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OSMANIA UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

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AGIT

Accession No.602

Title Torkochergraliclus

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last marked below.

TÁRKASAMGRAHA

OF

ANNAMBHATTA

with his

TARKADIPIKA.

Edited

with an Introduction, Translation and Notes

BY

S. S. SUKTHANKAR, M. A,

Professor of Sanskrit, Rajaram College, Kolhapur,

। तमसो मा ज्योतिर्गमय ।

Published by

THE BOMBAY BOOK DEPOT Girgaum, Bombay.

BOMBAY

Painted by K. R, Mohite, at the Aryabhanu Press, Kolhapur,

and published by D, R. Dewooller, Manager, Bombay Book-Depot, Girgaum, Bombay,

Rights Reserved.

Price Rupees two.

INSCRIBED

[[10]]

the loving memory of my father

SHANKAR SHIVRAM SHASTRI SUKTHANKAR.

PREFACE.

I have attempted in the following pages to explain the Tarkasamgraha so as to bring it within an easy reach of the understanding of an average student. I leave it to the proper authorities to judge how far the attempt has succeeded. While acknowledging the valuable help I received from earlier annotators of the manual and its allied works I may point out that I have ventured to differ from them on certain topics. The supposed subjectivity of Kanada’s Samanya and Visheshi, the genesis of Samavaya and the fallacy of Asatpratipaksha are some of the topics wherein I have proposed new inter- pretations which I take to be more convincing. Some of such discussions I have put within brackets because I thought the average student could very well do without reading them.

The deep knowledge of the subject of my brother Nyayashastri Bhawanishankar Sukthankar, Medallist in Nyaya, stooa me in good stead He helped me to solve not a few problems in Nyaya. Prof P. V. Kulkarni, of the Elphinstone College, from whom I received my first lessons in Nyaya has obliged me by going through the major part of the manuscript and by making many valuable suggestions. Prof. V. A Gadgil of the Wilson College, Prof. Shembavnekar of the St, Xavier’s College, Prof. Suru of the Fergussion College and Profes- sors Adnık iri and Shinde of the Rajaram College, have laid me under a døbt of obligation by suggesting the lines on which the book was to be written. It was indeed my supreme privilege to be encouraged heartily by all these scholars in my first venture.

•

Mr. Mohite the manager of the Aryabhanu Press is to be thanked for undertaking the printing of this book Even when there was heavy pressure of work and for executing it with the utmost despatch. I cannot help acknowledging the enthusiastic care and initiative that Mr. Kokate their competent printer showed in giving the bock its nice get-up.

Last but not least, I have to thank Mr. Dewool kar the Manager, Bombay Book-Depot, who undertook the publication of the edition in spite of other heavy commit- ments.

Kolhapur,

15th June 1930.

S. S. S.Section No.

Introduction.

Sanskrit Text.

• CONTENTS . -

…

Page.

1-XXV

१-५०

Notes.

Section

Page.

Section

Page.

१ मङ्गल

[[1]]

२१ गन्ध

[[64]]

२. पदार्थ

[[3]]

२२ स्पर्श

[[65]]

३ द्रव्य

[[6]]

२३ अनित्यत्व & नित्यत्व of

[[४]]

गुण

[[9]]

रूप etc.

[[65]]

५ कर्म

[[12]]

२४ सङ्ख्या

[[67]]

६ सामान्य

[[13]]

२५ पारमाण

[[69]]

[[७]]

विशेष

[[18]]

२६ पृथक्त्व

[[70]]

८ समवाय

[[21]]

२७ संयोग

[[71]]

९ अभाव

[[25]]

२८ विभाग

[[71]]

१० पृथ्वी

[[27]]

२९ परत्वापरत्वे

[[72]]

११ आपः

[[40]]

३० गुरुत्व

[[73]]

१२ तेजः

[[42]]

३१ द्रवत्व

[[73]]

१३ वायु

[[47]]

३२ स्नेह

[[74]]

१४ आकाश

[[52]]

३३ शब्द

[[75]]

१५ काल

[[54]]

२४ बुद्धि

[[75]]

१६ दिक्

[[55]]

३५ अनुभव,

१७ आत्मन्

[[55]]

यथार्थ and अयथार्थ 77

१८ मनस्

€9

३६ यथार्थानुभव

[[78]]

१९ रूप

[[61]]

३७ करण

[[79]]

२० रस

[[63]]

३८ Causation

[[80]]

[[2]]

Section

Page.

Section

Page.

[[7]]

३९ कार्य

[[83]]

१८ उपमिति

[[121]]

yo 3 Kinds of Causes 84

५९-६३ शाब्दज्ञान

[[123]]

१४१ करण

[[88]]

६४ अयथार्थानुभव

[[126]]

४२ प्रत्यक्ष

[[88]]

६५ स्मृति

[[127]]

१४३ सन्निकर्ष

[[92]]

६६-६९ सुख ete.

[[128]]

४४ अनुमान

[[96]]

७० प्रयत्न

[[128]]

४५ स्वार्थानुमान and

७१-७२ धर्म, अधर्म

[[128]]

परार्थानुमान

[[103]]

७३-७४ आत्मगुणs

[[199]]

४६ न्याय

[[104]]

७५ संस्कार

[[129]]

४७ करण of अनुमान

[[105]]

७६ कर्म

[[129]]

४८ लिङ्ग

[[105]]

७७ सामान्य

[[130]]

४९ पक्ष

[[105]]

७८ विशेष

[[130]]

५० सपक्ष

[[106]]

७९ समवाय

[[130]]

५१ विपक्ष

[[107]]

८० अभाव

[[131]]

५२-५७ हेत्वाभासs

[[107]]

८१ उपसंहार.

[[133]]

INTRODUCTION.

[[1]]

Origin of the न्याय and वैशेषिक systems:-

It is interesting to see how minds of men of countries so distant as India and Greece have progressed from one sphere of thought to another, on very similar lines. If in Greece the philosophy of Plato preceded and paved, in some degree, the way for the logic and metaphysics of Aristotle, in India, the philosophy of the Upanishads was the precursor of the rationalistic metaphysics of and the logic of , both of which could be said to be, to some extent, at least, its outcome.

गौतम,

The

This coincidence is not by mere chance. transition from philosophy to logic and reasoning is the direct outcome of the tendency of the human mind to revert back to ratiocination as a reaction from an extreme faith in intuition, presupposed by philosophy. The philosophy of the Upanishads always made an appeal to intuition. If you want to realise the truth you will do so only by intuition, was the teaching of the Upanishads. No amount of reasoning, no scepticism, no logic could reveal the truth to you. नैषा सर्केण मतिरापनेया, says the काठक Upanishad.

snubs the over-inquisitive uff saying, ufi andanghai à qui saqaqidaezai â Zani gelê i

(1)

Introduction.

All these are typical of the predominant spirit of the Upanishads. They made a consistent appeal to intuition.

Intuition and ecstasy are the privilege of a few only. They are doors that are positively shut to the majority of men. The emphasis on intuition.

carried too far is bound to result in a reaction against itself. Logic and metaphysics are within the reach of each and every man with some aptitude at least to think. So, it is quite natural that not long after the Upanishadic philosophy must have come into vogue the extreme materialism of the लोकायतिकs. कणाद and the गौतम came into the field to strike the golden mean between the two extremes. If the period stands as a reaction of the orthodox faith against Buddhism, as Max Muller says, it is quite natural that the सूत्रs of कणाद and गौतम represent an attempt check the extreme materialistic tendency of the ass by diluting it with an admission of the authority the Vedas.

That the

and the

systems originally

attempted to bring about a harmony between the orthodox philosophy dependent upon intuition and the school of thought standing for extreme materialism will be clear from certain topics dis- cussed in the सूत्रs of गौतम and कणाद कणाद establishes the authority of the Veda in several

s (Cp.6.1.1;

( II )

Introduction.

2,3,4;10.2.9.) He praises in 6, 2.1 which he specifically describes as including as, s etc. But it is interesting to see how he repudiates the view of the Upanishads that our bodies are composed of three-some say five-elements and establishes, in the wise of a rationalist, not caring for tradition, that they are made of one element only ( 4. 2. 1.). His condemnation of a vicious Brahman ( 6 1.6, 7, 8. ), his conclusion that souls are many (3.2.20 ), in the teeth of the Upanishadic doctrine that plurality is mere Unity and that there is one self only ( 3. 2. 19. ) are all typical of the spirit for which ar’s system stands.

The same tendency is to be observed in ’s न्यायसूत्र Like कणाद he has the highest respect for the Vedic tradition; (2.1.67.)he defends the Veda against objections like those of कौस in the निरुक्त (1:2.56-60); he believes in . But he has the honour to differ

from the Vedic tradition whenever it came into conflict with reason. Thus, like, he believes, on grounds of reason, that our bodies are made of one element only, (3. 1. 28.) though here he points how reasoning (3. 1. 30) is supported by certain allusions in the as (3.1.29) That he differs from the extreme materialist is clear from his refutation of their view that the body is the self (3.1..4.) The upshot of the whole is that these systems want to differ

III)

Introduction.

from the where it conflicted with reason; and to adhere to it where its doctrines did not clash with reason-because only thus could they make their systems popular by an appeal to the orthodox sentiment.

This theory will account for the fact that while there are some who regard the न्याय-वैशेषिक systems as closely related to the

a subdi-

vision of the

according to , there are others who regard it as an ad. As appealing to reason they were लौकायतिकs and they were आस्तिक because they appealed to the Vedic authority also.

The above discussion will enable us to judge the relation between the न्याय-वैशेषिक दर्शन and the वेदान्त. Both accepted reasoning as a valuable means to knowledge but differed in the relative value they attached to it. Thus while the a does recognize the validity of reasoning, it gives its verdict in favour of a when there is a conflict between y and . The attaches value to reasoning in so far as the latter is in harmony with the . When आरुणि directs श्वेतकेतु to perform the various exp- eriments [ उदके लवणमवाधाय मा प्रातरुपसीदथाः ] when he says, यथा सौम्यैकेन मृत्पिण्डेन सर्वे मृण्मयं विज्ञातं, or when the गीता describes the ब्रह्मसूत्रपदs as हेतुमद्भिः all attach value to reasoning. But they want to assign to it

(IV)

Introduction.

a position lower than the when, for instance, काठक says नैषा सर्केण मतिरापनेया. The न्यायवैशेषिक attitude is quite the opposite. As seen above they will shelve

when it conflicts with reasoning and admit its authority when it is in harmony with the latter.

[[2]]

The वैशेषिकs: – These are the followers of कणाद the author of the . The name has been variously explained. Some say that the system got its name from the category of . But this view does not possess sufficient force in view of the fact that f was not the only category peculiar to the school, समवाय, for instance, being an equally important inn- ovation introduced by them. That this derivation has not the sanction of tradition behind it is obvious from the one suggested by the न्यायकोशकार who derives it thus

विशेषं पदार्थभेदमधिकृत्य कृतो प्रन्थो वैशेषिकम् ।

i.e. the work which concerns itself with the defferent- iation of categories. अभ्यङ्करशास्त्रिन् in his commentary on the सर्वदर्शनसङ्ग्रह advances a similar explanation. द्रव्यगुणादिभेदेन सप्तैव पदार्था इति निश्चित्य सर्व सुव्यवस्थितं कणादः प्रत्यपादयत् । अत ईदृशं विशेषमुद्दिश्य प्रवृत्तत्वादिदं वैशेषिकशास्त्रमिति गीयते ।

– स. द. स. औलुक्यदर्शन (p. 210 ) This interpretation is plainly enough based on the words साधर्म्यवैधर्म्याभ्यां in the introductory सूत्र of कणाद धर्मविशेषप्रसूताद्रव्य गुणकर्मसामान्यविशेषसमवायानां पदार्थाना साधर्म्य- वैधर्म्याभ्यां तत्वज्ञानाभिःश्रेयसम् ।

(v)

Introduction.

are

Could we not base the name with a greater amount of plausibility on the word विशेष in धर्मविशेष ? claims for his the supreme privilege of having been inspired by distinctive merit (d). We could hazard the explanation that the

is one which is the outcome of disti- nctive merit. The name that originated from this must have come to be applied to all followers of ’s school.

As regards the propriety surer basis, in this case,

The नैयायिकs: – These are the followers of गौतम the author of the न्यायसूत्रs. of the name we are on a than in that of the s. The name is evidently derived from, reasoning. One cannot definitely say that meant the five–membered syllogism that was brought into vogue by , which bears

maa, the name to-day. For, there are indications, in वात्स्यायनs gloss * of नैयायिकs whose syllogism consisted of no less than ten members. Whether the members were five or ten, it is beyond doubt that thes got their name from their syllogistic reasoning. That this is not a mere conjecture but a fact becomes evident from the examination of the history of the word न्याय. न्याय is genetically a term of the air system and denoted the upshot of the ratiocination employed in reconciling apparently

दशावयवानेके नैयायिका वाक्ये सञ्चक्षते ।

(VI)

Introduction.

contradictory texts in the

Vedic literature,

particularly the Brahmanas. This is the import of the definition of the न्याय of the पूर्वमीमांसा.

वेदार्थनिर्णयसाधनं अधिकरणात्मकः पदार्थः भाषापरिच्छेद.

Thus there are न्यायs in the पूर्वमीमांसा like ’ सविशेषणे हि वर्तमानौ विधिनिषेधौ विशेषणमुपसङ्क्रामतः सति विशेषबाधे’ इति न्यायः । जातेष्टिन्याय and others. How न्याय formed the very backbone of the qnia system can be judged by the nomenclature of several taiat works, particularly that of Jaimini, which is called the न्यायमाला.

that,

It is easy to understand how the term in the first instance, denoted reasoning, in the

sphere of Vedic ritual, reasoning irrespective of the Vedic ritual or not.

came to be applied to all

its having a bearing on That there are ans

like स्थूणानिखननन्याय and अन्धगोलाङ्गूलन्याय in vogue in Sanskrit shows how 14, later on, became a term of wider application. The term that primarily denoted the reasoning of the qîi came to

air be applied to all sorts of reasoning and was not confined to any particular school. Thus the qıza speaks of अध्यारोपन्याय and logicians speak of s. the system of which primarily taught how to the name derived from the word.

अपवादन्याय and the Jain Needless to say, then, that is a representative, that reason came to possess

(VII)

Introduction.

[[3]]

The difference between the two schools:-

It has become difficult to distinguish between the two schools in view of the peculiar relation in which they stood soon after their inception. They started with distinct spheres for their speculations. The नैयायिक school had to deal with logic, the वैशेषिक with metaphysics. One can imagine how the first नैयायिक and वैशेषिक must have dealt with topics purely logical and metaphysical respectively. But the works of the first नैयायिक and वैशेषिक are lost to us and we find in कणाद’s वैशेषिकसूत्र and गौतम ’s न्यायसूत्र respectively metaphysics with a sprinkling of logic and logic with bits of metaphysics: because, sufficient time must have elapsed since the inception of the systems which were now on their way to amalgamation. Thus when कणाद establishes अनुमान as a प्रमाण ( 2. 1. 8. ) or when he refers to tamas (3.1.15.) he deals with topics that come within the pale of 14. And when

, on the other hand, deals with topics like the permanence of the soul (3. 1. 19) or when he determines that our bodies are constituted of only one element he deals with topics that fall within the sphere of metaphysics. In short, the systems that were to investigate in different spheres were already showing a tendency towards amalgamation.

And the reasons for this tendency are not far

(VIII)Introduction.

to seek. Both the systems had appeared to temper the reaction from the tendency to place a blind faith in the authority of the scriptures. Asadas they do show deference for the Vedic tradition. But a tendency to differ from the tradition where it clashed with reason is also slightly perceptible in both the systems. When the says that the

ðí⤠body is made up of one element only, he differs, en- grounds of reasoning, from the that says that the body is made up of three elements or five. When a नैयायिक defines मोक्ष as दुःखाभाव and not as ब्रह्मात्मत्वप्रतीति, he shows a tendency to differ from the

Thus both were rationalistic and here we can

trace the common meeting-ground of both. The anecdotes that कणाद’s last words were पलिवः पीलवः in- stead of the name of some god and that there was a clash between the वैदिक व्यास and the नैयायिक अक्षपाद * (a), though not credible, are yct significant of the attitude of the two systems towards the gut.

The system in from that in those of a

’s as is to be distinguished on the following points:–

is metaphysical and deals with six cate-

gories that are supposed to exhaust the Universe.

• गौतमो हि स्वमतदूषकस्य व्यासस्य मुखदर्शनं चक्षुश न कर्तव्यमिति

प्रतिज्ञाय पश्चाद् व्यासेन प्रसादितः etc.

• अभ्यङ्करशास्त्रिन् on अक्षपाददर्शन in स. द. सं.

(1x)

Introduction.

is dialectical and deals with sixteen heads that

have a bearing on dialectics and reasoning.

2. कणाद admits two प्रमाणs प्रत्यक्ष and अनुमान, गौतम admits

two more, उपमान and शब्द.

After TM and

the systems came nearer

and nearer. The writers who came in the field brought about a syncretism between the two schools and to-day the distinction between them is no more than theoretical.

Now, one is said to belong to the or the वैशेषिक according as he adheres or not to the theories summarised in the following stanza cited in the सर्वदर्शनसङ्ग्रह :-

द्विले व पाकजोत्पत्ती विभागे च विभागजे ।

यस्य न स्खलिता बुद्धिस्त वै वैशेषिकं विदुः ॥

1. The वैशेषिकs hold that द्वित्व is produced ( जन्य ) by अपेक्षायुद्धि; the नैयायिकs hold that it is only made known ( ज्ञाप्य ) by अपेक्षायुद्ध अन्नम्भट्ट holds the fromer view, 1 ( see notes on सङ्ख्या. )

2. The नैयायिकs hold that when a jar is baked, the change of colour is due to the atoms in the jar (पीलु) being baked individually. The s hold that the jar as a whole (fa) is baked and not the individual atoms. The former are called पीलुपाकवादिन्s and the latter पिठरपाकवा दिन्s. अनम्भट्ट holds the former view 2

—- तर्कसङ्ग्रह

1 द्वित्वादिकं तु सर्वत्रानित्यमेव । 2 अच परमाणुष्वेव पाकये न व्यणुकादौ । सर्कदीपिका

( x )

Introduction.

3. The वैशेषिकs hold that विभाग can be कर्मज as well as विभागज while the नैयायिकs hold that it can be कर्मज only. अन्नम्भट्ट admits विभागजविभाग like the वैशेषिकs. 1

We can extend the list by adding the following:-

4. समवाय is अनुमानविषय according to the वैशेषिकs. It is प्रत्यक्षविषय according to the नैयायिकs. अन्नम्भट holds that it is inferrible only.?

5. जीवात्मन् is inferrible only according to the वैशेषिकs. It is perceived directly by the mind acco- rding to the नैयायिकs अन्नम्भट्ट holds the former view.

Thus अन्नम्भट्ट shows a tendency towards the वैशेषिक system.

[[4]]

Are कणाद’s and गौतम ’s systems atheistic ?

The 14 and the systems have been included by tradition in the list of वैदिकदर्शनs ( दर्शन = philosophy) also styled ananas as distinct from the अवैदिकदर्शनs like those of the जैनs and the बौद्धs. Tradition says, 3

1 विभागोडापे द्विविधः कर्मजो विभागजश्व ! 2 प्रत्यक्षः समवाय इति नैयायिका आहुः ।

समवायोऽतीन्द्रियोऽनुमेय एवेति वैशेषिकाः ।

-तर्क दीपिका,

न्यायकोश.

नीलो घट इति विशिष्टप्रतीतिर्विशेषणविशेष्य सम्बन्धविषया । विशिष्ट- प्रत्ययःषाद्दण्डीति प्रत्ययवदिति समवायसिद्धिः । तर्कदीपिका.

3 न्यायकोश - दर्शन.

( XI )

Introduction.

द्वौ योगी ( साङ्ख्य and पातव्जल ) द्वे व मोमांसे ( पूर्व and उत्तर )

(

द्वौ तर्कों ( न्याय and वैशेषिक ) इति षड् बुधाः – ( एतानि आस्तिकशास्त्रा-

(1 ण्याहुः । )

Nobody questions the fact that the

and

the systems as they developed after m¤ and कणाद were वैदिक and theistic. For the later तार्किक

included in the list of s, and to Him they attributed the creation and destruction of the world.1 All are agreed on this point. But the suggestion by some that does not find a place in the सूत्रs of गौतम and कणाद is as much bold as misleading. Of these some hold that the absence of mention is due to an atheistic tendency on the part of and, while others believe that it is due to the idea that “God is beyond and above the phenomenal world with which their systems were chiefly concerned. " agreed on the point that both me and maɛ did not admit. Some have gone to the extent of saying that says nothing about God which is a clear mistake in view of the fact that as seen

But they are

1 संसारखि नानां सर्वप्राणिनां निशि विश्रामार्थ सकलभुवनपतेर्महेश्वरस्य सञ्जि- gîqlansıó aa: ga: gumai Ânyað aðalíaggiazal etc.

—प्रशस्तपादभाष्य ( p. 48 )

-तर्क दीपिका.

ईश्वरस्य चिकीषवशात् परमाणुषु किया जायते ।

2 Banerjea, Dialogues on Hindu Philosophy, ref, by Athalye & Bodas,

3 Athalye and Bodas pp. 136-137.

4 Athalye and Bodas p. 137.

(XII)

Introduction.

in the quotation in the note above he ascribes creation and destruction to as explicitly as

any

other later logician. Keith also seems to hold

the view that and God. For, he says,1 that the silence of कणाद that the authors of the

not believers in God?

can

the early criticisms of the

are both silent about

we therefore assert

and गौसम

..means

and the as were

It may be the

system in the period

between कणाद and प्रशस्तपाद resulted in the recognition

of this defect and that the

to fill the lacuna “2

Creator was assumed

But as has been said above, this is an errone- ous view about the सूत्रs of कणाद and गौतम In कणाद we find the following as which according to the commentators, hint at the assumption of God and Yogins by him. सञ्ज्ञा कर्म त्वस्मद्विशिष्टानां लिङ्गम् । 2. 1. 18.

प्रत्यक्षप्रवृत्तत्वात्सञ्ज्ञाकर्मणः । 2. 1. 19.

Keith Atomism

264–266,

Keith elsewhere does take note of ’s reference to × (p 22)

How to reconcile the two ?

2. It is not unhikely that this theory of the न्याय-वैशेषिक atheism

was due to their bearing some resemblance to the Epicureans sc far as the atomic theory was concerned. It the Epicureans demed God, well, so might the न्याय– वैशेषिकs: seems to be the

idea.

[[44]]

Cp. Webb’s History of Philosophy ‘Its attraction ( that of the atomic theory) to the Epicurean School, however, was not its scientific utility so much as its apparent inconsistency with the doctrine of the divine government of the world which they regarded as the source of the worst evil that affects mankind, namely the fear of death, and what may come after it.” (p. 66)

(XIII)

Introduction.

If we suppose that it is commentator’s’ ingeu- ity that is behind this assumption, no such suppo- sition is possible in the case of the last सूत्र, तद्वचनादा- म्नायस्य प्रामाण्यम् where सत् evidently stands for ईश्वर. Again, now and then, shows the highest respect for the which is one more evidence to show that he was not an atheist. His eulogy of धर्म which he specifically describes in the सूत्र अभिषेचनेापवास ब्रह्मचर्य गुरुकुल वासवानप्रस्थयज्ञदान etc. is one more instance in point.

That’s system was not atheistic at its inception is further proved by the tradition of the origin of the system, which howsoever mythical and fanciful, is yet typical of the spirit in which the system has been looked upon.

Tradition3 says

that in the form of an owl revealed the a to कणाद being pleased with the latter’s austerity. This tradition dating as far back as प्रशस्तपाद + is illustrative

1 सञ्ज्ञा नाम, कर्म कार्य क्षित्यादि तदुभयमस्मद्विशिष्टानामीश्वरमहर्षीण

सत्त्वेऽपि लिङ्गम् । — उपस्कार, on the वै. सू. 2. 1. 18 जयनारायण’s विवृति follows suit.

2 बुद्धिपूर्वा वाक्यकृतिर्वेदे । 6 1 1 तस्मादागमिकम् 2. 1. 17.

तदूचना etc. repeated twice.

3 तपस्विने कणादमुनये स्वयमीश्वर उलूकरूपधारी प्रत्यक्षीभूय पदार्थषट्कमु-

पदिदेशेत्यध्यैति श्रूयते ।

• अभ्यङ्करशास्त्रिन् on औलूक्यदर्शन in the स. द. सं

4 योगाचारविभूत्या यस्तोषयित्वा महेश्वरम् । चक्रे वैशेषिक शास्त्रं तस्मै कण-

भुजे नमः ।

• प्र. भा. p. 329.

( xIv )

Introduction.

’s system ever enjoyed a place

of the fact that in the list of the fs. How else could we explain this attitude towards the as of if not on the assumption that from the very beginning they were looked upon as consonant with the Vedic tradition and as such far from atheistic,-a conclusion that ought to have a foundation in the

as themselves ?

As regards

licitly states that

again, there is a

which exp-

had a place in his system. Cp.

ईश्वरः कारण पुरुषकर्माफल्य दर्शनात् । 4 1 19.

वात्स्यायनः-पुरुषोऽयं सभीद्दमानो नावश्यं समीहाफलमाप्नोति तेनानुमी- यते पराधीनं पुरुषकर्मफलाराधनमिति यदधीनं स ईश्वरः तस्मादीश्वरः कारणम् ।

In the presence of this

how can we say, as some have said, that man is silent on the question of ईश्वर ? गौतन again evinces a deep regard for the Vedic tradition. Cp. his

मन्त्रायुर्वेदप्रामाण्यवच्च तत्प्रामाण्यमप्राप्तप्रामाण्यात् । 2. 1. 67.

वात्स्यायनः आयुर्वेदप्रामाण्यवद्वदप्रामाण्यमनुमातव्यम् p. 92.

In the face of this evidence any attempt to show that’s and man’s gas are atheistic or even silent on seems unwarranted. The truth is that the s do refer to , but do not discuss him, at any great length, as they do other topics, because of his transcendental nature. The systems as evolved by कणाद and गौतम were

(xv)

rationalistic,

Introduction.

no doubt, but their reasonings never landed them into atheism.

[[5]]

कणाद and गौतम

The earliest extant work of the

system is the वैशेषिकसूत्र of कणाद, also styled the वैशेषिकदर्शन. The system as it is developed in the s gives ground to the belief that the as must have been preceded by other works on the subject, which the सूत्रs like the सूत्रs of बादरायण and जैमिनि supplanted by their systematic form and comprehensive treat- ment; and the view of some1 that the

thought must have existed prior to the rise of Buddhism seems to be well founded Thes of are held by some2 to be later than the as of a while others3 hold the opposite view which seems to be more reasonable than the former.

The author of the सूत्रs is styled कणाद or कणभुक् or all meaning ‘Atom-eater.’ Some associate the

name with the theory of atoms for which

is

held responsible. Others say that he got the name

1 Radhakrishnan, History of Indian Philosophy Vol. 2 P. 177 2 Athalye and Bodas, Tarka-Samgraha, qung’s as ( after 4th cent,

B. C. ) maas सूत्रs

(end of 5th oent. B.C. )–Introduction, p. xxxIII.

3 Keith, Atomism p. 92.

4 अयं च कणभक्षणेन तपश्चरणादुञ्छन वर्तनाच कणाद इति प्रसिध्यति । - न्यायकोश. कणाद इति तस्य कापोती धृतिमनुतिष्ठतो रथ्यानिपतितांस्तण्ड लानादाय प्रत्यहं कृताहारनिमित्ता सञ्ज्ञा । - न्यायकन्दली p. 2.

( XVI )

कपोस

Introduction.

because he lived on corn that he gleaned from the road like a pigeon. (a) He belonged to the काश्यपगोत्र 1 His system is sometimes called the a the name being explained in two ways. Some say ’s other name was which must have been the source of the name of the system, while others say that being pleased with the penance of revealed to him the system in the form of an owl (3), the second explanation being too fancied to be believable.2 Sugiura3 says that he was called’ rice-eater’ because he lived on rice collected from women while his name 3 is due to his residence on mountain combined with an ugly form. It is said that was so materi- alistic that his last words on his death-bed were û187:1 fios:1 Atoms! Atoms!

गौतम the author of the न्यायसूत्रs is also styled

The latter name is explained away as being due to an incident between and whom the former saw with an eye set in his foot, because he did not condescend to look with the ordinary eyes at who held the opposite views. It has been proved that this a cannot be identified with the Я and not in the least with his name-sake who

1 प्रशस्तपाद p. 200……..काश्यपोऽब्रवीत्

2 न्यायकोश p. 2.

3 Cited in Athalye and Bodas Introd. XXX.

4 See quotation page IX.

(XVII)

Introduction.

was the founder of Buddhism.1

that identifies him with

that makes him the brother of

Similarly the view

[[2]]

and also another3

are untenable.

His as are the earliest extant literary work on the system, but must have been preceded by similar cther works in the same field. His ’s is primarily

system is dialectical and logical;

metaphysical. has once for all given the final form to the Indian syllogism with its five aYTS. Among the theorics of the metaphysics of कणाद those of परमाणु, विशेष and समवाय are important.

[[6]]

Is the Atomic Theory of the borrowed from others?

Keith is inclined to believe against the view of Max Mullers that the atomic theory of the NES

1 Athalye & Bodas T.S. XXXIII.

2. अन्ये तु नैयायिकः अक्षपादः अक्षचरणः प्रशस्तपादः प्रशस्तचरणच इति

महर्षेर्गोतमस्यैव नामाभिधाः सन्तीति मन्यन्त । – न्यायकोश p. 2.

[[3]]

वायुपुराण

cited in the praface to the प्रशस्तपादभाष्य p. 10

4 Keith’s Atomism p. 17.

5 Six Systems

It is no doubt very tempting to ascribe a Greek origin to ¿017’s theoryof atoms. But suppose the atomic theory had really been borrowed from a Greek source, would it not be strange that’s atoms are supposed never to assume visible dimensions till there is a combination

of three double atoms( »¶¤ )? I do not remember anything like

this in the Epicurean authors and it seems to me to give quite an independent character to s’ view of the nature of an atom.”

(XVIII)Introduction.

was borrowed from the Greeks.

‘The Epicureans

raised it into a widespread belief, and it would be irrational to deny that it might easily have been conveyed to India, says he. Radhakrishnan* cate- gorically repudiates the view of Keith showing how the theory of atoms of the

essentially

differs from that of Democritus, who first developed the theory in Greece which was later adopted by the Epicureans, on the following points:-

1. According to Democritus atoms differ in quantity or size, and not in quality. Accor- ding to the the qualities of an atom of the earth are different from those of an atom of water and light and air, which in their turn differ mutually. But their sizes are the same.

2. Democritus and Epicurus hold the atoms to be in motion by nature, while the believes that they are at rest until moved

into action by अदृष्ट or परमेश्वर.

3. Greek atomism dispensed with the agency of God in creation: The

did

admit the agency of God in a more or less definite shape.

Prof. Radhakrishnan says in conclusion, ‘There

are thus distinctive features of the

History of Indian Philosophy II, pp. 202-3,

( xix )

atomism

Introduction.

which cannot be due to Greek influence and it is easy to find anticipations of the atomic theory in the early Indian thought.

Jain Atomism vs. 3⁄4ठAtomism:-

The atoms of Jainism are so different in their nature from those of the a system that no theory can be tenable which regards one as the borrower of the other. In Jainism all atoms possess the qualities of रूप, रस, गन्ध, संयोग and a potential power to produce though they themselves are शब्दरहित. In the वैशेषिक system the atoms of the different substances possess different qualities and have got nothing to do with which is the exclusive quality of

which is fay and has

no atoms. This sets aside the claim that the

is an off-shoot of Jainism.

[[7]]

Я’s personal history (probably 1625 to 170C A. D.):

a the son of was born in a family

Athalye and Bodas; T. S. Introduction LXIII He must have lived later than गदाधर (1600 A. D.) whose work he taught to hi students and earlier than the author of the commentaryti b. वैद्यनाथ गाडगीळ the earlist known commentary on the तर्कसङ्ग्रह ( earlia: than 1722 A. D.) The oldest known ms. of the

also corroborate

this conclusion for it is dated

93ɣ i, e. 1712 A. D.

(xx)

Introduction.

known as राघवसेोमयाजिन्s. All are agreed that he was a Brahmin of fhe South, though opinions differ about the exact region. Some place him in the Karnataka; others state that he was an in- habitant of the Tailangana.? The Madras edition of the तर्कसङ्ग्रह places him in केशवपुर on the banks of the Krishna, where there are Rigvedin Brahmins styled as living to this date. Godbole3 in his Dictionary of the History of India places him in a village named Garikpada in the Tailangana, his place of study being कौण्डिनपुर.

E had the privilege of being born in a family that had literary traditions behind it. His father was, it seems, well versed in the for he is styled अद्वैतविद्याचार्य. His elder brother रामकृष्ण 4 was a great grammarian who is reputed to be the author सिद्धान्तरत्नाकर a gloss on the सिद्धान्तकौमुदी.

अनम्भट्ट himself wrote the तर्कसङ्ग्रह, the तर्कसङ्ग्रह दीपिका, मिताक्षग and भाष्यप्रदीपोद्योतन, both works on grammar, 1 यतोऽनेनैव महापण्डितेन विरचिते कैयदव्याख्याने इति महामहोपाध्याया द्वैतविद्याचार्य राघव सोमयाजिकुलावतंसश्रीतिरुमलाचार्यवर्यस्य सूनोरगम्भहत्य इति वर्णावलिरवलोक्यते त. सं. Madras Edition.

2 अभय कर्णाटकदेशीयः (तैलङ्गदेशीयो वा ? )- न्यायकोश P. 9.

3 Referred to by Athalye and Bodas, T. S.

4 अस्य च अप्रजो महापण्डितो रामकृष्णभट्टः येन सिद्धान्तकौमुद्याः सिद्धान्त- रत्नाकर नाम व्याख्यानमा विष्कुर्वता etc.

Madras Edition T. S,

(xxI )

Introduction.

f and two or three works more, showing

his versatility.

The

which a

must have composed

to initiate his students in

has had the rare

When a descr-

distinction of being one of the most popular manuals on Sanskrit Logic. ibes the purpose of its compilation to be at gæðu he is not wide of the mark. It is simple, brief and as lucid as the subject would permit it to be. A comparison of the definitions and the general treat- ment of topics, in the

, with any other typi-

cal work on Sanskrit Logic will bear out the above estimate of the manual. The long list of comme- ntaries on the ad is a strong testimony to the popularity the manual has enjoyed from the beginning. z, though of the syncretist school, was essentially a (Cp. the section on the difference between the ants and the @¤s. ) That he belonged to the conservative school of the fs and not to the new one is clear from his definition of 4, his view that ag is inferrible. only, his admission of fats, not to add several other indications.

must have

In the course of his tuitions felt that in being brief in his ang he was becomi- ng obscure. So the suf€TM must have written to supplement the manual. The sing and

been

Introduction.

dis

to be

ifası

दीपिक

the hữu form one organic whole. The simple, no doubt, but it could not hope comprehensive while aiming at brevity. The fills in the gap It is not the ang but the that sheds light on such important theories as the परमाणुवाद, the अनन्यथासिद्धि of कारण, the अनुमेयत्व of बाधु, the question of 3, the propriety of . So it is no exaggeration to say that the is supplies some of the most vital topics on Sanskrit Logic.

and the give in There was very little

In brief, then nutshell the system of. scope for originality after and, above all, after 40 had given final shape to the system. That is why all works on after are written on lines closely similar and treat of topics almost identical.

[[8]]

A general estimate of the 14-¤ system:—

When our horizon of knowledge is ever widening it is not unlikely that we may fail to look at the accomplishments of the system with any deep regard. Some of their theories like those of an and rata may not appeal to the scientific mind of our centuries. Our faces may be lit up with smile not unmixed with sarcasm when a f of the calibre explains away the f of a with the शङ्कर मिश्र remarks,

of

(XXII)

Introduction.

कथं तर्हि नीलं मभ इति प्रतीतिरिति चेत्र । सुमेरोर्दक्षिणदिशमाक्रम्य स्थितस्ये- न्द्रनीलमयशिखरस्य प्रभामालोकयतां तथाभिमानात् ।

( उपस्कार on the वैशेषिक सूत्र II. 1. 5 )

We might question the logic behind the argument advanced to prove that gold is. To us the view of कणाद that the ऊर्ध्वञ्वलन of fire and the A of wind are the workings of the Unseen तिर्यक्पवन might sound a little superstitious. But these are negligible before the solid contributions the system has made to human thought. The of the

परमाणुवाद वैशेषिकs, their theory of causation, the न्याय of गौतम, the treatment of logical fallacies and the classification into categories are all entitled to a high place in the history of thought. And even where the 10-

fails we have to make allowance for the limitations, particularly, in the field of the exper- imental sciences, under which it had to labour in those early days. The argument to prove the a of gold like several others suffers from this drawback.

“Is there any knowledge in the world which is so certain that no reasonable man could doubt it,” asks Bertrand Russel in opening his Probl- ems of Philosophy and none need be sorry if the न्यायवैद्यषिकs have indulged in certain vagaries of thought. It may be true as Radhakrishnan says that theirs is not a harmonious system like the

(xxiv)

Introduction.

वेदान्त or साङ्ख्य but a mere catalogue of items. It is not so much in their achievements as in their bold attempts at speculation that the fs are entitled to an eminent place. We must approach and appraise such schools of thought bearing in mind the remarks made by the same great philosopher (Russel) about the capacity of philosophy.

“However slight may be the hope of disc- overing an answer it is part of the business of Philosophy to continue the consideration of such questions, to make us aware of their importance, to examine all the approaches to them, to keep alive that speculative interest in the universe which is apt to be killed by confining ourselves to definitely ascertainable knowledge “.

( xxv)

॥ श्रीशान्ता विजयतेतराम् ॥ .

