The Department of Public Instruction, Bombay.

TARKA-SANGRAHA

ANNAMBHATTA

WITH THE AUTHOR’S DÎPIKA, and

GOVARDHANA’S NYÂYA-BODHINÎ

EDITED BY THE LATE

YASHAWANT VASUDEV ATHALYE, M. A., LL. B.

TOGETHER WITH

INTRODUCTION AND CRITICAL AND EXPLANATORY NOTES

MAHADEV RAJARAM BODAS, M. A., L Le Be

Vakil, High Court, Bombay.

REVISED AND ENLARGED

Second Edition; 1000 Copies,

Price Three Rupees.

Bombay Sanskrit Series Mo. LV.

PRINTED BY ANANT VINAYAK PATWARDHAN AT THE

ARYABHUSHAN PRESS, POONA, AND

PUBLISHED BY THE GOVERNMENT CENTRAL PRESS, BOMBAY.

Contents

Preface to the Second edition

Extract from Preface to the First edition

Introduction

Annambhatta and his works

Abbreviations

[[5]]

LXXI

TEXT AND COMMENTARIES

1-68

NOTES

60-376

Sect. 1 मङ्गलम्

69 Sect. 29 परत्वापरत्वे

…167

2 पदार्थाः

[[73]]

30 गुरुत्वम्

***168

[[35]]

3 द्रव्याणि

[[776]]

31 द्रवत्वम्

4 गुणाः

[[81]]

[[22]]

32 स्नेहः

…169

5 कर्माणि

[[87]]

38 शब्दः

…170

6 सामान्यम्'

[[89]]

34 बुद्धिः

–173

“>

" विशेषाः

…

[[93]]

ॐ अनुभवः

***180

8 समवायः

[[96]]

36 अनुभवभेदाः

***183

9 अभावाः

[[99]]

37 करणम्

***186

10 पृथिवी

•103

38 कारणम्

***192

11 TT:

***110

30 कार्यम

…196

[[4]]

13 तेजः

asg

…111

40 कारणानि

***206

梦想

[[17]]

13 वायुः

14 आकाशम

***114

41 करणम्

…210

…126

[[42]]

…211

प्रत्यक्षम्

10 कालः

**129

43 सन्निकर्षः

**221

16 दिक

…132

[[9]]

44 अनुमानम्

***233

17 आत्मा

…134

45 स्वार्थ परार्थं च

[[262]]

→,

18 मनः

छ

…145

[[2]]

46 पञ्चावयवाः

***264

47 परामर्शः

..281

19 रूपम्

***151

20 रसः 21 *** 22 स्पर्शः

23 पreatererत्वे

पाकजाषाकजत्वे

24 सङ्ख्या

35 TRATUTE

26 पृथक्त्वम् 27 संयोगः 28 विभागः

•

[[155]]

[[166]]

150 …163

[[164]]

40 पक्षः 50 सपक्षः 51 विपक्षः

18 लिङ्गम्

[[06]]

…284

}

…293

52 हेत्वाभासाः

…296

58 सव्यभिचारः

***301

54 विरुद्धः

..306

ॐ सत्प्रतिपक्षः

***307

—166

56 अमिद्धः

***308

Sect. 57 बाधितः

68 उपमानम्

Content.

••3181 Sect. 73-74 आत्मगुणाः

[[000387]]

[[9]]

59 शब्दः

●०७

-332

.334

75 संस्कारः

..368

76-79 कर्मसामान्य-

60-61 आकाङ्क्षा प्रायः } 340

[[62]]

योग्यता -सन्निधयः

वायम

63 शाब्दम

64 अप्रमा

65 स्मृतिः

66-72 सुखादयो

गुणाः

समवायविशेषाः

··369

80 अभावः

ねるね

..370

…349

81 उपसंहारः " …374

[[352]]

ॐ

…359 Appendix A

**370

[[13]]

— 364

Appendix B

…380

Appendix C

…382

[[980]]

**365 Index

**387

Preface to the Second Edition

The first edition of this book was published in 1897 and was soon out of print. Annambhatta’s work having been appointed a text-book for examinations by Bombay and other Universities, there was a great demand for a second edi- tion, but various reasons interrupted the work of revision. It was at first intended to omit the Nydya-Bodhint which had nothing special about it, and insert in its place Tarka- Dipiká-Prakása of Nilakantha and also a few useful extracts from other commentaries by way of footnotes; but as the plan would have increased the bulk of the volume it was abandoned and the text of the first edition was retain- ed. Three additional copies, marked Q. U. and W, were available for consultation and the necessary corrections and additions suggested by them have been made in the text, more particularly in the Nyâya-Bodhini. U and W especially afforded considerable help in settling many doubtful pas- sages of this commentary, and many of their variants have been adopted in this edition. The new commentaries published in W were also useful in clearing ambiguities in the text of the Sungraha and the Dipika, and the text may now therefore be said to be finally settled for all practical purposes.

The most important addition to the Notes was a literal translation of the text of the Sangraha printed in italics at the top of each section, which will be found useful to students. Ambiguities and mistakes left in the hurry of the first edition have now been removed as far as possible, and many passages in the notes have been re-written for the purpose. Some paragraphs had to be renumbered and some sections have been rearranged. Portion of the preface in the first edition dealing with the author has been placed after the Introduction, and another portion deal- ing with Mss. collated for the text has been transferred to the end as Appendix C. The Index at the end is a new feature added in this edition.

The Introduction required very few alterations. Where new facts have been brought out by later reseraches, addi-

Tarka-Sangraha.

tional foot-notes have been inserted at the proper places. The discovery of unknown Jain and Buddhistic literature in India as well as in Tibet and China by the researches of distinguished scholars like Dr. Sarat Chandra Das and Mahá- mahopadhyaya Satisa Chandra Vidyabhushana is likely to throw new light on many dark spots in the history of Indian philosophy, and many of our current notions are also likely to be altered. All speculations on this subject must therefore be accepted as only provisional at present. It would be a very interesting and instructive study to trace the gradual development of many philosophical problems, such as the atomic theory, the identity of cause and effect, the Nyaya syllogism and the notion of Abhâva. But until fuller materials are available, it will be worse than useless to indulge in idle guesses. It is now fully recognized that Indian philosophical systems are not the creations of individual promulgators, but organic growths from out of various currents of thoughts germinating through ages and collected in the Brahmanas the Aranyakas and the more ancient Smritis and Puranas. A critical and comparative study of these philosophies will assuredly reveal the lines of this growth as well as its reaction on the religious development of the Hindus. It is to be hoped that Indian scholars will devote greater attention to the study of this aspect of Indian philosophy.

Bombay, 30th September 1918.

}

M. R. BODAS

Extract from the Preface to the First Edition

[[490]]

A few words as regards the explanatory and critical notes appended to this edition will suffice. The chief aim in writing these annotations was to make them as ex- haustive as the limited scope of a book mainly intended for students would permit. The notes will not appear disproportionate to the text, if the difficulty of the subject as well as the want of a proper guide to these systems are taken into account. The notes are designed to give the student a tolerably complete and accurate idea of the Nyâya and Vaiseshika systems as a whole; and hence many topics, although omitted or only cursorily glanced at in Annam- bhatta’s work, have been discussed in the notes, because they form essential ingredients of the systems. Manuals like the Tarka-Sangraha and the Dipika are to be studied only as stepping stones to the knowledge of a great and intricate science; and the notes have been written with a view to facilitate the further progress of the student as much as possible.

An attempt has been made in the Introduction prefixed to this edition to trace the gradual development of Nyaya and Vaiseshika literature from the age of the Sútras upto the latest period. A historical sketch like this is sure to give the students a better notion of these systems than any amount of study of isolated works. The attempt is of course only tentative, but it at least opens a vast field for inquiry which may be profitably pursued in future. It was at first intended to discuss some of the more important doc- trines of Nyaya and Vaiseshika systems in the Introduc- tion, especially with reference to their evolution and bear- ing on the general course of thought in India. The task, however, was found to be too vast for such a work as the present and the plan had to be abandoned for want of space; but a few hints of the kind will be found in the notes in their proper places.

Tarka-Sangraha.

It will not be proper to conclude this preface without briefly explaining the circumstances under which this work is published. The present edition of Tarha-Sangraha with commentaries and notes was undertaken by the late Mr. Y. V. Athalye more than twelve years ago and it was an ambition of his life to devote all his leisure time to the writing of the notes so as to make them really exhaustive and useful, not only to students in Indian Colleges, but also to advanced scholars. He saw that in order to popularise the study of Nydya it was necessary to clear the many disputed points that beset the path of a conscientious student and to place the cardinal doctrines of the Nyaya- Vaiseshika philosophy in their true light. No man was better fitted for such a work than Mr. Athalye, whose pro- found scholarship and legal acumen enabled him at once to unravel the intricacies of Nydya logic. Pressure of official and other business however hardly left him any time to complete a task upon which he had set his heart. The work had to be constantly put aside, and consequently much labour and time were wasted in these interruptions; while latterly ill health made him more and more unable to bear the strain of a continuous effort. In spite of these difficulties he hoped to bring out this edition at an early date, and would have done so had not premature and almost sudden death carried him off at a time when he was most wanted. He had however left ample materials behind him, which required only a final revision and arrangement to make the book acceptable to the public; and so it was resolved to publish it as a posthumous work……..

家嘣

Bombay,

March 1917.

M. R. BODAS,

Introduction.

A Historical Survey of Indian Logie.'

“THE foundation of logic as a Science,” says Ueberweg, “is a work of the Greek mind, which, equally removed from the hardness of the Northern and the softness of the Oriental, harmoniously united power and impressibility.”” The supple mind of the Oriental is said to be wanting in the mental grip and measure required for strictly scientific think- ing. Ueberweg, when he laid down the above proposition, was not wholly ignorant of the existence of Nyaya philoso- phy, but his knowledge of it seems to have been very mea- gre. Had he known some of the standard works of Nydya and Vaiseshika systems, he would not have passed such a sweeping remark about the incapacity of the Oriental mind to develop a rigorous science like Logic. The same ignorance has led many eminent writers to belittle Indian philosophies in general or, where striking coincidences are discovered between Greek and Indian speculations, to assume a Grecian importation of philosophical ideas into India at some ancient time. Thus Niebuhr unhesitatingly asserts that the close similarity between Indian and Greek philosophies cannot be explained except by the intercourse which the Indians had with the Græco-Macedonic kings of Bactria.” On the other hand, there are writers like Gorres who as positively declare that the Greeks borrowed their first elements of philosophy from the Hindus. Max Müller is probably nearer the truth in saying that both Greek and Indian philosophies were autochthonic, and that neither of the two nations bor- rowed their thoughts from the other. As the human mind is alike everywhere, it is quite possible that philosophers in both India and Greece unconsciously adopted the same mode

[[44]]

[[4]]

This paper was read by me at a meeting of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society on the 24th September 1896 and is published in the Journal of the B. B. R. A. Society, Vol XIX p. 306.

2 Dr. F. Ueberweg: System of Logic, p. 19.

3 Thomson’s Laws of Thought, Appendix p. 285. * Thomson’s Laws of Thought, Appendix p. 285.

Tarka-Sangraha.

of reasoning and arrived at similar results quite independent- ly. A closer study of Indian philosophical literature is al- ready producing a conviction among European scholars that it is tolerably indigenous and self-consistent, and that it does not need the supposition of a foreign influence to ex- plain any portion of it. It should also be noticed that notwith- standing many coincidences between the Indian and the Grecian currents of philosophical thought there are several features in each so peculiar as to make any inter-communion between them highly improbable. The fact, for instance, that Indian Logic retained a close similarity to Pre-Aristo- telian Dialectics up to a very late time is a legitimate ground for believing that the influence of Aristotle’s works was never felt in India. Besides, as a history of Indian philoso- phy is still unwritten, and will probably remain so for years to come, it is advisable for every student to keep an open mind on the subject. Preconceived theories, however ingeni- ous or plausible, are more likely to mislead than help such investigations. We shall therefore assume, until the cou- trary is indubitably proved. that Indian philosophy, including Indian logic, is a home-grown product, creat- ed by the natural genius of the people and capable of his- torical treatment.

That it is possible to write a history of the Nyaya and Vaiseshika philosophies will be readily admitted; but a history of philosophy, such as it ought to be, presupposes a good many things, which may not find universal acceptance. It assumes, for instance, that the Indian systems of philoso- phy were gradually evolved out of a few broad principles by a succession of writers and under particular circumstances. The idea that philosophical speculations in India were the spontaneous brain-creations of a few mystic Brahmans, dreaming high thoughts in lonely forests and totally unaffected by the passing events of the world. must be discarded once for all. There is no reason why philosophy in India should have followed a different course from what it did in Greece and other civilized countries. Systems of philosophy are as much liable to be influenced by past aud contemporary events as any other branch. of science or literature; and IndianIntroduction.

philosophy should be no exception to the rule. But the task of writing such a history is beset with innumerable difficul- ties. The chief of these is the absence of any reliable his- torical data which might serve us as landmarks in the ocean of Sanskrit literature. Not only are the dates of the princi- pal writers and their works unknown, but even the existence of some of them as historical personages is doubted. Many of these works, again, are not available for reference,’ while of those that are printed or can be procured in Ms. only a few have yet been critically studied. European scholars are still too much engrossed in their Vedic and antiquarian researches to devote serions attention to a systematic study of Indian philosophies; while as to native Paudits, however learned. the very notion of a history of philosophy is foreign to their ninds. There are works in Sanskrit, like the Sarva-Darsana- Sangraha of Mádkacûchúrya and the Shad-Darsana-Samuch- chaya of Haribhadra Suri, which profess to treat of all current systems of philosophy; but the historical view is totally absent in them. There the systems are arranged either ac- cording to their religions character or according to the pre- dilections of the anthor. In modern times, scholars like Colebrooke, Weber, Hall and Bannerjee have made some vainable contributions, but many of their opinions and cri- ticisms are now antiqnated and stand in need of revision in the light of further researches. A good deal has also been added to our knowledge of the Buddhistic literature, bur even there the attention of scholars has not yet been suffici- ently directed to its philosophical portion. It is not possible, therefore, under these eirenmstances to do more than throw out a few hints which, while dispelling some of the prevalent errors on the subject, will serve as a basis for future inquiries in the same direction. The following pages will not have been written in vain if this aim is even partially achieved.

