‘unseen force’

water which is poured at the root of the tree moving [upwards] up to the top of the tree is due to the ‘unseen force.’304

***5.2.9. freezing and melting of ‘water’ is due to ***

a ‘conjunction’ with ‘lustre’

aggregation of ‘water’ is because of the conjunction of ‘lustre’ with the coagulated ‘air,’ but melting happens because of earthly and heavenly ‘lustre.’

***5.2.10. [water] discharged from clouds is the ***

mark [of lustre’s activity] therein

‘lustre exists in the ethereal waters’ this [sentence refers to] ‘lustre,’ and the act of water descending from the clouds, that is ‘thunder’ [and] is the mark of ‘lustre.’

5.2.11. and [these phenomena] are Vedic [evidence]

‘the [waters] which held fire forcefully as an embryo’ [Atharva Veda 1.33.1]305 this

Vedic sentence is the mark of the ‘lustre’ [subsisting] in the heavenly waters. 306

305 quote traced back from Bloomfield’s Vedic Concordance; the edition of Jambūvijayaji (Baroda 1961), lacks such references, therefore every effort should be made to fill such lacunae.

306 ‘heavenly waters’ (āpas), but Āpaḥ is in Vedic astrology a feminine deity, and a per-sonification of Water, who presides over the Pūrvāṣāḍhās ‘asterism’ (nakṣatra); the deity has therefore a motherly function because only mothers can contain water like an embryo; waters according to this cosmogonic myth, cover and contain the golden embryo that is symbolised by lustre.

162 * Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

5.2.12. apāṃ saṃyogād vibhāgāc ca stanayitnuḥ

meghāśani śabdas stanayitnuḥ / viruddha dikkriyābhyāṃ

vāyubhyām apāṃ preryamāṇānāṃ taraṅgabhūtānāṃ

parasparābhighātākhyāt saṃyogāc ca śabdaḥ / ekenāpi prakupitena

vāyunā vyavacchidyamānānām apāṃ vibhāgāc ca śabdaḥ /

***5.2.13. pṛthivīkarmaṇām tejaḥ karma ***

vāyukarma ca vyākhyātam

yathā nodanābhighaṭasaṃyuktasaṃyogadṛṣṭebhyaḥ pṛthivāṃ

karma tathā tejaso vāyoś ca / etad niyataṃ karma / niyataṃ tu /

***5.2.14. agnerūrdhvaṃ jvalanaṃ vāyoś ca tiryakpavanam ***

aṇumanasoś cādyaṃ karmety adṛṣṭakāritāni

agneravasthāne tiryag vā gamane pacyamānasyābhasmī bhāvaḥ

syāt apāṃ vā tathā vāyoratiryag gamane pūyamānadravyāṇām

pavanābhāvogneś ca aprabodhaḥ vinaṣṭaśarīrāṇām ātmanāṃ

sargādau pṛthivyādi paramāṇuṣvādyaṃ parasparopasarpaṇakarma

na syāt tathā labdhabhūmīnāṃ yogināṃ kalpānte abhisandhāya

prayatnena manaḥ śarīrād vyatiricyāvatiṣṭhamānānāṃ sargādau

navaśarīrasambandhāya manasa ādyaṃ karma na bhavet adṛṣṭadṛṭe

/ tasmād agner ūrdhvaṃ jvalanaṃ vāyoś ca tiryakpavanamaṇūnāṃ

copasarpaṇakarma manasaś cādyaṃ karma etāni prāṇinām adṛṣṭena

kṛtāni /

307 substance ‘air’ is a broader concept than its local activities such as ‘wind’; thus, ‘wind’

may be seen as a component of ‘air,’ just as, for instance, ‘activity’ is a component of the substance ‘motion’; the commentator does not use different terminology for this ontological distinction.

308 one hypothetical reading would be that the ‘selves’ to which the commentary alludes are the ‘subtle bodies’ described in Vedic eschatology, which are subject to rebirth; relevant to this is Praśastapāda’s use of the epithet ‘ativāhikaśarīra’ (Bhāṣya 359) in relation to the workings of dharma and adharma, which presumably impacts the des-tiny of the minute, yet transmigratory ‘subtle body’; Indian philosophy distinguishes, I think, between ‘substance soul,’ ‘subtle body,’ and ‘body’; mokṣa for Vaiśeṣika is removing the ‘subtle body’ from the pure nature of ‘soul’ in order to liberate it from the shackles of motion (karma theory).

Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 163

5.2.12. thunder is due to a ‘conjunction’ and ‘disjunction’ of ‘water’

thunder is the ‘sound’ of clouds and lightning; [sound] takes place because of a

‘conjunction’ called mutual striking of waters which are being moved and which have become waves, ‘air’ has action from opposite directions; ‘sound’ is [produced] from a ‘disjunction’ of ‘water’ and from being cut off from one agitated

‘wind.’307

***5.2.13. movement of ‘lustre’ and the motion of ‘air’ have ***

been explained through ‘earth’-motions

because ‘earth’-motion is [triggered] by a ‘conjunction’ with a conjoint impulse of the stroked [thing], it follows that ‘lustre’ and ‘air’ are types of irregular motion;

[thus] this ‘earth’-motion is irregular; however, the regular [motion is]

***5.2.14. upwards burning of fire, oblique blowing of ‘wind’ ***

***and the first motion of atoms and ‘mind,’ [all ***

***these] are caused by the ‘unseen force’ ***

fire would stay or move sideways, the cooked thing would not change into ashes or water, also, if ‘air’ did not move horizontally there would be no kindling of fire for the substances to be purified; in the case of the subtle selves that had lost their bodies, 308 at the beginning of a new creation of the world there would not be a first motion of the atoms of ‘earth,’ and so forth, or, of their mutual approaching;309

likewise, the yogis at the end of the world, those who had reached cosmic states, having steadied their ‘mind’ by ‘effort’ to continue [in those states], at the beginning [of a new] creation, there would be no initial motion of mind that connects

[them] with a new body, all of these [facts] would not happen without the ‘unseen force’; 310 therefore, the upwards blowing of fire and the oblique blowing of ‘air,’

as well as the mutual motion of atoms, and the first motion of ‘mind,’ all these are also done by the ‘unseen force’ in the case of ‘living beings.’

309 ‘bodies’ (śarīra) either ‘subtle’ or ‘gross’ are constituted from 2 mahābhūtas (earth and lustre); ‘their mutual approaching’ at the turn of cosmic cycles (‘at the beginning of a new world) refers to the inability of the atoms of earth to form a new body of these selves, which are presumably trapped in a limbo, as the Vedic cosmology describes; the ‘unseen force’ (adṛṣṭa, or dharma and adharma) is the law of karma that dramatically influences not only the formation of new bodies, but more importantly the arrangement of the whole new cosmos which takes a new shape with each new turn of the destruction and dissolution of cosmos.

310 the use of ‘adṛṣṭādṛṭa,’ which is the compound of adṛṣṭāt (ablative) + ṛṭe (‘without’) implies that all these motions and states of the individual selves ‘are attended by’ or

‘depend on adṛṣṭa’; in other words, without adṛṣṭa, these do not happen.

164 * Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

5.2.15. hastakarmaṇā manasaḥ karma vyākhyātaṃ

yathātmasaṃyogaprayatnābhyāṃ haste karma tathātma manaḥ

saṃyogāt prayatnāc ca manasaḥ karma etat sadehasya karma

tatra jāgrata icchādveṣapūrvakāt prayatnāt prabodhakāle tu

jīvanapūrvakāt / yataḥ saṃyogo yogaḥ sa ca karmakāryaḥ ato

yogāṅgaṃ karma yogamokṣau ca karmādhikāropy ucyete /

***5.2.16. ātmendriyamanorthasannikarṣāt ***

sukhaduḥkhe tad anārambhaḥ

yato hetorātmendriya manorthasannikarṣo jñānakāraṇatvena

sukhaduḥkhe janayatiatas tad anārambhaḥ tasya

sannikarṣasyānārambhonutpattir ucyata iti / tathā hi -

***5.2.17. ātmasthe manasi śarīrasya ***

sukhaduḥkhābhāvaḥ sa yogaḥ

yadā hy ātmani manovasthitaṃ nendriyeṣu tadā

catuṣṭayasannikarṣasyānārambhāt tat kāryayoḥ sukhaduḥkhayor

abhāvarūpo vidyamānaśarīrasya ātmano vāyunigrahāpekṣa ātmano

manasā saṃyogo yogaḥ / yogāṅgaṃ prāṇāyāma karma kiṃ noktam /

5.2.18. kāya karmaṇātma karma vyākhyātaṃ

ihātmaśabdena vāyuḥ yathātmasaṃyogaprayatnābhyāṃ haste

karma tathātmavāyusaṃyogāt prayatnāc ca prāṇāpāna karma /

Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 165

5.2.15. ‘mind-motion’ is explained by ‘hand-motion’

when motion-in-hand happens because of a connection between ‘effort’ with

‘soul,’ then, there is ‘mind-motion’ from a conjunction between ‘soul-mind-effort’ which is the motion of a embodied self [ātman]; while the ‘awakened-state’

is from ‘effort’ preceded by ‘volition’ and ‘aversion,’ yet, at the ‘time of awaken-ing,’ [mind-motion] is preceded by life principle;

[introductory line]: since yoga is a ‘conjunction’ and because the ‘effect-of-motion’ is a limb of yoga, [therefore] yoga and mokṣa are [both] described in the chapter of motion –

***5.2.16. the non-occurrence [as well the occurrence ***

***of] ‘pleasure’ and ‘pain’ are because of a ***

contact between soul-mind-senses-object

‘anutpatti’ is explained to be the non-occurrence of the [4-fold] contact; thus,

[Kaṇāda] says –

***5.2.17. yoga is that which, when‘mind’ stays in the ‘soul,’ [makes such ***

that] ‘pleasure’ and ‘pain’ no longer exist in the embodied [soul]

when indeed, ’mind’ is steady in the ‘soul’ and not in the senses, then there is non-occurrence of the 4-fold contact; the result of these 2 [situations] is the form of absence of ‘pleasure’ and ‘pain,’ yoga being the ‘conjunction’ between

‘mind’ and ‘soul’ which depends on a breathing control of the ‘soul’ with a body.

[introductory line] why the activity of prāṇāyāma, which is part of yoga, is not mentioned?

***5.2.18. the motion of ‘ātman’ is explained ***

by the motion of body

here, the word ‘ātman’ refers to ‘air’; such as there is motion-in-hand because of a ‘conjunction’ between ‘effort’ with ‘ātman,’ similarly, there is a ‘conjunction’

between ‘ātman,’ ‘air,’ and ‘effort’ [and that] is the motion of prāṇāyāma.

166 * Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

***5.2.19. apasarpaṇam upasarpaṇam aśita pīta saṃyogaḥ ***

kāryāntara saṃyogāś c’ety adṛṣṭa kāritāni

maraṇakāle pūrvaśarīrād manaso niḥsaraṇam apasarpaṇam

śarīrāntareṇābhisambandho manasa upasarpaṇam śukraśoṇitāt

prabhṛti garbhasthasya mātrā upayuktenānnapānena

nāḍyanupraviṣṭena sambandhośitapītasaṃyogaḥ kalalārbuda

māṃsa peśī ghanaśarīrādibhir ekasmin naiva saṃsāre ye

saṃbandāste kāryāntara saṃyogāḥ tānyapasarpaṇādīnyadṛṣṭenaiva

kriyante na prayatnena /

5.2.20. tad abhāve saṃyogābhāvoprādurbhāvaḥ sa mokṣaḥ

evaṃ rūpasyānādyapasarpaṇādi nimittasyādṛṣṭasyābhāve

jīvanākhyasyātmamanaḥ saṃyogasyābhāvonyasya ca

śarīrasyāprādurbhāvo yaḥ sa mokṣaḥ / tamovṛtatvāt sarvasya

jñānānutpattau tamo hetuḥ / tat punaḥ /

***5.2.21. dravyaguṇakarmavaidharmyād ***

bhāsābhāvamātraṃ tamaḥ

vināśitvena nityair dravyair vaidharmyād amūrtatva sparśatva

prakāśavirodhair anityadravyair vaidharmyān na dravyaṃ

tamaḥ na ca guṇaḥ karma vā āśrayānupalabdheḥ / tasmāt

prakāśasyābhāvamātraṃ tamaḥ / kuta etat ?

311 sūtra does not necessarily imply that the atomic mind is that which goes away and in; it only mentions that a dravya – presumably but not certainly – the atomic mind, comes into contact with whatever is ‘consumed’ (upayukta), ‘eaten’ (ānna), and

‘drunk’ (āpāna).

Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 167

***5.2.19. going away, coming in, ‘conjunction’ with [something] ***

***eaten, drunk, as well as ‘conjunction’ with other ***

activities, are [all] caused by the ‘unseen force’

at the time of death, there is going in and going forth of ‘mind’ from a previous body, the going in of the ‘mind’311 is due to a connection with another body, that

which is situated in the womb begins to [take shape] from the state of ‘semen’

and ‘blood’ to [that] which is of the ‘measure’ of an ‘embryo,’ the conjunction between eaten and drunk is a contact312 attached to that which is used [by the mother] which enters through the vein in those [stages of the foetus] which are

[caught up] in the cosmic cycle namely [the development stages] kālala, arbuda, māṃsa, peśī, and ghaṇa, as well as the ‘mind’-‘soul’-’conjunction’ with other activities, and the retreating of other [activities] and so forth [all] are done only by the ‘unseen force,’ and not by ‘effort.’

***5.2.20. absolute liberation is when there is absence of that ***

***[unseen force] because there is no ‘conjunction’ ***

due to the non-manifestation [of body]

in the absence of [the] ‘unseen force’ which is the instrumental cause of the begin-ningless motion of ‘form,’ the absence of the ‘conjunction’ of ‘mind’ and ‘soul,’

which is called life principle [jīvana], and the non-manifestation of a body, which is called mokṣa, is the argument for [the existence of] darkness [according to which] everything is covered and that knowledge of darkness cannot be ascertained; that is [to say] again –

***5.2.21. because it is a different [category] from substance, quality, and ***

motion, darkness is only the absence of manifestation [of light]

darkness is neither a substance, nor a quality, nor [even] motion because of the inscrutability of [its] substratum, because of [its] undifferentiated nature with regard to impermanent substances, because [it] is antithetical to brightness, because [it] is intangible, and because of [its] undifferentiated nature with regard to permanent substances, and due to the fact that [it] is perishable; therefore, darkness is only the absence of light; how is this?

312 this contact is called ‘sambandho’śitapītasaṁyoga’ and takes place throughout the stages of embryonic formation.

168 * Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

5.2.22. tejaso dravyāntareṇāvaraṇāc ca

tejasaḥ savitṛprakāśāderbahiḥ sadbhāvāt parvataguhādau ca

dravyāntareṇāvṛte abhāvād manyāmahe tejasobhāvamātraṃ tama

iti / bāhyaṃ pradīpādinivartyam avidyātmakaṃ tu jñānajyotiṣā ity

uktau yogamokṣau /

***5.2.23. dikkālāvākāśaṃ ca kriyāvadbhyo ***

vaidharmyān niṣkriyāṇi

ākāśa kāla diśomūrtāḥ kriyāvataḥ pṛthivyāder amūrtatayā

vaidharmyān niṣkriyāḥ ‘ca’ śabdādātmāpi niṣkriyaḥ /

5.2.24. etena karmāṇi guṇāś ca vyākhyātāḥ

etena amūrtatvena guṇāḥ karmāṇi ca niṣkriyāṇi draṣṭavyāni ‘ca’

śabdāt sāmānyādayaḥ /

5.2.25. niṣkriyāṇāṃ samavāyaḥ karmabhyaḥ pratiṣiddhaḥ

niṣkriyānām abhighātādīnāṃ karma samavetaṃ na bhavati

svāśraye karmajananāt /

5.2.26. kāraṇaṃ tvasamavāyino guṇāḥ

yasya guṇāḥ kāraṇam uktās tasyā samavāyina eva kāraṇam /

313 ‘sadbhāvāt’ presumably the lustre light refers to another kind of light, the light that exists inside a cave, this light, however, is not the same as sunlight.

314 that ‘soul’ is devoid of motion might be just an explanatory innovation inserted by Candrānanda in the list of abstract substances.

315 ‘this explanation’ may refer to the above sūtras which use the vaidharmic (or differential) epistemological reasoning, which seeks to settle definitions by drawing distinctions (rather than by sādharmyic reasoning that does so by drawing commonalities).

Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 169

5.2.22. and [darkness] is due to lustre being covered by another [entity]

because of the absence of [lustre’s] occurrence in other substances, as in a mountain cave for instance, the brightness of Savitṛ (sun god) exists externally from that of the lustre’s manifestation [inside the cave], 313 therefore, we think that dark-

ness is the absence of lustre, only; external [darkness] is removable by a lamp, but

[darkness which is] ignorance [can be removed] through the lustre of knowledge, thus, in this way both ‘liberation’ [mokṣa] and ‘yoga‘ [yoga] are explained.

***5.2.23. ‘space,’ ‘time,’ and ‘vacuum’ are devoid of motion, and are ***

distinguishable from [things] which are possessed by motion

‘space,’ ‘time,’ and ‘vacuum’ are formless, and because [they] are different from

‘earth’ and so forth, which have concrete form and activity, [but space and so forth] have no concrete form, therefore are motionless, [but] due to the word ‘ca’

[and], ‘soul’ is also [considered]314 devoid of motion.

5.2.24. by this [explanation]315 qualities and motions are being explained

in this way, because of formlessness, the ‘qualities’ and ‘motions’ are to be considered motionless, because the word ‘ca,’ universal and so forth categories [are motionless too]. 316

***5.2.25. ‘inherence’ in things devoid of motion is a contradictory ***

[and different category] than ‘motion’

motion is not inherent in [things] that are devoid of motion, such as stroke and so forth, because motion is generating [motion] in its own substratum, 317 [not the substratum of things]

5.2.26. but qualities are non-inherent causes

concerning qualities which are stated to be causes, they are non-inherent, because themselves are cause such as cause [itself] is.

316 concepts that are devoid of motions are ākāśa, diś, ātman, guṇa, karma, and sāmānya; could they all have in common a universal nature as well?

317 ‘generating motion in its own substratum’ resembles Aristotle’s view on ‘essence’ or

‘nature’ which has a ‘principle of movement,’ Aristotle (Physics 192b20).

170 * Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

5.2.27. guṇair dig vyākhyātā

‘pūrveṇa niṣkramaṇam’ ityādeḥ pratyayabhedasya dig

nimittakāraṇam vyākhyātā kāraṇatvenātideśo nā samavāyitvena /

5.2.28. kāraṇena kāla iti

yenaiva kāraṇena pratyayabhedahetutvena dig vyākhyātā tenaiva

‘yugapat kṛtam’ ityādi pratyayabhedasya kālo nimittakāraṇaṃ

vyākhyātaḥ /

// pañcamo’dhyāyaḥ / samāptaḥ karmādhikāraḥ //

6.1.

/ ṣaṣṭasyādhyāyasyādyam āhnikam /

karmāṇi vyākhyāya guṇā vyākhyāyante / tatra dharma ādau

vyākhyāyate śāstrādau tasyoddiṣṭatvāt / tasya vaidiko vidhiḥ

sādhanaṃ / vedasya satyatā kuta iti cet, yataḥ -

6.1.1. buddhipūrvā vākyakṛtirvede

‘agnihotraṃ juhuyāt svargakāmaḥ’ […] ity evaṃ bhūtā racanā

bhagavato maheśvarasya buddhipūrvā sā tataḥ pramāṇam

āptapraṇītatvasya satyatāvyāpteḥ / atīndriyam aśakyaṃ jñātum

iti cet,

318 perception of difference is fundamental for Vaiśeṣika’s epistemology; it refers to the possibility of the knowledge about the essence of substances which is ultimately ‘differentiated’; viśeṣa and antyaviśeṣa are concepts of a crucial importance, both ontologically and epistemologically, respectively.

319 it is debatable if ‘direction’ is an appropriate translation for ‘diś.’

320 all substances as well as all qualities are possessed by a ‘specific dharma,’ an epistemic entity that plays an important role in Vaiśeṣika’s theory of individuation, for it is dharma that which, for instance, identifies in a universal, say redness, a particular red from another particular red, both of which belong to the same class of redness.

Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 171

5.2.27. ‘space’ is defined by [its] qualities

‘space’ which is explained as the instrumental cause of the perception of the variation [of states]318 as in sentences such as ‘departing eastwards’; extension is because of being cause and because of [space being] non-inherent [in the perception of variation].

5.2.28. ‘time’ is defined by causality [of the states of space]

that by means of which ‘direction’319 is explained [produced] by the conceptualisation of the manifold, by that, ‘time’ [itself] is explained to be the instrumental cause for the conceptualisation of the manifold [as expressed in the sentence]

‘[time] done simultaneously [with space]’.

// the fifth chapter / section of motion is completed //

Translation

/ the first lesson of the sixth chapter /

after having explained the motions, [now] qualities will be explained; concerning these, ‘dharma’ is being explained first, because this is how [it] was first intended by the śāstras; according to a Vedic injunction [dharma] is the means [for the knowledge of qualities];320 if you ask on the truthfulness of the Vedas, then [the answer is yes] because –

6.1.1. sentences formulated in the Vedas, are preceded by an Intellect321

‘one desirous of heaven should sacrifice agnihotra’ […]322 such [an] element [of faith] is authoritative because it derives from a prior Intellect [and] because it is composed by Bhagavān Īśvara, therefore it is authoritative for its truthfulness is invariably connected with a trustworthy person who composed it; if you say that which is beyond sense organs is impossible to know, then,

321 given that the subject of this āhnika is the knowledge of qualities, the relationship between Vedas and Divine Intellect must be analysed through the lens of the relationship between the ‘quality’ sound (e.g. Vedas) and ‘substance’ God (Intellect, Bhagavān Īśvara). Between them there is an intimate relationship of ‘inherence.’

322 Jambūvijayaji does not provide a reference to this sentence, but we take it to refer to the Vedas or Brāhmaṇas.

172 * Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

6.1.2. na cāsmad buddhibhyo liṅgamṛṣeḥ

liṅgyatenenārtha iti liṅgaṃ vijñānaṃ / na hi yādṛśam

asmad vijñānaṃ vartamānāvyavahitasambandhārthaviṣa

yaṃ tadṛśam evam bhagavato vijñānaṃ / ataḥ saṃbhavati

bhagavatotīndriyārthaviṣayaṃ vijñānaṃ / sa kathaṃ jñāyate ?

6.1.3. tathā brāhmaṇe saṃjñākarmasiddhir liṅgam

vinopadeśena brāhmaṇādikam artham asmākam ālocayatāṃ

pratyakṣeṇa na ‘brāhmaṇoyam’ iti jñānam utpadyate / pratyakṣeṇa

cārthamālocya saṃjñāpraṇayanaṃ dṛṣṭaṃ putrādiṣu / santi

caitā brāhmaṇādisaṃjñāstā yena pratyakṣam ālocya praṇītā iti

sūtrārthaṃ varṇayanti / ataḥ -

6.1.4. buddhipūrvo dadātiḥ

yata eva parameśvarasya kṛtir vedādau vākyapadaracanātoyaṃ

smārto ’pi dānādividhistadīya amnāyam ananta śākhā bhinnam

ālocya saṃkṣepam anumanyamānānāṃ bhṛgu prabhṛtīnāṃ

buddhipūrvaḥ / evaṃ dānādividhayo dharma hetavaḥ /

6.1.5. tathā pratigrahaḥ

tathaiva pratigraho’pi prakṣīṇavṛtter vadātajanmanaḥ

pratigrahānurūpaguṇayuktasya dharmāyaiva bhavati /

323 Maharṣi Bhṛgu was born from the chest of Brahmā during a sacrificial fire (brah-mayajña) mediated by Varuṇa; he is considered progenitor (prajāpati) of beings; he is a great sage, and his very dear wife was Pulomā.

Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 173

***6.1.2. [the] characteristic mark of a seer’s [intellect] ***

is that it is unlike our cognition

‘liṅga’ means the knowledge by means of which a subject-meaning is known; the knowledge of Maheśvara is not similar to our knowledge which connects the subject-matter with things near and present, because the god-like [or seers’]

knowledge manifests about things which are beyond sense-organs; how is it that

[Maheśvara] is known?

***6.1.3. similarly, the characteristic mark of a Brahmin [or ***

seers’ knowledge] is the act of naming [things]

in our case, knowledge as to [whether] ‘this is a Brahmin’ cannot be produced without initiation, by mere sight, or ordinary perception; concerning [the name of] the son [of Brahmiṣṭa] and so forth, conducting the naming-ritual is after the consideration of the meaning as well as with the perception of [him]; the meaning of the sūtra is that conducting the naming-ritual of the Brahmin and so forth, is after due consideration with perception of the subject-matter, and these have been enunciated [by the sūtra]; therefore –

6.1.4. sacrificial offerings are [or must be] preceded by [Vedic] knowledge

this is how Parameśvara made the Vedas in the beginning arranging them in sentences in fix position[s], as well as the tradition smārta concerning offerings and so forth which have also been foreseen by the Intellect of Bhṛgu323 who is the

maker of these [offerings], and who expounded their contents after having considered the sacred texts, he divided them into innumerable branches; therefore,

injunctions such as the act of offering and so forth, are conducive to ‘dharma.’324

6.1.5. similarly, receiving [must be] preceded by [Vedic] knowledge325

for instance, the act of receiving is only in the case of a [Brahmin] who has lost his way of livelihood, one who has pure birth, [and] one who possesses the proper qualities for taking, [such receiving] leads to dharma.

324 translated ‘bring about’ instead of ‘they cause dharma’ because I wish to stress the ontological importance and prevalence of dharma in this commentary.

325 in other words, the act of receiving is [or should be] preceded by Intellect.

174 * Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

6.1.6. tayoḥ kramo yathānitaretarāṅgabhūtānām

yathā bhūtāny anitaretarāṅgaṃ na paraspareṇa kāryakāraṇabhūtāni

na hyaraṇī agneḥ kāraṇam api tu svāvayavā eva atha cāraṇyor

agneś ca kramaḥ / evam etayoḥ pūrvaṃ dānadharmaḥ paścāt

pratigrahadharmaḥ na tu kāryakāraṇabhāvaḥ / kutaḥ ?

6.1.7. ātmaguṇeṣvātmāntaraguṇānām akāraṇatvāt

na hy anyadīyā ātmaguṇā anyadīyātmaguṇānāṃ kāraṇaṃ bhavanti

/ tatra -

6.1.8. aduṣtabhojanāt samabhivyāharatobhyudayaḥ

aduṣṭaṃ brāhmaṇaṃ bhojayitvā tadīyād āśīrvādādisamabhivyāhārāt

puruṣābhyudayaḥ / tat kāraṇaṃ dharmo bhavat īty arthaḥ /

6.1.9. tad duṣṭabhojane na vidyate

saty apy āśīrvādādivacane duṣṭaṃ brāhmaṇaṃ bhojayitvābhyudayo

na prāpyate / atha ko duṣṭaḥ ?

6.1.10. duṣṭaṃ hiṃsāyāṃ

parasya hiṃsāyāṃ śārīramānasa duḥkharūpāyāṃ pravṛttaṃ duṣṭaṃ

jānīṣva / hiṃsā śabda upalakṣaṇam, yataḥ -

326 ‘abhyudaya’ may be translated by ‘elevation’ or ‘prosperity’ in this world and the next world, a condition which the religious man aspires to by performing devotional and ritual deeds; it should not be confused with ‘liberation’ (mokṣa).

Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 175

***6.1.6. the sequence of the 2 [offering and receiving] is similar to [the sequence] ***

of those things which are unrelated to each other [by cause effect]

just as elements [are] each other independent parts and not mutual entities [fused with each other] by cause and effect, fire being not the cause of the sticks, but rather these are parts in themselves, in the same way, there is a sequence of

[throwing] sticks in the fire, hence between these 2 things, dharma of giving is earlier, dharma of taking follows after, but cause and effect relation [between them] does not exist; why?

***6.1.7. the qualities of one soul have no causality ***

[upon] the qualities of another soul

qualities of another soul do not become the cause of another self; [with regard]

to that

6.1.8. ‘mundane elevation’326 *** is [obtained] from the utterance ***

[of a blessing] after feeding a pure [Brahmin]

having fed a pure Brahmin, the ‘elevation’ of man is [obtained] from the utterance of his blessing and so forth, this becomes the cause of ‘dharma,’ this is the meaning.

6.1.9. this [elevation] does not exist when feeding an impure [Brahmin]

there is no achievement of mundane elevation after having fed an impure Brahmin, even if there is the utterance of blessings, and so forth; 327 now, what is impure?

6.1.10. impurity [consists] of violence

you should know that anyone who commits violence against another person is impure whether the [violence] is in the form of mental or corporeal pain; the word

‘hiṃsa’ [violence] is an indication [of many such kinds], because –

327 here the rule is addressed to pure Brahmins; blessing and true speeches have no effectiveness if the internal and deep purity of the Brahmin is not confirmed; in Indian philosophy, there is not always dissociation between speaker and the spoken, between object and meaning, between śabda Brahman and śabda of people; there is often a holistic and immanent yet dualistic and transcendental mode in understanding truth.

176 * Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

6.1.11. samabhivyāhārato doṣaḥ

kṛtamahāpātakasya saṃbhāṣaṇamātrād eva doṣeṇa yujyate kimuta

bhojanādinā iha samabhivyāhāraḥ saṃbhāṣaṇaṃ pūrvatrāśīrvādaḥ /

6.1.12. tad aduṣṭe na vidyate

tat samabhivyāhāra dūṣaṇaṃ hiṃsādirahite brāhmaṇe na vidyate /

aduṣṭ‘epi

6.1.13. viśiṣṭe pravṛttiḥ

na hiṃsādimātra rahite api tu deśakālavijñānācārairviśiṣṭe

brāhmaṇe’bhyudayārthinaḥ pravṛttiḥ tataḥ -

6.1.14. same hīne cāpravṛttiḥ

aduṣṭo brāhmaṇo deśādiyukto viśiṣṭa ucyate / eṣām

ekena guṇena yuktaḥ samaḥ / savair yukto viśiṣṭaḥ / tau

tyaktvānyo duṣṭo vā kṣatriyādir vā prāṇimātraṃ vā hīna

ucyate / tatrābhyudayepsormantrapūrvake suvarṇādidāne

vaiśākhyādinimitte samahīnayor pravṛttiḥ api tu viśiṣṭe /

***6.1.15. etena hīnasamaviśiṣṭadhārmikebhyaḥ ***

parādānaṃ vyākhyātam

etena viparītena krameṇāpadi parāsvādānaṃ vyākhyātam / uktaṃ

ca‘hīnādādeyam ādau tu tad abhāve samād api / asambhave

tvādadīta viśiṣṭād api dhārmikāt’ […] /

328 samabhivyāhāra, ‘companionship’ includes ‘speech’ and ‘conversation,’ which means that even speech may be polluted by either listening to or conversing with a violent person.

Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 177

6.1.11. impurity [subsists even] in companionship328

concerning a person who gets impurity, [that one] commits a great sin even through sheer conversation [with an impure Brahmin], then what about [impurity in] speaking, and through feeding and so forth? in this passage the word

‘samabhivyāhāra’ means conversation, while in the previous passage it means blessing.

***6.1.12. such [impurity] does not subsist when [in ***

***companionship] with a pure [Brahmin] ***

that impurity in the form of conversation does not exist in a Brahmin who is devoid of violence and so forth; in the case of the pure [Brahmin] also –

***6.1.13. [nor does impurity subsists in] ‘propensity’ ***

***towards a morally-qualified [Brahmin] ***

‘propensity’ of a person wishful of prosperity [should not be] towards only a Brahmin devoid of violence, but [also] towards a Brahmin who is qualified through

[qualities] related to ‘time,’ ‘region,’ ‘knowledge,’ and ‘demeanour’; therefore,

***6.1.14. there [should not be] propensity [for companionship] ***

towards a mediocre [or] inferior [Brahmin]

a pure Brahmin observing the space [rule of settlement] and other [rules] is described as [a] morally qualified [Brahmin]; one who is bound by [only] one of these moral qualities is mediocre; and one who is associated with all the qualities is a distinctively superior [Brahmin]; avoid these 2 impure [Brahmins], kṣatriya or other class, or any living creatures [because they are] considered inferior; one who desires ‘mundane elevation’ should not have propensity towards a mediocre or inferior Brahmin, but only towards a distinctively superior Brahmin, at the time of Vaiśākhī [month]329

and so forth, offering [him] gold and along with a mantra, and so forth.

***6.1.15. this is why, accepting [offerings] are explained [differently] between ***

the inferior, mediocre, and morally-qualified [Brahmins]

thereby, the act of accepting money from another at the time of calamity has been explained in a reverse sequence; and thus it is stated: ‘in the beginning one may accept from an inferior [person] in his absence [may accept] from a mediocre

[Brahmin]; in the absence of that [mediocre Brahmin] however, one may accept from a superior-qualified [Brahmin].’

329 a full-moon day that falls in the month Vaiśākhī in the Hindu calendar which corresponds to April–May.

178 * Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

6.1.16. tathā viruddhānāṃ tyāgaḥ

anenaiva viparītakrameṇātmano hīnaiḥ ripubhir māraṇāyākṣiptas

tān eva śatrūn abhihanyāt /

6.1.17. sama ātmatyāgaḥ paratyāgo vā

ātmanas tulyaguṇena śatruṇā prāptasya brāhmaṇasya vikalpaḥ

ātmano vadha, ātatāyino vā /

6.1.18. viśiṣṭa ātmatyāgaḥ

ātmanodhikaguṇena śatruṇā prāptasyātmana eva ripuprayukto

vadhoṅgīkāryaḥ / ihātmāpekṣayā hīnādivyavahāraḥ pratigrahītṝṇām

anyonyāpekṣā /

// iti ṣaṣṭhasyādyam āhnikam //

6.2.

/ ṣaṣṭhasyādhyāyasya dvitīyam āhnikam /

evaṃ śrutismṛtividhibhyo dharmo bhavat īty uktvā idānīm eṣāṃ

dharmasiddhau prakāraviśeṣam āha / tathāhi -

***6.2.1. dṛṣṭānāṃ dṛṣṭaprayojanānāṃ ***

dṛṣṭābhāve prayogobhyudayāya

śrutismṛtiparidṛṣṭānāṃ snānādīnāṃ dṛṣṭasya malāpakarṣāder

anabhisandhāne prayogobhyudayāya bhavati / ke te ?

330 tyāga: ‘avoid,’ ‘abandon,’ ‘kill,’ or ‘sacrifice.’

331 ‘self-surrender’ (ātmatyāga) refers to a form of ‘suicide’ when one is attacked by a superior Brahmin; there should be self-sacrifice, rather than the act of sacrificing or killing a pure Brahmin.

Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 179

***6.1.16. comparably, avoiding the hostile ones [should ***

be applied in a reversed order]

in the similar reverse order, a Brahmin should kill enemies when these attack for the sake of killing [and] those who are inferior to himself.

***6.1.17. when [encountering] a mediocre [Brahmin], should one ***

sacrifice330 oneself [to him], or [sacrifice] the adversary[?]

there is an option regarding the Brahmin who is attacked by an enemy endowed with qualities equal to his: [either] killing oneself or [killing] the aggressor.

***6.1.18. [but] when [encountering] a morally-superior [Brahmin] ***

one should sacrifice oneself [rather than harming him]331

one who is captured by an enemy with superior qualities should [rather] accept death at the hands of the enemy; here the usage of [the words] inferior and so forth refer to oneself, and in mutual dependent relation with the act of accepting.

// here [ends] the first lesson of the sixth [chapter] //

Translation

// the second lesson of the sixth chapter //

thus, having stated that ‘dharma’ is [achieved] from the injunctions of śruti and smṛti texts, regarding these, he now explains the specific types of ‘dharma’; for example –

6.2.1. [acts] which are explicitly stated,332 *** [acts] whose ***

***purpose is seen, [acts] whose purpose is not seen are ***

[all acts which lead] to ‘mundane elevation’

concerning the visible acts from the smṛti and śruti texts we understand that ablutions which are the removal of dirt and so forth are of the visible kind, their performance [however] lacks any connection with a purpose, and all these lead to

‘elevation’; which are these?

332 Pundit Devadatta Patil of Rivona sees ‘dṛṣṭānāṃ’ as injunctions explicitly mentioned in the śruti and smṛti texts (personal communication).

180 * Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

***6.2.2. abhiṣecanopavāsa brahmacarya gurukulavāsa ***

***vānaprasthya yajña dāna prokṣaṇa diṅnakṣatra ***

mantra kāla niyamāś ca adṛṣṭāya

viśiṣṭa deśakālāpekṣeṇāmbhasā yaḥ śarīrasya saṃyogastad

abhiṣecanaṃ snānaṃ / naktaṃ dinaṃ vāso niyamapūrvonāhāra

rūpa upavāsaḥ / brahmaśabdenātmā brahmaṇi

caraṇaṃātmamanasor yaḥ saṃyogaḥ stryādiparihārarūpo

brahmacaryam / vijñānādyarthino gurūparicaryāparasya tad gṛheṣu

vasanaṃ gurukulavāsaḥ / śāstravidhinā gehāniḥsṛtyāraṇyaṃ

prasthito vānaprasthaḥ tasya karma vānaprasthyaṃ / yajñaḥ

pākayajñādayaḥ / dānaṃ suvarṇādi dānamabhaya dānaṃ ca /

prokṣaṇaṃ sandhyopāsanādi / diṅ-niyamādayonye viśeṣāḥ / diṅ-

niyamaḥ ‘prāṅmukhonnāni bhuñjīta’ […] / nakṣatra-niyamaḥ

‘kṛttikāsvādadhīta’ […] / mantra-niyamaḥ devasya tveti nirvapati

/ kāla-niyamaḥ ‘vasante brāhmaṇognīnādadhīta’ […] / evam etat

sarvaṃ dṛṣṭa prayojana tiraskāreṇa prayujyamānaṃ dharmāya

sampadyata iti /

6.2.3. cāturāśramyam upadhāc cānupadhāc ca

yad idaṃ caturṇām āśramiṇāṃ karma tad upadhayā

prayujyamānam adharmāyānupadhayā tu dharmāya bhavati / kā

upadhā ?

333 it could refer to saṃdhyā devotion that is performed at twilight.