अथ

तर्कसङ्ग्रहः

तर्कदीपिका सहितः

[१]

निधाय हृदि विश्वेशं विधाय गुरुवन्दनम् बालानां सुखबोधाय क्रियते तर्कसङ्ग्रहः ॥

अथ तर्कदीपिका

विश्वेश्वरं साम्बमूर्ति प्रणिपत्य गिरां गुरुम् । टीकां शिशुहितां कुर्वे तर्कसङ्ग्रहदीपिकाम ॥

चिकीर्षितस्य ग्रन्थस्य निर्विघ्नपरिसमाप्त्यर्थ शिष्टाचारानुमितश्रुति- बोधितकर्तव्यता कमिष्टदेवतानमस्कारलक्षणं मङ्गलं शिष्यशिक्षार्थ निबनचिकीर्षितं प्रन्यादौ प्रतिजानीते - निधायेति ।

ननु मङ्गलस्य समाप्तिसाधनत्वं नास्ति । मङ्गले कृतेऽपि किरणा- Propriety and वल्यादौ समाप्त्यदर्शनात् मङ्गलाभात्रेऽपि काद-

Significance

म्बर्यादौ समाप्तिदर्शनादन्वयव्यतिरेकव्यभिचारा- दिति चेन्न । किरणावल्यादौ विघ्नबाहुल्यात्समाप्त्यभावः । कादम्बर्यादौ तु ग्रन्थाद्बहिरेव मङ्गलं कृतमतो न व्यभिचारः ।

of मङ्गल

[[1]]

[[१]]

तर्कसङ्ग्रहः

ननु मङ्गलस्य कर्तव्यत्वे किं प्रमाणमिति चेत् । न । शिष्टाचारा- नुमितश्रुतेरेव प्रमाणत्वात् । तथाहि - मङ्गलं वेदबोधितकर्तव्यता कं, अलौकिकाविगतिशिष्टाचारविषयत्वात् दर्शादिवत् । भोजनादौ व्यभि- चारवारणाया लौकिकेति । रात्रिश्राद्धादौ व्यभिचारवारणायाविगीतेति । शिष्टपदं स्पष्टार्थम् । " न कुर्यान्निष्फलं कर्म " इति जलताडनादेरपि निषिद्धत्वादिति ॥

[[1]]

तर्कसङ्ग्रह इति । तन्ते प्रतिपाद्यन्त इति तर्का द्रव्यादिसप्त- पदार्थास्तेषां सङ्ग्रहः सङ्क्षेपेण स्वरूपकथनं क्रियत इत्यर्थः । कस्मै प्रयोजनायेत्यत आह — सुखबोधायेति । सुखेनानायासेन बोधः पदार्थज्ञानं तस्मा इत्यर्थः ॥ ननु बहुषु तर्कग्रन्थेषु सत्सु किमर्थमपूर्व- ग्रन्थः क्रियत इत्यत आह–बालानामिति । तेपामतिविस्तृतत्वाद्वालानां बोधो न भवतीत्यर्थः । ग्रहणधारणपटुवलिः, न तु स्तनन्धयः । किं कृत्वा क्रियत इत्यत आह— निधायेति । विश्वेश जगन्नियन्तारं शिवं हृदि निधाय नितरां स्थापयित्वा सर्वदा तद्ध्यानपरी भूत्वत्यर्थः । गुरूणां विद्यागुरूणां वन्दनं नमस्कारं विधाय कृत्वेत्यर्थः ॥

[ २ ]

द्रव्यगुणकर्मसामान्यविशेषसमवायाभावाः सप्त पदार्थाः ॥

त. दी. – पदार्थान्विभजते– द्रव्येति । पदस्यार्थः पदार्थ इति व्युप्तस्याभिधेयत्वं पदार्थ सामान्यलक्षणम् ॥ नन्वत्र विभागादेव सप्तत्वे सिद्धे सप्तग्रहणं व्यर्थमिति चेत् । न । अधिकसङ्ख्याव्यवच्छेदार्थत्वात्॥ नन्वतिरिक्तः पदार्थः प्रमितो न वा । नाद्यः प्रमितस्य निषेधायोगात्,

२तर्कसङ्ग्रहः

नान्त्यः प्रतियोगिप्रमितिं विना निषेधानुपपत्तेरिति चेत् । न । पदार्थत्वं द्रव्यादिसप्तान्यतमत्वव्याप्यमिति व्यवच्छेदार्थत्वात् ॥ ननु सप्तान्यतमत्वं सप्तभिन्नभिन्नत्वमिति वक्तव्यम् । एवं च सप्तभिन्नस्याप्रसिद्धत्वात्सप्ता- न्यतमत्वं कथमिति चेन्न द्रव्यादिसप्तान्यतमत्वं द्रव्यादिभेदसप्तका- भाववत्वमित्युक्तत्वात् । एवमग्रेऽपि द्रष्टव्यम् ॥

[ ३ ] ३]

तत्र द्रव्याणि । पृथिव्यप्तेजोवाय्वाकाशकालदिगात्ममनांसि नवे ॥

त. दी. - द्रव्यं विभजते तत्रेति । तत्र द्रव्यादिमध्ये द्रव्याणि नवयन्वयः । कानि तानीत्यत आह - पृथिवीत्याति ॥

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ननु तमसो दशमद्रव्यस्य विद्यमानत्वात्कथं नवैव द्रव्याणि । अन्धकार तथाहि नीलं तमश्चलतीत्यबाधितप्रतीतिबलानीलरूपा- अभाव. धारतया क्रियाधारतया च द्रव्यत्वं तावत्सिद्धम् । तत्र तमसो नाकाशादिपञ्चकेऽन्तर्भावो रूपवत्त्वात् । अत एव न वायौ, स्पर्शाभावात्सदागतिमत्त्वाभावाच । नापि तेजसि, भास्वररूपाभावा- दुष्णस्पर्शा भावाच । नापि जले, शीतस्पर्शाभावान्नीलरूपाश्रयत्वाच्च । नापि पृथिव्यां गन्धवत्त्वाभावात्स्पर्शरहितत्वाच । तस्मात्तमा दशमद्रव्यमिति चेन्न । तमसस्तेजोऽभावरूपत्वात् । तथाहि तमो हि न रूपवद्रव्यमालोकासहकृत चक्षुर्ब्राह्यत्वादालोकाभाववत् । रूपिद्रव्य चाक्षुषप्रमायामालोकस्य कारणत्वात् । तस्मात्प्रौढप्रकाशक- तेजः सामान्याभावस्तमः । तत्र नीलं तमश्चलतीति प्रत्ययो भ्रमः । अतो नव द्रव्याणीति सिद्धम् ॥

तर्कसङ्ग्रहः

द्रव्यत्वजातिमत्त्वं गुणवत्त्वं वा द्रव्यसामान्यलक्षणम् ॥ लक्ष्यैक- Definition देशावृत्तित्वमव्याप्तिः, यथा गोः कपिलत्वम् । and its three अलक्ष्यवृत्तित्वमतिव्याप्तिः, यथा गोः शृङ्गित्वम् । faults. लक्ष्यमात्रावर्तनम सम्भवः यथा गोरेकशेकत्वम् । एतदपणत्रयरहितो धर्मो लक्षणम् । स एवासाधारणधर्म इत्युच्यते । लक्ष्यतावच्छेदकसमनियतत्वन साधारणत्वम् । व्यावर्तकस्यैव लक्ष- णत्वे व्यावृत्तावभिधेयवादी चातिव्याप्तिवारणाय तद्भिन्नत्वं धर्मविशेषणं देयम् । व्यवहारस्यापि लक्षणप्रयोजनखे तु न देयम्, व्यावृत्तेरपि व्यवहारसाधनत्वात् ॥ ननु गुणवत्त्वं न व्यसामान्यलक्षणम् । आद्यक्षणे उत्पन्नविनष्टद्रव्ये चाव्याप्तेरिति चेन्न । गुणसमानाधि- करणसत्ताभिन्न जातिमत्त्वस्य विवक्षितत्वात् ॥ नन्वेवमप्येकं रूपं रसात्पृथगिति व्यवहारनृपादावतिव्याप्तिरिति चेन्न । एकार्थसमवाया- देव तादृशव्यवहारोपपत्तों गुणे गुणानजीकरणात् ॥

[ ४ ]

रूपरसगन्धस्पर्शसङ्ख्यापरिमाणपृथक्त्वमंयोगविभागपर- त्वापरत्वगुरुत्यद्रवत्व स्नेहशब्दबुद्धिसुखदुःखेच्छाद्वेषप्रयत्न- धर्माधर्मसंस्काराश्रतुविंशतिगुणाः ॥

द. दी. - गुणं विभजते–रूपेति (द्रव्यकर्मभिन्नले सति सामा- न्यवान्गुणः ) । गुणत्वजातिमान्वा ॥

ननु लघुत्वमृदुत्व कठिनत्वादीनां विद्यमानत्वात्कथं चतुर्विंशति- गुणा इति चेन्न लघुत्वस्य गुरुत्वाभावरूपत्वात् मृदुत्व कठिनत्वयोरवपत्र मंयोगविशेषरूपत्वान् ॥

Some questionable

गुण

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तर्कसङ्ग्रहः

[ ५ ]

उत्क्षेपणावक्षेपणाकुञ्चनप्रसारणगमनानि पञ्च कर्माणि ॥

त. दी. - कर्म विभजते- उत्क्षेपणेति । संयोगभिन्नत्वे सति संयोगासमवायिकारणं कर्म । कर्मत्वजातिमद्वा ॥

ननु भ्रमणान्दरव्यतिरिक्तस्य कर्मणः सत्त्वात् पञ्चेत्यनुपपन्नमिति-

All other actions includ-

din नमन,

चिन्न । भ्रमणादीनामपि गमनेऽन्तर्भावान्न पञ्चविधत्वविरोधः ॥

[ ६ ]

परमपरं चेति द्विविधं सामान्यम् ॥

त. दी. - सामान्यं विभजते-परमिति । परमधिकदेशवृत्ति ।

[ ७ ]

नित्यद्रव्यत्तयो विशेपास्त्वनन्ता एव ॥

त. दी. - विशेषं विभजते नित्येति । पृथिव्यादिचतुष्टयस्य परमाणव आकाशादिपञ्चकं च नित्यद्रव्याणि ॥

समवायस्त्वेक एव ॥

[ ८ ]

त. दी. - समवायस्य भेदो नास्तीत्याह - समवायस्त्विति ॥

[ ९ ]

अमावश्चतुर्विधः । प्रागभावः प्रध्वंसाभावोऽत्यन्ताभावोऽ- न्योन्याभावश्चेति ॥

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तर्कसङ्ग्रहः

त. दी. - अभावं विभजते-अभावेति ॥

[१०]

गन्धवती पृथिवी । सा द्विविधा नित्यानित्या च । नित्या परमाणुरूपा । अनित्या कार्यरूपा । पुनस्त्रिविधा । शरीरेन्द्रि- यविषयभेदात् । शरीरमस्मदादीनाम् । इन्द्रियं गन्धग्राहकं घ्राणं नासाग्रवर्ति । विषयो मृत्पापाणादिः ॥

त. दी. —— तत्रोद्देशादिक्रमानुसारात्पृथिव्या लक्षणमाह– गन्धव- तीति । नाम्ना पदार्थ सङ्कीर्तनमुद्देशः । उद्देशक्रमे च सर्वत्रेच्छेव नियामिका ॥

Four objections against the definition

ननु सुरभ्यसुरभ्यवयवारब्धे द्रव्ये परस्परविरोधेन गन्धानुत्पादाद- व्याप्तिः । न च तत्र गन्धप्रतीत्यनुपप- and their refutation. तिरिति वाच्यम् । अवयवन्धस्यैव तत्र प्रतीतिसम्भवेन चित्रगन्धानङ्गीकारात् ॥ किं चोत्पन्नविनष्टघटादाव- व्याप्तिरिति चेन्न गन्धसमानाधिकरणद्रव्यत्वापर जातिमत्त्वस्यैव विव- क्षितत्वात् ॥ ननु जलादावपि गन्धप्रतीनेरतिव्याप्तिरिति चेन्न अन्य- यव्यतिरेकाभ्यां पृथिवीगन्धस्यैव तत्र मानाङ्गीकारात् ॥ ननु तथापि कालस्य सर्वाधारतया सर्वेषां लक्षणानां कालेऽतिव्याप्तिरिति चेन्न सर्वाधारताप्रयोजकसम्बन्धभिन्नसम्बन्धेन लक्षणस्याभिमतत्वात् ॥

पृथिवीं विभजते-सा द्विविधेति । नित्यत्वं ध्वंसाप्रतियोगित्वम् । ध्वंसप्रतियोगित्वमनित्यत्वम् ॥ प्रकारान्तरेण विभजते— पुनरिति ।

1. v. 1 सा पुन. etc.

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तर्कसङ्ग्रहः

आत्मनो भोगायतनं शरीरम् ॥ यदवच्छिन्नात्मनि भोगो जायते तद्भोगायतनम् । सुखदुःखान्यतरसाक्षात्कारो भोगः ॥ शब्देतरो- भूतविशेषगुणानाश्रयत्वे सति ज्ञानकारणमनः संयोगाश्रयत्वमिन्द्रि यत्वम् । शरीरेन्द्रियभिन्नो विषयः । एवं च गन्धवच्छरीरं पार्थिव- शरीरम् गन्धवदिन्द्रियं पार्थिवेन्द्रियम् गन्धवान्विपयः पार्थिवविषय इति तत्तल्लक्षणं बोध्यम् । पार्थिवशरीरं दर्शयति - शरीरमिति । पार्थिवेन्द्रिय दर्शयति- इन्द्रियमिति । गन्धग्राहकमिति प्रयोजन- कथनम् । घ्राणमिति सञ्ज्ञा । नासाग्रेत्याश्रयोक्तिः । एवमुत्तरत्रापि ज्ञेयम् । पार्थिवविषयं दर्शयति - विषयेति ॥

[[1]]

[ ११ ]

शतिस्पर्शवत्य आपः । ता द्विविधाः नित्या अनित्याश्च । नित्याः परमाणुरूपाः । अनित्याः कार्यरूपाः । पुनस्त्रिविधाः शरीरेन्द्रियविषयभेदात् । शरीरं वरुणलोके । इन्द्रियं रसग्राहकं रसनं जिह्वाग्रवर्ति । विषयः सरित्समुद्रादिः ।

त. दी. - अपां लक्षणमाह-शीतेति ।

उत्पन्नविनष्टजलेऽव्याप्तिवारणाय शीतस्पर्शसमानाधिकरणद्रव्य- वापरजातिमत्व तात्पर्यम् ॥ शीतं शिलातलमि-

Two possible

adjections and त्यादी जलसम्बन्धादेव शीतस्पर्शभानमिति नाति- their refutation व्याप्तिः । अन्यत्सर्वं पूर्वरीत्या व्याख्येयम् ॥

[१२]

उष्णस्पर्शवत्तेजः । तद्विविधं नित्यमनित्यं च । नित्यं परमाणुरूपम् । अनित्यं कार्यरूपम् । पुनस्त्रिविधं शरीरेन्द्रिय-

तर्कसङ्ग्रहः

विषयभेदात् । शरीरमादित्यलोके । इन्द्रियं रूपग्राहकं चक्षुः कृष्णताराग्रवर्ति । विषयश्चतुविधः नौमदिव्यौद यीकरजभेदात् । भौमं वयादिकम् । अविन्धनं दिव्यं विद्युदादि । मुक्तस्य परिणामहेतुरौदर्यम् । आकरजं सुवर्णादि ॥

त. दी. - तेजसो लक्षणमाह- उष्णस्पर्शवदिति । उष्णं जल- मिति प्रतीतेस्तेजः सम्बन्धानुविधायित्वान्नातिव्याप्तिः । विषय विभाग- भौमेति ॥

of the nature of

light.

ननु सुवर्ण पार्थिवं पीतत्वाद्गुरुत्वाद्धरिद्रादिवदिति चेन्न । सुवर्ण and similar अत्यन्तानल मेयोगे सति घृतादौ द्रवत्वनाश- bright metalsare दर्शनन, जलमध्यस्थवृतादौ द्रवत्वनाशावरी-

नेन, अमति प्रतिबन्धकं पार्थिवद्रव्यवत्व- नाशाग्निसंयोगयोः कार्यकारणभावावधारणात् । सुवर्णस्यात्यन्तानल- संयोगे सत्यनुच्छिद्यमानद्रयत्वाधिकरणत्वेन पार्थिवत्वानुपपत्तेः । तस्मात्पतिद्रव्यद्रवत्वनाशप्रतिबन्धकतया द्रवद्रव्यान्तसिद्धी नि त्तिकद्रवत्वाधिकरणतया जलत्वानुपपत्तः, रूपवत्तया वाय्वादिष्व नन्तर्भावान्, तैजसत्वसिद्धिः । तत्रोष्णम्पशेभास्वरूपयोदपष्टम्भ- कपार्थिवरूपभ्यां प्रतिबन्धादनुपलब्धिः । तस्मात्सुवर्ण तेजल- मिति सिद्धम् ॥

[ १३ ]

रूपरहितस्पर्शवान्वायुः । स द्विविधो नित्योऽनित्यथ । नित्यः परमाणुरूपः । अनित्यः कार्यरूपः । पुनस्त्रिविधः ।

ሪ

तर्कसङ्ग्रहः

शरीरेन्द्रियविषयभेदात् । शरीरं वायुलोके । इन्द्रियं स्पर्शग्राहकं त्वक्सर्वशरीरवर्ति । विषयो वृक्षादिकम्पनहेतुः ॥

शरीरान्तः सञ्चारी वायुः प्राणः । स चैकोऽप्युपाधिभेदा- त्प्राणापानादिसञ्ज्ञां लभते ॥

द. दी. - वायुं लक्षयति- रूपरहितेति । आकाशादावतिव्याप्ति- वारणाय स्पर्शवानिति । पृथिव्यादावतिव्याप्तिवारणाय रूपरहितेति । ननु प्राणस्य कुत्रान्तर्भाव इत्यत आह - शरीरेति । स चेति । एक एव प्राणः स्थानभेदात्प्राणापानादिशब्दव्यवहियत इत्यर्थः ।

the prof

स्पर्शानुमेयो वायुः । तथाहि - योज्यं वायौ वाति सत्यनुष्णाशीत- स्पर्शो मासते स स्पर्शः क्वचिदाश्रितो गुणत्वाद्रूपवत् । fur वायु. न चास्य पृथिव्याश्रयः उद्भूतस्पर्शवतः पार्थिवस्यो- दभूतरूपवत्त्वनियमात् । न जलतेजसी, अनुष्णाशीतस्पर्शवत्त्वात् । न विभुचतुष्टयं सर्वत्रोपलब्धिप्रसङ्गात् । न मनः, परमाणुस्पर्श-

स्यातीन्द्रियत्वात् । तस्माद्यः प्रतीयमानस्पर्शाश्रयः स वायुः ॥

ननु वायुः प्रत्यक्षः प्रत्यक्ष स्पशीश्रयत्वाद्धटवदिति चेन्न । उद्भूत-

रूपवत्त्वस्योपाधित्वात् । यत्र द्रव्यत्वे सति बहि- /s वायु प्रत्यक्ष- विषय अनु- रिन्द्रियजन्यप्रत्यक्षत्वं तत्रोद्भूतरूपवत्त्वमिति मानविषय ? घटादौ साध्यव्यापकत्वम् । यत्र प्रत्यक्षस्पर्शा - श्रयत्वं तत्रोद्भूतरूपवत्त्वं नास्तीति पक्षे साधनाव्यापकत्वम् । न चैवं तप्तवारिस्थतेज सोऽप्यप्रत्यक्षत्वापत्तिः । इष्टत्वात् । तस्माद्रूपर- हितत्वाद्वायुरप्रत्यक्षः ॥

प्रलय.

तर्कसङ्ग्रहः

इदानीं कार्यरूपपृथिव्यादिचतुथ्र्यस्योत्पत्तिविनाशक्रमः कथ्यते । उत्पत्ति ईश्वरस्य चिकीपीवशात्परमाणुषु क्रिया जायते । ततः and परमाणुद्वयसंयोगे सति शुकमुत्पद्यते । त्रिभिर्धणुकै- स्त्र्यणुकम् । एवं चतुरणुकादिक्रमेण महती पृथिवी महत्य आपो महत्तेजो महान्वायुरुत्पद्यते । एवमुत्पन्नस्य कार्यद्रव्यस्य सञ्जिहीपीवशात्परमाणुपु क्रिया । क्रियया परमाणुयविभागे सति व्यणुकनाशः । ततस्त्र्यणुकनाशः । ततचतुरणुकस्येत्येवं महापृथिव्या- दिनाशः ॥

¿

असमवायिकारणनाशाद्वयणुकनाशः समवायिकारणनाशात्य- 2 Views re. णुकनाश इति सम्प्रदायः । सर्वत्रासमवायिकारण-

नाशाद्व्यनाश इति नवीनाः ॥

प्रलय.

परमाणु-

किं पुनः परमाणुसद्भावे प्रमाणम् । उच्यते । जालसूर्य मरीचिस्थं सूक्ष्मतमं यद्रज उपलभ्यन्त तत्सावयवम्, चाक्षुपद्रव्य- वाद त्वात्पटवत् । त्र्यणुकावयवोऽपि सावयवो महदारम्भक- त्वात्तन्तुवत् । यो व्यणुकावयवः स परमाणुः । स च नित्यः । तस्यापि कार्यत्वेवस्थाप्रसङ्गात् । सृष्टिप्रलयसद्भावे धाता यथा पूर्वमकल्पयत्” इत्यादिश्रुतिः प्रमाणम् । सर्वकार्यद्रव्यध्वंसोऽ- वान्तरप्रलयः सर्वभावकार्यध्वंसो महाप्रलय इति विवेकः ॥

[ १४ ]

शब्दगुणमाकाशम् । तचैकं विभु नित्यं च ॥

त. दी. - आकाशं लक्षयति शब्दगुणमिति । नन्वाकाशमपि

[[१०]]

तर्कसङ्ग्रहः

किं पृथिव्यादिवन्नाना । नेत्याह तच्चैकमिति । भेदे प्रमाणाभावा-

दित्यर्थः ।

विभु

।

एकत्वादेव सर्वत्रोपलब्धेर्विभुत्वमङ्गीकर्तव्यमित्याह - विभिवति । सर्वमूर्तिद्रव्यसंयोगित्वं विभुम् । मूर्तत्वं परिच्छिन्नप- रिमाणवत्त्वं क्रियावत्त्वं वा । विभुत्वादेवात्मवन्नित्यमि- त्याह - नित्यं चेति ॥

and

मूर्तत्व.

[१५]

अतीतादिव्यवहारहेतुः कालः । स चैको विभुर्नित्यश्व ॥

त. दी. - काले लक्षयति- अतीतेति । सर्वाधारः कालः सर्व- कार्यनिमित्तकारणं च ॥

[ १६ ]

प्राच्यादिव्यवहारहेतुर्दिक् । सा चैका विस्वी नित्या च ॥

त. दी. - दिशो लक्षणमाह– प्राचीति । दिगपि कार्यमात्रे

निमित्तकारणम् ॥

दिक ज

alsor करण

काथा

[ १७ ]

for al

ज्ञानाधिकरणमात्मा । स द्विविधः परमात्मा जीवात्मा च । तत्रेश्वरः सर्वज्ञः परमात्मैक एव । जीवात्मा प्रतिशरीरं भिन्नो विभुर्नित्यथ ॥

त. दी. - आत्मनो लक्षणगाह - ज्ञानेति ॥ आत्मानं विभजते- स द्विविध इति । परमात्मनो लक्षणमाह-तत्रैति । नित्यज्ञानाधि- करणत्वमीश्वरत्वम् ॥

[[११]]

तर्कसङ्ग्रहः

नन्वीश्वरस्य सद्भावे किं प्रमाणम् । न तावत्प्रत्यक्षम् । तद्धि God’s existence बाह्यमाभ्यन्तरं वा ॥ नाद्यमरूपिद्रव्यत्वात् । questioned and नान्त्य मात्मसुखादिव्यतिरिक्तवात् । नाप्यनुमानं proved. लिङ्गाभावादिति चेन्न । क्षित्यङ्कुरादिकं कर्तृ- जन्यं कार्यत्वाद्धटवदित्यनुमानस्य प्रमाणत्वात् । उपादानगोचरा- परोक्षज्ञानचिकीर्षाकृतिमत्त्वं कर्तृत्वम् । उपादानं समवायिकारणम् । सकलपरमाण्वादिसूक्ष्मदर्शित्वात्सर्वज्ञत्वम् । “यः सर्वज्ञः स सर्वविद्” इत्याद्यागमोऽपि तत्र प्रमाणम् ॥

जीवस्य लक्षणमाह - जीव इति । सुखाद्याश्रयत्वं जीवलक्षणम् । ननु " मनुष्योऽहं ब्राह्मणोऽहम् " इत्यादी सर्वत्राहं प्रत्यये शरीरस्यैव शरीर is विषयत्वाच्छरीरमेवात्मेति चेन्न । शरीरस्यात्मत्ये करपा - notआत्मन् दादिनाशे सति शरीरनाशादात्मनोऽपि नाशप्रसङ्गात् । नापीन्द्रियाणामात्मत्वम् । तथात्वे “योऽहं घटमद्राक्षं सोऽहमिदानीं त्वचा स्पृशामि " इत्यनुसन्धानाभावप्रसङ्गादन्यानुभूतेऽ- न्यस्यानुसन्धानायोगात् । तस्माद्देहेन्द्रियव्यतिरिक्तो जीवः । सुखदुःखादिवैचित्र्यात्प्रतिशरीरं भिन्नः ॥

इन्द्रियः are not

आत्मन्

स च न परमाणुः शरीरव्यापि सुखाद्यनुपलब्धिप्रसङ्गात् । न जीव is मध्यमपरिमाणः । तथा सत्यनित्यत्वप्रसङ्गेन कृतनाशा- कृताभ्यागमप्रसङ्गात् । तस्मान्नित्यो विभुर्जीवः ।

विभु

[ १८ ]

सुखाद्युपलब्धिसाधनमिन्द्रियं मनः तच्च प्रत्यात्मनियत-

त्वादनन्तं परमाणुरूपं नित्यं च ॥

१२तर्कसङ्ग्रहः

त. दी. - मनसो लक्षण मह – सुखेति । (स्पर्शरहितत्वे सति क्रियावत्त्वं मनसो लक्षणम् । मनो विभजते- तच्चेति । एकैकस्या- त्मन एकैकं मन इत्यात्मनामनेकत्वान्मनसोऽप्यनेकत्वमित्यर्थः । परमाणुरूपमिति । मध्यमपरिमाणत्वेऽनित्यत्वप्रसङ्गादित्यर्थः ॥

ननु मनो नाणु किन्तु विभु, स्पर्शरहितद्रव्यत्वादाकाशवादित Mind is चेन्न । मनसो विभुत्व आत्ममनःसंयोगस्यासमवायि- atomic. कारणस्याभावाज्ज्ञानानुत्पत्तिप्रसङ्गात् । न च विभुद्वय- संयोगोऽस्त्विति वाच्यम् । तत्संयोगस्य नित्यत्वेन सुपुतयभावप्रस- ङ्गात् । पुरितद्व्यतिरिक्तप्रदेश आत्ममनः संयोगस्य सर्वदा विद्यमान- त्वात् । अगुत्वे तु यदा मनः पुरीवति नाड्यां प्रविशति तदा सुपुप्तिः । यदा निःसरति तदा ज्ञानोत्पत्तिरित्यणुत्वसिद्धिः ॥

[ १९ ]

चक्षुर्माग्राह्यो गुणो रूपम् । तच्च शुक्लनीलपीतरक्तहरि - तकपिशचित्रभेदात्सप्तविधं पृथिवीजलतेजोवृत्ति । तत्र पृथिव्यां सप्तविधम् । अभास्वरशुक्लं जले । भास्वरशुक्लं तेजसि ॥

त. दी. - रूपं लक्षयति - चक्षुरिति । सङ्ख्यादावतिव्याप्तिवार- णाय मात्र पदम् । रूपत्वेऽतिव्याप्तिवारणाय गुणपदम् । प्रभाभित्ति- संयोगेऽतिव्याप्तिवारणाय चक्षुमीत्रग्राह्यजातिमत्त्वं वाच्यम् । रूपं विभजते- तच्चेति ॥

चित्ररूप

नन्वव्याप्यवृत्तिनीलादिसमुदाय एव चित्ररूपमिति चेन्न । रूपस्य व्याप्यवृत्तित्वनियमात् । ननु चित्रपटेऽवयवरूपस्य प्रतीतिरस्त्विति चेन्न । रूपरहितत्वेन पटस्याप्रत्यक्ष- propriety त्वप्रसङ्गात् । न च रूपवत्समवेतत्वं प्रत्यक्षत्व प्रयोजकं

and its

[[१३]]

तर्कसङ्ग्रहः

गौरवात् । तस्मात्पटस्य प्रत्यक्षत्वानुपपत्त्या चित्ररूपसिद्धिः ॥ रूपस्याश्रयमाह - पृथिवीति । आश्रयं विभज्य दर्शयति-तत्रेति ॥

[२०]

रसनग्राह्यो गुणो रसः । स च मधुराम्ललवणकटुकषाय- तिक्तभेदात्षा ुधः । पृथिवीजलवृत्तिः । पृथिव्यां पड्विधः । जले मधुर एव ॥

त. दी. रसं लक्षयति- रसनेति । रसवेऽतिव्याप्तिपरिहाराय गुणपदम् । रसस्याश्रयमाह - पृथिवीति ॥ आश्रयं विभज्य दर्शयति पृथिव्यामिति ॥

[२१]

प्राणग्राह्यो गुणो गन्धः । स च द्विविधः सुरभिर सुरभिश्च । पृथिवीमात्रवृत्तिः ॥

त. दी. - गन्धं लक्षयति - घ्राणेति । गन्धत्वेऽतिव्याप्तिवारणाय गुणपदम् ॥

[२२]

त्वगिन्द्रियमात्रग्राह्यो गुणः स्पर्शः । स च त्रिविधः । शीतोष्णानुष्णाशीतभेदात् । पृथिव्यप्तेजोवायुवृत्तिः । तत्र शीतो जले । उष्णस्तेजसि । अनुष्णाशीतः पृथिवीवाय्वोः ॥

त. दी. - स्पर्श लक्षयति– त्वगिति । स्पर्शत्वेऽतिव्याप्तिवारणाय गुणपदम् । संयोगादावतिव्याप्तिवारणाय मात्रपदम् ॥

[[૨૪]]

तर्कसङ्ग्रहः

[ २३ ]

पोलुsaloms

नैयायिका

मिठट प

रूपादिचतुष्टयं पृथिव्यां पाकजमनित्यं च । अन्यत्रापाकजं नित्यमनित्यं च । नित्यगतं नित्यम् । अनित्यगतमनित्यम् ॥

त. दी. - पाकजमिति । पाकस्तेजः संयोगः । तेन पूर्वरूपं

नश्यति रूपान्तरमुत्पद्यत इत्यर्थः ॥

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वैशेषिका opinion of otferent”. अत्र परमाणुष्वेव पाको न व्यणुकादौ । आमपाकनिक्षिप्ते घटे

Two views re.

पाकः-पीलुपाक- वादिन्s [पटरपाक वादिन्

परमाणुषु रूपान्तरोत्पत्तौ श्यामघटनाशे पुन- णुकादिक्रमेण रक्तघटोत्पत्तिः । तत्र परमाणवः समवायिकारणम् । तेजः- संयोगोऽसमवायिकार- णम् । अदृष्टादिकं निमित्तकारणम् । व्यणुकादिरूपे कारणरूपमसवा- यिकारणम् इति पीलुपाकत्रादिनो वशेषिकाः । पूर्वघटस्य नाशं विनै- वावयवेषु परमाणुपर्यन्तेषु च युगपद्रूपान्तरोत्पत्तिरिति पिठरपाक- वादिनो नैयायिकाः । अत एव पार्थिवपरमाणुपु रूपादिकमनित्य मित्यर्थः ॥ अन्यत्रेति । जलादावित्यर्थः । नित्यगतमिति । परमा- णुगतमित्यर्थः ॥ अनित्यगतमिति । यणुकादिनिष्टमित्यर्थः । रूपा- दिचतुष्टयमुद्भूतं प्रत्यक्षमनुद्भूतमप्रत्यक्षम् । उद्भूतत्वं प्रत्यक्ष- प्रयोजको धर्मः । तदभावोऽनुद्भूतत्वम् ॥

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एकत्वादिव्यवहारहेतुः सङ्ख्या । नवद्रव्यवृत्तिरकत्वा- दिपरार्धपर्यन्ता । एकत्वं नित्यमनित्यं च । नित्यगतं नित्य- मनित्यगतमनित्यम् । द्वित्वादिकं तु सर्वत्रानित्यमेव ॥

त दी. - सङ्ख्यां लक्षयति- एकत्वेति ॥

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तर्कसङ्ग्रहः

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मानव्यवहारकारणं परिमाणं । नवद्रव्यवृत्ति । तच्चतु- विधम् । अणुमहद्दीर्घ स्वं चेति ॥

त. दी. - परिमाणं लक्षयति — मानेति । परिमाणं विभ जते - तदिति । भावप्रधानो निर्देशः । अणुत्वं महत्वं दीर्घत्वं ह्रस्वत्वं चेत्यर्थः ॥

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पृथग्व्यवहारकारणं पृथक्त्वं । सर्वद्रव्यवृत्ति ॥

त. दी. - - पृथक्त्वं लक्षयति पृथगिति । इदमस्मात्पृथगिति व्यवहारकारणमित्यर्थः ॥

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संयुक्तव्यवहारहेतुः संयोगः । सर्वद्रव्यवृत्तिः ॥

त. दी. – संयोग. लक्षयति - संयुक्तेति । इमौ संयुक्ता - विति व्यवहारहेतुरित्यर्थः । सङ्ख्यादिलक्षणेषु सर्वत्र दिक्कालादावति- व्याप्तिवारणायासाधारणेति पदं देयम् ॥

संयोगो द्विविधः कर्मजः संयोगजश्च । आद्यो हस्तक्रियया हस्त Two kinds पुस्तकसंयोगः । द्वितीयो हस्तपुस्तकसंयोगात्काय-

of संयोग. पुस्तकसंयोगः ॥

अव्याप्यवृत्तिः संयोगः । स्वात्यन्ताभावसमानाधिकरणत्वमव्याप्य- वृत्तित्वम् ॥

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तर्कसङ्ग्रहः

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संयोगनाशको गुणो विभागः । सर्वद्रव्यवृत्तिः ॥

त. दी. - विभागं लक्षयति- संयोगति । कालादावतिव्याप्ति- वारणाय गुण इति । रूपादावतिव्याप्तिवारणाय संयोगनाशक इति । विभागोऽपि द्विविधः कर्मजो विभागजश्च । आद्यो हस्तक्रियया Two kinds हस्तपुस्तकविभागः । द्वितीयो हस्तपुस्तक विभागा-

of विभाग त्कायपुस्तकविभागः ॥

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परापरव्यवहारासाधारणकारणे परत्वापरत्वे । पृथिव्यादि- चतुष्टयमनोवृत्तिनी । ते द्विविधे दिक्कृते कालकृते च । दूरस्थे दिक्कतं परत्वम् । समीपस्थे दिक्कृतमपरत्वम् । ज्येष्ठे काल- कृतं परत्वम् । कनिष्ठे कालकृतमपरत्वम् ॥

त.

a. दी. - परत्वापरत्वयोर्लक्षणमाह-परेति । परव्यवहारासाधा- रणकारणं परत्वम् । अपरव्यवहारासाधारणकारणमपरत्वमित्यर्थः । परापरत्वे विभजते— ते द्विविधे इति । दिक्कृतयोरुदाहरणमाह- दूरस्थ इति ॥ कालकृते उदाहरति - ज्येष्ठ इति ॥

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आद्यपतनासमवायिकारणं गुरुत्वं । पृथिवीजलवृत्ति ॥

त. दी. गुरुत्वं लक्षयति - आद्येति । द्वितीया दिपतनस्य वेगा समवायिकारणत्वाद्वेगेऽतिव्याप्तिवारणायाद्येति ॥

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तर्कसङ्ग्रहः

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आद्यस्यन्दनासमवायिकारणं द्रवत्वं । पृथिव्यप्तेजोवृत्ति । द्विविधं सांसिद्धिकं नैमित्तिकं च । सांसिद्धिकं जले नैमि- त्तिकं पृथिवीतेजसोः । पृथिव्यां घृतादावग्निसंयोगजन्यं द्रवत्वम् । तेजसि सुवर्णादौ ॥

त. दी. - द्रवत्वं लक्षयति– आद्यस्यन्दनेति । स्यन्दनं खवणम् । तेजः संयोगजन्यं नैमित्तिकद्रवत्वमुदाहरति- घृतादाविति । तेजसि तदाह - सुवर्णादाविति ॥

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चूर्णादिपिण्डीभावहेतुर्गुणः स्नेहः । जलमात्रवृत्तिः ॥

त. दी. - स्नेहं लक्षयति-चूर्णेति । कालादावतिव्याप्तिवारणाय गुण इति । रूपादावतिव्याप्तिवारणाय चूर्णादीति ॥

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श्रोत्रग्राह्यो गुणः शब्दः । आकाशमात्रवृत्तिः स द्विविधो ध्वन्यात्मको वर्णात्मकचेति । ध्वन्यात्मको भेर्यादौ । वर्णा- मकः संस्कृतभाषादिरूपः ॥

त. दी. – शब्दं लक्षयति-श्रोत्रेति । शब्दत्वेऽतिव्याप्तिवार- गाय गुण इति । रूपादावतिव्याप्तिवारणाय श्रोत्रेति ॥ शब्द- स्त्रिविधः । संयोगजो विभागजः शब्दजश्चेति । तत्राद्यो भेरीदण्ड-

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/

तर्कसङ्ग्रहः

संयोगजन्यः । द्वितीयो वंश उत्पाट्यमाने दलद्वयविभागजन्यश्चटच- टाशब्दः । भेर्यादिदेशमारभ्य श्रोत्रपर्यन्तं द्वितीयादिशब्दाः शब्दजाः ॥

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सर्वव्यवहारहेतुर्बुद्धिज्ञीनम् । सा द्विविधा स्मृतिरनुभवश्च । संस्कारमात्रजन्यं ज्ञानं स्मृतिः । तद्भिन्नं ज्ञानमनुभवः ॥

त. दी. – बुद्धेर्लक्षणमाह - सर्वेति । जानामीत्यनुव्यवसाय- गम्यज्ञानत्वमेव लक्षणमित्यर्थः । बुद्धिं विभजते– सेति ॥ स्मृतेर्ट- क्षणमाह-संस्कारेति । भावनाख्यः संस्कारः । संस्कारध्वंसेऽतिव्या- प्तिवारणाय ज्ञानमिति । घटादि प्रत्यक्षेऽतिव्याप्तिवारणाय संस्कार- जन्यमिति । प्रत्यभिज्ञायामतिव्याप्तिवारणाय मात्रेति ॥ अनुभवं लक्षयति-तद्भिन्नमिति । स्मृतिभिन्नं ज्ञानमनुभव इत्यर्थः ॥

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सद्विविधो यथार्थोऽयथार्थश्च । तद्वति तत्प्रकारकोऽनुभवो यथार्थः यथा रजत इदं रजतमिति ज्ञानम् । स एव प्रमेत्यु- च्यते । तदभाववति तत्प्रकारकोऽनुभवोऽयथार्थः । यथा शुक्ताविदं रजतमिति ज्ञानम् ॥

त. दी. - अनुभवं विभजते- सद्विविध इति । यथार्थानुभवस्य लक्षणमाह - तद्वतीति । ननु घटे घटत्वमिति प्रमायामव्याप्तिः घटले घटाभावादिति चेन्न । यत्र यत्सम्बन्धोऽस्ति तत्र तत्सम्बन्धानुभव इत्यथी- द्घटत्वेऽपि घटसम्बन्धोऽस्तीति नाव्याप्तिः । स इति यथार्थानुभव एव

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तर्कसङ्ग्रहः

शास्त्रे प्रमेत्युच्यत इत्यर्थः । अयथार्थं लक्षयति– तदभाववतीति नन्विदं संयोगीति प्रमायामतिव्याप्तिरिति चेन्न । यदवच्छेदेन यत्सम्बं- न्धाभावस्तदवच्छेदेन तत्सम्बन्धज्ञानस्य विवक्षितत्वात् संयोगाभावाव- च्छेदेन संयोगज्ञानस्य भ्रमत्वात्, संयोगावच्छेदेन संयोगसम्बन्धस्य सत्त्वात्, नातिव्याप्तिः ॥

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यथार्थानुभवश्चतुर्विधः प्रत्यक्षानुमित्युपमितिशाब्द भेदात् । तत्करणमपि चतुर्विधं प्रत्यक्षानुमानोपमानशब्दभेदात् ॥

त. दी. - यथार्थानुभवं विभजते - यथार्थेति । प्रसङ्गात्प्रमाकरणं विभजते- तत्करणमिति । प्रमाकरणमित्यर्थः प्रमायाः करणं प्रमाण- मिति प्रमाणसामान्यलक्षणम् ॥

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असाधारणं कारणं करणम् ।

त. दी. - करणलक्षणमाह– असाधारणेति । साधारणकारणे दिक्कालादावतिव्याप्तिवारणायासाधारणेति ॥

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कार्यनियतपूर्ववृत्ति कारणम् ॥

त. दी. - कारणलक्षणमाह- कार्येति । पूर्ववृत्ति कारणमित्युक्ते रासमादावतिव्याप्तिः स्यादतो नियतेति । तावन्मात्रे कृते कार्येऽ- तिव्याप्तिरतः पूर्ववृत्तीति ॥

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Three

तर्कसङ्ग्रहः

ननु तन्तुरूपमपि पटं प्रति कारणं स्यादिति चेन्न । अनन्य- थासिद्धत्वे सतीति विशेषणात् । अनन्यथासिद्धत्व- leinds of मन्यथासिद्धिविरहः । अन्यथासिद्धिश्च विविधा । अन्यथासिद्धि येन सहैव यस्य यं प्रति पूर्ववृत्तित्वमवगम्यते तं प्रति तदन्यथासिद्धम् । यथा तन्तुना तन्तुरूपं तन्तुत्वं च पटं प्रति । अन्यं प्रति पूर्ववृत्तित्वे ज्ञात एव यस्य यं प्रति पूर्ववृत्तित्वमवगम्यते तं प्रति तदन्यथासिद्धम् । यथा शब्दं प्रति पूर्ववृत्तित्वे ज्ञात एव घटं प्रत्याकाशस्य । अन्यत्र क्लमनियतपूर्वर्वर्तिनैव कार्यसम्भवे तत्सहभूतमन्यथासिद्धम् । यथा पाकजस्थले गन्धं प्रति रूपप्राग- भावस्य । एवं चानन्यथासिद्धनियतपूर्ववृत्तित्वं कारणत्वम् ॥

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कार्य प्रागभावप्रतियोगि ॥

त. दी. - कार्यलक्षणमाह कार्यमिति ॥

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कारणं त्रिविधं समवाय्यसमवायिनिमित्तभेदात् । यत्सम- वेतं कार्यमुत्पद्यते तत्समवायिकारणम् । यथा तन्तवः पटस्य पटश्व स्वगतरूपादेः । कार्येण कारणेन वा सहैकस्मिन्नर्थे समवेतत्वे सति यत्कारणं तदसमवायिकारणम् । यथा तन्तु- संयोगः पटस्य तन्तुरूपं पटरूपस्य । तदुभयभिनं कारणं निमित्तकारणम् । यथा तुरीवेमादिकं पटस्य ॥

त. दी. – कारणं विभजते - कारणमिति । समवायिकारणस्य

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तर्कसङ्ग्रहः

उक्षणमाह–यत्समवेतमिति । यस्मिन्समवेतमित्यर्थः । असमवायि- कारणं लक्षयति-कार्येणेति । कार्येणेत्येतदुदाहरति - तन्तुसं- योग इति ॥

कार्येण पटेनैकस्मिंस्तन्तौ समवेतत्वात्तन्तु संयोगः पटस्यासम- Tiro kinds वायिकारणमित्यर्थः । कारणेन सहेत्येतदुदाहरति– of असमचा- तन्तुरूपमिति । कारणेन पटेन संहकस्मिंस्तन्ती यिकारण समवेतत्वात्तन्तुरूपं पटरूपस्यासमवायिकारणमित्यर्थः । निमित्तकारणं लक्षयति-तदुभयेति । समवाय्यसमवायिभिन्नं कारणं निमित्तकारणमित्यर्थः ॥

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तदेतत्त्रिविधकारणमध्ये यदसाधारणं कारणं तदेव करणम् ॥

त. दी. - करणलक्षणमुपसंहरति–तदेतदिति ॥

[ ४२ ]

तत्र प्रत्यक्षज्ञानकरणं प्रत्यक्षम् । इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षजन्य ज्ञानं प्रत्यक्षम् । तद्विविधं निर्विकल्पकं सविकल्पकं चेति । तत्र निष्प्रकारकं ज्ञानं निर्विकल्पकं यथेदं किञ्चित् । सप्रकारकं ज्ञानं सविकल्पकं यथा डित्थोऽयं ब्राह्मणोऽयं श्यामोऽयमिति ॥

त. दी. - - प्रत्यक्षलक्षणमाह– तत्रेति । प्रमाणचतुष्टयमध्य इत्यर्थः। प्रत्यक्षज्ञानस्य लक्षणमाह- इन्द्रियेति । इन्द्रियं चक्षुरादिकम् । अर्थो घटादिः । तयोः सन्निकर्षः संयोगादिः, तज्जन्यं ज्ञानमित्यर्थः ॥ तद्विभजते- तद्द्द्विविधमिति ।

२२तर्कसङ्ग्रहः

निर्विकल्पकस्य लक्षणमाह — निष्प्रकारकमिति विशेषणविशेष्य- निर्विकल्पक सम्बम्धानवगाहि ज्ञानमित्यर्थः ॥ ननु निर्विकल्प के

and किं प्रमाणमिति चेन्न । गौरित विशिष्टज्ञानं विशेष- सविकल्पक णज्ञानजन्यं विशिष्टज्ञानत्वाद्दण्डीति ज्ञानवदित्यनु- भानस्य प्रमाणत्वात् । विशेषणज्ञानस्यापि सविकल्पकत्वेऽनवस्था- प्रसङ्गान्निर्विकल्प कसिद्धिः॥ सविकल्पकं लक्षयति-सप्रकारकमिति । नामजात्यादिविशेषणविशेष्य सम्बन्धावगाहि ज्ञानमित्यर्थः सविकल्प- कमुदाहरति-यथेति

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प्रत्यक्षज्ञानहेतुरिन्द्रियार्थ सन्निकर्षः पधिः । संयोगः, संयुक्तसमवायः, संयुक्तसमवेतसमवायः, समवायः, समवेत- समवायो, विशेषणविशेष्यभावश्चेति । चक्षुषा घटप्रत्यक्ष- जनने संयोगः सन्निकर्षः । घटरूपप्रत्यक्षजनने संयुक्तसम- वायः सन्निकर्षः, चक्षुःसंयुक्ते घटे रूपस्य समवायात् । रूपत्वसामान्यप्रत्यक्षे संयुक्तसमवेतसमवायः सन्निकर्षः, चक्षुः संयुक्ते घटे रूपं समवेतं तत्र रूपत्वस्य समवायात् । श्रोत्रेण शब्दसाक्षात्कारे समवायः सन्निकर्षः, कर्णविवरवृत्त्याकाशस्य श्रोत्रत्वात्, शब्दस्याकाशगुणत्वात्, गुणगुणिनोश्च समवायात् । शब्दत्वसाक्षात्कारे समवेतसमवायः सन्निकर्षः, श्रोत्रसमवेते शब्दे शब्दत्वस्य समवायात् । अभावप्रत्यक्षे विशेषणविशे- ष्यभावः सन्निकर्षो, घटाभाववद्भूतलमित्यत्र चक्षुः संयुक्ते भूतले घटाभावस्य विशेषणत्वात् । एवं सन्निकर्षष जन्यं

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तर्कसङ्ग्रहः

ज्ञानं प्रत्यक्षम् । तत्करणमिन्द्रियम् । तस्मादिन्द्रियं प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणमिति सिद्धम् ॥

त. दी. इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षं विभजते- प्रत्येक्षति । संयोगसन्निक- मुदाहरति– चक्षुषेति । द्रव्यप्रत्यक्षे सर्वत्र संयोगः सन्निकर्ष इत्यर्थः आत्मा मनसा संयुज्यते, मन इन्द्रियेण, इन्द्रियमर्थेन, ततः प्रत्यक्ष- Process ज्ञानमुत्पद्यते । संयुक्तसमवायमुदाहरति– घटरूपेति । of तत्र युक्तिमाह – चक्षुः संयुक्त इति । संयुक्तसमवेत- समवायमुदाहरति– रूपत्वेति । समवायमुदाहरति — श्रोत्रेणेति । तदुपपादयति– कर्णेति ।

प्रत्यक्ष.