The value of a history of philosophy will be appreciated by those who know how much our knowledge of Greek

Most of the writings of eminent Buddhist logicians like Diñndgu and Dharmakirti are now available only in Chinese and Tibetan transla- tions, their Sanskrit originals having been apparently lost. See Sadajiro Sugiura’s Hindu Logic as preserved in China and Japan

XII

Tarka-Sangraha.

philosophy has been deepened by the accounts left by Plato, Xenophon and Thucydides. Systems of philosophy as well as individual doctrines are never the products of personal caprice or of mere accident; they are evolved out of a long chain of antecedent causes. They are in fact the tangible manifestations of various latent forces which mould the character and history of the nation. There could have been no Aristotle without a Plato or a Socrates, and no Socrates without the Sophists. A knowledge of this sequence is therefore essential to a true appreciation of every system and every doctrine, an isolated study of them being either insufficient or misleading. Besides, theories and schools are often the work not of one individual or of one age, but of a succession of thinkers who fashion and refashion them as it were until they become worthy of general acceptance. Such seems to have been the case with doctrines of God, of cansality and of creation, in India as well as in Greece. The true aim of a history of philosophy may be explained in the words of Zeller:-

“The systems of philosophy, however peculiar and self- dependent they may be, thus appear as the members of a larger historical inter-connection; in respect to this alone can they be perfectly understood; the further we follow it the more the individuals become united to a whole of his- torical development, and the problem arises not merely of explaining this whole by means of the particulars condi- tioning it, but likewise of explaining these moments by one another and consequently the individual by the whole.'

[[971]]

A history of Indian philosophy, such as would fulfil this purpose, is not’of course possible in the present rudimentary state of Indian chronology. Still even a crude attempt of that kind will give truer insight into each system or each doctrine than can be got by a study

a study of isolated works. The need of such connected view of phil-

osophy is all the greater in the case of systems like the Nyaya and the raiseshiku whose real merits

Zeller : Outline of Greek philosophy, p. 3.

Introduction.

XTI

lie hidden under a heavy load of scholastic surplusage. They have not the halo of religion and mysticism which makes the Vedanta and the other theological systems so attractive to students of Hindu philosophy, while the scholasticsubtleties of the most modern Nyaya writers, such as Siromani and Gadadhara, inspire positive terror in untrained minds. If the Nyaya and Vaiseshika systems, therefore, are to be popularized and their value to be recognized, it is necessary to divest them of their excrescences.

A large mass of rubbish is to be found in the works of modern Naiya- yikas, and the task of extracting the pure ore out of it is very difficult; but it is worth performing. The process of sifting and cleaning will have to he repeated several times before we can really understand some of the profoundest conceptions that are interwoven in these systems. Philosophy is the stronghold of Hinduism, and the system of Nyuya forms as it were the back-bone of Hindu philosophy. Every other system accepts the fundamental principles of Nyiya logic, while even where there are differences, the dissentients often borrow the very arguments and phraseology of the Ngaya for their own purpose. A study of the Nyâya as well as Vaiseshike systems is therefore a necessary step to a proper understanding of most of the systems. It forms as it were an introduction to the general study of philosophy, and hence no scholar who would seek the truth in the latter can afford to neglect them.

Among the numerous systems of philosophy that have been evolved in India during the last three thonsand years. the Nyaya and Vaišeshika occupy a unique position, both on account of their cardinal doctrines and of the mass of learning that has accumulated around them. A general view of these doctrines will not, therefore, be out of place in a sketch like this. Nyaya, which is the more compact and perhaps also the more modern of the two, is much more a system of dialectics than one of philosophy. The aphorisms of Gotama and the works founded on them treat no doubt of metaphysical and theological questions occasionally, but

XIF

Tarka-Sangrahu.

they come in rather as digressions than as inseparable parts of the system. The Vaiseshika, ou the other hand, is essentially a system of metaphysics with a disquisition ou logic skilfully dovetailed into it by later writers. It is these peculiarities which have earned them the name of logical systems and which distinguish them from each other as well as from other systems of Indian philosophy. These peculi- arities must be carefully noted, for inattention to them has led many to misunderstand the true scope and function of these systems.'

Gotama begins by enumerating 16 topics, which have heon erroneously called padûrthas.” These topics are not a classification of all sublunary things or categories. They look like headings of so many chapters in a treatise on logic. Of these the first nine, ric प्रमाण, प्रमेय, संशय, प्रयोजन, दृष्टान्त, सिद्धान्त, अवयव, तर्क, and निर्णय, constitute what may be called logic proper, while the last seven may be collectively termed illegitimate or false logic. qurur includes the four proofs, Perception, Inference, Compurison and Word;” while T comprises all objects which are known by means of those proofs, riz. soul, body, organ, material qualities, coguition, mind, effort, fault. death, fruition, pain and salvation.* These multifarions things have obviously nothing in common except the capacity of being known by one or other of the above proofs; and Gotama accordingly treats of them only in that light. He rarely troubles himself about the nature or form of these things, or of their produc- tion and destruction, as Kupádu, for instauce. does. This is the reason why Gotama’s definitious of soul, cognition, mind, etc., only tell us how they are known, but say nothing as to what kind of things they are. Gotama’s theory of knowledge is essentially material. Perception is a physical process consisting in the contact of organs with their appropriate objects; while Inference. which is threefold,

! Logic in Sanskrit is designated by various names, such as Nydyu, Hrin-Vidya, Hetu-Šástra, Ânvikshiki, Prâmaya-Śástra, Tattea-Sastra, Torka-Vidyó, Vádártha, and Phukkiku-Šústra. Home of these names

are found in works of 4th and 5th centuries B. C.

2 @ S. I, 1, 1, + G. S. I, 1, 9.

S. I, 1, 3.

G. S. I, 1, 4.

Introduction.

XVII

ternal objects. Logic as a science of knowledge falls under gra, and is so treated in all Vaiseshika treatises. Vaiseshikas recognize only the first two of the four proofs mentioned by Gotama,’ and they differ from the Naiyayikas on some other points also. What specially distinguishes the Vaiseshi- kas, however, is their remarkable power of analysis; and their system may for that reason be appropriately called analytical philosophy. They divide and subdivide each class of things, and dissect every notion into its minutest com- ponents. No doubt the process of analysis is sometimes car- ried to an extreme where it ends into fruitless distictions, but its influence on philosophical speculations in general must have been enormous. It is this feature of the Vaiseshika system that has made it the source of all liberal thought in Indian philosophy. None are so unres- trained in their speculations, and none are such powerful critics of time-worn prejudices as the followers of Kanáda.No wonder then that they were looked upon with distrust by the orthodox school, and were labelled Ardha-Vaināśīkas (Semi- Buddhists) by their opponents.2 The Vaiseshikas never de- clared any open revolt against orthodox faith, nor is there any reason for supposing that Kanada or his immediate fol- lowers were atheists; but the tendency of their doctrine was none the less unmistakable. As the devout Lord Bacon produced a Hume and a Voltaire in Europe, so

the Vaiseshika doctrines must have led ultimately to many a heresy in India, such as those of the Bauddhas and the Jainas.

A remarkable feature of both the Nyaya and the Vaiseshi- ka systems, as in fact of all the Indian systems of philoso- phy, is the religious motive which underlies them. Religion is the incentive to all these speculations, and religion is also the test of their truth and utility. Salvation is the goal which both Kanâda and Gotama promise the people as the reward of a thorough knowledge of their respective sys-

1 B. P. Ben, ed p. 213.

Sankaracharya : Brakına-Sûtru-Bhásh ya II. 2. 18,

XVII

Tarka-Sangraha.

tems. Amidst all the differences one idea appears to be common to all the ancient Indian systems, namely, that knowledge is the door and the only door to salvation. Opin- ions only differ as to what things are worth knowing. Conse- quently the bitterest controversies have raged among these rivals as to what things ought to be known for the speedy at- tainment of salvation. These controversies usually take the form of attacks on the rival classifications of categories as be ing either defective or superfluous or illogical. Another effect of the religious character of these systems is the discussion of many apparently irrelevant topics which have made them look somewhat heterogeneous and unsystematic. The many digressions in the works of Gotama and Kanada as well as their followers are easily understood if we look to the bearing which those topics have upon the end and aim of philosophy. Take for instance the controversy about non-eternity of sound. What has the eternity of sound to

to do with logic? Au inference would be just as right or wrong whether the words conveying it are eternal or not. But the question of the eternity of sound is vitally connected with the infallibility of the Vedas which are final authority in all matters of doubt; and all orthodox systems, therefore, must have their say on the point. We thus find that questious of the most diverse character are discussed wherever the context leads to them while others more closely related to the subject are neglect- ed. Each system has consequently become a mixture as it were of the fragments of several sciences such as logic, metaphysics, psychology, and theology. This is not how- ever a weakness as some superficial critics have supposed. It arises from the very conception of a Daršana, and could never have been avoided by those who in these systems sought to provide a complete guide as it were to the road to salvation. Indian philosophy is not singular in this respect. Everywhere philosophy grows out of religious instincts. The sense of dependence on supernatural powers and a desire to conciliate them were the first incentives

G. S. I, I, 1; V. S., I, 1, 4.

G. S. 11, 2, 13.

ú v

Introduction.

XIX

which led men at a very early period to think of their religions well-being. Philosophy," says Zeller, “just begins when man experiences and acts upon the necessity of explaining phenomena by means of natural causes. The Rigveda, the Brühmanas and the Upanishads abound in passages showing how in Indin this feeling grew in inten- sity until it became the ruling passion of the Brahmans. Salvation was the sole purpose of life, and knowledge of the universe was the means to it. The ancient Upanishads were the repositories of the speenlations which rose like bubbles out of this fermentation of thought, and which appear to have ultimately crystallized into the various systems of philosophy. In Greece philosophy tended to become more and more ethical and worldly; in India it could never free itself from its religious setting. This is the reason why in spite of additions and modifications Indian Daršanas never lost their original character com- pletely. A history of each of these systems is therefore a history of its gradual evolution within certain limits, while its relations ontside of them remained practically unchanged.

The period before the rise of Buddhism is almost a blank page.

We know nothing of it except that a large amount of free speculation must have been stored up at that time in the Brihmanas and the Upanishads. The only system which dates prior to Buddhism is the Sankhya, aud possibly the Vuileshika also; but all the other Darsangs are presumably of a post-Buddhistic origin, at least in the form in which we possess them. In fact the very notion of a system seems to be post-Buddhistic. The severe conflict between Buddhism and Brahmanism which stirred men’s minds in the century after Buddha’s death must have compelled both the parties to systematize the doctrines and express them in a compact methodical form.

1 Zeller: Outline of Greek Philosophy, p. 6.

See ay paper entitled “A Brief Survey of the Upanishads. J. B. P. R. A. Society, Vol. XXII. p. 67.

Tarka-Sangraha.

The same canse or canses which led the Buddhists to collect their ethical and philosophical teachings in their suttas during the period which elapsed between the first and the second Council must have also induced their Brahman rivals to compose similar works for the defence of Vedic ortho- doxy. The two collections of aphorisms belonging to the Prior and the Posterior Mimâmsâs and known by the names of Jaimini and Bâdarayana respectively have a strong controversial flavour about them, and appear to be the first products of this reaction against Buddhism. The aphorisms of Kanada and Gotama could not have been of any prior date, and as we do not know of any Nyaya or Vaiseshiha works older than these Sutras, the history of those systems may safely be said to begin in the 5th or the 4th century before Christ.

Roughly speaking the literature of the Nyaya and Vaiseshika systems extends over a period of 22 centuries, that is, from about the 4th century B. C. till very recent times, of which the last two hundred years, not being dis- tinguished by any original works, may be left out of account. The history may be divided into three periods: the first from about 400 B. C. to 500 A. D., the second from thence to 1800 A. D., and the third after that till the end of the last century. The only known representatives of the first period are the two collections of aphorisms going under the name of Gotama and Kanada respectively, and perhaps the scholium of Prasastapáda also; but there must have ex- isted other works now lost. The second period is pre- eminently distinguished by a series of commentaries on these Sûtras beginning with Vâtsyâyana and comprising several works of acknowledged authority. The third period saw the introduction of independent treatises and commentaries on them which at last dwindle down into short manuals like Tarka-Sangraha and Tarka-Kaumudī. These three periods also mark three successive stages in the development of the two systems. The first may be called the age of the formation of doctrines in the Satras; the second that of their elaboration by commentators; and the third that of their systematization by writers of special treatises. The

Introduction.