334 the author recognises adṛṣṭa the role to obtain benefits that lead to ‘mundane elevation’; all these acts enumerated are performed not for ‘liberation’ (niḥśreyasa) but rather for ‘abhyudaya,’ hence the translation with ‘for the sake of adṛṣṭa’ – it means that dharma is obtained from each of these acts.

335 Vaiśeṣika accept Brahman as the generating principle.

336 ‘abhayadānaṃ’ (offering for protection) refers to the protection of animals and other human beings, with reference to non-violence – it is basically referring to ahiṃsā.

337 VSc 6.1.14. where ‘offering of gold’ is mentioned being performed at full moon in April–May.

338 ‘prokṣaṇa’ a possible reference to the saṃdhyā ritual.

Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 181

***6.2.2. ablutions, fasting, celibacy, dwelling with a guru, dwelling in a ***

forest, sacrifice, offering, sprinkling water,333 mantra related to *** ***

***‘space,’ lunar station (nakṣatra), and injunctions regarding ‘time’ ***

are [all performed] in accordance with the ‘unseen force’334

bathing is ablution in relation to the body and [its performance] consists of ‘water’

in respect to a specific ‘time’ and ‘space’; fasting is in the form of refraining from food preceded by a rule concerning day [and] night; celibacy is of the kind of abstaining from women and so forth, which means that [abstaining] refers to a Brahmin’s moral conduct in relation to ‘mind’ and ‘soul,’ and by the word ātman, it refers to Brahman; 335 dwelling with a guru is living in his house first for the purpose of wisdom, as well as devotion [to him], and other [duties]; dwelling in

[a] forest is after having renounced the household to dwell in a forest as prescribed by the śāstras; sacrifice is cooked sacrifice and so forth; offering is ‘safety offer-

ing’336 and ‘gold offering’337 and so forth; sprinkling is in relation to adoration at

twilight,338 and so forth; ‘space’-related rules and so forth regarding other ‘particularities’ [of religious life]; ‘direction’-related rule [is the rule] ‘one should eat facing east’ [Tait. Brahm. 1.1.2];339 the rule of constellation is: ‘one should enact fires on lunar mansion’ […]; 340 the rule concerning mantra is ‘devasya tveti’341

by which one takes out [the material for the sacrificial cake]; the rule regarding

‘time’ is ‘a Brahmin should establish fire during spring-time’ […]; thus, with all such things, when they have their ‘examined purpose’ concealed and are being conducted [as such], then, ‘dharma’ is obtained.

***6.2.3. the [duties of the] 4 stages of life are both ***

deceitful342 as well as non-deceitful343

now, whatever act344 concerning the 4 stages of life when performed with defect or without defect, that leads to ‘dharma’ or ‘adharma,’345 what is [considered]

defect?

339 this reference follows the recommendation which the Italian edition (VSi) of Leonardo V. Arena (1987:155) provides.

340 according to Hindu astrology, Kṛttikā is the third of the 27 nakṣatras; it is ruled by Sun; see Black Yajurveda: Taittirīya Saṃhitā.

341 the rule can be rephrased as ‘one should take out the material for the sake (devatasya) of sacrificial cake.’

342 ‘anupadhā category’ includes acts that should be performed ‘without break’ or ‘purity of intention’ (VSc 6.2.5).

343 ‘upadhā acts’ are acts that are not conductive to dharma because they are performed with a form of ‘internal impurity’ (aśuci), ‘break,’ or ‘failure’ (VSc 6.2.4).

344 the usual translation for ‘karma’ has been ‘motion,’ but in this context it may refer to

‘acts’ or ‘deeds’ that any of the 4 āśramas require.

345 if there are defects, then the act leads to the absence of dharma, and when there are no defects in the act, then it leads to dharma.

182 * Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

6.2.4. bhāvadoṣa upadhā

bhāvasya abhisaṃdher dambhādidoṣa upadhety arthaḥ / ka

anupadhā ?

6.2.5. adoṣonupadhā

abhisaṃdher dambhādirahitatvam anupadhety arthaḥ /

***6.2.6. iṣṭa rūpa rasa gandha sparśaṃ prokṣitaṃ ***

abhyukṣitaṃ ca tad śuci

smṛtau yasya rūpādayo na niṣiddhāsta tac chuci mantrapūrvakaṃ

prokṣitaṃ kevalābhiradbhir abhyukṣitaṃ ca / etad viparītam aśuci /

kiṃ ca,

6.2.7. aśuc īti śucipratiṣedhaḥ

yasya cātyanta śucipratiṣedhaḥ tad apy aśuci vāg duṣṭādikaṃ /

6.2.8. arthāntaraṃ ca

madyādi ca yat sākṣānniṣidhyate tadapya śuci / tataḥ śuci

bhoktavyam / nanu -

***6.2.9. ayatasya śucibhojanād abhyudayo ***

na vidyate yamābhāvāt

ayatasya viśiṣṭa prayatna rahitasya śucimāhāraṃ

yadṛcchayopayuñjānasyābhyudayo nāsti viśiṣṭasyābhisandher

abhāvāt / naitat,

346 ‘deceit’ might be extended over the nature of knowledge of reality itself.

Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 183

6.2.4. ‘defect’ is the fault in a condition

[the] meaning of ‘upadhā’ is [a] defect in someone’s’ [mind] such as hypocritical intention and so forth; 346 what is [considered] a non-deceitful [act]?

6.2.5. absence of defect [refers to] a flawless condition

[the] meaning of ‘anupadhā’ is lacking any deceiving relation with hypocrisy.

***6.2.6. a pure [act] is that which [involves] sprinkling downwards, ***

***and sprinkling upwards, according to the ‘form,’ ***

‘taste,’ ‘smell,’ [and] ‘touch’ of a desired thing

sprinkling upwards with ‘water’ only, and sprinkling downwards preceded by a mantra is a pure [act] and is not prohibited because its [performance related to]

form and so forth is [mentioned] in the smṛti texts; that which is contrary [to that]

that is impure; moreover –

6.2.7. purity obstructs impurity

corrupt speech and so forth [unlawful acts] is the [reason] because of which one who [is] absolutely pure [entity] is prohibited from [interacting with] an impure

[entity]

6.2.8. and [obstructs] other things [as well]347

and liquor for example, is that which is also impure because it is clearly prohibited; therefore, one should eat something which is pure; indeed

***6.2.9. ‘mundane elevation’ is not obtained from pure food [consumed] ***

by one who is unrestrained, because [he/she] lacks control

one who is un-restraint and devoid of specific ‘effort,’ even if it uses pure food accidentally, there will be no ‘elevation’, for in this case it lacks a specific moral intention; [objection] that is not so,

347 sūtra wishes to extend the discussion about things that are impure by comparison with pure things and acts.

184 * Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

6.2.10. vidyate cānarthāntaratvād yamasya

na prayatnavyatirekī yamaḥ prayatnābhāve sarvasyāḥ kriyāyā

abhāvāt vidyate śucimāhāramupayuñjānasya prayatnaḥ / yadi

prayatnaḥ pradhānaṃ vināpi yogādinābhyudayaḥ syāt / naitat,

6.2.11. asati cābhāvāt

asati yogādyanuṣṭhāne na prayatnamātrasya bhāvādabhyudayaḥ

kriyopadeśa vaiyarthyāt / idānīṃ niḥśreyasa hetuṃ dharmam āha -

6.2.12. sukhād rāgaḥ

stryādiviṣayajanitāt sukhād eva rāgo vardhate /

6.2.13. tanmayatvāt

yair yair asya sukhahetubhiḥ śarīraṃ bhāvitaṃ tanmaya ivāste /

tatastan mayatvād rāgaḥ / kiṃ ca,

6.2.14. tṛpteḥ

yadā tṛpto bhavati tadāsya tṛpti nimitto rāgo bhavati śarīrapuṣṭeḥ /

kiṃ ca,

6.2.15. adṛṣṭāt

apūrvadṛṣṭeṣvanupakārakeṣu ca kasyacid rāgo jāyate atrādṛṣṭa eva

kāraṇam / kiṃ ca,

Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 185

6.2.10. and there is a restraint which is known to have another meaning

restraint does not mean something dissimilar from ‘effort’; if ‘effort’ is absent from all activities, there will be absence of ‘effort’ in the case of a person using pure food; [objection] if ‘effort’ is so important, then there will be mundane elevation even without yoga and so forth; [response] no, this cannot be so:

***6.2.11. when this [yogic restraint] is absent [then] there is absence ***

of the ‘existential’ [mundane elevation] [as well]

in the absence of the performance of yoga and so forth [and] only by ‘effort’

there is no mundane elevation, because it is a worthless instructive activity; now

[Kaṇāda] explains ‘dharma’ which is conducive to absolute liberation.

6.2.12. [yogic restraint is important] because from ‘pleasure’ [arises] passion

passion is augmented from ‘pleasure’ only, and is produced from subjects such as women, and so forth;

6.2.13. because [passion] becomes identical with the object [of pleasure]

since one becomes identical with it [passion] due to causes [like] ‘pleasure,’

because the body is made of them [the qualities of pleasure] then, due to becoming identical, passion takes place; moreover,

6.2.14. [because the subject] is gratified

when one is satisfied because of a full-grown body there is passion from satisfaction; moreover,

6.2.15. [gratification] is due the ‘unseen force’

someone’s passion is produced from causes not previously seen and there the

‘unseen force’ causes [the ‘subtle self’] to be born again; moreover,

186 * Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

6.2.16. jātiviśeṣāc ca rāgaviśeṣaḥ

yathā tiraścāṃ tṛṇādibhojane evaṃ jātiviśeṣād api rāgaḥ /

sukhādibhyo rāgaḥ duḥkhādibhyo dveṣaḥ / tataḥ -

6.2.17. icchādveṣapūrvikā dharmādharmayoḥ pravṛttiḥ

icchāpūrvikā dharme pravṛttiḥ anyena dhanamadādabhibhūtasya

vā dveṣapūrvikāpi grāmakāmeṣṭy ādau / adharmepīcchā pūrvikā

paradārādiṣu dveṣa pūrvikā / evaṃ dharmādharmayoḥ sañcayaḥ /

yata evam /

6.2.18. tataḥ saṃyogo vibhāgaś ca

sañcitau yadā dharmādharmau bhavataḥ tadā śarīrendriyaiḥ

saṃyogo janmākhyo bhavati kṣīnayoś ca tayor maraṇakāle

viyogaḥ / punarapyābhyāṃ dharmādharmābhyāṃ śarīrādisaṃyogo

vibhāgaś cety evam anādir ayaṃ ghaṭīyantravad āvartate jantuḥ /

etad viparītakrameṇocyate tathā hi -

6.2.19. ātmakarmasu mokṣo vyākhyātaḥ

ātmeti manaḥ manaḥkarmasu tad abhāve

saṃyogābhāvoprādurbhāvaś ca sa mokṣa iti mokṣo vyākhyātaḥ /

// ṣaṣṭho’dhyāyaḥ //

348 ‘crawling beings eating grass’ (tiraścāṃ tṛṇādibhojane).

349 ‘icchādveṣapūrvikā dharmādharmayoḥ pravrttiḥ’ could be simply translated by ‘propensity towards dharma’ and adharma is preceded by ‘propensity’ and ‘antipathy’; in other words, whatever inner and uncontrolled inclinations one has determines the future of acts conducive to dharma and adharma.

350 ‘grāmakāmeṣṭyādau’ may refer to a man who desires to join the collective inhabitants of a place such as heaven, reachable after death.

351 the gloss describes the chain of causation from the external psychological level of emotions (‘volition’) down to dharma, which is an invisible entity of an ethical order that characterises both the entities, either mental, molecular, or atomic; reality has at least 3 levels: physical, psychological, and ethical (dharmic).

352 questions must be addressed further: Where is this accumulation stored? Where is its substratum? the mind? the ‘soul’?

Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 187

6.2.16. a particular passion arises [according to] its particular species

such as there are crawling beings348 eating grass and so forth, similarly there is passion [according to] a particularity of species also; and passion is because of

‘pleasure’ and so forth, ‘aversion’ is because of ‘pain’ and so forth, therefore –

***6.2.17. ‘volition’ and ‘aversion’ precede the propensity ***

towards ‘dharma’ and ‘adharma’349

‘volition’ precedes the propensity towards ‘dharma,’ and conversely, ‘aversion’

precedes the condition of being full of intoxication, but the one who overcomes

[these flaws] precedes the desire to attain the heavenly abode first by oblation;350

concerning someone infatuated with the wife of another, that [thought] has been preceded by a ‘volition’ as well as by adharma;351 hence, this is an accumulation

of ‘dharma’ and ‘adharma’;352 this is so, because,

6.2.18. from that [unseen force] there is ‘conjunction’ and ‘disjunction’

when there is accumulation of ‘dharma’ and ‘adharma,’ then there is ‘conjunction’ between flesh and senses, and that is called ‘birth-principle’ [janman], and when these [dharma and adharma] are reduced, the ‘disjunction’ [of body from senses] takes place at the time of death; moreover, the ‘being’353 is without begin-

ning and it returns like a [Persian] wheel of ‘water’-pots, and [because of dharma and adharma] there is ‘conjunction’ and ‘disjunction’ with body; this is explained in a reversed order, for example –

6.2.19. liberation is explained in relation to ‘motion’ [and] ‘soul’

the [word] ‘ātman’ refers to ‘mind,’354 [and] liberation is that [which is to be understood] in relation to mind motions, in the absence of ‘that,’355 in the absence of a connection [of these mentioned above], and in the ‘non-manifestation’ [of body]356 this is [how] liberation is explained;357

// the sixth chapter //

353 the being that returns must be the ‘subtle self,’ which is to be identified by the term

‘jantu’; it cannot be the ‘soul’ because soul lacks intrinsic capacity of motion.

354 contrary to what we might be tempted to translate, the commentator explains that

‘ātma’ does not refer to ‘soul’ in this gloss.

355 ‘tat’ refers to adṛṣṭa (tad abhāve), see VSc 5.2.20.

356 ‘aprādurbhāva’ (non-manifestation) of a new ‘biological subtle body’ (jantu).

357 the importance of such negations derives from being discussed in relation to mokṣa; the ‘motion in mind’ is a particularly vital factor here; as it is known, buddhi, which is a vaiśeṣikaguṇa, will not be a constitutive part of the state of mokṣa; it will eventually vanish, leaving the ātman completely blank, which is due to the dissolution of adṛṣṭa, which seems to have manoeuvred them until then.

188 * Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

7.1.

/ saptamasyādhyāyasya prathamam āhnikam /

idānīṃ rūpādīn āha -

7.1.1. uktā guṇāḥ

rūpādisūtreṇoddiṣṭā ity arthaḥ /

7.1.2. guṇalakṣaṇaṃ coktam

‘dravyāśrayī’ [ 1.1.15] ity ādinā dravyakarmabhyāṃ vaidharmyaṃ

kathitam ity arthaḥ /

7.1.3. idam evaṃ guṇam idam evaṃ guṇam iti co’ktam

tathā hy uktaṃ ‘rūparasagandhasparśavatī pṛthivī’ [2.1.1.] ityādi /

tatra -

***7.1.4. pṛthivyāṃ rūpa rasa gandha sparśā ***

dravyānityatvād anityāḥ

ghaṭādeḥ pārthivasya dravyasya vināśāt tad gatānām api rūpādīnāṃ

vināśa āśrayavināśāt /

7.1.5. agni saṃyogāc ca

agni saṃyogāc ca pārthiveṣu paramāṇuṣu rūpādīnāṃ vināśaḥ kārye

samavetānāṃ tvāśraya vināśād eva / paramāṇuṣvagnisaṃyogād eva

kutaḥ ?

358 see, for example, the list given in sūtra 1.1.5.

359 whether ‘because of connection with fire’ or ‘because connection and fire,’ it seems a debatable translation.

Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 189

Translation

/ the first lesson of the seventh chapter /

now, he explains ‘form-colour’ and so forth,

7.1.1. the qualities have been stated

the qualities intended by the sūtra358 are ‘form-colour’ and so forth, this is the

meaning [of the sūtra]

7.1.2. and the definition of qualities has been explained [too]

the meaning is designated in respect to the difference between [qualities], substances, and motions as stated by [the sūtra] ‘[qualities] have substance as a substratum’ [1.1.15]

***7.1.3. and [the definition] has been stated thus: ‘this quality ***

***here’ is ‘such present quality’ [hic et nunc] ***

[sūtra] has stated that ‘earth’ has ‘form-colour,’ ‘taste,’ ‘smell,’ ‘touch,’ and others as such; concerning this [Kaṇāda] says –

***7.1.4. ‘form-colour,’ ‘taste,’ ‘smell,’ and ‘touch’ are ***

***transitory [qualities] of ‘earth’ because of the ***

impermanence of [the concrete] substance

because the substratum is dissolvable, its ‘form-colour’ and so forth which are implied in [that substratum] are also dissolved, for example because substance-substratum is dissolved ‘pot’ [made] of ‘earth’ [is dissolved too].

***7.1.5. [impermanence of concrete substance] is ***

because of a conjunction with fire

destruction of ‘form-colour’ and so forth [which happens] in the atoms of ‘earth’

is because of the association with fire, 359 [and because] the inherent product disappears with its substratum too; 360 how is it that there is a connection of atoms with fire?

360 ‘inherence’ (samavāya) opposed to saṃyoga is supposed to explain a form of ‘occurrence’ (vṛtti), a ‘dependent occurrence’ of holes in their parts or of attributes in their substratum.

190 * Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

7.1.6. guṇāntaraprādurbhāvāt

yasmāc chyāmādiguṇebhyo vyatiriktaṃ guṇāntaram utpadyate

tataḥ pūrve paramāṇu guṇā vinaṣṭāḥ guṇavati guṇānārambhāt /

7.1.7. etena nityeṣvanityatvam uktam

etena guṇāntaraprādurbhāvena nityeṣu paramāṇuṣu rūpādīnām

anityatvam uktaṃ pārthiveṣveva / yataḥ -

7.1.8. apsu tejasi vāyau ca nityā dravyanityatvāt

salilānalānilaparamāṇuṣu rūpādayo nityāḥ āśrayanityatvāt virodhi

guṇāntarāprādurbhāvāc ca nāgnisaṃyogān vināśaḥ /

7.1.9. anityeṣvanityā dravyānityatvāt

anityeṣu salilādiṣu anityā rūpādaya āśrayavināśe teṣām api vināśāt /

7.1.10. kāraṇaguṇapūrvāḥ pṛthivyāṃ pākajāś ca

anityāyāṃ kāryarūpāyāṃ pṛthivyāṃ kāraṇaguṇapūrvā

rūpādayo jāyante nityāyāṃ tu paramāṇu svabhāvāyāṃ pākajāḥ

pākādagnisaṃyogāj jātāḥ /

361 qualities are permanent and by ‘manifestation’ of quality from another quality one may understand what seems to be the pīlupākavāda theory of qualities of atoms, whereby qualities are not destroyed but rather transformed as a result of a contact with fire.

362 alternative translation: ‘because from qualities such as black and so forth, different qualities are produced separately, therefore, earlier qualities of atom are destroyed, because something which has qualities cannot produce other qualities [simultaneously]’; what derives from this gloss is the capacity of production of new qualities successively, not simultaneously, and only after the previous ones have disappeared.

Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 191

***7.1.6. [the impermanence of qualities is] because the ***

qualities metamorphose into others361

because that from which there is production of blackness and other qualities and so forth is different from the production of other qualities;362 therefore, the previous qualities of atoms are destroyed, because a quality cannot be produced from that which possesses [the same] quality.

7.1.7. by this [metamorphosis] the impermanence363 *** ***

of the permanent364 *** is explained***

in this way, the production of other qualities in the permanent atoms [and] the impermanence of ‘colour’ and so forth has been stated in relation to ‘earth’

[atoms] only;365 because –

***7.1.8. for example ‘water,’ ‘lustre,’ and ‘air’ are ***

***permanent because the essence is permanent ***

because of the permanence of the substratum, the atoms of ‘water,’366 ‘lustre,’

‘air,’ and [their] ‘form-colour’ and so forth are permanent too, due to the non-production of conflicting qualities, [and] because there is no destruction due to a

‘conjunction’ with fire. 367

***7.1.9. [another example:] impermanence subsists in impermanent ***

[substances] due to substances’ impermanence368

in [substances] which are impermanent, ‘water’ and so forth, [qualities] such as

‘form-colour’ and so forth are impermanent too, because of being destroyed with the destruction of the [concrete] substance.

***7.1.10. and [those qualities produced] from heating the ***

‘earth’ are primarily qualities of cause

qualities such as ‘colour’ and so forth are produced in ‘earth’ which is impermanent when is in its ‘product form’, and these are preceded by the qualities of

[their] cause; in ‘earth’ which is permanent together with the atoms’ intrinsic nature, [their qualities] are produced from heat due to a ‘conjunction’ between fire and heating.

363 ‘impermanence’ (nitya) here refers to qualities.

364 sūtra indicates the permanence of ‘substance’ (dravya).

365 regarding the dissolution of form-colour in relation to its substratum (pot). see VSc 7.1.4.

366 ‘salila’ another term for ‘water,’ ‘liquid,’ ‘tears.’

367 the permanence of qualities is acknowledged.

368 alternative translation: when the substratum is destroyed, the qualities are destroyed too; when the permanent substances exist, the permanent qualities exist too.

192 * Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

***7.1.11. apsu tejasi vāyau ca kāraṇaguṇapūrvāḥ ***

pākajā na vidyante

kārye udakādhyāvayavini samavāyikāraṇarūpe

rūpādaya ārabhyante pākajās tu jalādyaṇuṣu naiva santi

virodhiguṇāntarābhāvāt /

***7.1.12. aguṇavato dravyasya guṇārambhāt ***

karmaguṇā aguṇāḥ

aguṇasya dravyasyaivotpannasya kāraṇaguṇairguṇā janyante

na guṇakarmaṇām aśeṣāvayava guṇaikārtha samavāyābhāvāt

karmatvavat /

7.1.13. etena pākajā vyākhyātāḥ

agnisaṃyogā nivṛtteṣu śyāmādiṣu pākajā jāyante iti te’pi

guṇarahite siddhāḥ / saṃyogavati saṃyogārambhavat guṇavati

pākajā iti cet, na,

7.1.14. eka dravyavattvāt

ekadravyavantaḥ pākajās te kathaṃ tatraivārabhyeran viruddhatvāt

saṃyogasya tu saṃyogavatyārambho na duṣyati anekadravyatvāt /

parimāṇam idānīṃ vakṣyāmaḥ -

369 originally a substance has no (specific) qualities, for qualities are produced afterwards (asatkāryavāda); nor does it have motions, which brings us to infer that the English translation of ‘dravya’ is closer to ‘essence’ rather than a ‘concrete thing.’

370 ‘motion’ (karman) has no qualities, such as a substance can have.

371 what could be the ‘subject-matter’ referred to here? the commentator says that subject-matter can be ‘undistinguished (aviśeṣa) from the qualities of the entire whole’; the answer may be drawn from the first line of the same gloss ‘qualities are produced due to the qualities of cause,’ which leaves us to infer that a substance has 2 sets

Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 193

***7.1.11. in ‘water’, ‘lustre,’ and ‘air’ there are no [other qualities] that ***

are produced from heating which are primarily qualities of cause

in ‘water,’ which is a composite product and whose nature is an inherent cause, qualities such as ‘colour’ and so forth are produced; but in the permanent [earth]

in its atomic structure, [the qualities] do not exist at all because there are no other opposite qualities [produced from heating] in the atoms of water.

***7.1.12. there are no qualities [other than] the qualities ***

***produced from substance, because the qualities ***

[produced] by motions are not qualities

qualities are produced due to the qualities of cause in relation to a substance which is produced without qualities369 and they are not produced from [other] qualities and motions, 370 due to the absence of co-existence whose subject-matter is one

and the same with the qualities of the whole [thing],371 just as motionness is.

7.1.13. this is how the cooked [qualities] are explained

when that which is produced from cooking such as blackness and so forth ceases to exist because of a connection with fire, then, those [products] are established to be devoid of quality; if you say that – just as connection is produced in something which has connection – qualities born out of cooking [of a substance which has qualities] are then produced from baking, then [the answer is] no,

7.1.14. because [qualities subsists] in one substantiality [only]372

if [the qualities] produced from heat are connected with one substance, [then the question is] how could they be produced since they are opposite [in nature]? the initiation of a ‘conjunction’ with a substance will not be a defective [argument]

because substance is many; 373 now we shall discuss ‘dimension’ –

of qualities, some ‘specific,’ others ‘generic’ (e.g. soul); when, however, it is said that originally a substance has no qualities, that must refer to its ‘specific qualities’

(vaiśeṣikaguṇa) which occur as a result of ‘motion’ and presumably under the impact of adṛṣṭa (karma theory).

372 there are 3 kinds of substantiality: essential-universal; accidental-particular; and the specific-genera (sāmānyaviśeṣa).

373 ‘contact’ (saṃyoga) takes place only among substances, whereas ‘inherence’

(samavāya) takes place between substances and qualities.

194 * Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

***7.1.15. aṇormahataś copalabdhyanupalabdhī ***

nitye vyākhyāte

‘nitye’ ityadhyāyanāma ‘yad upalabhyate tatrāvaśyaṃ mahattvam

aṇutve tu paramāṇu dvyaṇuka manasām anupalabdhiḥ’ evaṃ

nityākhye’dhyāye upalabdhyanupalabdhyoḥ kāraṇe mahattvāṇutve

kathite bhavataḥ upalabdhyau mahattvasya niyamāt / tryaṇukasya

mahattve ’pi anupalabdhiḥ /

***7.1.16. kāraṇabahutvāt kāraṇamahattvāt ***

pracayaviśeṣāc ca mahat

tryaṇuke tat kāraṇadvyaṇukagatā bahutvasaṃkhyā mahattvaṃ

janayati kāraṇānāmamahattvāt / dvyaṅgule kāraṇāṅguli mahattvaṃ

mahattvaṃ karoti / praśithilaḥ saṃyogaḥ pracayaḥ / dvitūlake

tūlapiṇḍayoḥ vartamānaḥ pracayaḥ svadhārāvayava praśithila

saṃyogāpekṣo mahattvamārabhate /

374 the question to which the gloss attempts an answer is the following: starting with which size is the perception of an entity possible? The atom cannot be perceived because it is too small, neither dyad, nor even ‘mind’ which is of the size of an atom; it appears that for Vaiśeṣikas, it is possible to perceive ‘soul’ through ‘awareness’ (see VSc 3.2.13) but not ‘mind’ which is too small – unless one is an advanced yogi.

375 ‘ordinary perception’ (pratyakṣa) is possible with things that can be ‘seen’ somehow, therefore the size of ‘boundless’ of an entity begins with triad upwards (such as the quality of ‘number’ applies to anything beyond ‘number two’; not with ‘zero’ or

‘one,’ which presumably are not numbers); the sentence ‘boundless and minuteness are causes’ shows once again that for Vaiśeṣika philosophy, ontology of qualities and substances precedes and is more important than epistemology.

376 the view that triad (tryaṇuka) is still un-graspable (VSc 4.1.8) differentiates Candrānanda from other Vaiśeṣika commentators, an observation upheld by both Isaacson and Priesendanz.

377 sūtra appears to acknowledge the difference between ‘multiplicity of causes’

(kāraṇabahutva) and ‘boundless of causes’ (kāraṇamahattva), one may point to a successive chain of causality, the other to its extension or capacity to form largeness or infinite extension of a collection of particularities (pracayaviśeṣa).

378 ‘accumulation of particularity’ is a very important concept in establishing the role of viśeṣa and antyaviśeṣa in relation to the knowledge of ‘universals’ (sāmānya); substances which are said to be vibhū, like ‘vacuum’ and ‘soul,’ include immanently in themselves a multitude of particularities (pracayaviśeṣa); the concept of ‘particularity’

is a constitutive part of universality, and that particularity is indirectly as infinite and large as the universal is; if particularity is separate from universal, or if for example,

Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 195

***7.1.15. comprehension and non-comprehension of ***

***minuteness and boundless [dimensions] are explained ***

in respect to the permanence [of things]

‘permanence’ is the name of a chapter; ‘that which is comprehended, that is definitely [of a certain] large [size],’ but in atoms however, there is no perception of one atom, a dyad and mind; 374 thus in the chapter called ‘nitya,’ boundless is

called permanent [and there] it is told that boundless and minuteness are causes for comprehensibility and incomprehensibility, because there is a rule of what boundless375 is regarding comprehensibility; concerning triad, although it is a

[type] of boundless, it is still, incomprehensible. 376

7.1.16. boundless is the accumulation of particularities,377 *** because ***

the substratum has multiplicity and is unlimited378

plurality of ‘number’ – which exists in the atomic dyad which is the cause in the atomic triad – produces the boundless due to the absence of unlimited causes;379

in a substance of the size of 2 fingers, the size of the finger is the cause which produces [the] great size; 380 ‘pracaya’ [accumulation] means ‘loose contact’;381

in a substance having 2 cotton balls, the accumulation of 2 lumps of cotton ball requires a ‘loose contact’ between the parts [whereby ‘accumulation’ or ‘loose contact’] is the substratum of their own [parts] which are ‘the boundless.’382

the ‘particular good’ is divorced from Common Good (the universal), the particular becomes finite and just as a lost entity in ‘space,’ it becomes an existential doomed to suspension, or extinction; such a particular cannot exist indefinitely without absorp-tion, because the infinity of ‘space,’ its ‘dimension,’ is related to the infinity of ‘time’;

‘time’ and ‘space’ being interrelated concepts, it follows that their particularity would no longer reside outside ‘time,’ but rather in ‘time’; yet, the ontological status of antyaviśeṣa, as that of other eternal substances is that of being a fundamentally ‘different,’ yet immanent part of ‘time.’

379 the commentator seems to doubt that causes can form ‘boundless,’ or ‘accumulation’; cause produces effect, and once the effect perishes cause perishes too.

380 ‘boundless’ (mahattva) takes shape as result of additions ranging from simple to complex, from one to many.

381 about ‘loose contact’ see Vādīndra’s polemical passage which argues for the real

‘nature’ (svarūpa) of the ‘ultimate particularities’ (antyaviśeṣa) VSv long version, p.

70: ‘viśeṣeṣu sattāṅagīkāre svarupahāniprāsaṅga iti cet – na sattāyā svarūpahānyā

saha vyāpti viraheṇa prasanṅgasya praśithilamūlatvāt; viśeṣeṣu sattāṅagīkāre viśeṣalakṣaṇa hāniḥ’; from this passage it follows that viśeṣa does not have sattā, but rather its existence is only ‘relative,’ ‘relational,’ and ‘dependent’ on something else, the substance; viśeṣa is a fuzzy concept that is very ‘loose’ (praśithila), and cannot exist independently.

382 ‘accumulation’ (pracaya) is a key concept for understanding the dilemma between

‘particular’ and ‘universal,’ between ultimately small (antyaviśeṣa) and the universal (sāmānya).

196 * Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

7.1.17. tad viparītam aṇu

etasmāt trikāraṇān mahato yad viparītaṃ dvyaṇuparimāṇaṃ tad

aṇu pratyetavyam /

7.1.18. aṇu mahad iti tasmin viśeṣābhāvād viśeṣabhāvāc ca

tasmin mahati vastuni kuvalādāvāmalakāpekṣayā aṇuvyavahāra

āmalake tu bilvāpekṣayā / evaṃ prakarṣasya bhāvābhāvābhyām

ekasminn evāṇu mahadvyavahāro bhāktaḥ / kutaḥ ?

7.1.19. eka kālatvāt

yata ekasmin neva kāle tasmin neva vastuni anyāpekṣayā dvau

puruṣau aṇu mahad vyavahāraṃ viruddhaṃ kurvāte ato jānīmahe

‘bhākto’yam’ iti / tatrāpekṣakāṇu vastuni /

7.1.20. dṛṣṭāntāc ca

yathā śuklatantujanite kārye śuklimaiva kṛṣṇatā evamato dṛṣṭāntād

mahadbhārabdhe mahattvam eva nāṇutvam /

383 if boundless is a ‘reality’ (the accumulation of parts) so also the minuteness (the many small parts that constitute great accumulation, e.g. antyaviśeṣa) is; Vaiśeṣika sees no contradiction between one and many, between universal and particular.

384 ‘kuvala’ (Ziziphus mauritiana) refers most probably to the jujube tree and its fruit, whose precise natural distribution is uncertain due to its extensive cultivation; its origin is thought to be in southern Asia (between Lebanon, northern India, and southern and central China).

385 ‘āmalaka’ (Emblica officinalis) may refer to the gooseberry fruit, a species of ribes (which includes currants); it is spread in India (where it is used in pickle), the Caucasus, and northern Africa; it has a symbolical value in Theravada Buddhism.

386 ‘bilva’ (Ægle marmelos) possibly ‘Bengal quince,’ known as the ‘golden apple,’ is a species of a tree native to the Indian subcontinent and Southeast Asia; it grows in

Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 197

7.1.17. minuteness is the reverse of that [boundless]383

it should be acknowledged that minuteness is of the dimension of a dyad [and] is that which is completely different from the 3 causes out of which boundless exists.

***7.1.18. minute and boundless, is that in which there ***

***is both manifestation of particularity as well ***

as non-manifestation of particularity

in boundless, there are things [contained] which are minute in respect to the arrangement of kuvala fruit384 by comparison with āmalaka fruit; 385 but āmalaka fruit is minute in comparison with bilva fruit; 386 thus, because of the [relative]

presence and absence in one and the same substance, the designation of ‘minute’

and ‘great’ has a relative [metaphorical value]; from where did [you derive such an assertion]?

7.1.19. [for example] the oneness of ‘time’ [has units and oneness]387

since, at one and the same time, 2 men arrange the same thing to be small and large in relation to another thing, therefore we know [the sentence] ‘this is metaphorical’; 388 in respect to the minute [thing] this [is decided] by mutual comparison.

7.1.20. [minute and boundless are proved] also from analogy

just as there is whiteness only in a product made of white threads, and not blackness, similarly, from this exemplification, [we say that] boundless is generated only from a great size, and not from minuteness.

India, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Malesia as a naturalised species, and it is a tree considered sacred by Hindus.

387 alternative translation: ‘because one and the same thing can be minute and large at the same “time”’; everything can be large and small when it is compared with the size of other things, both of which are an aspect of oneness; a small and a big thing, minuteness and largeness, can be simultaneous; but ‘time’ is not simultaneous, for as we shall see, it is a sum of units, only; it is conceived as a succession of minute points which together form the extended infinite and eternal ‘time’ which is metaphorically expressed; the main subject in this sūtra is not ‘time,’ but the fruit discussed in the previous gloss.

388 in other words, oneness of time is to be taken ‘metaphorically.’

198 * Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

***7.1.21. aṇutvamahattvayor aṇutvamahattvābhāvaḥ ***

karmaguṇair vyākhyātaḥ

yathā guṇakarmāṇi nirguṇāni kāryasyarūpāder avayavaguṇair

ekārthasamavāyābhāvāt evaṃ kāraṇabahutvādibhir

ekārthasamavāyābhāvād aṇutvamahattvayos tad abhāvaḥ /

7.1.22. aṇutvamahattvābhyāṃ karmaguṇāḥ aguṇāḥ

kāraṇabahutvādibhir ekārthasamavāyābhāvād

aṇutvamahattve yathā aṇutvamahattvaśūnye evaṃ karmaguṇā

aṇutvamahattvaśūnyāḥ /

7.1.23. etena dīrghatva hrasvatve vyākhyāte

upalabdhyanupalabdhī mahattvāṇutvavat / kāraṇa mahattvādibhyaś

ca jāyate dīrghatvaṃ viparītaṃ hrasvatvaṃ tasmin viśeṣābhāvāt

ity aupacārikatvam tathaiva / tayor dīrghatvahrasvatvābhāva ity

atideśaḥ /

7.1.24. karmabhiḥ karmāṇi guṇair guṇāḥ

yathā kāraṇa bahutvādy ekārthasamavāyābhāvād

aṇutvamahattvaśūnyāḥ evaṃ dīrghahrasvatvaśūnyāḥ ete

karmaguṇāḥ /

389 if there is absence of ‘minuteness’ and ‘boundless’ in the parts, then there is absence of ‘minuteness’ and ‘boundless’ in the ‘whole’ (oneness); whatever exists in parts, that is also present in the ‘whole’; Indian philosophy overcomes the Greek philosophical dilemma between parts and whole, logos-logos, addressed from very early by Anaximander.

390 ‘has, have’ is translated when we have the bahuvrīhi compound; but when we have the tatpuruṣa compound we translate by ‘is, are’; as Professor Thite clarifies, in the Vedic texts, there are accents, and with the help of such accents one can decide whether a word is a tatpuruṣa compound or bahuvrīhi; the ‘udātta’ accent, for instance, is not shown by any marks in Sanskrit, but in the Romanised texts, it is marked with a sign of a single apostrophe; in a tatpuruṣa compound, the accent stays on the second part of the compound but in the bahuvrīhi compound the accent stays on the first part of the compound (see Aufrecht’s edition of Rig Veda).

Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 199

***7.1.21. when minute and great [things] do not have minuteness, and ***

boundless, [they] are explained by way of motions and qualities

just as qualities and motions which are devoid of qualities due to the absence of the co-existence of oneness in qualities of parts such as ‘colour’ and so forth, in a similar manner, there is [an] absence of minuteness and largeness in [the] plurality of causes and so forth due to the absence of [their] inherence in the nature of

oneness.389

***7.1.22. minuteness and boundless [explain] that motions ***

and qualities have no390 [other] qualities

just as because of the plurality of causes and so forth [and] due to the absence of co-existence in one and the same thing, there is absence of minuteness and boundless, in a similar manner the quality of motion391 is devoid of minuteness and boundless.

7.1.23. in this way, [Kaṇāda] explains shortness and lengthiness

comprehension and non-comprehension are [explained] like minuteness and boundless; the lengthiness is produced from unlimited causes and so forth, shortness is [just] the reversal of that; therefore, this figurative usage is due to an existential particularity;392 concerning the absence of shortness and lengthiness there is an extension [of the same rule of application].

7.1.24. motions are [devoid of ‘x’]393 *** because of motions, ***

qualities are [devoid of ‘y’]394 *** because of qualities***

just as motions are devoid of minuteness and boundless due to the absence of the co-

existence of oneness in the multiplicity of causes,395 in the same way, the qualities of motions are devoid of shortness and lengthiness; these are the qualities of motions.

391 as in the preceding gloss 7.1.21, Candrānanda speaks of karmaguṇa, or guṇakarmani; earlier we mentioned that motions do not have qualities.

