मञ्जुश्रीः न्याये २०२०

Source: TW

Early nyAya focus on argumentation

• Oldest text of Nyāyaśāstra is Akşapāda Gautama’s Nyāyasūtra.
• Gautama’s first sutra is: pramāņa-prameya-samsaya-prayojana-drstānta-siddhāntāvayava-tarka-nirnaya-vāda-jalpa-vitandā-hetvābhāsacchala-jāti-nigrahasthānānām tattvajñānāt niņśreyasādhigamaḥ
  • प्रमाण-प्रमेय-संशय-प्रयोजन-दृष्टान्त-सिद्धान्तावयव-तर्क-निर्णय-वाद-जल्प-वितण्डा-हेत्वाभास-च्छल-जाति-निग्रहस्थानानाम् तत्त्वज्ञानात् निःश्रेयसाधिगमः
• The 16 terms are
  1. pramāņa (means of right knowledge),
  2. prameya (object of right knowledge),
  3. samsaya (doubt),
  4. prayojana (purpose),
  5. drstänta (familiar instance),
  6. siddhanta (established tenet)
  7. avayava (members),
  8. tarka (confutation),
  9. nirnaya (ascertainment),
  10. vāda (discussion),
  11. jalpa (wrangling),
  12. vitanda (cavil),
  13. hetvābhāsa (fallacy),
  14. chala (quibble)
  15. jāti (futility),
  16. nigrahasthāna (occasion for rebuke).

Historical development

The principle early commentators (prAchIna-nyAya) on the Nyāyasūtra-s are:

1. Paksilasvāmin Vātsyāyana (c. 450), author of Nyāyabhāşya (commentary on Gautama’s Nyāyasūtra-s). Inspired buddhists like di~NnAga.
2. Uddyotakara (c. 550), author of Nyāya-bhāşya-värttika (commentary on Vätsyāyana’s Nyāyabhāşya)
3. Vācaspati Miśra (c. 900), author of Nyāya-vārttika-tātparya-tikā (commentary on Uddyotakara’s Nyāya-bhāsya-vārttika)
4. Udayana (c. 1000), author of Nyāya-vārttika-tātparya-tikā-parisuddhi (commentary on Vācaspati’s Nyāya-vārttika-tātparya-tikā). nyAya and vaisheShika merged.

Earliest phase of Nyāyaśāstra was concerned with the study of reasoning, the art of philosophic debate. After Udayana (c. 1000), begins a new phase in Nyāya-studies: Navya-nyāya.

The principle Navya-naiyāyika-s are: Gangesopādhyāya (tattvachintAmaNi), Väsudeva Sārvabhauma, Pragalbha, Gadadhara, Raghunātha siromaņi..

mithilA-centric in the beginning; with very rigorous testing and standards.

Distinctive features of navya-nyAya

Distinctive Features of Navya-nyāya:

Merger

• (1) Merging of two schools of philosophy - Nyāya & Vaišeşika.

New language

• (2) Development of a rigorous technical language

Example:
Ordinary sentence: न भूतले घटः। (No pot is on the ground)
Navya-nyāya sentence: भूतल-निरूपित-आधेयता-निरूपित-प्रतियोगिता सा घटत्वावच्छिन्ना … (absentee-hood-conditioned-by-superstratum-hood conditioned-by-ground is limited by pot-hood)

Motivation

Ambiguity in general sanskrit.sanskrit

Lack of articles.

• नीलो घटः। English: A pot is blue, All pots are blue.
• वैद्य आगतः। English: A doctor has come. The doctor has come.

This problem is compounded with increasing number of nouns.

Eg. धूमस्य कारणम् अग्निः। Each fire is the cause of some smoke. Each fire is the cause of all smoke. Some fire is the cause of some smoke. etc..

When communicating precise ideas, this causes problems

Focus on pramāna theory

• (3) Exclusive focus on refinement of logic and pramāna theory (epistemology)

True cognition (jñāna) is very important - for all 4 puruShArthas. Epistemology deals with distinguishing true and false congitions.

Cognition classification

• memory (smr̥ti)
  • true (यथार्थ)
  • false (ayathārtha)
• non-recollective (anubhava)
  • true (pramā)
    • perceptual, inferential, comparison based, testimony-based
  • false (apramā)
    • false (viparyaya -4 types)
    • doubt (saṁśaya)
    • tarka

Pratyakşa (Perception)

Gautama’s sutra:

इन्द्रियार्थ-सन्निकर्षोत्पन्नं ज्ञानम् अव्यपदेश्यम् अभिचारि व्यवसायात्मकम् प्रत्यक्षम्
Perception is the cognition which arises from the contact of a sense-organ with an object; it is non-verbal, accurate and has a definite nature.