XXI

first is characterised by great originality and freshness, the second by a fulness of details, and the third by scholastic subtlety ultimately leading to decadence. These divisions may sometimes overlap, for we have treatises like Târkika- raksha and Sapta-padârtha before the 14th century, so we have commentaries on the Sútras, like Sankara Miśra’s Upashara, and Viśvanatha’s Vritti, written afterwards. This does not however affect our general conclusion that the writings of the 14th century and onwards are in marked contrast with those of the preceding age. The exact duratiou of these periods may have varied a little in the case of the two systems, but the order is the same. The mutual rela- tion of these two systems, however, appears to have changed at different times. During the first period they seem to have been two different systems, independent in origin but treating of the same topics and often borrowing from each other. Vûtsyâyana regards them as supplementary.1 In the second period, however, they become somewhat antagonis- tic, partly owing to an accumulation of points of difference between the two, and partly on account of the alliance of the Vaiseshikas with the Buddhists. The third period saw the amalgamation of the two systems, and we come across many works, like the Tarka-Sangraha for instance, in which the authors have attempted to select the best portions of each and construct from these fragments a harmonions sys- tem of their own. This is a curious phenomenon, no doubt, and we do not yet sufficiently know the causes which brought about these successive changes in the attitude of the exponents of these two systems towards each other; but the fact is important in as much as it must have been a powerful factor in moulding both of them. At any rate it accounts for the difficulty, which every student meets with at the threshold, whether to regard these systems as really supplementary or antagonistic to each other. They are spoken of as both, and yet no Sanskrit writer seems to have perceived the inconsistency of doing so.

The only explanation that can at present be suggested is that the

1 Våt, on G, S. I., 1, 4.

SXII

Tarka-Sangraha.

twins after quarrelling for some time reunited under the in- ilnence of a reaction.

Having premised so much we may proceed to consider the three periods in order; and the first thing we shall have to do is of course to fix the age of the Sútrus of Gotuma and Kanada. They are the recognized basis of the Nyaya and the Vaiseshika systems, and they are so far as we kuow the oldest works on those systems. Not that they were the first of their kind; perhaps they were preceded by cruder attempts of the same sort that have perished; perhaps the present works are improved editions of older ones. For all practical purposes, however, the works of Konado aud Gotama may be taken as the starting points for the two systems. Now before adverting to the evidence that exists for determining the dates of these two Sûtras it is necessary to notice one or two misconceptions that would otherwise hinder our task. The first of these is the confusion that is often made between the system and the Satra work expounding it; and the second is a similar want of distinction between the systems as a whole and the particular doctrines com- posing it. The three things, ri., Gotama’s work, the Nyaya system, and the individual doctrines embodied in it, are quite distinct, and ought not to be confounded with one another. They may for anght we know have originated at different times, and no inference can therefore be safely drawn as to the probable date of the one from any ascertained fact relating to the other. The fact for instance that some of the Vaiseshika doctrines are controverted in Badariyana’s Brahma-Sutras has been made the ground for inferring that Kamida’s Sutras were composed prior to those of Bâdarayana, and yet there are cogent reasons for believing that they were of a much later origin. We must therefore suppose that the doctrines controverted in Brahma-Sûtras existed prior to their incorporation into a regular system as set out in Kanûda’s work. Similarly many of the argu-. ments as to the relative priority of Nydya and Vaišeshika systems are based on assumptions made from some doctrines of the one being cited or refuted by the other. Such argu-

1Brahma-Sûtras, II, 2, 11, et. Seq.Introduction.

XXIII

ments however are misleading and often produce confusion. The Nydya doctrine of arredare must have existed before the rise of Buddhism and even before the formation of the Sankhya system, the oldest works of which con- trovert it. Does it follow therefore that Gotama and Kanddu preceded both the Sankhyas and the Bauddhas? And if so, how are we to account for the fact that several doctrines of the Sâñkhyas as well as the Bauddhas are in their turn quoted in the Satras of both these authors? Here is a dilemma which can only be solved by supposing that the doctrine of rare and many others like it subsequently adopted by the Naiyâyikas and Vaiseśhi- kes must have formed topics of hot discussion long before the Sûtras of Gotama and Kanada were composed. In like manner, even supposing that the system as such ex- isted at or before a particular date it will not be right to argue that Kanûda’s Sûtras also must have existed at that time. Nor should it be supposed that the whole system as conceived later is to be found in these works. Many doctrines now looked upon as cardinal principles of Vaise- shika philosophy, are conspicuous by their absence in Kanada’s work, such as, for instance, Abhava as a seventh category, the last seven qualities, and the doctrine of Vitosha. This much however is certain, that when the Sútrus were composed the two systems had assumed a detinite form which was never to be substantially changed. There are important gaps that were filled up afterwards; but the skeleton is there and it is the skeleton that gives shape to the body. The process may have been something like this. First bold thinkers started theories of their own on the burning questions of the day, and then these theories after much discussion crystallized into specific doctrines such as those of असत्कार्य, समवाय and others. The ancient Upanishads abound in passages in which we find such definite principles being actually worked out of a mass of general speculations. The next step is for some eminent

[[2]]

Colebrooke’s Miscellaneous Essays, Vol. I., p. 354, Cowell’s note, * V. S. 1., 1, £; 1., 1, 6; I., 2, 3.

XXIV

Tarka-Sangraha.

teacher to adopt and develop some of these doctrines and form a school which might in time grow up into a system. The difference between a school and a system is that of degree. A school adopts a theory about a particular phenomenon, while a system aims at explaining consist- ently the whole order of nature by reducing several of these theories into harmony. Auḍulomin,:Kâśakṛitsna, Bódari, and many others whose names occur in the philosophical Sútras, seem to have been founders of the schools which preceded the regular systems. The system when thus formed required an authoritative exposition, and many must have been the failures of inferior persons, before a master mind like Gotama or Kanada could produce a work that would live into futurity. The present Sútras of Kanada and Gotama must, therefore, be regarded as re- presenting the end rather than the commencement of this evolutionary process. They did not originate the systems, they only stereotyped them, by giving them as it were a body and shape. Besides, it is probable that the fashion of propounding philosophical systems in the form of Sútras, if not the systems themselves, came into vogue after the rise of Buddhism. The ethical teachings of Gautama Buddha were expressed in the shape of pithy sentences which were easy to remember and possessed a certain attraction for the popular mind. The Brahmans, probably with a desire to beat their rivals with their own weapons, composed Sûtras on their own philosophical systems modelled on the Bud- dhistic suttas, and possessing in some cases literary finish of a very high order. The necessity of meeting their op- ponents in controversies which became frequent from this time compelled the orthodox philosophers to put their card- inal doctrines in a definite shape; and this they did by ex- pressing them in an incisive and dogmatic form so as to produce immediate conviction. The uncompromising tone and rigid logic of these post-Buddhistic Sutras are in strong contrast with the loose reasoning and poetical imagery which abound in earlier philosophical books, such as the Upanish- ads. While morality was the stronghold of the Buddhists, philosophy was their weakest point in these early times;

Introduction.

XXV

naturally the shrewd Brahmans cultivated this latter branch with the greater vigour in order to outshine their rivals. The Satras of Jaimini and Bâdarayana must have been composed with some such object in view; and the example, once set, was of course followed by other teachers belonging to the orthodox party.

It is difficult to determine the chronological order of the several systems of philosophy, and the attempts hither- to made have not been very successful. The Sankhya system and many of the doctrines of the Vaiseshikas, if not the whole of their system, are most probably Pre-Buddhistic. The Vaiseshika system pre-supposes the Sankhya, and there is evidence to show that the Taišeshiku not only preceded Buddhism and Jainism, but directly contributed to the rise of those sects, many of their peculiar dogmas being closely allied to Vaiseshika theories. The Buddhistic doctrines of total anihilation, for instance, is only a further and an inevi- table development of the Vaiseshika doctrine of armandang; while the categories or Padarthas of the latter find their counterpart in the five Astikayas or essences of the Jainas. The atomic theory moreover is largely adopted by the Juinas, and even enters into their legendary my- thology. The epithet Ardha-Vainášikas or Semi-Bud- dhists, contemptuously bestowed upon the Vaiseshika by Śâîkarâchârya,1 concealed a historical truth, if the Vaiseshikas as suggested above were the half-hearted precursors who by their materialistic speculations paved the way for the extreme radicalism of Gautama Buddha. The Faiseshika school is specifically named in the sacred texts of the Jainas and also in the Lalita-Vistâru. Several of their doctrines are refuted in Bûdarðyana’s Brahma-Sûtras, and it is possible that they may have existed then in some systematic form. As to the other systems, the two Mimúmsâs appear to have come immediately after the rise of Buddhism and before the advent of the Nyaya and the Yoga. Neither

1 Bee foot-note supra.

• Weber: History of Indian Literature, p. 236, foot-nute,

XXVI

Tarka-Sangraha.

Bâdarayana nor Jaimini refers to any peculiar Nyaya doc- trine, while the few aphorisms in Badarayana’s work which mention logu look like interpolations. It will be shown presently that Gotame himself borrows from Bâdarayana’s work.'

Looking to the sitrus, however, the two Mimássá collec- tions appear to be the oldest of them, while the works of Gotama and Kanida come next in succession. The date of Jaimini and Bâdardyana, who quote each other and might have been contemporaries, is not yet settled. They are certainly aware of the Buddhistic sect, many of whose doc- trines they quote and refute.” The two Mîmâmsû Sûtras therefore could not have been composed before the 6th century B. C. They may for the present be assigned to the 5th or the earlier part of the 4th century B. C. The Sutras of Gotama and Kanada must be still later productions, as will appear from a comparison of them with the Brahma- Sutras. The opening sutras of both Gotama and Kanáda appear to recognize the Vedantic doctrine of knowledge being the means to salvation; while throughout their works whenever they treat of soul, salvation, pain, knowledge, and such other topics, their language seems to be strongly tinged with Vedantic notions. The phraseology is often the same, and in several places even direct references to the Brahma-Sutras may be detected in these works. For example the Vaiseshiha sutras, अनित्य इति विशेषतः प्रतिषेधभावः aud aff appear to be answers to Bidarûyana’s objections to the eternity of atoms; while the Sutra afara व्यतिरेकान्नागमिकम’ is evidently aimed at the Vedántic view explained in the four preceding sûtras, that the Soul is to be known only through Śruti. Similarly V. S. IV, 2, 2-3 controvert the Vedûntin’s view that our body is formed by

Garbe holds that Vaišeskike was prior to Nydyu: Vide. Die Samkhya Philosophie, p. 116.

Brahmo-Sútra II, 2, 18, et seg; Mîmáisá-Sutru 1, 2, 33; see also Colebrooke’s Miscellaneous Essuys, Vol. I, p. 354.

[[3]]

V. S. IV, 1, 4-5.

A Brahma-Sutra II, 2, 14-15.

V. S. III, 2, 9.

Cf. also G, S. III, 1, 28-30.

Introduction..

the union of five or three elements.

XXVII

and

Again many of the terms used by Kanda, such as अविद्या, लिङ्ग, प्रत्यगात्मा,

TT appear to be borrowed from Badarayana. The same holds good of Gotama. In several places he propounds views very similar to well-known edintic doctrines”; while a comparison of G. S. III, 2, 14 with Brahma- Sútra II, 1, 24 will show that Gotama borrows even illustrations and arguments from Badariyana3 G. S. II, 1, 61-67 would likewise show that Gotama was also posterior to Jaimini. It may be argued that the borrowing may have been on the other side, or that the particular sûtras may be later additions. But we must in such cases judge by the whole tone and drift of authors. While in all the cases noted above the topics form essential parts of the two Mimáiså systems, they come only incidentally in the works of Kamida and Gotuma. We can, therefore, confidently assert that the works of Gotama and Kaņâda, as we have them at present, cannot be older than the 4th century B. C.

[[5]]

The question as to the relative priority of these two sys- toms per se is beset with many difficulties. Opinions have been advanced on both sides. Chandrakanta Tarkilankara, in the preface to his edition of Faiseshiku-sitrus. strongly contends for the priority of Višeshiku system, while others maintain the opposite view. Goldstücker calls the Vaiseshiba ouly a branch of the Nydya without deciding their relative priority while Weber is undecided on the point. Much of the confusion, however. on this point can be avoided by making a distuction, as already noted, between the Valleshiku system and the Vaseshiki sitrus. There are strong gronuds for believing, as Mr. Tarkilankara contends, that the Faiteshika system preceded Gotama’s and yet the Sutras of Kaydda or at least many of them, may be of a

1 Brahmut-Sûtra II, 2, 21-22.

Cf. G.S. IV, 1, (4.

श्रीरविनाशे कारणापलब्धिवद्दव्युत्पत्तिवच वजत्पतिः । Gutana-Sit; उपसंहारदर्शना- 47 va dira: Brahma-Sûtru.

’ विध्यर्थवादावादवचनाचे नियोगात् G. S. II. 1, 61.

Chimacharya: Nyáya-Kosha, Intro., p. 2-3, note.

0 Goldstücker’s Pâini, p. 153.

Weber: History of Indian Literature, p. 245.