392 ‘viśeṣabhāva’ may be the ultimate existential (antyaviśeṣa) in the system’s theory of individuation, which ‘measures’ both the intervals as well as the sizes of things.

393 ‘devoid’ of minuteness and boundless; this sūtra must be read in relation to 7.1.22.

394 devoid of shortness and lengthiness; this sūtra must be read as a continuation of 7.1.22.

395 ‘absence of the inherence of oneness in the multiplicity of causes’ indicates that inherence is a different concept from the connection between ‘units’ out of which ‘multiplicity’ is made; it may well be the case that ‘oneness’ is not one and the same concept as ‘unit.’

200 * Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

7.1.25. tad anitye’nityam

etac caturvidhaṃ parimāṇaṃ anitye vartamānatvād anityam /

kiṃ tu -

7.1.26. nityaṃ parimaṇḍalaṃ

paramāṇu parimāṇaṃ parimaṇḍalaṃ tan nityaṃ / tasya -

7.1.27. avidyā vidyāliṅgam

parimāṇarahitasya dravyasyāsambhavaḥ paramāṇūnāṃ paramāṇu

parimāṇasya sambhave liṅgaṃ / ‘avidyā’ asambhavaḥ, sambhavo

‘vidyā’ /

7.1.28. vibhavād mahānākāśaḥ

vibhavād mūrtadravyaiḥ samāgatair gacchataḥ saṃyogāt

paramamahattvam ākāśasyāst īti gamyate /

7.1.29. tathātmā

ākāśam ivātmāpi paramamahān draṣṭavyaḥ / asamāsād dikkālāvapi

mahāntau /

396 the 4 dimensions (caturvidhaṃ parimāṇaṃ) are ‘minuteness’ (aṇutva), ‘largeness’

(mahattva), ‘lengthiness’ (dīrghatva), and ‘shortness’ (hrasvatva).

397 the gloss clarifies that shortness and lengthiness refer to the fixed dimension of things and should not be confused with other qualities such as ‘number.’

398 atoms are said to be globular (or spherical) but form a ‘continuum’ of a whole all-pervasive substance seen as a collection of minute entities; a comparable view that began with speculations from Aristotle’s Physics (232b20) was professed at Oxford in the 13th century but rejected as heretical by the Paris Condemnations in 1277.

399 the view according to whatever is globular is eternal derived from the definition about the composition of a substance; whatever has parts [or corners] is dissolvable; a globular object not only cannot have parts, but also by not having corners, it cannot ‘cling’

to something; the view that globular things must be eternal can also be encountered in classical Greek philosophy.

Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 201

7.1.25. that [4-fold dimension]396 *** is impermanent ***

in impermanent [substances]

[the] 4-fold dimension is impermanent because it exists in continuous sub-

stances;397 however –

7.1.26. globular [dimension] is eternal398

dimension of atom is globular, [thus] it is eternal;399 regarding this –

7.1.27. ignorance is the logical mark of ‘valid knowledge’400

that [entity] devoid of ‘dimension,’ the manifestation of a substance devoid of dimension, is the inferential mark for the existence of an atomic ‘dimension’;

‘avidyā’ refers to the impossibility [of measuring the atom] and ‘vidyā’ refers to

[the] ‘possibility’ [of measurement].401

7.1.28. because of [its] omnipresence402 ‘vacuum’ is very large

because of ‘conjunction,’ omnipresence is from the coming together [and] from

‘disjunction’ between coagulating substances, [thus] ‘vacuum’ is understood to have extreme great size.

7.1.29. ‘soul’ is similar [very large]

since ‘soul’ resembles ‘vacuum’ [in dimension], it should be seen as extremely great [too];403 the ‘space’ and ‘time’ are great also, even though they are not [mentioned] jointly.

400 sūtra draws a sharp distinction between ‘ontological knowledge’ and ‘logical knowledge’; the latter is based on ‘inferential marks’ (liṅga) and seems to have a lesser importance than ontological knowledge.

401 the impossibility of the existence of a substance having no measurement is the mark of the possibility [of the measurement of the atom]; ‘saṃbhava’ is translated with

‘experience-perception’ because of the compound sam (with) + ‘bhāva’ (existential), as well as because the whole gloss refers to the epistemology of the atomic dimension; this is possible (saṃbhava) only in advanced forms of knowledge.

402 there is a difference between infinity and magnitude, for Vaiśeṣika seems to differentiate between vibhava and mahat.

403 that ‘soul’ is omnipresent is only a conjecture from VS 7.1.28–29.

202 * Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

7.1.30. tad abhāvād aṇu manaḥ

vibhavasyābhāvād manasoṇutvaṃ jñānāyaugapadyāc ca /

7.1.31. guṇair dig vyākhyātā

yatra yatrāvadhiṃ karoti tatratatra ‘idam asmāt pūrveṇa’ ityādi

vyavahāro mūrteṣu pravartate ato mūrtasaṃyogākhyairguṇair dig

vyākhyātā mahattvavatī / tathā -

7.1.32. kāraṇena kāla iti

yena kāraṇena parāparavyatikarādinā kālonumīyate tasya sarvatra

bhāvāt tenaiva kāraṇena kālo vibhur vyākhyātaḥ /

// saptamasyādyam āhnikam //

7.2.

/ saptamasyādhyāyasya dvitīayam āhnikam /

idānīṃ saṃkhyādīn upakramate bhedavyavahārahetuḥ saṃkhyā

sādhunā rūpādi vyatiriktety etad artham āha -

404 as elsewhere in this commentary ‘bhāva’ has been translated with ‘existential’ and

‘entity.’

405 the explanation of mind as atomic leads to another speculation (possibly from the side of yogis), namely that thinking is generally a successive, not simultaneous process; the argument Candrānanda puts forward is based on sheer logics; because mind is atomic, it cannot be in 2 places at the same time, nor simultaneous; these latter characteristics belong to substances that are all-pervasive (time-space, soul, and vacuum).

Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 203

***7.1.30. but ‘mind’, because of the absence of that ***

[omnipresence],404 *** is atomic***

and due to the absence of all-pervasiveness, ‘mind’ is atomic [in dimension]

which explains why it cannot cognise simultaneously. 405

7.1.31. by means of qualities, ‘space’ is explained

whenever one makes a limitation, there is an arrangement [as expressed in the sentences] ‘east [of that], from this to that limit,’ therefore ‘space’ is explained regarding concrete things, therefore ‘space’ is explained as possessed by largeness because the qualities are named in connection with concrete substances; therefore,

7.1.32. [with space] ‘time’ is explained by the causal [principle]406

by means of a causality, which is the alternative causality between far and near

[time], ‘time’ is inferred because of its existence everywhere,407 [thus] by such

[reasoning] ‘time’ is explained as all-pervasive.

// the first lesson of the seventh chapter //

Translation

//the second lesson of the seventh chapter //

now, concerning the succession of numbering, this represents the proof for the differential arrangement of [qualities] ‘number’ and so forth,408 due to their separate nature from [other] qualities ‘colour’ and so forth, for which purpose, [he] says –

406 the principle of causality or ‘consequentiality’ is followed by both ‘time’ and ‘space,’

as well as ‘mind.’

407 time inferred from ‘existence everywhere’ shows that ‘time’ is similar to ‘space’ and has an implied spatial or locative value as well.

408 Vaiśeṣika is a ‘philosophy of difference and particularity,’ so number plays a major role in demonstrating the differential nature of reality and its constituents.

204 * Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

***7.2.1. rūparasagandhasparśavyatirekād ***

arthāntaram ekatvaṃ tathā pṛthaktvam

‘ekoyam’ ityādi pratyayo na rūpādinimittaḥ tat pratyaya

vilakṣaṇatvāt / rūpādi nimitte hi ‘rūpavān’ ityādi

pratyayaḥ syāt / tasmād arthāntara nimittaḥ / ekatvaika

pṛthaktve kāryeṣu kāraṇaguṇapūrve / dvitvāderekatvebhyo

nekaviṣayabuddhisahitebhyo niṣpattiḥ / tathaiva dvipṛthaktvādeḥ

pṛthaktvebyaḥ kiṃ tu ekapṛthaktvadhyāparasāmānyabhāvaḥ /

***7.2.2. tayor nityatvānityatve tejaso ***

rūpasparśābhyāṃ vyākhyāte

yathā dravyanityatvāt tejaḥ paramāṇurūpasparśau nityau evam

ekatvaika pṛthaktve nityadravyavartinī nitye yathā ca anitye tejasi

dravyānityatvād nityau rūpa sparśau tathaiva kāryavartinī anitye

ekatvaika pṛthaktve /

7.2.3. niṣpattiś ca

yatha ca tejasi kārye kāraṇa guṇa pūrvāṃ rūpasparśyorūtpattir

evamekatva pṛthaktvayoḥ / evaṃ gurutva dravatva snehānāṃ /

evam ekatva -

409 pṛthaktva is one of the generic qualities of ‘soul,’ ‘time,’ and ‘space’; like the categories of sāmānya and viśeṣa – being correspondent to each other – pṛthaktva (separateness) and ekatva (oneness) should be analysed in mutual correspondence.

410 dvitva (reduplication or separateness) accounts for the infinite division of things belonging to the same class (genera), and in this respect one can say that a substance, as well as being a produced effect can be multiplied ad infinitum, remaining thus, from an ontological point of view, both one and many, both identical and separated; it is in this way that ‘soul,’ ‘time,’ and ‘space’ subsist in their abstract yet essential ontological realm.

411 this is an important passage as it further elucidates what ‘sāmānya bhāva’ is in relation to the reality of particularity and universality, which both have an infinite extension,

Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 205

7.2.1. another category is ‘oneness,’ which like ‘distinctness,’409 *** is ***

***a different subject-matter [having] a distinct nature [other ***

than the nature of] ‘form-colour,’ ‘taste,’ ‘smell,’ ‘touch.’

‘form-colour’ is not the cause for the conceptualisation of ‘this is the same’

because conceptualisation varies in character; it is true that ‘colour’ might cause the conceptualisation of [statements like] ‘that possesses a ‘colour’ and so forth; but this rationalisation refers to another subject-matter; ‘oneness’ and ‘distinctness’ are qualities which precede [each other], such as the effects are [preceded]

by causes; production is [thus] the cognition of many objects, due to the ‘uniqueness’ and the reduplication of ‘distinctness’; 410 similarly, due to ‘distinctness’

there exists [as a result] reduplication, however, the ‘universal’ is not something different from ‘oneness’ and ‘distinctness.’411

7.2.2. from them [oneness and separateness]412 *** permanence ***

***and impermanence of ‘lustre’ are explained by ***

[the simile of] ‘form-colour’ and ‘touch.’

just as there is permanence of substance, the ‘form-colour’ and ‘touch’ of ‘lustre’-

atoms are permanent,413 similarly the oneness and ‘distinctness’ are permanent too, if they exist in eternal substances; and to give an example, when ‘lustre’ is not a permanent substance, because its touch and ‘form-colour’ are not permanent, so also the singularity of oneness and ‘distinctness’ are not permanent when they subsist in an effect-product. 414

7.2.3. and [likewise] production [is explained]415

for instance, the effects of lustre [emerge] like qualities are preceded by causes because ‘distinctness’ and oneness produce [the experience of] ‘touch’ and ‘form-colour’; thus is [also the case] with ‘weight,’ ‘fluidity,’ [and] ‘viscosity.’

reality, and permanence, whereby particularity being a universal as the universality, and universal being as specific as particularity.

412 alternatively: oneness and separateness.

413 when in Vaiśeṣika we have the mahābhūtas which are said to be impermanent, this transitory character applies only to the concrete form of mahābhūtas, however, the atoms constituting these mahābhūtas are permanent; so ultimately, substance is impermeant or eternal, even though it suffers modification and change.

414 the impermanence refers, therefore, to the nature of the effect and products to subsist ontological change (pīlupākavāda).

415 this sūtra should be read as a continuation of 7.2.2.

206 * Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

***7.2.4. ekatva pṛthaktvayor ekatva pṛthaktvābhāvoṇutva ***

mahattvābhyāṃ vyākhyātaḥ

ekatvapṛthaktvyor avayava guṇaikārtha samavāyābhāvād naikatva

pṛthakte sta ity arthaḥ /

7.2.5. karmabhiḥ karmāṇi guṇair guṇāḥ

tathivāvayava guṇaikārtha samavāyābhāvāt karmaguṇā naikatva

pṛthaktvavantaḥ / nanu sarveṣām eva padārthānām ekatvaṃ sad

aviśeṣāt /

***7.2.6. niḥsaṃkhyatvāt karmaguṇānāṃ ***

sarvaikatvaṃ na vidyate

karmaṇāṃ guṇānāṃ ca saṃkhyārahitatvāt sarvaikatvaṃ nāivāsti /

bhāktam ekatvaṃ guṇādiṣv iti cet,

7.2.7. ekatvasyābhāvād bhāktaṃ na vidyate

mukhyasyaikatvasyābhāvād guṇādiṣu bhāktaṃ yad ekatvaṃ

kalpyate tad bhavata ekatvasiddhau na paryāpnoti ‘dravyeṣu

mukhyaṃ guṇeṣu bhāktam’ ityata eva bheda prasaṅgāt / nanu

kāryakāraṇayor ekatvaṃ prāptaṃ dravye saṃkhyānirviśeṣāt

ekatvābhāvād eva pṛthaktvabhāvaḥ syāt / naitat,

416 sūtra tries to avoid infinite regress, because if ‘oneness’ and ‘distinctness’ were derived from each other, the ontological knowledge (which usually acknowledges a substratum) would no longer be a valid ground for demonstration.

417 in other words, motions and qualities do not possess other qualities (such as separateness and oneness) for otherwise they would lead to infinite regress, and the ontological nature and definition of qualities would be lost.

418 possibly here a refutation of a Vedānta position.

Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 207

***7.2.4. the absence of‘distinctness’ and ‘oneness’ in a ***

***[another] distinctness’ ‘and ‘oneness’ demonstrates ***

the [reality] of ‘minuteness’ and ‘largeness’416

correspondingly, there is no ‘oneness’ and ‘distinctness’ [in another oneness and ‘distinctness’] due to the absence of co-existence of one and the same subject-matter in the qualities, and in the constitution of oneness and ‘distinctness’

[respectively], this is the meaning [of this sūtra].

7.2.5. motions [are explained] through motions, qualities through qualities417

likewise [if you say that] because of the absence of [motions], the qualities of motions do not have ‘oneness’ and ‘distinctness’ inherent in one and the same object and its qualities; [objection] this is not so, because that is like with all categories, [for] oneness is when there is absence of particularity.

***7.2.6. oneness does not exist in all things418 because ***

qualities and motions are innumerable419

[if you say] that because motions and qualities are numberless, oneness subsists in all [categories], then this is not so; [but] if you say that qualities and so forth are metaphorically one, [then Kaṇāda says this]

***7.2.7. if420 oneness does not exist, metaphorical ***

existence does not exist [either]

if ‘oneness’ does not exist first and foremost [in the substance], then that oneness will be imagined to be metaphorical in qualities, but [to say] that oneness suffices to be established as a real entity,421 this is simply undesirable, because the difference [between substance and quality] is from a different passage: ‘[oneness] exists first in the substances and secondarily in the qualities’; [objection] now, if there is oneness of cause and effect because substances are numberless, [it follows that]

owing the absence of oneness only, there will be difference [in substances]; but this cannot be so [because]

419 as mentioned, ‘vacuum,’ ‘space,’ ‘time,’ and ‘soul’ are devoid of motion (VSc 5.2.23), and ‘soul,’ for instance, can exist in the soteriological state as deprived of specific qualities.

420 the beginning of the sentence can be translated with the ablative (pañcamī vibhakti), namely ‘because,’ ‘since,’ and ‘if.’

421 ‘there will be only difference’ (between oneness of substances and oneness of qualities).

208 * Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

7.2.8. kāryakāraṇaikatvapṛthaktvabhāvabhā

vād ekatva pṛthaktve na vidyate

dvitvāt kāryakāraṇayor naikatvaṃ kāryasya

kāraṇavyatiriktāśrayābhāvād nāpi pṛthaktvam /

7.2.9. etad anityanityayor vyākhyātaṃ

etat pūrvasūtram anityaviṣayam api nityeṣvākāśādiṣu

yathāsaṃbhavaṃ vyākhyātaṃ boddhavyam / tathā hi śabdākāśayoḥ

kāryakāraṇayor naikatvaṃ nāpi pṛthaktvam /

***7.2.10. anyatarakarmaja ubhayakarmajaḥ ***

saṃyogajaś ca saṃyogaḥ

anyatarakarmajaḥ saṃyogaḥ śyenasyopasarpaṇakarmaṇā sthāṇunā

/ mallayor upasarpaṇād ubhayajaḥ / saṃyogajaḥ kāraṇākāraṇayoḥ

saṃyogāt kāryākāryagataḥ yathāṅgulyākāśa saṃyogābhyāṃ

dvyaṅgulākāśa saṃyogaḥ /

7.2.11. etena vibhāgo vyākhyātaḥ

anyatarakarmajo vibhāgaḥ śyenasyāpasarpaṇāt / ubhayakarmajo

meṣayor apasarpaṇāt / vibhāgajas tu aṅgulyor anyonya vibhāgāt

vinaṣṭamātre dvyaṅguleṅgulyākāśavibhāgaḥ kāraṇākāraṇayor vā

hasta ākāśayor vibhāgāc charīrākāśa vibhāgaḥ /

422 ‘oneness’ and ‘distinctness’ do not characterise perishable effect-products; they seem to characterise essences, and substances that have a permanent nature, however abstract these may be; thus, we may say giving that ‘time-space’ and ‘soul’ possess

‘oneness’ and ‘distinctness,’ they possess as a result an all-pervasive nature that can show them to be one and many at the same time.

423 ‘causality’ and ‘substance’ are the most fundamental philosophical concepts in Vaiśeṣika.

Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 209

***7.2.8. if there is no oneness and ‘distinctness’ in cause and effect, ***

there is no ‘oneness’ and ‘distinctness’ [separately either]

because of the dichotomy of cause and effect, there is no oneness of effect [product] and there is no ‘distinctness’ either, due to the absence of substratum other than the cause. 422

***7.2.9. this has been explained in regard to both ***

permanence and impermanence

although the subject-matter of the previous sūtra is the impermanent thing, this should be understood as explained in regard to permanent [substances] such as

‘vacuum’ and so forth, in accordance with the potentiality [of its existence]; for example, between ‘vacuum’ and ‘sound,’ which are cause and effect, there is neither oneness nor ‘distinctness.’

***7.2.10. ‘conjunction’ is produced from one of the motions, ***

both motions, and from a ‘conjunction’

‘conjunction’ is produced from the motion of 1 of the 2 [entities]: the falcon’s activity of approaching a pillar; [or] when 2 wrestlers come together [for a fight];

‘conjunction’ is produced from [either] the 2 causes, [or] derived from a relation between an effect with non-effect,423 as for instance, when there is ‘conjunction’

of 2 fingers with the ‘vacuum-space’424 because of the 2 fingers’ ‘conjunctions’

with ‘vacuum.’

7.2.11. in this way ‘disjunction’425 *** is explained***

‘disjunction’ is produced from the motions of the 2 [entities]: that of a falcon when takes off [from the pillar]; [‘disjunction’] is produced from both motions of sheep departing [from each other]; but [the ‘disjunction’] produced from separation takes place when [for instance] 2 fingers are separated from each other

[or] when the ‘vacuum-space’ between 2 fingers is obliterated, [and] there is a separation of the space between 2 fingers, through either cause or non-cause, for example, from the separation of the vacuum in hand there is separation of body-

fingers in ‘vacuum.’426

424 ākāśa (elsewhere translated as ‘vacuum’) should not be confused with ‘space’ (diś), elsewhere translated as ‘direction.’

425 as in other glosses, we have translated ‘vibhāga’ as ‘separation’ and ‘disjunction’

interchangeably.

426 VSc 7.2.11 contains 3 types of ‘disjunction’: when a thing goes away; when both things separate; and when there is a ‘disjunction’ there is another ‘disjunction.’

210 * Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

***7.2.12. saṃyogavibhāgayoḥ saṃyogavibhāga abhāva ***

aṇutvamahattvābhyāṃ vyākhyātaḥ

yutasiddhyabhāvān na tau staḥ ity arthaḥ /

7.2.13. karmabhiḥ karmāṇi guṇair guṇāḥ

yutasiddhyabhāvān na saṃyoga vibhāgavanta ity arthaḥ /

***7.2.14. yutasiddhyabhāvāt kāryakāraṇayoḥ ***

saṃyogavibhāgau na vidyete

kāryakāraṇayoḥ paraspareṇa saṃyogavibhāgau na vidyete yathā

ghaṭakapālayoḥ yutasiddhyabhāvāt / yutasiddhirdvayor anyatarasya

vā pṛtag gatimattvam sā ca nityayoḥ yutāśrayasamavetatvaṃ

cānityayoḥ yathā ghaṭapaṭayoḥ tvagindriyapārthivaśarīrayoś ca

/ na ca ghaṭakapālayoḥ yutāśrayasamavāyaḥ ghaṭasya teṣveva

samavetatvāt / śabdasyārthena saṃbandha iti cet, na,

7.2.15. guṇatvāt

ākāśasya guṇatvāc ca śabdo nārthena saṃbadhyate /

427 as with other glosses, here ‘saṃyoga’ has been translated as ‘contact’ and conjunction’ interchangeably.

428 ‘largeness’ which is a form of universal is explained as not having ‘disjunction.’

429 the sūtra is translated negatively by Ganesh Thite: ‘motions have no motions; qualities have no qualities.’

430 Thite says that effect can exist without cause, after the cause disappears; the sūtra aims to prove the independent ontological reality of ‘contact’ and ‘separation’ without appealing to logical inference.

Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 211

7.2.12. absence of ‘conjunction’427 *** and ‘disjunction’ in ***

***[another] ‘conjunction’ and ‘disjunction’ are ***

explained by minuteness and boundless428

the meaning of this [sūtra] is not that the condition of these 2 exist because of an absence of combinations.

7.2.13. motions are [explained] by motions, qualities by qualities429

the meaning of this sūtra is this: because there is absence of combination, these

[motions and qualities] do not have ‘conjunction’ and ‘disjunction’

***7.2.14. ‘conjunction’ and ‘disjunction’ of cause and effect ***

do not exist when there is no combination430

the mutuality of ‘conjunction’ and ‘disjunction’ of cause and effect does not exist as in, for instance, between pot and potsherds, because of the absence of a pre-established combination; [a] pre-established combination means to have a separate moment of both, or one of the two, and that [separate moment] exists inherent in the combined permanent substances as well as impermanent substances, as, for instance, between a pot and cloth [on the one hand], and in the touch of the skin with earthly bodies [on the other hand]; there is no co-existence in the combination of pot and potsherds without inherence with the substratum, because pot is indeed inherent in these [potsherds];431 if you say that there is an [inherent] rela-

tion between word and meaning, then [the answer is] no,432

7.2.15. because [sound] is a quality [of vacuum]433

sound is not eternally joined with meaning, because it is [only] a quality of

‘vacuum.’

431 the gloss refers to the difference between yutasiddha and samavāya; it is a clear distinction between a combination of entities, and inherence between 2 concepts; see the saṃyoga and samavāya distinction.

432 Vaiśeṣika does not approve of the view according to which ‘meaning’ is intimately attached to the sound-word, for it wishes to stick to its own asatkāryavāda theory that words are ‘new’ and therefore language is always conventional not eternal, or pre-existent as the Mīmāṃsākas would acknowledge.

433 quality has no relation of combination with the substance; it can only inhere; ‘qualitiness’ (guṇatva) – which is used in the sūtra – is the state of having a quality, not only of being a quality.

212 * Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

7.2.16. guṇe ca bhāṣyate

guṇe ca rūpaṃ rasa ityādiṣu prayujyate kriyāyāṃ ca na ca

guṇakarmaṇāṃ guṇaiḥ saṃbandhaḥ /

7.2.17. niṣkriyatvāt

arthasaṃyoge sati śabdorthaṃ prāpnuyāt niṣkriyatvāc ca guṇasya

gamanābhāvaḥ /

7.2.18. asati nāst īti ca prayogāt

arthasaṃyoge sati śabdaḥ asati abhāve nāsti īti na prayujyeta / na

hyasatā saṃyogaḥ / tasmāt saṃyogasyābhāvāt /

7.2.19. śabdārthāv asaṃbaddhau

nanu ca -

7.2.20. saṃyogino daṇḍāt samavāyino viṣāṇāc ca

saṃyogisamavāyibhyāṃ daṇḍaviṣāṇābhyāṃ daṇḍiviṣāṇinoḥ

pratyayo dṛṣṭaḥ / asti ca śabdādartha pratyayaḥ tasmād asyāpi

sambandho’st īti / naitat,

434 for a reminder of the list of qualities, see VSc 1.1.5.

435 once again, there is a difference between prayujate (to set in movement) and saṃbandha (connection); this gloss tells us about the relationship between motion and qualities.

436 the previous gloss 7.2.14 speaks of a prayujate (plunging) with motions and effects, but this sūtra seems to contradict it.

437 the system reaffirms its commitment to realism; real connections cannot be made with mere concepts or to non-extant things; saṃyoga – the term used here – is referring only to the relation between real existentials.

Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 213

7.2.16. and about quality [and its relation] that has been explained

regarding quality, ‘form-colour,’ ‘taste,’ and so forth434 [these] are connected with the effect-activities too, but there is no [intimate] bond of qualities and motions

with [such] quality.435

7.2.17. and because [qualities] are devoid of activity436

if there were ‘conjunction’ between ‘word’ with ‘meaning,’ sound would reach the meaning, [but] since meaning is inactive, the quality [sound] cannot move

[either].

***7.2.18. because of the expression ‘does not exist,’ ***

[sound] does not subsists [in vacuum]

if there were a ‘conjunction’ between ‘sound’ and ‘meaning,’ then the word would not be used with regard to ‘asat’ [non-extant] in [sentences such as] ‘nāsti’ [for]

there cannot be any ‘conjunction’ with ‘asat’ [non-extant]; 437 therefore, it is [so]

because of the absence of ‘conjunction’ [between sound and meaning] -

7.2.19. ‘sound’ and meaning do not subsist [in each other]438

and now [the counter-objection is the following]439

***7.2.20. [due to the relation] of a stick which is in ‘conjunction,’ ***

and due to the horn inherent [in the animal]

stick and horn which are in ‘conjunction’ or inherent with both the possessor of stick and the possessor of horn, 440 this is visibly experienced; there is knowledge of meaning from sound, therefore, there must also be a contact with it [meaning];

[response] this is not so,

438 ‘artha’ within Vaiśeṣika’s realistic framework refers to ‘object’ and ‘meaning’ as well.

439 there is no gloss offered here by Candrānanda, and for the same sūtra Vādīndra glosses this only: ‘tasmād iti śeṣaḥ’ (‘therefore this the remaining part’ may indicate that the commentator drew a final conclusion here, namely that language is not eternal, but only conventional, as the sūtra settled it).

440 this is an objection contrary to Vaiśeṣika’s theory of language that does not see an intimate relation between ‘meaning’ and ‘sound.’

214 * Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

7.2.21. dṛṣṭatvād hetuḥ pratyayaḥ

daṇḍiviṣāṇinor ādṛṣṭatvād adoṣaḥ iha tu śabdārthayoḥ

sambandhasyoktanyāyen ādṛṣṭatvād hetur arthapratyayaḥ

saṃbandhe /

7.2.22. tathā pratyayābhāvaḥ

yadi śabdorthena saṃbaddhaḥ syādgṛhītasaṅketo’pi tato’rthaṃ

pratipadyeta / tasmād sambaddhau /

7.2.23. saṃbaddhasaṃbandhād iti cet sandehaḥ

nanu śabdenākāśaṃ sambaddham ākāśena cārthaḥ evaṃ

sambandhasambandhād arthena sambandha iti / naitat

sarvārthānām ākāśena saṃbandhāt kasmin na arthe śabdaḥ

prayukta iti sandehād apratipattiḥ syāt / ato na saṃbandhaḥ /

tasmāt -

7.2.24. sāmayikaḥ śabdād artha pratyayaḥ

tasmāt sanketa nimittaḥ śabdād arthe pratyayo na saṃbandhāt /

441 a question should be asked as to whether saṃbandha in Vaiśeṣika is a real ontological relation or a logico-inferential one.

442 the nature of language in Vaiśeṣika is radically different from the Mīmāṃsā’s; language is ‘conventional’ or artificial, that is to say, can be created by humans through new conventions.

Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 215

***7.2.21. conceptualisation cannot be a condition ***

[derived] from visibility [only]441

impurity is that because of which there is the imperceptibility of the contact between the possessor of a stick and a possessor of horn; but if the contact [between sound and meaning] is imperceptible as already said, then the conceptualisation of meaning will not be made through contact [between sound and meaning].

***7.2.22. similarly, the absence of its conceptualisation [is ***

not a cause of the knowledge of meaning]

if there were a contact between meaning and word, then one who has not known the convention442 [between them] would understand the meaning from this [word];

***7.2.23. when you say that there is doubt because of the ***

connection [of vacuum] with the connected [sound]

[objection] now ‘vacuum’ is connected with ‘sound,’ and meaning [is connected]

with ‘vacuum,’443 thus, due to the connection with the connected there is a subsistence with meaning; [response] this is not so, because all meanings are connected with ‘vacuum,’ there will be doubt regarding which meaning the word is used for, and there will be no knowledge; therefore, there is no subsistence [between meaning and ‘vacuum’], therefore –

***7.2.24. conceptualisation of meaning is because ***

the meaning is conventional

therefore, the conceptualisation is not because of a connection between meaning

and word, [but rather is caused] by convention444

443 This could be Mīmāṃsākas’ objection according to which meaning and word are eternal, being, as it were, connected with ākāśa.

444 The nature of word and meaning is thus not eternal as Mīmāṃsā maintains, but a convention settled by rules (e.g. by grammarians such as Pāṇini); in this respect, language, truth, and knowledge itself are ‘compositional’; the convention of words, as āhnika 6.2. made clear, is through the act of naming, by ṛṣis or God.

216 * Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

***7.2.25. ekadikkālābhyāṃ sannikṛṣṭaviprakṛṣṭābhyāṃ ***

param aparam

eka dikkau piṇḍau dikkṛtayoḥ paratvāparatvayoḥ kāraṇaṃ / eka

kālau vartamānakālasaṃbaddhau kālakṛtayoḥ paratvāparatvayoḥ

kāraṇaṃ / tau ca sannikṛṣṭaviprakṛṣṭabuddhyapekṣayā piṇḍau

kāraṇam /

7.2.26. kāraṇaparatvāt kāraṇāparatvāc ca

parāparadikpradeśa saṃyogāvasamavāyikāraṇam / tathaiva

parāparakālapradeśa saṃyogau / dikkālapradeśaiḥ saṃyogāt

sannikṛṣṭaviprakṛṣṭayoḥ piṇḍayoḥ sannikṛṣṭaviprakṛṣṭabuddhya

āpekṣayā sannikṛṣṭe paratvam viprakṛṣṭe ca paratvam /

***7.2.27. paratvāparatvayoḥ paratvāparatvābhāvoṇutva ***

mahattvābhyāṃ vyākhyātaḥ

parāparadikkālapradeśasaṃyogāḥ paratvāparatvayoḥ

kāraṇam / anayoś ca yutasiddhyabhāvena saṃyogābhāvāt

paratvāparatvabhāvaḥ /

7.2.28. karmabhiḥ karmāṇi guṇair guṇāḥ

yathā karmaguṇāḥ aṇutvamahattva śūnyāḥ evaṃ karmaguṇā

yutasiddhyabhāvena dikkālapradeśasaṃyogābhāvāt paratvāparatva

śūnyāḥ /

445 On ‘buddhyapekṣam,’ see VSc 1.2.3 in conjunction with vyāvṛttibuddhi a specific cognitive function that has access to grasping the differentiated nature of things, VSc 1.2.6; namely to perceive things in their ultimate differentness; as Candrānanda says this type of cognition is produced in those seers (tad darśināṁ) who can draw such minute differentiations about the ultimate particularities, specifically about those things that have an indistinguishable shape and quality (vartamānāstulyākṛtiguṇeṣu).

See ārṣajñāna VSc 9.28.

446 to be ‘dependent on cognition’ means that cognition mediated by the atomic mind distinguishes between pairs of opposite ontological categories, as well as in successive units, which follow one another. If there is something that defines the original

Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 217

***7.2.25. ‘prior’ and ‘posterior’ exist because of nearness and ***

remoteness in relation to both ‘time’ and ‘space’

when there are 2 balls having 1 direction, then ‘space-direction’ is the cause of their ‘near’ and ‘distant’ [position in space and time]; 2 things belonging to the same ‘time’ and connected with the present [tense] become [the] cause of

‘remoteness’ and ‘proximity’ caused by ‘time’; and [the illusion] of these 2 balls is caused by and is dependent upon the ‘cognition’445 of nearness and remoteness.

***7.2.26. because of the remoteness of cause and ***

because of the nearness of cause

‘conjunction’ between the remote and near location is a non-inherent cause; in a similar way, there is ‘conjunction’ of remote-and-near-‘space’ and posterior-and-prior-‘time’; due to the ‘conjunction’ between the near and distant balls with location in ‘time,’ there is near and nearness, and because there is remote there will be remoteness [which notions] are dependent upon a cognition of [the concept] near

and the distant.446

***7.2.27. minuteness and largeness are explained because ***

***of the absence of the prior and posterior of ***

proximity and remoteness [of existentials]447

the cause of ‘proximity’ and ‘remoteness’ [is established] by the connections between prior and posterior [things] located in ‘space’ and ‘time’; and concerning these 2 things, because there is no intimate relation and because there is no ‘conjunction,’ [then] there is no [concept of] prior and posterior [either].

***7.2.28. motions are [explained] by means of motions, ***

qualities are [explained] by means of qualities

just as ‘motion’ and ‘quality’448 are devoid of minuteness and boundless, so also

‘motion’ and ‘quality’ are devoid of ‘consequence’ and ‘non-consequence’ due to the absence of a ‘conjunction’ with the location in ‘time’ [and] ‘space’ of the

‘existential’ (bhāva) with which [conjunction] is associated.

mentality of the Vaiśeṣika system, then it is precisely this kind of reasoning: dualistic epistemology in a successive expanded pluralistic world. That is not to say that synchronic and intuitive thinking is missing in this system; successive reasoning defines the normal perception, while simultaneous, synchronic, and intuitive thinking define the ‘supernatural’ forms of knowledge such as ‘ārṣajñāna’ mentioned in VSc 9.28.

447 ‘existentials’ are not explicitly mentioned here; Vaiśeṣika students need familiarisa-tion not only with the odd Sanskrit syntax but also with the style of this darśana as well.

448 ‘karmaguṇa’ has been translated here not as a compound as it elsewhere in this commentary, but rather as 2 different nouns.

218 * Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

7.2.29. iheti yataḥ kāryakāraṇayoḥ sa samavāyaḥ

guṇādayaḥ samavāyino dravya / ataḥ samavāyaṃ kathayati iheti

yataḥ kāryakāraṇayoḥ pratyaya utpadyate ‘iha tantuṣu paṭaḥ, iha

ghaṭe rūpādayaḥ, iha ghaṭe karma’ iti [sa] samavāyaḥ / kārya

kāraṇa grahaṇasyopalakṣaṇatvāt ‘jāter vyaktau viśeṣāṇāṃ ca nitya

dravyeṣu samavāya’ ity uktaṃ bhavati /

***7.2.30. dravyatvaguṇatva karmatva pratiṣedho ***

bhāvena vyākhyātaḥ

yathaika dravyavattvān na dravyaṃ bhāvo guṇakarmasu ca bhāvān

na karma na guṇa evaṃ samavāyo ’pi /

7.2.31. tattvaṃ ceti

yathā sal liṅgāviśeṣādeko bhāvastathā ‘iha’ liṅgāviśeṣādekaḥ

samavāyo vṛtti rahito nityo niravayavaś ca /

// iti saptamo’dhyāyaḥ //

449 inherence of ‘particularity’ in ‘universality’ is a doctrine that explains the web of interrelations that exists in the worldview of this system; there are no longer enigmas, or contradictions between particular and universal; the interrelatedness of the two is something that has been developed in other Middle Eastern traditions too (Hebrew, Syriac, Islamic Sufi).

450 ‘inherence’ explains that ‘real’ or ‘existential’ (bhava) is something other than the real categories of substance, quality, and motion, because reality is something that

Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 219

***7.2.29. cause-effect inherence is when ‘that [is ***

conceptualised] here’ [‘hic et nunc’]

qualities and so forth are inherent in substance; therefore [Kaṇāda] explains inherence as follows: it is that because of which there is conceptualisation of a cause-effect [relation] produced [as expressed in the sentences] ‘here in the threads there is cloth, here in the pot there is colour and so forth, here in the pot there is motion,’

this is co-existence; the knowledge of cause-effect is only indicative [in the sentences] ‘there is co-existence of generality in individuality, [and co-existence] of particularities in permanent substances,’449 this is how [inherence] has been stated.

***7.2.30. obstruction between substantiality, qualitiness, and ***

motionness is explained by existentiality450

just as ‘substance’ is not one and the same [existential] with ‘substantiality,’

because it subsists in quality and motion and is not a real [to be confused with]

motion and quality, so also ‘inherence’ is [explained]. 451

7.2.31. also, that [inherence]452 is suchness

just as the reality of oneness is because of non-particularity [of visible marks],453

similarly, there is one inherence without specific marks as regard the [experience of] ‘hic et nunc’454 which is devoid of re-occurrence, has no parts, and is permanent.

// this is the seventh chapter //

defines all 3 categories; see also VS 1.1.14 and other essential sūtra on reality, sattā, and bhāva.

451 ‘inherence’ (samavāya) is defined as a real independent category.

452 see sūtra 7.2.29.

453 oneness and universality are coextensive with the sādharmyic cognition; it focuses on simplicity of the abstract substances and entities in general.

454 ‘hic et nunc’ type of experience may be a form of intuition that ultimately leads to the knowledge of ‘tattva,’ which in certain contexts has been translated with ‘essence.’

220 * Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

8.