Sound.

ननु दूरस्थशब्दस्य कथं श्रोत्रसम्बन्ध इति चेन्न वीचीतरङ्गन्यायेन Two theories कदम्बमुकुलन्यायेन वा शब्दाच्छब्दान्तरोत्पत्ति- re. the trans क्रमेण श्रोत्रदेशे जातस्य शब्दस्य श्रोत्र सम्बन्धात्प्र-

mission of

त्यक्षत्वसम्भवात् । समवेतसमवायमुदाहरति–शब्द- त्वेति । विशेषणविशेष्यभावमुदाहरति–अभावेति । तदुपपादयति– घटाभाववदिति । भूतले घटो नास्तीत्यत्र घटाभावस्य विशेष्यत्वं द्रष्टव्यम् । एतेनानुपलब्धेः प्रमाणान्तरत्वं निरस्तम् । यद्यत्र घटोs - भविष्यत्तर्हि भूतलमिवाद्रक्ष्यत् । दर्शनाभावान्नास्तीति तर्कितप्रतियो- गिसत्त्वविरोध्यनुपलब्धिसह कृतेन्द्रियेणैवाभावज्ञानोपपत्तौ अनुपलब्धेः प्रमाणान्तरत्वासम्भवात् । अधिकरणज्ञानार्थमपेक्षणीयेन्द्रियस्यैव करण- त्वोपपत्तावनुपलब्धेः करणत्वस्यायुक्तत्वात् । विशेषणाविशेष्यभावो विशेषणविशेष्यस्वरूपमेव, नातिरिक्तः सम्बन्धः । प्रत्यक्षज्ञानमुपसं- हरस्तस्य करणमाह– एवमिति । असाधारणकारणत्वादिन्द्रियं प्रत्य-

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तर्कसङ्ग्रहः

क्षज्ञानकरणमित्यर्थः । प्रयक्षमुपसंहरति–तस्मादिति ॥

[ ४४ ]

uncertain

अनुमितिकरणमनुमानम् । परामर्शजन्यं ज्ञानमनुमितिः । व्याप्तिविशिष्टपचधर्मताज्ञानं परामर्शः । यथा वह्निव्याप्य- धूमवानयं पर्वत इति ज्ञानं परामर्शः । तज्जन्यं पर्वतो वह्नि- मानिति ज्ञानमनुमितिः । यत्र यत्र धूमस्तत्राग्निरिति साहचर्य - नियमो व्याप्तिः । व्याप्यस्य पर्वतादिवृत्तित्वं पक्षधर्मता ॥

त. दी. - अनुमानं लक्षयति– अनुमितिकरणमिति । अनु- मितेलक्षणमाह - परामर्शेति । ननु संशयोत्तर प्रत्यक्षेऽतिव्याप्तिः, स्थाणुपुरुपसंशयानन्तरं, पुरुपत्वव्याप्यकरादिमानयमिति परामर्शे सति, पुरुष एवेति प्रत्यक्षजननात् । न च तत्रानुमितिरेवेति वाच्यम् । “पुरुपं साक्षात्करोमि " इत्यनुव्यवसायविरोधादिति चेन्न । पक्षतासहकृतपरामर्शजन्यत्वस्य विवक्षितत्वात् । सिषाधयि पाविरह सहकृतसिद्ध्यभावः पक्षता । साध्यसिद्धिरनुमितिप्रतिव- न्धिका । सिद्धिसत्त्वेऽप्यनुमिनुयामितीच्छायामनुमितिदर्शनात् सिषा- धयिषोत्तेजिका । ततश्चोत्तेजकाभावविशिष्टमण्यभावस्य दाहकारण- स्वयत् सिषाधयिपाविरह सहकृतसिद्ध्यभावस्याप्यनुमितिकारणत्वम् ॥ परामर्श लक्षयति- व्याप्तीति । व्याप्तिविषयकं यत्पक्षधर्मताज्ञानं स परामर्श इत्यर्थः । परामर्शमभिनीय दर्शयति-यथेति । अनुमि- तिमभिनयति - तज्जन्यमिति । परामर्शजन्यमित्यर्थः ॥ व्याप्तेर्लक्षण-

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तर्कसङ्ग्रहः

माह-यत्रेति । यत्र धूमस्तत्राग्निरिति व्याप्तेरभिनयः । साहचर्यनियम इति लक्षणम् । साहचर्यं सामानाधिकरण्यं तस्य नियमः । हेतुसमानाधि- करणात्यन्ताभावाप्रतियोगिसाध्य सामानाधिकरण्यं व्याप्तिरित्यर्थः । पक्षधर्मतास्वरूपमाह - व्याप्यस्येति ॥

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अनुमानं द्विविधं स्वार्थ परार्थ च । तत्र स्वार्थ स्वानुमि- तिहेतुः । तथा हि स्वयमेव भूयो दर्शनेन यत्र धूमस्तत्राग्नि- रिति महानसादौ व्याप्तिं गृहीत्वा पर्वतसमीपं गतस्तद्गते चाग्नौ सन्दिहानः पर्वते धूमं पश्यन्व्याप्तिं स्मरति यत्र धूमस्त- त्राभिरिति । तदनन्तरं वह्निव्याप्यधूमवानयं पर्वत इति ज्ञानमुत्पद्यते । अयमेव लिङ्गपरामर्श इत्युच्यते । तस्मात्पर्वतो वह्निमानिति ज्ञानमनुमितिरुत्पद्यते । तदेतत्स्वार्थानुमानम् ।

यत्तु स्वयं धूमादग्निमनुमाय परप्रतिपत्यर्थ पञ्चावयववाक्यं प्रयुङ्क्ते तत्परार्थानुमानम् । यथा पर्वतो वह्निमान्धूमवत्त्वात् । यो यो धूमवान्स वह्निमान् यथा महानसः । तथा चायम् तस्मात्तथेति । अनेन प्रतिपादिताल्लिङ्गात्परोप्यनिं प्रतिपद्यते ॥

त. दी. - अनुमानं विभजते– अनुमानमिति । स्वार्थानुमितिं दर्शयति - स्वयमेवेति । भूयोदर्शनेनेति । धूमाग्न्योर्व्याप्तिग्रहे साध्य- साधनयोर्भूयः सहचारदर्शनेनेत्यर्थः ।

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तर्कसङ्ग्रह

ननु पार्थिवत्व लोह लेख्यत्वादौ शतशः सहचारदर्शनेऽपि वाद व्यभिचारोपलब्धेर्भूयो दर्शनेन कथ व्याप्तिग्रह इति

How to know

that the व्याप्ति चेन्न । व्यभिचारज्ञानविरह सहकृत सहचार ज्ञानस्य

is validi

व्याप्तिग्राहकत्वात । व्यतिचारज्ञान द्विविधम् निश्वयः शङ्का च । तद्विरहः कचित्तत्कचित्स्वतः सिद्ध एव । धूमा- मिव्याप्तिग्रहे कार्यकारणभाव भङ्गसङ्गलक्षगस्त को व्यभिचारशङ्का- निवर्तकः ॥ ननु सकलवहिधूमयोरसन्निकर्षात्कथं व्याप्तिग्रह इति चेन्न । धूमत्ववह्नित्वरूप सामान्य लक्षणप्रत्यासत्त्या सकलधूमवह्निज्ञान- सम्भवात् ॥ तस्मादिति लिङ्गपरामर्शादित्यर्थः । परार्थानुमानमाह — यत्विति ॥ यच्छब्दस्य तत्परार्थानुमानमिति तच्छब्देनान्वयः ॥ पञ्चावयववाक्यमुदाहरति यथेति ॥

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प्रतिज्ञाहेतूदाहरणोपनयनिगमनानि पञ्चावयवाः । पर्वतो वह निमानिति प्रतिज्ञा । धूमवत्त्वादिति हेतुः । यो यो धूम- वान्स सोऽभिमन्यथा महानस इत्युदाहरणम् । तया चाय- मित्युपनयः । तस्मात्तथेति निगमनम् ॥

त. दी. - अवयवस्त्ररूपमाह - प्रतिज्ञेति । उदाहृतवाक्ये प्रति- ज्ञादिविभागमाह - पर्वतो वहिमानिति । साध्यवत्तया पक्षवचनं प्रतिज्ञा ॥ पञ्चम्यन्तं लिङ्गप्रतिपादकं ववनं हेतुः । व्याप्तिप्रति- पादकमुदाहरणम् । पक्षधर्मताज्ञानार्थमुपनयः । अवाधितत्वादिकं निगमनप्रयोजनम् ॥

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तर्कसङ्ग्रहः

[ ४७ ]

स्वार्थानुमिति परार्थानुमित्योर्लिङ्गपरामर्श एवं करणम् । तस्माल्लिङ्गपरामर्शो ऽनुमानम् ॥

त. दी. - अनुमितिकरणमाह - स्वार्थेति ॥ ननु व्याप्तिस्मृ- तिपक्षधर्मताज्ञानाभ्यामेवानुमितिसम्भवे

व्याप्तिविशिष्टालिङ्गपरामर्शः

किमर्थमङ्गीकर्तव्य इति चेन्न । वह्निव्याप्यधूमवानयमिति शाब्दपरामर्श- स्थले विशिष्टपरामर्शस्यावश्यकतया लाघवेन सर्वत्र परामर्शस्यैव करणत्वात् । लिङ्गं न करणम् । अतीतादौ व्यभिचारात् ।

व्यापारवत्कारणं करणमिति मते परामर्शद्वारा व्याप्तिज्ञानं अनुमान acc. to करणम् । तज्जन्यत्वे सति तज्जन्यजनको व्यापारः॥

अनुमानमुपसंहरति–तस्मादिति ॥

end view re.

करण

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लिङ्गं त्रिविधम् । अन्वयव्यतिरेकि केवलान्वयि केवलव्य- तिरेकि चेति । अन्वयेन व्यतिरेकेण च व्याप्तिमदन्वयव्य- तिरेकि । यथा वह्नौ साध्ये धूमवत्त्वम् । यत्र धूमस्तत्राग्निर्यथा महानस इत्यन्वयव्याप्तिः । यत्र वह्निर्नास्ति तत्र धूमोऽपि नास्ति यथा महाहृद इति व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिः । अन्वयमात्रव्या प्तिकं केवलान्वयि यथा घटोऽभिधेयः प्रमेयत्वात्पटवत् । अत्र प्रमेयत्वाभिधेयत्वयोर्व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिर्नास्ति सर्वस्यापि प्रमेय- त्वादभिधेयत्वाच्च । व्यतिरेकमात्रव्याप्तिकं केवलव्यतिरेकि

[[२८]]

तर्कसङ्ग्रहः

पृथिवीतरेभ्यो भिद्यते गन्धवत्त्वात् । यदितरेभ्यो न भिद्यते न तद्गन्धवत् यथा जलम्, न चेयं तथा, तस्मान्न तथेति । यन- न्धवत्तदितरभिन्नमित्यन्वयदृष्टान्तो नास्ति पृथिवमात्रस्य पक्षत्वात् ॥

त. दी. – लिङ्गं विभजते- लिङ्गमिति ॥ अन्वयव्यतिरेके लक्ष यति–अन्वयेनेति । हेतुसाध्ययोर्व्याप्तिरन्वयव्याप्तिः । तदभावयोर्व्याप्ति- व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिः ॥ केवलान्वयिनो लक्षणमाह–अन्वयेति । केवला- न्वयिसाध्यकं केवलान्वयि । अत्यन्ताभावाप्रतियोगित्वं केवलान्व- यित्वम् । केवलान्वायनमुदाहरति यथा घटोभिवेयः प्रमेयत्वादिति । ईश्वरप्रमाविपयत्वं सर्वपदाभिधेयत्व च सर्वत्रास्तीति व्यतिरेकाभावः ॥ केवलव्यतिरेकिणो लक्षणमाह-व्यतिरेकेति । केवलव्यतिरेकिणमुदा- हरति - पृथिवीति । नन्विरभेदः प्रसिद्धो वा न वा । आद्ये यत्र प्रसि- द्वस्तहेतुत्वेऽन्वयित्वम् असत्त्वेऽ साधारण्यम् । द्वितीये साध्यज्ञाना- भावात्कथं तद्विशिष्टानुमितिः । विशेषणज्ञानाभावे विशिष्टज्ञानानुदयात् । प्रतियोगिज्ञानाभावाद्यातिरेकव्याप्तिज्ञानमपि न स्यादिति चेन्न । जला- दित्रयोदशान्योन्याभावानां त्रयोदशसु प्रत्येकं प्रसिद्धानां मेलनं पृथिव्यां साध्यते तत्र त्रयोदशत्वावच्छिन्नभेदस्यैकाधिकरणवृत्तित्वा- भावान्नान्वयित्वा साधारण्ये । प्रत्येकाधिकरणे प्रसिद्धया साध्यविशि-

। ष्टानुमितिर्व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिनिरूपणं चेति ॥

[ ४९ ]

सन्दिग्धसाध्यवान्पक्षः । यथा धूमवच्चे हेतौ पर्वतः ॥

[[२९]]

तर्कसङ्ग्रहः

त. दी. – पक्षलक्षणमाह — सन्दिग्धेति । ननु श्रवणानन्तर- भाविमननस्थलेऽव्याप्तिः । तत्र वेदवाक्यौरात्मनो निश्चितत्वेन सन्दे- हाभावात्किं च प्रत्यक्षेऽपि वह्नो यत्रेच्छयानुमितिस्तत्राप्यव्याप्तिरिति चेन्न । उक्तपक्षताश्रयत्वस्थ पक्षलक्षणत्वात् ॥

[ ५० ]

निश्चितसाध्यवान्सपक्षः । यथा तत्रैव महानसः ॥

त. दी. - सपक्षलक्षणमाह– निश्चितेति ॥

[ ५१]

निश्चितसाध्याभाववान्विपक्षः । यथा तत्रैव महाहृदः ॥

त. दी. - विपक्षलक्षणमाह - निश्चितेति ॥

[ ५२ ]-

सव्यभिचारविरुद्धसत्प्रतिपक्षासिद्धबाधिताः पञ्च हेत्वाभासाः ॥

त. दी. – एवं सद्धेतुं निरूप्यासद्धेतुं निरूपयितुं विभजते- सव्य- भिचारेति । अनुमितिप्रतिबन्धकयथार्थज्ञानविषयत्वं हेत्वाभासत्वम् ।

[ ५३ ]

सव्यभिचारोऽनैकान्तिकः । स त्रिविधः । साधारणासा- धारणानुपसंहारिभेदात् । तत्र साध्याभाववद्वृत्तिः साधारणोऽ

[[३०]]

तर्कसङ्ग्रह

नैकान्तिकः । यथा पर्वतो वह्निमान्प्रमेयत्वादिति प्रमेयत्वस्य वह्नयभाववति हृदे विद्यमानत्वात् । सर्वसपक्ष विपक्ष- व्यावृत्तोऽसाधारणः । यथा शब्दो नित्यः शब्दत्वादिति । शब्दत्वं सर्वेभ्यो नित्येभ्योऽनित्येभ्यश्च व्यावृत्तं शब्दमात्र- वृत्ति । अन्वयव्यतिरेकदृष्टान्तरहितोऽनुपसंहारी । यथा सर्वम- नित्यं प्रमेयत्वादिति । अत्र सर्वस्यापि पक्षत्वाद्दृष्टान्तो नास्ति ॥

त. दी. – सव्यभिचारं विभजते- स त्रिविध इति । असा - धारणं लक्षयति - तत्रेति । उदाहरति — यथेति । असाधारणं लक्षयति–सर्वेति । अनुपसंहारिणो लक्षणमाह - अन्वयेति ॥

[ ५४ ]

साध्याभावव्याप्तो हेतुर्विरुद्धः । यथा शब्दो नित्यः कृत- कत्वादिति । कृतकत्वं हि नित्यत्वाभावेनानित्यत्वेन व्याप्तम् ॥

त. दी. - विरुद्धं लक्षयति-साध्येति ॥

[ ५५ ]

यस्य साध्याभावसाधकं हेत्वन्तरं विद्यते स सत्प्रतिपक्षः । यथा शब्दो नित्यः श्रावणत्वाच्छब्दत्ववदिति । शब्दोऽनित्यः कार्यत्वाद्धवदिति ॥

त. दी. -सत्प्रतिपक्षं लक्षयति– यस्येति ॥

[[३१]]

तर्कसङ्ग्रहः

[ ५६ ]

असिद्धस्त्रिविधः । आश्रयासिद्धः स्वरूपासिद्धो व्याप्यत्वा- सिद्धश्वेति । आश्रयासिद्धो यथा गगनारविन्दं सुरभ्यरविन्द- त्वात्सरोजारविन्दवत् । अत्र गगनारविन्दमाश्रयः । स च नास्त्येव । स्वरूपासिद्धो यथा शब्दो गुणश्चाक्षुपत्वात् । अत्र चाक्षुषत्वं शब्दे नास्ति शब्दस्य श्रावणत्वात् । सोपाधिको व्याप्यत्वासिद्धः । साध्यव्यापकत्वे सति साधनाव्यापक उपाधिः । साध्यसमानाधिकरणात्यन्ताभावाप्रतियोगित्वं साध्यव्यापकत्वम् । साधनवन्निष्ठात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वं साधनाव्यापकत्वम् । पर्वतो धूमवान्वमिवादित्यत्रार्द्रेन्धन- संयोग उपाधिः । तथाहि । यत्र धूमस्तत्रार्द्रेन्धन संयोग इति साध्यव्यापकता । यत्र वह्निस्तत्रार्द्रेन्धनसंयोगो नास्त्ययो- गोलक आर्द्रेन्धनसंयोगाभावादिति साधनाव्यापकता । एवं साध्यव्यापकत्वे सति साधनाव्यापकत्वादार्द्रेन्धनसंयोग उपाधिः । सोपाधिकत्वाद्वह्निमचं व्याप्यत्वासिद्धम् ॥

त. दी. - असिद्धं विभजते - असिद्ध इति ॥ आश्रयासिद्ध- मुदाहरति - गगनेति ॥ स्वरूपासिद्वमुदाहरति शब्देति ॥ व्याप्यत्वासिद्धस्य लक्षणमाह-सोपाधिक इति । उपाधिलक्षण- माह – साध्येति । उपाधिश्चतुर्विधः । केवलसाध्यव्यापकः पक्षधर्मा- वच्छिन्नसाध्यव्यापकः साधनावच्छिन्न साध्यव्यापक उदासीनधर्मा- वच्छिन्नसाध्यव्यापकश्चेति । आद्य आर्द्रेन्धनसंयोगः । द्वितीयो यथा - वायुः प्रत्यक्षः प्रत्यक्षस्पर्शाश्रयत्वादित्यत्र बहिर्द्रव्यत्वावच्छिन्नप्रत्यक्ष-

३२तर्कसङ्ग्रहः

त्वव्यापक मुहूतरूपवत्त्वम् । तृतीयो यथा–प्रध्वंसो विनाशी जन्यत्वा- दित्यत्र जन्यत्वावच्छिन्नानित्यत्वव्यापकं भावत्वम् । चतुर्थो यथा- प्रागभावो विनाशी प्रमेयत्वादित्यत्र जन्यत्वावच्छिन्नानित्यत्वव्यापकं

भावत्वम् ॥

[ ५७ ]

यस्य साध्याभावः प्रमाणान्तरेण निश्चितः स बाधितः । यथा वाहिरनुष्णो द्रव्यत्वादिति । अत्रानुष्णत्वं साध्यं तद- भाव उष्णत्वं स्पार्शनप्रत्यक्षेण गृह्यत इति बाधितत्वम् ॥

त. दी. - बाधितस्य लक्षणमाह–यस्येति । अत्र बाधस्य ग्रावाभावनिश्रयत्वेन सत्प्रतिपक्षस्य विरोधिज्ञानसामग्रीत्वेन साक्षाद- नुमितिप्रतिबन्धकत्वम् । इतरेषां तु परामर्शप्रतिबन्धकत्वम् । तत्रापि साधारणस्याव्यभिचाराभावतया विरुद्धस्य सामानाधिकरण्याभावतया व्यापकत्वासिद्धस्य विशिष्टव्याप्तच भावतयाऽसाधारणानुपसंहारिणोर्व्या- तिसरायाधायकत्वेन च व्याप्तिज्ञानप्रतिबन्धकत्वम् । आश्रयासिद्धस्व- रूपासिद्धयोः पक्षधर्मताज्ञानप्रतिबन्धकत्वम् । उपाधिस्तु व्यभिचारज्ञा- नद्वारा व्याप्तिज्ञानप्रतिबन्धकः । सिद्धसाधनं तु पक्षताविघटिततया आश्रयासिद्धेऽन्तर्भवतीति प्राञ्चः । निग्रहस्थानान्तरमिति नवीनाः ।

[ ५८ ]

उपमितिकरणमुपमानम् । सञ्ज्ञासञ्ज्ञिसम्बन्धज्ञानमुपमितिः । तत्करणं सादृश्यज्ञानम् । अतिदेशवाक्यार्थस्मरणमवान्तर-

[[33]]

तर्कसङ्ग्रहः

व्यापारः । तथाहि कश्चिद्रवयशब्दार्थमजानन्कुतश्चिदारण्यक - पुरुषागोसदृशो गवय इति श्रुत्वा, वनं गतो, वाक्यार्थं स्मर- न्गोसदृशं पिण्डं पश्यति । तदनन्तरमसौ गवयशब्दवाच्य इत्युपमितिरुत्पद्यते ॥

त. दी. - उपमानं लक्षयति– उपमितीति ॥

[ ५९ ]

आप्तवाक्यं शब्दः । आप्तस्तु यथार्थवक्ता । वाक्यं पदस- मूहः । यथा गामानयेति । शक्तं पदम् । अस्मात्पदादयमर्थो बोद्धव्य इतीश्वरसङ्केतः शक्तिः ॥

त. दी. - शब्दं लक्षयति–आप्तेति । पदलक्षणमाह- शक्तमि- ति । अर्थस्मृत्यनुकूलः पदपदार्थसम्बन्धः शक्तिः ।

of the word

सा च पदार्थान्तरमिति मीमांसकाः । तन्निरासार्थमाह- अस्मादिति । The natureof डित्थादीनामिव घटादीनामपि सङ्केत एव शक्तिः, शक्ति अभिधा

न तु पदार्थान्तरमित्यर्थः ॥ गवादिशब्दानां जाता- वेव शक्तिर्विशेषणतया जातेः प्रथममुपस्थितत्वात् व्यक्तिलाभस्त्वा- क्षेपादिना इति केचित् । तन्न, गामानयेत्यादौ वृद्धव्यवहारात्सर्वत्रा नयनादेर्व्यक्तावेव सम्भवेन जातिविशिष्टव्यक्तावेव शक्तिकल्पनात् । शक्तिग्रहश्च वृद्धव्यवहारेण । व्युत्पित्सुबलो गामानयेत्युत्तमवृद्ध- The process of वाक्यश्रवणान्तरं मध्यमवृद्धस्य प्रवृत्तिमुपलभ्य

understanding

शक्ति. गवानयनं च दृष्ट्वा मध्यमवृद्धप्रवृत्तिजनकज्ञा- नस्यान्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां वाक्यजन्यत्वं निश्चित्याश्वमानय गां बधान

[[३४]]

तर्कसङ्ग्रहः

इति वाक्यान्तर आवापोद्वापाभ्यां गोपदस्य गोत्वविशिष्टे शक्तिरश्व- शब्दस्याश्वत्वविशिष्ठे शक्तिरिति व्युत्पद्यते । ननु सर्वत्र कार्यपर- त्वाद्यवहारस्य कार्यवाक्य एव व्युत्पत्तिर्न सिद्धपर इति चेन्न । काञ्चयां त्रिभुवनतिलको भूपतिरित्यादौ सिद्धेऽपि व्यवहारात्, विकसितपद्मे मधुकर इत्यादी प्रसिद्धपदसमभिव्यवहारात्सिद्धेऽपि मधुकरादिपदे व्युत्पत्तिदर्शनाच्च ॥

लक्षणापि शब्दवृत्तिः । शक्यसम्बन्धी लक्षणा । गङ्गायां घोष इत्यत्र

The nature

of लक्षणा

गङ्गापदवाच्यप्रवाहसम्बन्धादेव तीरोपस्थितौ तीरेऽपि

and its three शक्तिर्न कल्प्यते । सैन्धवादौ लवणाश्वयोः परस्पर-

[[1]]

varieties

सम्बन्धाभावान्नानाशक्तिकल्पनम् ॥ लक्षणा त्रिविधा । जहल्लक्षणाऽ जहल्लक्षणा जहदजहल्लक्षणा चेति । यत्र वाच्यार्थस्यान्ययाभावस्तत्र जहती, यथा मञ्चाः क्रोशन्तीति । यत्र वाच्यार्थस्यान्त्रयस्तत्राजहती, यथा छत्रिणो गच्छन्तीति । यत्र वाच्यैकदेशत्यागेनैकदेशान्वयस्तत्र जहदजहती यथा तत्त्वमसीति । गौण्यपि लक्षणैव लक्ष्यमाणगुणतन्त्र- न्धरूपा । अग्निर्माणवक इति ॥

[[1]]

व्यञ्जना व्यञ्जनापि शक्तिलक्षणान्तर्भूता शब्दशक्तिमूला

अर्थशक्तिमूला च अनुमानादिनान्यथासिद्धा ॥

included in

लक्षणा and अभिधा

तात्पर्यानुपपत्तिलक्षणात्री जम् । तत्प्रतीतीच्छयोच्चरितत्वं तात्पर्यम् । तात्पर्यज्ञानं च वाक्यार्थज्ञाने हेतुः । नानार्थानुरोधात्तु प्रकरणादिकं तात्पर्यग्राहकम् । द्वारमित्यादौ पिधेहीति शब्दाध्याहारः । नन्वर्थ- ज्ञानार्थत्वाच्छब्दस्यार्थमविज्ञाय शब्दाध्याहारासम्भवादर्थाध्याहार एव युक्त इति चेन्न, पदविशेषजन्यपदार्थोपस्थितेः शाब्दज्ञाने हेतुत्वात् ।

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तर्कसङ्ग्रहः

अन्यथा घटः कर्मत्वमानयनं कृतिरित्यत्रापि शाब्दज्ञानप्रसङ्गात् ॥

पङ्कजादिपदेषु योगरूदिः । अवयवशक्तिर्योगः समुदायशक्ती रूढिः । नियतपद्मत्वज्ञानार्थं समुदायशक्तिः । अन्यथा कुमुदेऽपि प्रयोगप्रसङ्गः । इतरान्विते शक्तिरिति प्राभाकराः । अन्वयस्य वाक्यार्थतया भानसम्भवादन्वयांशेऽपि शक्तिर्न कल्पनीयेति गौतमीयाः ॥

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आकाङ्क्षा योग्यता सन्निधिश्च वाक्यार्थज्ञानहेतुः । पदस्य पदान्तरव्यतिरेकप्रयुक्तान्वयाननुभावकत्वमाकाङ्क्षा । अर्था - बाधो योग्यता । पदानामविलम्बेनोच्चारणं सन्निधिः ॥

।

।

त. दी. - आकाङ्केति । आकाङ्क्षादिज्ञानमित्यर्थः । अन्यथाका- ङ्क्षादिभ्रमाच्छाब्दभ्रमो न स्यात् । आकाङ्क्षा लक्षयति–पदस्येति ॥ योग्यतालक्षणमाह— अर्थेति ॥ सन्निविलक्षणमाह- पदानामिति । अविलम्बेन पदार्थोपस्थितिः सन्निधिः उच्चारणं तु तदुपयोगितया

युक्तम् ॥

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आकाङ्क्षादिरहितं वाक्यमप्रमाणम् । यथा गौरवः पुरुषो हस्तीति न प्रमाण माकाङ्क्षाविरहात् । अग्निना सिवेदिति न प्रमाणं योग्यताविरहात् । प्रहरे प्रहरेऽसहोच्चारितानि गामानयेत्यादिपदानि न प्रमाणं सान्निध्याभावात् ॥

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तर्कसङ्ग्रहः

त. दी. - गौरश्वइति । घटः कर्मत्वमित्यना काङ्क्षोदाहरणं द्रष्टव्यम् ॥

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वाक्यं द्विविधम् । वैदिकं लौकिकं च । वैदिकमीश्वरो- क्तत्वात्सर्वमेव प्रमाणम् । लौकिकं त्वाप्तोक्तं प्रमाणम् । अन्यदप्रमाणम् ॥

Part 1 o

त. दी. - वाक्यं विभजते वाक्यमिति । वैदिकस्य विशे- पमाह - वैदिकमीश्वरोक्तत्वादिति ।

are

वेदs not नित्य

ननु वेदस्यानादित्वात्कथमीश्वरोक्तत्वमिति चेन्न । वेदः पौरुषेयो वाक्यसमूहत्वाद्भारतादिवत् । न च स्मर्यमाणकर्तृत्वमु- पाधिः । गौतमादिभिः शिष्यपरम्परया वेदेऽपि कर्तृ- स्मरणेन साधनव्यापकत्वात् । " तस्मात्तेपानात्त्रयो वेदा अजायन्त " इति श्रुतेश्व ॥ ननु वर्णा नित्याः स एवायं

’ गकार’ इति प्रत्यभिज्ञाबलात् । तथा च कथं वेदस्यानित्यत्वमिति चेन्न, उत्पन्नो गकारो नष्टो गकार इति प्रतीत्या वर्णानामनित्यत्वात् ’ सोऽयं गकार’ इति प्रत्यभिज्ञायाः सेयं दीपज्वालेतिवत्साजात्यावलम्बन- त्वात् वर्णानां नित्यत्वेऽप्यानुपूर्वी विशिष्टवाक्यस्यानित्यत्वाच्च । तस्मादीश्वरोक्तो वेदः ॥ मन्वादिस्मृतीनामाचाराणां च वेदमूलक- तया प्रामाण्यम् ।

स्मृतिमूलवाक्यानामिदानीमनध्ययनात्तन्मूलभूता काचिच्छाखोच्छिन्नेति

स्मृति Question of

तर्कसङ्ग्रहः

कल्प्यते । ननु पश्यमान वेदवाक्योत्सादस्य

texts having no कल्पयितुमशक्यतया विप्रकीर्णवादस्यायुक्त-

corresponding श्रुति त्वान्नित्यानुमेयो वेदो मूलमिति चेन्न । तथापि वर्णानुपूर्वीज्ञानाभावेन बोधकत्वासम्भवात् ॥

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वाक्यार्थज्ञानं शाब्दज्ञानम् । तत्करणं शब्दः ॥

त. दी. ―― नन्वेतानि पदानि स्वस्मारितार्थसंसर्गवन्ति आका - ङ्कादिमत्पदकदम्बकत्वात्, सद्वाक्यवदित्यनुमानादेव संसर्गज्ञानसं- भवाच्छब्दो न प्रमाणान्तरमिति चेन्न ।

शाब्दज्ञान अनुमित्यपेक्षया शाब्दज्ञानस्य विलक्षणस्य शब्दात्प्र- is not त्ये मीत्यनुव्यवसायसाक्षिकस्य सर्वसम्मतत्वात् ॥ अनुमिति

included अनुमान.

नन्वर्थापत्तिरपि प्रमाणान्तरमस्ति ‘पीनो देवदत्तो दिवा न अर्थापत्ति, सम्भव, भुङ्क्ते’ इति दृष्टे भुते वा पीनत्वान्यथानुपपत्त्या ऐतिह्य, चेष्टा

रात्रिभोजनमर्थापत्त्या कल्प्यत इति चेन्न । देव- दत्तो रात्रौ भुङ्क्ते दिवाऽभुञ्जानले सति पनिया - दित्यनुमानेनैव रात्रिभोजनस्य सिद्धत्वात् । शते पञ्चाशदिति सम्भवोऽ प्यनुमानमेव । इह वटे यक्षस्तिष्ठतीत्यैतिह्यमज्ञातमूलवक्तृकः शब्द एव । चेष्टापि शब्दानुमानद्वारा व्यवहारहेतुरिति न मानान्तरम् । तस्मात्प्रत्यक्षानुमानापमानशब्दाश्चत्वार्येव प्रमाणानि ॥

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तर्कसङ्ग्रहः

सर्वेषां ज्ञानानां तद्वति तत्प्रकारकत्वं स्वतो ग्राह्यं परतो वेति

ज्ञान is परतः

प्रामाण्यवत्

विचार्यते । तत्र विप्रतिपत्तिः । ज्ञानप्रामाण्यं

तदप्रामाण्या ग्राहक यावज्ज्ञानग्राहकसामग्रीग्राह्यं न वा । अत्र विधिकोटिः स्वतरत्वम् । निषेधकोटिः परतस्त्वम् ॥ अनुमानग्राह्यत्वेन सिद्धसाधनतावारणाय यावदिति । ‘इदं ज्ञानमप्रमेति’ ज्ञानेन प्रामाण्यग्रहाद्वाधवारणायाप्रामाण्याग्रा- हकेति । इदं ज्ञानमप्रमेत्यनुव्यवसायनिष्टप्रामाण्यग्राहकस्याप्रामा- ण्याग्राहकत्वाभावात्स्वतस्त्वं न स्यादतस्तदिति । तस्मिन्प्रामाण्या- श्रयेऽप्रामाण्यग्राहक इत्यर्थः । उदाहृतस्थले व्यवसायेऽप्रामा- ण्यग्राहकस्याप्यनुव्यवसाये तदग्राहकत्वात्स्वतस्त्वासिद्धिः । ननु स्वत एव प्रामाण्यं गृह्यते, घटमहं जानामीत्यनुव्यवसायेन घटघटत्वयोरिव तत्सम्बन्धस्यापि विपयीकरणात्, व्यवसायरूप- प्रत्यासत्तेस्तुल्यत्वात्, पुरोवर्तिनि प्रकारसम्बन्धस्यैव प्रमात्व पदार्थत्वादिति चेन्न । स्वतः प्रामाण्यग्रहे जलज्ञानं प्रमा न वेत्य- नभ्यासदशायां प्रमात्वसंशयो न स्यात् । अनुव्यवसायेन प्रामा- व्यस्य निश्चितत्वात् । तस्मात्स्वतोमाह्यत्वाभावात्परतो ग्राह्यत्वम् तथाहि । प्रथमं जलज्ञानानन्तरं प्रवृत्तौ सत्यां, जललाभे सति पूर्वोत्पन्नं जलज्ञानं प्रमा समर्थप्रवृत्तिजनकत्वात् यन्नैवं तन्नैवम्, यथा ममा; इति व्यतिरेकिणा प्रमात्वं निश्चीयते । द्वितीयादिज्ञानेषु पूर्वज्ञानदृष्टान्तेन तत्सजातीयत्यलिङ्गेनान्वयव्यतिरेकिणाऽपि गृह्यते ॥ प्रमाया गुणजन्यत्वमुत्पत्ती परतस्त्वम् । प्रमाऽसाधारणकारणं गुणः । प्रमा produ- अप्रमाऽसाधारणकारणं दोषः । तत्र प्रत्यक्षे विशेषण- ced by गुण वद्विशेष्यसन्निकर्षो गुणः, अनुमितौ व्यापकवति

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तर्कसङ्ग्रहः

व्याप्यज्ञानं, उपमितौ यथार्थसादृश्यज्ञानं शाब्दज्ञाने यथार्थयोग्यता- ज्ञानम् इत्याद्यूहनीयम् । पुरोवर्तिनि प्रकाराभावस्थ व्यवसायेनानुप- स्थितत्वादप्रमात्वं परत एव गृह्यते । पित्तादिदोषजन्यत्वादुत्पत्तौ परतस्त्वम् ॥

ननु सर्वज्ञानानां यथार्थत्वादयथार्थज्ञानमेव नास्ति । न च ’ शुक्ताविदं रजतमिति’ ज्ञानात्प्रवृत्तिदर्शनादन्यथाख्यातिसिद्धि-

अयथार्थज्ञान proved aga-

रिति वाच्यम् । रजतस्मृतिपुरोवर्तिज्ञानाभ्यामेव प्रवृ- inst मीमांसक त्तिसम्भवात् उपस्थितेष्टभेदाग्रहस्यैव सर्वत्र प्रवर्तकत्वेन नेदं रजतमित्यादावतिप्रसङ्गाभावादिति चेन्न । सत्यर-

view.