XXVIII

Tarka-Sangraha.

later date. The fact that, while Vaiseshika doctrines are noticed in Bidarayana’s Brahma-Sûtras, Gotama’s system is not even once alluded to, shows that some Vaišeshika doctrines at least were promulgated not only before Gotama but even before the composition of the Brahma-Sutras. Vatsyayana’s remark that omissions in Gota- ma’s work are to be supplied from the cognate system of the Vaiseshikas may likewise be taken to imply that that system existed before Gotama’s time’; while the latter’s reference to & प्रतितन्त्रसिद्धान्त, 2 by which he probably means doctrines taught by some allied school such as the Vaiseshikas would support such an inference. The posteriority of Gotama may also be inferred from the fact that many topics summarily disposed of or imperfectly discussed by Kanada are fully treated by him, as for instance inference, fallacies, eternity of sound, and the nature of soul. It is true that some of these arguments would also prove that Kanada’s sutras were anterior to Gotama’s work, and it is possible that a collec- tion of Vaiśeshika sútras was known to Gotama. But we must also take account of the fact that several sûtras in the present collection of Kanida’s aphorisms appear to be sug- gested by Gotama’s work.

[[3]]

V. S. III, 2, 4, tion of G. S. I, 1, 10. illustration of the

for instance, is clearly an amplifica- V. S. III, 1, 17 again gives an fallacy, although the name,

strange to say, is nowhere explained throughout Kanada’s work. The word is, however, used by Gotama as a defini- tion of wearer, and it is possible that the author of the Vaiseshika sútras borrowed it from him, and wrongly used it as the name of the fallacy. These sutras, therefore, if

[[3]]

Fât. on G. S. 1, 1, 4.

2 G. S. I, 1, 29.

प्राणापाननिमेषोन्मेष जीवनमनोगतीन्द्रियान्तरविकाराः सुखदुःखेच्छाद्वेषप्रयत्नाश्वात्मनो लिङ्गानि Vaiseshika Sdira.

इच्छाद्वेषप्रयत्नमुखदुःखज्ञानान्यात्मनो लिङ्गमिति। Gotama-Satra.

5 यस्माद्विषाणी तस्माद्वौरिति चानैकान्तिकस्योदाहरणम् ।

shule: gañarc: G. S. 1, 2, 46,

Introduction.

XXIX

not the whole work of Kanada, must have been composed after Gotama’s work was published. Now there are good reasons for suspecting that Kaṇdda’s work, as we have it at present, contains a large number of aphorisms which have been either modified or added in after times. A comparison of Kanada’s sûtras, as found in our printed editions, with the Bhashy of Prasastapada shows that many of the stras are not explained by the scholiast and were probably unknown to him.’ Moreover, all these suspicious aphorisms relate to topics that look like having been suggested after- wards. The practice of making such interpolations in ancient works is not uncommon in Indian literature. The Sáñkhya-Sútras are notoriously modern productions, though ascribed to an ancient Rishi; and even the Brahma-Sûtras of Bâdarayana lie under the suspicion of being tampered with. The loose and unsystematic arrangement of the Vaiseshika aphorisms must have considerably facilitated the task of an interpolator, while such liberties could not have been easily taken with the more compact and finished produc- tion of Gotama.2

The most reasonable conclusion that may be drawn from the foregoing facts is that, although we can say no- thing definite about an original collection of Vaiseshika aphorisms, the present work of that name is comparatively modern. We have no materials at present to fix its proba- ble age. Kanadu is a mythical personage and is variously styled Kasyapa, Kanabhaksha or Kanabhuk. The latter

See the excellent conspectus showing the sutras corresponding to each section of Praśastapâda’s scholium, prefixed to the Benares Edi- tion of that work,

2 Mahamâhopadhyaya Satischandra Vidyabhushan thinks that only the 1st book of Nydya-Sutras was composed by Akshapadu, while the 2nd, 3rd and 4th books bear marks of different hands. The later books contain passages from Lankâvatáru Sútra of Yogáchára Budhistic school, the Madhyamika Sútra of Nagarjuna and Sataka of Aryadeva all composed about 300 A. D. Vâtsyayana is said to have collected allthe later additions together. See Bhandarkar Commemoration Volume p.161. * P. B. Ben, ed. p. 200; V. S. Up. Calc. ed, p. 160-1 1; Trikāṇḍa- Sesha.

昏

ZEX

Tarka-Sangraha.

two appellations are, of course, paraphrases of Kanada, which literally means an eater of seeds or atoms.

[[66]]

The

name is said to be derived from his having lived upon pick- ed-up grain-seeds while practising austerities; more probably it is a derisive appellation invented by antagonists for his atomic theory. The system is also called Aulúkya Darsana, and a pretty old tradition is told that God Mahadeva pleased by the austerities of the sage Kanada appeared to him in the guise of an owland revealed the system which the latter subsequently embodied in the Sútras." A Rishi named Ulúka is mentioned in the Mahabharata, but nothing can be said as to what connection he had with the Vaiseshika system. The name Aulûkya is, however, considerably old, being mentioned by Udyotakâra and Kumû- rila. The name Vaiseshika occurs even in the scholium of Prasastapûda, who also refers to the tradition about God Mahadeva just mentioned. Vayu-Purâna makes Aksha- púda, Kanada and Ulúka sons of Vyasa, but no reliance can be placed on such an authority.

[[5]]

[[6]]

It has been already shown that the present collection of Vaiseshika aphorisms is posterior to the 4th century B. C., and the references to it contained in Vatsyayani’s commentary on Gotama’s work prove that it must have existed before the 5th century A. 1. Vûtsyayana mentions it as समानतन्त्र, enumerates the six tegories’ and actually quotes one aphorism of Kanada.s

[[7]]

the 5th

Cit-

Sugiura on the authority of a Chinese work Ishiki Jutsuki says he was called rice-eater because he used to go out and eat rice obtained from women, while he was called Ulika, because he lived in a mountain and was very ugly. Vide Sugiura’s Hindu Logic as preserved in China and Japan p. 14.

? Sure. D. S. Calc. ed. p. 110.

[[5]]

Bhimacharya: Nyaya-Kosha, Intro, p 2.

Nyaya Vartika, Bibl. Ind. p. 168; Tantra-Vârtika 1., 1, 4.

P. B. Ben. ed. p. 234.

" See the verses quoted in P. B. Ben. ed. Intro. p. 10.

अस्त्यन्यदपि द्रव्यगुणकर्मसामान्यविशेष समवायाः प्रमेयम् । तद्भेदेन चापरिसइख्येयम् ।

Tat. on G. S. I, 1, 9.

यस्माद्विषाणी तस्मादध इति (V. S. III 1.16 ) किमनुमानमिति चेत् सन्तानपिपत्ति-

HH: Đức. ! Vii on G. S. Il, 2, 36.

NHIỆT

Introduction.

[[1]]

XXXI

This is the utmost that we can say with certainty about the age of Kanada’s work. The date of Prasastapada, the earli- est scholiast of Kanada, is equally uncertain. He cannot be the same as the Rishi Prasasta mentioned in the Praca- rádhyaya of Baudhayana-Sútra for Baudhayana-Sutra being composed before the 4th century B. C., Prasastapada and « fortiori Kaņādu would have to be placed long before that time. Prusastapáda has also been identified with Gotama, the author of Nyâya-Sutras," but it seems to be a mistake. So no inference as to the age of the Vaiseshika-Sútras can be drawn from the date of the commentator. The six ca- tegories as well as the proofs are mentioned in the medical work of Churaka, who has been identified with Patoñjali, the author of the Mahabhashya. But even if this identity is correct, the original work of Charaka hay- ing been subsequently recast and enlarged by Dridha- bula, particular passages from it cannot be relied upon for historical purposes.

[[5]]

Happily we can obtain better results in the case of Gotama’s work. That it is posterior to the rise of Buddhism is evident on its face, for Buddhistic doctrines are expressly mentioned therein. It is also, as has been already shown, later than the latter part of the fifth century B. C., the time of Bådarâyaņa’s Brahma-Sutras which, while refuting Vaiseshika doctrines, make no mention of the cognate school of Naiyâyikas. Goldstücker says that both Kâtyûyana and Patanjali knew of the Nyaya Sútras. Now Patanjali is said to have written his great work about 140 B. C. ; but Katyayana’s date is not so certain. According to a story, told in Kuthi-Sarit-Sâgara, Kâtyâyana was a pupil of Upacarsha and a minister of king Nanda who reigned about 350 B. C. 7 Goldstücker makes light of the authority of

1 Biihler : Sacred Laws (S. B. E. Series) Part I Âpastambu, Intro. p. XXII.

2 Bhimâchârya: Nydya Kosha Intro. p. 2. * Paruma-Lughu-Mañjúshá. A verse said to be from Yogabijo calls Patanjali, a writer on three sciences, grammar, medicine, and Yoya.

[[6]]

• G. S. III, 2, 11-13. 5 Goldstücker’s Panini, p. 157. * Ibid p. 234. ↑ Katha-Sarit-Sayaru 1, 5; Max Miller: History of Ancient Suns- krit Literature, p. 240.

Tarka-Sangraha.

Katha-Sarit-Sagara, but it is hard to believe that such a story could have got currency without some sort of founda- tion. If the story is true the Nyaya-Sútras would have to be placed before 350 B. C. Kâtyáyana’s date is now general- ly taken to be about the middle of the 4th century B. C. and so Gotama will have to be placed before that time. There is another fact which confirms this conclusion. Śabara Sramin, the scholiast on Jaimini’s Sútras, often quotes an ancient author whom he calls Bhagavan Upucarsha, and who must have, therefore, lived a long time before him. This Upavarsha is said to have written commentaries on both the Mimámsa Sûtras.’ If he be the same as the reput- ed teacher of Kôtyayana above mentioned, he must have lived in the first part of the 4th century B. C. Now a passage quoted by Sabara Scâmin from the commentary of this Upacarshat shows that he was intimately acquainted with Gotama’s system and largely adopted its doctrines. Gotama’s work must, therefore, have been composed be- fore the 3rd century B. C., that is, it belongs to the 4th cen- tury B. C.

[[3]]

There is another piece of evidence, which, though ap- parently conflicting with the above conclusion, really sup ports it. Âpastamba the author of the Dharma-Sútra, knew both the Pûrca and the Uttara Mîmânså systems, but not the Nyâya.

It is true that Apastamba in two passages of

Eggeling’s S’atapatha-Brahmana (S. B. E, Series) Intro. p. 30. ’ Colebrooke’s Miscellaneous Essays, Vol. I. p. 357.

3 Another story in Somadeva-Bhaṭṭa’s Katha-Sarit-Sügara makes bim live in Pâțaliputra during the reign of Nanda, ¿, c., about 350 B. C; but no reliance can be placed on the chronological data furnished by this book in the absence of other evidence.

Šábaru-Bhishya, Bibl. Ind. p. 10 ; for an English translation of the passage see Colebrooke’s Miscellaneous Essays, Vol. I. p. 328.

5 This conclusion will not be affected by any date that may be assign. ed to Papini. Goldstücker places Pânini long before the rise of Bud- dhism and holds that he did not know Gotama’s work. Pâņini mentions the word but only in the sense of a syllogism or rather a thesis, such as those in Jaimini’s work. See Gullstücker’s Pénini, p. 152.

Biihler : Sacred Laws (5. B. E. Series) Part I Apastamba, Intro.

P. xxvii.Introduction.

XXXIII

his work uses the word r and a respectively’; but there he clearly refers to Parca-Mîmámsá,and not to the system of Gotama. Nor is this use of the word uncommon in ancient writings. The fact that the word 14, which was subsequent- ly monopolized by the followers of Gotama, is applied by Apastamba to the system of Jaimini, shows that at his time Gotama’s system was either unknown, or at least so new as not to have attaine lany wide celebrity. Apastamba according to Bühler must have lived before the third century B. C. and even 150 or 200 years earlier’; but his knowledge of the two Mimumsås shows that he could not have lived long before 400 B. C. Gofama’s work must there- fore be assigned to the end of the 5th or the beginning of the 4th Century B. C.

It is needless to state after this that our Gotama is quite different from Gotama the author of a Dharma-Sútra, who preceded Baudhayana and was a fortiori prior to Apastamba; nor has he anything to do with the mythical sage of that name mentioned in the Ramayana and Mahá- bharata as the son of Utathya and the husband of Ahilya. Nothing is known about the personality of our author, and it is even doubtful whether his real name was Gotama or Gautama. Being a Brahman he could not have belonged to the race from which the founder of Buddhism sprang. He is also called Akshapáda or Akshacharana, but the origin of the name is not known. Some have conjectured that the epithet was a nick-name given to Gotama for his peculiar theory of sensual perception, and means one who stands or walks upon organs of sense (err); but there is no an- thority for this. At any rate the author, whoever he may he, possessed great originality and a grasp of general principles that enabled him to systematize the science of logic for the first time. He cannot, however, be said to have founded it, for logical rules seem to have prevailed even before his time. Manu proclaims the need of reason for a correct understanding of the sacred law, while

Apastamba-Dharma-Sutra II, 4, 8, 13; and II, 6, 14, 13.

2 Bühler : Sacred Laws (S. B. E. Series) Part I, p. xliii.

Thid. p. xx and lv.

pastamba, Intro.

Man-Smuriti xii, 106.

XXXIV

Tarka-Sangraha.