/ aṣṭamo’dhyāyaḥ /

buddhir idānīṃ nirūpyate

8.1. dravyeṣu jñānaṃ vyākhyātam

ṣaṇṇāṃ padārthānāṃ madhyād dravyeṣv eva jñānaṃ vyākhyātaṃ

yathotpadyate sannikarṣāt na tu guṇādiṣu / tasya -

8.2. mana ātmā ca

mana ātmā ca jñānasya kāraṇaṃ vyākhyātam / idānīṃ guṇādiṣu

jñānam āha -

8.3. jñānanirdeśe jñānaniṣpattir uktā

yataḥ indriyasannikarṣeṇa jñānaniṣpattir uktā guṇādīnāṃ

cendriyeṇa sannikarṣo nāsti ityatastvidānīṃ jñānam ucyate teṣām

asannikarṣe vijñānaṃ yataḥ -

455 likewise, VSc 1.1.6, Candrānanda re-confirms that the categories are 6 (not 7 as in later Vaiśeṣika, for instance in Śivāditya’s Saptapadārthī which adds ‘abhāva’ as the seventh padārtha [SP 3]). This shows that Candrānanda’s commentary is a more traditional and faithful rendering of the original tenets of the system.

456 ‘substance’ (dravya) is the most important category in Vaiśeṣika, a system that we could define to be an example of ‘substantialist philosophy’; sūtra 8.4 overempha-sises this view by saying that: ‘substance is the cause, and the cause of causes,’ which means that substance is the ‘ultimate reality,’ or the ‘essence’ of reality (sattā); what is aimed at by this system is an ‘essential knowledge,’ and the nature of substance is the ultimate form of such knowledge; to understand it better, one should consider reading Vaiśeṣika in contradistinction to Buddhist schools such as Mādhyamikā.

Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 221

Translation

/ the eighth chapter /

now ‘cognition’ is explained

8.1. knowledge is explained in regard to substances

among the 6 categories, 455 knowledge is explained only in relation to substances,456

and perception is that which produces it, yet, [perception] is not for the sake of qualities and so forth [but rather for the sake of substances]; 457 of these [he says].

8.2. and ‘soul’ and ‘mind’ [is the cause of knowledge]

causation of knowledge [its production] is explained as [between] ‘mind’ and

‘soul’; now [he] says [something] regarding the knowledge in relation to qualities, and so forth.

***8.3. it is said that production of knowledge is the ***

indication of a detailed knowledge458

because it has been said that the production of knowledge is [made] by the close contact with senses, qualities, and so forth, being not in contact with [these]

senses, therefore, knowledge is now said [to exist] in relation to that [knowledge

by] distant contact between these, that is [by] discernment,459 because, –

457 ‘cognition’ refers to the ultimate form of knowledge, such as yogipratyakṣa, which targets the comprehension of the ultimate essences of substances, in relation to which qualities are secondary as they do not represent the main project of Vaiśeṣika’s epistemology; perception does not stop at the surface of things (qualities), it aims rather at the knowledge of substances and their essences.

458 ‘knowledge’ is real because being an effect, and given the theory of asatkāryavāda, all effects are ‘real new things.’

459 vijñāna is a higher form of knowledge, perhaps that which relies on vaidharmya, see also parijñāna in VSc 1.1.6.

222 * Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

***8.4. guṇakarmasva sannikṛṣṭeṣu jñānaniṣpatter ***

dravyaṃ kāraṇaṃ kāraṇakāraṇaṃ ca

guṇakarmaṇāṃ yato dravyaṃ samavāyikāraṇaṃ tatas teṣu

sākṣādindriyeṇā sannikṛṣṭeṣu vijñānaniṣpatteḥ kāraṇasya

sannikarṣasya tadeva dravyaṃ kāraṇaṃ, na guṇakarmāṇi tasmād

guṇakarmasu saṃyukta samavāyāt jñānaṃ caśabdo hetau /

8.5. sāmānyaviśeṣeṣu sāmānyaviśeṣābhāvāt tata eva jñānam

sāmānye sattādau viśeṣeṣu cāntyeṣu tad darśināṃ

dravyasannikarṣād eva jñānam utpadyate na sāmānyaviśeṣebhyaḥ

teṣu tad abhāvāt / anyatra tu -

8.6. sāmānyaviśeṣāpekṣaṃ dravyaguṇakarmasu

dravyaguṇakarmasu dravyendriyasannikarṣāt sāmānyāc ca sādeḥ

[sattādeḥ] sāmānyaviśeṣāc ca dravyatvādeḥ ‘sad’ iti ‘dravyam’

ityādi ca jñānam utpadyata iti / iha sūtre sāmānyaṃ sattā viśeṣā

dravyatvādayaḥ pūrvasūtre’nyathā / tatrāpi -

460 there seem to be qualitative levels of perception; the basic one is the perception by senses, a more superior one however is ‘discernment,’ which grasps entities and their essences through a form of supra-sense perception (atīndriya).

461 on antyaviśeṣa, see VSc 1.2.6.

462 sāmānya and viśeṣa do not subsist in another sāmānya and viśeṣa, for otherwise the proof will fall into infinite regression.

Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 223

***8.4. when qualities and motions are not near [our senses] ***

***we say that substance is the cause for the production ***

of [our] knowledge, and the cause of causes

because substance is the inherent cause of qualities and motions, then in relation to these, there is production of discernment with the sense-organs which are in direct contact with the perception which is the cause [of that discernment],460

and neither substance nor quality nor motion are the cause [of that perceptive contact] therefore, the knowledge of qualities and motions is produced from the co-existence with the contacted [thing], and the word ‘ca’ [in the sūtra] is used in the sense of cause [of knowledge].

***8.5. because of the absence of the ‘universal’ and ‘particularity’ ***

***in universality and particularity, from that, only, we know ***

the knowledge [concerning the ‘universal particularity’]

‘sattā’ is first and foremost a universal, regarding the ‘particularities’ and ‘ultimate particularity,’461 those [seers] who perceive them, the production of the knowledge [about them] is solely by contact with the substance-essence, and not because of [another] universal and particularity for these are absent in them [universal and particularity]; 462 but as regards the other concept [‘universal particularity’] [Kaṇāda says]

***8.6. concerning substance, quality, and motion [the knowledge ***

of these] is dependent on ‘universal particularity’463

substance, quality, motion [are known] because of the power of the sense-perception with substances, and because of the universal particularity and so forth, which [like any real] has a beginning464 [and] which has both particularity and universality, such as the substance and so forth have, this is how knowledge is produced; in this sūtra, ‘sattā’ is universal [sāmānya], ‘viśeṣa’ means existential-substantiality and so forth, [but] in an earlier sūtra it is [explained] differently;

[knowledge] in relation to substance is based upon substance, quality, and motion, moreover,

463 because sūtra does not contain the particle ‘ca,’ we take the view that Kaṇāda refers here to a third concept, namely ‘sāmānyaviśeṣa’ (universal particularity) which is the

‘real’ contained by both ontological levels, viśeṣa as well as sāmānya; it is chiefly due to this concept that a substance is explained as both one and many.

464 ‘universal’ is created when the substance is created, meaning that it exists prior to the origination of the differentiated state of substance.

224 * Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

8.7. dravye dravyaguṇakarmāpekṣam

cakṣuḥ sannikarṣād yaj jñānaṃ dravye sāmānyaviśeṣāpekṣaṃ viṣāṇ

īti guṇāpekṣaṃ ‘śukla’ iti karmāpekṣaṃ ‘gacchati’ ity utpadyata

iti / dravyādīnāṃ ca viśeṣaṇatvāt pūrvam upalambhaḥ tena

viśeṣaṇabuddheḥ kāraṇatvaṃ viśeṣyabuddheḥ kāryatvaṃ /

***8.8. guṇakarmasu guṇakarmābhāvād ***

guṇa karmāpekṣaṃ na vidyate

guṇe guṇakarmmaṇor abhāvāt karmaṇi ca guṇakarmanimittaṃ

guṇakarmasu jñānaṃ na bhavat īti / dravyādau jñānasya

pūrvotpattāvaniyamaḥ, yathā -

***8.9. samavāyinaḥ śvaityācchvaityabuddheḥ ***

śvete buddhiste kāryakāraṇabhūte

śvetaguṇasamavāyinaḥ śvaityasāmānyāt śvaityasāmānyajñānāc

ca śvetaguṇajñānaṃ jāyate sāmānya guṇa saṃbandho ’pi

draṣṭavyaḥ ato viśeṣaṇabuddhiḥ kāraṇaṃ viśeṣya buddhiḥ kāryaṃ /

viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyatvābhāve tu -

465 it shows that dravya could be better translated by ‘essence’ so as to be differentiated from substance, quality, and motion.

466 the prevalence and importance of the meaning ‘dravya’ has already been asserted as the basis on which the whole structure of reality is built, followed by ‘lesser’ categories such as ‘qualities’ and ‘motions’; the use of ‘dravyapekṣam’ (dependent on the substance) is a case in point.

467 a more literal translation would be: substances are ‘comprehended prior’ to adjectives; needless to say, that the goal of the system is to grasp the ultimate reality and essence of things which is to be found in the concept of ‘dravya.’

Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 225

8.7. [knowledge] concerning substance465 *** is based ***

upon substance, quality, and motion

knowledge of substance is due to the contact with [the] eye, [and] is dependent on ‘universality’ and ‘particularity’466 as for example [in the sentence] ‘[something] possessing horns is dependent on a quality for example “white,” which is equally dependent on the motion “goes,”’ in this way [knowledge] is produced; substances and so forth are comprehended first because of the adjective,467 by this, the cognition of adjective [qualifier] which is an effect, is conducive to the cognition of the qualified [thing].

***8.8. because there is absence of quality and motion in ***

***[other] qualities and motions, [knowledge] is not ***

dependent on [subsequent] qualities and motions

since there is absence of qualities and motions in [other] qualities and motions, there is no possibility for the knowledge of qualities and motions to be the instrumental [cause] of [the knowledge] of [other] qualities and motions; there is a rule concerning the prior production of the knowledge of substances; 468 as for

example –

***8.9. knowledge of white is from whiteness, which is inherent ***

***[in white], because of the ‘cognition’ of whiteness, there is ***

‘cognition’ of white [thing], these are cause-effect existentials

because the universal white is inherent in the ‘quality white’ and from the knowledge of the ‘universality of white’ the cognition of the quality of whiteness is

[subsequently] generated, it should also be considered that there is a connection between universal and quality; 469therefore, the cognition of the adjective is the cause, [while] the cognition of the qualified is the effect; but regarding the absence of the adjective [specifier] and the specified [thing] [Kaṇāda says] –

468 it may refer to the intuitive perception that is not mediated by inference; as we shall see, in later Vaiśeṣika literature there is direct and indirect perception; for instance, Vādīndra’s VSv gloss on 3.1.20 (short version p. 37) differentiates between ‘indeterminate’ (nirvikalpapratyakṣa) versus ‘determinate’ (savikalpapratyakṣa); see also Candrānanda’s VSc 9.28 which distinguishes between siddhadarśana and ārṣajñāna, whereas PD of Praśastapāda (pp. 186) talks about a ‘simple perception’

(svarūpālocanamātra) as opposed to ‘differentiated perception’ (savikalpa).

469 on the connection between sāmānya and guṇa, see the chapter on guṇa in Halbfass 1992: 113–37.

226 * Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

8.10. dravyeṣv anitaretara kāraṇāḥ kāraṇāyaugapadyāt

aṇutvāt manaso yaugapadyābhāvāt saty api

krame ghaṭapaṭajñānayor na kāryakāraṇabhāvaḥ

viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyatvāyogāt /

8.11. tathā dravyaguṇakarmasu kāraṇāviśeṣāt

gauḥ śuklā gacchatī īti ca dravyaguṇakarmasu jñānānāṃ krameṇāpi

jāyamānānāṃ na kāryakāraṇabhāvo viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyatābhāvād

ityasya pūrvoktasya kāraṇasyāviśeṣāt / ato dravyajñānaṃ na

guṇakarmabuddhyoḥ kāraṇaṃ guṇakarmabuddhī api na parasya

kāraṇaṃ / viśeṣaṇanyāyābhāve tu -

8.12. ayam eṣa kṛtaṃ tvayā bhojainam iti buddhyapekṣaṃ

‘ayam’ iti sannikṛṣṭe ‘eṣa’ iti ca kiñca dviprakṛṣṭe pratyayaḥ

‘kṛtaṃ tvayā’ iti kaṛtṛkarmapratyayau ‘bhojayainam’ iti

kaṛtṛkarmapratyayau / sannikṛṣṭāpekṣo viprakṛṣṭe pratyayaḥ

‘kṛtaṃ’ iti karmāpekṣaḥ kartari ‘bhojaya’ iti kartrapekṣaḥ karmaṇi

/ kutas sāpekṣā iti cet,

470 since both sentences are in the ablative, being as it were in a relation of correspondence, the sūtra has been translated with the conditional ‘if.’

Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 227

***8.10. if there is no mutual causality among substances, ***

there is no simultaneity of their cause [either]470

because of the minuteness of ‘mind,’ and because of the absence of [its] simultaneity, although there is a sequence [of cognitions], still, there is no cause-effect relationship between cognitions of pot and cloth, because there is no link between a specifier and specified.

***8.11. similarly, regarding substances, qualities, and motions ***

***[these do not stand in a cause-effect relation] due ***

the absence of [their own] specific cause

even though, in [the sentence] ‘the white cow goes’ the cognitions of substance, quality, [and] motion are being produced in a sequence, still, there is [an] absence of [a] cause-effect relationship because of the absence [of a relation] between a specifier and the specified thing, this reasoning, as stated earlier, is [applicable]

without any difference; therefore, the cognition of substance is not the cause of the cognition of quality and motion, nor is the cognition of quality and motion a cause of another [thing]; however, regarding the absence of [the rule concerning]

the adjectival specifier [Kaṇāda says] –

***8.12. ‘this one is this,’ ‘you have done,’ ‘feed him,’ [all ***

these rules] are dependent on ‘cognition’

‘ayam’ indicates [something] which is near, and ‘eṣaḥ’ is the perception of something [slightly] remote, ‘kṛtam tvayā’ indicates the experience of the doer and doing-activity, ‘bhojayainam’ indicates subject and object [relation]; the conceptualisation of the remote [thing] is dependent on that of the near [thing],471 in the word ‘kṛtam’ there is knowledge concerning a subject dependent on object, in the sentence ‘bhojaya’ there is knowledge concerning the object dependent on a subject; if the [question is as to] why there is a relation of dependence, [then Kaṇāda says this]

471 as in many instances, aṇutva, mahattva, permanence and impermanence, proximity and remoteness, these dual concepts mutually imply each other in Vaiśeṣika logic and epistemology, whereby one point of reference implies another; the system is a dualistic epistemology in a pluralistic ontology.

228 * Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

8.13. dṛṣṭeṣu bhāvādadṛṣṭeṣvabhāvāt

dṛṣṭeṣu satsu yataḥ sannikṛṣṭādiṣu viprakṛṣṭādi pratyayā

bhavanti nā dṛṣṭeṣu ataḥ sāpekṣā api santo na kāryakāraṇabhūtāḥ

viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyatvāyogāt / buddhīnām arthendriyāpekṣatverthas

tāvad ucyate -

8.14. artha iti dravyaguṇakarmasu

vināpy arthatvena sāmānyena triṣv eva dravyādiṣu tatra prasiddhyā

‘artha’ śabdaḥ paribhāṣyate / kveva yathā sāmānyaviśeṣeṣu vinā

sāmānyāntareṇa yathā sattādiṣu sāmānyeṣu sāmānyaṃ sāmānyam

iti jñānaṃ tathā viśeṣeṣu viśeṣāntarābhāve ’pi ‘viśeṣo viśeṣa’

iti tad darśināṃ vijñānam evaṃ dravyādiṣu vināpy arthatvena

pāribhāṣikorthaśabdaḥ / indriyāṇyucyante tāni ca na pañcātmakāni

yataḥ -

8.15. dravyeṣu pañcātmakaṃ pratyuktam

yato dravyeṣvārabdhavyeṣu pañca bhūtāni ārambhakāṇi na

vidyante api tu yānyārabhante catvāri tāni svāṃ svāṃ jātim

ārabhante / evam indriyāṇyapi pratiniyata bhūtakāryāṇi tathā hi -

472 ‘noun’ and ‘adjective’ might indicate the viśeṣa and viśiṣṭa categories of Dvaita Vedānta, which play an important role in the grammar and ontology of both Vaiśeṣika and Dvaita schools.

473 word ‘artha’ refers to ‘subject-matter’ (object-matter) which in this gloss is under cognitive scrutiny.

474 artha refers here to padārtha (ontological categories); the 3 basic categories here are the first 3 padārtha: dravya, guṇa, and karma.

Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 229

***8.13. [cognition is possible] regarding visible [things] ***

***due to their existentiality, [and cognition of] unseen ***

things is due to their non-existentiality

as far as a visible thing is concerned, there are cognitions of remoteness and so forth in things which are near and so forth, but in relation to unseen things, however, although they are dependent, they are not cause and effect because there is no jointness between a ‘specified’ and ‘specifier’;472 while the cognitions are

dependent on objects and sense-organs, now, the object is being described –

***8.14. [word] ‘artha’473 is used in regard to ***

substance, quality, [and] motion

even if the universal lacks any object [to be known], the word ‘artha’ is fully explained after having been established only in regard to the 3 categories, substance, and so forth;474 where [is it that established]? just as the universal and particular are devoid of other universality, so also regarding the reality of the universal of things and so forth, these are [indicated] by the knowledge [as expressed in the sentence] ‘universal is from being universal,’ similarly, particularity being another ‘existential’ [is expressed in the sentence] ‘particularity is from particularity,’ and this is the discernment of those seers; in the same way, in the word substance, and so forth, the word ‘artha’ is used in a technical sense, even if

[substance, and so forth] are not the subject of discussion; sense-organs are also described, and they are not [to be confused with] the group of 5 [mahābhūtas]

because –

***8.15. regarding the substances, they are [tied up] ***

with the nature of the five-fold group475

because things at their inception are known not to have the 5 great elements [as their cause], but the 4 elements are those which generate their own genera, in the same way, the sense-organs have their function fixed [to their specific] ele-

ments;476 thus, [he] says –

475 the group of 5 refers to the 5 mahābhūtas.

476 the gloss seems to discuss the levels of supervenience of the evolution of the cosmos, first substances (essences), second mahābhūtas (elements), and then the senses that correspond to each of the elements (e.g. one particular sense is for ‘earth,’ another sense is for ‘water,’ and so forth); the next sūtra, by using the ablative (pañcamī vibhakti), explains how these senses are ‘attached’ or ‘fixed’ to each element.

230 * Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

8.16. bhūyastvād gandhavattvāc ca pṛthivī gandhajñāne

gandhajñānaṃ ghrāṇaṃ tasmin nārabdhavye pṛthivī kāraṇaṃ

bhūyastvāt śarīrāpekṣayā tu bhūyastvaṃ / bhūyastvaṃ ca ghrāṇe

pṛthivyāḥ pādādināgandhopalabdhyabhāvāt / gandhavattvāc

ca yataś ca svasamavāyinā gandhena ghrāṇendriyaṃ gandham

abhivyanaktya tastasya gandhavatī pṛthivy eva kāraṇam

bhūtāntarāṇi tu saṃyogīni svalpāny eva /

***8.17. tathāpas tejo vāyuś ca rasarūpasparśajñāneṣu ***

rasarūpasparśaviśeṣād iti

svasamavāyinā madhurāpākajena rasena rūpeṇa śukla bhāsvareṇa

sparśenāpākajānuṣṇāśītena yato rasananayanasparśanāni

rasarūpasparśān abhivyañjanti ato rasavattvād rūpavattvāt

sparśavattvāc ca bhūtāntarair nimittair anabhibhūtatvena

bhūyastvāc ca triṣvindriyeṣu yathā saṃkhyaṃ āpas tejo vāyuś

ca samavāyikāraṇāni draṣṭavyāni / ākāśaṃ tu svata eva śrotraṃ

karṇaśaṣkulyavacchinnaṃ na prakṛtiranārambhakatvāt / evaṃ

pratyakṣaṃ vyākhyātam /

// aṣṭamo’dhyāyaḥ //

477 bhūyastva is ‘abundance, plentifulness, majority, preponderance’ in (Apte dict.: 1204).

478 like Vaibhāṣika Sarvāstivāda’s ontology, Vaiśeṣika draws an ontological distinction between the ‘function of senses’ (e.g. smelling), ‘senses’ as such (e.g. nose-smell), and the ‘objects of senses’ (e.g. earth).

479 once again, the category of viśeṣa comes into play, without which the real ontological distinction between ‘functions’ of smelling, ‘sense-organs’ of smelling, ‘qualities,’ and ‘substances’ cannot be conceived; such differentiations would be ultimately known by a sub-category known by the label of ‘dharmaviśeṣa.’

480 ‘vacuum exists independently’ means that it is not an inherent cause as is the case with ‘water,’ ‘lustre,’ and ‘air,’ which are the inherent cause for taste, eye, and touch, respectively.

Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 231

***8.16. ‘earth’ is known when there is comprehension ***

of ‘smell,’ due to [its] density477

knowledge of smell [of ‘earth’] by smelling is caused by ‘earth’ when it is produced due to the density which is [judged] interdependently with the body; and having density, the smell of ‘earth’ is not comprehended by [other organs], leg and so forth; and being possessed by smell, and since smelling is inherent in it

[‘earth’], the sense-organ of smell indicates the smell [of earth]; and this earth, having smell, is itself the cause; however, the other elements are connected [with

this] only to a little extent.478

***8.17. similarly, there is knowledge of ‘taste,’ ‘form,’ and ***

***‘touch,’ as regards ‘water,’ ‘lustre,’ and ‘air’ due to ***

the particular479 *** ‘taste,’ ‘form,’ [and] ‘touch’***

by means of ‘form-colour’ we have the shining, by means of ‘taste’ we have the sweet which is inherent [in the cake offering] and it is not harnessed by the [cooking process], by means of ‘touch’ we have that which is cold, hot, and not-cooked, tongue, eye, and touch-organ [of skin] these indicate ‘taste,’ ‘form,’ [and] ‘touch,’

therefore due to tastiness, shape, [and] touchiness, due to the causes which are non-affected by other elements, and because of their amplitude in relation to the 3 sense-organs, therefore, ‘water,’ ‘lustre, [and]’ ‘air’ are to be considered as inherent causes; but, as regards ‘vacuum’ this exists independently, 480 [for]

hearing is characterised by the cavity of the ear [vacuum], not by the lobe of the

ear,481 because [the lobe] is not the root element [to be perceived] and [hearing]

does not originate in the ear-organ [but in ‘vacuum’]; 482 thus, perception has been explained.

// the eighth chapter //

481 the gloss renders explicit the importance of the knowledge of the essence of the substances in their very subtle nature (antyaviśeṣa, dharmaviśeṣa); when it is said that

‘hearing is characterised by the cavity of the ear’ the commentator must refer to the empty ‘space’ which is the substance ‘vacuum’; in other words, the essence of sound and hearing is ‘vacuum.’

482 śabda which stands for ‘sound’ and ‘word’ is therefore explained as a quality of the substance ‘vacuum,’ therefore, its origin should be sought not in an instrumental cause (ear) but rather in its ultimate cause which is the substance ‘vacuum’; the earlier ontological distinction between ‘functions’ of senses, organs of ‘senses,’ and ‘object’

of senses, finds its utility here, namely by detecting the substance that is the ‘root-cause’ of any sense-perceptive manifestation.

232 * Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

9.

/ navamo’dhyāyaḥ /

idānīm anumānaṃ vyācikhyāsus tasya viṣayaṃ darśayati -

9.1. kriyāguṇa vyapadeśābhāvād sat

na tāvat kāryaṃ prāg utpatteḥ pratyakṣeṇa gṛhyate / nāpy

anumānena sati liṅge tasya bhāvāt liṅgābhāvaś ca tadīyayoḥ

kriyāguṇayor anupalabdheḥ na cānyad ‘vyapadeśa’ śabda sūcitaṃ

liṅgam asti / tasmāt prāg utpatter asat / paścāt -

9.2. sad asat

sadbhūtaṃ ca kāryaṃ pradhvastam uttarakālam asad eva na

satastirodhānaṃ kriyāguṇa vyapadeśābhāvād eva / madhye tu -

9.3. asataḥ sat kriyāguṇa vyapadeś[ā]bhāvād arthāntaraṃ

pradhvaṃsāt pūrvamutpatter uttarakālamasatorthāntarabhūtaṃ

vastu ‘sat’ ity ucyate kriyāguṇa vyapadeśānāṃ bhāvāt /

483 for an alternative translation of VSc 9.1–12, see Halbfass 1992: 242–6.

484 ‘asat’ may be taken to be the ‘undifferentiated’ entity that pre-exists in the cosmos; Upaniṣadic dialogue between the master Uddālaka Āruṇi and his son Śvetaketu (Ch.

Up. 6.2.1) who discuss whether in the beginning of the world the ‘real’ thing (sat) exists in an ‘undifferentiated,’ ‘non-phenomenal’ state (asat). I think the whole discussion of ‘asat’ is about what can be conceptualised or non-conceptualised through language, not about what exists or not.

485 allusion is made here to asatkāryavāda theory.

486 as in other instances, like cognition, the alternative appearance and disappearance of cognition proves the function and existence of ‘mind’ and ‘soul.’

487 in other words, ‘real’ does not exist prior to its production, by which the gloss reaffirms the Vaiśeṣika theory of asatkāryavāda; if, however, ‘asat’ is taken – as mentioned in an earlier footnote – to be that which is not conceptualised (not necessarily

Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 233

Translation

/ the ninth chapter /

in order to elucidate inference, [Kaṇāda] shows now its object [of application]483

9.1. non-real484 *** is [that] which has no activity, quality, [and] designation***

effect is not grasped by direct perception before its prior production; 485 nor through

inference due to its transformation when there is a mark of it, and when there is absence of an [inferential] mark, there is non-comprehension of activities and qualities, 486 and it is indicated by the word ‘vyapadeśa’ [designation] that there is

[1] mark and not another mark; therefore, the un-real [asat] is prior to its [present]

existence; 487 afterwards [Kaṇāda says]

9.2. [effect is understood in relation to] real [and]488 un-real

and the ‘un-real’ is like the ‘real’ effect-product which is destroyed at a subsequent time, [and] there is no termination of the ‘real’ due to the absence of designation of quality and activity; but concerning their inter-relation [Kaṇāda says] –

***9.3. ‘asat’ is different from ‘sat’ because it has ***

no designation, quality, and activity

because of the termination of the ‘real’489 prior to [another] production, 490 the

‘real’ thing is a different subject-matter from the ‘non-real’ produced at a subsequent time due to its prior termination, [and real is different from non-real]

because of the existence of designation, quality and activity.

that which does not exist), then asatkāryavāda may be another form of asatkāryavāda, for it does not radically deny the existence of an effect, but perhaps only its manifestation; on how asatkāryavāda could ‘with the appropriate clarification and adjustment be easily called satkāryavāda,’ see Halbfass 1992: 58.

488 instead of ‘is,’ Halbfass reads this sūtra with ‘becomes’ 1992: 243.

489 real’s termination refers to the ‘non-existence of real effect’ prior to its actual birth.

490 it is debatable if ‘termination’ refers here to the cessation of something, or just to the

‘complete absence’ of something; does ‘unreal’ mean something completely ‘non-existent’ or it is just something ‘dormant’ or ‘un-manifested’? Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6.2. seems to be ambiguous about the nature of ‘sat’ and ‘asat’; should we read it in terms of absence versus the presence of a thing, actuality versus potentiality, or rather manifestation versus un-manifested thing?

234 * Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

9.4. sac cāsat

sad api vastu bhāvāntara niṣedhena gaur aśvo na bhavat īti

kāryākaraṇena na ayaṃ gauḥ yo na vahati ‘asad’ ity upacaryate /

9.5. yac cānyat satas tadapy asat

sataś ca vastuno yad anyad atyantābhāvarūpaṃ

prāgupādhipradhvaṃsāviṣayaṃ śaśaviṣāṇādi tad apy asad eva /

asatāmaviśeṣāt prāg asati kathaṃ kāraka pravṛttir nānyatr eti cet,

na, viśeṣagrahaṇāt / tatra -

***9.6. asad iti bhūtapratyakṣābhāvād bhūtasmṛtevirodhi ***

pratyakṣatvāc ca jñānaṃ

pradhvaṃsā sati ‘asat’ iti jñānaṃ bhūtasya vastunaḥ pūrvavad

idānīṃ darśanābhāvāt tasya ca bhūtasya vastunaḥ smaraṇād

virodhinaś ca kapālāder grahaṇād vināśaṃ parikalpyotpadyate

anyathā tat katham iva na dṛśyeta tathā tv asya aviśeṣaḥ /

prāgabhāve tu -

491 sūtra designates how the system can maintain 2 kinds of argument as well as 2 kinds of reality; one should not confuse the concept of ‘reality’ with ‘existence’; see Vādīndra who discusses how a thing can be ‘real’ and ‘non-existent’ at the same ‘time’; in this gloss, Candrānanda seems to agree with Vādīndra who maintains that the ‘non-existing real’ refers to the real that cannot exist independently because its ‘nature’

(svarūpa), stands on very flimsy foundations, that is to say, it has a quasi-inexistent substratum; for example, the substratum of antyaviśeṣa is the substance.

492 sūtra expresses here the ‘argument of difference,’ which is grounded upon inferential logic more than on a realistic ontological basis.

Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 235

9.4. and the ‘real’ [thing can also be] ‘unreal’

‘real’ thing also can be ‘unreal’ by excluding another existential, just as a bull is not a horse because of not doing [horse] activity, that is not a bull for it does not

bear, therefore it is metaphorically called a ‘non-real’ [thing].491

***9.5. that which is ‘real’ [demonstrated] from that which is ***

different, that also [demonstrates] ‘non-real’ as well492

and ‘real’ is that which has a form completely absent in another thing, a subject-matter such as hare’s horn and so forth, which are a priori absent, metaphorically, and which is not [the subject-matter] of absence after destruction, such as hare’s horn which is ‘non-real’ as well; since ‘non-real’ [things] are a priori indistinct,493

and since [there is a doubt] regarding the propensity of an agent not in someone else, then the reply] is no, because there is conceptualisation of difference;494 [and]

concerning that [Kaṇāda says] –

***9.6. knowledge of the non-real is because of the absence of the ***

***perception of a [real] entity, as well as because of the memory of ***

that entity, and because of the perception of [something] opposite495

knowledge concerning ‘asat’ is after seeing the dissolution of the thing that passed as in the [expression] ‘earlier’ [indicated] because [it] is not visible now, and because of the memory of the past thing [and] from having grasped the potsherds which are contrary and different; [the non-real] is produced after having imagined

[its] destruction, for otherwise, how would that be perceived if its nature were not differentiated? 496 but regarding the prior absence, [he] says –

493 ‘a priori indistinct’ does not necessarily mean prior ‘non-existence,’ it means that

‘asat’ should be only seen as ‘undifferentiated,’ ‘undistinguished.’

494 the ‘argument of difference’ mentioned in the previous footnote acquires a new explanation: the ‘grasping of difference’ is possible due to 2 factors: ontological, by the individuating factor (antyaviśeṣa), and the other epistemological (dharmaviśeṣa), which is the sense-data that the perceiver perceives directly through senses, with yogipratyakṣa.

495 on ‘virodha,’ see probans in VSc 3.1.8.

496 ‘perception of difference’ is possible because things are unique each time they are produced and each time they are destroyed.

236 * Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

9.7. tathābhāve bhāvapratyakṣatvāc ca

mṛtipiṇḍāvasthāyāṃ prāgabhāve ghaṭaviṣayaṃ pratyakṣajñānaṃ

nābhūd idānīṃ tu ghaṭaviṣayaṃ viruddhaṃ vijñānam udabhūt

smaryate cā bhāvāvasthā tasmād idānīm ayaṃ bhāvaḥ samabhūt

pūrvam asyābhāva evā ca asīd iti prāgabhāve ‘asat’ iti niścaya

jñānam /

9.8. etenā ghaṭo gaur adharmaś ca vyākhyātaḥ

yadā hi sthālyāṃ ghaṭa ity utpannavijñānasya kāraṇāntarataḥ

samyakpratyaya utpadyate ‘nāyaṃ ghaṭaḥ sthālīyam’ iti tad

api ghaṭapratyayasyābhāvāt tasya ca smaraṇād viruddhasya

ca sthālyāder darśanād boddhavyam / evam aśve ‘agauḥ’ iti /

tathā sāmānyato darśanād rātrisnānāder dharmatve sambhāvite

‘adharma’ ity utpadyata iti cetanācetanātīndriyabhedenodāharaṇ

atrayam /

9.9. abhūtaṃ nāst īti anarthāntaram

prākpradhvaṃ sopādhyabhāvebhyo yad anyadatyantābhāvarūpaṃ

śaśaviṣāṇādi tad abhūtaṃ ‘nāst īti’ paryāyaśabdābhyām

avyatiriktam ucyate nāsya paryāyaśabdair arthāntaratā kathyate

ato’ sya paryāyaśabdair evopadarśanaṃ lakṣaṇaṃ nāsya deśakālādi

niṣedhaḥ / anyatra tu -

***9.10. nāsti ghaṭo geha iti sato ghaṭasya ***

gehasaṃyogapratiṣedhaḥ

nāsti ghaṭosmin deśe kāle veti deśādi niṣedho ghaṭāder na

svarūpato niṣedhaḥ kriyata iti /

Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 237

9.7. similarly, there is the perceptibility of an un-real ‘existential’497

regarding the prior non-existence of a lump of clay there is ‘perceptual cognition’ of a pot-object at the time of [its] prior existence, but now the ‘cognition’

of a pot-object of the thing that came forth is contradictory [because] the state of the potsherd is remembered, therefore this co-produced existential was certainly previously non-existent, and the firm ‘cognition’ is that which refers to ‘asat’ as regards the prior non-existence of that ‘asat.’

9.8. by means of this ‘a-ghaṭa’ [non-pot], ‘a-ga’ [non-

bull], ‘a-dharma’ [non-dharma] are explained

when indeed a perfect perception of ‘the pot of a pan’ is produced in relation to the discernment resulted from [the fact of] ‘a pot in a pan,’ [the sentence] ‘this is not a pot, it is a pan’ is due to the absence of the [direct] experience of the pot as well as because it [is based on] recollection after seeing the dish and so forth, which is contrary to the pot, [this is how knowledge] should be understood; similarly, regarding a horse [expressed in the sentence] ‘it is a non-bull’ [this knowledge is to be explained], similarly, after seeing the generality; bath during night-time, this is to be understood as [lawful] dharma, because the knowledge of ‘un-lawful’ had been produced, thus these are 3 examples in which there is a difference between perceivable and unperceivable, and something [intuitive] which is beyond the sense-organ perception.

***9.9. ‘non-existent,’ [and] ‘this is not’, [between these 2 ***

sentences] there is no difference in meaning

regarding the prior, secondary, or posterior non-existential [abhūta] that is of the nature of absolute non-existence, like for example a hare’s horn and so forth as indicated in the [expressions such as] ‘non-existential,’ ‘this is not,’ which are defined by synonymous words and do not express another meaning, therefore, the philosophy [Vaiśeṣika] defines [things] by means of synonymous words,

[and] not by the negation of ‘time,’ ‘space,’ and so forth; but concerning the other

[things][he mentions] –

***9.10. [in the sentence] ‘there is no pot in the house,’ this indicates a ***

negation of the connection between an existing pot and the house

there is ‘no pot at this ‘time’ [and] ‘space,’ this [sentence] is the negation of

‘space’ and so forth in regard to pot and so forth, and the absence of the produced pot’s own nature is not denied.

238 * Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

***9.11. nāsty anyaś candramā iti sāmānyac ***

candrama saḥ niṣedhaḥ

‘nāsti dvitīyaś candramāḥ iti saṅkhyāpratiṣedhena

sāmānyāc candratvākhyāc candramā nivartyate iti

kṛtvā candratvaṃ sāmānyaṃ nāstī ty uktaṃ bhavati /

deśakālabhāvasāmarthyopādhīnām abhāve tad atyantā sata eva

prabhedaś candratva sāmānya niṣedha iti varṇayanti / sikatā

bhyonutpatter dadhnaḥ kṣīrāc cotpatteḥ pratyakṣeṇa cā grahaṇāt

sadasat / kāryaṃ kāraṇe

9.12. sadasator vaidharmyāt kārye sadasattā na

sattvāsattvayor yugapad viruddhatvān na sad asat kāryaṃ kāraṇe

/ tasmād asad eva / pratyakṣaparokṣaviṣayatvād yogipratyakṣaṃ

pratyakṣānumānayor madhye vyākhyāyate /

***9.13. ātmanyātmamanasoḥ saṃyogaviśeṣād ***

ātmapratyakṣam

āhṛtya viṣayebhya indriyāṇi tebhyaś ca mana ātmany eva yadā

samādhīyate tad āyogajadharmāpekṣādātmāntaḥ karaṇasaṃyogād

viśiṣṭāt tatra bhavatāṃ svasmin na ātmani jñānaṃ pratyakṣam

utpadyate /

497 quite contrary to the Buddhist view (pratītyasamutpāda), Vaiśeṣika sees ‘essence’ (tattva) and ‘reality’ (sattā) beyond the usual powers of perception such as seeing and so forth; thus, without officialising a doctrine of non-existence (like the discussion on

‘darkness’ attempts in VSc 5.2.21) the system acknowledges reality beyond visibility, not least because there are forms of supra-perception.

498 like the expression ‘sadasat’ (VS 9.2) whereby for a thing to be ‘sat’ it needs to have quality and designation, it is only the manifestation and perception of ‘sat’ that can be doubted, not its immanent or ‘hidden’ existence in the cause; the gloss may render asatkāryavāda problematic is understood in Western terms such as ‘to be or not to be’;

‘sat’ and ‘asat’ may have a predominant linguistic, and mental value, not necessarily an existential one.

499 ‘non-reality’ applies only to whatever entity is produced or effected; it refers to the

‘non-reality’ of the ‘becoming.’

Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 239

***9.11. ‘there is no other moon’ this [expression] ***

precludes the universal moon

‘there is no second moon,’ by this [sentence] the number [of the moon] is denied, therefore moon excludes the universal called moon, thus, as a matter of fact, it is said that there is no universal such as moonness; in the absence of such conditions as ‘time,’ ‘space,’ and ‘power of existence,’ [some] explain that it is something which is totally absent and [they] deny the universal moonness; because there is no grasping by perception, effect is both existing and non-existing in the cause,498

[one example is] the non-production of curd from sand, [but it is rather] produced from milk.