Naiyāyika-s are realists. Accordingly, they believe in the case of an example, apple, that:

• (A) The “apple” is distinct from just an experience or idea of an apple
• (B) The “apple” is distinct from just its red-color, its coldish touch, smooth texture and sweet taste, and also from just a series or set of these qualities.
• (C) The “apple” that I now touch (or bite or smell) is the same as the “apple” that saw a while ago.
• (D) The “apple” that I see is the same as the “apple” that you see.

Other classifications

3 main western theories on what we percieve directly (“i see an apple”)-

• direct realism
• representational realism (“see” means something special)
• phenomenalism (“apple” means something special)

Knowability

• Ontological
  • There exists an external world independent of whether we perceive
• Epistemological
  • External world exists. Humans are capable of knowing exactly how it is.

Sense-Object Relations

Types of Sense-Object Relations:

1. संयोग - Conjunction -> Sense-organ + G4
2. संयुक्त-समवाय - Inherence-in-the-conjoined -> Sense-organ + TuT/H
3. संयुक्त-समवेत-समवाय - Inherence-in-the-inherent-in-the-conjoined -> Sense organ + सामान्य (universal)
4. समवाय - Inherence -> Ear + sound
5. समवेत-समवाय- Inherence in the inherent-> Ear + गुण of sound
6. विशेषण-विशेष्य-भाव - Qualifier-qualificand relation - Perception of absence

See a blue car. samavAya sambandha (inseperable connection) between blue color and this car.

Contact between eye and car - saMyoga (seperable connection). Contact between eye and blue car - saMyukta-samavAya. Seeing the car via saMyoga; and the blue color indirectly through the car.
Seeing the colorness of the blue color - saMyukta-samaveta-samavAya.

By superimposition of past memory of carness on car seen now, subject non-verbally knows that he is seeing car. anyathA-khyAti - error in superimposition - when mistaking a rope for a snake.

Buddhists say thoughts/ vikalpas are superimposed, not memories.

anuvyavasAya

Ordinary knowledge is neither self revealing nor self validating. “I know” vs “I know that I know” - latter is not automatic. Called “anuvyavasAya”.

shabda

Word of an Apta. Apta is one who knows the dharma, and won’t lie.

veda-s authored by Ishvara, an Apta.

Inference

Five avayava-s of Gautama’s syllogism:

प्रतिज्ञा-हेतू-दाहरणो-पनय-निगमनानि अवयवाः

1. Pratijñā (statement) - That which is to be proven
2. Hetu (reason) - The means for establishing what is to be proven
3. Udaharana - The general proposition followed by an example
4. Upanaya (application) -Winding up, with reference to the example, of what is to be established as being so or not so.
5. Nigamana (conclusion) - Re-stating of the proposition after the reason has been mentioned.

Stock Example:

• What is your thesis? That the hill has fire on it.
• Why? Because there is smoke there.
• So what? Where there is smoke, there is fire: e.g. the kitchen.
• And? The hill is such a smokey place.
• So? Therefore, it has fire.

darshana

jagat

• Navya-Nyāya lists 7 categories’ of object: substance (dravya), quality (guņa), motion or action (karma), universal (sāmānya), particularity or differentiator (višeşa), inherence (samavāya), and absence (abhāva).

• Dravya (Substratum)(9 types) / Substance: (i) that which possesses the universal substance-hood (dravyatva), (ii) that which possesses qualities

• Guna (Quality) (24 types): (i) that which possesses universals, and isn’t a substance or motion; (ii) that which possesses the universal quality-hood

• Karma (Action) (5 types) Motion: (i) that which causes conjunctions (between substances); (ii) that which possesses the universal motion-hood

• Samanya/ jAti (Universals) (2 types): that which is eternal, unitary, and inherent in many things. Eg. chairness.

• Differentium, visheSha (Particular) (Infinite): that which exists in eternal substances and functions as their differentiator

• Samavaya (Inherence) (1 type) that thing which is eternal and a relation

• Abhava (Absence) (4 types): [No general definition given)

Atman

According to Nyāya, Self is:

• A type of dravya -> therefore it is eternal, uncreated
• Infinite in number. (I can’t know your experiences directly.)
• All-pervasive in nature, tied to individual body-mind through karma
• By nature, not conscious
• in the liberated state, Self sheds all awareness

anumAna of ātman

Gautama’s inferential sutra to prove existence of ātman:

इच्छा-द्वेष-प्रयत्न-सुख-दुःख-ज्ञानानि आत्मनः लिङ्गम् इति

Let,

S(x) = x is a substance;
C(x) = x is a state of consciousness( e.g. desire);
Q(x) = x is a quality
B(x) = x is a body (or manas or any other dravya);
Ixy = x inheres in y

Then,

1. (∃ x) (Cx)

   • [There are states of consciousness]

2. (X)(Cx ⊂ Qx)

   • [States of consciousness are qualities]

3. (X)(Qx ⊂ (∃y)(Sy . Ixy)]

   • [All qualities inhere in some substance or other]

4. (X)(Cx ⊂ (y)(By ⊂ ~Ixy)]

   • [Conscious states cannot inhere in any corporeal substance, e.g. body]

5. Hence the inference

6. There are states of consciousness - desire, fear, revulsion, etc.

7. States of consciousness are qualities (guņa-s)

8. All qualities must inhere in some substance or other

9. Conscious states cannot inhere in any corporeal substance, e.g. body

10. Hence the atman must be posited as the substratum of states of consciousness

Buddhists attack the 2nd, 3rd and 4th statements of this inference.

Naiyāyika-s answer as follows:

1. States of consciousness are guna-s because they cannot be categorized into any other 6 types of objects (dravya, karma, sāmānya, višesa, samavāya, abhāva)
2. Guna-s cannot exist without a substratum - this is loka-siddha (proved in day-to-day experiences)
3. Can these guņa-s (states of consciousness) be supported by body? Naiyāyika-s provide 3 arguments against this consideration.

• States of consciousness do not exist as long as the body.
• Would imply that there are huge hosts of conscious agents - in different parts of the body.
• States of consciousness are dissimilar to corporeal qualities. They’re not externally perceptible like temperature, weight /… , but are internally perceptible. Also intentionality, unlocatability.

Manas, an inner sense organ, cannot itself be a substratum for the emotions. There is a knower seperate from every other instrument of perception.

Also, there has to be a single knower who sees via various “windows”. Also, a single knower should be the basis of both karma and karma-phala.

īśvara

According to Nyāya, īśvara is a “special type of Self”. paramAtman

• => dravya - eternal, uncreated
• Eternally conscious
• Possesses perfect, eternal, universal knowledge
• Can desire and will, but does not undergo pain/pleasure
• Instrumental cause of the Universe

IshvarAnumAna

• Inferential subject (pakşa)

  • अदृष्टाद्वारकोपादान-गोचर-जन्य-कृत्य-जन्यानि समवेतानि जन्यानि
  • Things produced, inherent (samaveta) [in something else], [but which are] not produced through an effort (krti) which is [itself] produced [, an effort] which has as its scope the material causes of the things produced], [and which things) are not [produced] by means of invisible merit (adrsta)…

• Inferred property (sādhya a)

  • अदृष्ट-प्राग्-अभाव-व्याप्य-प्राग्-अभावाप्रतियोग्य्-अपादान-गोचरापरोक्ष-ज्ञान-चिकीर्षा-कृतिमज्-जन्यानि
  • …are produced by someone who can act, who has the desire to act and the direct knowledge, (the three attributes of which) have the material cause (of the things produced) as their scope and are not the counter-positive (pratiyogi) of a prior absence (prāgabhāva) which is pervaded by the prior absence of invisible merit…

• Inferred property (sādhya b)

  • स्व-जनकादृष्टोत्तरोपादान-गोचरापरोक्ष-ज्ञान-चिकीर्षा-कृतिमज्-जन्यानि
  • [or] are produced by someone who can act, who has the desire to act and the direct knowledge, [the three attributes of which] have the material cause [of the things produced] as their scope and take place after the invisible merit which produces [the things produced]…

• Inferred property (sādhya c)

  • अपरोक्ष-ज्ञान-चिकीर्षा-प्रयत्न-विषयी-भवद्-उपादानानि
  • [or] have material causes which are the object of an effort, a desire to act and a direct knowledge…

• Inferential mark (hetu)

  • समवेतत्वे सति प्राग्-अभाव-प्रतियोगित्वात्
  • …because, it being the case that they are inherent [in something else], [the things produced] are the counter-positive of a prior absence.

mithya-jñāna

According to Nyāya, mithya-jñāna is of two types -

1. wrong understanding about the nature of the external world
2. wrong understanding about the Self

The two-fold mithya-jñāna is the cause of samsāra.

moksha

• Right knowledge about the world and the Self is obtained through contemplation.
• This will lead to the dissolution of the (identification) bond between the Self and the body-mind-complex.
• A liberated Self is without pain/pleasure/consciousness.