Bádarayana goes to the other extreme of declaring the utter futility of our reasoning power to discover truth. Besides, it is quite obvious that, unless the art of reasoning had been practised for a long time previous, and had been considerably developed, neither the philosophical speculations in the Upanishads nor the rise of heretical sects, such as the Charcâkas, Bauddhas and Jainas, could have been possible. What then did Gotamo achieve ? What is his place in the history of Indian logic? This is an interesting question, and would, if satisfactorily answered, throw a flood of light on the early history of Indian philosophy,

Gotama was certainly not the pioneer. The very fact that he has evolved a logical system complete and well knit in all essential respects would lead us to suspect that he must have used materials left by his predecessors and profited by their errors. This is not a mere inference however, for Vâtsyâyana in his Commentary on G. S. I, 1, 52, actually tells us that there was a school of Naiyâyikas who required ten premises in a syllogism, and that Gotama reduced their number to five. This is quite probable, for Indian systema- tists always favour brevity, and even Gotama’s five premis- es were subsequently reduced by others to three. Gotama therefore, mast have been preceded by other labourers in the same field whose works have been eclipsed by his superior treatise. External evidence would lead us even a step further. The two passages from Apastamba’s Dharma- Sútra, referred to above, show that the word was formerly applied to Parca-Mimâmsá. Similar passages are also found in many ancient Smritis and also some modern works in which the same word or its derivatives are used in connection with Jaimini’s system. So late a writer as Madharâchârya calls his epitome of Jaimini’s work amatør- विस्तर, while many other fimimsd works have न्याय aS part of their title. The various theses propounded in Jaimini’s work are called Nyayas, and even Panini uses the word

1 Brahma-Sutra II, 1. 11.

Pat. on G. S. I., 32.

Introduction.

XXXY

in a similar sense.’ How then are we to explain the fact that a word so generally used by the Mimannsakas came afterwards to designate the rival and totally dissimilar system of Gotama. As a general rule we find that when a new school arises it coins its own phraseology to distinguish itself from its predecessors. In this case, however, the followers of Gotama appropriated an old word, and that word stuck to them so fast as to become afterwards their exclusive property. The explanation, it seems, lies in the fact that the science of logic which afterwards developed into a separate system was originally the child of Pûrca-Mimâmsû.

Analogy of other arts and sciences points to the same conclusion. All sciences in India appear to have sprung out of sacrificial necessities. Astronomy was founded on the rules by which Vedic Rishis ascertained the correct time for performing periodical sacrifices, from the movements of heavenly bodies. While medicine had its germ in the analysis of the properties of Soma plant and other sacrificial substances, music was first cultivated by the Udgåtri priest for singing his Saman hymns, and a knowledge of architecture and geo- metry was found to be essential in constructing the sacri- ficial pandal and the Vêd. It is probable, therefore, that the art of reasoning also originated in some requirement of the all important sacrifice. Such requirements were mainly two, the correct interpretation of vedic texts on which the due performance of the sacrifices depended, and victory in the philosophical and other discussions which were usually held in the intervals of sacrifices. It was a special function of the Brahman priest to give decisions on any disputed points that might arise in the course of a sacrifice, and this he could not have done unless he was a master of ratiocination. Such decisions which may be likened to the chairman’s rulings in a modern assembly, are scattered through the ancient Brahmanas, and are collected together as so many Nyayas in the ancient Pûrea-Mimâmst aphorisms of Jaimini. The philosophical disquisitions were collected in the various

1 Panini’s Satra III, 2, 122.

IXIVI

Tarka-Sangraha.

Upanishads and produced the system of Uttara-Mimâṁsâ. Jaimini lays down many rules of exegesis which seem to be the direct progenitors of the logical rules of Gotama. The vari- ous tests for instance illustrated in the third chapter of Jaimini’s attempt to determine whether a rite or a Vedic direc- tion is principal or auxiliary are only so many varieties of inference. The foy so often mentioned by Jaimini must have suggested the and era of Gotama and Kanûda respec- tively. We may therefore suppose that it is the Mimamsakas who, first prompted by exegetical necessity, developed sundry rules of logic which they illustrated by means of what they called Nyayas or theses. When therefore Manu or Apastamba speaks of a ore we must understand by the term these rules of inference as applied to Vedic interpre- tation. The utility of these rules for other purposes, founded as they mainly are on the broad basis of common sense, could not have but been perceived very soon and naturally taken advantage of. This secularization so to say of these exegetical rules of Pûrca-Mimâmsá gave birth to a science which was at first known by the name of आन्वीक्षिकी. It probably got its modern appellation of Nyâya, when Gotama raised it into a philosophical system by including in his treatise disquisitions on sundry metaphysical topics, such as the origin of knowledge, eternity of sound, nature of proof and the agency of God. If this hypothesis is correct, we can form a tolerably clear idea of the task Gotama set before himself and which he has performed so admirably. From a bundle of experimental rules which were known only as a secular art called graft and said by some to be subsidi- ary to audaz, Gotama evolved a system which at once became the rival of the two Mîmâmsûs and which from thence forward exercised a strong sway over generations of Indian Pandits. Gotama can very well be compared in this respect with Aristotle or Immanuel Kant. Nay in one sense his influ- ence has been even greater; for Kant and Aristotle failed to supplant their predecessors completely, while Gotama con- structed a new system, as it were, which eclipsed all previ- ous attempts and which has from his time become the sole standard for posterity.

Introduction.

XXXVII

The work of Gotama differs in many respects from that of Kanada. While the former is methodical and details a system of logic practically complete, the latter discloses no consistent aim and no arrangements of parts. It has the- the appearance of a loose bundle of critical notes on the principal philosophical topics of the day. This fact raises a doubt as to whether Kanâda’s aphorisms were ever the real basis of the Vaiseshika system as we find it now. The oldest exponent of the complete system as described in all modern Vaiseshika works is Prasastapada, and he may for aught we know, be its real founder also. The supposition is not so improbable as it might appear at first sight. Almost all the peculiar doctrines that distinguished the later Vaiseshikas from the Naiyâyikas and other schools are to be found in Prasastapada’s work and are conspicuously absent in Kanada’s Sutras. The doctrines about fee, græstata, fäumsfâum, and several others, which are regarded as pecu- liarities of the Faiseshika system, are not even touched upon in Kanada’s aphorisms, although they are pretty fairly discussed in Prasastapâda’s Bhashya. The seven categories on which the whole Vaiseshika system is based are probably an afterthought; and even the doctrine of fast which ac- cording to some gave the name to the system appears to be a later development. Kanada restricts the word f ( cate- gories properly so called) to three things only, geu gu and #; Prasastapâda enlarges the number to six, and some later author added अभाव. अ

[[3]]

[[2]]

It is true that the aphorism धर्मविशेषप्रसूताद् द्रव्यगुणकर्मसा- मान्यविशेषसमवायानां पदार्थानां साधर्म्यवैधम्यभ्यिां तत्त्वज्ञानान्निःश्रेयस- fr enumerates the six categories; but this aphor- ism is most probably a later interpolation. It is in- ordinately long, unlike other aphorisms of Kanada, and number of distinct propositions that would

contains

erâ qla zaqyuarie V. S. VIII, 2, 3.

}

Several Mss. of Prašastapâda’s Bhashya end with the colophon इति प्रशस्तपादविरचितं द्रन्यादिषट्पदार्थ भाष्यं समाप्तम्.
V. S. I. 1, 4.

XXXVII

Tarka-Sangrahu.

have sufficed for half a dozen Satras. Besides it is very awkwardly worded if not positively ungrammatical. A com- parison of this aphorism with the opening passage of Prasastapâda’s scholium leaves hardly any doubt about its spuriousness. Prasastapada’s passage runs thus द्रव्यगुणकर्मसामान्यविशेषसमवायानां पण्णां पदार्थानां साधर्म्यवैधर्म्यतत्त्वज्ञानं निःश्रेयसहेतुः । तच्चेश्वरम्बोदनमित्युक्ताद्धमदेव ॥

[[1]]

Now one of these two passages must be an adaptation of the other. According to Kiranavali, this passage of Prasasta- púda explains only the first three sûtras of Kanada, which implies that the fourth Sútra quoted above was unknown to the scholiast. Hence if Kirandvali is to be believed, the aphorism must be the later of the two. Śridhara, the author of Nyaya-Kandali, speaks to the same effect. In introducing the last sentence he says that it was added to remove any apparent inconsistency between the preceding sentence and Kanāda’s second aphorism यतोऽभ्युदयनिःश्रेयससिद्धिः स धर्मः । The inconsistency is that while according to the scholiast knowledge of categories is the means of frer, Kanada speaks of it as resulting from ; and this inconsistency is removed by the scholiast by adding that the knowledge of categories itself springs from fas revealed in divine com- mandments. So according to Sridhara this last clunse is an addition of the scholiast intended to remove the apparent inconsistency, and yet it is summed up in the opening words of the fourth Satre, धर्मा विशेषप्रसूतात्. Either these words or the whole aphorism must therefore have been suggested by Prasastapada’s passage. If the aphorism, as it stands now, had existed before, there would have been no giàu, and therefore no necessity for Prasastapada’s additional clause apartisandamgaftr. We must, therefore, suppose that the aphorism was added by some later writer in order to supply what appeared to him an oversight of Kanada. Besides, the fact that there should have been even the suspicion of a contradiction between the enumeration of six categories and Kanada’s second sûtra proves that the six

तञ्चेश्वर

ཝཱ

1 P. B. Ben. ed. pp. 6, 7.

Introduction.

•

XXXIX

categories were not thought of by Kanada and were for the first time mentioned by his scholiast, Prasastapâda. We must, therefore, construe the aphorism e già curomede’ as implying that Kandda mentioned only three categories to which the scholiast added three more, while the seventh was added still later. Ifany doubt is folt on the point, a critical examination of the aphorisms which are supposed to define

e and fry will dispel it. These aphorisms speak of विशेष as well as of सामान्य in a way quite different from the Inter conceptions of the two categories. Aphorisms rated सामान्यं for 317 gedigre and ergerät faqat are especially significant. The first shows that Kundra used the word विशेष as a relative term opposed to सामान्य, meaning that the notions of years and differentia are always relative. and that the same property nay be a genus with respect to one class, and a differentiu with respect to another class of things. v, for instance. is a genus as including all jars under one class, and a differentia na distinguishing all jars from other substances, as cloth and men. The second aphorism shows that Kondda distinguishes ultimate differences of things from other differentiae by giving to the former the special name of rear. It is these ultimate differences that are denoted by the later Vatteshikas by the category fary; and the fact that Kayida regards them only as one species of differentia shows that he did not include them in a separate category having absolute and not merely a relative existence. The conclusiou is irresistible that the TS, which were at first only one kind of differentia, were after- wards developed into an independent category. The notions of सामान्य and समवाय can also be shown to have originated in the same way."

It will be thus seen that unlike Nyaya, Vaiseshika was never given out to the world as a cut and dry system. It was gradually evolved as the ever-flowing stream of controversy

1 V. S. VIII. 2. 3.

2 V. S. 1. 2. 3-6.

Similarly while Kandda mentions only 17 qualities, the scholiast adds seven more, 46 and others, making in all 24, which number has been accepted by all later writers.

Tarka-Sangraha.

suggested new points or disclosed the faults of old ones: Prasastapáda thus occupies a somewhat intermediate position between Kanada and his later commentators. He is sufficiently removed in time from Kanada to call him a muni and a desciple of Maheśvara,’ while he himself is regarded almost as a semi-mythical personage by later writers. His age cannot, however, be ascertained even approximately. The earliest known commentary on Prasastapâda’s work is that of Sridhara who gives his own date as 991 A. D. He must also have preceded Sankarâchárya who seems to quote from him several times. The opinions ascribed by Sankarachârya to the Kanada school are all found in Praśustapada’s work." Śricharana, in his commentary on Sariraka-Bhâshya called Prakaṭartha, says that a particular view criticised by San- kara belongs to the older school of Vaiseshikus though opposed to that contained in Râvana’s Bhashya. The view referred to is propounded by Prasastapâda who must, therefore, be older than Ravana." This Bhâshya of Rdxana which may be a commentary either on Kanada’s Sútras or Prasasta pâda’s own work, is not available, nor is its date known. Udayana’s Kiranacali is, however, said to have been based upon it.* If this Ravana is the same as the reputed author of a com- mentary on Rigveda he appears to have been a very ancient author, and Prasastapáda must be still older. Moreover, if Praśastapóda was as suggested above the first to enumera- te the six categories, he must have preceded Våtsyáyana who mentions them. Nothing more definite can be said on the point for the present, and we must, therefore, leave Prasastapada’s date too as one of the uncertainties of Indian chronology."

1 P. B. Ren. el. pp. 1 and 329.

? Cf. the passages in Sûriraka-Bhúshya ( Anandashram ed, pp. 514-5 and p 519 with the passages in P.B.Ben. ed.p. 48 and p. 328 respectively.

· Pra-atapada has also been referred to as प्रशस्तचरण, प्रशस्तकर and * and some even identify him with Gotama Sec Tindhyes’vuri- prasády’s Futra. to Taiśeshiku Darŝunu (Bibl. Ind. ed.)

P. B. Ben ed. Intro. p. 12 note. * Våt. on G. S. I, 1, 9.

If Churaku, the writer on medicine, is correctly identified with Pa- tanjali, Prasastapada must be anterior to him. See p. xxx1 supra.

Introduction.