***9.12. the differentiation between ‘sat’ and ‘asat,’ [shows] that ***

there is absence of ‘reality’ in the ‘effect-product’

due to the opposition between ‘sat’ and ‘asat,’ there is no existential and non-existential effect in the cause simultaneously; therefore, [effect] is only un-real;499

[introductory line] because the subject-matter of perception is invisible

[parokṣa],500 [now] the yogic perception is explained by the medium of both perception and inference. 501

***9.13. because of a particular ‘conjunction’ between ***

***‘soul’ and ‘mind’ [taking place] in the ‘soul’ ***

[there arises] the perception of the ‘soul.’

having withdrawn the senses from objects, and the ‘mind’ from them [senses], when ‘mind’ is concentrated only in the ‘soul,’ then the direct knowledge regarding one’s own ‘soul’ is produced from a specific connection between ‘soul’ and

‘mind,’ which [perception] is dependent on a dharma born of yoga in those beings

[who practise contemplation]. 502

500 ‘direct perception has a peculiar subject-matter’ may refer here to the role of perception to see through a ‘specific dharma’ (dharmaviśeṣa), the ultimate ‘differential essence of things’ (viṣayatva).

501 (preceding line to sūtra 9.13) yogipratyakṣa is a direct perception about the nature of things and is explained to be both perceptual and inferential; to sum up, the theory of perception in Vaiśeṣika may be called ‘inferential induction.’

502 explanation: the introductory line of this sūtra and gloss explains that there exists a special form of knowledge achieved by yogis; the use of the genitive dual in the introductory line (pratyakṣānumānayoḥ) might mean that, like Praśastapāda, Candrānanda acknowledges a 2-fold character of yogipratyakṣa; there is also an epistemological argument at stake here, namely whether ‘soul’ is its own perceiver, or whether is perceived by someone else, say ‘mind’ (manas).

240 * Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

9.14. tathā dravyāntareṣu

pratiṣiddhātmasaṃyogeṣu vyāpakadravyeṣvātmanā saṃyukteṣu

apratiṣiddhātmasaṃyogeṣu ca paramāṇvādiṣu ubhābhyāṃ

saṃyukteṣu jñānam utpadyate / kiṃ ca,

9.15. ātmendriya manorthasannikarṣāc ca

sūkṣma vyavahita viprakṛṣṭeṣu artheṣu teṣāṃ catuṣṭayasannikarṣād

api pratyakṣaṃ jāyate / tathāsmadādipratyakṣeṣu /

9.16. tat samavāyāt karmaguṇeṣu

yathāntaḥ karaṇa saṃyogād dravyāntareṣu jñānam utpadyate

tathaiva tad dravya samaveteṣu karma guṇeṣu jñānam utpadyate

/ yathā ca catuṣṭaya sannikarṣāt sūkṣmādiṣvasmat pratyakṣeṣu ca

jñānaṃ tathaiva tat samaveteṣu guṇakarmasu jñānam utpadyate

saṃyukta samavāyāt /

503 knowledge is produced in regard to the other substances through the contact between

‘mind’ and ‘soul.’

504 these ‘contacts’ (saṃyukta) depend on the knowledge that takes place between ‘mind’

and ‘soul.’

505 ‘perceptive knowledge’ is already referred to in the previous sūtra 9.13.

Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 241

***9.14. in a similar way [knowledge is produced] in ***

regard to the other substances503

knowledge is produced in respect to [several] contacts:504 when substances’

contact with the ‘soul’ is not obstructed by atomic [substances] and so forth; in respect to ‘conjunctions’ of the soul that are not obstructed when all-pervasive

[substances] are not in contact with the ‘soul,’ and when there are ‘conjunctions’

that obstruct the ‘soul,’ moreover,

9.15. [perceptual knowledge]505 *** is also due to a contact ***

***between ‘soul,’ senses, ‘mind,’ and object-matter. ***

regarding things which are small, hidden, remote, their perceptual [knowledge] is also produced from the 4-fold perceptual contact;506 in this way, our perceptions and so forth [are produced].

***9.16. [perception is produced] in regard to motions and ***

qualities through the co-existence [of objects] in them

just as due to a ‘conjunction’ [of mind] with different causes, the knowledge concerning other substances [soul and so forth] is produced, similarly, the production of knowledge regarding motions and qualities [happens] by the inherence of those substances in their motions and qualities [of things]; 507and just as knowledge is produced in regards to minute things and our perception is through the 4-fold contact, similarly, the knowledge concerning qualities and motions is produced

due to the co-existence with the connected [object].508

506 ‘the 4-fold contact’ is the one mentioned in the sūtra itself 9.15.

507 once again, the ontological perceptual knowledge about the substances (and their essences) precedes any inferential knowledge about quality and motions; substance has proximity, whereas quality has a secondary value.

508 ‘saṃyuktasamavāya’ plays an important role within the Vaiśeṣika theory of perception; it is what may be called ‘inferential induction’ whereby the epistemology of the system lies in both perception and inference, among which the former is principal and crucial.

242 * Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

9.17. ātmasamavāyād ātmaguṇeṣu

yathātmamanaḥ saṃyogāt svasmin na ātmani jñānaṃ tathaiva

svātmasamaveteṣu sukhādiṣu jñānam utpadyate / yogipratyakṣaṃ

vyākhyāya anumānaṃ vyācaṣṭe -

***9.18. asyedaṃ kāryaṃ kāraṇaṃ sambandhy ***

ekārthasamavāyi virodhi ceti laiṅgikam

asyedam iti sambandhamātraṃ darśayitvā ‘kāryaṃ

kāraṇam’ ityādinā viśinaṣṭi / ‘kārya kāraṇa’ grahaṇena

samavāyimātropalakṣaṇājjātyāder api grahaṇaṃ, ‘sambandha’

śabdena saṃyogino grahaṇam dhūmādeḥ / anyad vyākhyātaṃ

saṃyogyādi sūtre / tatra evaṃ vidhaprasiddha saṃbandhasyair atha

ekadeśam asandigdhaṃ paśyataḥ śeṣānuvyavasāyo yaḥ sa liṅga

darśanāt sañjayamāno laiṅgikam iti vṛttikāraḥ /

9.19. etena śābdaṃ vyākhyātaṃ

yathā kāryādi smṛti savyapekṣam anumānaṃ trikālaviṣayam

atīndriyārthaṃ ca tathaiva śābdaṃ saṃketa smṛty apekṣaṃ

trikālaviṣayam atīndriyārthaṃ ca / ato numānenaika

yogakṣematvād anumānam eva yuktaṃ bhavati / kaḥ śabdorthasya

cet, tad ucyate -

509 the ‘intimate relation’ (samavāya) between the qualities and the substance ‘soul’ gives us the opportunity to analyse, define, and perceive ‘soul’ itself; however abstract a substance may be, qualities and their marks are an important medium by which we grasp the nature of substances, because between them there is an intimate relation, or as the Latin scholastic philosopher Duns Scotus would put it, there is only a ‘formal distinction’ not a ‘real distinction’ (as the Thomist traditions maintain).

510 the concept of ‘haecceity’ which Duns Scotus generated, puts forward a similar argument about the existence of ‘I’; namely by the ‘sense data’ which demonstrate both the individualised essence of ‘soul’ can be demonstrated; ‘univocity’ would mean that there is no sharp distinction between simple essence and individualised nature, but only a ‘formal’ one.

511 the discussion carries on about the specific qualities of the ‘soul,’ on whose essential knowledge liberation depends; on the other hand, the importance of the glosses 9.13

through 9.17 lies in that it gives yoga a role to play at the cognitive level; neverthe-

Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 243

***9.17. [knowledge] concerning the qualities of ‘soul’ [is produced] ***

through their co-existence with the [substance] ‘soul’509

just as from a ‘conjunction’ between ‘mind’ and ‘soul’ one’s knowledge concern-

ing one’s own ‘soul’ is produced,510 similarly the knowledge of ‘pleasure,’ and

so forth,511 which are inherent in one’s own ‘soul,’ is produced [as well]; having explained yogic perception, he [now] explains the inference –

***9.18. [the sentences] ‘this is the effect of this,’ ‘this is connected ***

***with this,’ ‘this is inherent in one and the same thing,’ ***

***‘this is in conflict with this’ all these [expressions] are ***

[dependent] on the mark [of ‘that X thing’]512

after having shown only the connection between ‘this is of that,’ now he distinguishes between ‘cause and effect’ and so forth; by the grasp of [the words] ‘effect, cause’ it is understood that the defining indicators are only inherent in the genera and so forth; by the word ‘connected’ there is the conceptualisation of a ‘conjunct,’

such as smoke and so forth; other things are explained in the sūtra beginning with

‘saṃyoga’; in this respect, Vṛttikāra513 says: ‘whosoever sees without doubt one part of an object in the relation established, in this way his remaining consideration is produced from the vision connected with the characteristic mark.’

9.19. thereby, [knowledge derived from] word-sound is explained514

just as inference presupposes the memory of an effect and so forth, which is the object-matter of a supra-sensual perception [and is subject] to the 3 tenses

[past, present, future], 515 similarly the [knowledge derived from] ‘word-sound’

is dependent on the memory of convention and is the domain [which covers] the 3 temporalities, and is something beyond sense-perception;516 therefore, because inference possesses one and the same subsistence [with śabda] inference is to be ascertained [as a result]; if you [asked] as to what is the meaning of word [śabda-pramāṇa] then this would be stated –

less, since yoga entails mental motion, it must have only an intellectual role to play, a mediating role, not necessarily directly soteriological.

512 if glosses 9.13–17 dealt with perception, from VSc 9.18 onwards the commentator deals with inference, which is a second major epistemological pramāṇa in Vaiśeṣika.

513 Candrānanda quotes from an unknown ‘author of the Vṛtti commentary’ (Vṛttikāra), which is currently lost.

514 śabda-pramāṇa may be a ‘linguistic type of knowledge,’ subsumed under anumāna (inferential logics and dialectics).

515 allusion is made here to a supra-ordinary form of knowledge that transcends senses and temporality; later, in VSc 9.28 the commentator returns to it.

516 the theory of language in Vaiśeṣika is that sound-word (śabda) is not eternal, therefore the meaning, like knowledge itself, is a ‘composite entity or process’; that is to say, language is merely conventional, established by God or seers who possess the power to name, define, and memorise things and their essences, see, for instance, VSc 6.1.13.

244 * Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

***9.20. hetur apadeśo liṅgaṃ nimittaṃ pramāṇaṃ ***

kāraṇam ity anarthāntaram

hetvādi śabdais tāt paryeṇa kāraṇaṃ kathayati / hetur apadeśaḥ

kāraṇam ity arthaḥ / evaṃ śabdaḥ kāraṇaṃ sad arthasya pratipattau

liṅgam kuta iti cet,

9.21. asya idam iti buddhyapekṣatvāt

yathā ‘arthasya pratipattāvi yaṃ hastaceṣṭā kāraṇaṃ pratipattavyā’

iti vṛttasaṅketaḥ tāṃ hastaceṣṭāṃ dṛṣṭvā tataḥ śabdāt kāraṇād

arthaṃ pratipadyate evam ‘asyārthasya pratipattau ayaṃ śabdaḥ

kāraṇam’ iti prasiddhasaṅketāt tataḥ śabdāt kāraṇād arthaṃ

pratipadyate yathābhinayāder apy arthaṃ pratipadyante laukikāḥ

evaṃ śabdorthasya saṅketavaśena vyañjakatvāt kāraṇam iti

vṛttikāraḥ / evam upamādīnām antarbhāvaḥ / evaṃ dve eva

pramāṇe / pramāṇatvaṃ ca pramīyate’neneti pramāṇaṃ pramā

pramāṇam iti vā / anumānāṅgaṃ smṛtir ucyate -

9.22. ātma manasoḥ saṃyoga viśeṣāt saṃskārāc ca smṛtiḥ

agnyarthino dhūmadarśanaṃ yad utpannaṃ tad apekṣād ātmāntaḥ

karaṇa saṃyogād viśiṣṭāc ca bhāvanākhyasaṃskārād yatra dhūmas

tatrāgnir iti smṛtir utpadyate /

517 ‘comparison’ (upamāna) is not a different pramāṇa but is rather sub-included under

‘inference’ (anumāna).

518 the gloss finally elucidates that there are no more than 2 pramāṇas; confusion may be created due to the subsuming under inference of other ‘sub-pramāṇas’ such as śabda, smṛti, and upamāna.

Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 245

***9.20. reasoning, invalid argument, inferential mark, instrumental ***

cause, means of knowledge, causation, these are synonymous

by words such as ‘hetu’ [reasoning] and so forth, he ultimately explains the cause; reasoning [and] pretext means cause; thus, if you ask how the word can be a cause, the mark for understanding the existing object is:

***9.21. because of the [object’s] dependence on ‘cognition’ ***

[we can say] ‘this belongs to this’

just as ‘for the object of understanding, the movement of the hand should be understood as the cause,’ in that way someone who has understood the convention conceptualises the object after having seen the movement of the hand, and then, from its sound, as it [is expressed in the sentence] ‘for the sake of knowledge of this object, this word is the cause,’ one [observer], as a result of an established convention, conceptualises from the sound-word the object of the cause, just as worldly people conceptualise an object through gesture and so forth, hence, this word is the indicator of the meaning because of a convention [between them] as stated by the author of the Vṛtti that this [word] is the cause; in this way comparison and so forth are included [in inference]; 517 hence, the means of knowledge are only 2; and the means of knowledge is proved [by the word] ‘anena [‘hereby’] it is known,’ or by ‘pramā’ [which indicates the authoritative] means of knowledge;518

memory is a part of inference, as expressed [as follows] –

***9.22. memory [comes into existence] from a particular ‘conjunction’ ***

between ‘mind’ and ‘soul’ and because of a ‘latent impetus’519

the visualisation of the rising of smoke follows from the perception of fire due to a [perceptual] ‘conjunction’ between ‘soul’ with ‘mind’, and from a specific

[impression] called ‘bhāvanā’ [expressed in sentences such as] ‘whenever there is fire there is smoke,’ memory is produced.

519 saṃskāra (latent impetus) in VSc 9.22–4 deals with memory from sleep, whereas from VSc 9.25 onwards with memory in the awakened state.

246 * Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

9.23. tathā svapnaḥ svapnāntikaṃ ca

uparatendriyasya pralīna manaskasyāntaḥ karaṇe naiva jñānaṃ

svapnaḥ svapne’pi svapnajñānaṃ svapnāntikaṃ tad ubhayaṃ

pūrvapratyayāpekṣād ātmamanaḥ saṃyogaviśeṣād bhāvanāsahāyāt

utpadyate /

9.24. dharmāc ca

ananubhūtārthaviṣayam api svapnajñānaṃ śubhāśubhasūcakaṃ

dharmāt ‘ca’ śabdād dharmāc ceti / jāgratas tu -

9.25. indriyadoṣāt saṃskārāc cāvidyā

vātādi doṣeṇopahatendriyasya pūrvarajatānubhava janitāt

saṃskārād ātmamanaḥ saṃyogāc ca viśiṣṭād dharmāpekṣād

atasmiṃs tad iti jñānaṃ yathā śuktikāyāṃ rajatam iti /

anadhyavasāyo yathā dākṣiṇātyasyoṣṭradarśane /

9.26. tad duṣṭa jñānaṃ

yad etat saṃśayaviparyayānadhyavasāya svapnalakṣaṇaṃ tad

duṣṭam apramāṇam iti

9.27. aduṣṭaṃ vidyā

yad aduṣṭaṃ pratyakṣānumānākhyaṃ tad vidyety ucyate /

520 ‘svapnāntika’ might be the deep part of the dream, sub-consciousness in dreams, or the ‘awareness of dream.’

521 the difference between a ‘voluntary dream’ caused by mind (svapna) and an ‘involuntary dream’ (svapnāntika) is that the latter is caused by karmic conjunctions that are beyond man’s control.

522 knowledge about dream indicates the ‘law of karma’ that is enacted by auspicious and inauspicious deeds caused by dharma and adharma.

Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 247

9.23. and similarly, dream and ultimate consciousness520 *** [are produced]***

dream is when knowledge concerning [a person’s] senses are stopped, and ‘mind’

is calm, which [knowledge] is produced by mind alone, [but] the ultimate consciousness and the knowledge of dream are both produced from a particular

‘conjunction’ between ‘soul,’ ‘mind,’ and the ‘conjunction’ based on an earlier experience which is associated with ‘bhāvanā’ [mental energy]. 521

9.24. and from ‘dharma’ [and adharma]522

knowledge concerning a dream whose object has not even been experienced is the subject-matter of ‘auspicious’ and ‘non-auspicious’ [things] due to ‘dharma’

[merit], and because of the word ‘ca’ [in sūtra 9.24] there is another ‘adharma’ [as well]; however, concerning [cognition in an] awakened [state] –

***9.25. [there is] ignorance because of a defect in the ***

senses and because of a latent impression

[in the case of a person] whose sense-organs have been affected by a defect [doṣa] of wind and so forth, from a latent impression caused by an earlier experience of lunar station [asterism rajata], as well as because of a ‘conjunction’ between ‘mind’ and

‘soul’ dependent on a particular dharma, 523 then [defective] knowledge occurs concerning for example [the confusion between] silver and an oyster shell; for instance the hesitation of the visualisation between a ‘southerner’ and a ‘camel.’

9.26. that is defective knowledge

whatever knowledge is characterised by ‘dream,’ ‘non-recognition,’ ‘reversed knowledge,’ [or] ‘doubt,’ that is defective [cognition] and is not a valid means of knowledge.

9.27. flawless [knowledge] is [considered] ‘vidyā’ [authoritative]

whatever knowledge is not defective, that is called pratyakṣa [perception] and anumāna [inference], and that is called ‘vidyā’ ‘vidyā’ [authoritative].

523 ‘viśiṣṭādharma’ may well be an allusion to ‘antyaviśeṣa’ (VS 1.2.6) which is the ‘cognitive factor’ for the identification of causes of illness; the mention of doṣas such as ‘vāta’ and so forth, shows that the Vaiśeṣika system plays a role in the Ayurvedic aetiology, in its medical practice, for the medic, like the yogi, is the observer who must introspect the ultimate particularity of any disorder, be it of either a physical or mental order; since antyaviśeṣa is a factor that differentiates the non-composite eternal substances, here the illness lies in the corrupted ‘soul,’ not the fundamental elements wind, fire, water, and earth.

248 * Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

9.28. ārṣaṃ siddhadarśanaṃ ca dharmebhyaḥ

tatra yal liṅga nirapekṣam atītānāgata vartamāneṣu

dharmādiṣvatīndriyeṣu granthair anupātteṣu devarṣīṇāṃ yat

prātibham utpadyate vijñānaṃ laukikānāṃ kadā cid eva ‘śvo

me bhrātā āgantā hṛdayaṃ me kathayati’ ity anavadhāraṇa

phalaṃ kevalaṃ tarkeṇa nīyate tad ārṣam ity ucyate /

añjanarasāyanādi siddhānāṃ tu sūkṣmavyavahitaviprakṛṣṭā

rthaviṣayaṃ yadvā divyāntarikṣādi nimittebhyaḥ prāṇināṃ

dharmādharma vipākaparijñānaṃ tat siddhadarśanaṃ / tac ca

pratyakṣānumānābhyāṃ na bhidyate ārṣaṃ bhidyata iti varṇayanti

/ tad etad ārṣaṃ siddhadarśanaṃ ca viśiṣṭād dharmād ātma manaḥ

saṃyogāc cotpadyate /

// iti navamo’dhyāyaḥ //

10

/ daśamo’dhyāyaḥ /

buddhiprasaṅga evāparyavasite sukhaduḥkhabuddhyorālaṃbane

sukhaduḥkhe ca kathayati / tathā hi ‘sukhaduḥkhamohamayāni

bhūtāni’ ity āhuḥ / tad ayuktam /

524 from the main features of siddhadarśana and the reference to vipāka, we may perhaps be entitled to raise the question as to whether the distinction between siddhadarśana versus ārṣajñāna may correspond to the difference between abhyudaya and niḥśreyasa, where abhyudaya is a ‘worldly’ elevation, an upgrading to superior cosmic levels, where siddhadarśana seems to play a role; niḥśreyasa however, is very different from abhyudaya; it is like the difference between ārṣajñāna and siddhadarśana (ārṣaṁ bhidyata iti varṇayanti) whereby the latter seems to contain a spatial, dimensional or cosmic knowledge; at any rate, neither of them should be confused with yogipratyakṣa, which is a perception that plays a role in the soteriological-cognitive process of the knowledge of categories; the forms of knowledge discussed in the ninth adhyāya: duṣṭa and aduṣṭa, ārṣajñāna and siddhadarśana represent the Vaiśeṣika theory of perception, and are only extraordinary types of knowledge, not pramāṇas.

Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 249

***9.28. knowledge of visionary sages and [that] of ***

the perfectible ones is from dharma

regarding the knowledge of the divine sages not grounded on the sacred texts, which [knowledge] is not based on inferential marks such as dharma and so forth, regarding, past, present, and future things which are beyond the reach of sense-organs, that is [knowledge] intuitively produced and it only sometimes belongs to worldly people [when they announce] ‘my heart tells me that my brother will come tomorrow,’ this [knowledge] is called aṛṣa [seers’ knowledge] being derived only from speculative logic, and guess, its result is only non-ascertainment; however, the [knowledge] of the perfectible sages is [achieved] from eye-anointment and chemicals, and [perceives] minute, hidden, [and] remote things, and discerns the ripening of dharma and adharma caused by [the activities of] celestial living beings, and those from the intermediate regions, and so forth; such knowledge is not different from perception and inference, [but] the sages’ visionary knowledge is different, thus it is explicated;524thus, this and that knowledge – of the sages and the knowledge of the perfect people – is produced from a ‘specific dharma’525 and from a contact between ‘mind’ and ‘soul.’

// this is the ninth chapter //

Translation

/ the tenth chapter /

thus, since the earlier discussion concerning ‘cognition’526 is not complete, [the author] says that ‘pleasure’ and ‘pain’ are the supporting basis of ‘cognition,’

‘pleasure’ and ‘pain’; 527 for example, some people say that ‘pleasure,’ ‘pain,’ and

‘chimeras’ are beings; [but] this is not so,

525 Candrānanda allocates a lot of scope to Vaiśeṣika’s ‘theory of difference’ in which he sees the capacity to offer a valid tool which responds to all needs; he offers several types of knowledge, siddhadarśana, aṛṣa, yogipratyakṣa, for 2 different kinds of purposes: abhyudaya and niḥśreyasa.

526 the tenth chapter ends with the restatement of soteriology, according to which, the nature and function of ‘cognition’ play a mediating role in achieving that.

527 in other words, such vaiśeṣikaguṇas exist in themselves, they cannot have other vaiśeṣikaguṇas as their substratum, because their substratum is the embodied ātman; if ‘pain’ and ‘pleasure’ were permanent and existed in themselves, then ‘liberation’

would be impossible, but this is something which the commentator rejects.

250 * Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

***10.1. ātma samavāyaḥ sukhaduḥkhayoḥ ***

***pañcabhyorthāntaratve hetus tad ***

āśrayibhyaś ca guṇebhyaḥ

ātmany eva yaḥ samavāyaḥ sukhaduḥkhayor asau pañcabhyaḥ

kṣityādibhyas tad āśrayibhyaś ca guṇebhyo gandha rasa rūpa

sparśebhyo arthāntaratve hetuḥ anyaguṇānām anyatrāsamavāyāt

/ ātmasamavāyaś caitayor ahaṃkāreṇaika vākyabhāvāt / ātma

samavāyitve ’pi -

***10.2. iṣṭāniṣṭa kāraṇaviśeṣād virodhāc ca mithaḥ ***

sukhaduḥkhayor arthāntara bhāvaḥ

stryādikāraṇajanyaṃ sukhaṃ / viṣādikāraṇajanyaṃ duḥkhaṃ /

parasparaviruddhe ca sukhaduḥkhe anyonyavināśenotpatteḥ / ato

anayoḥ bhedaḥ naikatvam ekārtha samavāyāt / saṃśayanirṇayau

parasparābhāvamātraṃ, na vastu santāv iti cet, na,

***10.3. saṃśayanirṇayayor arthāntara bhāvaś ***

ca jñānāntaratve hetuḥ

arthāntarāt parasparavilakṣaṇāt kāraṇād bhāva utpattiḥ

saṃśayanirṇayayoḥ / tathā hi viśeṣaṃ jijñāsor gṛhītaviśeṣasya

sāmānyālocanāt saṃśayo jāyate / saṃśayāt parataḥ pramāṇāntareṇa

viśeṣagrahaṇāt ‘sthāṇur evāyam’ iti niścayaḥ / yadi caitau na

vastusantau bhavetāṃ naitau vilakṣaṇakāraṇābhyām utpadyeyātāṃ

/ ato jñānāntarabhūtau saṃśayanirṇayau parasparataḥ, nirṇayas tu

pratyakṣānumānābhyāṃ na bhidyete iti kecit /

528 each soul has its own set of ‘specific qualities’ (vaiśeṣikaguṇa) that are experienced individually and not by any other self; in addition to the individualistic and unique experience of ‘I’ (ahaṃkāra), this argument is proof of the existence of the plurality of the souls.

529 once again, dualistic epistemology is prevalent in Vaiśeṣika categories.

530 how can qualities be in one single subject-matter and yet many? what is their identity when they inhere in an object; a possible response to the manifoldness of qualities should be sought in relation to the variety of ‘pleasure’ and ‘pain’; see the argument for the plurality of the souls in āhnika VSc 3.2.

Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 251

***10.1. co-existence of ‘pleasure’ and ‘pain’ in the ‘soul’ is ***

***the cause of the [knowledge of the] difference between ***

the 5 elements which constitute [one body]

whatever co-existence of ‘pleasure’ and ‘pain’ exists in the ‘soul’ itself, that is the cause of a different subject-matter from the 5 elements [mahābhūta] ‘earth’ and so forth, and from the qualities such as ‘smell,’ ‘colour,’ ‘taste,’ ‘touch,’ inhabiting their substratum [5 elements], [and this is] because there cannot be co-existence of qualities there, or in another soul [at the same time];528 and the inherence of the 2 [pain and pleasure] in the ‘soul’ is one and the same with ‘I-consciousness’

[ahaṃkāra]; in spite of their co-existence in the ‘soul,’ [Kaṇāda] says –

***10.2. because [‘pleasure’ and ‘pain’ are caused] by a ***

***specific ‘desirable,’ ‘undesirable’ [fact], and because ***

***of their reciprocal opposition, ‘pleasure’ and ‘pain’ ***

are existentials different from [each other]

‘pleasure’ is produced from causes such as women, and so forth; ‘pain’ is produced from causes such as poison and so forth; ‘pleasure’ and ‘pain’ are mutually opposite, because their production [happened] from mutual destruction; 529 therefore, there is difference between them and there is no identity [between them]

through their co-existence in one object [and] its manifoldness;530 if you say that doubt and conclusion are based only on mutual non-reality [but] they are not actually existing things, [then the answer is] no,

***10.3. and doubt and conclusion are different from each ***

other, and this is the proof of another ‘cognition’

manifestation of both doubt and conclusion is caused from the difference of their separate uniqueness, each of which possessing a different meaning; thus, doubt is produced in regard to a person who wants to know the particularity but who has not understood that particularity is due to the contemplation of generality;531

another doubt is when after having understood the particularity through another means of knowledge, there comes [as a result] the discernment that ‘this is only a pillar [not a man],’ if these two things were not real then they would not be produced from causes which are different from each other; therefore, doubt and conclusion are 2 forms of knowledge different from each other, but the conclusion does not differ from perception and inference, this is what some people say.

531 the reality of ‘universals’ is possible only after the knowledge of ‘particularity’ has been grasped; the knowledge goes from simple to complex; without particularity the knowledge of the universal becomes the knowledge of generic things, (epistemic generalisation) which often leads to confusion and doubt; particularity and universality are opposite but equivalent terms for they imply each other; concerning universals in Aristotle see De Int 7.17a38–41; Met 7.13.

252 * Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

***10.4. tayor niṣpattiḥ pratyakṣa laiṅgikābhyāṃ ***

jñānābhyāṃ vyākhyātā

yatha smṛtimata ātmānaḥ pratyakṣam liṅgāṃ dṛṣṭā apratyakṣe

jñānaṃ utpadyate thataiva sāmānyamātradarśanāt smṛtimato

viśeṣaṃ jijñāsor agṛhīte viśeṣe sthāṇuḥ puruṣo va iti

jāyate saṃśayaḥ / yathā ca bhūtārtha saṃbandhavaśenā

‘ayam evaṃ bhūtortha’ iti pratyakṣam utpadyate tathaiva

viśeṣasambandhavaśenā nivṛtte saṃśaye ‘idam evaṃ bhūtam’ iti

nirṇayo jāyate / idānīṃ kāryakāraṇabuddhī nirūpayati -

10.5. bhūtam iti pratyakṣaṃ vyākhyātam

svakāraṇebhya utpannekārye bhūtaṃ niṣpannam idaṃ kāryam

iti kāryajñānaṃ ‘viśeṣaṇajñānād viśeṣyajñānam’ iti nyāyena tad

vyākhyātam tac ca mukhyam / anyatra tu aupacārikam kāryābhāvāt

/ tathā hi - niṣpatsyamāne kārye /

10.6. bhaviṣyat īti kāryāntare dṛṣṭatvāt

yathā bhūtāyāḥ sāmagryā anantaraṃ paṭādi kāryamutpannaṃ

dṛṣṭaṃ tathā bhūta sāmagrīdarśanād idānīm anutpanne ’pi kārye

kāryaśabdam upacarya ‘bhaviṣyati kāryam’ iti jāyate kāryabuddhir

/ niṣpadyamāne ’pi -

532 viśeṣa (particularity) is that which defines the theory of perception in Vaiśeṣika from the highest visible level to the most minute invisible level.

533 ‘thing brought forth’ may refer to a thing from the past, the next sūtra refers to a thing from the future.

Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 253

***10.4. production of both [doubt and conclusion] is ***

***explained by the [different] means of knowledge ***

[pramāṇa] perception and inference

just as, when a person having memory – after having seen directly the mark of himself – this knowledge is not perceived in the same manner as that of the man who has only seen something generic, and having a particularity from memory wishes to investigate and grasp the particularity [when the particular is not known]

a doubt arises as [expressed in the question] ‘is [this] a pillar or man’; and just as, by a contact with a past thing a perception as [expressed in the sentence] ‘this is an object like this’ is produced, in the same manner, conclusion-judgement takes place because of a contact with the particularity532 after doubt has been removed; now he explains the ‘cognitions’ of cause and effect –

10.5. perception is explained with a thing brought forth [already]533

after effect is produced from its own causes [as expressed in the sentence] ‘this effect has occurred [so] it is produced,’ this is a cognition of effect [as expressed in the sentence] ‘through the knowledge of adjective-qualification there is the knowledge of the qualified [thing]’ by means of this rule ‘that’ [cognition of effect] is produced, and it is the chief subject [of cognition]; elsewhere [this subject-knowledge] is secondary because of the absence of effect; thus, when the effect is going to be produced,

***10.6. [effect-knowledge exists] because is seen in a subsequent effect ***

[as expressed in the sentence] ‘it will happen’ [in the future]

such as after an uninterrupted collection [of causes] as it must happen, 534 an effect such as a pot and so forth has been visibly produced, so also, now, after having seen that type of collection [of causes] even though the effect is not [yet] produced, having used the word ‘kārya’ [effect] metaphorically, the cognition concerning effect is produced [as in the sentence] ‘effect will happen’;535 although

[effect] is being produced –

534 ‘uninterrupted collection as it must happen’, refers to the necessity of the endless chain of causation entailed by the indestructible relationship between cause and effect (vyāpti); cause requires an effect, and effect requires a cause, both ontologically and epistemologically.

535 the epistemology of the system takes a logical-inferential turn not least because everything including ‘time’ is composed of parts which stand in a relation of interdependence; if, from an ontological point of view, there is a reality such as ‘present,’ then one can naturally assert the reality of subsequent temporal parts, ‘past’ and ‘future’

moments, whereby they necessarily presuppose each other.

254 * Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

10.7. tathā bhavat īti sāpekṣebhyonapekṣebhyaś ca

yadā prastāritāṃs tantūn pūrvapūrvasaṃyogāpekṣān

upalabhamānaḥ paścāt paścād uttarottaratantusaṃyoge

saty anapekṣān upalabhate tadāsya paṭṭikādyavāntaraṃ

kāryaṃ paśyata utpadyamāne kāryadravye niṣpannāniṣpanna

saṃyoga paryālocanayā ‘bhavati kāryam utpadyate

kāryam’ iti jāyate buddhiḥ / yathā cotpattau evaṃ vināśe ’pi

prayatnānantarotpattīnāṃ ghaṭādi dravyāṇāṃ vināśe ‘abhūt’ iti

pratyayasya ‘bhūtapratyakṣābhāvāt’ [9.6] ity ādinā kathitatvāt

idānīṃ pāriṇāmike śarīrādau kathyate / tatra vinaṣṭe -

10.8. abhūdityabhūtāt

abhūtād vinaṣṭād ity arthaḥ / pāṇipādagrīvādīnavayavān

vibhaktānupalabhya vinaṣṭādasamavāyikāraṇāt saṃyogad vinaṣṭe

kārye ‘abhūt kāryaṃ śarīrākhyam’ iti jāyate buddhiḥ / vinaśyati

punaḥ -

10.9. sati ca kāryāsamavāyāt

sati saṃyoge ‘ca’ śabdād asati ghaṭakādi vināśakāraṇa vyāpāre

’pi keṣāñcid grīvādhyavayavānāmanivṛtte saṃyoge vibhāgāc

ca pāṇyādīnāṃ vinivṛtte kāryasya śarīrāderasamavāyād

vināśakāraṇāghrātatvena pracalitatvād vinaṣṭāvinaṣṭa

saṃyogālocanena ‘kāryaṃ naśyati’ iti jñānaṃ utpadyate / anye

tu ‘abhūt kāryam’ iti vyācakṣate tad ayuktaṃ tad abhiprāyeṇa iva

kāryasya vinaṣṭatvāt / eṣā ca buddhiḥ -

536 sūtra alludes to the theory of asatkāryavāda which allows for the possibility of new things (as opposed to satkāryavāda, where effect exists already in the cause).

537 cause and effect are again mutually inclusive as well as mutually exclusive.

Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 255

***10.7. similarly, [cognition of effect] happens from both ***

dependent and independent [causes]

when there are threads spread out, dependent [on each other], the earlier and earlier connections are not [yet] comprehended, [but] after the ‘conjunction’ is no longer there, one comprehends the subsequent independent [threads], and observes the subordinate effects such as stripes and so forth; the production of the effect [as in the assertion] ‘this is an effect’ is in relation to the design of the ‘conjunction’ between produced and non-produced [entities] when there is the sight of the production of an effect from cause, this is [how] cognition is generated; just as there is production, so also there is destruction [of things] by some other effort [or forces], as in the case of pot substances and so forth, whose destruction is ‘abhūt’

as explained in [the sentence] ‘bhūtapratyakṣābhāvāt’ [‘due to the absence of the past thing’] [VS 9.6] and so forth, thus such things are told regarding the body which is the subject to transformation and so forth [which is an effect of causes]; regarding a destroyed [thing] –

10.8. [cognition of] a ‘past thing’ is536 *** from the ***

[cognition of another prior] past thing

meaning of ‘abhūt’ [refers here to] a destroyed [thing]; after having comprehended separately, [body] parts such as hand, foot, neck, and so forth, because of the ‘conjunction’ with a non-inherent cause which is destroyed when the effect-

product is destroyed,537 then there is the comprehension of ‘effect-product called body was there’; but when [effect-product is] destroyed –

10.9. it exists also, because of the non-inherent effect [in cause]538

because of the word ‘ca,’ [we say that] ‘conjunction’ [both] exists [as well as] is destroyed, for although the operation of the destroyer-cause does not destroy the body parts such as neck and so forth because of [their] conjunctions, and other parts of the body such as hands and so forth are destroyed due to disjunctions, an effect is not inherent in the body, because the destruction [as expressed in the sentence] ‘effect is being destroyed’ is noticeable in the relation between a destroyed

[thing] and a non-destroyed [thing], this is how knowledge generates; yet, other

[thinkers while] commenting upon this, explain that ‘the past thing is an effect,’

[but] that is not correct because of the destructibility of the effect has been operated by that [cause]; and ‘cognition’ is [produced] like this –

538 the non-inherence of the effect in the cause, according to asatkāryavāda, means that the effect cannot ‘pre-exist’ in the cause; effect exists only if there is a cause; alternative translation: ‘when it [conjunction] exists [and when it does not exist] [cognition is possible] because of the non-inherent effect [in cause],’ the alternate existence of ‘conjunction’ to exist and not to exist, is indicated by the conjunction ‘ca,’ see Thakur 2003: 119.

256 * Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

***10.10. ekārtha samavāyiṣu kāraṇāntareṣu ***

darśanād ekadeśa ity ekasmin

śarīrādau kvacid ekasmin na arthe yadā pāṇyādayovayavāḥ

samavāyina upalabdhāḥ athāsyasya teṣu ekadeśabuddhir utpannā

idānīṃ tan vibhajya vibhaktānupalabhya etasmin nekadeśini ‘abhūt

kāryam’ iti jñānotpattiḥ / ke te avayavā ity āha -

10.11. udaraḥ pṛṣṭhamudaraṃ pāṇir iti tad viśeṣebhyaḥ

svasāmānyaviśeṣebhyaḥ śirastvādibhyo yeṣu jñānaṃ jāyate [te]

śirādayovayavā ityarthaḥ / kāraṇa buddhis tu -

10.12. kāraṇam iti dravye kāryasamavāyāt

kāryaṃ dravyaguṇān karma vā samavetaṃ dravye paśyato

‘dravyaṃ kāraṇam’ iti mukhyā buddhiḥ kāryasya jātatvāt /

ajāte tu –

10.13. saṃyogād vā

janiṣyamāṇe ’pi kārye tantvādīnāṃ paraspareṇa saṃyogād asya

paṭaṃ prati teṣu kāraṇabuddhir utpadyate

539 viśeṣas are abstract individuals which stand beyond the visible particulars of the body (head, back, belly, hand); to put it differently, one may say that there is the ‘particular head’ on the one hand, but what viśeṣa indicates is perhaps that there is also an

‘essence’ of a head, on the other hand, which is invisible to the naked eye.

540 sāmānyaviśeṣa has been translated here differently, and not in terms of ‘universal particularity’ or ‘generic specificity’ as elsewhere in this edition.