जतस्थले पुरोवर्तिविशेष्यकरजतत्वप्रकारकज्ञानस्य लाघवेन प्रवृत्तिजनक तया शुक्तावपि रजतार्थिप्रवृत्तिजनकत्वेन विशिष्टज्ञानस्यैव कल्पनात् ॥

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अयथार्थानुभवस्त्रिविधः संशयविपर्ययतर्कभेदात् । एक स्मिन्धर्मिणि विरुद्धनानाधर्मवैशिष्टयावगाहि ज्ञानं संशयः । यथा स्थाणुर्वा पुरुषो वेति । मिथ्याज्ञानं विपर्ययः । यथा शुक्ताविदं रजतमिति । व्याप्यारोपेण व्यापकारोपस्तर्कः । यथा यदि वह्निर्न स्यातर्हि धूमोऽपि न स्यादिति ॥

त. दी. अयथार्थानुभवं विभजते- अयथार्थति । स्वमस्य मानसविपर्ययरूपत्वान्न त्रैविध्यविरोधः ॥ संशयलक्षणमाह-एक- स्मिन्निति 1 घटपटाविति समूहालम्बनेऽतिव्याप्तिवारणाय एकेति । घटो द्रव्यमित्यादावतिव्याप्तिवारणाय - विरुद्धेति ।

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तर्कसङ्ग्रहः

पटत्वविरुद्धघटत्ववानित्यत्रातिव्याप्तिवारणाय नानेति ॥ विपयर्य- लक्षणमाह - मिथ्येति । तदभाववति तत्प्रकारकनिश्वय इत्यर्थः ॥ तर्क लक्षयति - ब्याप्येति । यद्यपि तर्कों विपर्ययेऽन्तर्भवति तथापि प्रमाणानुग्राहकत्वाद्भेदेन कीर्तनम् ॥

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स्मृतिरपि द्विविधा । यथार्थाऽयथार्था च । प्रमाजन्या यथार्था । अप्रमाजन्याऽयथार्था ॥

त. दी. - स्मृतिं विभजते - स्मृतिरिति ॥

[ ६६ ]

सर्वेषामनुकूलतया वेदनीयं सुखम् ॥

त. दी. - सुखं लक्षयति- सर्वेषामिति । सुख्यहमित्याद्यनुव्य- वसायगम्यं सुखत्वादिकमेव लक्षणम् । यथाश्रुतं तु स्वरूपकथन- मिति द्रष्टव्यम् ॥

[ ६७ ]

सर्वेषां प्रतिकूलतया वेदनीयं दुःखम् ॥

[ ६८ ]

इच्छा कामः ॥

[ ६९ ]

क्रोधो द्वेषः ॥

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तर्कसङ्ग्रहः

[ ७० ]

कृतिः प्रयत्नः ॥

[ ७१ ]

विहितकर्मजन्यो धर्मः ॥

[ ७२ ]

निषिद्धकर्मजन्यस्त्वधर्मः ॥

न्या. बो. - धर्माधर्मौ निरूपयति–विहितेति । वेदविहिते- त्यर्थः । निषिद्धेति । वेदनिपिद्धेत्यर्थः ॥

[ ७३ ]

बुद्ध्यादयोऽष्टावात्ममात्रविशेषगुणाः ॥

[ ७४ ]

बुद्धीच्छाप्रयत्ना द्विविधाः । नित्या अनित्याश्च । नित्या ईश्वरस्य । अनित्या जीवस्य ॥

[ ७५ ]

संस्कारस्त्रिविधः । वेगो भावना स्थितिस्थापकश्चेति । वेगः पृथिव्यादिचतुष्टय मनोवृत्तिः । अनुभवजन्या स्मृतिहेतु-

४२तर्कसङ्ग्रहः

भीवनाऽऽत्ममात्रवृत्तिः । अन्यथा कृतस्य पुनस्तदवस्थापादकः स्थितिस्थापकः कटादिपृथिवीवृत्तिः ॥

त. दी. - संस्कारं विभजते- संस्कार इति । संस्कारत्वजाति- मान्संस्कारः । वेगस्याश्रयमाह – वेग इति । वेगवजातिमान्वेगः । भावनां लक्षयति- अनुभवेति । आत्मादावतिव्याप्तिवारणायानुभवेति । अनुभवध्वंसेऽतिव्याप्तिवारणाय स्मृतीति । स्मृतेरपि संस्कारजनकत्वं नवीनरुक्तम् ॥ स्थितिस्थापकं लक्षयति – अन्यथेति ॥ सङ्ख्यादयोऽष्टौ नैमित्तिकद्रवत्ववेगस्थितिस्थापकाः सामान्यगुणाः । अन्ये रूपादयो विशेषगुणाः । द्रव्यविभाजकोपा- धिद्वयसमानाधिकरणावृत्ति - द्रव्यकर्मावृत्ति - जाति - मत्त्वं विशेषगुणत्वम् ।

सामान्यगुण

and

विशेषगुण

।

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चलनात्मकं कर्म । ऊर्ध्वदेशसंयोगहेतुरुत्क्षेपणम् । अधो- देशसंयोगहेतुरपक्षेपणम् । शरीरसन्निकृष्टसंयोगहेतुराकुञ्चनम् । विप्रकृष्टसंयोगहेतुः प्रसारणम् । अन्यत्सर्वं गमनम् । पृथि- व्यादिचतुष्टयमनोमात्रवृत्ति ॥

त. दी. कर्मणो लक्षणमाह - चलनेति । उत्क्षेपणादीनां कार्यभेदमाह – ऊर्ध्वेति । शरीरेति । वक्रत्वसम्पादकमाकुञ्चनम् । ऋजुतासम्पादकं प्रसारणमित्यर्थः ॥

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तर्कसङ्ग्रहः

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नित्यमेकमनेकानुगतं सामान्यं । द्रव्यगुणकर्मवृत्ति । तद्- द्विविधं परापरभेदात् । परं सत्ता । अपरं द्रव्यत्वादि ॥

त. दी. - सामान्यं लक्षयति — नित्यमिति । संयोगादावति- व्याप्तिवारणाय नित्यमिति । परमाणुपरिमाणादावतिव्याप्तिवारणाय- अनेकेति । अनुगतत्वं समवेतत्वम् । तेन नाभावादावतिव्याप्तिः ॥

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नित्यद्रव्यवृत्तयो व्यावर्तका विशेषाः ॥ त. दी. – विशेषं लक्षयति– नित्येति ॥

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नित्यसम्बन्धः समवायः । अयुतसिद्धवृत्तिः । ययोर्द्वयोर्मध्य एकमविनश्यदपराश्रितमेवावतिष्ठते तावयुतसिद्धौ । यथावय- वावयविनौ गुणगुणिनौ क्रियाक्रियावन्तौ जातिव्यक्ती विशेषनित्यद्रव्ये चेति ॥

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त. दी. - - समवायं लक्षयति– नित्येति । संयोगेऽतिव्याप्तिवा- रणाय नित्येति । आकाशादावतिव्याप्तिवारणाय सम्बन्ध इति । अयुतसिद्धलक्षणमाह — ययोरिति । नीलो घट इति विशिष्टप्रतीति- विशेषणविशेष्य सम्बन्धविषया विशिष्टप्रत्ययत्वाद्दण्डीति प्रत्ययवदिति समवायसिद्धिः । अवयवावयविनाविति । द्रव्यसमवायिकारणम- वयवः । तज्जन्यद्रव्यमवयवि ॥

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}

तर्कसङ्ग्रहः

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अनादिः सान्तः प्रागभावः । उत्पत्तेः पूर्व कार्यस्य । सादिरनन्तः प्रध्वंसः । उत्पत्यनन्तरं कार्यस्य । त्रैकालिकसं-

1 सर्गावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकोऽत्यन्ताभावः । यथा भूतले घटो नास्तीति । तादात्म्यसम्बन्धावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकोन्योन्या- भावः यथा घटः पटो न भवतीति ॥

त. बी. - प्रागभाव लक्षयति– अनादिरिति । आकाशादावति- व्याप्तिवारणाय सान्त इति । घटादावतिव्याप्तिवारणाय - अनादि- रिति प्रतियोगिसमवायिकारणवृत्तिः प्रतियोगिजनको भविष्यतीति व्यवहारहेतुः प्रागभावः ॥ प्रध्वंसं लक्षयति - सादिरिति । घटादा- वतिव्याप्तिवारणाय - अनन्त इति । आकाशादावतिव्याप्तिवारणाय– सादिरिति । प्रतियोगिजन्यः प्रतियोगिसमवायिकारणवृत्तिर्ध्वस्त- व्यवहारहेतुर्ध्वसः ॥ अत्यन्ताभावं लक्षयति त्रैकालिकेति ॥ अन्योन्याभावेऽतिव्याप्तिवारणाय संसर्गावच्छिन्नेति । ध्वंसप्रागभाव- योरतिव्याप्तिवारणाय त्रैकालिकेति ॥ अन्योन्याभावं लक्षयति तादात्म्येति । प्रतियोगितावच्छेदकारोप्यसंसर्गभेदादेकप्रतियोगिक- योरप्यत्यन्ताभावान्योन्याभावयोर्यत्वम् । केवलदेवदत्ताभावो दण्ड- भाव इति प्रतीत्या विशिष्टाभावः । एकसत्त्वे द्वौ न स्त इति प्रतीत्या द्वित्वावच्छिन्नोऽभावः । संयोगसम्बन्धेन घटवति समवायसम्बन्धेन घटाभावः । तत्तद्भटाभावाद्घटत्वावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकसामान्याभावश्चा- तिरिक्तः ॥ एवमन्योन्याभावोऽपि । घटत्वावच्छिन्नः पटो नास्तिति

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तर्कसङ्ग्रहः

म्यधिकरणधर्मावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकाभावो नाङ्गीक्रियते । पटे घटत्वं नास्तीति तस्यार्थः । अतिरिक्तत्वे स केवलान्वयी । सामयिकाभावोऽत्यन्ताभाव एव समयविशेषे प्रतीयमानः । घटा- सामयिकाभाव भाववति घटानयनेऽत्यन्ताभावस्यान्यत्र गमना is अत्यन्ताभाव भावेऽप्यप्रतीतेर्घटा पसरणे सति प्रतीतेः । भूतले घष्टसंयोगप्रागभावप्रध्वंसयोरत्यन्ताभावप्रतीतिनियामकत्वं कल्प्यते । घटवति तत्संयोगप्रागभावप्रध्वंसयोरसत्त्वादत्यन्ताभावस्याप्रतीतिः । घटापसरणे च संयोगध्वंससत्त्वात्प्रतीतिरिति ।

केवलाधिकरणादेव नास्तीति व्यवहारोपपत्तावभावो न पदार्थान्तर- मिति गुरवः । तन्न । अभावानङ्गीकारे कैवल्यस्य निर्वक्तमशक्यत्वात् । अभावाभावो भाव एव नाति-

Why अभाव is पदार्थ

रिक्तः अनवस्थाप्रसङ्गात् । ध्वंसप्राभगावः प्रागभावध्वंसश्च प्रतियो- ग्येव । अभावाभावोतिरिक्त एव, तृतीयाभावस्य प्रथमाभावरूप- त्वान्नानवस्थेति नवीनाः ॥

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सर्वेषां पदार्थानां यथायथमुक्तेष्वन्तर्भावात्सप्तैव पदार्था

इति सिद्धम् ॥

गौतम ’s so-called

त. दी. – ननु प्रमाणप्रमेय-संशय-प्रयोजन- दृष्टान्त-सिद्धान्ता- वयव तर्क निर्णय- -वाद- जल्प-वितण्डा– हेत्वा- भास - च्छल - जाति-निग्रहस्थानानां तत्त्वज्ञाना- न्निश्रेयसाधिगम इति न्यायशास्त्रे षोडशपदा-

16 पदार्थs can come under the

सप्तपदार्थ

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तर्कसङ्ग्रहः

नामुक्तत्वात्कथं सप्तैवेत्यत आह- सर्वेषामिति । सर्वेषां सप्तस्येवान्त- र्भाव इत्यर्थः । ’ आत्मशरीरेद्रीयार्थमनोबुद्धिप्रवृत्तिदोषप्रेत्यभावफलदुः- खापवर्गास्तु प्रमेयमिति द्वादशविधं प्रमेयम् । प्रवृत्तिर्धर्माधर्मौ

रागद्वेषमोहा दोषाः । राग इच्छा । द्वेषो मन्युः । मोहः शरीरादावा- त्मभ्रमः । प्रेत्यभावो मरणम् । फलं भोगः । अपवर्गो मोक्षः । स च स्वसमानाधिकरणदुःखप्रागभावासमानकालीन दुःखध्वंसः । प्रयोजनं सुखं दुःखहानिश्च । दृष्टान्तो महानसादि । प्रामाणिकत्वेनाभ्युप- गतोऽर्थः सिद्धान्तः । निर्णयो निश्वयः । स च प्रमाणफलम् । तत्त्वबुभुत्सोः कथा वादः । उभयसाधनवती विजिगीषुकथा जल्पः । स्वपक्षस्थापनहीना वितण्डा । कथा नाम नानावक्तृकः पूर्वोत्तरपक्ष- प्रतिपादकवाक्यसन्दर्भः । अभिप्रायान्तरेण प्रयुक्तस्य न्तिरं प्रकल्प्य दूषणं छलम् । असदुत्तरं जातिः । साधर्म्यवैधम्र्योत्कर्षापकर्षवर्ण्य- विकल्पसाध्यप्राप्स्यप्राप्तिप्रसङ्गप्रतिदृष्टान्तानुत्पत्तिसंशयप्रकरणहेत्वर्थाप- त्यविशेषोपपत्त्युपलब्ध्यनुपलब्धिनित्यानित्यकार्याकार्य समा जातयः । वादिनोऽपजयहेतुर्निग्रहस्थानम् । प्रतिज्ञाहानिः, प्रतिज्ञान्तरं, प्रति- ज्ञाविरोधः, प्रतिज्ञासन्यासो, हेत्वन्तरम् अर्थान्तरं, निरर्थकं, अवि- ज्ञातार्थकं, अपार्थकं, अनाप्तकालं, न्यूनं, अधिकं, पुनरुक्तं, अननुभा- पणं, अज्ञानं, अप्रतिभाविक्षेपः, मतानुज्ञा, पर्यनुयोज्योपेक्षणं, निरनुयो- ज्यानुयोगः, अपसिद्धान्तः, हेत्वाभासश्च, निग्रहस्थानानि । शेषं सुगमम् ॥ ननु करतलानलसंयोगे सत्यपि प्रतिबन्ध के सति दाहानुत्पत्तेः शक्तिः पदार्थान्तरमिति चेन्न । प्रतिबन्धकाभावस्य कार्यमात्रे कारणत्वेन शक्तेरनुपयोगात् कारण-

शक्ति is not a separate पदार्थ.

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तर्कसङ्ग्रहः

स्यैव शक्तिपदार्थत्वात् । ननु भस्मादिना कांस्यादी शुद्धिदर्शनादाधे- यशक्तिरङ्गीकार्येति चेन्न । भस्मादिसंयोगसमान कालिनास्पृश्यस्पर्श- प्रतियोगिक यावदभावसहितभस्मादिसंयोगध्वंसस्य शुद्धिपदार्थत्वात् ॥ स्वत्वमपि न पदार्थान्तरम् । यथेष्टविनियोगयोग्यत्वस्य स्वत्वरूप- त्वात् । तदवच्छेदकं च प्रतिग्रहादिलव्यत्वमेवेति ॥

अथ विधिर्निरूप्यते ।

प्रयत्नजनकचिकीर्षानिनकज्ञानविषयो

Nature of fafa. विधिः । तत्प्रतिपादको लिडादिर्वा । कृत्य-

साध्ये प्रवृत्त्यदर्शनात् कृतिसाध्यताज्ञानं प्रवर्त-

कम् । न च विषभक्षणादौ प्रवृत्तिप्रसङ्गः इष्टसाधनतालिङ्गककृति- साध्यताज्ञानस्य काम्यस्थले नित्यनैमित्तिकस्थले च विहितकालजी- चित्वनिमित्त कज्ञानजन्यस्यैव प्रवर्तकत्वात् । न चाननुगमः स्वविशे- पेणवत्ताप्रतिसन्धान जन्यत्वस्यानुगतत्वादिति गुरवः । तन्न । लाघवेन कृतिसाध्येष्टसाधनताज्ञानस्यैव चिकीर्षाद्वारा प्रयत्नजनकत्वात् । न च नित्ये इष्टसाधनत्वाभावादप्रवृत्तिप्रसङ्गस्तत्रापि प्रत्यवायपरिहारस्य पापक्षयस्य च फलत्वकल्पनात् । तस्मात्कृतिसाध्येष्टसाधनत्वमेव लिङाद्यर्थः । ननु " ज्योतिष्टोमेन स्वर्गकामो यजेत” इत्यत्र लिडा स्वर्गसाधनकार्य प्रतीयते । यागस्याशुविनाशिनः कालान्तरभावि स्वर्ग- साधनत्वायोगात्तद्योग्यं स्थायिकार्यमपूर्वमेव टिडाद्यर्थः ॥ कार्य कृति - साध्यं । कृतेः सविषयत्वात् । विषयाकाङ्क्षायां यागो विपयत्वेना- न्वेति । कस्य कार्यमिति नियोज्याकाङ्क्षायां स्वर्गकामपदं नियोज्यपर- तयान्वेति । कार्यत्रोद्धा नियोज्यः । तेन ज्योतिष्टोमनामकयागविष-

/ यकं स्वर्गकामस्य कार्यमिति वाक्यार्थः सम्पद्यते । वैदिकलित्वात " यावज्जीवमग्निहोत्रं जुहुयात् " इति नित्यवाक्येऽप्यपूर्वमेव वाच्यं

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तर्कसङ्ग्रहः

कल्प्यते । “ आरोग्यकामो भैपजगनं कुर्यात् " इत्यादी लौकिक- लिङः क्रियाकार्ये लक्षणेति चेन्न । यागस्याप्ययोग्यतानिश्चयाभावेन साधनतया प्रतीत्यनन्तरं तन्निर्वाहार्थमवान्तरख्यापारतया अपूर्वकल्प- नात् । कीर्तनादिनाऽनाशश्रुतेर्न यागध्वंसो व्यापारः । लोकव्युत्पत्ति- बलात्क्रियायामेव कृतिसाध्येष्टसाधनत्वं लिडा बोध्यत इति लिङ्गत्वेन रूपेण विध्यर्थत्वम् । आख्यातत्वेन प्रयत्नार्थकत्वम् । पचति पाकं करोतीति विवरणदर्शनात् किं करोतीति प्रश्न पचतीत्युत्तराच्चाख्या- तस्य प्रयत्नार्थकत्वनिश्चयात् । रथो गच्छतीत्यादावनुकूलव्यापारो लक्षणा " देवदत्तः पचति तण्डुलान्देवदत्तेन पच्यते तण्डुलः” इत्यत्र कर्तृकर्मणोर्नाख्यातार्थत्वम् किन्तु तद्गतैकत्वादीनामेव । तयोराक्षपादेव लाभः । प्रजयतीत्यादौ धातोरेव प्रकर्षे शक्तिः । उपसर्गाणां द्योत- कत्वमेव । न तत्र शक्तिरस्ति ॥

पदार्थज्ञानस्य परमं प्रयोजनं मोक्षः । तथाहि ।

the goal

" आत्मावाsरे

द्रष्टव्यः श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यो निदिध्यासितव्यः " इति of तक श्रुत्या श्रवणादीनामात्मसाक्षात्कार हेतुत्वबोधनात् । श्रुत्या देहादिविलक्षणात्मज्ञाने सत्यप्य सम्भावनाऽनिवृत्ते युक्त्यनुसन्धा- नरूपमननसाध्यत्वात् मननोपयोगिपदार्थनिरूपणद्वारा शास्त्रस्यापि मोक्षोपयोगः । तदनन्तरं श्रुत्युपदिष्टयोगविधिना निदिध्यासने कृते तदनन्तरं देहादिविलक्षणात्मसाक्षात्कारे सति देहादावहमभिमान - रूपमिथ्याज्ञाननाशे सति दोषाभावात्प्रवृत्त्यभावे धर्माधर्मयेोरभावा- जन्माभावे पूर्वधर्माधर्मयोरनुभवेन माशे चरमदुःखध्वं सलक्षणो मोक्षो जायते । ज्ञानमेव मोक्षसाधनं मिथ्याज्ञान निवृत्तेज्ञानमात्र-

[[४९]]

CC

तर्कसङ्ग्रहः

साध्यत्वात् " तमेव विदित्वातिमृत्युमेति नान्यः पन्था विद्यतेऽय- नाय " इति साधनान्तरनिषेधाच्च । ननु " तत्प्राप्तिहेतुर्विज्ञानं कर्म चोक्तं महामुने ” इति कर्मणोऽपि मोक्षसाधनत्वस्मरणाज्ज्ञानकर्मणोः समुच्चय इति चेन्न । नित्यनैमित्तिकैरेव कुर्वाणो दुरितक्षयम् । ज्ञानं च विमलीकुर्वन्नभ्यासेन च पाचयेत् । अभ्यासात्पक विज्ञानं कैवल्यं लभते नरः " इत्यादिना कर्मणो ज्ञानसाधनत्वप्रतिपादनात् । ज्ञानद्वारे कर्म मोक्षसाधनं न साक्षात् । तस्मात्पदार्थज्ञानस्य मोक्षः परमं प्रयोजनमिति सर्वं रमणीयम् ॥

इति श्रीमद्वैतविद्याचार्य - श्रीमद्राघव सोमयाजिकुलावतंस - श्रीमत्ति- रुमलाचार्यवर्यस्य सूनुनाऽनम्भट्टेन कृता स्वकृततर्कसङ्ग्रहस्य दीपिका सम्पूर्णा ॥

काणादन्यायमतयोर्बालव्युत्पत्तिसिद्धये ।

अनम्भट्टेन विदुषा रचितस्तर्कसङ्ग्रहः ॥

इति श्रीमहामहोपाध्यायानम्भट्टविरचितः स्वकृतदीपिकया समे- तस्तर्कसङ्ग्रहः समाप्तः ॥

TRANSLATION

AND

NOTES.

Tr.- Having placed the Lord of the Universe in heart and having saluted the spiritual preceptor a compendium of Categories is being composed for the easy understanding of youngsters.

The author enters upon a discussion as regards the propriety of a ¤, in his, which is a running commentary on the . Therein he establishes that it has been an invariable practice with the 2 or those who admit the ultimate authority of the Vedas ( वेदप्रामाण्याभ्युपगन्तृs) to begin their works with a which ensures their completion without anything untoward coming in the way (निर्विघ्नपरिसमाप्त्यर्थ. )

विश्वेश is शिद, the साम्बमूर्ति of the दीपिका. Cp. अक्षपादमते [ नैयायिकमते ] देवः सृष्टिसंहारकृच्छिषः – षड्दर्शनसमुच्चयः

विधाय गुरुवन्दनम्

Cp.

बालानाम्

यस्य देवे परा भक्तिर्यथा देवे तथा गुरौ तस्यैते कथिता हाथीः प्रकाशन्ते महात्मनः॥

-श्वे साश्वतर 6. 23

Cp. शिशुहिता टीst in the दीपिका. अनम्भट्ट explains बाल as प्रहृणधारणपटुर्बलः न तु स्तनन्धयः ie a youngster suffici- ently advanced in age to be able to grasp and grip things taught, and not a suckling who is not capable of ग्रहण much less धारण.

•

(1)

Notes-

[ Sect. I

The explanation by another commentator अधीतव्याकरण काव्यकोशत्वे सति अनधीतन्यायशास्त्रत्वं बालत्वम् though unwarranted in view of the interpretation of the

is yet suggestive.

सुखबोधः

Because other treatises on & or Logic, whether by their extent or subtlety, become incomprehensible.

Cp. तेषां ( बहूनां प्रन्धानां ) अतिविस्तृतत्वाद्बालानां बोधो न जायते

-दीपिका.

’s expectations have turned true and his has always been a stepping-stone to those who want to command a knowledge of. The popularity of the treatise in its field is evinced by the number of commentaries thereon. The treat- ise is sufficiently simple and does not share the cumbrous style of other works.

तर्कसङ्ग्रह

}

तर्क is here used as a synonym for q category ’ ( सन्ते प्रतिपाद्यन्त इति तर्का : द्रव्यादिपदार्थाः ) So तर्कसङ्ग्रह means पदार्थसङ्ग्रह, a compendium ( सङ्ग्रह : सङ्क्षेपेण oui ) of the categorics. The word has been used in the same sense in the nomenclature of some other treatises on Sanskrit Logic, like ma, agal. The primary significance of the word તાજીમુયો.

which means’ Reasoning’ must have been an incentive to its constant use in naming treatises on Sanskrit Logic, because Reasoning’ forms the

very back–bone of Logic.

(2)Sect. 2]

[[२]]

पदार्थ s

Notes-

Tr.-Seven are the nameable things viz. Substance, (2) Quality (3) Action (4) Generality (5) Parti- cularity (6) Intimate Relation and (7) Negation.

quâ is a namcable thing.

Why are seven

पदार्थ

The as state the 4 of aŝaim to be the cessation of :a consequent upɔn the removal of fax or erroneous know- ledge of things in the Universe. It follows, therefore, that for gama we must possess तत्त्वज्ञान of things in the Universe.

admitted.

But how are we to get the 1 of the infinite things in the Universe? With the limitations imposed upon humanity it is impossible for man to rightly comprehened things individually. Is it then impossible to get rid of fara? Are we destined to rot in the perpetual thraldom of ignorance?

It is exactly in overcoming this difficulty that science is most helpful. By analysis and synthesis science makes the infinite finite. Cows may be infinite. But do I not correctly picture to myself essentially the cows that gum lifted in the past, from fauz’s cowpens? Can I not project my imagination in future and visualise essentially the cows that are yet to appear in the world? So the individually infinite cows cease to be beyond the grasp

of my finite knowledge. What has helped me is analysis and synthesis, or, in other words, classification.

Any science worth the name forges or at least attempts to forge some instrument based on classi-

(3)

Note:

[ Sect. 2

fication to overcome this infinitude of Universe. When आरुणि, in the छान्दोग्य, asks his son श्वेतकेतु,

उत समादेशमप्राक्ष्यः येनाश्रुतं श्रुतं भवति अमतं मतं……………

he precisely wants the latter to grasp a prin- ciple that would enable him to overcome infinity: the principle in the instance being reality of causes is based on a classification of causes and effects.

The tendency to classify, on the part of the as, the infinite things in the world, resulted in the assumption of the sevens. Take anything in the world and it must needs be capable of being subsumed under some one of the seven rás. To put it otherwise, the seven qs exhaust between them the whole universe. Eventually, if the seven чs are known the whole universe is known and मिथ्याज्ञान is radically removed..

A very close parallel to the qs of the fas is to be found in the ten Categories of Aristotle a Greek thinker ( 384–322 B. C. ).

पदार्थ

The etymological meaning of the word ef

is a thing that is nameable.’

पद्यते गम्यते अनेनेति पदे-a word.

ऋच्छन्ति इन्द्रियाणि यं सः अर्थः-an object ( to

which senses have access)

So means ‘an object of sense with a name. ’ ( ¶754 μá: )

As every object in the world is nameable designates the most comprehensive class of things to which each and every object in the world belongs.

(4)

Sect. 2]

Notes-

The following table will explain the develop- ment of the theory of पदार्थs.

पदार्थ s

भाव

अभाव

[[5]]

The substrata of

Attributes

attributes ( द्रव्य )

[[1]]

non-place-changing

Abiding in many objects ( सामान्य )

[[2]]

place-changing

4 ( कर्म )

Abiding in individual objects.

3 गुण.

विशेष and समवाय have been admitted by the वैशेषिकs to account for their age and theory of permanent connexion respectively, for which see below.

The number of पदार्थs:-

It is worth noting that, the founder or

rather the systematizer of the only six पदार्थs omitting अभाव ! Cent. A. D.) who in other final shape to the अभाव in the list. 2 माधव

माधव in his हरिभद्र in his षड्दर्शन समुच्चय

1 वै.

वै. सूत्रs I. 1. 4.

school mentions Even प्रशस्तपाद, ( 5th respects, gives the tenets does not include in his सर्वदर्शनसङ्ग्रह 3 and adhere to the theory of

2 द्रव्यगुणकर्मसामान्यविशेषसमवायानां षण्णां पदानी साधम्यांवैधर्म्य-

भ्यां तत्वज्ञानं निःश्रेयसहेतुः

-पदार्थधमसङ्ग्रह.

3 द्रव्यगुणकर्मसामान्यविशेषसमवाया इति षडेव ते पदार्था इत्युद्देशः ।

4 द्रव्यं गुणस्तथा कर्म सामान्यं च चतुर्थकम् ।

विशेषसमवायौ हि तत्त्वषट्कं हि तन्मते ॥

–60

(5)

–Notes

six पदार्थs.

पदार्थs. The

[Seet. 3

admission of अभाव as a

q is due to the scholastic ingenuity of the पदार्थ later commentators. उदयन ( किरणावली ) and later शिवादित्य ( सप्तपदार्थी ) admit

अभाव as a category. It school of the ais as a separate 4. But finally

might be noted that the did not admit

the number of the 4s is fixed at 7.

The वैशेषिकs refuse to admit सादृश्य, सङ्ख्या, शक्ति, and

as independent as as some systematists like the яms do. The us say that they can be brought under some of the 7 s. Thus can be brought under समवायसम्बन्ध, सङ्ख्या is a गुण, शक्ति is the स्वरूप of a thing, ज्ञातता is merely संयोग of the ज्ञान with the ज्ञेय.

Some say that गौतम has enumerated sixteen पदार्थs. But to call the 16 topics of discussion enumerated by गोतम as पदार्थ is a misnomer. गौतम never implies that the 16 heads exhaust the things in the universe and as this is the basic conception of 4, the sixteen heads of

us. As wants to induce his students to

a dialectician

can never be styled as

closely study the 16 heads which are so useful in dialectics. A is metaphysical and not dialecti- cal. The चित् and अचित् of the वेदान्तिन्s or the प्रकृति and ges of the airs may be as, in their way; but the जल्प, वितण्डा or छत्र of गौतम can hardly be the classes meant to subsume the things in the world.

३ द्रव्यs

Tr.-Then the substances are nine only; earth, water, light, air, ether, time, space, self and mind.

(6)

Sect. 3]

Having enumerated the 7

Notes-

s ang proceeds to enumerate the sub-varieties of the first 4 viz. द्रव्य. In the case of as the number has not fluctuated, at least so far as the as are concerned, since the time of कणाद गौतम does admit these द्रव्यs, though not so systematically or explicitly as 2 द्रव्य is a पदार्थ in which qualities or actions can abide.

Is अन्धकार a द्रव्य ?

The is of the school of say that अन्धकार is द्रव्य in addition to the nine stated.

They argue that

the substratum of 9 and

is a

because it is

1, and nothing but a

can be, as a rule, the substratum of these. When we say नीलं तमः

we attribute नीलगुण to तमस् ; when we enter a dark room with a lamp and when we find तमस् receding we say तमचलति thus ascribing क्रिया to A:.

Thus being an आश्रय of गुण and क्रिया, तमः, say the menîЯtuas, must be a

Then they show how

.

cannot come under

any of the nine s enumerated.

It cannot be

the cool touch,

qual, because it has no touch and smell. Can it be a then? No. It has not white colour and taste that are peculiar to g. It cannot be : because neither has it the hot touch nor the bright white colour peculiar to :

It

1 पृथिव्यापस्तेजो वायुराकाशै कालो दिगात्मा मन इति द्रव्याणि । वै.सू. 1.1.5. 2 पृथिव्यापस्तेजो वायुराकाशमिति भूतानि । न्या. सू. 1-1-13. नात्ममनसोः सन्निकर्षाभावे प्रत्यक्षोत्पत्तिः । न्या सू. 1-2-21. दिग्देशकालाकाशेष्वप्येवं प्रसङ्गः । ibid. 1-2-22.

(7)

-Notes

[ Sect. 3

cannot be ang which has touch but no colour wher- eas : is without touch and possesses blue colour. Lastly, it cannot be either a or काल or दिकू or or : because all of these are without colour.

The ants, therefore, hold : to be an additional द्रव्य.

The तार्किकs refuse to admit तमः as a द्रव्य at all. They say that : is no more than an a of à¤: and hence is to be subsumed under aniq.

The ai

.

based his contention on the presen- ce of गुण and क्रिया in तमस् The तार्किक summarily rejects both as being illusory. It ang were really नाल how is it that we apprehend its so-called नीलरूप even in the absence of light (*)? Because, the rule is that for perceiving a thing with colour light is necessary. So the fl in darkness is an illusion. Similarly the attribution of a is erron- eous. When we see darkness moving with the appearance of a lamp the movement really belongs to the lamp and not to the darkness. So that ŋŋ: is not a but mere of : and it has been so recognised by the

is who, with slight modification, say it

a 2

¤,

author of the

It might be added fier, a न्यायकन्दली a gloss on प्रशस्तपाद’s भाष्य something positive which he includes under $9,3

1 दीपा पसरणक्रियाया एव तत्र भानात् ।

regards तमः as

-न्यायबोधिनी.

2 तस्माद्वपविशेषोऽयं अत्यन्तं तेजोऽभावे सति सर्वतः समारोपितस्तम इति

प्रतीयते । आरोपितं नीलरूपं तमः इति कन्दलीकारमतम् । दिनकरी. 3 Cp the अनुमान, तमो द्रव्यं रूपवत्त्वात् ( क्रियावत्त्वाच ) ।

– दिनकरी on सिद्धान्तमुक्तावली.

(8)

Sect. 4]

Notes-

Are gold and similar bright metals to be regarded as an additional substance? The s hold them to be : and nothing else. See below under:

The nine s can be divided into two broad divisions, corporeal, those that are capable of action and a or y all–pervading, which are not capable of action.

मूर्त

द्रव्य

fay

१ पृथ्वी २ अप् ३ तेजस् ४ वायु ५ मनस् १ आकाश काल ३दिकू ४ आत्मन्

or

द्रव्य

भूतद्रव्यs

Which singly or jointly are the material causes

of the products in the world

१ पृथ्वी २ अप् ३ तेजस् ४ वायु ५ आकाश

The word

अभूतद्रव्यs

Which are not the material causes of any products in the world.

१काल, २ दिक्, ३ आत्मन्४ मनस्

is explained as a which is an

आश्रय for गुणs and कियाs like a tree.

४ गुण‍

Tr.-Qualities are twenty-four; colour, taste, odour, touch, number, dimension, individuality or separateness, conjunction, disjunction, remoteness, nearness, gravity, fluidity, viscidity, sound, knowledge, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, effort, merit, demerit, and impression.

and can be translated better by ‘remote- ness’ and ’nearness’ than by ‘priority’ and ‘posteri- ority’ because they are both temporal and spatial. gor is that that abides in gas without changing their locations.

(9)

-Notes

[ Sect. 4

It is noteworthy that mentions only seventeen गुणs omitting to include in his list गुरुत्व, द्रवत्व, स्नेह, संस्कार, धर्म, अधर्म and शब्द. 1 In प्रशस्तपाद, for the first time, we find the number raised to twenty- four 2 Neither गौतम in his न्यायसूत्रs nor वात्स्यायन in his भाष्य explicitly or impliedly notes the qualitics- palpably because they are out of the range of dialectics.

The

repudiates the admission by some (?) of लघुत्व, कठिनत्व, मृदुत्व - the commentator नृसिंह adds वक्रत्व–as additional qualities by sh wing how लघुत्व is mere गुरुत्वाभाव, It must be admitted that लघुत्व or lightness is not mere negation, लघुत्व and गुरुत्व being different degrees of heaviness—and how site and मृदुत्त्व are no more than अवयवसंयोगविशेष वक्रत्व,

वक्रत्व, नृसिंह says, is also अवयवसंयोगविशेष.

Of the twenty-four qualities some belong to the मूर्तद्रव्यs exclusively, some to अमूर्त or विभुद्रव्यs exclusively, while others belong to both.

Thus we get the following scheme:

[[3]]

1 रूपरसगन्धस्पर्शी : सङ्ख्या परिमाणानि पृथक्त्वं संयोगविभागों परत्वापरत्वे बुद्धयः सुखदुःखे इच्छाद्वेषी प्रयत्नाथ गुणाः ।

[[4]]

वै. सू. 1 1.6. 2 चशब्दसमुचिताथ गुरुत्वद्रवत्वस्नेहसंस्कारादृष्ट ( धर्म & अधर्म ) शब्दाः सप्तैवेत्येवं चतुर्विंशतिगुणाः ।

• प्र. भा.

Cp again एते गुणाश्चतुर्विंशतिसख्याकाः कणादेन कण्टतश्चशब्देन दर्शिताः । - मुक्तावली

3 रूपं रसः स्पर्शगन्धौ परत्वमपरत्वकम् ।

द्रवत्वं स्नेहवेगाश्च मता मूर्तगुणा अमी ॥ (वेगेन स्थितिस्थापकोऽप्युपलक्षणीयः) धर्माधम भावना व शब्दा बुध्यादयोऽपि व

एतेऽमूर्तगुणाः सर्वे विद्वद्भिः परिकीर्तिताः ॥

सङ्ख्यादयो विभागान्ता उभयेषां गुणा मताः ॥ सि. मुक्तावली

( 10 )

Sect. 4 ]

Notes–

गुणs

मूर्तगुणs.

अमूर्तगुणs

मूर्तामूर्तगुणs

1 रूप

7 गुरुत्व

2 रस

8 द्रवत्व

1 बुद्धि 6

प्रयत्न

1 पृथक्त्व

2 सुख 7

धर्म

2 संयोग

3 गन्ध 9 स्नेह

3 दुःख 8

अधर्म

3 विभाग

4 परत्व 10 वेग ( संस्कार ) 5 अपरत्व 11 स्थितिस्थापक (संस्कार) 6 स्पर्श

4 इच्छा 9 भावना (संस्कार) 4 सङ्ख्या

5 द्वेष

10 शब्द

5 परिमाण

Again, some of the qualities can abide in individuals while others can abide in combina- tions of them. The former are called fans, the

latter सामान्य गुणs.

विशेषगुण.

गुणs

सामान्यगुण.

11 रस

4 इच्छा 12 गन्ध

5 द्वेष

13 स्पर्श

1 बुद्धि 9 भावना 2 सुख 10 रूप

3 दुःख

1 सङ्ख्या 9 गुरुत्व 2 परिमाण 10 वेग

3 पृथक्त्व 4 संयोग

5 विभाग

6 प्रयत्न

14 स्नेह

6 परत्व

7 धर्म 15 सांसिद्धिक द्रवत्व i. c.

7 अपरत्व

8 अधर्म

16 शब्द

( natural fuidity)

8 नैमित्तिकद्रवत्व (artificial fluidity)

s represents a very

The enumeration of the bold step on the part of the ms to enlist in the most comprehensive way all possible qualities. To say that the list is final is arbitrary when sciences are becoming more accurate and new properties are being discovered. But considering the times

(11)

-Notes

[ Sect. 5

when the gas were enlisted certainly it was a very comprehensive list of qualities.

५ कर्मन्

Tr.-Actions

are five, throwing upwards, dropping downwards, contraction, expansion and motion in general.

s while abiding in their substrata bring about a change in their locations.

From the time of कणाद the number of कर्मन्

has remained steady.

¤, of course, has no place for their discussion in his s. Motion may be vertically either upwards ( उत्क्षेपण ) or downwards ( अपक्षेपण ), and horizontally towards oneself ( 3⁄45*7 ) or farther from oneself (яaka). All action that cannot come under either of these is relegated to the broad class of п. The very presence of the head of ma shows that the systematizers could not catch hold of some sound principle of division to exhaust all cases of action.

गुण and कर्मः–

Ts are stationary; s transitory. What is meant is that s while abiding in their substrata do not make them change their locations while s when abiding in objects bring about the change of location.

as

The lotus by possessing the y of he does not change its place. But the ball when it possesses does change its place, say, from the hand

upwards.

In view of this difference we can hardly

(12)Sect. 6]

Notes-

accept the suggestion of some1 that ’they are, as it were, two different phases of the same phenomenon. गुण in the process of change is action while कर्मन् when made fixed and permanent becomes a “.’ It is not permanence or otherwise that distingiushes the two. For do we not see the lotus fading and the chameleon changing its colour and do we not, in these cases, persist in calling their ass, from the start to the finish? No ft will ever say that the motion of earth is its . For he is very positive in his distinction between गुण and कर्मन् कर्मन् presupposes change of location; does not.

६ सामान्य.

Tr-Generality is of two kinds, higher and lower.

is constituted by the common characteristic which enables us to group several individuals, in which it abides in common, as belonging to one class. Thus is the a forming the bovine

class; or existence is another persists in all existing things.

which

is materially s. While the

[Some2 say: ’s notion of different from that of the later former holds it to be a subjective characteristic, the latter regard it as objective. According to, the same characteristic may be सामान्य or विशेष according to the way in which we view it. If we look upon गोत्व as something persisting in many cows, it is 17; if, on the other hand, were viewed as distinguis-

1 तर्कसङ्ग्रह by Athalye and Bodas.

[[2]]

**

and Keith’s Atomism pp. 192–193.

( 13 )

-Notes

[ Sect. 6

hing a cow from a horse, say, it becomes विशेष. According to the later तार्किक, सामान्य always remains a सामान्य, because it is an objective quality running through the members of a class, not changing with our view point.

This view in based on an inaccurate interp- retation of the सूत्र, सामान्यं विशेष इति बुध्यपेक्षम् कणाद wants to make a distinction between two kinds of 8191748 and two kinds of विशेषs.

There are three सामन्यs which can be विशेषs and vice versa vis. द्रव्यत्व; गुणत्व, कर्मत्व. [ इत्यत्वं गुणत्वं कर्मवञ्च सामान्यानि विशेषाश्च’ )

There is one 91917 viz. 88 which can never be विशेष (भावोऽनुवृत्तेरेव हेतुत्वात् सामान्यमेव )

There are some विशेषs ( अन्य विशेषs ) residing in eternal things which can never be सामान्यs ( अन्यत्रान्त्येभ्योः विशेषेभ्यः )

.

One might naturally ask how is it that some सामान्यs and विशेषs can be विशेषs and सामान्यs respectively, while others cannot. A reply to the question is given in the words बुध्यपेक्षम् It depends, says कणाद, upon their giving अनुवृत्तबुद्धि (cognition of persistence ) and व्यावृत्तबुद्धि. (cognition of exclusion ) द्रव्यत्व, for exa- mple, can give both the notions. cannot give व्यावृत्तबुद्धि because there is nothing that cannot come under सत्त’. The नित्यद्रव्यवृत्ति विशेष cannot give अनुवृतबुद्धि. By their very nature they are distinct. प्रशस्तपाद’ does not at all distort the sense of the as Keith wants

1 कणादs वैशेषिक सूत्र १ २.३. 2 वै सू.१.२.५.

3 वै. सू.

१. २. ४. 4 वै. सू. १.२.६. 5 सामान्य द्विविधं परमपरं चानुवृत्ति-

प्रत्ययकारणम् ।….तश्च व्यावृत्तेरपि हेतुत्वात् सामान्यं सद्विशेषाख्यामपि लभते ।

-प्र. भा. 6 Atomism-p. 193.

(14)

Sect. 6 ]

Notes-

us to believe. Even

in his 3

same view. Thus, beyond doubt, as much objective as that of any later

holds the

’s ama is

. ]

सामान्य is divided into two divisions, पर सामान्य, the higher generality and अपरसामान्य, the lower generality. Others, like fuafite (emad), give three divisions पर, अपर and परापर.

पर and अपरसामान्यः- If we consider the सामान्यs पृथिवीस ( व्यापक ), and घटत्व, (घट manufactured from पृथिवी ) पृथिवीत्व is परसामान्य being the more comprehensive of the two, घटत्व the अपरसामान्य, being less compreh- ensive ( व्याप्य ). But पृथिवत्वि becomes an अपर सामान्य with regard to which is a wider class. Thus according to this division, परत्व or अपरत्व is only relative, determined by the more or less compreh- ensive nature of one class in relation to the other.

पर, अपर, परापर or व्यापक, व्याप्य, व्यापकव्याप्य सामान्यः- According to this division at is the 17 and is always so, no other more comprehensive class being found. अपरसामान्य belongs to that class, which is the least comprehensive and cannot have any other sub-class. Thus घटत्व is अपरसामान्य, and is always so because no class less comprehensive than it is found. All classes between these two extremes are , for they can be relatively and अपर. Thus पृथिवीत्व is पर with regard to घटत्व but अपर with regard to . Thus according to this division पर, अपर and परापर are absolutely so and not relatively. $ अनुवृत्तयुद्धिः सामान्यस्य (लक्षणं) व्यावृतबुद्धिर्विशेषस्य । निस्यद्रव्यवृत्तयोs- नन्ता विशेषाः । ते खल्वत्यन्तं व्यावृत्तिहेतुत्वाद्विशेषा एव । उपस्कार on वै. सू

१. २.३.

(15)

-Notes

[ Sect. 6

What is a will always be so, and similar is the case with regard to अपरसामान्य and परापर सामान्य.

Which of the two divisions is better? Though it is difficult to answer the question offhand, it will be found, on close scrutiny, that the first division is more scientific than the second. Because, and

are relative terms and presuppose comparison between two. If I describe a thing as the hearer would not be satisfied until I state the thing which it is This relative terms is retained in the first sacrificed in the second.

with regard to

nature of the two

division while it is

When I say सत्ता is परसामान्य naturally one would like to know the

am with regard to which it is, and his expectancy will be satisfied . when both परसामान्य and अपरसामान्य are stated. The who adheres to the first division will always whenever he calls one or

state the other 3. This relative aspect of second division. When a to परसामान्य, he refers to सत्ता; necessary to State

and is lost in the ¤ of this school refers he does not think it ; and when he refers to

अपरसामान्य, he refers to घटत्व etc. and thinks it needless to refer to the . Again, the second school does surreptitiously admit the principle of relativity in its variety of qu i, e. q with regard to one, with regard to another. Then why not admit the principle wholesale?

પર

It should be noted that सामान्य and जाति are used almost synonymously.

सामान्य resides in द्रव्य, गुण and कर्मन्, but not in any other category. The reasons that come in the any other category. The

(16)

Sect. 6]

Notes-

way of an assumption of generality, have beer given by उदयनाचार्य in his किरणावली, in the stanza

akhnged agùswazikalk: 1

रूपहानिरसम्बन्धो जातिबाधक सद्ग्रहः ॥

H

if (1) the

(2) the thing

There cannot be any a or object is one only like 3, mentioned with different names are identical e. g घटन्व cunot be a जाति different from कलशत्व; or बुद्धि from ज्ञनाव, घट being the same as कलश, बुद्धि the same as (3) there results cross-division; thus a anc मूर्तत्व cannot form जाति for आकाश is a भूतद्रव्य but stil not ; (4) there is want of finality (QENI अनवस्था Accordingly there cannot be a जाति, जातित्व. For i we once admit a n of that will again have another fa and so on ad infinitum; (5) there is loss of the very nature of a thing. Thus there cinnot be a and of faûts because fans, by ther very nature, are mutually distinct while a presupposes similarity; (6) there is want of con nexion. Thus there cannot be a sit like a because समवायत्व being जाति with regard to समवाय wil reside in the latter by another सनवाय; and this समवा will require the help of a third

T

to resid in its substratum and so on ad infinitum. avoid this fault we have to deny any connexion between समवाय and समवायत्त्र; hence no जाति lik समवायत्व. Nor can there be any like HTË because अभावत्व will have to reside in अभाव by समवाय But being negative cannot enter into an connection with anything positive Thus

1 अभावत्वादिजात्यभ्युपगमे वा वाधकमेतत् ।

—-शङ्कर’s उपस्कार on वै. सू. 1. - 2-3

(17)

i

-Notes

[ Sect. 7

in connection with a is impossible. Thus the last three circumstances have been introduced to anticipate जातिs of सामान्य,

is

विशेष, समवाय and अभाव. vitiated by any of these

सखण्ड सामान्य or उपाधि to be

Whatever circumstances is called

distinguished from अखण्ड सामान्य or जाति proper which is not vitiated by either of the circumstances.