XLI

The age of commentaries proper begins with Vatsyúyana, otherwise known as Pakshila-Srâmin, whose commentary on Gotama’s work is the oldest known work of the kind we now possess.’ Vátsyagana must have lived about the end of 5th century A. D. or he preceded the well-known Bud- dhist teacher Diandja who is said to have lived in the early part of the 6th century. Diandya was succeeded by the celebrated anthor of Udyota who is mentioned by Subandhu writing in the 7th century. Udyotakára is said to have written his work to dispel the errors of Diñnâga aud others, and Vâchaspati in his Tika adds that his principal object was to defend Vâtsyâyana against the at- tacks of Dinnaga.*

[[3]]

According to the Jain Śloka-Vârtika, Udyotakûra was in his turn answered by Dharmakirti. Now Dharmakirti is kuown to have lived in the first half of the 7th century

I Was Vûtsyayana & Buddhist? bome have supposed him to be so be- cause his work does not begin with a prayer to any of the Hindu deities. But the epithet Svâmin as well the fact that the Buddhist writer D’ândga controverts his views sh.uld leave no doubt about his ortodoxy. He was also called Dram la ( Dravida ?) or Pakshilusvamin. He was a cative of Conjeeveran and lived about A. D. 400 i. e. a century before Dinnaga and Vasubandhu. See S. C. Vidyabhushana’s Indian Logic, Mediæcal School, pp. 68-72.

Max Müller: India, What can it teach us? Ist ed. p. 320. Dinnaga is said to have introduc.d the universal proposition if into the Indian syllogism for the first time.

3 Vasacadutta (Calc. ed. p. 235) has

aafaddare See

also Dr. Hall’s Preface to his edition of that work. Udyotakara was called Bharadvaja and lived at Thaneswar near Delhi. He was a preceptor of the Pâs’upata sect.

Sen quotation at P. B. Rea. ed. Intro, p. 10. Udyotakára hiusolf says :-

दक्षः प्रवरो मुनीनां शनाय शास्त्र जगतो जगाद ।

कुर्केका ज्ञाननिवृत्तिहेतुः करिष्यते तस्य मया निबन्धः॥

Also see Weber, Zenache, D. J. O. XXIL. 727, and Colebrooke Miscel laneous Essays Vol. I r. 282, Cow–P’s n to.

5 J. B. B. R. A. S. Vol. XVIII p. 229.

Ibid.p. 90. Dr. Sarischandra Vidyabhushan thinks that Dharmakirii and Udyotakâra were contemporaries and flourished about 633 A. D. See Indian Logic, Medieval school. p. 105 and Bhandarkar Memorial Volume p. 164.

XLI

Tarka-Sangraha.

Dinnaga and Udyotakara therefore must have belonged to the Cth, and Vatsyayana at the latest to the end of the 5th century. Vâtsyayana is not, however, the earliest scholiast on Gotama’s Sutras. The alternative interpretations of G. S. I. 1,5 given by him show that the traditional meaning was obscured at his time, and that several writers before him had interpreted the Sutras in different ways. The interval between Gotama and Vatsyayana is considerable and could not have passed without producing some notable writers; yet no relics of the period appear to have been left behind. Either the Scythian inroads which ravaged the country from the 1st century B. C. to the 4th century A. D. must have swept away all literary records of the period, or some unknown cause must have lulled philosophical ac- tivity for the time.

After Udyotakûra there seems to have occurred another long gap in the succession of orthodox Nydya writers until the end of 10th century, when a revival took place under the influence of the author of react which is the earliest known commentary on Prasastapada’s Bhashya.Śridhara wrote at least three other works named अद्वयसिद्धि, तत्त्वबोध, and avatar. The absence of any eminent Nyaya or Vaiseshika writer between Udyotakûra and Śridhara makes it highly probable that the tradition was broken in the interval. This interregnum so to say is the more inexplicable as the period was one of intense intellectual activity. Controversies be- tween the Brahmins as represented by the Mimâmsakas and Fedûntins on the one hand and the Buddhists and the Jainas on the other occupy almost the whole of this period; and it is strange that the followers of Gotama and Kanada did not freely enter into the fray. Vatsyayana and Udyotakara set the ball of controversy rolling, but no Nyaya or Vaiseshi- ka writer seems to have taken up the cudgels on their be- half immediately after Dharmakirti’s strictures. The task of answering the great Buddhistic writer was left to Mimai- sakas like Kumárila, S’ankarúchûrya and Mandana, who were by no means favourable either to the Nyaya or to the Vaiseshika systems. Dharmottura defended Dharmakirti against the criticisms of Kumârila and Mandana, and we againIntroduction.

XLIII

find Śridhara a Naiyayika answering Dharmottara. Though the Nyaya and Vaiseshika systems had thus no spokesman of their own during this interregnum, the individual doctrines inculcated by them were not a bit neglected. They were fully handled by the rival disputants as if they had by that time become the common property of all schools.The Mimáṁsa- kas strongly controverted the doctrine of non-eternity of sound, and the Vedantins criticized the atomic theory. The Prôbhâkaras started novel views about Samarayo, while all the schools fought over the proper number and nature of proofs. The answer to these criticisms came partly from the Buddhists and the Jaiuns and partly from the later Nydya writers. The fact seems to be that at this time the Nyaya and much more the Vaiseshika doctrines, despite smaller differences, found their strongest supporters among the Buddhists and the Jainas, many of whose tenets closely resembled the peculiar doctrinos of the Vaiseshikas. The Nyaya-Bindu, for instance, which can now be safely ascrib- ed to

Dharmakarti,’ is a purely Vaiseshika treatise while the Pramâna-Samachchaya of Dinnaga and Dharmakir- ti’s Vārtikas on it must also have been largely indebted to previous Vaiseshika works. This must also be the rea- son why Vaiseshikas were at this time looked upon almost as heretics.2

The alliance of the Vaiseshikas with the Buddhists and the evident tendency of many of their theories towards atheism and materialism alarmed the orthodox writers of the Mimamsa and Vedanta schools who at once consigned them to the purgatory of non-believers. Sankarûchârya calls them Ardha-Vainášikas ( Semi-Buddhists), while Kumárila brackets them with Sukyas as heretics who are frightened

1 J. B. B. R. A. S. Vol. xxx p. 47. and S. C. Vidyabhushana’s Indian Logic, Mediacal School p. 109.

2 For a detailed account of Jaina and Buddhistie Logicians, see Dr. Satischandra Vidyabhushana’s Indian Logic, Medieval School and for Chinese and Japanese writers see Suguira’s Hindu Philosophy as preserced in China and Japun.

XLIY

Tarka-Sangraha.

out of their wits by the advent of the faithful Mîmânsakas. And yet a glance at Prutastapâda’s Bhashya will show that the Vaiseshikas were at least as orthodox aud as decidedly anti-Buddhistic as either the Minámsalis or the l’euântins. Pras stapáda begius, with a prayer to God and concludes by ascribing the origin of the world as well as of the Vaiseshika system to Mahesvara. He accepts the autho- rity of Śruti and occasionally controverts the views of the Buddhists. The notion of Faiseshikas being heretical pro- bably originated in the din of controversy between the Bud- dhists and the Mimáṁsakas, and the prejudice thus created stack to them for a long time afterwards. The system of Nyaya, however, seems to have escaped the stigma of heresy, probably owing to its comparative neglect in this period. The controversies of this period mainly raged round metaphy- sical and theological questions which were monopolized by the Vaiseshika, while the purely logical part of Gotama’s system did not provoke much opposition. Only one doc- trine of the Naiyayikas was made the subject of controversy, namely the theory of a personal Creator of the universe. This doctrine was strongly advocated by the sect of Pasum patas, and various sub-sections of Bhagavatas. These theis- tic Schools probably derived their inspiration from Gotama’s work, but they very soou became distinct religious sects.’ On the whole it appears that, although there is a lack of special Nyâya or Vaiseshika works in this period, the vari- ous doctrines laid down by Gotama and Kundda were fully threshed out and underwent additions and alterations which were not even dreamt of by previous writers.

The interreguum from Udyotakâra’s time to the end of the 10th century may have been produced by various causes which cannot be know at present; nor can we say for cer- taiu how the subsequent revival was brought about. Perhaps learned men at this time were too much occupied with reli- gious and sectarian disputes to attend to the drier subtleties of logic. The fact however, cannot be denied, for while none of the known works of Nyaya or Vaiseshika proper can be

Max Müller : History of Ancient Sanskrit Literature p. 48,

Introduction.

assigned to the interval between the 7th and the 10th cen- turies, the succeeding age is marked by such an furush of Nyaya and Vaiseshika writers is more thin atoned for the inactivity of the previous period. The most notable produc- tions of this later age are a series of com venturies on the works of Prasuistapâda and Vâtsydying who had then vome to be looked upon as ancient authorities to be explained and enlarged with reverence, rather than criticized or cor- rected by abler successors. In this later period boldness and originality of thought dwindle in proportion to an in- crease of scholastic subtlety. The range of topics is limited, but each is treated with a greater fullness and ingenuity. There is a distinct tendency towards scholasticism. which afterwards assumed such abnormal proportions in the Nad- dea school, but the change was not completed till four centuries later. It may be described as an age of transition from the genuine philosophy of medieval India to the scholastic verbiage of modern times; and it is a striking fact that this age nearly coincides with the growth of scholasticism in medieval Europe. It is not a little remarkable that the history of Indian logic bears in this respect a close analogy to the progress of thought in Europe. If Gotama lived about the same time as Aristotle, Vátsyayana was probably the contemporary of Boethias and the Revivalists; while the modern Acharyas, such as Sridhara, Váchaspati and Udayana flourished in the same age which produced Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus in the West. Are we then to suppose that human mind in India as well as in Europe passed successively through the same phases of philosophic development and nearly at the same rate of progress? The question is difficult to answer, but the coincideuces are none the less interesting.

The first writer of this age of revival was Sridhara who wrote his Nydya-Kandali in 991 A. D.’ Sridhara

1 See P B. Ben. ed. p. 331. The colophon contains the line, zaraagar• ELGERCRISTÈ Zeeget oftar : which gives Saké 914 1. e. 991 A. D. 48 the date of the composition of the work, Blandarkar ( Report on Search of SK. Mss. for 1883-4 p. 314) reads the line as afqazdrag, which gives the date Saké 910 or 988 A. D., but this must be a mistake, for the word are is inexplicable without A.

XLVI

Tarka-Sangraha:

takes great pains to refute the opinions of Kumárila and Sureścara alias Mandana on the one hand as well as Dharmot- taru on the other, a fact which seems to show that Sridhara was the first eminent Vydga writer after them. Rajasekhara, a Jain commentator ou Nyaya-Kandali mentions three other commentaries on Prusastapáda’s Bhashya, besides Śridhara’s work, viz., the Vyomavati of Śiváchárya the Kiranavali of Udayana and the Lilavati of Sri Vatsa or Vallabha, all of which were written after Sridhara’s work but before the end of the 13th century. The chronological order of these writers may be fixed as Sridhara, Vallabha, Udayana, and Sicâditya." All of them came to be looked upon as eminent authorities and honoured with the title of Acharya. Each of them was distinguished for some new conception, or original treatment of old topics. The works of Vallabha and Śivâditya are not yet available so as to enable us to form any definite opinion about them, but their views are frequently quoted and criticized in later works. Udayana’s Kiraņúcali was probably left unfinished by the author, as all the Mss. hitherto available contain only the chapters on ger and gor. Sridhara lived as stated above at the end of the tenth century. He was followed by Váchas- pati Misra in the 11th century, who wrote commentaries on all the principal philosophical systems, and whose works have been deservedly held in the highest estimation by the succeeding generations. Vâchaspati, the author of Bhâmatt and Śûnkhya-Tattva-Kaumudi, wrote an equally able com- mentary on the Vårtikas of Udyotakára, called Vârtika-Tât- parya-Tika and this Tthe of Vachaspati became the text of another commentary, Tâtparya-Pariśuddhi by Udayana.*

[[3]]

[[2]]

1 P. D. Den. ed. Intro. p. 19.

2 See the opening passage of Tarka-Dipika-p. 1, and Note thereon, p. 72 infra.

3 J. B. B R. A. S. Vol. xvii. p. 90. Cowell in the preface to his translation of Kusumánjall tries to prove that Váchaspati lived in the 10th century; but his view cannot be accepted as Váchaspati quotes trade of King Bhoja who reigned in A. D. 993 Satischandra Vidya- bhushana also places Váchaspati in 976 A. D. when he is said to have composed hie Nyaya-sûchi-nibandha.

Bhandarkar : Report on Search of Sk. MSS. for 1883-4, p. 81.

Introduction.

ILVII

Udayanacharya, the author of Kiranavali and Parisuddhi lived, therefore, some time after Váchaspati, and may be assigned to the end of the 12th century.’ Udayana is the greatest Naiyayika writer of this age. He combines in himself the two-fold character of an eminent dialectician and a religious revivalist, and has consequently become the centre of a number of traditions which have perhaps little foundation in fact. A story, for instance, is told of his having once made a pilgrimage to the temple of Jagannath, where he found the temple-door shut against him. On this the irate Naiyâyika addressed the following couplet to the Deity :-

ऐश्वर्यमदमत्तोऽसि मामवज्ञाय वर्तसे ।

उपस्थितेषु बोद्धेषु मदधीना तब स्थितिः ॥"

“Infatuated with omnipotence as thou art, thou treatest me with contempt; but (remember) when the heretics approach, thy very existence depends upon me.”