541 when it is said that ‘the first cognition’ is ‘the substance as a cause’ by this it is meant that ‘substance is the first and foremost category of knowledge’ among all padārthas, and in a sense the most important one; before knowing the effects of things, one needs

Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 257

***10.10. [effect-product] exists because it has been seen, with other ***

caused-things, in one portion of one body, this it is one only

when [body] parts such as hand and so forth, are inherent in an effect-product body and so forth, and sometimes in one and the same subject, then, the ‘cognition’ of the parts is comprehended; now, the production of cognition [as expressed in the sentence] ‘the effect happened,’ is after a separation from that [cause], and after having comprehended their divisibility, both ‘in that’ and ‘each instance’;

[regarding the question] which are these limbs, [he] says this –

***10.11. head, back, belly, hand, these are [known] ***

by their ‘particularities.’539

the meaning of this [sūtra] is that head, and so forth, are the limbs whose knowledge is produced from headiness and other parts, which have their own ‘generalities’ and ‘particularities’; 540 however, regarding the ‘cognition’ of cause [Kaṇāda]

says –

10.12. cause is [known] from the co-existence of effect in the essence

the first ‘cognition’ [expressed by the sentence] ‘substance is the cause’541 takes

place when one sees the effect of the substance or quality or motion inherent in

[that] substance from which an effect is produced; when, however, [effect] has not

[yet] been produced –

10.13. or [is known] from a ‘conjunction’ [with something else]542

even when ‘effect’ is going to be produced [in the future] through mutual ‘conjunction’ of threads and so forth, [then] cognition concerning ‘conjunction’ as the cause of the cloth is produced; the production of ‘cognition’ of cause [derives]

from the effect that will be produced [such as] cloth is preceded by threads and so forth, 543 which stand in a mutual relation.544

to identify, inductively, the cause, which is the substance itself which is the cause and substratum of the effect-products.

542 as we know, there is a difference between ‘conjunction’ and ‘inherence.’

543 in this case, thread is the cause while cloth is the effect; ‘preceded by threads’ means that threads are the cause of the cloth; a similar cause-effect discussion occurs in VSc 10.15.

544 ‘cognition’ is a ‘composite process’; in this case it is the mutual composition between cause and effect which is always intertwined; cognition should not be understood as the faculty of one organ, such as mind, as in Western philosophy.

258 * Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

10.14. kāraṇasamavāyāt karmaṇi

saṃyogavibhāgeṣu nirapekṣakāraṇatvāt tat kāraṇadravye

samavetatvāt karmotpannam mātram eva kāraṇabuddhiṃ janayati /

idānīṃ guṇeṣu -

10.15. tathā rūpe kāraṇakāraṇasamavāyāc ca

kāryasya rūpasya samavāyikāraṇe paṭādau yat samavāyikāraṇaṃ

tantavas teṣu kāraṇakāraṇeṣu samavetatvāt kāraṇaṃ rūpādaya ity

ucyante ‘ca’ śabdād anutpanne ’pi kāryarūpe kāraṇabuddhiḥ /

10.16. kāraṇasamavāyāt saṃyoge

kāryasya paṭādeḥ samavāyikāraṇeṣu tantvādiṣu samavetatvāt

saṃyoge dravyaṃ prati kāraṇabuddhiḥ / guṇakarmārambhe tu -

545 Arena in his Italian edition (VSi) 1982: 200, translates that motion is not an inherent cause, see also VSc 10.12.

546 ‘conjunction’ and ‘disjunction’ are independent entities that work separately, not as cause-effect would do; therefore, the commentator says that they have no dependent cause; that is to say, they are ‘independent.’

547 ‘inherence of their cause in the substance’ means that the qualities ‘conjunction’ and

‘disjunction’ reside in their substratum, the substance.

548 something is caused because of the ‘inherence in a cause’; if a colour cannot be produced without being inherent in the cause, does this mean that effect pre-exists (or inheres) in the cause?

Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 259

***10.14. [knowledge of cause]545 is due to the ***

co-existence of causes in motions

because in ‘conjunction’ and ‘disjunction’ there is a non-dependent cause,546 and

because of the co-existence of their cause in the substance, 547 motions cause the

‘cognition of cause’ as soon as they are produced; now regarding the [cognition of] qualities –

***10.15. similarly, colour [is known] because its cause ***

is inherent in [another] cause548

cloth and so forth549 is that which has the nature of a product inherently connected with a cause, whereby the inherent cause is the threads in regard to cloth and so forth, the form-colour and so forth are called cause because of being inherent in the cause of causes; 550 because of the word ‘ca’ [‘and’] even though the form of effect is not [yet] produced, there is still cognition of cause.

***10.16. regarding ‘conjunction,’ [this is known] because ***

of its co-existence with the cause551

cognition of ‘conjunction’ as a cause concerns substance [cloth] due to the co-existence with threads and so forth, which are the inherent causes of the effect cloth and so forth; however, regarding the origin of qualities and motions –

549 ‘and so forth’ (or ‘etc.’) refers here to cloth and similar products, all of which are presumably made of the same material, threads.

550 even an effect can be considered a cause, which allows for an endless chain of causality; the expression ‘the cause of causes’ shows the infinity of the events and cosmic manifestations; the knowledge of the ultimate essence of such causes (the substance) is therefore the means to acquire ‘liberation’ which is the state that puts a halt to this endless chain of causality.

551 since the previous sūtras discuss the various causes, the subject of the sūtra I take to be the ‘cause.’

260 * Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

10.17. tathā kāraṇākāraṇa samavāyāc ca

kāraṇe ghaṭe akāraṇe cāgnau agnisaṃyogaḥ samavetatvāt kāraṇaṃ

pākajānāṃ / abhighātye karmakāraṇe abhihantari cākāraṇe

samavetatvāt vegavad dravyasaṃyogaḥ karmaṇaḥ kāraṇam /

pākajārambhe tu-

10.18. saṃyuktasamavāyād agner vaiśeṣikam

aṇūnāṃ pākajarūpādyārambhe aṇubhiḥ saṃyuktegnau samavetam

uṣṇasparśaṃ vaiśeṣikaṃ guṇam apekṣate saṃyogaḥ / dravyaṃ

varjayitvā anyatra saṃyogaḥ sāpekṣaḥ kāraṇam / atīndriye

bhūtādāvarthe -

10.19. laiṅgikaṃ pramāṇaṃ vyākhyātam

laiṅgikaṃ parokṣam ucyate ‘bhaviṣyati’ ityādi kāryāṇāṃ

yenāvagamyate tad anumānaṃ pramāṇaṃ vyākhyātaṃ

/ śāstrādau dharmo vyākhyeyatayā pratijñātaḥ atas tasya

pratyāmnāyānusandhānārthaṃ sūtradvayaṃ gatam api punar

ucyate -

***10.20. dṛṣṭānāṃ dṛṣṭaprayojanānāṃ ***

dṛṣṭābhāve prayogobhyudayāya

śrutau smṛtau ca dṛṣṭānām dṛṣṭasya prayojanasyābhāve

prayogobhyudayāya dharmāy ety arthaḥ / tasya cāmnāyāt

samādhigama uktaḥ / āmnāyasya ca siddhaṃ prāmāṇyaṃ -

552 this valid means of knowledge is ‘inference,’ which is one of the two major pramāṇas on which Vaiśeṣika is based.

553 ‘dṛṣṭānāṃ’ refers to ‘injunctions’ explicitly mentioned in the śruti and smṛti texts (courtesy of Pundit Devadatta Patil).

Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 261

***10.17. similarly, [cause is known] because it can ***

inhere in both cause and non-cause

regarding the pot which is a cause as well as a non-cause, the ‘conjunction’

with fire is the cause of the things produced from heating because of the inherence; the ‘conjunction’ with a speedy substance is the cause of motion due to the co-existentiality of the motion in the cause, which is to be destroyed and due to the non-cause which is the destroyer [of the motion]; yet, regarding [things] made of heating –

***10.18. particularity [is known] because fire is in close ***

contact with the contacted thing [when burning]

regarding the inception of the form-colour produced from the heating of atoms, a ‘conjunction’ is dependent upon a specific quality, namely hot-touch which is inherent in the contacted fire; except for the substance, in other situations, ‘conjunction’ is a dependent cause; regarding beyond-senses [cognition] such as the past things –

***10.19. the authoritative inferential means of ***

knowledge has been explained552

[means of knowledge based on] inferential marks is called ‘parokṣa’ [beyond eye-perception], the inference [anumāna] is that which is known by means of effects [in sentences such as] ‘it will become’ and so forth, thus, the means of knowledge have been explained; in the beginning of this science [Vaiśeṣika philosophy], dharma was announced as that which is to be explained, therefore, in order to coordinate the meaning of the 2 sūtras [the one from the beginning] with the conclusion, even though it has been explicated, [nevertheless, now, Kaṇāda]

explains it again –

10.20. [acts] which are explicitly stated,553 *** [acts] whose ***

***purpose is seen, [acts] whose purpose is not seen are ***

[all acts which lead] to ‘mundane elevation’554

performance of acts which are seen in the śruti and smṛti [texts] when their purpose is not [visibly mentioned] is for the sake of elevation, this is the meaning

[of the sūtra]; the achievement of [dharma] is stated in the sacred texts; and the authority of the sacred texts is well-established –

554 this sūtra is identical with VS 6.2.1.

262 * Vaiśeṣikasūtra *

10.21. tad vacanādāmnāya prāmāṇyam iti

tanubhuvanādikāryatayā vijñāto bhagavān īśvaraḥ tat praṇayanāc

cāmnāyasya siddhaṃ prāmāṇyaṃ / ‘iti’ śabdaḥ samāptyarthaḥ /

evaṃ dravyādīnāṃ sādharmya vaidharmya parijñānād vairāgya

dvarena jñānotpatteḥ ‘ātmā jñātavya’ ityādi vākyebhyaś

copāsākrameṇa vijñānāvāpter niḥśreyasādhigamaḥ

/ jagatosyānandakaraṃ vidyāśarvayāḥ sadaiva yaś candram /

/ āndayati sa vṛttiṃ candrānando vyadhāt etāṃ //

// iti vaiśeṣikasūtravṛttiḥ samāptā //

Vaiśeṣikasūtra * 263

***10.21. because [the sacred texts] are the speech of ‘Him’ the ***

sacred texts are authoritative means of knowledge

Bhagavān which means Īśvara [and] is known through the effect-products such as body, cosmos, and so forth, [and] since He composed the sacred texts, [these texts] are established as authoritative; the word ‘iti’ [in the sūtra] means comple-tion [of Vaiśeṣika philosophy, here]; hence, by the knowledge of differences and similarities between substances and so forth, through the production of knowledge [obtained] by the means of ‘detachment’ [from the world], and through the acquisition of a special knowledge about ‘adoration’ that follows a successive order of precepts such as ‘the soul should be known,’ and so forth, [by all of these]

there is achievement of ‘absolute liberation.’

[colophon]555

/ he who gives always delight to the moon, is like the [moon] which gives bliss to the entire world / [such a moon] belongs to the night of knowledge, [so also] Candrānanda prepared this commentary //

// thus, the commentary on the Vaiśeṣikasūtra is concluded [here]//

555 the colophon displays a play of poetic words using the simile of the moon (symbol of knowledge in dark or ‘confusing’ times); the Vaiśeṣika student should identify the main subject, which is the author himself, Candrānanda, and not the moon; Candrānanda resembles the moon because by ‘differential knowledge’ (Vaiśeṣika philosophy) he dispelled the darkness of knowledge, which is ignorance about reality.

Appendices

1 Vaiśeṣika and world philosophy

(Ancient, Classical, and Early Medieval periods)

Vaiśeṣika and world philosophy

266 * Vaiśeṣika and world philosophy *

Pañcāstikāyasāra

Brahmasūtra (BB)

Tattvārthasūtra

(afflated: śruti) Saṃhitā-Brāhmaṇas Āraṇyaka-Upaniṣads

Jaina Mahavīra

(The Canon) Āyāraṅga, Sūyagaḍa, Uttarajjhāyā, Dasaveyāliya, Isibhāsiyāiṃ

**Jaina Kundakunda’s Umāsvāti’s **… Vedānta Bādarāyaṇa’s

’ nirvāṇa

Sutta Piṭaka

Rig Veda

(schism)

Sāma Veda Yajur Veda

Ṣaṣṭitantra

Atharva Veda

The 7 Sages (Saptarṣi)

(The Canon)

Vinaya Piṭaka

Sāṃkhyasūtra (SS)

Mīmāṃsāsūtra (MS)

century BC)

Abhidhamma Piṭaka

***Buddhism Buddha ***th (5

Rājagṛha Council (c. 411 BC)

Vesālī Council (c. 386 BC)

Indian

(recollected: smṛti) Mahābhārata of Vyāsa Rāmāyaṇa of Vālmīki Purāṇas

…

Pāṭaliputra Council (c. 240 BC)

**Sāṃkhya Kapila’s Pañcāśikā’s ** *Yuktidīpikā … *Mīmāṃsā Jaiminī’s of Ur

Abraham

Jewish and Islamic

**Moses ** The Pentateuch

**Solomon ** The Book of Proverbs

The Torah

The Mishnah

Sentences

Syriac

City of Aššur

Aramaic alphabet

Words of Aḥiqar

Menander the Wise’s

Hesiod’s

Theogony & Works and Days

Categories*

Dialogues

Greek

Minoan civilization

**The War of Troy ** Iliad Odyssey

**The 7 Sages **Ionian: **Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes **Eleatic: **Xenophanes, Parmenides, Zeno **Physicists: Heraclitus, Empedocles, Democritus, Anaxagoras Pythagoras Socrates Plato’s **Aristotle’s ** *Physics ***Panaetius’ ** On Duties On Philosophical Schools **Epictetus’ ** Discourses Enchiridion

Latin

Stonehenge

Founding of Rome

**La Tène culture **(Celtic)

**Epicurus’ ** Letter to Herodotus

**Ennius’ ** Epicharmus

**Cicero’s ** Hortensius (lost) De Legibus

**Lucius Annaeus Seneca’s ** De Constantia Sapientis

**Apuleius’ ** De Platone et dogmate eius De Deo Socratis

**Arrian of Nicomedia’s ** Discourses of Epictetus Enchiridion

Age

30–15 BC

15–5 BC

6–2 BC

2 BC–2 AD

Vaiśeṣika and world philosophy * 267
*)

(YS)

( Continued

(l)

Vṛtti (VS)

Vṛtti

Bhāṣyaṭīkā (l)*

[SS]

Vaiśeṣikasūtra

(l) Bhāṣya VS (l)

Yogasūtra*

Bhāṣya VS (l)

VS (lost)

**Vaiśeṣika Kaṇāda’s ** *Vākya Kaṭandī VS *Rāvaṇa’s Bhāradvāja’s Ātreya’s Yoga Patañjali’s

**Vaiśeṣika Candramatī’s ** *Daśapadārthaśāstra ***Praśastapāda’s Praśastamati’s Candrānanda’s **… **Jaina Pūjyapāda’s ** Sarvārthasiddhi **Akalaṅka’s ** Tattvārtharājavārtika [TV] Nyāyaviniścaya (NN)

**Mallavādin’s ** Nayacakra Dvādaśāranayacakra

(NS)

Viṃśatikā

Nyāyabhāṣya (NS)

Nyāyasūtra

Abhidharmasamuccaya

Indian

Nyāya Gautama’s

Buddhism Asaṅga’s Vasubandhu’s

Nyāya Vātsyāyana’s

**Sāṃkhya Īśvarakṛṣṇa’s ** Sāṃkhyakārikā [SK] & Sāṃkhyavṛtti

*World; *

Free

The Quran

*On Providence; *

(c. 570–632 AD)

Jewish and Islamic

**Philo of Alexandria’s ** *On the Eternity of the *

*Every Good Man is *

Sufi Ascetics (ḥunafā’)

Prophet Muhammad

Christ

̄rahaṭ’s

*and the passions, *

Ecclesiastes

Moses

Syriac

**The Birth of Jesus **

**The Peshitta **(Syriac Bible)

**Bardaiṣān’s ** Hymn on the Soul Dialogue Against Fate An Account of India **Ephrem of Nisibis’ ** Hymns on Faith

**Ap ** Demonstrations

**John of Apamea’s ** *Dialogue on the soul *

*Commentary on *

**Jacob of Serugh’s ** *Memra on the Veil of *

Memra on Melchizedek Memre on Creation

**Aenesidemus’ ** Pyrrhonist Discourses

**Galen’s ** On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato

**Clement of Alexandria’s ** Protrepticus

**Origen’s ** On the First Principles

**Plotinus and Porphyry of Tyre’s ** Enneads Life of Pythagoras

**Tertullian’s ** *De Anima De Carne et Anima ***Dionysius the Pseudo-Areopagite’s ** Divine Names Celestial Hierarchy Mystical Theology **Stobaeus’ ** Physical and Moral Extracts

**John the Lydian’s ** De Ostentis

**Zacharias of Mytilene’ ** Ammonius

**John Philoponus’ ** Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics

Greek

**Lucretius’ ** De rerum natura

**Pliny the Elder’s ** Naturalis Historia

**Marcus Manilius’ ** Astronomica

**Seneca the Younger’s ** Naturales quaestiones

**Ovid’s ** *Metamorphoses ***Aulus Gellius’ ** Attic Nights Adversaria **Marcus Aurelius’ ** Meditations

**Sextus Empiricus’ ** Adversus Mathematicos Pyrrhoniae Hypotyposes **Cassius Dio’s ** Historia Romana

**Jerome’s ** De seraphim De voce Osanna

**Augustin’s ** Contra Academicos De Magistro De Trinitate

**Claudianus Mamertus’ ** De Statu Animae

Latin

Age

2 BC–2 AD

2–4 AD

4–6 AD

268 * Vaiśeṣika and world philosophy *

Jinabhadra’s

Haribhadra’s

**Sureśvara’s ** *Bhāṣyavanti (BS) Naiṣkarmyasiddhi *

Toṭakācārya’s

Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya

Dakṣināmūrtivārttika

Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya

Śrutisārasamuddharaṇam

**Vedānta Gauḍapāda’s ** *Māṇḍukyakārikā Uttaragītābhāṣya Durgāsaptashatī *… **Buddhism Dignāga’s ** Ālambanaparīkṣā, **Dharmakīrti’s ** Saṃbandhaparikṣāvṛtti

Jaina

**Vedānta ** *Yogavāsiṣṭha ***Śaṅkara’s ** Brahmasūtrabhāṣyaṃ (BS) Taittirīyopaniṣad-bhāṣya Upadeśasāhasrī

**Maṇḍanamiśra’s ** *Brahmasiddhi Vidhiveka ***Padmapāda’s ** Pañcapādikā & Upaniṣad-bhāṣya (SK)

& Laghvi*

ṛhatī * Bhāvanāviveka*

Suvarṇasaptati

Śābara’s Bhāṣya

(NV) (NS)

’s

Gauḍapāda’s

Ślokavārttika

Bhāṣya SB com MS

Saundaryalaharī

Sāṃkhyakārikābhāṣya

Yogasūtrabhāṣya

Nyāyavārttika

Indian

Sāṃkhya

**Paramārtha’s … Mīmāṃsā Śābara’s Śabarasvāmi’s … Yoga Yājñavalkya ** Yājñavalkya Smṛti Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa **Yoga Vyāsa’s Vijñābhikṣu’s ** Sāṃkhyapravacanabhāṣya Sāṃkhyasūtra …

Nyāya Uddyotakara’s

…

**Mīmāṃsā Kumārila’s ** *(SLK)(com SB) ***Prābhākara’s Maṇḍanamiśra’s ** *Vibhramaviveka Sphoṭasiddhi Mīmāṃsāsūtranukramaṇī ***Śaṅkara’s ** Ānandalaharī Aparokṣānubhūti al-Yaman

Jewish and Islamic

**Ḥadīth **1st generation **Hudhayfah ibn **

(+656)

2nd generation Ḥasan al-Baṣrī (+728)

Rashidun Caliphate (632–661)

Umayyad Caliphate (661–750)

Abbasid Caliphate (750–1258)

*Al-Farāhīdī’s ** * Arabic Dictionary (Kitab al-‘Ayn)

Sudhaile’s

’s

**Bar **

Way of Life

mathematical science

Hierotheos

of Man

*causarum? *

Gnostika of Evagrius

Manichees

Syriac

**Iamblichus’ ** *On the mysteries On the Pythagorean *

*On general *

**Narsai’s ** Six memre on creation

**Stephen ** *Book of the Holy *

**Ahudemmeh ** *On the Composition *

*On Man as a Microcosmos ***Isaac of Nineveh’s ** Mystical Treatises **Jacob of Edessa’s ** *Enchiridion De cause omnium *

**Babai the Great’s ** Commentary on Kephalaia

**Severus Sebokht’s ** Treatise on Astrolabe

**John of Damascus ** Fountain of Knowledge On Right Thinking Dialogue against the On Dragons and Ghosts

**Joseph Hazzaya’s ** On the Divine Essence, Chapters of Knowledge Book of Questions and Answers Photiki’s

451

Alexandria’s

Isagoge of Porphyry

Confessor

Thalassius

**Gregory of Nyssa’s ** Hexaemeron

**Diadochos of **

Hundred Chapters

**Council of Chalcedon **

**Stephanus of **

*Commentary on the *

On how to make gold

**Maximus the **

*Ambigua to John Ambigua to Thomas Questions to *

**Anastasius of Sinai’s ** Hexaemeron

Greek

’

Philosophy

**Boethius ** *The Consolation of *

Commentary on Isagoge

**Priscian’s ** Solutiones ad Chosroen

Bobbio Scholiast

Latin

( Continued

Age

4–6 AD

7–8 AD

Vaiśeṣika and world philosophy * 269
*)

(SK)

( Continued

Vyomavatī (PD)

*NKD * Pramāṇamañjarī

Saṣṭitantra

*Saptapadārthī (SS) & *

*Nyāyakandalī (PD) *

Jayamaṅgalā

Nyāyabhūṣaṇa

Vyomaśiva’s

Sarvadeva’s

***& ***

Vaiśeṣika Śivāditya’s

Śrīdhara’s

Lakṣaṇamālā (l)

Sāṃkhya Vārṣagaṇya’s Śaṅkara’s

, Tattvabindu & Bhāmatī

Nyāyasāra

(PD) (l)

*Nyāyakanika * Iṣṭasiddhi

*Saṁkṣepaśārīraka & Pañcaprakriyā * Brahmasūtrabhāṣyaṃ

Vyākhyā

Pañcāpādikāvivaraṇa

Bhāsarvajña’s

Prakaraṇapañjikā

Nyāyamanjarī (NMJ)

Indian

**Nyāya Jayanta’s Śālikanātha’s … Śaiva Siddhānta Rāmakaṇṭha’s ** Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa Nyāya

… Vedānta Śālikanātha’s Vācaspatimiśra’s Vimuktātman’s Prakaśatman’s Sarvajñātman’s Bhāskarācārya’s

)

Al-Farabi’s

Philosophers

Baghdad

Ḥunayn b. Isḥāq

Arabic translator)

Jewish and Islamic

**Al-Tirmidhī’s ** Jāmi’ al-ṣaḥīḥ ( Ḥadīth collection Grand Library of ( *Bayt al-Ḥikmah ***Al-Kindi’s ** On First Philosophy

(Greek to Syriac and

*Harmony of the Two *

*Wisdom, *

*and Its Property *Ḥunayn b. Isḥāq

translator )

Syriac

**Job of Edessa’s ** Book of Treasures

**David bar Paulos’ ** *Concerning the Book of *

*An Answer about Nature *

(Greek to Syriac

Apocalypse

**Photios’ ** Myriobiblos

**Arethas of Caesarea ** *Codex Clarkianus Scholia on the *

Greek

**John Scotus Eriugena’s ** The Division of Nature

Latin

Age

9 AD

10 AD

270 * Vaiśeṣika and world philosophy *

Yaśastilaka

Vadamahrnava

**Jaina Somadevasūri’s Prabhācandra’s ** *Tattvārthavṛttipadavivaraṇa ***Abhayadeva’s Hemachandra’s ** *Yogaśāstra Siddhahemavyakarana ***Vādirājasūrī’s ** Nyāyaviniścayavivaraṇa com NN

Tantrāloka

Indian

**Buddhism Abhinavagupta’s … Nyāya Pārthasārathimiśra’s ** *Nyāyaratnākara (SLK) Nyāyaratnamālā ***Udayana’s ** Ātmatattvaviveka (ATM) Nyāyakusumāñjalī Lakṣaṇāvalī Tatparyaparisuddhi Nyāyapariśiṣṭa KRV Kiraṇāvalī (PD) Lakṣaṇamālā

Indica*

Jewish and Islamic

**Alberuni’s ** (Kitāb al-Hind)

**Avicenna’s ** The Book of Scientific Knowledge (Danishnama-i ‘ala’i) **Avicebron’s ** Source of Life (Yanbu’ al-Hayat)

**Al-Ghazali’s ** The Incoherence of the Philosophers (Tahāfut al-Falāsifa) **Avempace’s ** Letter on the Union of the Intellect with Human Beings (Risālat al-ittiṣāl al-ʿaql bi al-insān) **Averroes’ ** See Commentaries on Aristotle

**Maimonides’ ** The Guide for the Perplexed

**Gersonides’ ** Wars of the Lord

**Bedersi’s ** *Examination of the Universe *& A Treatise upon Personal or Individual Forms Wisdom

Syriac

**Michael the Syrian’s ** The Chronicle

**Bar Hebraeus’ ** *The Cream of Science Book of Speech of *

Butter of Wisdom Book of the Dove

Theologian

Doctrina

**Symeon the New **

Hymns of Divine Love

**Michael Psellus’ ** *De Omnifaria *

Greek

Sentences

Logic

Metaphysics

**Peter Lombard’s ** *The Four Books of *

**Odo of Tournai’s ** *De Peccato Originali ***Thierry of Charters’ ** *Lectiones ***Gilbert of Poitiers’ ** De Trinitat **Anselm of Canterbury’s ** The Proslogion

**Johannes Hispanus’ ** *translated Avicenna’s *

**Dominic Gundissalinus’ ** *translated Avicenna’s *

Latin

( Continued

Age

11–12 AD

2 Vaiśeṣika scholasticism

*Vaiśeṣika system *

(commentarial traditions) 1

Vaiśeṣikasūtra of Kaṇāda

(c. 2nd century BC–2nd century AD)

Vākya (lost)

Kaṭandī (lost)

Rāvaṇa’s Bhāṣya (lost)

Bhāradvāja’s Vṛtti (lost)

Ātreya’s Bhāṣya (lost)2

Sūtrapāṭha tradition

Bhāṣya tradition

Independent tradition3

Candrānanda’s

Praśastapāda’s

Candramatī’s

*Vṛtti (com. * VS )

Padārthadharmasaṃgraha *Daśapadārthaśāstra *

(c. 7th–10th century AD)

(PD)

(6th century AD)

Udayana’s

(c. 6th century AD)

Śivāditya’s5

*Lakṣaṇāvalī LKS, (com. VS) *

Bhāṣyaṭīkā (lost)

*Saptapadārthī (SP) *

(11th century AD)

Vyomaśiva’s

Lakṣaṇamālā

Sena Court MS

Vyomavatī

(c. 950 century AD)

Śrīkaṇādasūtravṛtti

(com. PD)

Vādirāja’s

(Vyākhyā)

(c.900 AD)

Vivaraṇa (1025 AD)6

(12th century AD)

Śrīdhara’s

**Vādīśvara’**s

Bhaṭṭa Vādīndra’s

Nyāyakandalī NKD

Mānamanohara

Kaṇādasūtranibandha4 (KSB), (com. (com. PD) (991 AD)

(12th century A D)

VS) (13th century AD)

Udayana’s

Vallabhācārya’s

Bhaṭṭa Rāghava’s

Kiraṇāvalī (Kir)

Nyāyalīlāvatī7

Nyāyasāravicāra

(com. PD)(c. 1005 AD)

*(12th century AD) *

Śaṅkaramiśra’s

Vardhamāna’s

Ratnakośa

*Upaskāra UPK *

*Kiraṇāvalīprakāśa *

*(lost, mentioned by *

(com. VS)

(com. Kir)

Gaṅgeśa)

(15th century AD)

(12th century AD)

Keśavamiśra’s

Jayanārāyaṇa Tarkapañcānana’s

Bhaṭṭa Vādīndra’s

Tarkabhāṣā

Vivṛti (com. UPK)

Rasasāraḥ (com Kir)

*(14th century AD) *

(1861 AD)

(13th century AD)

Jinavardhanasūri’s

Candrakānta Tarkālaṅkāra’s

*Commentary *

*Vaiśeṣikadarśanam (com VS, *

*(Jaina com. SP), *

Calcutta, 1887)

(1415 AD)

( *Continued *)

Vaiśeṣika scholasticism

272 * Vaiśeṣika scholasticism *

( *Continued *)

Pañcānana Tarkaratna’s Śaṅkaramiśra’s

Śaṅkaramiśra’s

Parīkṣara

*Praśastapādabhāṣyatīkāsaṃgraha *

*Kaṇādarahasya (com VS) *

(Bengali com UPK)

(com. PD)

(15th century AD)

(1940)

Kiraṇāvalīniruktiprakāśa (com Kir)

Bhairavendra’s

Vīrarāghavācārya’s

(15th century AD)

*Śiśubodhinī (com SP), *

*Rasāyaṇa *

Padmanābhamiśra’s

(c. 1500 AD)

(Tamil com. VS)

Setu (com. PD)

1958 Madras

Nyāyakanalīsāra (com. NKD)

Mādhava Sarasvatī’s

*Mitabhāṣiṇī (com. SP), *

**Brahmamuni Parivrājaka ** & Kiraṇāvalībhāskara (com. Kir)

(1523 AD)

Vidyāmārtaṇḍa’s

(16th century AD)

Bhāṣyasametam

Jagadīśa Tarkālaṃkāra’s

Śeṣānanta’s

(Hindi com VS)

Sūkti (com. PD) (17th century AD)

*Padārthacandrikā (com. *

(Baroda, 1962)

SP)

(1608 AD)*

Other commentaries in vernaculars

Balabhadra’s

Kṛṣṇabhūpāla’s

Sandarbha (com. SP)

Trisūtrīprakāra (com VS) (date unknown)

(c. 17th century AD)8

Kṛṣṇaśuddhi’s

**Jayarāma **

Viśeṣavādārtha (com on VS) (date unknown)

Nyāyapañcānana’s

*Padārthamālā *

Vrajabhūṣaṇamiśra’s Padārtharatnamālā

(17th century AD)

Edited by Nagesvara Panta Dharmadhikari (1905–1906)

**Viśvanātha **

Tirumalai Tātācārya’s

Nyāyapañcānana’s

Sugamā Vaiśeṣikavṛttiḥ (Prayaga, 1979)

*Bhāṣāpariccheda9 with *

Udayavīra Śāstrī’s

*Siddhāntamuktāvalī *

*Vaiśeṣikadarśanam *

*(Hindi com. Gaizabad, 1984) *

Āryamuni Paṇḍita’s

Nyāyadarśanam (Lahore 1907, 1982)

*and Vedabhāskara (Hindi com.) *

(Barchhwar, 1972)

**Exonymic references to Vaiśeṣika (Buddhist and Jaina)**10

**Bhāvaviveka’s ** Tarkajvala (6th century AD) Svātantrika Buddhist **Dignāga’s ** Pramāṇasamuccaya (6th century AD) Buddhist dialectician **Mallavādin’s ** Dvādaśāranayacakram (5th century AD) Jaina **Jinabhadra’s ** Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya (489–593 AD) Jaina

**Rohagupta’s ** Ṣaḍulūka (17th century AD) Jaina

1 This is by no means a complete list of Vaiśeṣika commentaries, and is different from the compendium of Thakur 2003; mine offers only an essential and comprehensive list of the most important works which had generated subsequent commentaries. The emphasis is here on the spine of Vaiśeṣika system.

2 See Vādīndra’s Kaṇādasūtranibandha KSB.

3 Not to be confused with what Wezler calls ‘Independent transmission of MSS on Sūtrapāṭha.’

4 Kaṇādasūtranibandha is also known by the title of Tarkasāgara of Śrī Kṛṣṇarāja’s.

5 The first Vaiśeṣika tract to introduce the category of abhāva as the 7th among the previous 6 categories.

6 See Thakur, 2003, p. 412. The commentary is important because it contains references from previous tracts on Vaiśeṣika (Sūtrapāṭha of Kaṇāda, Praśastapāda, and Vyomaśiva). It appears that the work is a very early attempt at merging the Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya systems.

7 On the vast list of commentaries on Vallabhācārya’s Nyāyalīlāvatī, see Thakur, 2003, p. 321.

8 There are many commentaries on Śivāditya’s SP but these are accepted by scholars, see J.S. Jetly, 1963, p. 13.

9 The authorship of Bhāṣāpariccheda is debated. See Thakur, 2003, p. 339, who inclines to Kṛṣṇadāsa Sārvabhauma of Navadipa (Bengal).

10 Once again, this is not a complete list; any effort should be made to collecting external Testimonia on the early tenets of the poorly preserved and little known Vaiśeṣika philosophy.

3 New Manuscripts on Vaiśeṣika

(Locations)

*MSS catalogue MSS location *

*MSS serial *

MSS entry

(abbreviations) (approximate)

number

Adyar D.

Adyar Library1

71607

Kaṇādanayabhūṣaṇa

Alwar

Alwar2

600

Vaiśeṣikasūtra, Kaṇāda

America

American

3630

Kaṇāda Vaiśeṣikasūtra

Oriental

Institute3

Andhra Uni.

Waltair4

2556

…

Baroda

18315

**Vaiśeṣikasūtra (VSc)6 imbedded **

in a codex Tarkabhāṣā Nyāya

padaparibhāṣā7

BBRAS

Bombay, Royal 1057

Vaiśeṣikasūtram, Kaṇāda

Asiatic Society 1058

Vaiśeṣikasūtram of Kaṇāda with

1059

Bhāṣyam by Praśastapāda

Vaiśeṣikasūtram of Kaṇāda with

Upaskāra by Śaṅkaramiśra

Ben8

Benares9

182

…

207

…

220

…

Ben10

Benares

100

Vaiśeṣikasūtram

Vaiśeṣikasūtrabhāṣyam

184

Vaiśeṣikasūtrabhāṣyam

BORI

Pune11

… (abbreviated ‘J ’)12

403

… (abbreviated ‘Ś ’)

British Library London13

3023 (2056) Kaṇādasūtra

1698d (2057) Vaiśeṣikasutropaskara

232b (2058) Vaiśeṣikasutropaskaraḥ

Calcutta

Indian Museum 3

Vaiśeṣikasutropaskaraḥ

Collection

Calcutta

Calcutta Sanskrit 369

Vaiśeṣikaṭīkā

College

CPB

Nagpur

663

Kaṇādasūtra

5442

Vaiśeṣikadarśana

Cranganore

Cranganore14

…

( *Continued *)

New Manuscripts on Vaiśeṣika

274 * New Manuscripts on Vaiśeṣika *

( *Continued *)

*MSS catalogue MSS location *

*MSS serial *

MSS entry

(abbreviations) (approximate)

number

Damodar15

Kashmir

1469?

…

Darbhanga

Darbhanga16

1469

…

Darbhanga Raj Darbhanga17

2445

…

Gough

Calcutta

…

Vaiśeṣikadarśana18

Hall

Calcutta

…19

Vaiśeṣikasūtra

Oxford

205620

Kaṇādasūtra22

302321

…

Jodhpur

663

…

Jodhpur

33355

Kaṇādasūtra

Collection23

Nagpur

16024

…

Kavīndrācārya Baroda

167

Kaṇādasūtrabhasyasahita

Bombay

…

Presidency25

L. D. Institute26 Ahmedabad

26307

**Vaiśeṣikasūtrapāṭhaḥ with VSc **

(un-catalogued)

Khn

Bombay

…

Presidency27

Mysore N.D. X. Mysore

37153

Vaiśeṣikasūtram Kaṇādaḥ

Madras28

Chennai29

20432

Vaiśeṣikavastunirṇayaḥ of Nṛsiṃha

National

New Delhi30

…31

…

Mission for

Manuscripts

Allahabad

…

Benares

366

…

Oppert I

Madras

618

Vaiśeṣikadarśana

676

Vaiśeṣikadarśana

7276

Kaṇādasūtra

1042

Kaṇādasūtra

Prayag I.

Allahabad32

240

…

PUL II

Lahore

378

Vaiśeṣikatantravastunirṇaya of

379

Nṛsiṃha

380

Vaiśeṣikadravyasetu of

Padmanābha Bhaṭṭācārya

Vaiśeṣikasūtra, Kaṇāda

Rajapur

Rajapur33

140

…

183

…

Report

Bombay

403

Vaiśeṣikasūtrasavṛtti

Report XXVI

Bombay

…

RORI XXI34

Jodhpur

2624–7

…

2629–33

…

SB. New DC

Varanasi35

3276536

…

VIII

94410

Vaiśeṣikasūtram

94474

Vaiśeṣikasūtram

94842

Vaiśeṣikasūtram

97345

Vaiśeṣikaśāsanam

97697

Vaiśeṣikasūtram

( *Continued *)

New Manuscripts on Vaiśeṣika * 275

( *Continued *)

*MSS catalogue MSS location *

*MSS serial *

MSS entry

(abbreviations) (approximate)

number

TD.37

Tanjore38

5972-599039 …

E 37153–4

Vaiśeṣikasūtrabhāṣya, Udyayana

Trav. Uni.40

Trivandrum

17490–92

Vaiśeṣikatantravastunirṇaya,

17493-4

Nṛsiṃha

17498

Vaiśeṣikasūtram, Kaṇāda

Vaiśeṣikādimatanirūpaṇam

Trav. Uni. Sup. Trivandrum

23328–50

Kāṇādasiddhāntacandrikā of

23351–4

Gangādharasūri

22615

Kāṇādasiddhāntacandrikāvyākhyāp

rasadah of Gangādharasūri

…

Ujjain II.41

Ujjain

3639

…

Ujjain

4635

Imbedded in

Tarkasaṅgrahaḥ

with Tarkadīpikā

(abbreviated ‘Ś3’)

Varanasi

Varanasi42

3276543

Vaiśeṣikasūtram

VRI. V.

Vrindavan

14379

Vaiśeṣikasūtrapāṭha, Kaṇāda

14362

Kaṇādasiddhantacandrika,

Gangadhara

Wai D. II

Wai

6108

Vaiśeṣikasūtrani

6109

Vaiśeṣikasūtrani

6110

Vaiśeṣikasūtrani

6111

Vaiśeṣikasūtra with Upaskāra

WIHM I.