It should be seen that of the six circumstances that of is the most important. The first two are too obvious and none would be inclined to formulate a when they are present. The last three merely explain the technical assumption of the तार्किकs that there cannot be जातिs of सामान्य, विशेष, समवाय and अभाव.

It is the third, a, which is at the basis of many faulty classifications and cross-divisions which one must be very careful in avoiding. What is meant by cross-division will be clear from the following instance.

then in that

If कृष्णत्व were considered a जाति will be included all things anima- te and inanimate that are black and from that and will be excluded all things that do not happen to be black. Thus black men may get into one class with black sheep and black cows. This classifica- tion based on cross–division is most unreasona- ble because it sets at naught the established class. which is more reasonable viz. humanity etc.

७ विशेष‍

Tr.–Whereas (a) the particularities are nothing

short of (54) infinite.

As distinguish eternal objects like gs,

etc.

į

(18)

Sect. 7]

Noles-

[ As said in the section on सामान्य, कणाद refers to two kinds of विशेषs, अन्त्य and those that are not अन्य. When he definitely states that these as can never be a he refers to their being mutually distinct

Again, he has definitely assigned them a place in the list of is. He has thus given this category as much prominence as सामान्य अन्यत्रान्त्येभ्यो

e: is not merely incidental as is seen from the interpretation we put upon the in the previous section. Thus there is hardly any evidence to support the view of those2 who say that does not give much prominence to this category. The invention of the category of a is a sequel to that of सामान्य. If there are some qualities in common

there must be others that are uncommon. ]

gives the propriety of this category in nutshell in the following words: घटादीनां ध्यणुकपर्यन्तानां तत्तदवयवभेदालरस्परं भेदः परमाणूनां परस्परं भेदको विशेष एव स तु स्वत एव व्यावृत्तस्तेन तत्र विशेषान्तरापेक्षा नास्ति ।

What is meant is this:-whenever we disting- uish between substances we do so on the

The signi- ficance of the theory.

basis of their constituent parts. When is distinguished from 42, it is because the con- stituent parts of the one are different from those of the other. This leads to the rinciple - भेदादवयविभेदः.

a-

But, as we know, no far is constituted of parts. The अणुs of the elements पृथ्वी, अप, तेज, वायु,

1 अन्यत्रान्नस्येभ्यो विशेषेभ्यः

2 ming by Athalye & Bodas p. 94-95; Keith inplies the same-

thing in his Atomism p. 195.

(19)

-Notes

[ Sect. 7

for instance, do not consist of parts. The fas viz आकाश, काल, दिक् and आत्मा do not consist of parts. The minds being atomic also do not consist of parts. How, then, are we to distinguish between one atom and another or one and another, in other words, how are we to distinguish between

नित्यद्रव्यs ?

It is to solve this difficulty that the category of a has been invented by the ass. They say that eternal substances are distinguished one from the other by the fans abiding in them. Each eternal substance has one which is distinct

from other विशेषs.

It should be clearly seen that every atom of geal, xq, àt: aig, will have one 7 in it. Therefore, we can distinguish not only an atom of one substance from that of another, say, qi, but also between two atoms of the same substance. Again, each of the four substances आकाश, काल, दिकू, आत्मन् has cne fa distinguishing it from all others.

Every mind again has one fan distinguishing it from all other minds as also from all other substances.

We can thus distinguish between eternal things, no doubt. But what is it that distinguishes one far from another? If you admit a second faời as residing in the first to ride over the difficulty the fault of will arise. So the replies by saying that the s perform a double function. First, they distinguish the eternal objects in which they abide and, secondly, they distinguish them- selves mutually ( स्वतो व्यावर्तर्क ).

( 20 )

Sect. 8]

Notes-

It may be added that the theory of farms is a lame theory. If you admit that the can also distinguish itself from others why not admit straightway that the by its very nature can distinguish itself from another? The one alternative is as much hypothetical as the other, while the second has the advantage of being free from a or being complex. That is why the later affas abstained from subscribing to this theory of f1.

८ समवाय.

Tr.-Intimate Relation is one only

समवाय is intimate relation or inherence ( सम् + अव- +34 ✓ 【 to go2) which subsists between things of which one

cannot exist in the absence of the Thus there is समवाय between घट and कपालs; cannot exist without the s. There is समवाय similarly between the नीलरूप and उत्पल because नीलरूप in the case cannot exist apart from उत्पल.

other. for the

The is supposed to abide between five pairs. [१] अवयव - श्रवयविन् [२] गुण-गुणिन् [३] क्रिया- क्रिया- वान [४] जाति व्यक्ति [५] विशेष - नित्यद्रव्य.

To illustrate these pairs in order, there is समवाय between [१] कपाल–घट, [२] नोलरूप – उत्पल, [३] उत्च-

1 नव्यनैयायिकाः, भट्ट कुमारिलः, प्राभाकराः, मध्वमतानुयायि- वेदान्तिनश्च एतादृशं विशेषं पदार्थे नाङ्गोचक्रुः । यथैव विशे- पाणां स्ववृत्तिश्व में विना व्यावृत्तत्वं तथैव नित्यद्रव्याणामपि ।

• न्यायकोश.

2 The forms समवेत, समवेयात् समवैति point to this etymology.

( 21 )

-Notes

[ Sect. 8

पण - उत्क्षिप्तकन्दुक, [४] गोत्व- बलीवर्द, [५] विशेष पार्थिव परमाणु.

The five pairs, agala i. e. which are not proved to have been gag means (1) To separate or (2) to join. So ya means- (1) separated or (2) joined. Whatever are not known to have been separated are agaida according to the first derivation. The same sense is implied by the second derivation according to which means which are not proved to have been joined and which hence were never separated because joining presupposes separation. So, either way, a means proved as inseparable

• etc. are described as

[ Looking to the five pairs we can make a Genesis of plausible conjecture as regards the genesis समवाय. of the theory of समवाय. The categories of द्रव्य, गुण, कर्म, सामान्य and विशेष were thousht out. The next question was the connection of the most important of these vis. with each of the

rest and also with itself.

द्रव्य-द्रव्य= अवयवावयविनी

;>

"”

"

गुण = गुणगुणिनौ

• कर्म= क्रियाक्रियावन्तौ

-सामान्य=जातिव्यक्ती

विशेषविशेषनित्यद्रव्ये

Though i was already assumed under the gus, it was not serviceable in the present case. While प्रयोग is कर्मजन्य, the connections under consi- deration could not be Я because go and are not capable of being कर्माश्रय, only द्रव्य being so capable. Again, a is impermanent whereas the connection that was needed to explain the prese-

(22)Sect. 81

Nolcs-

nce of ctc. in must be such as possessed pormancace–as much permanence as the connect- ed things enjoyed, because the pairs are insepa- rably connected. The case of 47 and quia was similar and no 4 could be postulated because the connection was relatively permanent. None cin separate the blue colour from the lotus nor the Jar from the P tsherds. So the category of agai was invented by the datas’.

a does not specifically make a list of the five pairs. But the suggestion, that the definition that it is a connection between things that cannot exist separately begins with 90an, made by some? is untenable. For a does refer to egafula in two which collectively give us three of the five pairs, 225 अवयवावयार्थनौ, गुणगुणिनौ and क्रियाक्रियावन्तौ प्रशस्तपाद might have been at best responsible for the extension of sigaffa connection to जाति व्यकि and विशेष- नित्यद्रव्य.

[[3]]

a

In view of the above genesis, the suggestion by some that has been admitted by the to account for the duality of cause and effect appears inaccurate. सनवाय Was not admitted exclusively for this purpose. It was admitted to account for the relatively permanent rÎHa between the five pairs which could not be accoun-

1 तत्र प्रमाणं तु गुणकियादिविशिष्टबुद्धिर्विशेषणविशेष्यसम्बन्ध-

विषया fana faaegîtongret gaa gîa fârâegikaika.

विशिष्टबुद्धिलाद्दण्डी पुरुष नुमानम् । एतेन संयोगादिवाधात्समवायसिद्धिः । - मुक्तावली.

2 Atomism pp. 196-197.

3 तसिद्धभावात्कार्यकारणयोः संयोगविभागौ न वियेते । वै. सू. ७-२-१३ 4 Ghate afraid notes p. 6.

( 23 )

-Notes

J

[ Sect. 8

it

ted for on the hypothesis of . And it only incidentally supports the असत्कार्यवाद; because embraces the pair of अवयव अवयविन, अवयव being the cause, अवयविन् the effect. If समवाय were admitted for the sake of असत्कार्यवाद, why is it postulated to abide between विशेष—नित्यद्रव्य and जाति–व्यक्ति which are not related as cause and effect? When E defines समवाय as इहेदमिति यतः कार्यकारणयोः स समवायः, ( 7.2 - 29 ) 1 he enly touches on one aspect of समवाय to illustrate आश्रयाश्रयिभाव ( इहेदमिति ) of समवाय, as is clear from his assumption of agafa in the case

अयुतसिद्धि of the three pairs in the सूत्रs quoted above. If समवाय were intended for असत्कार्यवाद, its assumption was unnecessary for गुण-गुणिन्, क्रिया- क्रियावत which are कार्य-कारण only as a

When शङ्कराचार्य matter of theory. repudiates the doctrine he repudiates it not so much because it supports

as beca- use of inherent defects in it. शङ्कराचार्य thinks that the assumption of समवाय over and above संयोग is superfluous. Again, he believes that the assumpt- ion that 4 is one and eternal is too technical and is manipulated to suit the convenience of the system.]

and समवाय

संयोग is कर्मजन्य and hence आनिन्त्य while समवाय is संयोग नित्य. 2 Again संयोग comes under the पदार्थ गुण; समवाय is an altogether independent पदार्थ. संयोग resides in the संयोगिद्रव्यs by समवाय relation ( गुण-गुणिनौ ) while समवाय does not require another समवाय to be present in the समवायिन्

1 CP. शङ्करमित्र’s उपस्कार : – कार्यकारणयोरित्युपलक्षणम् । अकार्यकारण-

मोरित्यपि द्रष्टव्यम् । on 7-2-26.

2 न चासौ संयोगः सम्बधिनामयुत सिद्धत्वात् अन्य तर कर्मादिनिमित्ता -

• प्रशस्तपाद’s भाष्य P. 326.

भवात् ।

( 24 )

Sect. 9]

Notes-

If a second been produced to account for the presence of one, in the ann a third will have to be admitted to account for the presence of the second on the first and so on ad infinitum. To avoid this contingency the तार्किकs have admitted समवाय to be नित्य To prevent ma, they have admitted it to be one. The neo-als and s admitted as to be and many1. When we call a permanent, it should be borne in mind, is relative only, i. e.

were admitted as having

that the permanence lasts only so long as

both the समवायिन्s last. As soon as one समवायिन् is destroyed, the will be also destroyed. Thus

the समवाय between घट and कपाल will last only so long

as the

lasts. As soon as the

समवाय will also disappear.

is destroyed the

The नैयायिकs hold that समवाय is प्रत्यक्षावेषय or obser- ved by direct perception. The s hold that it is a, inferrible only. Because, they argue, if समवाय were admitted to be प्रत्यक्षविषय, it will not comprehend cases of between perceptible and imperceptible things like and, because, one of the two things being imperceptible the connection between them also will be impercepti- ble. at holds the second view2,

९ अभाव.

Tr.-Non-existence is of four kinds: Antecede- nt non-existence, Consequent non-existence, Absolute non-existence and Reciprocal non-existence.

1 समवायो नाना अनित्यथ इति प्राभाकरा नव्याबाहुः न्यायकोश. 2 नीलो घट इति विशिष्टप्रतीतिर्विशेषमविशेष्य सम्बन्धविषय । विधि-

टप्रत्ययत्वाद्दण्डीति प्रत्ययवदिति समवायसिद्धिः । त दी.

( 25 )

-Notes

[ Sect. 9

As we have seen before, a as an independ- ent category was not admitted by, though he recognizes the four s1. कणाद’s attitude seems to be the only reasonable attitude. It is anoma- lous to class, which is essentially negative, side by side with the positive categories. Even प्रशस्तपाद? and later writers of manuals like माधव, हरिभद्र t and 5 (1200-1400. a. d.) are unwilling to admit in the fold of positive categories. Being negative by nature the concept of a distinctive positive characteristic. If characteristic, पदाभाववत् भूतल ought to

has got no had some have been

different from, but we know from experience that they are not different, in both cases the upshot of the whole being mere 43.

The s who are responsible for the ingen- uity of the assumption of the as an independ- ent category hold that to be at is as much a positive attribute (a) of the substratum (m) as any other like and a. The weakness of their argument is made clear by the fact shown above viz. that is in no way different from पटाभाव as नीलरूप is different from शुक्ररूप’ The प्राभाकरs and the as are more logical in their attitude. towards अभाव when say that it is mere अधिकरण, घटाभाव- वभूतल भुतल

amounting to only. Keith traces the germs of the idea of not-being as something know able and existent in the न्यायसूत्रs of गौतम and वात्स्यायन’s

thereon.7

1 वै. सू. ९-१-१, ३, ४, ५.

2-3-4 See quotations on p. 5

5 अर्थाः षट् पदार्थाः । द्रव्यगुणकर्मसामान्यविशेषसमवायाः । - तर्कभाषा. 6 केवलाधिकरणादेव नास्ति इति व्यवहारोपपत्तावभाव इति न पदार्थान्तरं

किन्तु अधिकारणात्मक एवेति प्राभाकराः । न्या. को.

7 Atomism p. 204

(26)

Notes–

Sect. 10]

Knowledge of अभाव, say the तार्किकs, is depende- nt upon the knowledge of its counterentity (प्रतियोगिन् ) i. c. the thing of which is predicated. Thus to know घटाभाव we must know what a घट is.

अभाव is प्रत्यक्षविषय according to the तार्किकs. Because, they say, we see with our इन्द्रियs, अभाव like घटाभाव, पदाभाव. According to the भाट्ट मीमांसक अभाव is the object of an independent प्रमाण called अनुपलब्धि.

अभाव $

संसर्गाभाव negation of

प्रागभाव

अभावघट

before it

is

contact.

प्रध्वंसाभाव अत्यन्ताभाव अभावपिट अभाव घट

तादात्म्याभाव- अन्योन्याभाव. negation of Identity. देवदत्त is not यज्ञदत्त.

after it on the भूतल.

is

produced destroyed.

[[१०]]

पृथिवी.

Tr. Earth is the substance that possesses odour. It is of two kinds, eternal and non-cternal. The ete- rnal earth is of the form of atoms, the non-eternal, of the form of product.

$ It should be seen that अन्योन्याभाव can be reduced to अत्यन्ता-

भाव though the contrary is not always possible.

घटः पटो न अन्योन्याभाव.

घटे पटत्वं न - अत्यन्ताभाव

But we cannot say भूतलं घटो न is equal to भुतले घटो न.

(27)

-Notes

[ Sect. 10

g here proceeds to define the several things enumerated before.

A work on a is theoretically required to con- sist of four parts. 11 statement. 2 am, cla- ssification. 32 definition and 40, an exa- mination of the definitions. But there is a divergence between theory and practice in that of the definitions is generally conspicuous by its absence in manuals on Sanskrit Logic. It is perhaps in alone that we find any space devoted to परीक्षा 3. अत्रभह has got no separate section on a, unless we gave the name to the discussion of the definitions in the दीपिका. उद्देश and विभाग are not sharply disting- uished and in the portion we do find something of विभाग + Cp. समवायस्त्वेक एव etc. Again, it is not unusual to come across the portions in those for Hus cp. गन्धवती पृथिवी सा द्विविधा. That is why some do not admit as a separate division.

It is the portions comprising of s or definitions that constitute the most important parts of manuals on Sanskrit Logic.

The definitions in Sanskrit Logic are framed

लक्षण

with a double purpose: first (1) to enable us to carry on our worldly dealings by a orrect knowledge (Roma) and secondly, (2) o distinguish the thing defined from all others

1 नाम्ना पदार्थ सङ्कीर्तन मुद्देशः तर्कदीपिका.

2 स एवासाधारणधर्म इत्युच्यते-

3 cp. 2-2-1,4,5,

4 त्रिधा चास्य शास्त्रस्य प्रवृत्तिदेशी लक्षणं परक्षा चेति । विभागोऽपि तेन

रूपेणेोदेय एव ।

[[1]]

भाध्य, चद्रकतिभह on वै. सू. 1-1-2

(28)

Sect. 10]

Notes-

( aftarurgia ), the second being merely a step to the former. I know by distinguishing it from all other objects and then am able to carry on my worldly dealings with it.

In Sanskrit definition an attempt is made to set the finger on a particular attribute which is peculiar to the thing and is thus capable of marking it off from everything else. That is why it is called Sassaùtiglada that is, a peculiar circumstance केवलव्यतिरेकितुविशेष 1 not to be found anywhere else. If a ft wants to define a cow he will define it by saying that it is a Mega, animal i. e. one which has the dew-lap. He knows that it is only the bovine class that has this distinguishing feature. This is the implication of the definition of लक्षण as असाधारणो धर्मः.

This is indeed a happy device to mark off the thing defined from all others. But a definition. ought to be more ambitious. Not only must it distinguish the thing defined from everything else, but it must, side by side, give us an insight into the nature of the thing. To that extent, Sanskrit definitions are deficient because they never attem- pt to give us a glimpse of the essence or nature of the thing.

तर्कदीपिका gives the three drawbacks that are Three likely to mar the accuracy of the definition. दोषs of They are अध्याप्ति, भविष्यति and असम्भव If लक्षण. anybody were to define a cow as an animal with tawny colour the fault will be अव्याप्ति

• cp. पृथिवी इतरेभ्यो भियते । गन्धवस्वात् । मभेतरभिनं तम

गन्धवत् ।

( 29 )

-Notes

[ Sect. 10

(partial pervasion); because, there are other cows besides, such as red, white, which will be left out if the definition were accepted. If I were to define it as an animal with horns’ my definition. will include animals like the bison and the buffalo that are also horned, the fault resulting being (over-pervasion). If I were to define a cow as an animal with unbifurcated hoofs the definition. will suffer from the fault of (improbability)

because cows, as a rule, are animals with bifurcated hoofs. It should be seen that the same may be and also. In the instance above, a tawny animal is with regard red cows but with regard to tawny horses etc. But an अव्याप्त or अतिव्याप्त लक्षण can never be असम्भवि because, in both, at least, a portion of the thing defined is referred to.

Earth is the substance possessed of odour. Definition According to the s, s do not poss- of ess any qualities at the moment when they पृथिवी

come into existence1 For, they say, if y and ❗ were to come into existence simultaneously there will be no difference between the two.

According to this theory even an earthy thing The Definition will not have smell at the moment modified when it comes into existence. Much2 less will there be smell if, according to the Budd- hists, a perished as soon as it comes into

1 प्रथमं द्रव्यं निर्गुणं निष्क्रियं चैवोत्पद्यते पश्चात्तत्समवेता गुणक्रिया

उत्पद्यन्ते ।

-211.

ન્યા. જો.

2 गन्धसमानाधिकरणद्रव्यस्यापरजातिमत्त्वस्यैव विवचितत्वात् त.दी.

( 30 )

Sect. 10]

Notes-

existence. (a). So such things will be left out of the scope of the definition which, therefore, has to be interpreted, says the , as meaning that Earth possesses, narrower than cap- able of existing in the same abode as odour. Sec- ondly, what about earthen products where good and bad smells counteract mutually resulting in no consciousness of smell? You do not admit a

te account for such cases as you do चित्ररूप, तर्कदीपिका rejects such a possibility by saying that, in any case, there ought to be perceptible one smell good or bad, and, therefore, the definition does apply to cases where good and bad smells are present.2 And lastly, what about the presence of smell in water and absence of it in a stone? According to the definition water will be earth, an apparent absurdity, and the stone will be not-earthy which is improbable. points out how such cases are not in conflict with the definition. If we get smell in water, it is due to the presence of earthy particles in it. If we do not get smell in a stone, that is because it is not present there in a high degree, says the . If there were absolutely no smell, how do we get it from the ashes of a burnt stone?3

The word ad in the definition ought to be interpreted as गन्धसमवायिकारण. In तर्क, the समवायिकारण of गुण 1 अग्राव्याप्तिकथनं च बौद्धमतमनुसृत्य । तन्मते तदुत्पत्तिक्षणे

एव तन्नाशस्वीकारात् । -न्या. को.

सुरभ्यसुरभ्यचित्रगन्धानङ्गीकारात् ।

i -त. दी. 3 न च पाषाणादौ गन्धाभावाद् गन्धवन्वमव्याप्तमिति वाच्यम् । तत्रापि गन्धसत्वादनुपलब्धिस्त्वनुक टत्वेनाप्युपपद्यते । कथमन्यथा तद्भस्मनि गन्ध उपलभ्यते ।

2 ननु

( 31 )

-मुक्तावली.

-Notes

[ Sect. 10

and is always the in which they abide. In the present instance, the समवायिकारण of गन्ध is पृथ्वी because the latter is the substratum of the former. The enlargement of the definition is due to the fact that गन्धवत्त्व can be an attribute of काल and दिक because the two are all-embracing. Nothing in the world is such as is not related to and ft. So

can be as

is also related to them, and well predicated of them. But they are not the समवायिकारण or material cause of गन्ध as पृथिवी is. They are the साधारणनिमित्तकारण of गन्ध. Hence the elucidatory enlargement of the word गन्धवत्त्व

नित्या अनित्याच.

Earth is of two kinds permanent and imper- manent. Permanent earth is the atoms of which all earthy products are

are made. Impermanent earth consists of the various products formed from

atoms.

The division into and a is an euphuism to show how there is the permanent carthy eleme- nt behind all earthy products. In plain words, the wants to say that all earthy products are constituted of atoms which are permanent.

The products are impermanent because they depend for their existence on the daìa between the atoms. They, like, will last only as long as the between the atoms lasts and then disappear.

नित्या परमाणुरूपाः..–

Atomic

One of the most valuable contributions to Ind- ian thought is the परमाणुषाद of the वैशेषिकs. It makes them intensely realistic. It’s value is evinced by the fact that, till late, even

Theory

(32)Sect. 10]

[[6]]

Notes-

modern physics was assuming atom’ as the last constitueut of matter into which all products in the world could be analysed and which could not be split up.

It was only very lately that this theory has been replaced by the electron theory according to which even atoms can be split up into electrons the ultimate constituents of matter. (See Intro- duction. )

accounted

The atomic theory may be thus for. Every material object, if it is earthy (šta ), watery (a), luminous (a), or aerial (a ), is found to consist of parts. (,,, and

are a and hence do not consist of parts. being atomic are also partless. ) These parts are again found to have been constituted of still smaller parts which, in their turn, are made up of parts smaller still. We could have gone on analysing the objects into their constituent parts till infinity, if this process of analysis ad infini- tum had not plunged us into a logical absurdity. If this analysis were not to stop at a particular terminus every object big or small would be found to have been composed of infinite parts. Thus the à¤* mountain will consist, according to this reasoning, of infinite parts and so a d (mustard seed) will be analysed into as many i. e. infinite parts. Thus the mountain and the mustard seed will be both equal in size because both consist of infinite component parts-an absurdity too patent. In brief, if I were not to put a limit to my analysis some- where I shall not be able to say, as I do in my

⭑

तेषां [ अवयविनां ] अवयवधाराया अनन्तत्वे मेरुसर्षपयोरपि 8117985n: । 3a:mfaîteà air:

(33)

• मुक्तावली.

-Notes

[ Sect. 10

daily usage, that a particular thing is greater or smaller than another, because the difference in size is determined by the greater or smaller number of the constituent parts. A mango is larger than the plum because the constituent parts of the former are more in number than those of the latter. But if the parts become infinite where then the difference between the sizes of the two?

So what is required is a terminus where I must stop my analysis. In other words, I must assume a standard unit further than which I am not going to analyse and in terms of which I can say that this this thing is big and that small. And this standard part is “the atom” of the 10¥¤ which thus is supposed to be indivisible. The assumption of the unit of atom explains why one thing is bigger than another. That which consists. of more atoms is bigger, and that which consists of less is smaller.

The theory is to be developed thus. A mater- ial object that is perceptible is found to consist of parts. Those of parts smaller still. If we were to analyse in this way the smallest perceptible part will be the त्रसरेणु or त्र्यणुक which is of the size of the mote in the sun-beam, smaller than which no object is seen. This g, because it is perce- ag, + ptible, must consist of parts, which are called. ags “diads” which are imperceptible and formed of two atoms each. These s, inasmuch as

1 न च त्रसरेणावेव विश्वान्तिरस्तीति वाच्यं । त्रसरेणुः सावयवः चाक्षुष- द्रव्यत्वात् पटवत् इत्याद्यनुमानेन तदवयवसिदै । त्रसरेणोश्वयवाः सावयवाः महदारम्भकत्वात् कपालवत् इति अनुमानेन तदवयवसिद्धेः

मुक्तावली.

(34)

Sect. 10]

Notes-

they give rise to the product ( श्रयणुक) possessed of magnitude, must be themselves constituted of parts smaller still and these are the atoms." (अणुs)*

व्यणुक

त्र्यणुक [ त्रि+अणु = द्यणुक ]

णुक [ द्वि+अणु ]

।

यणुक :- द्वौ अणू कारण यस्य तत् । च्यणुकः - त्रिभिर्ह्यणुकैर्यदुत्पद्यते तत् । त्रसरेणुः - त्रिभिः सहितो रेणुसेरणुः ।

That g or the mote in the sunbeam is Why should not the ultimate constituent of matter we admit follows from the fact that it is visible like a jar. Since it is visible it must have magnitude which presupposes constituent parts. Thus a is visible because it possesses magnitude which, in its turn, is due to the 4s (potsherds) of which the is constituted. So also must have parts.

and अणु.

Can these parts be the gs or the final con- stitutents of matter? No, says the

. Because Cp. परमाणुस्वभावायाः सत्वे किं प्रमाणम् । अनुमानम् । अणुपारे- माणतारतम्यं क्वचिद्विश्रान्तं परिमाणतारतम्यत्वात् । मद्दत्सरिमाणतार- तम्यवत् । यत्रेदं विश्रान्तं यतः परमाणुनास्ति स परमाणुः । अत एव नित्यो द्रव्यत्वे सति अनवयवत्वादाकाशवत् । अथायं सावयवो न तर्हि परमाणुः कार्यपरिमाणापेक्षया तदवयवपरिमाणस्य लोकेऽल्पी यस्त्वप्रती- तेः। यश्च तस्यावयवः स परमाणुर्भविष्यति । अथ सोऽपि न भवत्यवयवा न्तरसद्भावादेवं तनवस्था । ततश्चावयविनामल्पतरतमादिभावा न स्यात् । सर्वेषामनन्तकारणजन्यत्वाविशेषेण परिमाण प्रकर्षाप्रकर्षहेतोः कारण सङ्ख्या भूयस्त्वा भूयस्त्वयोरसम्भवात् । अस्ति तावदयं परिमाणभेदः । तस्मादणुपरिमाणं कचिन्निरतिशयमिति सिद्धो नित्यः परमाणुः ।

–न्यायकन्दली.

(35)

-Notes

►

[ Sect. 10

they (parts) give to a product (g) possessing magnitude, they must be themselves constituted of other constituents. For potsherds are constituted of smaller constituents. What the means is

this. If the 4

were constituted of gs it ought to be अणुतर; because he supposes महत्त्व and अणुत्व to be opposite dimensions. Thus as two products conjoined result in producing a product which is महत्तर so two अणु products ought to result in an अणुतर product. But sag is perceptible and hence cannot be an aga thing which must be much more super- sensuous than an ag thing which is admitted to be supersensuous. So the parts of the must not be as but the as divisible into the smaller gs.

Why do they admit त्र्यणुक to consist of three व्यणुकs (=63ys) ?

The as being produced from ags are the- mselves in size. If two as had formed the त्र्यणुक it would have been अणुतर. But since the number is three, they can well give rise to the त्र्यणुक which is महत्. Because the rule of the वैशेषिक system is that महत्त्व’ is produced by कारणमहस्व, कारण बहुत्व ( not द्वित्व ) or प्रपयविशेष. That is, the महत्व of a thing is produced either by the magnitude of the parts, or the plurality (not duality) of the parts if they do not possess magnitude, i. e. are g, or the peculiar way of arrangement as in a bale of cotton where greater or smaller pressure results in smaller or greater size of the bale.

Then why not say that the 4 consists of three ags which would account for its magnitude? The answer to the question seems to lie in the possible idca in the mind of the a that it is more natural

( 36 )

Sect. 10]

Notes-

Jak..

to descend from 3 to 2 and then to 1 than to des- cend from 3 to 1 at once. Thus descent from the व्यणुक to suणुक and thence to the अणु seems more nat- ural than from the sयणु straightway to the अणु. That is why the admits an intermediate ¶¶ which he had to admit to be ag and supersensuous because produced from two अणुs. 1

was a matter

Thus the admission of the of caprice and hence we find certain commentaries like the दिनकरी on the मुक्तावली 2 not admitting व्यणुक at all. There are others ( नव्या : ) who would stop the the division at व्यणुक or त्रसरेणु itself. 3

Tr. Again it is threefold owing to its division into the body, the senses and the object of sense. The body is what belongs to us and other (earthy) beings The sense is what perceives smell and is situated on the tip of the nose.

The objects of sense are clay, stones and similar other objects.

पुनस्त्रिविधा or सा पुनस्त्रिविधाः -

Both the readings are found in different sets 1 Read शङ्कर’s उपस्कार on वै. सू. 4.1.2.

न च त्रसरेणुरेवावधिः । तस्य चाक्षुषद्रव्यत्वेन महत्त्वादनेकद्रव्य- वत्त्वाच्च । महत्त्वस्य चाक्षुषप्रत्यक्षत्वे कारणत्वमनेकद्रव्यवत्त्वामादा- चैव । अन्यथा महत्वमेव न स्यात् कस्य कारणलं भवेत् ये च त्रसरे- गोरवयवा एव परमाणवः महद्रव्यारम्भकत्वेन तेषामपि सावयव-

वानुमानात् । तन्तुवत् कपालवश्च ।

2 अत्रेदं चिन्त्यं त्रिभिः परमाणुभिरेव व्यणुक्रमस्तु । परमाणुभ्यामनार-

म्भस्तु सिद्धान्तिनां व्यणुकाभ्यामनारम्भ इव… दिनकरी.

p. 154 3 अत्र नव्याः । त्रसरेणोश्वयाः सावयवा इत्याद्यनुमानयोरुक्तयोरप्रभो –

जकत्वेन त्रुटावेव विश्रामः ।

• दिनकरी. 155

( 37 )

-Notes

[ Sect. 10

of Mss. अनम्भट्ट’s reading, to judge from his तर्कदीपिका 1 must have been gain clearly hinting at another principle of division of earth in general.

This reading, whether used it or not, is in conflict with कणाद’s वैशेषिक सूत्रs where the division into शरीर, इन्द्रिय and विषय belongs to अनित्य पृथिवी. : He is closely followed by प्रशस्तपाद also कणाद’s division makes the matter explicit. शरीर, इन्द्रिय and विषयs are अनित्य because they are कार्यरूप being formed of atoms. Even supposing this division is of ga in general to what else can it refer if not to अनित्य पृथिवी ?

So whether we admit this reading or that, the upshot is the same. a gai makes explicit and

clear what is implicit in पुनस्त्रिविधा.

शरीरेन्द्रियविषयभेदात् : – This division is plainly based upon the notion that the universe exists for us as an outcome of our merits and demerits. As a result of our merits and demerits, we must enjoy pleasure or suffer pain which is derived from our experience of external objects (44). Our souls cannot get this experience unless they are embod- ied (). Mere possession of the body will not enable us to experience the objects in the world, in the absence of senses ( इन्द्रिय ).

It is with the help of the sense-organs ( 44 ) that the souls residing in the bodies (a) can experience objects in the world ( विषय ).

[ Note the definitions in the सर्कदीपिकाः शरीर

१ प्रकारान्तरेण विभजते ।

२ तत्पुनः पृथिव्यादि कार्यद्रव्यं त्रिविधं शरिरेन्द्रियविषयसंशकम् ।

वै. सू. 1. 5.2, 1.

(38)

Sect. 10]

NotesTM

आत्मनो भोगायतनम् ; भोग= सुखदुः वान्यतरसाक्षात्कारः; इन्द्रिय=राब्दे- तरोद्भूतविशेषगुणानाश्रयले सति ज्ञानकारणमनः संयोगाश्रयत्वम् i e. 1. which is the abode of the contact of mind i. e. joined to the mind when it cognises objects. 2. which is not the abode of any special qualities that are manifest excepting sound, i. e. which possesses the particular

the particular quality of the element ( c. g. गन्ध of पृथिवी, रस् of अप्, रूप of तेजस ) of which it is made only in an unmanifest form, only the af possessing it in a manifest form. ]

The

the senses.

is only inferred never perceived by The पार्थिव इन्द्रिय is what enables us to apprehend the special quality of gat. It is situated on the tip of the nose. Bodies of beings on earth are acts. It should be clearly seen that every tangible object in the world is a self embod- ied, according to the

That is why they class trees and creepers also with bodies. Again, it is to be noted that û and Ĥ are relative

यज्ञदत्त’s शरीर is a विषय to देवदत्त.

terms.

fs.*

The following division of शरीर given by मुक्तावली

is comprehensive.

जरायुज like men born

from the

womb.

शरीर

योनिञ्ज

अण्डज

like birds, snakes born from

eggs.

अयोनिज

स्वेदज

like bugs

born from perspiration,

न च वृक्षादः शरीरत्वे किं मानमिति वाच्यम् ।

उद्भिज्ज Voluntarily shooting up like

trees etc.

आध्यात्मिक वायु-

सम्बन्धस्य प्रमाणत्वात् । तत्रैव किं मानमिति चेत् । भमक्षत संरोहणादिना

(the tree grows when it is lopped and gets its incision filled when cut) तदुभयनात् । - मुक्तावली

(39)

-Notes

[ Sect. 11

The as are quite positive in their view that thes are made up of one clement only. This is in open conflict with the view of the Upanishads some of which say that the bodies are made of three elements and others that they are made up of five elements Both 1 and 2 have given serious attention to this topic and have devoted some as to establish that the bodies are made up of one element only.3 (see Intoduction)

The qualities of gift are

(1) All the colours (2) Six Tastes. (3) Two smells (सुरभि and असुरभि ) (4) अनुष्णाशीतस्पर्श.

११ आपः

Tr. Water is the substance which possesses cool touch (as its special quality). It is of two kinds: permanent and impermanent. The permanent is of the form of atoms. The impermanent is of the form of products. Again it is of three kinds according to the division into (1) body (2) sense-organ and (3) object of the sense. The body (pertains to souls) in the world of Varuna. The sense organ is that with which taste is perceived. The object is the river, the ocean and other (watery objects).

Cool touch is a quality peculiar to water. possesses hot touch. g possesses touch neither 1 प्रत्यक्षाप्रत्यक्षाणां संयोगस्याप्रत्यक्षत्वात्पञ्चात्मकत्वं न विद्यते । वै. सू 4.22.

गुणान्तरप्रादुर्भावाच्च न व्यात्मकम् । वै. सू. 4. 2. 3.

2 पार्थिवं गुणान्तरोपलब्धेः म्या. सू. 3 1.28.

3 मुक्तावलीः- न च दोष्मादेरुपलम्भादाप्यत्वादिकमपि स्यादिति वान्यम् । तथा सति जलत्यपथिवीत्वादिना सङ्करप्रसञ्ज्ञात । p. 156

(40)

Sect. 17 ]

Noles–

hot nor cool, वायु– possesses touch like that of पृथिवी. If anybody asks how is it that a slab of stone or wind sometimes1 possesses touch and is yet earthy, the

aptly accounts for it, saying that there. are watery particles present therein. Again the solid form of snow and hail should not make us believe that they are earthy. Because, says the तार्किक, their solid form is merely a भ्रम.

The definition air is to be interpreted with the same modification as in the defi- nition of पृथिवी i. e. शीतस्पर्शवत्यः शतिस्पर्शसमवायिकारणम् । शरीरं वरुणलोके :- cp. दिनकरी on the मुक्तावली, तत्रच श्रुतिरेव प्रमाणम् । मुक्तावली specially says that the bodies in वरुणलोक are अयोनिज, दिनकरी supplements by saying that the limbs of the body may be पार्थिव.

The is what gives us taste of things we eat and drink and what is situated on the tip of the tongue-not the tongue itself which is perceived and belongs to the body (t). Being it is

(शरीर

इन्द्रिय supersensuous. Made of water, it possesses taste and othar qualities of water but in an unmanifest form ( अनुभूत रूप ).

Water possesses the following qualities:–

(1) White colour, (2) Sweet Taste, ( 3 ) Cool touch, (4) Viscidity (स्नेह ), ( 5 ) Natural fluidity. ( सांसिद्धिक द्रवत्व).

1 शीतं शिलातलमित्यादौ जलसम्बधादेव शीतस्पर्शभानम् त. दी. 2 वाय्वादो कदाचिच्छीतस्पर्शोपलब्धिः औपाधिकी - वाक्यवृत्ति, तर्कसङ्ग्रह 3 न च हिमकरकयोः कठिनत्वात्पार्थिवत्वमिति वाच्यम् अदृष्टवि- शेषेण द्रवत्वप्रतिरोधात् करकायाः काठिन्यप्रत्ययस्य भ्रान्तित्वात् ।

• मुक्तावली.

(41)

-Notes

[ Sect. 12

If the water of the Jumna is blue, it is due to the colour of the of bed the of river which is earthy. When we find some water sour that is due to the mixture of particles that are not watery. When we get cool touch from sandal paste it is due, says the , to the watery element in sandal’.

१२ तेजस्.

Tr.-Light is what possesses hot touch by inti- mate relation. It is of two kinds: (1) permanent and (2) impermanent. The permanent is of the form of aloms. The impermanent is of the form of products. Again, it is of three kinds, being divided into body, the sense-organ, and the object (of sense). The body is ( what belongs to souls) in the solar world. The sense is that with which colour is perceived, the sight situated on the top of the black pupil. The object is fourfold. (1) Earthy, (2) Celestial, ( 3 ) Gastric or belonging to stomach and (4) Mineral. The Earthy consists of fire and other kindred (fiery) objects. The Celestial is what is fed by water, such as lightning. The Gastric is the cause of digestion of things eaten. The mineral is gold and similar bright metals.

The definition with a is to be interpreted like the definitions of quand

:.

Hot touch is a quality peculiar to. The touch of पृथिवी and वायु is अनुष्णाशीत; that of अप, शीत. आकाश, काल, दिक, आत्मा and मनः have no touch at all, the first four because they are all-pervading, the

1 Cp. 3831 ( p. 168)

(42)Sect. 12]

Notes-

last because it is atomic. How is the moon

proverbially cool in touch? suppressed her own touch,

The earthy touch has replies the an. $

नित्या अनित्याच.

Cp. notes on the division of पृथिवी. शरीर of तेजस is अयोनिज says the मुक्तावली.

आदित्यलोके, वरुणलोके etc. – These are mere assumptions of the f to account for existence of bodies parallel to earthy ones. When you admit the body to be composed of one single element you must prove existence of bodies exclusively watery ( अप् ), lustrous, (तेजस ) and aerial (वाधु ). As we do not come accross such bodies on earth, we can well imagine their existence in the respective worlds of वरण, आदित्य and वाधु, says the ताकि.

The Vedantist view about the formation of the body does not plunge them into this absurdity. They say that no body is made up of any one element excl- usively. It must be composed of all elements, (five or three) with one element in preponderance which gives its name to the product. Thus a so-called earthy body will consist of earth, air, water, light, and ether. If there are watery products like river etc they also must be constituted acc- ording to this principle. This assumption of qaciou or (1) does not force them to assume bodies in वरुणलोक etc.

विषयश्चतुर्विधः – (1) भौम fire which we use daily; elf includes other lustre such as that of the fire-fly or certain light-emitting fish.

$ स्वर्णचन्द्रकिरणादी तूपणस्पर्शः पार्थिवादिस्पर्शेनाभिभूतः - वाक्यवृत्ति,

तर्कसङ्ग्रह

( 43 )

-Noles

[Sect. 12

(2) –the lightning, the luminous nature of the rainbow etc. which (lustres) are fed by water. Whether and other luminous bodies are subsu- med. under this head is doubtful. Because they are not अबिन्धन, जिनवर्धनसूर commenting on the सप्तपदार्थी says fela nnà xa: 1864: a ¤ quâgeılk: 1

If we do not admit the Sun and other lum- inous bodies under where are we to relegate them? Nowhere else. In view of this fact the defi- nition by Я of fee as ad

( 3 ) औदर्यः– The जठराग्नि digest what we have eaten.

is too limited.

which enables us to

u.

(4) :-The minerals like gold, silver which are bright are also supposed by the an to be Controversy about these minerals dates as far as back who refers to their accidental fluidity, in 2.1.7.

Why is gold (as also other metals) regarded3⁄4¤¤?

To prove that सुवर्ण is तैजस ( light ) the सार्किकs argue thus:-

(5) सुवर्ण is a द्रव्य because in it we have the qualities of yellow (a) colour and touch. Under which of the nine s can it be subsumed?

It cannot be

either वाधु or आकाश or काल or दिक् or आत्मा or मनस because all of these are without colour while gaf possesses colour.

सुवर्ण

Can it be qua then? No, says the af. For, he has set up a test to determine whether a thing is 8 वै. सू. 2.1.7 त्रपुसीस लोहरजत सुवर्णानाममिसंयोगाद्द्रवत्वमद्भिः ‡ अमेरपत्यं प्रथमं हिरण्यं । इत्यागमः - दिनकरी. [ सामान्यम् ।

cp.

(44)

Sect. 12]

or not. He has seen

Notes-

things like ghee

melted and again restored to their solid form by the application of intense heat. If, on occasions, he has found that a things like ghee could not regain their solid form even on the application of intense heat, he has examined the case and conc- luded that there is some counteracting agent like water present which comes in the way of the res- toration of soldity. This phenomenon has enabled him to deduce that all earthy things being melted are restored to the solid form by the application of intense heat provided there is no counteracting agent like water present.