This irreverent apostrophe was probably founded on the fact that Udayana wrote two well-known treatises to prove the existence of God and to refute the atheistical objections of the Bauddhas and other heretics. These treatises respectively known as Kusumanjali and Bauddha-dhikkara, though small, prove Udayana to be a very acute and powerful writer. Udayana is said to have carried on a vigorous crusade against the Bauddhas and the Jainas; and if Monier Williams is right in assigning the complete decay of Buddhism in India to the beginning of the thirteenth century, Udayana must have taken a leading part in giving the death-blow. At any rate the great prominence given in all the later works to ईश्वरकारणवाद or the doctrine of a personal Creator of the Universe may be ascribed to Udayana’s influence. It is

[[3]]

1 Cowell’s Preface to his translation of Kusumanjali, p. x ; J. B. B. R. A. S. Vol. XVIII. p. 89-90. Dr. S. C. Vidyabhushana places him about 984 A.D. on the authority of a verse in his Lakshanâcali. Vide Bhandarkar Memorial Volume p. 165.

2 Nehemiah Gore’s Rational Refutation of Hindu philosophy translat- ed by F. Hall, p. 6, note. Monier Williams: Buddhism, p. 170.

FLYI

Tarka-Sangraha.

highly probable that Udayana’s works gave a strong impetus to the falca, Vaishnava and other theistic sects which arose in large numbers at this time. Nalydyitas amongst all the Indivx systematists were from henceforward the strongest supporters of monotheism, and the Nadden School in later times produced one of the greatest leaders of a modern theistic movement, viz., Chait nya of Bengal.

Tradition ascribes to Udayana the first conception of the iden of nuiting the two sister systems of Nyaya and Valleshika luto one harmonions whole. Udayana’s extant works do not however support this theory, although it is not improbable that he threw out hints to that effect, which led some later writer to make the experiment. The earliest known work in which the two systems are found actually combined, as in many later works, is the Sapta-Padarthi of Sicáditya Misra, and it is possible that he was the first to put the idea into practice. Šicâditya is also the first writer to mention Abhâu as the seventh category and to introduce a systematic discussion of logical questions under . Sapta-Pa lárt & may, therefore, be regarded as the model of all such later mauals as Tarka-Sangraha, Tarka-Kaumudi and Tarkimrita.

As to Vallabhacharya his exact date is uncertain, but he appears to have preceded the author of Sapta-Padârthi if not also Udayana. This seems probable from the mention of Nyâya-Lilâenti in a Canarese poem named Darśana-sâra written by a contemporary poet in praise of King Singhana of the Yadav dynasty of Devagiri, who reigned from A. D. 1210 to 1347 Da reina-sára also mentions Udayana

1A Ms. of Jinavurahana’s commentary on Sapta Padurthi is in the Decon ollege L bay This finavaraham lived in Samvat 1471. Pe- terson mentions . 15. of equit ́s numel Mayir:ft by Midhaca-Sara- awati, as daten 8. uta’ 1405. See 1 pori of the Se rch of Sanskrit MSS. for 1-93 p. 24. Also Bhinderkar’s Report for 1882-33 p 25 Prof. Ghute men lo is a t’id Commentary cpfer by S-g’ananta. Prof Ghate plac’s Udayana in 984 A. D. and Ganges’a in the 11the Century, and Siväaitya between the two. J. B. B. R. A. Society xx111 p. 34.

2 Bhandarkar : Burly History of the Dekkhan, p. 82.

Introduction.

XLIX

and some other writers.;’ but nothing further can be said about it until the work is available to the public. It is superfluous perhaps to remark that this Vallabha, the author of Nyaya-Lilavati was quite a different personnige from the great Vaishnavaite reformer of that name who dourished. in the 15th century.

[[2]]

A host of smaller writers such as Varadaraja and Malli- nátha may be mentioned as belonging to this second period, but they do not seem to have left any lasting mark on subsequent literature. The period may be roughly said to hare closed about the beginning of the 14th century. It is marked by a great activity in the beginning and at the end, with an intervening blank which lasted for about 3 centuries and which sharply divides the older from the later school of writers. The condict of opinions between the Vaiseshikas and the Naiyâyikas as well as the differences between the ancient and the modern schools of Naiyayikas, which are so frequently discussed in modern works, seem to have origina- ted in this period; and it was perhaps the growth of these minute differences that created at the end of

this period & reaction in favour of amalgamatiug the two systems. This attempt

attempt at amalgamation, however, produced an effect exactly contrary to what was intended, for it stereotyped the differences inste id of removing them. We find that in this period almost all the principal doctrines were evolved and the details were worked out, on which the dialecticians of the third period were exclusively to spend their scholastic ingenuity and produce volumes after volumes without making any real progress. With Udayana and Śivâditya we lose sight of writers who deserve

I am indebted for tuis information to my friend M. K. B. Pathak formerly of the Deccan College. He $21 話 Canarese Ms. of gamers in the library of Brahma Süri Sâstri of Sravana Belgole in Mysore territory. It is not known when the book was written, but the author appears to have been a contemporary of fargen.

2 Another writer Jayanta wrote Nyaya-mañjart an indepedent Commentary on Nydya-Sutras. He was a native of Kashmir and lived in the 11th century. He quotes Váchaspati and refutes Buddhists.

Tarka–Sangrahu.

to be called Acharyas, as having aimed at originality and written epoch-making books. The class of Achúryas or masters, was henceforward to give place to that of mere Upadhyâyas or ordinary pundits. The race of giants was to be succeeded by a remarkably versatile and disputatious troop of dwarfs. Philosophy lost its freshness as well as its charm, and gradually degenerated into a bundle of endless controversies.

The end of the 14th century saw the commencement of the third period of Nyaya literature; and Gangeśa, or Gangeś opûdhyŵya, the author of Tattca-Chintâmaņi may be said to be its oracle. He founded a new school of text- writers and commentators who afterwards came to be known as the Nuddea school owing to their having chiefly flourished in the tols of Nuddea or Navadwipa in Lower Bengal. The distinguishing features of the writers of the school were their overwhelming pride, an abnormal development of the critical faculty, and a total disinclination to

go out of narrow grooves of traditional doctrines. The original Sútras and the scholia on them recede into background, while Gangesa’s work itself becomes the centre of a mass of literature unparalleled in any other country or age. Here we see at one and the same time scholasticism at its climax and true philosophy at its lowest depth. We might wade through volumes of controversial jargon without coming across a single flash of deep thought or real insight into the nature of things. Mere conventionalities and distinctions without a difference are the weapons in this wordy warfare, with which one disputant tries to de- fend his thesis or to vanquish a rival. It may be doubted if either the writer or the reader is made a whit the wiser by all this labour.

All the writers of this school are not however equally faulty in this respect. The earlier ones especially show a considerable freedom of thought which is quite refreshing. The most notable of this kind is Gangesopadhyaya, the founder of the Nuddea school, whose exact date is not known, but who probably lived about the end of the 14th century. Gangesa quotes Vâchaspati, while his son Vardha-

Introduction.

mána wrote commentaries on Udayana’s Kirandvali and Vallabha’s Lilicati. Gangeŝa must have therefore lived after the 12th century. Gangela was followed by two writers of note Jayadera and Vasudeva. According to Burnell Jayadeva, otherwise known as Pakshadhara Miśra, wrote his Manya- loka, a commentary ou Gangesa’s Tattea-Chintamani about 5 centuries ago, that is. about the middle of the 14th century, but this is highly improbable. Vasudeva Sarvabhauma, a follow student of Jayadera and the author of a commentary ou Gangesa’s work, had four pupils of whom the first Gauránya, popularly known as Chaitanya, the celebrated religious reformer in Bengal, was born about 1485 A. D.2 Both Sircalhauma and Jayadeca mast, therefore, have lived in the latter part of the 15th century, and Gangesa at least a generation or two earlier. Jayadeca is said to have studi- ed Tattca-Chintamani with his uncle Harimiśra, which shows that Gangesa’s work was already a standard book in the first half of the 15th century. We shall not be wrong therefore in placing Gangesa in the latter part of the 14th century at the latest.*

Fúsudez Sárvabhauma must have been a remarkable man, for all of his pupils distinguished themselves in dif-

1 Burnell, Catalogue of Tanjor MSS, Vol II., p. 117. Jayadeva was not- ed for his intellectual powers. He got the nickname rg for having mastered a difficult book in a fortnight. He is probably the same as the author of a but is different from the poet who com- posed fatmaz. Raghunatha Siromani is said to have been his pupil for some time.

2 Cowell ( Colebrook’s Miscellaneous Essays, Vol. I., p. 281) gives the date of Chaitanya’s birth as 1489; but see Bose’s History of Hindu Civilization, Vol. I. p. 43. Chaitanya died in A. D. 1527. Vindhyc- svariprasad quotes verso current among Nuddea Pundits शाकेमुनियां मथुरेन्द्र पुन फाल्गुन पौर्णमास्याम् । त्रैलोक्यभाग्योदयपुण्यकीर्तिदेवः शचीनन्दन enfada । Here the word I may mean two or four and so will give either Saka 1207 and 1407 as the date of Gouranga’s birth Ses Intro. to l ́ais’eshiku Dars’ana (Bibl. Ind. ed.) p. 32.

Prof. Ghate places Gangcia in the 11th century on the authority of a Ms. of Jayadeca’s Iloka transcribed in Lakshmana Sameat 159 corresponding to A. D. 1267 See J. B. B. R. A. S. xxII p. 93 and Vindhye variprasad’s Intro, to Vaiseshika Darsana (Bibl. Ind.). p. 82.

LII

Tarka-Sangraha.

ferent fields. The first, Chaitanya, founded a Vaishnava sect which soon spread over the whole province of Bengal and revolutionized as it were the religious life of the people. The fact is noteworthy that the greatest exponent of the doctrine of faith in modern times received his early training in the dialectics of Nyaya philosophy. The devout mind of Chaitanya must have no doubt recoiled from the scholastic subtleties of Gangesa, but they could not have failed to influence many of his views. Vasudeva’s second pupil Raghunatha, otherwise known as Tarka-Siromani or simple Siromani, wrote Lidhiti, the best commentary on Gangesa’s Tattca-Chintamani, and is acknowledged to be the highest authority among the modern Naiyayikas. The third was Raghunandana, the lawyer and the author of a commentary on Jimúta-ráhana’s Dâya-vibhaga, and is now held to be the best current authority on tue Bengal School of Hindu law. The fourth Krishnananda, also wrote works on charms and other kindred subjects. All these writers being contemporaries of Chaitanya must have flourished in the beginning of the 16th century. Raghunatha Širomani wrote besides Didhiti commentaries ou Udayana’s works and a few other treatises, one of which is Padartha-Khandana or a refutation of Vaiseshika categories. He was succeeded by a series of commentators whose sole ambition seems to have been to make the Didhiti s unintelligible and terrible to the student as possible. Raghunatha’s immediate succes- sors were Mathuránátha, Harirama Tarkâlankára and Jagadiša, who were followed by their respective pupils, Raghudeva and Gadadhara. Gadadhara may be called the prince of Indian schoolmen, and in him the modern Nyaya dialectics reached its climax. He was such a thorough going Naiyayika that when asked to think of the prime cause of the univers: on Lis death-bed, instead of contemplating God he is said to have repented the words पौलव : पीलवः पीलवःः (atoms, a oms, atoms) His sixty-four treatises or Vadas as they are called on as many topics noticed in Tattva-Chintamani form a continuous commentary on Siromani’s Didhiti and Jayadeva’s Aloka; but several of them

‘Bhimacharya: Nydya-Kosha, Intro, p. 6.

ng..

are notIntroduction.

LIVI

yet available. Gadadhara having come about two generations after Raghunatha must be assigned to the end of the 16th or the beginning of the 17th century. He was thus nearly contemporaneous with Lord Bacon whose denunciations of scholasticism may be most appositely illustrated by extracts from Gadadhara’s writings. Akbar’s was an augustan age in ludia, and scholars like Gadadhara found a congenial atmosphere in the peaceful times of the great and enlightened Mogul; but Akbar’s death put an end to all dreams of a revival of letters. The wars and anarchy of the next two centuries afforded little scope for the culti- vation of philosophy, and we accordingly find that even scholastic Nyáya could not flourish after Gadûdhara.

The generation next after Gadadhara is represented by two writers standing on a somewhat lower level but equally famous. These were Sankara Misra, the author of Upaskâra, a commentary on Kandda’s Sútras, and Viscandtha who wrote Siddhanta-Muktúrali aud Gotama-Sútra-critti which is a commentary on Gotama’s aphorisms. Sankara Misra was a pupil of Raghudevo, the fellow student of Gadâdhara. There is some doubt as to the date of Fistanátha, bat be most probably belonged to this age."

It is remarkable that the Sutras of both Kanáda and Gotama should have attracted the attention of commentators at about the same time. Sankara-Misra and Viscandtha who respectively commented upon the works of Kanâda and Gotama greatly resembled each other and were probably contemporaries. A kind of reaction against the excesses of Gadadhara seems to have led these writers to seek the fresher fountains of the Sûtras. Another sign of this reaction was the production of manuals adapted to the understanding of the beginners and explaining the latest ideas in the simplest language. The Bhasha-Parichchheda, the Tarka-Sangraha and the Tarkâmrita are instances of this class of books, which must have come as a relief to those students of Nyaya

1 Rudrabhatta, brother of Viśvanâthe, wrote a commentary on Raghu- nåtha’s Didhiti, culled Raudri. Mes of two of Rudrabhaṭṭa’s works are mentioned by Aufrecht (Catalogus Catalogorum) as dated 1640 and 1657 respectively.