London44

910

Vaiśeṣikasūtra of Kaṇāda

1 The Adyar Library (founded in 1886) and Research Centre is at the Theosophical Society Adyar in Adyar, near Chennai.

2 Alwar is located 150 km south of Delhi and 150 km north of Jaipur. It is a city in India’s National Capital Region and the administrative headquarters of Alwar District in the state of Rajasthan.

3 The Oriental Institute (OI) – established in 1919 – is now at the University of Chicago.

4 Visakhapatnam (or Vizag) and Waltair, together represent the largest city and the financial capital of Andhra Pradesh.

5 The ascension number 1831 refers to what Muni Jambūvijayaji indicates in his critical apparatus as MS ‘O’ (from Baroda), which has a copy numbered 403 preserved at the Bhandarkar Oriental Institute Pune; as Ruzsa indicates, VSc came down to us in 2 scripts collations: Śāradā script (Ś , 1

Ś , Ś ), 1 in Jaina Devanāgarī (J) with a separate Sūtrapāṭha prefixed to it (JS). It has a bad copy (J , 2

J s) (that has been occasionally referred to where J was illegible). In the ed., P stands for J and O for 2

Ś . For a description of the MSS see Isaacson PhD, pp. 145–7.

6 VSc edited by Muni Jambūvijayaji at Baroda Oriental Institute in 1961 was only based on 2 MSS, one of which is abbreviated with ‘O’ by Jambūvijayaji and preserved at Baroda under the serial number 1831. As I mentioned in the introduction, this translation on Candrānanda’s Commentary (VSc) has 5 MSS in total: (1) the oldest is ‘PS’ + ‘P’ (MS 26307 at L.D. Ahmedabad, un-catalogued); (2) this has a copy ‘J2’ (MS 99 at BORI, Pune); (3) ‘O’ or ‘Ś1’ (MS 1831 at Baroda): (4) Baroda MS has copy Ś2 (403 at BORI, Pune); and (5) Ś3 (MS 4635 at Scindia Oriental Institute in Ujjain). For textual critical reasons, Isaacson and Ruzsa have changed the abbreviations that Jambūvijayaji gave ‘P’ and ‘O,’ respectively. My proposal is that we should keep the initial abbreviations that Jambūvijayaji gave ‘J’ (for Jaina Devanāgarī script) or ‘Ś’ (for Śāradā script), rather than expanding the range of symbols, not least because, if a critical edition is to be made, that should be an expansion, not a negation of Jambūvijayaji’s edition.

7 As Isaacson informs, MS 1981 forms part of a codex with several texts; in his Sanskrit Introduction to VSc 1961 ed. Jambūvijayaji identifies this MS as ‘Tarkabhāṣādidvādaśapustakāni.’

276 * New Manuscripts on Vaiśeṣika *

8 A Catalogue of MSS in the Library of Benares Sanskrit College (published in The Pandit, a monthly journal of the Benares College devoted to Sanskrit literature) (for Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika MSS

descriptions, see volume 6 (61–72) June 1871–May 1872, Vestanam 1–4 (p. cxviii); volume 7

(73–84) June 1872–May 1873: Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika – contd. Vestanam 5–70 (pp. cxlix–clxxxvi); and volume 8 (85–96) June 1873–May 1874: Vestanam 70–99 (pp. clxxxvii–ccxx).

9 See the Catalogue of Benares Sanskrit College, 1964–74 (in NCC vol. 28, p. vi).

10 Data obtained from the Sanskrit catalogue: Catalogue of Sanskrit Manuscripts in the Sanskrit College Library, Benares, with full index. Sarasvati Bhavana Library. Allahabad: Printed at the Government Press, N.-W.P. and Oudh [1888?].

11 Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute: http://bori .ac .in/; the BORI collection contains 2 copies of Sūtrapāṭha: MS 99 (a copy of the old MS abbreviated ‘PS’ with ‘P’ in VSc that belonged to Muni Puṇyavijayaji; and MS 403 that is a copy of Baroda MS 1831; Śāradā script). See earlier footnote on Baroda MS.

12 These abbreviations have been inserted into the Vaiśeṣika literature by Isaacson and Ruzsa, who aimed at collating the MSS according to the script, in view of a forthcoming critical edition of Sūtrapāṭha; I nurture the hope that the next savant student reading this will be convinced to bring to fruition to such a critical edition.

13 India Office Records and Private Papers at The British Library: www .b l .uk/ colle ction -guid es /in dia

-o ffice -reco rds.

14 Cranganore Palace, Cranganore, Kerala.

15 Manuscripts in a scroll containing titles of Sanskrit works with respective authors’ names, numbering 738. Ed. Damodara Sastri, son of Saheb Ram. Unpublished. Location: MUDS. Kashmir.

Stein Collection, see no. 0359 (location: The University of Madras, Dept. of Sanskrit Chepauk, Chennai 600 005).

16 One such manuscript, Catalogue of Kameshvar Singh Darbhanga Sanskrit University, can be found at BORI, Pune.

17 Kameshwar Singh Darbhanga Sanskrit University (KSDSU).

18 In the table of contents, the Catalogue Gough 1978, p. 35, presents only the title of the section of

‘Vaiśeṣikadarśana’ and not a list of the MSS or commentaries herewith.

19 The catalogue Hall 1859, p. 64, gives a short description but not a serial number.

20 Possibly identical with MSS 3023 (2056) see British Library.

21 I could not trace this MS in OI Catalogue; but other interesting MSS 2065–6, captured my attention Dravyakiraṇāvalīprakāśa, a commentary of Vardhamāna (presumably Bhaṭṭa Vādīndra).

22 The authors of the Oxford Catalogue (E. Windisch and J. Eggeling) refer to the Catalogue Hall, p. 64 (which as a location must refer to Calcutta).

23 Catalogue of Sanskrit and Prakrit manuscripts in the Rajasthan Oriental Research Institute. Ed.

Dawarkanath Sharma (Rajasthan Puratana Granthamala no. 145) part XV (Jodhpur Collection) Published. (RORI) 1984.

24 Possibly centralised and preserved now at BORI, Pune.

25 Possibly moved from Bombay Presidency to BORI, Pune.

26 This institute preserves the oldest and most important MS (c. 13th/14th century AD) upon which the 1961 Jambūvijayaji edition was edited.

27 Possibly moved from Bombay Presidency to BORI, Pune.

28 An Alphabetical Index of Sanskrit Manuscripts in the Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, Chennai. Ed. Vidyasagara Vidyavacaspati and Subrahmanya Sastri. Part 2. Chennai.

29 Government Oriental Manuscripts Library Madras University Campus (Chennai 600 005).

30 National Mission for Manuscripts (NMM) (address: 11 Mansingh Road, New Delhi – 110001)

www .namami .gov .in/.

31 It is worth inquiring first if the National Mission of MSS has centralised the digital copies of Vaiśeṣikasūtra.

32 Hindi Sahitya Sammelan is an institution based in Allahabad (Uttar Pradesh) for Hindi language and Literature.

33 Two MSS (140 and 183), for instance, are mentioned in the entry; these are supposed to be in the Sanskrit Pāṭhaśālā of Rajapur (South Maharashtra). When I visited the site (July 2016), the young pundits had no knowledge of any (handwritten) catalogue or list of the MSS in their possession, which obviously they should have possessed. All MSS (presumably not yet classified) were preserved in about 20 big bags on the roof of the main building. The pāṭhaśālā belonged most probably to the Vedānta tradition, because many MSS I randomly looked at belonged to that tradition and were not very old (paper, 18th and 19th century, approximately).

New Manuscripts on Vaiśeṣika * 277

34 A Catalogue of Sanskrit and Prakrit manuscripts in the Rajasthan Oriental Research Institute/

ed. by Muni Jinavijayaji since 1963 (part 1); for MSS 2624–7 and 2629–33, see Pt. XXI (Alwar Collection)/ed. by O.L. Menaria, V.M. Sharma and M. Vinayasagar 1985, pp. 12, 108, 880.

Description of 5985 Sanskrit and Prakrit MSS up to accession no. 6295. The ‘Pustak Shala collection’ was established in 1848 AD. Peter Peterson catalogued 2478 MSS of the collection in 1892. The collection was transferred to RORI (from a total 6711 MSS of the Alwar collection).

Additional 1687 MSS were obtained as a donation later. Contents: Index: 1 works (pp. 1–76); 2 Authors and Commentators (pp. 77–108); Table (pp. 2–666); Appendix: Extracts (pp. 669–880).

35 A Descriptive Catalogue of Sanskrit manuscripts acquired for and deposited in the Sanskrit University Library (Sarasvati Bhavana), Varanasi during the years 1791–1950; 12 vol. Varanasi: Shri Visweswara Press (MSS 94410, 94474, 94842, 97345, and 97697 are from volume 8, part 2, 1995).

36 For the description of MSS no. 30138–4283, see op. cit., volume 8, part 1, 1962 (Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika section).

37 Descriptive Catalogue of Sanskrit manuscripts in the Tanjore Maharaja Serfoji’s Sarasvati Mahal Library, Tanjore. Ed. P.P.S. Sastri (see volume 9, Vaiśeṣika, Nyāya, Sāṃkhya and Yoga. 1931, pp.

xxiv, 4439–986, 24. MSS 5972–6754. Appendices A–E (pp. 1–19).

38 Tanjore Maharaja Serfoji’s Sarasvathi Mahal Library.

39 In TD vol. XI, although the Library contains many Vaiśeṣika MSS, the catalogue mentions that

‘there are no MSS of the original sutras in either the Vaiśeṣika or Nyāya darśanas,’ p. iv.

40 Alphabetical Index of the Sanskrit Manuscripts in the University Manuscripts Library, Trivandrum. Trivandrum Alliance Printing Works, since 1957). Trav. Uni. refers to volume 3 (Ya to Sa) ed. T. Bhaskaran, 1984 (which contains MSS no. 14060–19312). The Catalogue contains other Vaiśeṣika MSS (17495–8) but they present the versions of Upaskāra, Praśastapāda, and other commentators.

41 A Descriptive Catalogue of Manuscripts in the Scindia Oriental Institute, Vikram University, Ujjain.

ed. V. Venkatachalam; comp. Ramesh Chandra Purohit, 1983–5, comprises at least 11 volumes but scholars should particularly look up into volume 4 (published in 2 parts, which contain more than 2000 MSS).

42 Sanskrit University Library (Sarasvati Bhavana), Varanasi, Uttar Pradesh.

43 See SB. New DC.

44 Welcome Institute for the History of Medicine, London.

Bibliography

(with additional abbreviations)

**Vaiśeṣika1 **

***VS ***

Sūtrapāṭha of Candrānanda’s Vṛtti (as contained primarily by Candrānanda’s Vṛtti; it also incorporates a series of MSS which transmit Sūtrapāṭha alone, recently collected and photographed by author).

VSc

Vaiśeṣikasūtra with Candrānanda’s Vṛtti. GOS. 136. Ed. Jambūvijayaji, Muni. Baroda: Oriental Institute. 1961. (Both editions can be accessed at: Weston Library (Ind. Sansk.

Ser. D. 1/136), and Oriental Institute, Oxford (508 Gae/136), as well as online.

***VSv (short version) ***

Vaiśeṣikadarśana of Kaṇāda with an Anonymous Commentary. Ed. Thakur, A. Darbhanga: Mithilā Institute. 1957.

VSv (long version)

Vaiśeṣikadarśanam (Bhaṭṭavādīndraracita Vaiśeṣikavārtika). Ed. Thakur A. Darbhanga: Mithilā Institute, 1985 (known also as Vādīndra’s Kaṇādasūtranibandha).

***VSi ***

Il Vaiśeṣika-Sūtra Di Kaṇāda. Introduzione, testo, traduzione, commento, lessico per Leonardo V. Arena. Urbino: Universita Degli Studi di Urbino. 1982.

***VSś ***

The Vaiśeṣika aphorisms of Kaṇāda, with comments from the Upaskāra of Śaṅkaramiśra and the Vivṛitti of Jayanārāyaṇa Tarkapañcānana. Trans. Gough, Archibald Edward.

Benares: E.J. Lazarus. 1873: alternatively: Vaiśeṣikasūtra of Kaṇāda with the commentary of Śaṅkaramiśra and extracts from the gloss of Jayanārāyaṇa. Trans.

Nandalal Sinha. Allahabad: The Panini Office Bhuvaneswari Arama. 1911.

1 Listed here in the order of importance

Bibliography

Bibliography * 279

The Metaphysics and Epistemology of the Early Vaiśeṣikas. Ed. Miyamoto, Keechi. Pune: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute. 1996. (Contains an English translation of DP; all my quotations are from this edition).

The Metaphysics and Epistemology of the Early Vaiśeṣikas. Ed. Miyamoto Keechi. Pune: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute. 1996. (Contains an English trans. of DP; All my quotations are from this edition).

Nyāyakandalī. A Commentary on Praśastapāda Bhāṣya with Three Sub-Commentaries. Ed.

Jetly, J. S. Vadodara: Oriental Institute. 1991. Alternatively: Padārthadharmasaṃgraha of Praśastapāda with the Nyāyakandalī of Śrīdhara. Trans. Gangānātha Jhā. Benares: Medical Hall Press. 1916.

Praśastapādabhāṣyam Padārthadharmasaṅgrahākhyam. Śrīdharabhaṭṭapraṇītayā Nyāyaka ndalīvyākhyayā. Vārāṇasyām: Sampūrṇānanda Saṃskṛta Viśvavidyālaya. 1977.

Kir

Praśastapādabhāṣyam with the commentary Kiraṇāvalī of Udayanācārya. Ed. Jetly, J.S.

GOS 154. Baroda: Oriental Institute. 1971.

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Lakṣaṇāvalī of Udayanācārya. Ed. Jhā, Śaśinātha and Keśavakāśmīri Bhaṭṭācārya.

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***Vṛttikāra ***

See its description in Thakur, 2003

Vyo

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Madras. 2015.

ALMOIB

An Alphabetical List of Manuscripts in the Oriental Institute, Baroda. Compiled by Śiromaṇi and Nambiyar Raghavan. Baroda: Oriental Institute. 1942.

CSPM

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Vaishampayan, Meena. Bombay: Asiatic Society of Bombay. 2012.

GOMLM

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Halbfass 1992

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Isaacson, Harunaga. Materials for the Study of the Vaiśeṣika System. Doctorate Thesis submitted at Rijksuniversiteit te Lieden. 1995. (Personal communication).

Isaacson 1994

Isaacson, Harunaga. ‘Notes on the Manuscript Transmission of the Vaiśeṣikasūtra and Its Earliest Commentaries’. In AS XLVIII 2 (1994):749–79.

Isaacson, Harunaga. ‘Yogic Perception (yogipratyakṣa) in Early Vaiśeṣika’. In SII 18

(1993): 139–60.

Kiraṇāvalībhāskaraḥ of Padmanābhamiśra. Ed. Kaviraj, Gopinath. Benares: Government Sanskrit Library. 1920.

Kumar, Ś. ‘Early Vaiśeṣika: The Concept of Categories in Vaiśeṣika Philosophy’. In Frazier, ed. 2014: 89–100.

2 The list includes secondary literature because the scholars mentioned therein have contributed greatly to the manuscript tradition of Vaiśeṣikasūtra.

Bibliography * 281

Kumar, Ś. Self, Society, and Value: Reflections on Indian Philosophical Thought. Delhi: Vidyanidhi Prakashan. 2005.

Kumar, Ś. Classical Vaiśeṣika in Indian Philosophy: On Knowing and What Is to Be Known. London: Routledge. 2013.

Mallavādin’s Dvādaśāranayacakram. Ed. Gāndhī, Lālacandra Bhagavāndāsa. Baroda: Oriental Institute. 1952.

***MBhD ***

Mahābhāṣyadīpikā of Bhartṛhari. Critically edited by Palsule, Gajanan Balkrishna. Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute. 1985–1991.

***MW dict. ***

An English-Sanskrit Dictionary by Monier-Williams. Ed. Nataraj. Springfield, VA: Nataraj Books. 2006 (online).

Narain, H. Evolution of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Categoriology. Vol. 1. Varanasi: Bharati Prakashan. 1976.

NCC

New Catalogus Catalogorum. Vol. 32. University of Madras. Sanskrit Department. Madras.

Apte Dict. Apte, V. S. The Practical Sanskrit-English Dictionary. Revised and enlarged edition. 3v. Poona: Prasad Prakashan. 1957–1959. (Online).

Nyāyakośa

Nyāyakośa. Ed. Jhāḷkīkar, M. B. Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute. 1928.

Nozawa

A Comparative Table of the Vaiśeṣikasūtras. Ed. Nozawa, M. Numazu College of Technology, NII Electronic Library Service. 1982: 75–93.

Ruzsa

Candrānanda’s commentary on the Vaiśeṣika-Sūtra. Ed. Ruzsa, Ferenc. Critical edition of all MSS (available at: https://elte .academia .edu /FerencRuzsa).

Ruzsa 2010

Two MSS of Candrānanda’s Vṛtti on the Vaiśeṣikasūtra and the Errors of the Copyists. In Eds. Bronkhorst Johannes and Preisendanz Karin. From Vasubandhu to Caitanya. Studies in Indian Philosophy and Its Textual History. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. 2010: 173–83.

Viṣṇubhaṭṭaviracitā Anargharāghavapañcikā. The Commentary of Viṣṇubhaṭṭa on the Anargharāghava of Murāri; critical edition, Ed. Harinarayana Bhat. Pondichéry: Institut français de Pondichéry. 1998.

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Chattopadhyaya, D. History of Science Philosophy and Culture in Indian Civilization.

Vol. 2. Part 4. Ed. Delhi: Centre for Studies in Civilisations. 2003.

***Wai D. II ***

Descriptive Catalogue of Sanskrit Manuscripts: Prājña Pāṭhaśālā Maṇḍaḷa Collection.

Ed. Jośī, Lakshmaṇaśāstrī. Wai, India: Prajñapāṭhaśāḷā Maṇḍaḷa. 1970.

Wezler, A. A Note on Concept adṛṣṭa as Used in Vaiśeṣikasūtras. In Ed. Datta, B. ArunaBharati: Prof. A.N. Jani Felicitation Volume. Baroda: Oriental Institute. 1983: 35–8.

Wezler, A. Remarks on the definition of ‘Yoga’ in the Vaiśeṣikasūtras. In IBS. Canberra: Faculty of Asian Studies. 1982: 643–86.

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***Arist Cat ***

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Dvātriṃśikā

Vedavādadvātriṃśikā of Siddhasena Divākara. Ed. Sanghavi, Sukhlalji. Mumbaī: Bhāratīya Vidyā Bhavana.1945.

MBhV

Vyākaraṇa-Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali. Ed. Kielhorn, Franz, 3 volumes. Bombay: Government Central Book Depot, 1880–1885.

***VP ***

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Index

// ॐ //

Index and Glossary of Sanskrit terms in VS1 and VSc

VS = Vaiśeṣikasūtra

VSc = Candrānanda’s Commentary (Vṛtti)

अ(a)

(causal factor for advanced seers) VS

adṛṣṭa (unseen force) VSc 5.1.15; 5.2.2;

9.28; (plays an ethical and ritualistic role)

5.2.4; 5.2.8; 5.2.14; 5.2.19; 6.2.1; 6.2.15;

VS 6.2.1; 10.20;

8.13; (used epistemologically) VSc

adṛṣṭaliṅga (unseen mark) VS 2.1.10.

8.13; (refers to seen and unseen objects

aṅga (limb, part, section) VS 6.1.6; VS

or marks) VSc 2.1.10; (‘non-perceived

6.1.6.

marks’ which lead to doubt) VS 2.2.20;

Aṅgiras (their body made of carbon) VSc

VSc 2.2.20; VS 2.2.22; 8.13; (influences

4.2.7; VSc 4.2.8.

the movement of the gem towards the

antyaviśeṣa (ultimate real particularity;

thief) VS 5.1.15; (cosmic and moral

infinite unique and distinct entities

law that causes earthquakes) VS 5.2.2;

perceivable by ‘dharmaviśeṣa’) VS

(cosmic law that regulates the growth of

1.2.6.

crops) VS 5.2.4; (regulates the upwards

ajñāna (incomprehension, ignorance) VS

circulation of water in trees) VS 5.2.8;

3.1.4-6; (false knowledge) VSc 2.2.23.

(causes the first action of atoms, mind,

aṇu (atom) VSc 7.1.15; VSc 7.1.21-22.

and winds) VS 5.2.14; (causes moments

anumāna (inference) VS 5.2.14; VSc 9.1;

to and fro, as well as mixture with things

9.12; 9.17; 9.19; 9.21; 9.27-28; VSc

eaten and drunken) VS 5.2.19; VS 6.2.2;

10.3; 10.19.

6.2.15; (causal factor in dreams) VS 9.24; atas (ataḥ, henceforth) VS 1.1.1.

1 This Index is an expanded Italian version of the one made by Vittorio Leonardo Arena (1992 edition, VSi), whose exhaustive Index, however, refers only to Sūtrapāṭha. In addition to this, I provide here additional terms and compounds which Candrānanda’s Vṛtti uses, and which I found particularly important for a general understanding of the Vaiśeṣika system.

286 * Index*

atha (now) VS 1.1.1

aham (I am) VS 3.2.9-10; 3.2.13; VSc

aduṣṭa (pure) VS 6.1.8; 6.1.12; 9.27; VSc

3.2.9-14; 10.1.

6.1.8; 9.27.

adharma (specific quality of the soul) VS

आ(ā)

9.8; VSc 1.1.5; 1.1.7; 5.1.15; 9.8; 9.27.

ārṣa (perception of seers, intuition) VS

anapadeśa (in logics, invalid argument) VS

9.28; VSc 9.28.

3.1.3; 3.1.7; VSc 3.1.10-11.

ākāśa (vacuum-space; cosmic substance)

anapekṣa (independent) VS

VS 1.1.4; 2.1.5; 2.1.20; 2.1.26; 5.2.23;

1.1.15-16; 10.7; VSc 1.1.15; 1.1.16;

7.1.28; VSc 1.1.15; 1.1.7-8; 1.1.17;

5.1.17; 10.7.

1.2.6; 1.2.9; 2.1.16; 2.1.20-23; 2.1.26-

anupadha (without blemish) VS 6.2.3;

28; 2.2.10; 3.2.7; 5.1.16; 5.2.21-23;

6.2.5; VSc 6.2.3; 6.2.4-5.

7.1.28-29; 7.2.9-11; 7.2.15; 7.2.23;

anupalabdhi (non-apprehension) VS 4.1.7-

8.17.

8; 7.1.15; VSc 7.1.15; VSc 1.1.21; 4.1.1; ākuñcana (bending) VS 1.1.6.

4.1.8; 7.1.15; 7.1.23.

āgamika (sacred tradition) VS 2.1.17;

apadeśa (assertion, logical argument) VS

3.2.8-9; VSc 2.1.17; 3.2.9.

3.1.9; 9.20; VSc 2.2.9; 3.1.10; 9.20.

ātman (occurs ninety-one times in VSc,

apavarga (terminus point) VS 2.2.29.

out of which twenty-seven times within

apāna (exhaling) VS 3.2.4; VSc 3.2.4;

Sūtrapāṭha) VSc 1.1.2; VS 1.1.4;

5.2.18

(‘ātma-‘ used as a reflexive pronoun)

aprādurbhāva (non-manifestation) VS

VSc 1.1.9; VSc 2.1.25; (it is discussed

2.1.24; 2.2.1; 4.2.2; 5.2.20; VSc 1.1.18;

as the embodied self) VS 3.1.13-14;

2.1.24

3.2.1; 3.2.4; 3.2.13; 3.2.15; 4.2.2-3; abhiukṣita (sprinkle with palm upwards)

5.1.1; 5.1.4; 5.1.6; (contact between

VS 6.2.6; VSc 6.2.6; see prokṣita

body and soul) VSc 5.1.11; (contact

abhighata (stroke) VS 5.1.3.; 5.1.5; 5.2.1; between ātman and hand) VSc 5.1.12;

VSc 1.1.21; 5.1.3; 5.1.5; 5.2.1; 5.2.12-

related to specific qualities such as

13; 5.2.25; 10.17.

between icchā and dveṣa) VSc 5.2.15,

abhisarpaṇa (ascending movement) VS

or to prayatna VSc 5.2.12; 5.2.15;

5.1.15; 5.2.8.

VSc 5.2.16-18; a conjunction between

abhyudaya (mundane elevation) VS 1.1.2;

ātman and manas means or is called

VSc 1.1.2; 1.1.6; 6.1.8-9; 6.1.13-14; jīvana VSc 5.2.20; (disappearance of

VS 6.2.1; VSc 6.2.1; VSc 6.2.9-11; VS

body, and other contacts - like that

10.20; VSc 10.20.

between ātman with manas - as well

ayatasya (the unrestrained one) VS 6.2.9;

as the disappearance of adṛṣṭa which

VSc 6.2.9.

seems to cause the formation of foetus,

avakṣepaṇa (downwards movement) VS

leads to mokṣa) VSc 5.2.20; VSc

1.1.6.

6.1.7; 6.1.17-19; VSc 8.2; VSc 9.13;

avidyā (deceiving knowledge, ignorance)

9.15; 9.17; 9. 22-23; 9.25; 9.28; VSc

VS 2.2.23; 4.1.5; 7.1.17; 9.25; VSc

10.1; 10.21 (it is subject to opponents’

2.2.23; 4.1.5; 5.2.22; 7.1.27.

criticisms) VSc 3.1.7; (it is involved in

avirodhin (non-contradictory) VS 1.1.11;

‘four-fold perception’) VSc 3.1.13; VSc

VSc 1.1.12.

3.2.6; 3.2.15; VSc 5.1.6; (it is devoid aviśeṣa (indistinct) VS 1.1.7; 1.2.18;

of actions, niṣkriya) VSc 5.2.23; (it is

2.1.16; 3.2.7; 3.2.15; 8.11; VSc 1.1.7;

involved in yogipratyakṣa).

2.1.18.

āditya (sunny) VS 2.2.16; VSc 1.1.27; avyabhicāra (constant, without deviation)

2.2.16-17; 5.2.6.

VS 4.1.11.

ādya (first) VS 5.1.17; 5.2.14; VSc 1.1.12; asat (undifferentiated, inexistent) VS

2.2.6; 2.2.23; 5.1.16-17; 5.2.14.

3.1.11; 6.2.11; 7.2.18; 9.1-6; 9.12; VSc

āpas (water) VS 1.1.4; 2.1.2; 2.2.2; 8.17;

2.2.23; 2.2.30; 6.2.11; 7.2.18; 9.1; 9.12;

VSc 8.17.

10.9.

āmnāya (sacred texts handed down by

asmad (I, the individual soul) VS 2.1.18;

repetition) VS 1.1.3; 10.21; VSc 1.1.2-3;

6.1.2; VSc 1.2.3; 2.1.18-19.

6.1.4.

*Index * 287

ārabha (inception) VS 1.1.8; VSc 1.1.8-9;

ए(e)

2.2.1; 4.2.5; 7.1.16;

eka VS 1.1.16; 1.2.9; 1.2.12; 1.2.18;

ārohaṇa (ascension) VS 5.2.6; VSc 5.2.6-7.

2.1.21; 2.2.27; 3.1.8; 3.2.3; 3.2.15; āvaraṇa (concealing) VS 5.2.22.

7.1.19; 7.1.21; 7.2.4; 7.2.6-8; 7.2.25;

āśrama (stage of life) VS 6.2.3.

9.18; 10.10; ekatva VSc 7.2.6-7.

āśraya (substratum) VS 10.1; VSc 1.1.9;

eva (only) VS 1.2.4; 3.1.7; 8.5; evam VSc

1.1.15-17; 1.1.19; 1.1.21; 1.2.7; 2.1.9;

1.1.10; 1.1.15-18; 1.1.20-21; 1.1.26;

2.1.15; 2.2.15; 5.1.1; 5.2.21; 7.1.4-5;

1.1.29; 1.2.6; 1.2.11; 2.1.1; 2.1.16;

7.1.9; 7.2.8; 7.2.14.

2.1.21; 2.1.27-28; 2.2.15; 2.2.18; 2.2.23;

2.2.28; 3.1.1; 3.1.8.

इ(i)

icchā (volition) VS 1.1.5; 3.2.4; 6.2.17;

क(ka)

VSc 1.1.12; 2.1.24; 5.1.3; 5.1.9; 5.2.15;

karman (action) VS 1.1.6-7; 1.1.10; 1.1.13;

6.2.17.

1.1.16-17; 1.1.19; 1.1.21; 1.1.24; 1.1.28-

indriya (senses) VS 3.1.1-3; 3.2.1; 3.2.4;

29; 1.2.5; 1.2.7-8; 1.2.10; 1.2.16; 2.1.21;

4.1.4; 5.2.16; 9.15; 9.25; VSc 2.2.28;

2.1.24; 2.1.28-29; 3.1.4; 4.1.12; 5.1.1-6;

3.1.2-4; 3.1.6-8; 3.2.4; 4.1.2; 4.1.5;

5.1.11; 5.1.16-17; 5.2.1; 5.2.13-15;

4.1.14; 6.1.1-2; 7.2.14; 8.3; 8.14-15; 9.8;

5.2.18; 5.2.21; 5.2.24-26; 6.2.19; 7.1.12;

9.13; 9.19.

7.1.21-22; 7.1.24; 7.1.31; 7.2.5-6; iṣu (arrow) VS 5.1.17.

7.2.10; 7.2.13; 7.2.28; 7.2.30; 8.6-8;

iṣṭa (desired) VS 6.2.6; 10.2.

8.11; 8.14; 9.16; 10.14; (act) VS 2.1.18-

19; 6.1.3; VSc 1.1.3-7; 1.1.10; 1.1.11; ई(ī)

1.1.14; 1.1.16-18; 1.1.20; 1.1.24; 1.1.28-

Īśvara (Maheśvara, Bhagavān,

29; 1.2.10-11; 1.2.16; 2.1.22; 4.1.14;

Hiraṇyagarbha) VSc 1.1.3; VSc 2.18-19;

5.1.1-5; 5.1.16-17; 5.2.1; 5.2.24; 6.1.1;

VSc 6.1.1; VSc 10.21.

7.1.12; 7.1.21; 7.2.6; 7.2.10; 7.2.16; 8.4;

8.8; 8.12; 10.14; 10.17.

उ(u)

kāya (body) VS 5.2.18.

utkṣepaṇa (going away) VS 1.1.6; 1.1.27;

kārya (effect, product) VS 1.1.7; 1.1.11;

VSc 1.1.14; 1.1.27; 1.2.5.

1.1.13; 1.1.22; 1.1.24; 1.2.1-2; 2.1.24;

udara (belly) VS 10.11.

2.2.9; 2.2.15; 2.2.32; 3.1.5; 3.1.8;

udasana (throwing up) VS 5.1.10.

4.1.2-3; 4.2.6; 5.2.19; 7.2.8; 7.2.14;

udīcīna (northwards) VS 2.2.17.

7.2.29; 8.9; 9.12; 9.18; 10.6; 10.9; unmeṣa (open twinkling) VS 3.2.4.

10.12; VSc 1.1.3; 1.1.7-8; 1.1.10-15;

upacāra (usage) VS 3.2.11-12; VSc 2.2.15.

1.1.21-29; 1.2.1; 2.1.1-4; 2.1.22; 2.2.1;

upadhā (blemish) VS 6.2.3-4; VSc 6.2.3.

2.2.9; 2.2.32; 2.2.35-36; 2.2.38; 3.1.4-5;

upalabdhi (inference) VS 4.1.6; 4.1.9;

3.1.8; 3.1.13; 3.2.4; 4.1.2-4; 4.2.1; 4.2.6; (apprehension) VS 7.1.15; VSc 1.1.21;

5.1.11; 5.2.15; 5.2.17; 5.2.19; 6.1.6;

4.1; 4.1.5; 4.1.8-10; 4.1.14; 7.1.15; 7.1.23.

6.1.18; 7.1.10; 7.1.21; 7.2.2; 7.2.7-10;

upavāsa (abstinence, fasting) VS 6.2.2;

7.2.14; 7.2.29; 8.7-11; 8.13; 8.15; 9.1-2;

VSc 6.2.2.

9.4; 9.12; 9.18-19; 10.4-12; 10.15-16; upasarpaṇa (going in) VS 5.2.19; VSc

10.19; 10.21.

5.2.19; 7.2.10.

kāla (time) VS 1.1.4; 2.2.6; 2.2.11; 5.2.23;

uṣṇa (hot) VS 2.2.2; 2.2.4; VSc 1.1.7;

5.2.28; 7.1.19; 7.1.32; 7.2.25; 6.2.2.

2.1.1; 2.1.3-4; 2.2.1; 8.17; 10.18.

kula (family) VS 6.2.2; VSc 6.2.2.

kṛti (made) VS 6.1.1; 8.12; VSc 1.2.6; ऊ(ū)

6.1.4.

ūrdhva (upright) VS 5.1.18; 5.2.14; VSc krama (sequence) VS 6.1.6; VSc 2.1.20-

2.1.14; 2.2.19; 2.2.13-14.

23; 3.1.1; 5.2.27; 6.1.6; 7.2.1.

kriyā (activity) VS 1.1.14; 2.1.12; 5.2.23; ऋ(ṛ)

9.1; 9.3; VSc 1.1.2; 1.1.8; 1.1.14; ṛṣi (Vedic and Upaniṣadic seers) VS 6.1.2;

1.1.21; 2.1.12; 2.1.21; 2.2.6; 2.2.9-11;

VSc 9.28.

2.2.15; 3.2.4; 5.1.1; 5.2.2; 5.2.8; 5.2.12;

288 * Index*

5.2.19; 5.2.23-35; 6.2.10; 7.2.16-17;

jñāna (knowledge, comprehension,

9.1-3; 9.10.

consciousness, cognition ) VS 3.2.1;

kṣipra (swift) VS 2.2.6; VSc 2.2.6.

3.2.3; 3.2.14-15; 4.1.10; 4.1.14; 8.1; 8.3-

5; 8.16-17; 9.6; 9.26; 10.3-4; (parijñāna)

ग(ga)

VSc 1.1.6; 1.1.12; 2.1.18; 2.2.6; gati (movement) VS 3.2.4; VSc 3.2.4;

(mithyājñāna) 2.2.23; 3.1.13; 3.2.1;

7.2.14.

3.2.3; 3.2.6; 3.2.14-15; 4.1.6; 4.2.8;

gandha (touch) VS 1.1.5; 2.1.1; 2.2.1;

5.2.16; 4.2.20; 5.2.22; 6.1.2-3; 6.1.13;

2.2.3; 4.1.10; 6.2.6; 7.1.4; 7.2.1; 8.16;

6.2.2; 7.1.30; 8.1-11; 8.14; 8.16; 9.6-8;

VSc 1.1.7; 1.1.12; 2.1.1; 2.1.5; 2.1.10;

9.13-17; 9.23-28; 10.3-5; 10.9; 10.11;

2.2.1-3; 3.2.4; 7.1.3; 8.16; 10.1.

10.21; see buddhi.

gurūkula (sitting by the guru) VS 6.2.2;

jvalana (burning) VS 5.2.14; VSc 5.2.14.

VSc 6.2.2.

gurutva (weight) VS 1.1.27; 5.1.7; 5.1.13; ड(Ḍa)

5.1.18; 5.2.3; VSc 1.1.5; 1.1.7; 1.1.21; duḥkha (pain) VS 1.1.5; VSc 1.1.7; VSc

1.1.27; 2.1.1-2; 2.1.4; 2.1.21-22; 5.1.7-

1.1.12; VS 3.2.4; VSc 3.2.17; VS

8; 5.1.13; 5.1.18; 5.2.1; 5.2.3; 5.2.18;

3.2.15-17; VSc 6.1.10; VSc 6.2.16; VS

7.2.3.

10.1-2; VSc 10.1-2.

geha (household) VS 9.10; VSc 6.2.2.

dṛṣṭaliṅga (visible mark) VS 2.1.8; (verbal

go (cow) VS 3.1.12; VSc 3.1.12.

testimonia) VS 2.1.15-19; VS 3.2.6-8.

grahaṇa (grasping, conceptualising) VS

2.2.24; VSc 1.1.6; 2.2.24; 2.2.29; 3.1.3;

त(ta)

4.1.5; 4.1.8; 7.2.29; 9.5-6; 9.11; 9.18; tattva (essence, entity, suchness) (refers

10.3.

mainly to the nature of substances) VS

2.1.28 (for ākāśa); VSc 2.2.8 (for kāla); घ(gha)

VSc 2.2.14 (for diś); VSc 4.1.14; tattva

ghaṭa (pot) VS 9.10; VSc 1.1.3; 1.1.21;

as co-existentiality (VS 7.2.31).

1.1.26; 1.2.9; 2.1.16; 2.2.7; 3.1.5;

tad (that, Him) VS 1.1.1-3; 2.1.21; 2.2.12;

3.1.13-14; 5.1.3; 5.2.1; 5.2.9; 5.2.12-13;

3.1.13; 4.1.1; 4.1.11; 5.2.2; 5.2.4;

5.2.27; 7.1.4; 7.2.14; 8.10; 9.2-8; 9.10;

5.2.16; 5.2.20; 6.1.9; 6.1.12; 6.2.6;

10.9.

7.1.17; 7.1.25; 7.1.30; 9.5; 9.16; 9.26;

10.1; 10.11; 10.21; tad in VSc (idem च(cha)

VS)

candra (moon) VS 9.11; VSc 4.2.9; 9.11;

tamas (darkness) VS 5.2.21.

10.21.

tiryak (oblique) VS 5.1.8; 5.2.14; VSc caturāśrama (the four stages of life) VS

3.2.4; 3.1.14.

6.2.3; VSc 6.2.3.

tulyajātī (analogy, simile) VS 2.2.26; VSc

cira (long-time) VS 2.2.6; VSc 2.2.6.

1.1.8.

tṛṇa (grass) VS 5.1.14; VSc 5.1.14; 6.1.18; ज(ja)

6.2.18.

jatu (lac, rubber, gum) VS 2.1.6; VSc

tṛpti (satisfaction) VS 6.2.14; VSc 6.2.14.