The

applies the test to ga. He finds that molten gaf can, by no amount of intense heat, be restored back to its original solidity.* He is sure there is no af tc account for this phenomenon

fa, he concludes.

So it cannot be

Can it be then? No, says the af. y possesses fluidity that is natural (a) and not accidental (afaf¤ produced by some extraneous agency like heat). The fluidity of ga is not natural but accidental being produced by the application of heat. Therefore g cannot be ag.

Naturally must come under :, the only substance remaning with which, the thinks, it has affinity in point of lustre.

az gadea Înaà fit arafkla àa । a । gaf àná xafa प्रतिबन्धकेऽत्यन्तानलसंयोगेऽसत्यपि अनुच्छिद्यमान द्रवत्वात् । यतैवं तन्नैवं यथा पृथिवी । —मुक्तावली Cp. तर्कदीपिका.

।

(45)

-Notes

[Sect. 12

Then a question arises, if ga is a: how is it that it does not possess the hot touch or the brilli- ant white colour that are supposed to be peculiar characteristics of :. The brushes aside.

तेजः. this objection by saying that these peculiar quali- tics are there but are imperceptible because supp- ressed by the stronger qualities viz. (îta )

अनुष्णाशीत touch and yellow colour of earth mixed therewith.’

Needless to say the argument is defective and typical of the way in which the s lightly brush aside objections that demanded a close scrutiny. If the absence of the peculiar qualities is explained away by having recourse to the make- -shift of the theory of suppression of qualities by another substance why should we not say that सुवर्ण is पृथिवी or any other substance, with some counteracting agent coming in the way of the manifestation of qualities? Again, the very pre- sumption that its fluidity cannot be destroyed has been radically shaken by modern physics which proves how any substance can be reduced to either of the three conditions, (1) solid (2) liquid or (3) gaseous.

But we

must make allowance for the yet undeveloped experimental sciences in those early days and admit that the value of the argument lies not so much in the soundness of the conclusion as in its boldness of attempt to tackle a knotty problem with as much precision as could be commanded then. The aftes could not think of that intense heat, as we can, now, which could reduce any substance to any of the three states.

१ Cp. तर्कदीपिका.

( 46 )

Secl. 13.]

Notes-

The view of the nco सार्किकs that सुवर्ग is पार्थिव is more accurate. T

The following are the विशेषगुणs of तेजसः-

(1) Hot touch (उष्ण : स्पर्शः ) (2) Bright white colour (कुल भास्वर ) ( 3 ) accidental fluidity (नैमित्तिक द्रवत्व)

As in the case of अप, the इन्द्रिय, sight – not the eye-which is supersensuous possesses these qual- itics in an unmanifest form because it is also made up of तेजः.

१३ वायु.

Tr-Air is devoid of colour but possesses touch. It is of two kinds viz. ( 1 ) Permanent. and (2) Impermanent. The Permanent is in the form of atoms The Impermanent is in the form of products. Again it is threefold according to its division into the body, the sense–organ,

and the object of sense. The body is (what pertains to souls) in the world of ag. The sense-organ is what enables us to apprehend touch, the sense of touch (त्व) extending over the entire body. The object is the wind that is the cause of the shaking of trees etc. Vital breath is air that permeates through the body. Thugh one, it receives names like प्राण, अपान and others owing to the various limiting adjuncts

या नवीनास्तु सुवर्ण पार्थिवमेव पीतं सुवर्ण द्रुतमिति साक्षात्सम्बधेन द्रवत्वप्रतीतेर्भ्रमत्वायोगात् द्रुतं द्रुततरमिति प्रतीतेर्द्रवस्वस्याप्यत्यन्तो. च्छेदात् पृथिवीत्वस्य पीतरूपसमवायिकारणत्वावच्छेदकत्वादुपनाश तादात्म्येन स्वर्णस्य विरोधित्वाच्च न पीतरूपनाश इति वदन्ति ।

• दिनकरी on the मुक्तावळी.

(47)

।

-Notes

रूपरहितस्पर्शवानः

Sect. 13

रूपरहित but

भ्राकाश, काल, दिकू, आत्मा, and मनः, are they do not possess स्पर्श. पृथ्वी, अप, तेजः, are स्पर्शवत् but they are not रूपरहित So रूपराईतस्पर्शवान् is a correct definition of arg. The aa in the definition is to be interpreted like the in the definition of grał.

नित्याअनित्या चः -

Cp The division of पृथ्वी, अ, तेजः and the

notes thereon.

About वायवीय शरीर the मुकाबली says, शरीरमयोनिजं पिज्ञा- चादीनाम् It should be seen that it is not the skin

। that is the but the peculiar agency that enables us to apprehend touch. It is spread all over the body that is why we feel the touch in any part of the body.

विषयो….

विषये …. वाधुः…. वायु here means ‘breescs ’ ’ wind ’ शरीरान्तः सञ्चारी…. प्राणः-some 2 hold that प्राण is the fourth variety of अनित्यवायु; but अनम्भट्ट, like many others, 3 includes it under f. He says that it is ag inside the body and as such not substantially different from the वृक्षादिकम्पजनक वायु.

[[1]]

Commentators from प्रशस्तपाद have felt that the body must consist of some mixture at least of other elements; merely watery body or aerial body is not possible, according to them. Cp. पार्थिवावयवो पष्ट- म्भावोपभोगसमर्थम् । प्र भाष्य. which is exactly repeated in the मुक्तावली.

2 Cp. प्रशस्तपाद, for instance, तत्र कार्यलक्षण बतुर्विधः शरीरमिन्द्रियं विषयः

प्राण इति । (p. 144 )

शिवादित्य (सप्तपदार्थी ) also holds the same view.

3 Cp. मुक्तावली.

(48)

ct. 13 ]

a a çàsgufaùza:………ÅÐÍ SHÀ

Notes-

What is meant is that (the 5 s). 7, Bia c. are only with different limiting adjuncts

:). The limiting adjuncts are the different rts of the body through which the vital breath .sses and receives different names accordingly. The following verse gives the five different mes the receives as it passes through five

fferent parts of the body.

हृदि प्राणः गुदेऽपानः समानो नाभिमण्डले

उदानः कण्ठदेशे स्याद्यानः सर्वशरीरगः ।

perceived by direct perception or inferred?

The enters upon a discussion as reg- ds the am by which ag is known. There are vo views on this question.

The old fas (:) hold that ag is known y inference only. According to them nothing can known by direct perception (4) that does not ›ssess manifest colour. (374469). They thus reduce यक्ष to घाक्षुषप्रत्यक्ष. Though वायु possesses स्पर्श that by self is not capable of making it known by direct erception in the absence of . Therefore the xistence of बाधु is inferrible only, (अनुमानविषय) acc- rding to the old school.

The neo- as (as) hold a view that is hore reasonable. They do not think that

वेदान्तसार gives another system of प्राणs with different names, based on difference of functions (ga attributes the system to कापिलमत) केचित् तु नागकूर्मककल देवदत्तधनञ्जयाख्याः पञ्चान्ये वायवः सन्तीति वदन्ति । तत्र नागः उद्विरणकरः । कूर्मः उन्मीलनकरः । कुकलः थुक्करः । देवदत्तो जृम्भणकरः । धनञ्जयः पोषणकरः । - वे. सा. १३.

(49)

-Notes

[Sect. 13

requires to make the object perceptible. In other words, they do not limit the term " to चाक्षुषप्रत्यक्ष. Even manifest touch or manifest smell or manifest taste or manifest sound is by itself able to make its substratum ( आश्रय ) प्रत्यक्षविषय, they say. Thus ag because it possessses manifest touch is, according to this school.

a

अनुमेय only.

following the old school holds that is

Creation and destruction of the world:

तर्कदीपिका incidentally details out the process of creation and destruction of the world.

When God wills to create, action is produced in the atoms of ( gât, eg, à¤; and a) two of which (atoms) combine to form a ; three व्यणुक a त्र्यणुक Four श्रयणुकs form a धतुरणु. And in this way the products are formed, small and big.

But

The Old and the New as agree in their views so far as the process of creation goes. they differ vitally in their views respecting process of destructiou.

the

According to the old school ofthe aff¤s(874q17), destruction in the case of all products excepting यणुकs

as follows upon the destruction of the constitue- nt parts (sugang=aggcaio). Thus let us supp- ose that ag is in the process of destruction. According to this view the gas will be destroyed first and then the g. They thus admit that the creation and destruction proceed in the same order.

( 50 )

Sect. 13]

Notes-

In the case of ■g they could not say that its destruction is preceded by the destruction of its constituent parts ( समवायिकारण), because the समवायिकारण of gas is as which are indestructible. Therefore they said that the destruction of as follows upon the destruction of their असमवायिकारण ( viz संयोग between the two ags.)

The weak point in this view lies in its assum- ption that creation and destruction proceed in the same order. To revert to the instance of gry, चतुरणुक, ifs are destroyed first, where can the be in the interval between its destruction and that of the त्र्यणुकs ? If we take off the pillars can we suppose that the roof can stand even for a moment ?

all cases.

To obviate this difficulty the neo-s held that the products are destroyed by the destruction of the असमवायिकारण viz. संयोग between the अवयवs, in While the old school admitted असमवायि- only in the case of g, the new school admitted it in all cases of destruction. Thus if a ggs is to be destroyed, it will be destroyed by the destruction of the conjunction between the *ges which remain intact. They thus admit that the creation and destruction proceed in the oppos- ite order. First ❤g will be destroyed and then g and so on. Needless to say, this view is more reasonable than the first.

www does not clearly show which view he follows though his use of the terms : may be significant of his bias in the direction of the

(51)

-Noles

[Sect. 14

old school which he faithfully follows in other respects. § (see Intro.)

१४ आकाश.

Tr.- Ether is that substance which has sound før its special quality. And it is one all-pervading and eternal.

But

शब्दगुणम्ः- While defining पृथिवी, अप, etc. the word ч was not explicitly stated in the definition cp. गन्धवती not गन्धगुणवती. Why should the word गुण be inserted in the definition of ? Some say that the word; has been introduced to refute the view of the भाट्टभीमांसकs who hold that शब्द is a द्रव्य. this view had been already refuted when admitted into the list of gas. So the explanation by others that the word " has been inserted to show that it is the exclusive quality of 1, not shared by any other, appears preferable.

was

The Existence of proved. That sound is a quality is proved by the inference:–शब्दो गुणः अनित्यत्वे सति एकेन्द्रियप्राय जातीयत्वदू । रूपवत् ।

§’s refutation of the system gives rise to the view that the originators of the system attributed creation and destruction to

nence to

the अदृष्ट and not to God. It is true, 1 gives undue promi- अदृष्ट in many cases. But whether he was inclined to eliminate God altogether is questionable, in view of the authority he claims for the Vedas and his adherence to the orthodox faith in

inculcating आश्रम, यज्ञ‍ rs etc. At best, we could say he could- not bring about a happy compromise between अदृष्ट

and ईश्वर. Sometimes the line of demarcation between &

is too

faint.

(52)Sect. 14]

(According to the

Notes-

6s,

is a and

which is a as

and hence must be a y like

residing in अनिस objects and चक्षुरिन्द्रियप्राय ).

As is a go it requires some as its 4. This cannot be पृथ्वी or अप् or तेजः or वायु because first, their qualities are produced by similar qualities of their parts while or sound is not so produced. What is meant is this. Supposing we have a lump of clay five lbs. in weight, we find that its smell is an aggregate of the smell of the parts. Technically such qnalities are

called कारणगुणपूर्वके, (produced by the qualities of the cause i. e. the parts). But sound is not ¶¶¶¶. I cannot lay my finger on a portion of the full string of a lute and say that portion has given a part of the sound produced on the lute when I play on it. I cannot put my finger on a part of a drum and say this part has given this much portion of the total sound produced by the drum. In other words sound is अकारणगुणपूर्वक Secondly, the qualities of पृथ्वी, अप, तेजः and बाधु, are never श्रोत्रप्रा while शब्द is श्रोत्रप्राह्य.

cannot be the quality of and which do not possess particular qualities (gs) while शब्द is a विशेषगुण.

It cannot be the quality of : because it is perceptible while : being atomic, its qualities

must be supersensuous.

Neither can it be the quality of 3⁄4

because

ax is «fhkam (cognised by the outer senses) while the qualities of are only a (cognised by the mind).

( 53 )

-Notes

[ Sect. 15

This leads to the admission of a ninth as the substratum of शब्द 1.

विभु

तच्चैक नित्यं चः- aầ☎ fay fà¿ ¤:—fay is an all–pervading substance (gâz) incapable of action. विभुद्रव्यs are always नित्य. आकाश, काल, दिकू, and आत्मन् are विभु, while पृथ्वी, अप, तेज, वायु and मनः are मूर्त, corporeal and capable of action. - usages like घटाकाश, मठाकाश need not make us believe that they are differents. For it is only the different limiting adjuncts, etc. that are responsible for the usage, being one only.

१५ काल.

Tr.-Time is the special instrumental cause of usages like ‘This is past. And it is one, all–per- vading and eternal.

It is Time that makes us speak of things as past ( अतीत ) and present and future. (आदि वर्तमान & अनागत) Time is the general cause ( साधारण निमित्तकारण ) of all effects; because whatever thing comes into exist- ence is limited by time as it is by space (f) and the agency of ईश्वर which also are the साधारणनिमित्तकारणs of things coming into existence. Time is, however, the exclusive cause (-) of usages like ’this is past’ and ’that is present2.

1 It should Leen seen that acc. to the neo.–as, asz is Eat’s शब्द ૢ’s विशेषगुण Cp. दिनकरी - नव्यास्तु शब्दनिमित्तकारणत्वेन क्लृप्तस्येश्वर- स्यैव शब्दसमवायिकारणत्वम् ।

Now, atmosphere is regarded as the medium conveying sound.

2 Note that the neo. -

identified दिक and काल with ईश्वर or

जीव CP. दिनकरी :- अत्र नव्या ईश्वरस्य दिक्कालरूपत्वं तत्तजीवस्य वा ।

(54)

Sect. 17 ]

एको विभुर्नित्यश्चः - Sec आकाश.

Notes-

When we hear of

past time, present time etc. it is not the time that varies but the conjunction of the particular object with the एकविभुद्रव्य, काल.

[[१६]]

दिक्.

Tr-Space is the special instrumental cause of usages like the west etc.

Like time space is the साधारणनिमित्तकारण of all things coming into existence, because everything is born in space.

It is the विशेषकारण, however, of usages regarding the east, west etc.

एका, नित्या, विभ्वी चः-See आकाश and काल. When we hear of the पूर्वा दिक् and the उत्तरा दिकू we should not suppose that as are many; it is she connections of several things with one that cause the differ- ence in the designation of quarters.

दिक and

(1) आकाश is a भूद्रव्य, दिन not so. ( 2 ) आकाश is समवाथि- कारण of शब्द which is a quality exclusi- आकाश vely abiding in it; while दिक् is साधारण histinguished निमित्तकारण and never the समवायिकारण of anything, and has no special quality.

१७ आत्मन्

Tr. Soul is the substance in which knowledge abides by intimate relation. It is of two kinds: (1) # Cp. मुक्तावली - ननु यद्येकैव दिक तदा प्राचीप्रतीच्यादिव्यवहारः

कथमुपपद्यत इत्याह ।

यत्पुरुषस्यादयगिरिसन्निहिता या दिक् सा

तत्पुरुषस्य प्राची । एवमुदयगिरिव्यवहिता या दिक् सा प्रतीची । सर्वेषामेव वर्षाणां मेरुरुत्तरतः स्थित इति नियमात् ।

( 55 )

-Notes

[ Sect. 17

the Highest soul and the Individual soul. Then the Highest soul is the ruler ( * ), one only and des- titute of pleasure, pain or similar feelings. The individual soul is different for every body, all- pervading and eternal.

ज्ञानाधिकरणम्- ज्ञानसमवायिकारणम् because ज्ञान abides in आत्मन् only. आत्मन् is अनुमेय only like आकाश, काल, मन; and the नित्य (i. e. अणु) portions of पृथ्वी, अप्, तेजः and वायु.

आत्मन् is divided into two classes ( 1 ) जीवात्मन् and (2) परमात्मन् जीवात्मन्s are the souls of individual beings and are infinite in number. The God is one only. Both are fay, all pervading. Every has 4. The qualities of the soul are perceived by the mind only.

जीवात्मन्

The existence of is proved thus in the मुक्तावली.

वास्यादीनां छिदादिकरणानां कर्तारमन्तरेण फलानुपधानं दृष्टं एवं चक्षुरादीनां ज्ञानकारणानामपि फलोपधान कर्तारमन्तरेण नोपपद्यते इत्यति- îìm: qai serà i

If I find, in some place, an axe and a log of wood, I shall be quite logical if I were to infer therefrom that there must be some wood cutter who makes use of the axe to lop off the wooden log. Similarly corresponding to the axe and the log we find the various senses (s) and their particular objects (e. g. the art and the of the g). So we shall be quite right in inferring some agent who makes use of these. This agent is the जीवात्मन्,

The s, unlike the fans, whose basic doctrine is तत्वमसि, hold that the जीवात्मन्s are different from the परमात्मन् f

Cp. III 2. 19-20

(56)

Sect. 171

Noles

Many erroneous notions exist as regards the nature of the जीवात्मन्. The तर्कदीपिका refers to and repu- diates two. (1) Some hold the i to be identical with the body. This assumption will make the la as much liable to change as the body. Thus the of देवदत्त the youth will be different from that of the old man which is absurd. Again, a wcunded soldier’s Soul will be less than what it was before he got wounded. And the soul will perish as soon as the body perishes. All these consequences revolt against the immutability and indestructibility of the soul. (cp.nfar, azdaìsanidisaq) अच्छेयोऽयमदायेोऽयम्)

Some hold that the senses () are indivi- dual souls. Then the soul that secs will be differ- ent from the one that hears and so on. This will make a cognitiou, presupposing a single soul, of the type, ‘I who saw, hear now, impossible, the two souls being different according to this theory.

supposed that

For, if one

all s

Neither should it be are collectively the soul.

were to be destroyed, the soul will be maimed to that extent. Milton’s soul after he became blind would be different from what it was before.

shows how mind also cannot be the soul. Mind being ad, its qualities will be also . So, g, etc, the qualities of the soul will be ad, while we find that they are not so, being actually experienced.

1 Cp the विशेषाध्यारोपन्याय in the बेदान्तसार where no less than

nine views are referred to.

2 मुक्तावली - मनसोऽणुत्वात् प्रत्यक्ष महत्त्वस्य हेतुत्वात् मनसि ज्ञानसुखादि-

सत्वे तत्प्रत्यक्षानुपपतिरित्यर्थः । see मुकावली for other views.

(57)

-Notes

[ Sect. 17

The Inference to prove the existence of .

The

gives the following inference to

prove the existence of

क्षित्यङ्कुरादिकं कर्तृजन्यम् । कार्यत्वात् । घटवत् ।

As the earth etc. are products they presuppose some intelligent agent who produced them. And this agent is God who must be commanding omniscience and omnipotence to be responsible for this Universe.

Though both are as, the former is the and ruler, the latter is the ruled, (2) the for- जीवात्मन् mer is a, the latter (3) The former is not subject to (and a) and is

always, the latter is so subject resulting in his bondage. (4) The former does not possess the qualities of सुख, दुःख, द्वेष the latter does ( मुख also pins the self to संसार ). S

The size of आत्मन् . ( whether जीवात्मन् or परमात्मन् ) An object can be either atomic (ag) or of a medium size Ram or all-pervading. ().

cannot be atomic. If it were atomic its qualities, etc. would be if(supersensuous). But they are not so, therefore, is not atomic.

Nor can it be of medium size. In that case it must be either of the size of the body or greater or smaller than it. If it is assumed to be of the size of the body soul will change as the body changes from youth to old age, a conclusion not desir- able. If it is smaller than the body some exper- iences of the body will not be cognised by the soul which is never the case. If bigger, some experiences

§ Some hold that

possesses mi, others not.

(58)

Sect. 18]

Notes-

of the soul will be enjoyed outside the body which isthe

and as such must be the the medium

of all experiences.

Therefore, the only alternative left is to assume that is fag, all-pervading.

बुद्धि, सुख, दुःख, इच्छा द्वेष, प्रयत्न, धर्म, अधर्म भावनासंस्कार are विशेषगुणs of जीवात्मन् बुद्धि (नित्य), इच्छा, and प्रयत्न are the विशेषगुणs of परमात्मन्.

;

सुखदुःखादिरहितः – आदि includes धर्म, अधर्म etc.

For the discussion of the alleged Atheism of the वैशेषिकs and the नैयायिकs (see the Intro.)

१८ मनस्.

Tr. Mind is the means to the cognition of plea- sure etc. Being assigned to every soul minds are infinite in number, atomic and permanent.

Mind, according to the fs, performs a double function. First, it is accessory to the ams or external senses like : and, the perceptions of which are transmitted by the mind to the soul. ( cp. आत्मा मनसा सन्धुज्यते । मन इन्द्रियेण इन्द्रियमर्थेन ). Secondly it is the exclusive organ which perceives सुख, दुःख, इच्छा etc, and is, therefore, defined as सुखायुपलब्धिसाधनम्. In the first case, मनः acts as a helper to the महिरिन्द्रयs. In the second it acts as an independent with specific objects of its own.

Mind is atomic ( परमाणुरूपं ) :-

The

sets out an argument to prove view that

how is atomic as against the it is all–pervading.

(59)

-Noles

[ Sect. 18

If the mind were all-pervading (fay) it will never be in contact with the self which is also all–pervading. Because the rule is that two fay things cannot be conjoined. And absence of cont- act with the soul will result in an absence of cogn- itions ( ज्ञानानुत्पत्तिप्रसङ्गात् ).

Even if we were to admit that two fay things are conjoined, their conjunction will be eternal, never ending, because no action producing disjun- ction is possible in the case of the as which are, as a rule, क्रियारहित. And if the supposed विभु mind were to be in conjunction with the विभु आत्मन्, there will be no end to their conjunction and consequently no end to cognitions. We shall then get cognitions even in deep sleep. Because the fay mind, even after it enters the gun vein as it is supposed to do in deep sleep, will have some part of it outside the g, and this part will be in conjunction with the

outside the gua and thus even in deep sleep there will be cognitions necessarily resulting from आत्ममनःसंयोग. As this is against the very nature of gy in which cogniti ons are conspicuously absent ( सुखमहमस्वाप्सम् । न किश्चिद- वेदिषम् 1 ) मनसु cannot be admitted to be विभु. Tho

says that the atomic mind severs its conjun- ction with the self when it enters the gun in which soul is conspicuous by its absence and thus deep sleep devoid of cognitions is induced.*

The argument is defective particularly ir though fy does not pervade

assuming that

In स्वप्रावस्था the mind is situated on the border of quia and th

outer portion.

(60)

Sect. 19]

Notes-

the gun also, as it ought to do because a fag is joined to all corporcal objects. Some as seek to remove this defect by saying that in gaa also

does pervade. But no perception is caused because पुरीतत् is devoid of त्वगिन्द्रिय, 11 say they.

Some

It is evident that since a is not included under any of the four atomic भूतs ( पृथ्वी, general अप, तेजः and वायु) the stuff of which it is Remarks. made is, according to the

s, quite different from them as also from al¤9, 63,

दिक् and that are non-atomic or ay. Minds being atomic must be नित्य, the rule being that अणुद्रव्यs are and thus the minds of the selves will not perish even in प्रलय. That is why the as of the previous existence persist in this existence also.

Every has a mind which will belong to it forever. On account of the different minds different souls get different cognitions at the same moment. As each a possesses one mind, and s are an, minds also are . ( infinite

as the in number).

१९ रूप.

Tr. Colour is the quality that is perceived by the eye only. It is of seven kinds, white, blue, yellow, red, green, tawny and variegated. It abides in Earth, Water and Light Then, seven varieties can abide in Earth; in Water abides colour that is non-brilliant and white. And the brilliant white colour abides in Light.

वा सुषुप्तौ न किश्चिदपि ज्ञानमुत्पद्यते । सुषुप्तिकाले पुरीतति त्वगिन्द्रिया- भावेन तत्रस्थितमनसस्त्वक्संयोगासम्भवात् । -रामरुद्री cited in न्यायकोश.

(61)

-Notes

[ Sect. 19

चक्षुर्मात्राद्य - Because सङ्ख्या, संयोग, विभाग and पृथक्त्व are चक्षुर्प्राय but not चक्षुर्मात्रप्राह्य because they can be cognised by the falso.

गुणः The जाति, रूपत्व also is चक्षर्मात्रप्राय, the rule being that जाति is cognised by the same इन्द्रिय as व्यक्ति.

the word

To exclude [The student should note that different पदार्थ from रूपत्व which is पदार्थ. ]

has been inserted.

is a g which is a

सामान्य, a different

चित्ररूप : - One of the seven varieties of रूप is fa, which means the variegated colour such as we find in the case of a variegated feather of a peacock or the striped skin of a zebra or a tiger. Whatever substance possesses colours more than one will be described as चित्ररूपिन् by the तार्किक.

तर्कदीपिका

The develops the curiously subtle which may be elu-

argument for accepting a cidated in the following way.

If I am able to perceive an object with my eye, I do so because the object possesses a manifest colour, ( उद्भूतरूप), says the सार्किक. In other words,

gustara is a necessary condition for the ocular perception of an object and the pervades the whole of the abode () and not a part only like a. Thus if I see a white lotus it is because the

lotus possesses white colour which persists throughout the lotus; if I see the red cloth it is because it possesses the red colour throughout. Similarly when I see a rainbow or a spotted deer I do so because each of them possesses a colour that pervades throughout. What colour can it be? cannot say that it is or or any of the

( 62 )Sect. 20]

Noles-

or any

six varieties because I find that or of the six does not pervade the whole of the adode (a) as it ought to. So I must admit ? colour which is व्याप्यवृत्ति and this is the चित्ररूप of the तार्किकs.

There could have been another solution of the difficulty. I could have said that the rainbow consists of parts each possessing one colour (रूपवत्समवेत ) But this would have been a complex way of expla- ining a thing which can be more simply explained by admitting चित्ररूप. It is simpler to say that इन्द्रधनुः is perceptible because it possesses than to say that it is perceptible because it is रूपवत्समवेत. 2

All colours are found in a objects.

Note the peculiar theory of the fs regarding the colour of water which is now supposed to be colourless. The as hold that it is non-brilliant white. The als believes that the is bright white in तेजः.

बाधु, आकाश, काल, दिक, आत्मा and मनः, do not possess रूप at all.

२० रस.

Tr. Taste is the quality that can be apprehended by the sense of taste. And it is of six kinds:—(1) sweet, (2) sour, (3) saline, (4) pungent (3), (5) astringent and (6) bitter (lam). It abides in Earth

1 कणाद,

as for as I know, does not refer to चित्ररूप Even प्रशस्तपाद, does not admit it. It is off who refers to it first in his “

न्या. क. P. 30.

न्दली Cp. प्र. भा.

2 The neo-

(s) refuse to admit

as, thus

doing away with the necessity of admitting चित्ररूप Cp. मुक्तावली

p. 449,

(63)

-Notes

and Water.

[ Sect. 21

The six varieties are found in Earth. In

Water only the sweet taste is found.

The word : in the definition excludes tarana cp. the definition of .

Sweet taste is such as is found in a ripe mango, or, in a tame form in fresh water; sour taste is such as is found in sour grapes; saline is the taste of salt; pungent is found in substances like chilly; astri- ngent taste is found in substances like the skin of the (tree); bitter taste is found in quinine

and kindred substances.

Note that

is not admitted because we do

not get such a taste. If we experience several tastes of the same substance we do so not simult- aneously but one after the other.

२१ गन्ध.

Tr. Smell is the quality apprehended by the sense of smell. And it is of two kinds: (1) fragrant, and (2) non-fragrant. It abides in Earth exclusively.

For the propriety of the word in the defi- nition see under रूप and रस. चित्रगन्ध is not admitted, because in a substance where both gu and eg Пs are present one is bound to suppress the other and so we apprehend only सुरभि or असुरभि गन्ध. (cp. the दीपिका on पृथ्वी section ) गन्ध is a quality peculiar to Earth alone. That is why Earth is defined as ad. If rose-water possesses smell, it is due to the pre- sence of earthy particles therein.

1 शिवादित्य admits चित्ररस in his सप्तपदार्थी.

( 64 )

Sect. 23]

Notes-

२२ स्पर्श.

Tr. Couch is the quality that is apprehended only (a) by the sense of touch. And it is of three kinds: (1) cool, (2) hot, and (3) temperate. It subsists in Earth, Water, Light and Air. Of these, in water the cool touch is found; in light, the hot one. The temperate touch is found in Earth and Air.

त्वगिन्द्रियमात्रप्राह्यः – The word मात्र excludes गुण like सङ्ख्या, संयोग, विभाग which are त्वगिन्द्रियग्राह्य and also चक्षुप्रीत्य. I can feel two mangoes as much as I can see them. I can feel the ч of the table and the book and also see it.

qi :–If water is hct sometimes it is due to तेजःसंयोग.

If in gold which is : I do not feel the hot touch it is because the touch is suppressed by the touch of earth mixed with gold.

अनुष्णाशीतः - If we feel the शतितार्थ in the case of a slab of stone it is due ¬¬ààm. If we feel the breeze from the Jumna to be cool it is also due to जलसंयोग.

२३ नित्यत्व AND अनित्यत्व OF रूप, रस, गन्ध

AND स्पर्श.

Tr. The four qualities viz. Colour, (2) taste (3) smell and (4) touch as abiding in Earth are impermanent being produced by the application of of heat (). As abiding in the rest they are not produced by the application of heat and are per-

( 65 )

-Notes

[Sect. 23

manent or impermanent. As abiding in permanent substances they are permanent and impermanent as abiding in impermanent substances.

What is meant is this.

,

रूप, रस, गन्ध, and स्पर्श are eternal as abiding in the atoms of अप, तेजः, and वायु; and non-eternal as abiding in the products () of the atoms of these substances. To take the instance of :, an atom of तेजः will naturally possess रूप, रस, गन्ध, and which are as imperishable as the atoms themsel- ves. A product of : will possess these qualities but the product being a the qualities abiding in it will be also lasting only so long as the product lasts.

The case of gat is different. quafi do not naturally possess these

The atoms of qualities which are produced in them by the application of heat. ( पाक - तेजःसंयोग ) and hence अनित्य. When these qualities are a

atoms, need- less to say they will be af as abiding in products.*

as abiding in

पीलुपाकवादिन्s and पिठरपाकवादिन्s. ( See Intro. )

Of the several points in which a is supposed to differ from a

this is one. In explaining the change of colour caused in a black jar when it is baked the two schools resort to two theories. The वैशेषिकs who are पीलुपाकवादिन्s say that by the पाक ( तेजःसंयोग ) the jar is dissolved into its constituent atoms (Ti), which, then assume a red colour and are conjoined again into the red jar. Against

कणाद वै. सू. 7. 1. 6. कारणगुणपूर्वकाः पृथिव्यां पाकजा

(66)

Sect. 24]

Notes-

these, the नैयायिकs who are पिटरपाकवादिन्s hold that the whole jar (1) changes its colour by the baking without being dissolved into atoms.

The attitude of the as is more reasonable because an acceptance of the view of the Ïâ¤s will not account for the sameness of the jar before and after baking, a seems to hold the of view the वैशेषिकs.

२४ सङ्ख्या.

Tr. Number is the peculiar cause of usages rela. ting to oneness and the like. It subsists in all the nine substances ranging from one to the highest number qui). Oneness is eternal and non-eternal. As abiding in eternal objects it is eternal and non-eternal as abiding in non-eternal objects. Duality and other numbers are impermanent in all instances.

एकत्वादि… सङ्ख्याः - It is on account of number that we have recourse to usages such as ‘This is one’, ‘They are two’ and so on.

नवद्रव्यवृत्तिः - Note the wordद्रव्य. As a quality सङ्ख्या can abide only in द्रव्यs. In एकं रूप रसात् पृथक्, where, to all appearance, * and a subsist in s and tu, both Ts, the usage merely shows that and रूपत्व abide in the same abode i. e. एक रुपं shows एकत्ववत् रूपवत् द्रव्यम् So, पृथक्त्व and रस abide in the same द्रव्य. परार्धः - The 10th multiple of the मध्य and the

100th of 4, 1000th of asfa.

एकत्वं नित्यमनित्यं च etc.:–एकत्व in नित्य substances like a परमाणु, the श्राकाश or काल will be नित्य. In other

( 67 )

-Notes

[ Sect. 24

words, one cannot imagine the destruction of the एकत्व of one परमाणु of पृथ्वी, अप, तेजसः or वाधु or of आकाश or of one आत्मन् or of one मनस् or of one काल or of one f, because all these are imperishable.

will

One

But one

can easily understand how fa things i. e. products (f) beginning with a cease to be as soon as they are destroyed. bale of cotton will cease to be one as soon as it is loosened or destroyed. One book will cease to be one as soon as it is destroyed. In other words, their एकत्व is अनित्य.

द्वित्वादिकं तु सर्वत्रानित्यमेत्रः- Here अभ्रभट्ट follows a peculliar tenet of the s wherein they differ from the नैयायिकs. The वैशेषिकs hold that numbers from two onwards are all created (जन्य ) by अपक्षाबुद्धि and hence अनित्य. अपेक्षाबुद्धि, 1 so far as सङ्ख्या is concerned, is the apprehension of the unities of objects more than one अनेकैकत्वबुद्धि : = अनेकेषां एकत्वानां बुद्धिः-अयमेकः sqùa cælenîsi già:). When we see, say, three jars standing we cognise them as this is one’, ’this is one’, ’this is one’, and these cognitions collectively called age result in our cognising the totality of the objects, that is, their fa. According to the à, numbers, from two upwards are produced in the objects (ततो घटद्वये द्वित्वमुत्पद्यते) by अपेक्षाबुद्धि. According to the नैयायिकs अपेक्षाबुद्धि only enables us to cognise (ज्ञा) the numbers from two upwards which are therefore

C

The term is of wider application and denotes a relative notion. Cp. how प्रशस्तपाद

uses it in a wider sense with regard to the

and दिक्कत परव कालकृत

and अपरश्व. Cp. again

subjective nature of how मुक्तावलीं says अपेक्षा बुद्धिनाशेन नाशस्तेषा (परत्वापरत्वानां काल- Rasmat ) Azita: 11

(68)

Sect. 25]

not produced (4) but only made known Thus according to the

upwards are as much नित्य as एक.

Notes-

s, numbers from f

It must be admitted that the view of the s

is more reasonable than that of the

s because

numbers from duality onwards are not independ- ent of unity and are subjective.

२५ परिमाणम्

Tr. Dimension the special cause of the usages regarding measurement exists in the nine substances. And it is of four kinds: (1) atomic. (2) possessing magnitude (3) long and (4) short.

नवद्रव्यवृत्तिः – For all substances are either विभु : or मूर्त. विभुत्व is महत्व in the highest degree (परममहत्परिमाण).

मूर्त may be either अणुपरिमाण or अवान्तर महत्परिमाण.

तच चतुर्विधम्ः

Note that according to the तार्किक, अणुन्व and महत्त्व are as much opposed to each other as Vice and Virtue or good and bad. In other words, they are not different degrees of the same dimension. That is why they suppose that two ag products will be ag as two vices will make a man more vicious. It is easy to see how two मद्दत् things will make the product महत्तर.

474:—or magnitude results from either (1) ACT e. g. two large bales of cotton make a lar- ger bale or (2) smaga e. g. three (and hence) Es which though erg and supersensuous give which is because perceptible or (3) яwash (particular arrangement) e. g. when a

rise to a

( 69 )

-Noles

[ Sect. 26

bale of cotton appears bigger or smaller according

to pressure.

अणु and परममहत्ः - ( बिशु) things are अतीन्द्रिय. Only अवान्तरमद्दत् things can be इन्द्रियमाह्य

अणुमहद्दीर्घ हस्वं चेतिः - Note

is not scientific; because g and

that the division

refer to the

cubical contents while दीर्घत्व and हस्वत्व are linear in nature and as such included in the

. Again,

दीर्घत्व and हस्त्व are not different dimensions but different degrees of the same dimension.

परिमाण is permanent as abiding in नित्यद्रव्यs and impermanent in अनित्यम्यs.

२६ पृथक्त्व.

Tr. Individuality is the special cause of usages relating to non-identity.

que is what enables us to say that is different from यज्ञदत्त.

पृथ्वस्व e. g. देववतो यादत्तात् पृथक is to be distinguished from अन्योन्याभाव eg. देवदतो यज्ञदत्तो न. The former gives a positive idea, the latter negative. While the latter rests with a mere denial, the former asserts in addition that it is something. We can say, गुणो न, but we cannot say, इव्यं गुणात्पृथक, because, ग्रन्य and

are inseparably connected. But as we can say रामः लक्ष्मणो न we can also say, रामः लक्ष्मणात् पृथक. Thus it is not always possible to predicate TMTMTMTMTM of a thing of which

can be predicated, though the reverse is possible.

( 70 )

Sect. 28 ]

Noles-

!

२७ संयोग.

Tr. Conjunction the particular cause of usages relating to conjoined things abides in all substances.

संयोग can be either produced by action ( कर्मज ) or produced by another conjunction (). When I touch a book with my hand, the संयोग is कर्मज. When there is हस्तपुस्तकसंयोग, there is काय (body ) पुस्तकसंयोग which is thus संयोगज, कर्मज संयोग may be again either अन्यतरकर्मज - eg. वृक्षकपिसंयोग ( कर्म being only on the part of कपि ) or उभयकर्मज ( e. g. महसंयोग where action resides in both the wrestlers). is a that abides only in a part of the pigs ( Only a part of the tree comes in conjunction with a part of the body of the monkey) and hence is called

संयोग presupposes विभाग. Nothing can be संयुक्त which was not ; in other words, disjoined things only are conjoined. For difference between aầìn and समवाय, see समवाय. Section 8.

२८ विभाग.

Tr. Disjunction, the quality that destroys conju‐ nction, resides in all substances.

Just as संयोग presupposes विभाग, विभाग presupposes In other words, there cannot be any disjun- ction unless the things were first conjoined. We cannot say that the horns of a bull are fit because they were never संयुक्त विभाग is to be distinguished from the which produces the f, hence the word has been inserted in the definition. fti

(71)

-Notes

[ Sect. 29

is not mere but something positive brought about by action.

The as and 3⁄4” admit of two kinds कमज and विभागज ( कर्मणा हस्तपुस्तकविभागः, हस्तपुस्तकविभागात्काय- पुस्तक विभाग :). The नैयायिकs who admit कर्मजविभाग refuse to admit the second variety on the score that the a of the TM, to take up the instance, is the same as that of the body and hence what is called ET विभाग ultimately proves to be कर्मज only. The वैशेषिक rightly say that the

of the part cannot be the * of the whole- the wheels in a watch may move but the watch does not move-and hence when there is कायपुस्तक विभाग it is due to विभाग only and not कर्मन् which abides only in a part of the body . When once you admit संयोगजसंयोग you must admit विभागजविभाग.

विभाग may be again अन्यतरकमेज or उभयकर्मजे ( वृक्षकपि- वियोगः and त्रयोवियोगः are instances of the two.)

Note that in the case of विभुद्रव्यs only अन्यतरकर्मज संयोग or विभाग is possible because विभु^ substances are incapable of कर्मन्.

२९ परत्वापरत्वे

Tr. Remoleness and Nearness are the special causes relating to being remote or near. They abide in the four substances beginning with earth and in the mind. They are of two kinds: those that are brought about by space and by time. The remoteness caused by space abides in one who stays at a distance. The nearness caused by space is found in one who stays near. The remoteness due to time is found in one who is senior (in age). The nearness due to time is found in one who is junior (in age).

(72)Scct. 31 ]

पृथिव्यादिचतुष्टय मनोवृत्तिनीः

Notes -

कालकृतपरत्व or अपरत्व presupposes अनित्यत्व which is present in the कार्य forms ( अनित्या कार्यरूपा ) of पृथ्वी, अप् तेजः, and वायु. देशकृत परत्व or अपरत्व presupposes मूर्तत्व (absenceof विभुत्व ) which is present in पृथ्वी, अप्, तेजः, वाधु ( both परमाणुरूप and कार्यरूप ) and मनः ( being atomic ).

कालकृतरत्व or अपरत्व shows distance in time.

""

space.

दिक्कतपरत्व or परत्व and अपरत्व are subjective (gram) that is why man says that they are destroyed on the अपेक्षाबुद्धिनाश.

३० गुरुत्व

Tr. Gravily or Weight is the non-intimate cause of the fall in the initial stage. It abides in Earth and Water.

आद्यपतन etc.

When the mango falls to the ground its fall is initiated by but later contin- ued by velocity (). In other words, the first is caused by a while the subsequent continu- ation of the is due to according to the wikas. Modern physics holds that the subsequent 7 is also due to gravity. The definition clearly implies that by the aft meant gravity or weight.

गुरुत्व तार्किक This is in conflict with the statement (see EI section गुणs ) लघुत्वस्य गुरुत्वाभावरूपत्वात् because even light bodies possess weight (so there has to be taken in a different sense i. e. that of heaviness).

For understanding af, see the section on causation.

३१ द्रवत्व

Tr. Fluidity, the non-intimate cause of the flow

(73)

-Notes

[ Sect. 32

in the initial stage abides in Earih, Water and Light. It is of two kinds; natural and artificial. The natural fluidity is found in water; the artificial in Earth and Light. The fluidity in earthy substances like ghee is produced by contact with fire. It abides in luminous substances like Gold.

आयस्यन्दन Cp. आद्यपतन in the definition of गुरुत्व. The act of flowing in the first instance is due to but is continued in the subsequent stages, by वेग, according to the तार्किकs.

Water alone possesses natural fluidity. In the case of products like , and 3⁄4ã products like gaf, the fluidity is artificial being produced by the application of heat (:). ́ ́If water in the form of snow and sleet is solid, it is due to an उपाधि [ हिमकरकयोरोपाधिकद्रव्यत्वनिरोधात्सूर्य किरण भूमिसंयोगादिनो- पाधिनिवृत्तिमात्रम् । न तु द्रवत्वलत्तिः • वाक्यवृत्ति. ]

३२ स्नेह.

Tr Viscidity the quality which is the special cause of agglutination of powder etc abides only in water.

चूर्णादिपिण्डी भावहेतुः - When particles of dust or flour are held together by water, it is due to the quality of present therein. If milk or oil or ano- ther liquid can effect the same thing, the aufta accounts for it by saying that this is due to the presence of watery particles in the liquid. (grad) a तदन्तर्गतजलभागस्यैव स्नेह उपलभ्यते) Could we not assign पिण्डीकरण (agglutination) to इवत्व ? No, says the तार्किक, for molten gold though possessed of, cannot effect it. is a quality peculiar to water.