2.1.6.

tejas (lustre, cosmic fire) VS 1.1.4; 2.1.3;

jīvana (life-principle, ‘biological life’

2.2.4; 5.2.13; 5.2.22; 7.1.8; 7.1.11; 7.2.2;

resulted from the contact between

8.17; (light) VS 5.2.9; VSc 2.2.2; 2.2.4;

ātman and manas) VSc 5.2.15; (or

2.2.9-11; 5.2.9-11; 5.2.13; 5.2.22; 7.2.2-3.

contact between body and ‘soul’) VSc

tyāga (avoidance, abandonment) VS

5.1.11; (or between ātman and hand)

6.1.16-18; VSc 3.1.14.

VSc 5.1.12), VSc 5.1.11-12; 5.1.15;

trapu (silver, tin) VS 2.1.7.

(conjunction between ātman and manas

means or is called jīvana) VSc 5.2. 20.

द(da)

janman (birth-principle) VSc 6.2.18; see

dakṣiṇā (southwards) VS 2.2.17; VSc

also janmākhya (designation for rebirth)

2.2.15-18; 9.25.

VSc 6.2.18.

dagdha (burned) VS 5.1.12; VSc 5.1.12.

*Index * 289

darśana (worldview) VS 9.28; 10.10; VSc

practice, yogajadharma) VSc 9.13; 9.28;

1.1.6; 1.1.10; 9.6; 9.8-9; 9.18; 9.22;

VSc 10.19-20; (involved in karmic

9.28; 10.4; 10.6.

retribution) VSc 5.1.15; VSc 6.1.1;

dāraka (boy) VS 5.1.11; VSc 2.1.19; 3.2.4.

6.1.4; VS 6.1.15; 6.2.17; VSc 6.2.17;

diś (space, direction) VS 1.1.4; 2.2.12;

(mental category) VS 9.24; 9.28; (it can

2.2.18; 5.2.23; 5.2.27; 7.1.31; 6.2.2; be known from the śruti and smṛti texts)

7.2.25; VSc 2.2.12-13; 2.2.15; 5.2.4;

VSc 6.2.1-3; 6.2.11; 6.2.18.

5.2.9; 5.2.23.

dharmika (righteous Brahmin) VS 6.1.15;

dīrgha (long) VS 7.1.23; VSc 7.1.23-24.

VSc 6.1.15.

duḥkha (pain) VS 1.1.5; 3.2.4; 3.2.15;

5.2.16-17; 10.1; VSc 3.2.15.

न(na)

duṣṭa (impure) VS 6.1.9-10; 9.26; VSc

nāḍī (vein) VS 5.2.6; VSc 5.2.6.

6.1.9-10; 6.2.7; 9.26.

nānā (plurality, diversity, variegation) VS

dṛṣṭānta (allegory, exemplification) VS

2.1.14; 2.2.9; 2.2.15; 3.2.16; VSc 1.1.29;

7.1.20; VSc 7.1.20; 2.1.8; 2.1.10.

2.1.1; 2.2.9; 2.2.15; 3.2.16-17.

deśa (place) VS 4.2.4; 10.10; VSc 2.2.8-9; nakṣatra (constellation, lunar station

3.2.4; 4.2.4; 5.1.2; 4.1.6; 4.1.10-11; (nakṣatra) VS 6.2.2; VSc 6.2.2.

6.1.13-14; 6.2.2; 6.2.11; 7.1.23; 7.2.26-

niḥśreyasa (absolute state of liberation) VS

28; 9.1-3; 9.9-11; 9.18-20; 10.10.

1.1.2; VSc 1.1.2; 1.1.6; 6.2.11; 10.21.

doṣa (fault, error, impurity) VS 2.2.35;

nitya (eternal, continuity, permanence)

6.1.11; 9.25; VSc 1.1.6; 2.2.35; 6.2.4;

VS 1.1.7; 1.1.11; 2.1.13; 2.1.27; 2.2.7;

7.2.21.

2.2.10; 2.2. 31; 3.2.2; 3.2.5; 4.1.1; drava (liquid) VS 2.1.2; 5.2.5; VSc 1.1.5;

7.1.7-8; 7.1.15; 7.1.26; 7.2.2; 7.2.9; VSc

1.1.7; 1.1.21; 2.1.1-3; 2.1.6-7; 5.2.1-6;

(idem VS).

7.2.3.

nimitta (cause, reason) VS 9.20; VSc

dravya (essence, substance) VS 1.1.4;

1.1.7; 2.1.23; 2.2.11; 2.2.29-30; 3.2.4;

1.1.7-8; 1.1.11; 1.1.14-17; 1.1.20;

3.2.7; 3.2.14; 5.2.20; 5.2.27-28; 7.2.1;

1.1.22; 1.1.25; 1.1.29; 1.2.5; 1.2.7-9;

7.2.4; 7.2.24; 8.8; 8.17.

1.2.12; 2.1.11; 2.1.21; 2.1.27; 2.2.7; nimeṣa (close twinkling) VS 3.2.4; VSc

2.2.13; 2.2.25; 2.2.27; 3.2.2; 3.2.5;

3.2.4.

4.1.6; 4.1.9; 4.1.12; 5.2.21-22; 7.1.8-9;

niyama (restrictive rule) VS 6.2.2; VSc

7.1.12; 7.1.14; 7.2.30; 8.1; 8.4; 8.6-7;

6.2.2; 7.1.15; 8.8.

8.10-11; 8.14-15; 9.14; 10.12; VSc

nirṇaya (decision) VS 10.3; VSc 3.2.10; (idem VS)

10.2-3.

dveṣa (aversion) VS 1.1.5; 3.2.4; 6.2.17;

nirdeśa (description) VS 8.3; VSc 8.3.

VSc 1.1.7; 1.1.12; 3.2.17; 5.2.15;

nivṛtti (antipathy, renunciation from the

6.2.16-17.

world, inward path) VS 3.1.14; VSc

2.3.38; 3.1.14.

ध(dha)

niṣkriya (immobile) VS 5.2.23; 5.2.25;

Dharma (sum of all infinitesimal dharmas;

7.2.17; VSc 1.1.21; 2.1.21; 5.2.23-25;

Vaiśeṣika doctrine) VS 1.1.1; (medium

7.2.17.

of mundane elevation and extra-

niṣpatti (inception) VS 2.2.36; 3.2.15; mundane salvation) VS 1.1.2; VSc

7.2.3; 8.3-4; 10.4; VSc 7.2.1; 8.3.

1.1.2; 1.1.6; (has its own ontological

nodana (impulse, bouncing) VS 5.1.8-10;

nature, dharmasvarūpa) VSc 1.1.3;

5.1.17; 5.2.1; 5.2.7; VSc 1.1.21; 5.1.8-

(specific quality of the soul, which

10; 5.1.16-17; 5.2.1; 5.2.7; 5.2.13.

together with adharma is subsumed

under adṛṣṭa) VSc 1.1.5; 3.2.17; VS

प(pa)

4.2.5; (mental quality of the soul)

patana (falling) VS 5.1.7; 5.1.13; 5.1.18;

VSc 9.25; (factor of memory, related

5.2.3; VSc 2.2.21; 5.1.3-7; 5.1.13; to bhāvanā) VSc 1.1.7; (defining

5.1.18; 5.2.3-4.

characteristic) VSc 2.1.8; 3.1.7; VS

padārtha (ontological category) VSc 1.1.6;

4.2.5; VSc 4.2.5; vs 9.8; VSc 9.8; (a

1.2.2; 2.1.19; 7.2.5; 8.1; VSc 1.1.6; quality born out of yogic intellectual

1.1.2; 2.1.19; 7.2.5; 8.1.

290 * Index*

paramaṇu (infinitesimal particle) VS

7.2.20-21; 7.2.29; 8.12-13; 9.8; 9.23;

4.1.7; VSc 1.1.12; 2.1.11; 2.1.13;

10.7.

2.1.27; 2.2.7; 3.2.2; 3.2.5; 5.1.5; 5.1.11; pramāṇa (means of knowledge) VS 9.20;

5.2.14; 7.1.5-8; 7.1.10; 7.1.15; 7.1.26-

10.19; VSc 6.1.1; 9.21; 9.26; 10.3;

27; 7.2.2.

10.19.

parādāna (dedication, offering) VS 6.1.15.

prayatna (intentional effort) VS 1.1.5;

parimaṇḍala (circular) VS 7.1.26; VSc

1.1.27; 3.2.3-4; 5.1.1; 5.1.9; 5.1.13; VSc

7.1.26.

5.1.1; VSc 5.1.3-4; VSc 5.1.8-14; VSc

parimāṇa (dimension, extension) VS 1.1.5;

5.1.17; VSc 5.2.1; 5.2.6; 5.2.15; 5.2.18;

4.1.12; 1.1.7; 1.1.18; 2.1.1-5; 2.2.6;

VSc 6.2.9-11; VSc 10.7.

2.2.12; 3.2.1; 3.2.17; 4.1.6; 7.1.14;

prayojana (scope, aim) VS 6.2.1; 10.20;

7.1.17; 7.1.24-27.

VSc 1.1.1; 6.2.2; 10.20.

pavana (breeze) VS 5.2.14; VSc 3.2.4;

pravṛtti (attraction, propensity, opposite to

5.2.14.

nivṛtti ‘antipathy’) VS 2.2.38; 3.1.14;

pāka (ripe, cooked, heat) VS 7.1.10-11;

6.1.13; 6.2.17; VSc 2.2.38; 3.1.14;

7.1.13; VSc 2.1.1; 2.1.4; 2.1.8; 7.1.11-

6.1.13-14; 6.2.17; 9.5.

14; 8.17; (vipākaparijñāna) 9.28;

prasāraṇa (expansion) VS 1.1.6.

10.17-18.

prasiddha (well established) VS 3.1.1;

pāṇi (hand) VS 10.11; VSc 3.1.8; 10.8.

3.1.9; VSc 2.1.16; 3.1.1; 3.1.8; 9.21.

pīḍana (pressing) VS 5.2.7; VSc 5.2.7.

prācīna (east, previous) VS 2.2.16;

pīta (drunken) VS 5.2.19; VSc 2.2.16;

(authorship title) VSc 1.1.1.

5.2.19.

prāṇa (breath) VS 3.2.4; VSc 2.1.18-19;

puṣpa (flower) VS 2.2.1; VSc 1.1.2;

3.2.4; 3.2.6-10; 3.2.14; 5.2.17-18; 6.1.3;

2.2.1-3.

10.21.

pṛthaktva (separateness, generic quality of

prādurbhāva (manifestation) VS 7.1.6;

the soul) VS 1.1.5; 1.1.23; 4.1.12; 7.2.1;

VSc 1.1.18; 2.1.24; 3.2.3; 6.2.19; 7.1.8.

7.2.4; 7.2.8; VSc 1.1.7; 1.1.23; 2.1.1;

prāmaṇya (authoritative) VS 1.1.3; 10.21;

2.1.3; 2.1.5; 2.2.6; 2.2.12; 3.2.1; 3.2.17;

VSc 1.1.2-3; 10.20-21.

7.2.1; 7.2.3-5; 7.2.7-9.

prokṣaṇa (aspersion) VS 6.2.2;

pṛthivī (earth) VS 1.1.4; 2.1.1; 2.2.3; 5.2.1;

VSc 6.2.2.

5.2.13; 7.1.4; 7.1.10; VSc 1.1.4; 2.2.26;

prokṣita (sprinkle with palm downwards)

7.1.3; 8.16.

VS 6.2.6; VSc 6.2.6.

pṛṣṭha (back of the body) VS 10.11.

parijñāna (discernment of categories and

pratigraha (receiving) VS 6.1.5; VSc

of the nature of all things) VSc 1.1.6,

6.1.5-6.

9.28, 10.21.

pratiṣedha (prohibition, negation) VS

4.1.4; 6.2.7; 7.2.30; 9.10-11; VSc 6.2.7.

ब(ba)

pratyakṣa (direct perception) VSc 2.1.8;

bahutva (multiplicity) VS 2.2.42; 7.1.16;

VS 2.1.15; VSc 2.1.15; VS 2.1.19; VSc

VSc 4.1.6; 7.1.16; 7.1.21-22; 7.1.24.

2.1.19; VS 2.1.25; VSc 2.1.25; VS

buddhi (cognition, knowledge, sometimes

2.2. 19; VSc 2.2.19; 2.2.28; VS 3.2.6;

used interchangeable with jñāna) VSc

VSc 3.2.6; VS 3.2.10; VSc 3.2.10; VS

1.1.2-3; VS 1.1.5; VSc 1.1.7; VS 1.2.3;

3.2.11; VS 3.2.13; VSc 3.2.13; VS

VSc 1.2.3; VSc 1.2.5-7; VSc 3.2.17; VS

4.2.1; VSc 4.2.1; VSc 6.1.3; 8.17; VS

6.1.1; VSc 6.1.1; VS 6.1.4; VS 6.1.2;

9.6; VS 9.7; VSc 9.7; VSc 9.12-13; VSc

VSc 7.2.1; VSc 7.2.9; VSc 7.2.25-27;

9.15; 9.17; 9.27-28; VSc 10.3; VS 10.4;

VSc 8.1; 8.7; VS 8.8; VSc 8.9; VS 8.11;

VSc 10.4; VS 10.5; VSc 10.7.

VSc 8.13; VSc 9.8; VS 9.21; VSc 10.1;

pratyagātman (soul as unique

10.4; 10.6-8; 10.10-16.

individuality) VS 3.1.14; 3.2.13; VSc

brāhmacarya (studentship with a guru,

3.2.13.

stage of life) VS 6.2.2; VSc 6.2.2.

pratyaya (conceptualisation, experience)

Brahmāloka (the haven of Brahmā) VSc

VS 7.2.21-22; 7.2.24; VSc 1.2.18;

1.1.2.

2.2.6; 2.2.12; 3.2.4; apratyaya (deceit)

brāhmaṇa (Brahminic) VS 6.1.3; VSc

VSc 5.1.6; 5.1.11-12; 5.2.27-28; 7.2.1;

1.1.1; 6.1.3; 6.1.8-9; 6.1.17.

*Index * 291

भ(bha)

र(ra)

bhāvanā (‘creative energy’ of memory;

rasa (taste) 1.1.5; 2.1.1-2; 2.1.2; 4.1.10; creative imagination) VS 1.1.7; 2.1.16;

6.2.6; 7.1.4; 7.2.1; 8.17; VSc 1.1.7;

2.1.19; 2.2.38; 9.22-23; VSc 1.1.7;

1.1.12; 2.1.5; 7.2.16; 10.1.

2.1.16; 2.1.19; 2.2.38; 9.22-23.

rāga (passion) VS 6.2.12; 6.2.16; VSc

bhūyastva (abundance, amplitude, density)

6.2.13; 6.2.16.

VS 8.16; VSc 8.16-17.

rūpa (form, colour, shape) VS 1.1.5;

bhojana (feeding) VS 6.1.8-9; 6.2.9; 8.12;

1.1.26; 2.1.1-3; 4.1.6; 4.1.8-9; 6.2.6;

VSc 6.1.11.

7.1.4; 7.2.1-2; 8.17; 10.15; VSc 1.1.5;

1.1.7-9; 1.1.12; 1.1.15; 1.1.26; 1.2.1;

म(ma)

1.2.5; 2.1.1-3; 2.1.5; 2.1.10; 2.1.25;

maṇi (gem) VS 5.1.15; VSc 5.1.15;

2.2.2; 2.2.22; 2.2.25; 2.2.38; 3.1.8;

manas (atomic mind) VS 1.1.4; 2.1.25;

3.2.4; 4.1.6-9; 4.1.11; 4.1.14-15; 4.2.2-

3.1.13; 3.2.1-4; 5.2.14-17; 7.1.30; 8.2;

3; 5.2.20; 6.1.5; 6.1.10; 6.2.2; 6.2.6;

9.13; 9.15; 9.22; VSc 1.1.8; 1.2.6;

7.1.1; 7.1.3-5; 7.1.7-11; 7.1.21; 7.2.1-3;

3.2.1-2; 3.2.4; 4.1.2; 4.1.6; 4.2.9;

7.2.16; 7.2.29; 8.17; 9.5; 9.9-10; 10.1;

5.1.12; 5.2.1; 5.2.14-15; 5.2.17; 5.2.19;

10.4; 10.15; 10.18.

6.1.10; 6.1.17; 6.2.2; 7.1.15; 7.1.30;

8.10; 9.23.

ल(la)

mantra (spell) VS 6.2.2; VSc 6.1.14; 6.2.2; lakṣaṇa (inferential characteristic) VS

6.2.6.

1.1.14-16; 7.1.2; VSc 1.1.1; 1.1.3; mahat (boundless, great, large) VS 4.1.6;

1.1.15; 2.1.1; 2.1.13; 2.2.1-2; 3.1.7;

7.1.15-16; 7.1.18; 7.1.21-22; 7.1.28;

4.2.2; 6.1.10; 7.2.1; 7.2.29; 9.9; 9.18;

7.2.4; 7.2.12; 7.2.27; VSc 2.2.34; 4.1.6;

9.26; 10.3.

4.1.8-9; 4.1.13-14; 7.1.15-18; 7.1.20-24; liṅga (sign, mark) VS 1.2.18; 2.1.8; 2.1.10;

7.1.28; 7.1.31; 7.2.28.

2.1.14-15; 2.1.18; 2.1.20; 2.1.26; 2.2.6; mitha (mutuality) VS 4.2.3; 10.2.

2.2.12; 2.2.30; 2.2.37; 3.1.14; 3.2.4;

musala (pestle) VS 5.1.2-5; VSc 5.1.2-5;

3.2.6; 4.1.2; 4.2.9; 6.1.2; 6.1.3; 7.1.27;

5.1.7-8.

9.20; (proof) VS 5.2.10; VSc 1.2.18;

mokṣa (final liberation) VSc 1.1.2; VS

2.1.8; 2.1.10; 2.1.15; 2.1.18; 2.1.20-21;

5.2.20; VSc 5.2.20; 5.2.22; (explained

2.1.23; 2.1.28; 2.2.2; 2.2.6; 2.2.8-12; in the context of soul and action) VS

2.2.14; 2.2.30; 2.2.37; 3.1.8-9; 3.2.1;

6.2.19; VSc 6.2.19 see niḥśreyasa

3.2.4; 3.2.6; 3.2.9; 3.2.15; 4.1.2-4; 4.2.9;

4.2.10-11; 6.1.2; 7.1.27; 7.2.31; 9.1; य(ya)

9.18-20; 9.28; 10.4.

yājña (sacrifice) VS 6.2.2; VSc 6.2.2; 8.9;

laiṅgika (indicator, proof) VS 9.18; 10.19;

8.11; 9.7; yājñadatta VSc 3.2.6; 3.2.10;

VSc 9.18; 10.19.

3.2.14.

yama (restriction) VS 6.2.9-10; VSc 6.2.2; व(va)

6.2.10.

vacana (affirmation, statement) VS 1.1.3;

yogipratyakṣa (yogic perception) VSc

10.21; VSc 2.1.18 ; 2.2. 37 ; 3.2.13.

9.12; (engenders a particular dharma)

vastra (garment) VS 2.2.1; VSc 2.2.1;

VSc 9.13; 9.17; 9.28.

2.2.36 ; 5.2.7 ; 2.2.1.

yogis (practitioners) VSc 5.2.14.

vānaprastha (forest-dwelling, stage of life)

yugapad (simultaneous) VS 2.2.6; 3.2.3;

VS 6.2.2; VSc 6.2.2.

VSc 2.2.11; 3.2.4; 9.12.

vāyu (air, wind) VS 1.1.4; 2.1.4; 2.1.10;

yuta (attached) VS 7.2.14; ayutasiddha

2.1.14-15; 2.1.27; 2.2.7; 2.2.13; 3.2.2;

(non-attached) VSc 1.1.14; 7.2.12-14;

3.2.5; 4.1.8; 5.2.6; 5.2.13; 7.1.8; 7.1.11;

7.2.27-28.

8.17; (wind) VS 5.1.14; 5.2.14; VSc yoga (jointness) VS 5.2.17 (an intellectual

1.1.4; 2.1.1; 2.1.11; .2.1.12-15; 2.1.17;

practice) VSc 5.2.14-27; (associated

2.1.27; 2.2.13; 3.2.4; 4.1.14; 4.2.2; with mokṣa) VSc 5.2.15; VSc 5.2.22;

5.2.6; 5.2.12; 5.2.17-18; 8.17.

VSc 6.2.11.

vāsa (habitation) VS 6.2.2; VSc 2.2.3; 6.2.2.

292 * Index*

vikāra (modification) VS 2.2.34; 3.2.4;

VSc 9.5–6; vs 9.13; 9.22–23; VS 10.2;

VSc 3.2.4.

VSc 10.3–5.

vidyā (perfect knowledge, science,

Viṣṇumitra VS 3.2.11; 3.2.14; VSc 3.2.14.

revelation) VS 9.27; 2.2.23; 7.1.27;

visphoṭana (blistering) VS 5.2.12.

VSc 2.2.23; 5.2.17; 6.1.12; 6.2.10; 8.15; vṛkṣa (tree) VS 5.2.8; VSc 5.2.8.

10.21.

Veda (fundamental sacred texts) VS 4.2.9;

viparīta (reversal) VS 7.1.17; VSc 6.1.16;

6.1.1; VSc 1.1.1; 2.2.37; 4.2.9; 6.1.1;

6.2.6; 6.2.18; 7.1.17; 7.1.23.

6.1.4.

viprakṛṣṭa (remote) VS 7.2.25; VSc 7.2.25-

vaidika (ceremonial, Vedic) VS 5.2.11;

26; 9.28.

VSc 5.1.11; 2.2.37.

vibhava (pervasion) VS 7.1.28; VSc

vaidharmya (analytical differentiation)

7.1.28; 7.1.30.

VSc 1.1.6–8; 1.1.10; 1.1.14; 1.1.17; VS

vibhāga (disjunction, separation, generic

1.1.21–22; VSc 2.1.1; 2.1.22; VS 2.2.31;

quality of the soul) VS 1.1.5; VSc

VSc 2.2.23; VSc 3.1.1; VS 5.2.21; VSc

1.1.12-13; 1.1.15; VS 1.1.19; VSc

5.2.21: VS 5.2.23; VSc 5.2.13; VSc

1.1.23; 1.1.28; VSc 2.1.1-3; VSc 2.1.5;

7.1.2; VSc 7.1.2; VS 9.12; VSc 10.21.

VSc 2.2.6; VSc 2.2.12; 2.2.36; VSc

Vaiśeṣika (philosophy of ontological

3.2.1; VSc 3.2.1; 3.2.17; VS 4.1.12; VSc

categories) VSc 1.1.2; 3.2.17; 10.18.

5.1.16-17; VSc 5.2.1; VS 5.2.12; VS

vaiśeṣikaguṇa (specific quality of the soul)

6.2.18; VSc 7.2.11-14; VSc 10.9.

VSc 1.1.2; VSc 1.1.7; VSc 2.1.25; VSc

virodha (opposition, contradiction) VS

3.2.17.

10.2; VSc 1.1.11; 5.2.21.

vyatireka (contrast) VS 1.1.20; 3.2.9; viśiṣṭa (qualified, distinct, varied) VS

(diversity) VS 5.1.3; 7.2.1.

2.1.18; (exquisite) 6.1.13; 6.1.15; vyapadeśa (indicator) VS 9.1; 9.3; VSc

6.1.18; VSc 1.2.18; 2.1.18; 4.1.8; 4.1.12;

2.2.8–9; 2.2.16–17; 9.1–3; 9.2.8–9.

5.1.10; 5.1.14-15; 6.2.2; 6.2.9; 9.13;

vyavastha (arrangement, system) VS 2.2.3;

9.22; 9.25; 9.28.

3.2.16; VSc 3.2.16.

viśeṣa (particularity, specificity)

vairāgya (detachment) (prerequisite for

VSc 1.1.6; (sāmānyaviśeṣa) VS

receiving the dharmic knowledge of the

1.1.7; (sāmānyaviśeṣa) VSc 1.1.7;

Vaiśeṣika) VSc 1.1.1; (in opposition to

VS 1.2.3; VSc 1.2.3; VSc 1.2.4;

any afflictions (doṣa) that emanate from

VS 1.2.5; VSc 1.2.5; VSc 1.2.6;

objects) (VSc 1.1.6); (soteriological

(sāmānyaviśeṣa) VS 1.2.11; VS 1.2.11;

dimension, related to discernment of

VSc 1.2.11; (sāmānyaviśeṣa) 1.2.13;

ontological categories) VSc 1.1.6;

(sāmānyaviśeṣa) 1.2.15; VSc 1.2.15;

10.21.

(sāmānyaviśeṣa) VS 1.2.17–18; VSc

viṣayadoṣadarśana (knowledge of doṣa in

2.1.1; VS 2.1.16; VSc 2.1.16; VSc

objects) VSc 1.1.6.

2.1.24; VSc 2.1.28; VSc 2.2.1; 2.2.8; viyoga (separation of the body at the time

2.2.14; VS 2.2.19; VSc 2.2.19; 2.2.22;

of death is due to disintegration) VSc

2.2.26; VS 3.2.7; VS 3.2.14; VSc

6.2.18.

4.2.14; VS 3.2.15; VSc 3.2.15; VS

virodha (conflicting, antithetical reasoning

4.1.4; VSc 4.1.4; (sāmānyaviśeṣa) VS

in Vaiśeṣika’s logics) VS 3.1.9; 9.18;

4.1.9; VSc 4.1.9; (sāmānyaviśeṣa)

VSc 1.1.11; 3.1.9; 5.2.21; VSc 9.18.

VSc 4.1.14; VS 4.2.5; VSc 4.2.5;

vināśa (dissolution, destruction) VSc

VS 4.2.6; VSc 4.2.6; VSc 4.2.9; VS

1.1.15; 1.2.7; 2.2.9; 2.2.29; 2.2.23;

5.1.8; VSc 5.1.8; VS 5.1.9; VSc 5.1.9;

5.2.4; 5.1.8; 7.1.4–5; 7.1.8–9; 9.6; 10.9.

VS 5.1.10; VS 5.1.16; VSc 6.2.1;

Varuṇaloka (the heaven of Varuṇa) VSc

6.2.2; VS 6.2.16; VSc 6.2.16; VSc

4.2.3.

7.1.16; 7.1.18; VSc 7.1.23; 7.2.5;

7.2.7; 7.2.29; 7.2.31; (sāmānyaviśeṣa)

श

VS 8.5; (sāmānyaviśeṣa) VS

śabda (sound) VS 2.1.24; 2.2.24; 2.2.36;

8.6; (sāmānyaviśeṣa) VSc 8.6;

2.2.40; (scripture, word) 3.2.9; 7.2.19; (sāmānyaviśeṣa) VSc 8.7; 8.9–10; VS

7.2.24; 9.19; VSc 1.1.1; 1.1.4–5; 1.1.7;

8.11; VSc 8.11; VSc 8.13–14; vs 8.17;

1.1.12; 1.1.17; 1.2.1; 2.1.8; 2.1.24–26;

*Index * 293

2.1.28; 2.2.1; 2.2.18; 2.2.23–24; 2.2.27; sañcita (‘storage’ of dharma and adharma;

2.2.28; 2.2.30; 2.2.32; 2.2.34; 2.2.36–41; karma theory) VSc 6.2.18.

2.2.43; 3.1.1–2; 3.2.4; 3.2.9–14; 5.2.12; saṅkhya (generic quality of the soul,

5.2.23; 5.1.10; 7.2.9; 7.2.14; 7.2.18–21;

number) VS 1.1.5; 1.1.23; 2.2.39;

7.2.23–24; 8.14; 9.1; 9.9; 9.19–21; 9.24;

2.2.43; 4.1.12; 4.2.7; 7.2.6; VSc 1.2.18;

10.6; 10.9; 10.15; 10.21.

2.1.2; 2.1.4; 5.1.2; 9.11.

śarīra (flesh, body) VSc 1.1.1–2; VSc

saṅghāta (solidification) VS 5.2.9.

2.1.23,25; VSc 3.1.14; VSc 3.2.3; VSc sattā (reality) VS 1.2.8; VSc 1.1.7; 1.2.4;

3.2.4; VSc 3.2.10–14; VS 3.2.14; VSc

1.2.10–12; 1.2.18; 2.2.30; 8.5–6; 8.14.

4.1.2; VSc 4.2.1,3–6; VSc 4.2.9; VSc

sādharmya (similarity, commonality,

5.1.13; VSc 5.2.14; VS 5.2.17; VSc

identity) VS 1.1.6; (alongside

5.2.17, 19–20; VSc 6.1.10; VSc 6.2.2, vaidharmya is an epistemic cause to

13–14, 18; VSc 7.2.14; VSc 8.16; VSc abhyudaya and niḥśreyasa) VSc 1.1.6;

10.7–10.

VS 2.2.29; VSc 2.2.29; VSc 10.21.

śāstra (sacred science) VS 3.2.17; 9.18; sandeha (uncertainty) VS 7.2.23; VSc

VSc 3.2.17; 6.1.1; 6.2.2; 10.19.

7.2.23.

śiras (head) VS 10.11; VSc 10.11.

sandigdha (ambiguity) VS 2.2.42; 3.1.11;

śuci (pure) VS 6.2.6–7; 6.2.9; VSc 5.2.6;

3.2.12; VSc 3.1.11; (non-ambiguity)

6.2.6–10; 9.1.

9.18.

śtrotra (ear) VS 2.2.24.

sannikarṣa (four-fold perceptual contact

śveta (white) VS 8.9; VSc 8.9.

between soul, mind, senses and objects)

VS 5.2.16–17; 3.1.13; 8.1; 8.4–7;

स

9.15–16; VSc 3.1.13; 5.2.16–17; 8.1; saṃmūrcchana (spreading, accumulation)

8.4–7; 9.15–16.

VS 2.14.

sama (sameness) VS 6.1.15; 6.1.17; VSc

saṃyukta (linked) VS 5.2.1; 5.2.7; 10.8;

6.1.8; 6.1.10–12; 6.1.14–15.

VSc 1.1.21; 1.1.27; 2.2.2; 2.2.5; 5.1.2; samabhivyāhāra (fellowship, association)

5.2.1; 5.2.6; 5.2.13; 8.4; 9.16.

VS 6.1.8; 6.1.11; VSc 6.1.8; 6.1.11–12.

saṃyoga (conjunction, generic quality of

samavāya (inherence, co-existence,

the soul) VS 1.1.5; VSc 1.1.7; 1.1.11–

co-existentiality, transfer-

13; VS 1.1.15; VSc 1.1.15; VS 1.1.16;

concomitance, vyabhicāra) VS 2.1.25;

VSc 1.1.16; VSc 1.1.18–21; VS 1.1.23;

4.1.9; 4.1.12; 5.2.25; 7.2.29; 9.16–17;

VS 1.1.25; VS 1.1.27–28; VSc 1.2.1–2;

10.1; 10.12; 10.14–18; VSc 1.1.6;

VSc 2.1.1–7; VS 2.1.23; VSc 2.2.6; VSc

1.1.14; 1.1.24; 2.2.2; 2.2.5; 4.1.9–12;

2.2.12; 2.2.16; 2.2.30; 2.2.36; 3.2.1;

4.1.14; 7.1.12; 7.1.21–22; 7.1.24;

3.2.17; 5.1.16–17; 6.2.18; 7.2.13–14.

7.2.4–5; 7.2.14; 7.2.29; 8.4; 9.16; saṃśaya (doubt) VS 2.2.19; 2.2.23; 2.2.25;

10.1–9.

10.3; VSc 2.2.18–26; 2.2.25–26; 2.2.42; sambandha (relation, subsistence) VS

9.26; 10.2–4.

7.2.23; (relation, connection) VSc

saṃsāra (cosmic cycle, perpetual return)

1.1.4; 3.2.4; 3.2.6; 5.2.14; 6.1.2; 7.2.14;

VSc 5.2.19.

7.2.16; 7.2.21; 7.2.23–24; 9.18; 10.4;

saṃskāra (latent impetus, dormant

(unrelated) 2.1.21; 3.1.7.

impression, specific quality of the soul)

sarpis (ghee, clarified butter) VS 2.1.6;

VSc 1.1.5; 1.1.12–13; VSc 2.1.1–4;

VSc 2.1.6.

VSc 3.2.1; 3.2.4; 3.2.17; VS 4.1.8;

sādhya (accomplishment) VS 1.1.10; VSc

VSc 4.1.8; VSc 5.1.16; VS 5.1.17; VSc

1.1.3; 3.1.10; 3.1.12.

5.1.17; VS 5.1.18; VSc 5.1.18; VSc

sāpekṣa (dependent) VS 10.7; VSc 1.1.15;

9.22; VS 9.25; VSc 9.25.

3.2.4; 5.1.1; 5.1.3–4; 8.7; 8.12; 8.13;

sāmānyadṛṣṭa (visible generic mark) VS

8.18.

2.1.16; VSc 2.2.6; VS 3.2.7; VSc 2.2.7;

sāmānya (universality, universal,

VSc 9.8.

generality, similarity, genera) VS 1.1.7;

saṃjñā (naming) VS 2.1.18–19;

1.1.17; 1.1.22; 1.1.24; 1.1.29; 1.2.3–5;

(designation) 4.2.8; 6.1.3; VSc 1.1.4;

1.2.11; 1.2.13; 1.2.15; 1.2.17; 2.1.16;

4.2.8; 6.1.3; 9.1.18–19.

2.2.19; 2.2.43; 3.2.7; 8.5–6; 9.11;

294 * Index*

(sāmānyaviśeṣa) VSc 1.1.6–7; 1.2.11;

hīna (inferior) VS 6.1.14–15; VSc

1.2.15; 4.1.19; 4.1.14; 8.5–7; 8.14;

6.1.14–16; 6.1.18.

10.11; (sāmānya) VSc 1.1.17; 1.1.23;

hetu (sign) VS 3.1.2; 3.1.7; (reason,

1.1.29; 1.2.2–5; 2.1.17; 3.2.7; 4.1.10;

proof, cause) 5.1.16; 10.1; 10.3; VSc

4.1.12; 5.2.24; 8.9; 9.18; 9.11; 10.3–4.

1.1.1; 1.1.6; 2.2.18–19; 3.1.7; 3.1.7; sāmarthya (capacity; power) VS 3.2.17;

(irrational) 3.1.10; 3.2.1; 3.2.7; 3.2.10;

VSc 3.2.17.

5.2.20; 5.2.28; 6.2.11; 6.2.13; 7.2.1; sāsnā (dewlap) VS 2.1.8; VSc 2.1.8.

7.2.21; 9.20; 10.1; 10.21.

siddha (proved) VS 9.28; (ayutasiddha);

hrasva (short) VS 7.1.23; VSc

VSc 1.1.14; 1.1.29; (prasiddha) VSc

7.1.23–24.

2.1.16; 2.2.18; 3.1.1; 3.1.8; (non-

established) 3.1.11–12; 4.1.8; 6.2.1;

Index on Comparative Philosophy

6.1.13; 7.2.17; 9.18; 9.21; 9.28;

10.20–21.

Aristotle 9; 12–16; 18–19; 55–60; 76; 89;

siddhi (perception) VS 1.1.2; (perfect

91; 98; 102; 106; 109; 130; 140; 152; knowledge) 6.1.3; 7.2.14; VSc

169–200; 251; 266–70; 283–85.

2.1.2; 3.1.2; (proved by sense-object

perception) 3.1.17; 7.2.14.

dharmaviśeṣa 19; 24; 62; 88–9; 105; 115;

sīsan (lead) VS 2.1.7.

146–7; 231; 235; 239.

sukha (pain, one the nine specific qualities

differentiae (διαφοραί) 15–6; 18.

of the soul) VS 1.1.5; VSc 1.1.7; 1.1.12; Duns Scotus 18; 77; 88–9; 242; 283.

VSc 2.1.25; VS 3.2.4; VSc 3.2.4; νοῦς (mind) 2.

3.2.6–7; VSc 3.2.9–10; 3.2.14–15; VS

3.2.15; VSc 3.2.15–17; VS 6.2.12; VSc

haecceity 242.

6.2.12–13; 6.2.16; VSc 9.17; VS 10.1;

Halbfass vi; ix; xvi; 3–5; 10; 12; 14; 17–8; 21;

VSc 10.1–2.

30; 36; 57; 107; 225; 232–33; 281; 285.

supta (sleep, sleeping) VS 2.1.7; VSc

Heidegger 3.

5.1.13.

suvarna (gold) VS 2.1.7; VSc 6.1.14;

Individuation 13–4; 17–9; 88–9; 105; 170;

6.2.2.

199; 283; 286.

sūci (needle) VS 5.1.15; VSc 5.1.15.

stanayitnu (thunder) VS 5.2.12; VSc

Jambūvijayaji 21–3; 25; 48–9; 52; 116;

5.2.12.

148; 161; 171; 276–7.

snigdha (viscosity) VS 2.1.2; VSc 2.1.2.

John Philoponus 18.

smṛti (sacred tradition, mental recollection)

VS 2.2.19; 9.6; 9.22; VSc 3.2.4; 6.2.1;

Parmenides 2; 4.

9.11; 9.21–22; 10.4.

Plato 6; 9; 10; 14; 16; 19.

sparśa (touch) VS 1.1.5; 2.1.1; 2.1.2–4;

Pre-Socratics 2; 7; 12.

2.1.9–10; 2.1.24; 4.1.10; 6.2.6; 7.1.4;

7.2.1–2; 8.17; VSc 1.1.7–8; 1.1.12;

specific universal (sāmānyaviśeṣa,

2.1.1–5; 2.1.9; 2.1.15–16; 2.1.18; particular universality, lower universal)

2.1.23–24; 2.2.1–2; 3.1.8; 3.2.3; 3.2.4;

4–5; 16; 19; 77–8; 88.

4.1.18; 5.2.21; 7.1.3; 7.2.2; 8.17; 10.18.

svapna (dream) VS 9.23; VSc 9.23–24;

theory of forms 14; 16.

9.26.

syandana (flowing) VS 5.2.5; VSc 5.1.1–7; ultimate particularity (antyaviśeṣa) 4–5;

5.1.9; 5.1.12; 5.2.5; 7.2.11; 9.21;

16–9; 27; 60; 62; 71; 76; 78; 91; 105;

140; 146; 170; 194–6; 199; 222; 231;

ह(ha)

234–5; 247

hasta (hand) VS 5.1.1–6; 5.1.11; 5.2.15;

VSc 7.2.11; 9.21.

Quinton xvi; 3; 4; 9; 285.

hiṃsā (violence) VS 6.1.10; VSc 6.1.10;

6.1.12–13.

Zeller 2; 7.