(74)

Sect. 34]

Notes-

३३ शब्द

Tr. Sound, the quality which is apprehended by the sense of hearing abides only in Ether. It is of two kinds: (1) inarticulate and (2) articulate. The inarticulate is such as is found in the case of drum

etc

The articulate takes forms like the Sanskrit

Language.

आकाशमात्रवृत्तिः- शब्द is a गुण peculiar to आकाश alone. Note the different threefold division given in the तर्कदीपिका. The words in the दीपिका, भेर्याकाशमारभ्य श्रोत्रपर्यन्तं द्वितीयादिशब्दाः शब्दजाः are important as throwing light on the idea regarding the transmission of sound. If one hears the sound of a trumpet blown at a distance it is due to the sound at the origin producing another sound and so forth till the last sound so produced reaches the ear. The

being nothing but is incapable of motion. There are two views regarding the way in which sound is transmitted. Some hold that the series of sounds travels only in one direction like the waves of the ocean (aîsîal 7). Others hold that the series radiates in all directions like the filaments of a कदम्ब flower ( कदम्बगोलक or कदम्बमुकुलन्याय ) that shoot forth in every direction. Considering that the same sound is heard on all sides, the second theory appears more reasonable.

of the

hold

The fs hold a to be an against the view ts who regard it as . The digi¤¤s

to be a go and not a г.

३४ बुद्धि

Tr. Cognition is knowledge which is the source of

(75)

-Notes

[ Sect. 34

all dealings. It is of two kinds: (1) Remembrance and (2) Experience.

(

व्यवहारहेतुः - Some render व्यवहार by ‘utterance of words’ saying that there are some dealings like walking in sleep which are not . But the same objection might be raised against the utt- erance of words’ which also are spoken in sleep without any ga preceding them. For all practical purposes dealings’ is a good rendering; because we see that our everyday transactions are a result of cognitions.

<

बुद्धि does not mean mind’ which is an inde- pendent substance; nor does it mean the process of cognition, understanding. It means the result of cognition; apprehension. Thus when I smell a flower, the गन्धप्रतीति is the बुद्धि.

स्मृति and अनुभव,

Tr. Remembrance is knowledge produced only by impression. Experience is knowledge other than

remembrance.

संस्कारः– स्मृति must be always preceded by

which leaves an impression on the mind called भावना. भावना संस्कार is the sole cause of स्मृति. When I see a beautiful picture ( अनुभव ) an impression भावना is left on my mind which is responsible for my remembering the picture afterwards.

संस्कारमात्र जन्यः – The word मात्र is inserted in the definition to exclude प्रत्यभिज्ञा ( सोऽय देवदत्तः ) in which one recognises the object before him to be the same that he had apprehended before. In and प्रत्यभिज्ञा, the भावना संस्कर does operate. But while in

(76)

Sect. 35]

Notes-

प्रत्यभिज्ञा it is the sole ( मात्र ) operating cause, in प्रत्यभिज्ञा the as well as the actual presence of the object ire necessary. When I remember, he is rot present before me; when. I recognise :he same whom I saw before

before me. In other words in

to be

a must be present

there is only;

in प्रत्यभिज्ञा there are तत्ता and इदन्ता both.

तद्भिनं ज्ञानमनुभवः The definition based on exclusion shows how difficult it is to define a in any precise terms based on its attributes.

३५ अनुभव, यथार्थ and अयथार्थ,

Tr. It is of two kinds: (1) right and (2) wrong. Right experience is that in which an object is cognised as possessing those altributes (:) which it does possess; e. g. the cognition, this is silver’, with regard to silver. This is also called ¤¤. Wrong experience is that in which an object is cognised as possessing those attributes which it does not possess. e. g. the cognition of silver in the mother-o’-pearl.

तद्वति तत्यकारकः अनुभवः- प्रकार is what distinguishes cognition of one object from that of another. In the cognition of घर, घरव is the प्रकार which dis- tinguishes घटज्ञान from other ज्ञानs like पटज्ञान. So तद्वति त- प्रकारक means, to take the instance of घट, घटत्ववति (घटे ) qzantes: &ght; which, in plain words, means that in 4 we cognise an object as it really is. In qi, on the other hand, the object is cognised as being what it is not. When a blind man is scared by a garland mistaken for a snake, there is अयथार्थानुभव.

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-Noles

यथार्थानुभव or प्रमा

[ Sect. 36

प्रत्यक्ष

अनुमिति

उपमिति

शाब्दज्ञान

अयथार्थानुभव

संशय

विपर्यय

तर्क

३६ यथार्थानुभव.

Tr. Right apprehension is of four kinds: ( 1 ) Direct knowledge, ( 2 ) Inferred knowledge, ( 3 ) Knowledge by comparison and (4) Verbal knowledge. The instruments of these are also of four kinds, viz. (1) Direct perception ( 2 ) Inference ( 3 ) Comparison and ( 4 ) Word.

प्रत्यक्षज्ञानः is बहिरिन्द्रियप्रत्यक्ष like घटप्रत्यक्ष where घट is cognised by the eye or अन्तरिन्द्रिय ( अन्तःकरण ) प्रत्यक्ष like सुखदुःखप्रत्यक्ष where सुख or दुःख are cognised by the mind.

अनुमितिज्ञानः- where, for instance, one infers the पर्वत to be वह्निमान् on seeing that it is धूमवान्,

‘उपमितिज्ञानः- where, for instance, an ignorant man to whom a ‘buffalo’was described,recognises an animal in the forest to be a buffalo, thus connecting the term with its appropriate object.

शाब्दज्ञानः- where, for instance, we understand that we are to do a certain thing, because the fes have say that we must do it. With reference to right apprehension the student should master the difference between the following terms:-

प्रभातृः - The recipient of the knowledge.

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Sect. 37]

प्रमाणः-The means to knowledge. प्रमेय : - The object of knowledge.

NotesTM

प्रमितिः The knowledge resulting from प्रमाण.

प्रमातृ

प्रमेय

प्रमाण

प्रमिति

प्रत्यक्षीकर्तृ

प्रत्यक्षवस्तु

प्रत्यक्षप्रमाण

प्रत्यक्षज्ञान

अनुमातृ

अनुमेयवस्तु अनुमान

अनुमिति

उपभातृ

उपमेयवस्तु उपमान

उपमिति

शब्दज्ञातृ

शब्दज्ञेयवस्तु

शब्द

शब्दज्ञान

३७ करण.

Gr. Instrument is a cause that is peculiar (to the effect in question ).

अभह defines करण because he has referred to thes, in the earlier section, of the four kinds of right apprehension.

is the cause which is peculiar to the effect in question. Thus is the only instrument for getting प्रत्यक्षज्ञान, अनुमान is the peculiar instrument for getting अनुमिति and so on.

What is meant by करण or असाधारणकारण ? If we take the instance of the lopping of a log of wood with an axe, the axe is the असाधारणकारण, according to the definition. So long as the axe is not there, there cannot be any lopping. Consequently fanta consists in being indispensable in the production of the effect. Well might one ask, is not the log as indispensable as the axe or more so? No doubt the log is indispensable for the fett but it is not व्यापारवत् as the करण ought to be. It is the व्यापारवत् असाधारणकारण that is the करण. The axe possesses the व्यापार necessary for the lopping of the log of wood;

(79)

-Notes

[ Sect. 38

. In short, object with work. But

the log of wood does not possess the करण is the instrument and not the regard to which the instrument is to is not the wood-cutter ? He is, but only secondarily. The for the cutting of the wood abides primarily in the axe, and only secondarily in the wood-cutter. Take away the axe, and what can the wood-cutter do? The wood-cutter can be substituted by another person who shall have to take the help of the axe. In view of this explan- ation it will be clear how ’s definition ought to be modified by adding the word व्यापारवत्..

Two views regarding :-The ancients and the moderns are divided on the question of the nature of . According to the ancients (who define करण as व्यापारवदसाधारणं कारणं) करण is the instrument possess - ing the व्यापार (व्यापारवत ). According to the moderns ( who define करण as फलायोगव्यव छिङ्कारण ) करण is the व्यापार itself immediately followed by the effect. It should be seen that the attitude of the moderns is consis- tent throughout regarding the nature of the The ancients, on the other hand, are inconsistent in defining करण as व्यापारवदसाधारणं कारणं, and saying in the same breath that लिङ्गज्ञान or व्याप्तिज्ञान which is a गुण and as such व्यापारराहत ( and not मनम् ) is करण अभभट्ट who follows the ancients in his definitions is

01 en to the same charge of inconsistency so far as the question of the करणs of अनुमिति and उपमिति is concer- ned. It will be seen that is to be subsumed

under the निमित्तकारण of the तार्किक,

38 THE THEORY OF CAUSATION. Cause is what invariably (fa) precedes the effect.

The word excludes things which may

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Sect. 38 ]

Notes-

precede the cause, sometimes but not always thus proving that they are not necessary for producing the effect and are, therefore, not causes.

ass of the potter may manufacture of the pot dispensed away with in

The

sometimes precede the but its agency may be many cases. Thus it is

not a and hence cannot be an of the pot.

पर्ववर्तिः– The cause must precede the effect If

alone was used the effect also will be embraced by the definition because it is invariably present. (cp. the dif¤)

Now, there are so may things which are नियतपूर्ववर्ति but nct कारणs तन्तुरूप is नियतपूर्ववर्ति of पट. The कुलालजनक is नियतपूर्ववर्ति of the घट, but if these were accepted as Rs, many things near or remote connected with the by an invariable antecedence will have to be accepted ass which is not desirable. Hence the adds the limiting clause mazuilaza aid to the definition. The clause means “provided the causal capacity is not exhausted (m) in producing something else.” So the complete definition of is

अनन्यथासिद्धत्वे सति नियतपूर्ववर्तिकारणम्.

The दीपिका gives three cases of अन्यथासिद्धि which though not exhaustive, are yet indicative of the general principle that everything that invariably precedes is not the cause. That the cases are by no means exhaustive is borne out by the fact that the raises the number to five.

The

gives the following cases:-

येन सहैव यस्य यं प्रति पूर्ववृत्तित्वमवगम्यते तं प्रति तदन्यथासिद्धम् which excludes cases like from being regarded the cause of पट. (तन्तुना सहैव तन्तुरूपस्य परं प्रति पूर्ववृत्तित्यभव

( 81 )

-Noles

[ Sect. 38

गम्यते (अतः ) पर प्रति तन्तुरूपमन्यथासिद्धम् ). Because तन्तुs prece- de पट, तन्तुरूप must precede पट. Note that according to the as the causal capacity of is exhausted ( अन्यथासिद्ध ) in producing पटरूप, hence it is not अनन्यथासिद्ध so far as पर is concerned.

२. अन्यं प्रति पूर्ववृत्तित्व ज्ञाते एव यस्य यं प्रति पूर्ववृत्तित्वमवग- म्यते तं प्रति तदन्यथासिद्धम् which excludes cases like the potter’s father from being regarded the cause of .

[ कुलालं ( घटकारं ) प्रति ( लस्य पितुः ) पूर्ववृत्तित्वे ज्ञाते एव कुलालजनकस्य घटं प्रति पूर्ववृत्तित्वमवगम्यते (अतः ) घटं प्रति कुलालजनकः अन्यथासिद्धः ] The कुलाल जनक precedes the कुलाळ and must hence be naturally earlier than the . And since he is the cause of कुलाल he is अन्यथासिद्ध so far as is concerned.

3. अन्यत्र वकृप्तनियतपूर्ववर्तिन एवं कार्यसम्भवे तत्सह भूतमन्य - थासिद्धम् this excludes cases like रूपप्रागभाव being regarded the cause of गन्ध. [ अपाकजस्थले क्लप्त ( शक्त ) नियत - पूर्ववर्तिनः गन्धप्रागभावादेव गन्धकार्यसम्भवे पाकजस्थले गन्धप्रागभाव- सहभूतः रुपप्रागभावः अन्यथासिद्धः ] Just imagine a jar after it is baked when it comes to have गन्ध and रूप. Speaking only about, what is it due to? Before the jar was baked there was गन्धप्रागभाव as well as रूपप्रागभाव ie both गन्ध & रूप were absent. Was it गन्धप्राग- भाव or रूपप्रागभाव that was responsible for गन्ध ? The reply is, गन्धप्रागभाव alone is responsible, for else- where ( अपाकजस्थल ), we have found that गन्धप्रागभाव is by itself an adequate ( वलत ) cause to produce गन्ध. (Note that the s regard of a thing as

one of its causes. )

Thus these cases of अन्यथा सिद्धि prove that ( 1 ) a thing in 14 relation with the cause (2) the ant- ecedent of the cause and (3) a thing coexisting with the cause are not to be regarded as causes.

(82)Sect. 39]

Notes-

३९ कार्य

Tr. The effect is the counter-entity of anteced-

ent negation.

is, as we have seen before, the thing

a

is predicated.

of which the

is the non- existence of a thing before it is produced. So means a thing which was not existent

before but later comes into existence.

This definition of

is based on the peculiar which the ans hold and very realistic. The aftas

view about causation which has made them hold that the effect () is not at all existent before it appears. The effect comes into existence quite anew, they say. That is why they are called असत्कार्यवादिन्s and are in conflict with other schools like the साङ्ख्य, योग, and the वेदान्त that assert that the effect does exist in the cause. In other words, while the assay that and are distinct the वेदान्तिन्s and kindred schools say they are not (cp. वाचारम्भणं विकारो नामधेय मृत्तिकेत्यव सत्यम् - छान्दोग्य. )

did not exist at all before open to the charge that came out of nothing,

This view that the production makes the it amounts to saying that a view similar to the Buddhists If the effect did not exist at all and sprang anew, why is it that out of earth we get earthen things only and not golden ones and out of gold only golden things and not earthy ones, both being equally au? The as refute this objection by taking the help of the lame theory of . The effect is linked with the cause by ¤, they say. That is why while preparing a gold earring one goes in for gold alone and not earth and for earth alone while preparing

(83)

-Noles

[ Sect. 40

an earthen jar. घट is connected by समवाय with मृत्तिका and not with gf. That is why particular causes produce particular effects.

, at one stroke, demolishes the fabric of the theory of red by asking where could समवाय which is a सम्बन्ध reside when one of the सम्बन्धिन्

was not at all existent and the fis

viz. the non-plussed.

40 THREE KINDS OF CAUSES

Tr. Causes are of three kinds: 1. Intimate cause. 2. Non-intimate cause and 3. Instrumental cause.

समवायिकारण

Tr. Intimate cause is that in intimate connection with which the effect is produced. e. g. the threads are (the intimate cause) of the cloth and the cloth of its own colour.

समवायिकारण also called उपादानकारण can be predicated of only three out of the seven पदार्थs. Only अनित्य द्रव्य, गुण and कर्मन् can have a समवायिकारण सामान्य, विशेष and समवाय, and अत्यन्ताभाव being नित्य can have no कारण at all. प्रागभाव has no beginning and hence no कारण. प्रध्वंसाभाव andअन्योन्याभाव are अनित्य but their cause can- not be

because a being negative can- not enter into a relation with anything. There- fore, we can assert a समवायिकारण of द्रव्य, गुण and कर्मन् only.

The समवायिकारण which thus can be predicated of द्रव्य, गुण and कर्मन् will be found to be इव्य only.

कपाa is the समवायिकारण of घट, उत्पल is the समवायि-

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Sect. 40]

Notes-

कारण of the नीलरूप, चक्र is समवायिकारण of the भ्रमणकर्मन

abiding in it.

These are the

tive कार्यs are in समवायसम्बन्ध ( समवत ) with them.

fans because the respec-

can

When we thus understand that

be asserted of द्रव्य, गुण and कर्मन् only, we can easily point out the समवायिकारण of any द्रव्य, गुण or कर्मन्. If I want to point out the समवायिकारण of a द्रव्य, I shall place my finger on the s or constituent parts of which it is made. If I want to point out the समवायिकारण of a गुण or a कर्मन्, I shall point to the abode viz. the in which they abide. Consequ- ently in all instances the समवायिकारण will be a द्रव्य. In cther words, समवायिकारण is the अवयव, in the pair अवयव - अवयविन् and गुणिन् and क्रियावान् in the pairs गुण- गुणिन् and क्रिया- क्रियावान् respectively.

असमवायिकारण.

Tr. Non-intimate cause is the cause which is connected with one and the same object by intimate connection, along with the effect or cause of the latter. e. g. The conjunction of threads is the non- intimate cause of the piece of cloth, and the colour of the threads is the non-intimate cause of the colour of the piece of cloth.

असमवायिकारणः If it is easy to detect the समवायिकारण. of a कार्य, it is not so easy to detect the असमवायिकारण Really speaking, असमवायिकारण is a very misleading name given to a cause which is closely. knit to the समवायिकारण and which plus the समवायिकारण amount to the effect. erant is thus to be taken to mean समवायीतर, and not समवायिविरुद्ध as it is likely to be interpreted. कपाल is the समवायिकारण of घट. But

(85)

-Notes

घट is not mere

3s_but

[ Sect. 40

कपालs

s but something more. plus their संयोग is घट. So कपालसंयोग is the असमवायिकारण of घट. Similarly तन्नुसंयोग is the असमवायिकारण of पट.

To take the असमवायिकारण of a गुण, नीररूप has उत्पल for the समवायिकारण. But mere उत्पल ( द्रव्य ) consisting of petals does not account for the total

It is 3

() of

the उत्पल.

and the " that amounts to the नीलरूप as abiding in the उत्पल. Thus, दलरूप ( colour of petals) is the असमवाविकारण of the उत्पलरूप. Similarly तन्दुरूप is the असमवायिकारण of पटरूप.

To take the असमवायिकारण of a क्रिया or कर्मन्, the भ्रमण of the wheel has the wheel as the समवायिकारण. But mere wheel does not account for the . The wheel must be moved by the hand of the mechanic before it moves In other words, यान्त्रिकद्दस्तचक्रसंयोग is the असमवायिकारण of the भ्रमण of the चक्र.

From the above illustrations it must have become clear that we can speak of the A&R¶ of such an effect only, of which we can predicate a

. In other words, there cannot be any असमवायिकारण of an effect, if there is no समवायिकारण. And similarly, when one speaks of the anafar of a thing we can be sure that the thing must also have an असमवायिकारण.

As समवायिकारण is possible to be predicated of onlyद्रव्य, गुण and कर्मन्, we can speak of the असमवायिकारण of these is only.

It should be seen that the असमवायिकारण of a द्रव्य is always the # of its was (constituent parts); that of a is always the 4 of the substratum of the कर्म ( कर्मधार ) with another object like the mechanic’s hand; that of a y is another similar गुण (तन्तुरूप, असमवायिकारण of पटरूप ) or another dissimilar

( 86 )

Sect. 40 ]

Notes-

गुग [ बहुत्वसङ्ख्या ( गुण ), the असमवायिकारण of परिमाण ( गुण) in घ्यणुक ] or क्रिया ( कपि क्रिया the असमवायिकारण of कपिवृक्षसंयोग ).

The श्रसमवायिकारण, therefore, stands close to the समवायिकारण and is hence described as समवायिकारणप्रत्यासन. Thus a proximity will be found to be of two kinds कार्यैकार्थप्रत्यासत्ति and कारणैकार्थप्रत्यासत्ति, also called लघ्वी and मद्दती प्रत्यासत्ति respectively

When the तर्कसङ्ग्रह defines असमवायिकारण as कार्येण सदैकस्मिन्नर्थे समवेतः वे सति कारणमसमवायिकारणम् it refers to कार्यैकार्थ- प्रत्यासत्ति तन्तुसंयोग is असमवायिकारण of this variety. Because it is ( तन्तूनां ) पदात्मककार्येण सह एकस्मिंस्तन्त्वात्मके कारणे समवेत i. e. संयोग being a गुण is समवेत with the तन्तुs with which is समवेत also the पट there effect because तन्तु is अवयव, and पट, अवयविन्. When again, the तर्कसङ्ग्रह defines असमवायिकारण as कारणेन सह एकस्मिन्नर्थे समवेतत्वे सति कारणं it refers to का- कार्थप्रत्यासत्ति सन्तुरूप is of this variety. Because, तन्तुरूप is कारणेन पटेन सह एक नस्तन्तौ समवेत i. c. it is connected by समवाय with the same ng with which is connected its cause पर by the same relation (i. c. समवाय ). हस्तचसंयोग is कार्यकार्थप्रत्यासन्न. Because the संयोग abides in ar by समवाय, in which the भ्रमण, its क र्य also abides by समवाय ( Dissolve कार्येण or कारणेन सह एकस्मिन्नर्थेन त्यासत्ति; )

Thus the असमवायिकारण of a द्रव्य or कर्म will always be कार्यैकार्थप्रत्यासन्न. That of गुण may be कारणैकार्थप्रत्यासन्न as in the above instance or कार्यैकार्थप्रत्यासन्न ( cp. पात्रजगन्ध has तेजः संयोग for its असमवायिकारण which is कायकार्थप्रत्यासन्न ).

From what has been said above, one can find out the असमवायिकारण by setting his finger on the cause which plus the समवायिकारण are embodied in the effect.

(87)

-Notes

[ Sect. 42

निमित्तकारण

Tr. Different from both of these is the instrumen- tal cause, as the shuttle or loom of the piece of cloth.

Whatever cause cannot come under any or असमवायि is निमित्तकारण. Thus the agent, instrument and such other causes will come under the broad class of fat. Time, space, God’s will, Destiny and antecedent negation are the साधारण निमित्तकारणs because they operate while each and everything in the world is produced.

निमित्तकारण can be predicated of द्रव्य, गुण and कर्म and also of प्रध्वंसाभाव and अन्योन्याभाव. Thus when a घट is destroyed the घटप्रध्वंसाभाव has for its निमित्तकारण the several things operating to destroy the . Similarly when I say राम is not लक्ष्मण, the अन्योन्याभाव is produced by the उत्पत्ति of राम and लक्ष्मण which, therefore, is the निमित्तकारण of the अन्योन्याभाव.

४१ करण.

Tr. Therefore of these three varieties of causes that alone which is the special cause is the

.

As we have seen before the idea of , whether according to the old school or new (i. e. whether the instrument or ) makes it come under निमित्तकारण only.

४२ प्रत्यक्ष.

Tr. Of them (=1819ge4qxd ) perception is the peculiar cause of Direct knowledge. Direct knowledge is knowledge produced by the contact of the senses and the objects. It is of two kinds: indeterminate and

(88)

Sect. 42 1

Notes-

determinate. Indeterminate knowledge is knowledge of a thing without apprehending its attributes; e. g. This is something.’ Determinate knowledge is knowledge of a thing with an apprehension of its attributes e. g. This is a Brahmin, this (man) is black.

Having given the four broad divisions of यथार्थानुभव or प्रमा viz. (प्रत्यक्ष, अनुमिति, उपमिति and शाब्द ),

Яn describes them in order.

In the case of प्रत्यक्ष, the करण and कार्य are both given the same name. Thus while the process which gives us direct knowledge is called я, the result viz. the direct knowledge is also called qe. In the case of the other varieties of knowledge viz. अनुमति, उपमिति and शाब्दज्ञान, the करण and कार्य are named differently : अनुमान is the करण, अनुमिति the कार्य; उपमान the करण, उपमिति, the कार्य; शब्द the करण, शाब्दज्ञान the कार्य

MA,

इन्द्रियार्थ सन्निकर्षजन्यं ज्ञानं प्रत्यक्षम् Note that अनुमिति, उपमिति and शाब्दज्ञान are also इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षजन्य, Thus before I infer पर्वतो वह्निमान् there must be चक्षुर्धमसन्निकर्ष. Similarly, when I get the उपमिति गवयशब्दवाच्योऽयं, there must be aff; Again, when I get सन्ध्यामुपासीत, there must be श्रोत्रशब्दसन्निकर्ष. How then are we to differentiate a from all these? The reply is that while प्रत्यक्ष is इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षजन्य exclusively, other varieties of knowledge are as much depen- dent on

as on other mental processes. सविकल्पक and निर्विकल्पक Indeterminate knowledge is the stage that precedes determinate knowledge. When I get a cognition e. g. (ч aan) this cogni- tion must have been preceded by another when I cognised the only as something existing किमपि. In other words, in the stage of निर्विकल्पक I

(89)

-Notes

[ Sect. 42

only cognise the सविकल्पक stage, (घटं जानामि ) I become more definite and connect the सत्ताज्ञान with some attributes ( प्रकार ) घटत्व etc. which I know already but which I had not connected with the thing in question in the afte¶¤ stage. It should be seen that in

what

of the thing, while, in the

takes place is merely the co-ordination of the of the निर्विकल्पक stage with the ज्ञान of the जाति, व्यक्ति, गुण or क्रिया which I had had already as a result of my past experience but which I had not connected with the a

stage. For if I did not know what or is I could not have said, si, ds, etc.

in the

Thus सविकल्पक ज्ञान is the sum - total of निर्विकल्पकज्ञान

which I possessed already.

plus the

As प्रत्यक्ष is इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षजन्य, precisely speaking, निर्विकल्पक ज्ञान alone is प्रत्यक्ष, सविद्यल्पक being something more than . But, for all practical purposes, it is better to admit सविकल्पक as प्रत्यक्ष also, because on it are based all our experiences in life. It should be seen that the Buddhists admitted Affe alone to

be real.

This explains the definitions, निष्प्रकारकज्ञान and सप्रकारकज्ञान in the text. In किमपीदं, the ज्ञान is without any attributes ( प्रकार =श’न विशेषण ); in घटोsय, the ज्ञान is विशिष्ट by the प्रकार, घटत्व. The detailed definitions विशेषणविशेष्यसम्बन्धानवगाहिज्ञानं & विशेषणविशेष्यसम्बन्धावगाहिज्ञान in the दीपिका mean the same thing. In निर्विकल्पक, no reference is made (aq) to the connection of the thing ( विशेष्य ) ( इदं किमपि ) with its attribute (विशेषण) (घटत्व) though both are there, vis, सत्ताज्ञान and the घटत्वादि

of past experience. In afa, there is reference ( भवगाहि) to this connection of विशेषण and विशेध्य.)

(90)

Sect. 42]

Noles-

विकल्प Note that the विकल्प or determinateness consists in apprehending, either a like ma; or go like शुक्ल, नील; or क्रिया like चलन; or व्यक्ति (also called द्रव्य ) like देवदत्त, डित्थ. Sometimes we may cognise only some of these; sometimes all. : grad fta: (डित्थः the name of the bull ) summarise the विकल्पs. The तार्किकs hold that निर्विकल्पकप्रत्यक्ष is inferred only. The inference stated in the Every qualified cognition must the cognition of the attributes. the दण्डि of a man, I must

This knowledge of 40

amounts to this. be preceded by Before I cognise

know the दण्ड.

must be

shall be confronted with the विशेषण of each preceding ज्ञान. the stage of निविकल्पकप्रत्यक्ष

a

lest we

in our search for

And this proves

Note that ईश्वर’s ज्ञान is always सविकल्पक प्रत्यक्ष.

इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षः– Thus there will be प्रत्यक्ष of the sight (g), of the sense of hearing (),of the sense of taste (a), of the sense of touch (xarda ), of the sense of smell (a) and of the mind ( मानस ).

सन्निकर्ष

Tr. The contact of the senses with their objects which is the cause of direct knowledge can be of six kinds, viz. (1) conjunction, (2) the intimate relation with the things conjoined, (3) the intimate relation with what is intimately related with the things conjoined, (4) intimate relation, (5) intimate relation with the intimately related, (6) and the relation of the attri- bute and the thing qualified.

The author now proceeds to describe the varie- ties of contact of the senses with their objects which are six in number.

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-Notes

[Sect. 43

[[४३]]

SIX KINDS OF सन्निकर्ष.

(1)

Cr. Conjunction is the contact when, with the eye, the direct perception of a jar is produced.

Here the sight directly gets joined to the object, the theory being that the travels to its object and returns with an image thereof.

The theory of perception: The gives the process of direct perception. All our experiences are the outcome of our and a. So, in order

that the soul should suffer pain or enjoy plea- sure, to be derived from direct perception, it com- es in contact with the mind which in its turn is connected with the sense, the latter getting again in contact with the object. The resultant experi- ence whether pleasant or otherwise is the outcome of our ч or (merit or demerit ).

धर्म अधर्म

As अनुमति, उपभिति and शाब्दज्ञान are all based on more or less it follows that the pleasure or pain to be derived from them is equally the result of our past merit or demerit.

(2.)

Tr. Intimate relation with thing cɔnjoined is the contact in producing the direct perception of the colour of the jar which is in conjunction with the sight.

घटरूप is समवेत in घट ( गुण – गुणिन् ) which is संयुक्त with the चक्षुरेन्द्रिय.

(3)

Tr. In the direct perception of the generality ‘colourness’ (&) the contact is the intimate relat- ion with what is intimately related with the thing conjoined.

(92)Sect. 43]

Notes-

(

कात्व is समवेत with रूप ( जाति - व्यक्ति ), which, in its turn, is समवेत with घट ( गुण – गुणिन् ) which is चक्षुः संयुक्त.

Tr.

(4)

Intimate relation is the contact

when we get a direct perception of sound with the sense of hearing. For, the sense of hearing is ether.

Abiding in the cavity of the ear sound is the special quality of ether and there is intimate relati- on between the quality and its abøde.

is

The s hold that

nothing but कर्णशष्कुल्य वच्छिन आकाश, ether limited by the cavity of the ear. So is the of

the समवाय between श्रोत्रेन्द्रिय and शब्द.

(5)

as well. Hence

Gr. In the direct perception of the generality of sound the contact is in intimate relation with the thing intimately related. Because the generality of sound is connected by intimate relation with sound which is in intimate relation with the sense of hearing.

Note the rule of the us that the d of a thing is perceived by the same sense by which the thing itself is perceived. Thus being perc- eived by the eye, also will be perceived by the sight. being perceived by the ear, oce also will be perceived by the organ of hearing.

Tr. The contact in the direct perception of negati- on is the relation of the attribute and substratum of attribute. For, in the cognition’ there is no jar on the ground’ the ground in contact with the sight is qualified by the attribute of the negation of the jar.

The is hold that is perceived by an independent means of proof ( प्रमाण ) called अनुपलब्ध.

( 93 )

-Noles

[ Sect. 43

(Cp. the 1). Against these the fits hold that negation is perceived by . They say that

प्रत्यक्ष. is perceived by the same sense that perceives the counterentity. Thus is perceived by the same sense viz. चक्षुरिन्द्रिय that perceives the घट. The cognition of is as much a प्रत्यक्ष as the

घटप्रत्यक्ष.

In this प्रत्यक्ष of अभाव, the चक्षुरिन्द्रय is संयुक्त with the भूतल which is the विशेष्य of the विशेषण घटाभाव thereon. Thus this सन्निकर्ष amounts to विशेषण- विशेष्यभाव which differs from the विशेषण- विशेष्यभाव in instances like नीलमुत्पलम् where there is समवाय between नीलरूप and उत्पल while there is no such additional relation ( falten: सम्बन्धः ) between अभाव and its आश्रय (विशेषण - विशेष्यस्वरूपमेव ).

Tr. Thus Direct Perception is knowledge produced by the contact of the senses with their re- spective objects The peculiar cause thereof is the organ of sense. Therefore it results that the sense is the means of direct perception.

Note that इन्द्रिय is the करण and इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्ष, व्यापार of according to the old as whom z follows. According to the नव्याः, इन्द्रियार्थसनिकर्ष will be the करण of प्रत्यक्षज्ञान. It should be noted that घ्राणेन्द्रिय, रसनेन्द्रिय, and श्रोत्रेन्द्रिय can apprehend the respective गुणs, their सामान्यs and their अभावs.

चक्षुरिन्द्रियः- can apprehend द्रव्यs in addition to its respective गुण i e रूप, सामान्य of the गुण and also its अभाव.

त्वगिन्द्रिय can apprehend द्रव्य in addition to its respective, its a and , according to the neo– तार्किकs, who do not think उद्भूतरूपवत्त्व is necessary for चाक्षुषप्रत्यक्ष. According to the old तार्किक, त्वगिन्द्रिय can apprehend only its g, the thereof and its अभाव. मनस् can apprehend only its गुणs their सामान्य and

(94)

Sect. 43]

its अभाव according to the वैशेषिकs. नैयायिकs it can apprehend the द्रव्य,

Notes–

According to the आत्मन् also.

Thus, there results the following scheme :–

चक्षुः perceives रूप

रूपत्व

लक्

स्पर्श

स्पर्शत्व

घाण

रसनेन्द्रिय श्रोत्र

गन्ध

"

रस

""

शब्द

-रूपाभाव

• द्रव्य

• स्पशीभाव - द्रव्य (acc.

गन्धाभाव

to some

मनम्

"

गन्धत्व

रसत्व

शब्दत्व

रसाभाव

शब्दाभाव

मुख, दुःख, इच्छा, प्रयत्न, भावना ] आत्मन्

their सामान्य and अभाव Facc. to

some

कर्म can be perceived by the चक्षुारीन्द्रय and स्वगिन्द्रिय according to some.

विशेrs are अतीन्द्रिय.

समवाय is अतीन्द्रिय according to the वैशेषिक. According to the नैयायिकs it is प्रत्यक्षविपय and perceived by the sense that perceives the समवायिन्s.

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अनुमान

Important Terms alphabetically arranged and illustrated with reference to the stock instance q वह्निमान् । धूमात् ।

अनुमानः - The process that leads us to infer fire

from smoke.

अनुमितिः - The result of अनुमान vis पर्वतो वह्निमान्

अन्वयव्याप्तिः-Positive concomitance, यत्र यत्र धूमस्तत्र तत्र वहिः- अन्वयव्यतिरेकव्याप्तिः – Positive and negative concomitance

Positive यत्र यत्र धूमः स्तत्र तत्र वहिः negative यत्र यत्र वहद्यभावः तत्र धूमाभावः

उदाहरणः - See परार्थानुमान.

उपनयः

[[99]]

केवलव्यतिरेकि अनुमानः अनुमान which is based on व्याप्ति that can be negative only, e g. पृथ्वी इतरभदेवती । गन्धवत्त्वात्

केवलव्यतिरेकहेतुः - हेतु in a केवलव्यतिरेकि अनुमान c g. गन्धवत्त्व

in the above instance.

केवलान्वयि अनुमानः- अनुमान which is based on व्याप्ति that can be positive only eg. पर्वतः अभिधेयः । प्रमेयत्वात् । यत्र यत्र प्रमेयत्वं तत्र तत्राभिधेयत्वम् । यथा घटे । केवलान्वयि हेतु :- हेतु in a केवलन्वीय अनुमान eg. प्रमेयत्व in the

above instance.

न्यायः— see परार्थानुमान,

पक्षः- the subject of inference; पर्वत in the instance

पर्वतो वह्निमान् । धूमवस्थात्

पक्षधर्मताः - The presence of the हेतु on the पक्ष; presence

of smoke on the mountain.

(96)

Sect. 43]

Notes-

परामर्श or लिङ्गपरामर्श; :- The knowledge that the हेतु which is generally and invariably present with the साध्य is present in the पक्ष.

परार्थानुमानः - Inference formally put. The formal

syllogism called 4, consists of five parts.

प्रतिज्ञा हेतु, उदाहरण, उपनय,

निगमन.

पर्वतो वह्निमान् प्रतिज्ञा

धूमवत्त्वात् — हेतु

यत्र यत्र धूमः तत्र वह्निः यथा महानसे - उदाहरण

अयं तथा - उपनय तस्मात्तथा - निगमन

लिङ्गाः- The same as साधन or हेतु धूम is the लिङ्ग in पर्वतो वह्निमान् । धूमवत्त्वात् ।

लिङ्गपरामर्शः - See परामर्श.

विपक्षः—- An instance in which the साध्य or thing to be proved is absent. महाहद ( a great lake ) is a विपक्ष if asna is the साध्य because fire is absent from a lake.

व्यापक & व्याप्यः are relative terms. Literally व्यापक means that which pervades i. e. is more ext- ensive than the , that which is pervaded, the less extensive. Thus is the 1 of धूम the s, because is found not only where धूम is present but in many more cases.

व्याप्तिः - Invariable concomitance. There is व्याप्ति

and because we find

between

where-

ver there is घूम. It is of three kinds: केवलान्वभि, केवलम्यतिरेकि and अन्वयव्यतिरेक, for which see above.

व्याप्यः See म्यापक.

सपक्षः- A similar instance; that in which the साध्य

(97)

-Notes

[Sect. 44

is present as in the . Thus, the kitchen is the सपक्ष of the अनुमान, पर्वतो वह्निमान् धूमवस्वात्, bec- ause there is वहि in the महानस.

-The same as for or, the indicatory mark present in the which leads to the agila. धूमवत्त्व is the साधन ( sometimes roughly said to be धूम. )

साध्यः—The thing proved. वह्निमत्त्व in the instance is साध्य. Sometimes we roughly say वह्नि is the साध्य स्वार्थानुमानः - The inference in which the process is merely implied but not formally expressed as in परार्थानुमान When I infer fire on the mount- ain because there is smoke thereon, thus going through the process of व्याप्तिज्ञान and लिङ्गपरामर्श but only implicitly, it is स्वार्थानुमान,

:-The same as a or though, to be accu-

साधन लिङ्ग

rate, it is the second member of the formal syllogism.

४४ अनुमान

Tr. Inference is the cause of inferred know- ledge. Inferred knowledge is knowledge produced by scrutinisation (quasi)

It should be noted that aga is the process that leads to aff. In the stock instance of inferred knowledge, the mountain is fiery because smoky, the conclusion that the mountain is fiery is the अनुमिति and the process consisting of पक्षधर्मता and व्याप्ति is the अनुमान.

The student should see that agan differs from in giving us the knowledge of a thing that is not in direct contact with our senses. In the

(98)

Sect. 44]

Notes-

senses do not

as they do in

instance of fire on the mountain our come in contact with the fire at all, direct perception. In the whole process of infer- ence, I see smoke on the mountain, and to that extent, my senses come in contact with an object.

Inferred knowledge depends upon two things. First, I must see the smoke on the mountain. This is technically called . Secondly, it is necessary that from my past experience I must have gathered that whereever there is smoke there is fire. This is technically called . I bring my past experrence to bear upon the present case of the smoke on the mountain. This is technically called qua And this results in the final judgment that the mountain is fiery

A.

Tr. Scrutinisation consists in the knowledge that the case under consideration possesses the indicatory mark characterised by invariable conco- mitance. e. g. this mountain possesses smoke that is invariably associated with fire.

The author now proceeds to define which gives us aff. As said above, inferred knowledge results from the co-ordination of two distinct congitions. The thing on the basis of the presence of which I am going to form the judgment must be present in the particular instance (g). The smoke must be present on the mountain on which I am going to infer the existence of fire. Again, I must have a knowledge of the invariable concomi- tance () between smoke and fire which I must have derived from my past experience. Both these result in what is known as परामर्श.

Tr. And the cognition produced by the mountain is fiery is inferred knowledge.

it that

(99)

-Notes

[ Sect. 44

The definition is simple in the light of the above explanation.

Tr. Invariable concomitance consists in the certainty of association that wherever there is smoke there is fire.

This association is either positive ( ) or negative (केवलव्यतिरेकि ) or both (अन्वयव्यतिरेकि) accor- ding as we can give a similar instance to support the argument on hand, or a dissimilar instance or both. To take the instance of the smoky mount- ain, we can state the invariable concomitance in either of the two ways.

We can say wherever there is smoke there is fire, as in a kitchen ( यत्र यत्र धूमस्तत्र तत्र वहिः यथा महानसे ) or, negatively, wherever there is no fire there is no smoke, as in a lake. ( TA AG¶HITEAR AA YAIMIT: 44 ang. ) This sort of concomitance is called अन्वयव्यतिरेकि positive and negative concomitance because we can substantiate it with two kinds of instances similar (the kitchen) and dissimilar (the lake).

But it is not possible always to give instances of both kinds. Sometimes we can adduce a similar instances only; sometimes there will be no similar instances but only dissimilar ones which are equa- lly effective in proving the case on hand. If we can adduce a similar instance only the concomit- ance is called

(positive concomitance). To take an instance:-The jar is nameable because it is cognisable, ( «àstia: яù)—we can state the concomitance only positively. Because there is nothing in the world that is not nameable and hence a dissimilar instance we cannot come across. Thus we can say,

(100)

Sect. 44]

Notes-

Whatever is cognisable is nameable like a piece of cloth ( यत्र यत्र प्रमेयत्वं तत्र तत्र अभिधेयत्वं यथा पटे । )

But for want of a dissimilar instance we can- not, say, whatever is not nameable is not cognis- able, there being nothing that is not nameable.

If we can adduce a dissimilar instance only, the concomitance can be negative only. Thus in the syllogism,

Earth differs from other substances, because it possesses smell ( पृथ्वी इतरभेदवती । गन्धवत्त्वात् । यत्र यत्र इतर भेदाभावः न तद्न्धवत् यथा जलम् ॥ )

we cannot adduce a similar instance. Because any instance that could be called similar will be included in the class of earth and as such cannot be cited in support of the argument. To

To be clear, if I were to say, whatever has smell differs from other substances like a flower, I shall be arguing in a circle. Because flower being earthy is included in the case under consideratton and as such cannot support it.

In such cases we have to depend upon negative instances (aver) supporting negative concomitance. Thus in the inference under consideration, I have to give the concomitance only negatively,

Whatever does not differ from substances other than earth does not possess smell like water [ यन्न इतरभेदवत् तन्न गन्धवदपि, यथा जलम् ]. This is

negative concomitance. It should be seen that definitions because they touch upon the whole of the thing defined, can be supported by dissimilar instances and negative concomitance, and are hence described as केवलव्यतिरोर्क हेतु.

་

The student must have thus seen that, accord-

(101)

-Notes

[ Sect. 44

ing to the possibilty or otherwise of adducing a similar of dissimilar instance, one can make use of positive or negative concomitance in the formation of a syllogism. This positive or negative conco- mitance determines the name of the indicatory mark also. Thus, in the instances given above,

Smoke is an indicatory mark that is both pos- itive and negative ( 3⁄4-îìî) because with regard to it both kinds of concomitance can be given.

In the second instance cognisability is an indicatory mark that is positive only, ( केवलान्वयि ) for with regard to it only positive concomitance can be given.

In the third instance, smell is a negative indicatory mark, ( qawiał) because with regard to it only a negative concomitance can be given.

Finally, the whole inference becomes positive or negative or positive-negative according as the indicatory mark is positive or negative or positive- negative.

Tr. qqudat consists in the presence of the less extensive on the mountain etc.

पक्षघर्मता has been explained above.

is the particular thing about which we make the inference. In the stock instance of smoke and fire, the mountain is the on which the abides. Note that before anything can be a ч it must satisfy either of the two cond- itions:-

Either I must be curious (iftgm:=doubtful ) to infer something about the mountain or though I myself am not so curious to know the thing

(102)Sect. 45]

Notes-

myself I must be inclined to convey it to others (सिषाधयिषा / साधू to prove ) The former is the पक्ष in a

aig an inference for oneslf; the latter is a

in an inference for others ( परार्थानुमान ).

and

The terms

are important. the less extensive is the indicatory mark also var- iously called for ty or maa. The indicatory mark receives this name because its extension is less than that of the thing proved which therefore comes to be called the more extensive (1977). Smoke is found in a lesser number of instances than fire. In a red-hot iron ball there is fire but there is no smoke. Thus smoke comes to be called the r the less extensive and fire

extensive.

४५ Two kinds of अनुमान.

the more

Tr. Inference is of two kinds:—that effected for oneself, and secondly, that effected for others.

The student should not suppose that the two varieties are quite independent. The first lies at the base of the second The first refers to the process of inference without any regard for formal statement. The second is merely the first put in a definite form., to convey the inference that I have informally made to another. When I infer fire on the mountain, I do informally go through the whole process which is formally laidout when I want to convince others of its truth. The inference for others (i) is nothing but the five-membered syllogism ( न्याय ) of गौतम.

Cr. Inference for oneself is the cause of inferr- ed knowledge for oneself. Co wit, having realised by

( 103 )

-Notes

[ Sect. 46

repeated observation, in the case of the great kitchen and similar other places, the invariable concomitance that wherever there is smoke there is fire, when one goes to the mountain and doubts if there is fire thereon he happens to see smoke on it and remembers the invaria- ble concomitance that wherever there is smoke there is fire. Then arises a consciousness “This mountain possesses smoke that is invariably associated with fire.” This itself is called the scrutinisation of the indicatory mark. From this, one gets the inferred knowledge, “the mountain is fiery.

“This is what is known as inference for oneself.

Note the four stages in an inference for oneself. (1) पक्षधर्मता (2) व्याप्तिस्मरण ( 3 ) परामर्श ( 4 ) अनुमिति.

Tr. When, on the other hand, having himself inferred fire on the mountain one uses the six-memb- ered argument to convince another, that is an inference intended for others. c. g पर्वतो वह्निमान धूमात् । यो यो धूम- वान् स स वह्निमान् । यथा महानसः । तथा चायम् । तस्मात्तथा ॥

e.

Cr. By the indicatory mark that is conveyed in this way the other party also is convinced of the existence of fire.

४६ न्याय and its five members.

Tr. The members of the syllogism Alve in number, are Assertion, (f) Reason, (), Mustration (RT), Application, (3974), Conclusion, (anya)

qdài afgara is afamı धूमवत्त्वात् is हेतु

यत्र यत्र धूमस्तत्र तत्र वह्निः यथा महानसे is उदाहरण

अयं च तथा उपनय

तस्मात्तथा… निगमन.

( 104 )

Sect. 48]

Notes-

The student should master the above form as also the one given below to be able to put into logical form an argument based on positive or negative or positive-negative concomitance. It should be seen that the use of either of these varieties of concomitance depends upon the po- ssibility of adducing an instance in support of it.

पृथिवी इतरेभ्यो भिद्यते । प्रतिज्ञा गन्धवत्त्वात् । हेतु

यन्नेतरेभ्यो भिद्यते न तद्गन्धवत् यथा जलं । उदाहरण

इयं न तथा । उपनय

तस्मात् न तथा । निगमन.

The members of the 44 or syllogism only formally embody what is informally present in a ga. A desire or expectancy is created by the first member which is satisfied by the subsequent members.

४७ करण of अनुमान.

Tr. The scrutinization of the indicatory mark is the special cause in an inference intended for oneself and that intended for others. Therefore scrutinization is the inference.

It should be seen that the special cause of an inference as given by Я is according to the new f view, and is in conflict with the definition of करण given before For परामर्श is itself the व्यापार, and not the व्यापारवत

४८ लिङ्ग.

Tr The indicatory mark is threefold:— ( 1 ) Positive-negative, (2) Positive, and (3) Negative. Positive-negative indicatory mark is one about which a positive and and negative concomitance can be pred-

( 105 )

-Notes

•

[ Sect. 50

icated. Wherever there is smoke there is fire as in the kitchen, ‘is positive concomitance. Wherever there is no fire there is no smoke as in a great lake is negative concomitance. Positive indicatory mark is one about which only a positive concomitance can be predicated. e. g. The jar is nameable because it is cognisable like a piece of cloth. In this instance there is no negative concomitance between cognisability and nameability Because everything is cognisable and nameable. The negative indicatory mark is one about which only a negative concomitance can be postulated. e. g. Earth differs from other (substances ), on account of possessing. smell. Whatever does not differ from other substances does not possess smell, like water. This is not so Therefore it is not like them (i.e. smell-less. ) In this case there is no positive instance to illustrate the positive concomitance that whatever possesses smell differs from other substances, because the entire Earth is the subject of the argument.

See notes on Concomitance.

Tr. The

is a

४९ पक्ष.

thing the presence of the ara (thing to be proved ) on which is doubtful; e. g. the mountain when the possessiom of the smoke is the

reason

cp. notes on पक्षधर्मता

५० सपक्ष.

A similar instance is one which is ascertained to possess the thing to be proved; e. g. a great kitchen, in the case just cited.

Note that in a similar instance the similarity is determined by the presence of the

(106)

(thing to

Sect. 52–57]

Notes-

be proved). Thus a fiery place (not a smoky one) is to be regarded as similar instance, in the instance of the fiery mountain.

५१ विपक्ष.

Tr. A dissimilar instance is one from which the absence of the thing to be proved is ascertained; e. g. the great lake in the case on hand.

An instance without fire will come under this class. It is an observation of the similar and dis- smilar instances that enables us to understand the concomitance positively and negatively.

५२-५७ हेत्वाभास.

The word am can be explained in two ways:- (१) हेतुवदाभासन्त इति हेत्वाभासाः ( न्यायबोधिनी ) which

are as in appearance ouly and defectve. (२) हेतोः आभासः defects in the हेतु or fallacies

हेतुदोष.

}

When the तर्कदीपिका defines हेत्वाभास as अनुमितिप्रति- बन्धकयथार्थज्ञानाविषय the ’ object of right knowledge preventing –which is the same as the as in the –it evidently takes in the second sense. Whether we take this meaning or that the ultimate outcome is the same. Because, according to the first interpretation, we have to deal with fallacious as which is virtually the same as deal- ing with the fault in the , which is the meaning, according to the second derivation.

"”

" हेत्वाभास An easier method to understand a “ is to recognise that it consists in either of the five requisites of a valid . in general, The five requisites of a valid हेतु

being absent. are (1) पक्षधर्मत्व

(107)

-Notes

[Sect. 52-57

(२) सपक्षे तत्त्व (३) विपश्चाद्व्यावृत्तत्र ( ४ ) अबाधितविषयत्व ( ५ ) असत्प्रतिपक्षत्व.

( 1 ) Violation of पक्षधर्मत्व.

[ आश्रयासिद्ध and स्वरूपासिद्ध. p. 32. ]

qgunta If we want to infer fire on the moun- tain the, smoke, must be present on the moun- tain which is the subject.

Violation of this requisite may take place in two ways: (1) There may be no e. g. the mountain at all (2) or, the e. g. smoke may be absent from the Accordingly a violation of result in two us. (1) that in which the not exist at all; and (2) in which the

a will

does

is absent

from the . The first is the faz out of the three varieties of me.

The stock instance is गगनारविन्दं सुरभि । अरविन्दत्वात् सरोजारविन्दयत्. गगनारविन्द a sky-lotus is an अविद्यमान thing as much

, or a castle in the air. So, to infer anything about it, is futile. This is the spritz tam i. e. one in which the

आश्रयासिद्ध हेत्वाभास

assumption of the ( hypothetical, baseless.

as a

of the) itself is

It is very easy to detect this fallacy, because what exists and what does not exist are matters known, as a rule, by every man of the world. Supposing I infer anything about a hare’s horn the fallacy in my reasoning will be too patent. Again, if I were to infer anything about the idols (मूर्ति) of Islam, the हेत्वाभास will be आश्रयासिद्ध, because, everybody knows Islam does not admit idol-wor- ship. If we were to infer anything about the dark complexion of a Londoner or the white complexion of a negro in Africa-not in the U. S. A.–or the

(108)

Sect. 52-57 ]

Notes-

generosity of a typical Aberdonian we shall commit he हेत्वाभास of आश्रयासिद्ध, because all these cases ( पक्षs)

lo not exist at all.

C

पक्ष

Some say that another variety of is possible. If I infer something which is already known and hence requires no inference, my is . Thus if I were to infer that I have body because I am a man, my inference will suffer from his drawback. Here the **¶ viz. ‘I’ does exist but s not in the logical sense because there is 10() or desire (or necessity) to prove the thing inferred. Sanskrit -414 requires that there nust be at least a desire to prove something about i thing, before it can be called . The fallacy esulting from the absence of the from the is वरूपासिद्ध, second variety of असिद्ध.

The stock instance is शब्दो गुणः । चाक्षुषत्वात् । Every-

(cognised by the

does

body knows that is not eye) but (heard by the ear). Thus not at all abide in शब्द. The हेतु, therefore, is स्वरूपासिद्ध. non-existent on the

This fallacy is much obvious and can be easily detected. Thus if I were to say that the cannibals are enlightened because educated I commit this fallacy. Because education is con- spicuous by its absence in cannibals. Again, if I were to say, that is a because he admits four Яs, I shall be committing this fallacy because has stated the s to be two. This will show how one can easily detect this fallacy.

2 Violation of सपक्षे सच्च [असाधारण अनैकान्तिक p. 30]

The second requisite of a valid is that it

(109)

-Notes

[Sect. 52–57

instances i.e. Instances

should be present in the a where the a exists. Thus when I want to infer fire on the mountain on the basis of the smoke, I must be sure that smoke is present in those cases only where there is fire. Thus I have seen smoke coming out of the kitchen and I know there is fire therein. This strengthens my conviction that there must be fire on the mountain also, because I see smoke thereon.

In केवलव्यतिरेकि अनुमान, it is true, the requirement of aaa is not fulfilled. But still it is valid. Because there is no सपक्ष at all By its very nature केवलव्यतिरो के अनुमान leaves no scope for सपक्ष and still possesses the power to prove the particular thing. Thus in

पृथिवी इतरभेदवती । गन्धवत्त्वात् । यदितरेभ्या न भिद्यते न

तद्गन्धवत् । यथा जलं । नचेयं तथा । तस्मान्न तथा ।

पृथ्वीतरभेद is not found in anything else but पृथ्वी which is the T. So there is is no similar instance is not faulty at all, if it is not

which does not exist.

and hence the

found in the 4

But the absence in cases where the though there are

ofसपक्षे सत्त्व invalidates an अनुमिति is present only in the q instances. Thus in an

of the kind, शब्दोऽनित्यः शब्दत्वात्, शब्दस्व is present only in the पक्ष, शब्द; but is not present in any of the सपक्ष instances though there are so many-all things constituting the . This results in the ma called an which is defined as the one that is absent both from similar (a) and dissimilar (faq) iustances. Of course the defect consists only in its being absent from the similar instances (); its absence from the far is no defect; because every valid is required to be absent

(110)

Sect. 52-571

Notes-

from the विपेक्ष. The विपक्षाद् व्यावृत्ति is given in the definition only to show its exclusive nature.

This fallacy is not generally difficult to detect. It is exactly the fault known as arguing in a circle. If I say that the Aberdonians are stingy because they are Aberdonians I commit this fallacy. Som- etimes it may be a little more subtle, because the

though exclusively abiding in the could be made out to be so with some difficulty. Thus in an 394 of the type ‘war is inhuman because there one army butchers another,’ the is the exclusive description of war and hence we commit the fallacy of असाधारण अनैकान्तिक हेतु,

(3) Violation of विपक्षाद व्यावृत्ति

[ साधारण अनैकान्तिक

p. 30]

To return to our instance of the fiery mountain, our inference that it is fiery because smoky is as much strengthened by our observation of smoke in similar instances () like kitchen as by our certain knowledge that it is absent from dissimilar instances (a) i. e. instances in which fire, to take our instance, is absent. Thus my conviction that the mountain is fiery is as much strengthened by my observing smoke in a kitchen with fire as by my failure to observe it in a lake without fire. Therefore, if any be found in the fa also, evidently my inference ceases to be valid. I begin to suspect that though the thing inferred may be true, its opposite may also be true, because I find the same present in a dissimilar instance, i. e. in an instance with the opposite or negation of the साध्य. This fallacy is styled साधारणानैकान्तिक because the हेतु is साधारण to सपक्ष and विपक्ष also.

Thus to take the stock instance, पर्वता वह्निमान् ¶¶ (because it is cognisable), we know that

(111)

-Notes

[Sect. 52–57

the 3, is present in instances where fire is present () as well as instances from which it is absent ( विपक्ष ). Thus a lake is as much प्रमय as a महानस प्रमेयत्व belongs to each and everything that can be the object of a cognition. Thus being present in the also, this is not conclusive.

The student should study this fallacy very carefully because the majority of fallacious argum- ents suffer from it. It is not so obvious as the others and demands some wide knowledge for its apprehension.

In our daily life, we indulge in fallacies that are mostly reducible to this because of our limited knowledge. Thus if I were to say to my learned. friend that some x. y. z. is a great social reformer because, like Ranade, he is a Judge of the Bom- bay High Court, I commit this fallacy. Because my learned friend knows that many a judge has sat on the judge’s chair without caring a jot for the social uplift of his countrymen. So the viz. being a judge is defective because it is found in the fa also viz. those cases where a judge was

not a social reformer.

Again, if I were to say that x. y. z. is a great educationist, because, like Sir Ashutosh Mukerjee, he is a member of the University Senate, I again commit the same fallacy A man with knowledge of things educational knows too well how there are some who do not know the A. B. C. of education take their seats on the Senate; in other words, he knows that the is present in the fa

also.

Again, if I were to say that x. y z. cannot be intelligent because he belongs to the depressed classes, I commit the same fallacy. Because, now

(112)Sect. 52-57 ]

Notcs

it is known by all, how intelligence is not the special privilege of a few. One knows how brilliant people are not wanting in the depressed classes So being present in the विपक्ष also this हेतु is साधारण अनैकान्तिक.

( 4 ) Violation of सपक्ष सत्य and विपज्ञादू व्यावृत्तत्व both

[ विरुद्ध p. 31]

The violation of these two requisites results into the fallacy called . It is needless to point

विरुद्ध. to the importance of both in a valid aga because it is already made clear above.

or done is it did not

of

and

The stock instance is शब्दो नित्यः कृतकत्वात् । Everybody knows that whatever is

, because there was a time when exist. So, will go to prove a not its . In other words, the is present in the also from where it ought to be absent. Again, the is absent from all instances, because nothing in the world which is a coexists with कृतकत्व. That is what is meant by defining विरुद्ध as साध्याभावव्याप्य which coexists invariably with the negation of the thing that is to be proved.

arises from specifying a

This fallacy is also easy to detect. For it which will exactly prove the opposite. If I were to infer that my friend will be an athlete because he drinks kettles of tea or smokes scores of cigarettes the same fallacy will occur.

Such instances will show how one can

easily detect this fallacy.

5. Violation of असत्प्रतिपक्षत्व [सत्प्रतिपक्ष p. 31]

Sometimes the सपक्षे सत्य and विपक्षाद्व्यावृतत्व may be unascertained in the case of a ty but there may be an opposite argument of stronger force which

( 113 )

-Notes

[ Sect. 52-57

destroys the first argument. Such fallacies are called

to which there is a rival’.

The stock instance is शब्दो नित्यः श्रावणत्वात् । शब्दत्वत् । (The

is A and perceived by the same sense as the, individual). The rival argument is शब्दोऽनित्यः कृतकत्वात् । घटवत्। Here श्रावणत्व is a सत्प्रतिपक्ष हेतु, because the more appealing हेतु viz. कृतकत्व disproves नित्यत्व. We know how शब्द is कृत which necessarily proves af. We are not so conclusive as regards, which may or may not prove नित्यच.

We have to interpret the fallacy only in this way. We have to take the second argument as the stronger of the two and more valid. Otherwise if we take both the arguments as inconclusive, there remains no difference between a¶g and अनैकान्तिक. Thus while in सत्प्रतिपक्ष we are conscious of a definite which proves the opposite of the साध्य and thus makes it invalid, in अनैकान्तिक the साध्य may be right but yet inconclusive. Thus पर्वतो व.मान् प्रमेयत्वात् may be right or wrong; it is incon - clusive. While in शब्दो नित्यः श्रावणत्वात्, the साध्य नित्यत्व is invalid1. This is what is meant by rat भावसाधकं हेत्वन्तरं यस्य वर्तते स सत्प्रतिपक्षः where there is a different to prove the negation of the first.

•

From this it will be clear that in, the second argument must be stronger than the first. The contention of some that in, both the arguments are of equal force is therefore untrue. After we admit that the second argument is stronger, naturally we have to admit that in afdrer,

1 Cp नैयायिकास्तु शब्दोऽनित्य इत्याहुः —न्यायकोश.

अनित्यश्चार्य कारणतः । - वै. सू 2-2-28.

(114)

Sect. 52-57]

Notes-

the opposite argument must be based on only to distinguish it from where also a stronger conclusion disproves the first but it must be taken to be derived from means of proof other than अनुमान lest बाधित will be the same as सत्प्रतिपक्ष.

How to distinguish the fallacy from विरोध ? While in the given proves the opposite of what it is supposed to prove ( कृतकत्व proves अनित्यत्व and not नित्यत्व as stated in the अनुमान ) in सत्प्रतिपक्ष, the does not prove the opposite necessarily. It is only inconclusive. In

may be true or false. In af, it is false.

, the

To be able to detect the fallacy one must be able to know a more conclusive argument proving the opposite and thus setting at naught the argu. ment given. Thus, if I say, the earth is steady because we do not tumble as we walk on its surface, I commit this fallacy because the stronger inference that as a planet of a lesser magnitude than the Sun it ought to move disproves my first conclusion. Similarly, if I say, ‘Education is bad because it taxes the brain,’ I commit the same fallacy because everybody knows the argument that education is good because it imparts culture.

(6) Violation of sandaidqzza (anûa p. 33 ]

अबाधितविषयत्व

If the proved by a

is disproved by another in a more valid gm, the of a बाधितहेतु is disproved by any other प्रमाण but अनुमान. Thus a stronger invalidates the in the first while a stronger अनुमानेतरप्रमाण invalidates the साध्य in the second. That is why has been defined as ‘one the absence of the of which is determined by a different means of proof’

art

In the stock instance अग्निः अनुष्णः द्रव्यत्वात् we

.( 115 )

-Notes

[ Sect. 52–57

find that the age of is disproved by the stronger Я of s according to which it is hot. Not that is stronger than in all cases because being as both stand on the same level. Here we say that it is stronger because it agrees with experience and is more reliable while the अनुमान, अभिः अनुष्गः &c does not. [ अत्र अनुष्णत्वं साध्य तदभाव उष्णत्वं स्पार्शनप्रत्यक्षेण गृह्यतइति बाधितत्वम् ]

Really speaking सत्प्रतिपक्ष and बाधित are similar in nature and instances of one may be as well instances of the other. The only difference is in the way in which the fallacious as are repudiated. If we take the help of a stronger a, the fallaci-

अनुमान, ous हेतु is सत्प्रतिपक्ष; if of a stronger प्रमाण other than अनुमान it is बाधित. Thus instances adduced to illust - rate hold good in the case of af, only with the difference that in the latter the stronger Я should not be a but some other. If I dis- prove the erroneous a ’that is steady by having recourse the 4s of s like Newton the becomes बाधित.

the

(7) Violation of विपक्षाव्यावृत्ति ( owing to an उपाधि ) [ सोपाधिक. P. 32 ]

We have already seen while discussing

fas how the fallacy arises on account of being present in the f. There the was such as was not in an invariable concomitance with the a owing to its being found with the as well as its अभाव, The idea that is prominent in the साधारणानैकान्तिक is that the हेतु is too wide to prove the ar. In the fallacy that we are discuss- no, doubt the is found both with the साध्य and its अभाव, the व्याप्ति being thus violated

ing at present,

(116)

Sect. 52-57

Noles-

but what is felt more prominently is the fact that the could be valid and prove the arif only we were to limit its scope by an .

The stock instance is पर्वतो धूमवान् । वहिमत्त्वात्. We sce how at is present also in instances like the red- not ball of iron (age) where is present but

विपक्षाद् व्यावृत्ति

is not present. Thus is vitiated in suchs. But further, we are conscious of the very close association of ala and . And we feel the is not too wide. It could prove the reasonably if we were to limit its scope just a little by stating that a must be igang (joined with or fed by wet fuel). In other words, we say that the अनुमान, पर्वतो धूमवान् । आर्दन्नसंयोगे वह्निमत्त्वात् is as valid as any other. And the अनुनान, पर्वतो धूनवान् वाहनत्त्वात् is fallacious only in so far as the is a little wider than it ought to be, on account of the 39 (31ZFUR- सयोग ). [ हिमत्त्व is definitely wider than आद्वैन्बनसंयोगे qura because the former is unconditioned, the latter conditioned.

In the instance of साधारणानैकान्तिक, पर्वतो वह्निमान् प्रमेवलत् we feel that the हेतु is too wide and no reasonable condition (39) limiting its scope could make it a valid as in the above fallacy.

ganz we are conscious that an euf (or) condition) will set the aright while in araraan such consciousness is not present.

In short, in

It must be confessed that the distinction between the two figures is subtle and may be said to be subjective also. What I feel to be an instance of साधारणानैकान्तिक may be taken for one of व्याप्यत्वासिद्ध by another with equal justice and cogency. That is why some logicians have taken both the fallacies to be identical. But as it stands, if I can set my

(117)

-Notes

[Sect. 52-57

(condition) in the case of a

s

finger on an I shall be justified in taking the to be otherwise called सोपाधिक. If no such उपाधि could be caught hold of, the could be reasonably styled साधारण नैकान्तिक.

This could be shown by taking one of the instances adduced to illustrate साधारणानैकान्तिक, To revert to the instance of Sir Ashutosh, if I say that the ‘being member of the Senate,’ if it were to be valid, ought to be conditioned by ‘provided there is a wide experience of the methods of study and tuition’ the हेतु becomes व्याप्यत्वासिद्ध One must admit that any member on the Senate who has a wide experience of the methods of study and tuition is an eductionist like Sir Ashutosh. It is a valid argument; and the argument in question is invalid. because unconditioned as it ought to be.

Thus to judge whether a हेतु is व्याप्यत्वासिद्ध or साधारण नैकान्तिक one must see whether there is an उपाधि to limit its scope or not.

What is an

:-From the above discussion

the nature of an 3 must have become clear. It is an adventitious circumstance, a condition which ought to be present before a certain which is too

wide could be valid.

उपाधि is defined by the तर्कसङ्ग्रह as: साध्याव्यापकत्वे सति साधनाव्यापकः उपाधि : i e उपाधि is that which being wider than the साध्य is not wider than the साधन. आद्रेन्धनसंयोग is व्यापक of the साध्य viz. धूम ( in पर्वतो धूमवान् वह्निमत्त्वात् ) i. e. we find आर्द्रेन्धनसंयोग wherever there is घूम. But it is not the व्यापक of the साधन वहि in the instance because we cannot say wherever there is a there is an anâqîn because वह्नि exists in many cases where आर्द्रेन्धनसंयोग

(118)

Sect. 52-57]

Notes-

a is invariably asso-

is not present. In short, an ciated with the साध्य, but not so with the साधन. In other words, it is a condition which if tacked to the will make it conclusive and capable of rightly proving the thing in question. Thus आर्द्रेन्धनसंयोगे वह्निमत्त्व is a valid हेतु to prove धूमवत्त्व.

साध्यव्यापक is explained as साध्यसमानाधिकरणात्यन्ताभावा- प्रतियोगित्वं. That is साध्यव्यापक which cannot be the counterentity of the absolute negation coexisting with the साध्य. [ साध्येन समानाधिकरणः यः अत्यन्ताभावः तस्य प्रतियोगित्वम् ]. Thus आर्द्रेन्धनसंयोग is not the प्रतियोगिन् ( viz. घट, पट the ) of the अभाव, (घटाभाव, पटाभाव etc. ) coexisting with the साध्य, धूमवत्त्व. With धूम exist अभावs of everything that is not धूम eg. पटाभाव, घटाभाव the counterentities of which are पट, घट etc This is an euphuistic way of saying that aⶶ_is invariably associated with धूमवत्त्व.

साधनाव्यापकत्व is explained as साधनवन्निष्ठात्यन्ताभावप्रति- योगित्वम् [ साधनवत्=साध्यसमानाधिकरण . ]

i. e. साधनाव्यापक is what is counterentity of the absolute negation coexisting with the ar. Thus just as घट, पट etc. are the प्रतियोमिनूs of the absolute negations coexisting with वह्नि the साधन, आर्द्रेन्धनसंयोग is also the fan of the a which coexists with a In other words, may exist in the absence of आर्द्रेन्धनसंयोग.

घट, पट etc. are साधन व निष्ठात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगिन् but they are not साध्यसमानाधिकरणात्यन्ताभावाप्रतियोगिन् while आर्द्रेन्धनसंयोग is so. Hence आद्रेन्धनसंयोग is the उपाधि in the instance under consideration.

( 8 ) सपक्षाभाव & विपक्षाभाव [ अनुपसंहारिन p. 31.]

We have seen how similar instances and dissimilar instances help us to be definite as reg-

(119)

-Notes

[ Sect. 52-57

ards the capacity of the to prove the Naturally enough when there is no

nor fag we

feel diffident about the validity of the to do so.

that forms the province of the

It is such

संहार हेत्वाभास.

3-

When we say that in this variety of हेत्वाभास, there is no nor a naturally we imply that in this the is the totality of things. Every object in the world must be the subject of the inference to bring about the absence of the 8 and This is the implication of the definition. 3+qqə¤íàÌəz£zatia: which has neither a positive instance nor a negative instance to proo: its validity.

The stock instance is सर्वमनित्यं प्रमेयत्वात Here as every-thing is included in the (4) there is neither a similar nor a dissimilar instance to prove the validity of the inference.

This fallacy is easy to detect. If everything in the world is the subject of the inference the fallacy is अनुपसंहारिन्.

It should be seen that in असाधारण, there are सपक्ष and both, though the 1s are absent from

them.

हेत्वाभासs (9 in all )

सव्यभिचार or 4 विरुद्ध 5 सत्प्रतिपक्ष असिद्ध

अनैकान्तिक

9 बाधित

1 साधारण 2 असाधारण

3 अनुप - 6 आश्रया- 7 स्वरूपा- संहारिन्

8व्याप्यत्वा-

सिद्ध सिद्ध

fera

(120)

Sect. 58]

Noles→→

How to differentiate the देत्वाभासs!

1 If is violated for want of the itself it is

आश्रयासिद्ध.

2 If पक्षधर्मत्व is

स्वरूपासिद्ध

"”

in the T it is

3 If only सपक्षे सत्त्व is violated it is असाधारण अनैकान्तिक, 4& 5 If only विपक्षाद्व्यावृत्तत्व is violated it is साधारण अनैकान्तिक

or व्याप्यत्वासिद्ध if we feel the presence of an उपाधि 6 If both सपक्षेसत्त्व and विपचाद् व्यावृत्तत्व, are violated

though there are सपक्ष and विपक्ष, it is विरुद्ध.

7 If सत्प्रतिपक्षत्व is violated it is असत्प्रतिपक्ष.

8 If अबाधितविषयत्व is violated it is बाधित.

9 If सपक्ष and विपक्ष do not exist at all it is अनुपसारन

It should be seen that an instance of one fallacy can, sometimes, be that of another too. It dep- ends upon one’s knowledge to detect the fallacy. Thus an inference of the type: the earth is steady because we are steady may be an instance of a or सत्प्रतिपक्ष according as we advance a stronger अनु- भानेतरप्रमाण or अनुमान.

This holds good in the case of other fallacies also. The student is required only to justify his view-point of fallacy. Two students may detect different fallacies in the same argument and be yet both of them right.

५८ उपमिति

Tr. That which is the special cause of know- ledge by comparison is comparison. Knowledge by comparison consists in the cognition of the relation of the name and the named. Its special cause is the knowledge of similarity. The remembrance of the

(121)

-Notes

[ Sect, 58

sense of the words meant for protracted application is the intermediate operation.

that a 4 is an

The process that leads to an 3 has been well described in a different reading. Its purport is: A person who is ignorant of the object denoted by the word (a wild ox) is told by a forester animal that bears close resembl- ance to a bull. As later the man happens to go to a forest he comes across an animal that bears a close resemblance to an ox but is not identical with it. At once he remembers the words of the forester and comes to the conclusion that the animal before him must be the (the wild ox.)

Thus is only the realisation of the conn- ection of a name with the object denoted by it ( सञ्ज्ञा - सञ्ज्ञिसम्बन्ध ) It depends upon similarity between two objects and is hence called . The words of the forester, who is very much acquainted with matters relating to forest, in the instance, only perform the function of apprising the ignorant person of the similarity between the bull and the

गवय.

These are the constituents of this process:- (1) Ignorance of the sense of a word; ( 2 ) Know- ledge that the object resembles a particular thing, derived from a reliable authority; (3) Direct perception of an object that bears such a res- emblance; ( 4 ) The remembrance of the words of that authority; and (5) The knowledge that the particular object is called by that name.

a

technically means words that con- vey their sense by protraction. In ’ is like a bull,’ the sense is protracted to the particular animal

( 122 )Sect. 59-63

Notes-

on the basis of similarity. The interpretation of the words as “authoritative direction” given by some does not take note of the technical significance attached to the word and must be hence discarded.

Note that the the definition of

For सादृश्यज्ञान being a

in this case is in conflict with

given by the author before. quality ( ज्ञान a गुण ) cannot

be the abode of any activity as it is required to be by the definition ( व्यापारवत् असाधारण कारण. )

सादृश्यज्ञानं करणं

अतिदेशवाक्यार्थस्मरणमवान्तरव्यापार : –

what is meant is that the सदस्य produces the व्यापार of the remembrance of the words of the authority with a protracted sense

५९-६३ शाब्दज्ञान.

Tr. Word is the sentence of an authoritative person. An authoritative person is one who speaks facts. Sentence consists of a group of words. e. g. ‘Bring the cow. A word is what possesses power to convey sense. Power is a convention () set up by the desire of God that from a particular word a parlicutar sense is to be undrstood.

शक्तं पदं :–Note the view if the तार्किकs that in a sentence each word contributes to the general sense of the sentence and is thus equal in import- ance to other words in the sentence. In other words, they do not give prominence to one word in a sentence over others. According to the tes the verb is the most important member of the sentence, all other words merely conditioning its sense (Cp, the f.)

ईश्वरेच्छा सङ्केत : - The modern तार्किकs say that it

(123)

-Notes

[Sect. 59-63

does not depend on the desire of God to assign It is man who námes things at

sense to a word.

his freewill, they say.

!

Note that is only one of the powers of the word. It is also called ft. The afs admit two kinds of power:-Power of primary significance (a) and (2) power of implication (a). The third power admitted by the grammar- ians and rhetoricians is power of suggestion,() which the aes include under the first two.

[[7]]

Tr. Expectancy, oompatibility and juxtaposi- tion are the cause of the apprehension of the meaning a sentence. Expectancy consists in the failure of a word to convey a coherent sense in the absence of anot- her word. Compatibility consists in the sense being not irreconcileable. Juxtaposition consists in the utterance of the words in close succession.

What is meant is this. (1) In a sentence the words must be mutually dependent. The absence of one word from the sentence must leave it inco- mplete. (a) (2) The sense yielded by the constituent words of the sentence must agree with facts in our experience. () (3) The words, when they are uttered, must give us a connected notion, and must be hence uttered without any great interval passing between the utterance of one word and another (f.)

Tr. A sentence formed without expectancy etc. must be unauthoritative, e. g. words like, ‘a cow, a horse, a man, an elephant’, are not authoritative, for want of expectancy; a sentence like ‘One should sprinkle with fire’ is not authoritative for want of compati- bility. Of the words “Bring the cow each uttered

( 124 )

"”

Sect. 59-63]

No tes-

after a long interval is not authoritative in the absence of juxtaposition.

The author here gives illustration of the necessity of the three requisites of a valid sentence.

Tr. Sentence is of two kinds: Vedic and worldly. Every Vedic sentence is authoritative because it is spoken by God. As regards the worldly sentence that which is spoken by persons of authority is authoritative. The rest (of worldly sentences) are unauthoritative.

Vedic sentences:–The Vedas, the Brahmanas and the Upanishads come under this class. Worldy sentences:-The Smriti literature (including the Sutras) written by the sages as also the words of other authoritative persons come under this class. Note that the smritis command authority because they are based on the Vedas. If there is a conflict between the two, Veda will be held more author- itative.

ईश्वरोक्तः - Note that the तार्किकs regard the Veda as spoken by God and thus having a begin- ning, impermanent; the मीमांसकs regard it as permanent, without a beginning or an end. sound is impermanent, according to the

s.

All

Tr. Verbal knowledge is knowledge of the sense

of a sentence. Its special cause is Word.

The remarks made on the conflict between

the author’s definition cf

of गुण as करण hold good in the

[ शब्द is a गुण ].

and his assumption

present case also.

Verbal authority is to be distinguished from- the direct perception of words. gets at the sense of the words.

(125).

In the former one In the latter only

–Notes

[ Sect. 64

includes a

one hears the sound. Note that and शाब्दज्ञान under अनुमान. ( वै. सू. १. २.३, १५ ) The दीपिका says that all the प्रमाणs such as अर्थापत्ति, ऐतिह्य come under the form given in the text.

६४ अयथार्थानुभव.

Tr. Erroneous knowledge is of three kinds. (1) Doubt, (2) Perversion and (3) Argument by reductio ad absurdum method.

संशय.

Tr. Doubt consists in an apprehension that refers to the attribution to oneand the same substance of many conflicting attributes. e. g. “Is this a pillar or a man”?

When one in darkness doubts whether a particular object is a pillar or a person, he attri- butes to the same substance the conflictig attri- butes of being a pillar and a man. Such knowledge is erroneous for in it one does not get definitely correct knowledge.

दीपिका

The includes dream under the head of Perversion (mental).

विपर्यय.

Tr. Perversion is false knowledge. e.g. the appreh- ension ‘This is silver’ in the case of a mother-o’-pearl.

In doubt there is reference to two extremities and hence it is indefinite. In perversion the person is definite but wrong.

The instance of doubt will cease to be so as soon as the man mistakes the pillar for the person or vice versa. So long as he vascillates between two extremes he is in doubt; as soon as he definitely takes a thing for what it is not he perverts.

(126)

Sect. 65 ]

Notes-

तर्क.

Gr. Method of reductio ad absurdum consists in making the opponent accept the more extensive when he accepts the less extensive.

What is meant is this. If my opponent does not admit, say, that the mountain is fiery even when he sees and admits that it is smoky, I shall convince him by arguing negatively. If there is no fire on the mountain, I shall say, there will be no smoke also. But as both of us see the smoke, we must admit that there is fire on the mountain. Thus this method is useful in convincing the oppo- nent of the invariable concomitance between two things which he is not prepared to admit.

In this method I force the opponent to accept the more extensive viz. absence of smoke if he accepts the less extensive, viz. the absence of fire. the more extensive is the ; the less extensive is the ; Smoke is present in many more instances than fire e. g. there is fire in the red-hot iron-ball but there is no smoke there.) This method is subsumed under erroneous knowledge because therein we suppose, to take the instance, that there is no smoke and fire when both are there. At any rate, here the error is conscious and purposeful and as such differs from the ordinary error. a includes a under doubt.

६५ स्मृति.

Tr. Remembrance is also twofold; right and wrong. Right remembrance is what is produced by right opprehension. Wrong remembrance is one that is caused by wrong apprehension.

(127)

-Notes

[ Sect. 66–¡

If the original apprehension was erroneo the remembrance also will be erroneous. If it correct the remembrance also will be correct.

६६ - ६९ सुख, दुःख, इच्छा, द्वेष.

in

Tr. Pleasure is what is felt to be agreeable by all. As it is very difficult to come across pleasur that is agreeable to all the definition has bee modified in the so as to include the feeling c pleasure of each and every individual. We find that the pleasure of one is the pain of another, our daily experience. If the difinition in the tex were accepted, such pleasures will be left out of it: scope. To include them the definition has beer modified in the so as to make pleasure a subjective feeling. As modified the definition सुख means whatever results in the cognition “I am happy.

[[11]]

Gr. Whatever is felt to be disagreeable is pain Desire is longing. Aversion is hatred.

190 प्रयत्न.

Gr. Effort is volition.

Note that what is meant by is not the

physical act which is

but the

mental effort

that precedes such an act.

Tr.

७१-७२ धर्म, अधर्म.

Merit is what results from (the perfor- mance of) actions that have been prescribed ( by the Vedas.) Demerit is what results from (the perfor- mance of) actions that are forbidden.

(128)

Sect. 73-76]

विहितकर्मन्s Such as सन्ध्योपासन, यज्ञावधान.

निषिद्धकर्मन्

??

Notes-

, a rite to kill the enemy.

७३-७४ The गुणs of आत्मन्.

Tr. The eight beginning with cognition are the special qualities of the Self. As abiding in God, cognition, desire and efført are permanent; and they are impermanent as abiding in the individual self. Note that God does not possess सुख, दुःख, इच्छा, द्वेष, धर्म, अधर्म.

७५ संस्कार.

Tr. Impression is three fold:-(1) Velocity, (2) Mental impression and (3) Elasticity. Velocity abides in the four substances beginning with earth (i. e. water, light and air ) and in the mind.

Ether, time, space and self are all-pervading and hence do not possess velocity.

Tr. Mental impression produced by exper- ience is the cause of remembrance and abides only in the self

See the section on स्मृति.

Gr. Elasticity is the impression that restores to ils original form an object whose form was changed. It exists in earthy substances like a mat.

७६ कर्म.

Tr. Acion is of the nature of motion. An upward toss is the cause of conjunction with the upward region. A downward throw is the cause of conjunction

"

` (129)

-Notes

[ Sect. 77–79

with the lower region. Contraction is the cause of contact near the body. Expansion is cause of contact away from the body. Every other action is called action in general; It abides in the four substances beginning with earth and the mind.

. See section 5. Note that the all-pervading substances are incapable of action.

७७ सामान्य.

Tr. Generality is permanent, one anu persists in many. It abides in substance, quality, and action. It is of two kinds. (I) the higher and (2) the lower. The higher is Existence. The lower is generality of substance etc.

एकः- -see section 6. The stanza : etc. gives the reason why many.

s and s cannot be

नित्यः – If generality were assumed to be imper- manent sometimes the individual of a particular class will be found without its class feaures which is absurd.

७८ विशेष.

Tr. Particularities abide in eternal substances and distinguish them.

See section 7.

७९ समवाय.

Tr. Intimate relation is permanent relation abiding in things inseparably connected. Inseparably connected things are those of which one as long as it does not perish exists only resting on the other. They

( 130 )

L

› Sect. 801

Notes-

are the following pairs:-(1) the part and the whole; (2) The quality and its substratum; (3) The action and its substratum; (4) The class and the indi- vidual of the class; and (5) Particularity and eternal substance.

See section 8,

८० अभाव.

प्रागभाव AND प्रध्वंसाभाव

Tr. Antecedent nonexistence is without a begin- ning but has an end. It exists prior to the production of the effect. Consequent nonexistence has a beginning but no end. It exists after the effect comes into existence.

Note that both प्रागभाव and प्रध्वंसाभाव presuppose the production of the effect and are thus related to the problem of causation. There is of before it comes into existence. As soon as it comes into existence the disappears. That is why it is said to to be without a beginning and with an end. The end of the antecedent nonexistence is brought about by the appearance of the effect.

Consequent non-existence is produced as soon as the is destroyed, and lasts for all time. to come. Thus it has a beginning but no end. The घटध्वंस is therefore the निमित्तकारण of the production of प्रध्वंसाभाव.

Tr. Absolute non-existence is one which lasts through the three times and which has a counterentity characterised by contact. e. g. there is no jar on the ground.

( 131 )

-Notes

[Sect. 80

There are two views regarding absolute non- existence. According to the as it refers to things that do not exist at all, like the colour of the wind. The absence of jar on the ground is not absolute according to this view, because it is disturbed by the appearance of the jar on the ground while the absence of a hare’s horn or colour of the wind is never disturbed. So, instances of nonexistence of the type af are relegated by them to a different class of nonexistence called temporary. (सामयिकाभाव) The नैयायिकs, on the other hand, say that both these cases come under the same class of absolute non-existence, and they do not admit a separate variety to account for cases like the absence of the jar on the ground. They argue that even if the jar be brought in it only temporarily obscures the absence of the jar which is there for all time. The view of the ass is more reasonable because they do not admit instances like the absence of the jar from the ground to be of absolute nonexistence as they are not (see ¤1). The case of the nonexistence of the hare’s horn is quite different from that of the absence of the jar from the ground. here leaves the res school with which he has identfied himself and includes सामयिकाभाव under अत्यन्ताभाष. It should be seen that the argument of some that it is not possible to predicate the nonexistence of a thing which does not exist does not find support at the hands of the नैयायिकs and the वैशाषकs.

संसर्गायनप्रतियोगिताक

differentiates absolute non-existence from reciprocal non-existence. In the former, the counterentity is characterised by

(132)Sect. 81 1

Notes-

contact (*), in the latter, it is characterised by relation of identity() In other words, in the former we deny contact, in the latter we deny identity. In saying there is no hare’s horn on earth we deny contact between the two; in saying is not we deny identity between the two.

Gr. Reciprocal non-existence is one that has its counterentity characterised by the relation af identity; e. g. the jar is not the piece of cloth.

See notes on the previous section and those on Section 9.

८१ उपसंहार.

Tr. As all things can be duly subsumed under the seven categories given it follows that there are only seven categories.

how the sixteen

The author shows in the heads of गौतम’s सूत्रs as also शक्ति स्वत्व etc. can be subsumed under the seven categories. See section 2.

Tr.

the learned composed the

initiating the beginners in the tenets of (the शास्त्र of ) कणाद and the न्याय ( of गौतम ).

for

5-

Our author is of the syncretist school, and as such gives us a compendium comprising of the tenets from both the and a schools. (See Introduction.

?

( 133 )