LIV

Tarka-Sangraha.

who were hitherto lost in the mazes of Pañcha-Lakshant and Daśa-Lekshant. In course of time these manuals too were overloaded with commentaries, but fortunately the commentaries on them, except perhaps two, never became as popular as the originals. The two exceptions are Viśra- natha’s Siddhania-Muktárali and Annambhatta’s Tarka- Dipika which boing written by the authors of the original works are nore like larger editions of those texts than mere explanatory glosses. These manuals proved very handy and useful to students, but they also marked the lowest watermark of the Nyaya and Vaišeshiku systems. Henceforward all originality was dead and the writers chiefly aimed at explaining the ideas of their predecessors instead of expounding their own. The Upadhyayas were now succeeded by writers whose high sounding names were in strange con- trast with the worth of their productions. Krodas or annotations became plentiful, but original thinking was dead and gone completely. Even these are now rare, and the once famous class of Naiyayikas is in danger of being extinct for ever.

The preceding resume of the Nyâya and. Vaiseshika lite- rature brings out, it is hoped, at least the one fact that that literature is as capable of a historical treatment as any other class of writings. It is the story of a gradual develop- ment of two philosophical systems which, springing out of a few elementary notions, attained their present proportions after many vicissitudes and in the course of several centuries. There must have been during this time considerable additions and alterations in the fundamental doctrines as conceived by the founders of the systems. The original nucleus was com- paratively small, but the accretions and out-growths seem to have assumed in time quite large proportions. What an amount of earnest thought and labour must have been devot- ed to this work of elaborating complete systems out of a few primary principles ! It was a process of evolution brought about partly by the natural law of growth and partly by the mutual action and reaction of the several systems of In- dian philosophy. In the beginning the chief rivals of the Nydya and Valieshika systems were the Sankhyas, whose

Introduction.

theory of the anti-production reality of effects was diamet- rically opposed to the Naiyayika doctrine of non-existent effect. Later they encounter the more formidable critics of the Mimamsa and Vedanta schools who differed from them in so many particulars that a severe conflict between the rivals was inevitable. The Mimamsakas affirmed the eternity of sound, while the Naiyûyikas denied it. The first enumerated six proofs, the Naiyûyikas four, and the Vaiseshikas only two. The Naiyâyika assumed a personal creator, the Vedan- tins an impersonal Brahman, while the Mimamsakas would recognize nothing but the eternal Vedas. Again the Vedâu- tins derived all creation from one universal spirit, the Naiyayikas from hard minute atoms. The former were idealists par excellence, the latter out and out realists. The doctrines of the former always tended towards mysticism and idealism those of the latter towards materialism and disbelief. It was natural that systems so widely divergent should come into conflict with each other. The long-continued controver- sies between these rivals systematically influenced the tenets of all of them. While the Vedantins incorporated much of the logic of the Naiyayikas into their works, the latter did not disdain to borrow many of the theological views of the form- er. It would be absurd therefore to expect that any of these systems as propounded in modern works would agree in all respects with the views of the ancient authors. The Naiyayi- has themselves recognize this fact by contrasting wherever necessary the views of the moderns with those of the ancients. It is also noteworthy that there is no sharp line dividing the ancient and the modern schools of Naiyâyikas. Sometimes the terms are applied to the Vaiseshikas and Naiyâyikas respectively; sometimes to older authors like Vâtsyûyana and Praśastapâda, as opposed to the later ones of the Nad- dea school; and occasionally even in that school to the author of Didhiti as dissenting from Gangesa. As an instance of the last, the student may compare the two definitions of करण one insisting upon the qualification व्यापारवत् and the other making proximity to the effect the sole test of causa-

IVI

Tarka-Sangraha.

tion. The line dividing the ancients and the moderns has thus coutiuaously moved forward and forward, thereby show- ing that the Naiyâyikas themselves acknowledged a progres- sive dovel puent of their philosophy. It ougat to be an in- teresting stuly to mark the successive stages of this develop- ment, and discover the causes that may have led to them. The time may come when a deeper knowledge of the Nyáya and Vaiseshika literature will enable us to solve this problem.

The foregoing observations have been mostly based on material obtainable from the literature of the Nyaya and Vaiseshika systems themselves; but works belonging to other philosophical systems as well as the vast literary trea- sures produced in ancient aui medieval In lis will, if properly examined, yield still more importaut data for a history of Indian philosophy. A comparison of Greek logic with the logic of the Nydya must also be very instructive. Such a comparison will not only show how similar ideas and mod es of thought occurred almost simultaneously ani in the same historical order to thinkers in two such distant countries as India and Greece, but it may also throw new light on some of the dark chapters in the history of Indian Logic. Space will not, however, permit me to enter into these interesting inquiries at present; and I must content myself with noting only one important fact which cannot be decently passed over in such a sketch as this. I, of course, refer to the strik- ing resemblance which the syllogistic method of the Nyaya bears to the Pre-Aristotelian dialectics in Greece. Zeno the Eleatic was the founder of this latter, and Zeno must have been a contacaporary of Gotama, or of at least some of his immed te predecessors. Zeno’s work, which is divided into three part–upon consequences, upon the interrogatory methol of disputation, an i пpon sophistical problems respec- tively-has many points of similarity with that of Gotama, while the interrogatory method, cultivated by Zeno’s fol-

1 For a discussion of these two views, see Notes on Sec. 37, pp. 186- 90, infra.

2 Whateley: Elements of Logic, p. 3.

Introduction.

LVII

lowers the sophists and brought to perfection in Plato’s Dialogues, was almost identical with the syllogistic process of the Naiyayikas. The essence of this method consisted in driving an opponent to a point where he was either totally silenced or the absurdity of his position became self-evident. So far as the Naiyâyikas were concerned this was not an ac- cidental feature, for they have laid down a special rule that no premise in a syllogism can proceed without having a previous TT or doubt, presumably started by an

the opponent in

controversy. Take the stock-example, “Mountain is fiery. “Why?” “Be- cause it has smoke.” “What then ?” “Wherever there is smoke, etc.,” and so on, every premise being a reply to some previous question, assumed until the imaginary querist has no more questions to ask. This is exactly the way Socrates used to argue with his real interrogators, or Euclid proved his theor- ems of geometry. Obviously this method is better suited for controversy than for purely didactic reasoning; and conse- quently we find that Indian thinkers who came after the Naiyayikas such as the Bauddhas and the Vedantins modified it to a considerable extent just as Aristotle did in Greece.’ The tripartite syllogism of Aristotle was nothing more than a re- adjustment of the ancient dialectical syllogism, although Aris- totle himself made too much of it and expected from it results which it was incapable of producing. Similarly those who claim superiority for the Aristotelian over the five-membered syllogism of the Naiyâyikas forget that both are mere instruments or mechanical aids for thinking, and as such cannot by themselves furnish an absolute guar ntee for truth. Both have their peculiar merits as well as draw-backs, and consequently both must be judged from their proper stand- points. Aristotle distinguished between the dialectic and the apodictic, i. e. the old and the new or his own syllogism by asserting that the former proceeded from mere belief or an assumed hypothesis while the latter was based on scientific

1 Colebrooke thinks that the three-membered syllogism of the later Vedanta was borrowed from the Greeks, but this is mere guess. See Miscellaneous Essays, Vol. I., p. 356.

LVIII

Tarka–Sangraha.

truth. There is much force in this distinction, and it may to some extent apply to the five-membered syllogism also. But Aristotle’s criticisms can no longer be accepted without reservation even with respect to doctrines intimately known to him. Much less can he be accepted as a safe guide in adjudging the merits of Indian logic.

It will not be proper to conclude this introductory sketch without noticing one more objection that is often advanced against the Nyaya-Vaiseshika systems, namely that their heterogeneous character detracts considerably from their value as systems of pure logic. Indian logicians, say these objectors, have by their frequent digressions on metaphysical and other topics, such as the categories, the sources of knowledge and the theory of atoms, been led into treating the strictly logical questions either perfunctorily or in a wrong manner altogether. On a closer consideration however this heterogeneity of the Ngaya and Vaiśeshika systems will be found to have been inevitable. The narrow conception of logic as being only a theory and art of proof and nothing more is no longer tenable. Modern investigations, such as those of Kant Ueberweg and others, show that the purely logical questions are inseparably connected with others comprehended in the wider province of metaphysics. The best answer to the above objection can therefore be given in the words of an eminent modern writer:-

“Start as we may,” says Prof. Adamson, in popular current distinctions, no sooner do logical problems present themselves than it becomes apparent that, for adequate treatment of them, reference to the principles of ultimate philosophy is requisite ; and logic, as the systematic handling of such problems, ceases to be an independent discipline and subordinate special brauch of general

becomes philosophy.

[[17]]

And again the same writer remarks:-

[[66]]

Any criticism of a general conception of logic or special application thereof which does not rest upon criticism

Prof. Adamson in his Art, Logic in Encyclopaedia Britannica, 9th ed. Vol. xiv p. 781.

Introduction.

LIX

of the theory of knowledge implied in it must be inept and useless. It will also have become apparent that a general classification of logical schools as opposed to the reference of these to ultimate distinctions of philosophical theory is impossible.”*

The Naiyayikas seem to have arrived at the same conclu- sion at an early period, and faced it boldly by embodying their views on all cognate and interdependent questions in a fairly consistent system. Gotama and Kanâda were not therefore such foolsin mixing logical and metaphysical topics in their works as some of their modern critics would believe them to be. Logic is no longer regarded as a theory of proof only; it is a theory of knowledge in general, and as such treats of many psychological and metaphysical topics which do not fall within the domain of the narrower science. Looked at from this standpoint Gotama’s conception of bis subject will be found to be remarkably accurate and just. Let us first understand him, and there will be then time enough to pick holes in his monumental work.†

WRITTENSKOMSASSINA

See Encyclopardia Britannica, 9th el. Vol. XIV, p. 799.

† Max Müller in noticing my Brief Survey of Indian logic remarks that at p. 476 of his Six Systems of India Philosophy “But unfortu- nately that period in the historical development of the Nyâya which is of the greatest interest to ourselves, namely that which preceded the composition of the Nydya-Sûtrus, had by him (i. e. myself) also to be left a blank, for the simple reason that nothing is known of Nyâya before Gotama”. It should be remembered however that Nyaya was recognised as a separate system only after Gotama and that all traces before him must be sought in the general philosophical literature such as the Upanishads.

Annambhaṭṭa and his works.

เ

Annabhaṭṭa, the author of the Tarka-Sangraha and the Dipika, shares the fate of many Sanskrit writers of being known only in his works. The name itself looks anomalous, and is either a contraction of Ananta Bhatta or a sanskritized form of the Canarese name Anna Bhatta. Little do we know about him, and that little mostly consists of traditions which cannot be accepted as true without the strongest corroboration. Mr. R. B. Godbole, in his Dictionary of Modern History of India’*, gives a detailed account of our author without however mentioning the source of his information. According to him, Annambhaṭṭa was a Tailang Brahman by birth and resided in a village named Garikapoda formerly in the possession of Nizam Ali. He lived in the 15th century at the time of the Chalukyas, studied Nyaya at Koundinyapura or Kondu Vidu for 12 years and became a famous Naiyâyika. He established a College for teaching Nyaya in his native town where he instructed his pupils in a graduated series of Nyaya works consisting of Tarka-San- graha, Tarka-Dîpikâ, Siddhânta-Muktâvali and Gadâdharî. He had many children none of whom survived him, and is said to have travelled out of his village only once in his life when he visited the shrine of Mallikarjuna at the advanced age of 55. From this it would appear that Annambhaṭṭa was posterior to both Gadâdhara and Viśvanátha, which is very probable; but then he could not have lived in the 15th century as stated by Mr. Godbole. It has been shown elsewhere, † that Gadadhara must have flourished in the latter part of the 16th century and Viśvanatha one generation later. Obviously Annambhaṭṭa who taught the works of these writers could not have lived before the beginning of the 17th

R. B. Godbole : भरतखण्डाचा ऐतिहासिक कोष p. 10%.

† See Introduction p. LIII supra.

Annambhatta and his Works.

LXÌ

century. Another of Mr. Godbole’s statements, viz. that Annambhatta travelled only once in his life, is contradicted by a tradition embodied in a well-known couplet that has passed into a proverb, काशीगमनमात्रेण नान्नम्भट्टायते द्विजः mean- ing that a man does not become a great scholar like Annam- bhatta simply by going to Benaras. If the verse refers to the author of the Tarka-Sangraha, he must have visited and studied at Benaras. The proverb would also show that he became famous for his learning at a very early period, a conclusion which is strengthened by the fact that his works became very popular and have been in use as elementary text-books in all parts of India. No reliance can therefore be placed on Mr. Godbole’s account, and in the absence of any other authentic source of information we are left to such meagre data as are supplied by the writings of Annambhaṭṭa himself.

Apart from such vague traditions, we can unhesitatingly say that Annambhaṭṭa is comparatively a modern writer. He belonged to the class of manual writers, who mostly flourished after the 16th century and whose chief aim was to simplify the Nyaya and Vaiseshika systems by pruning all superfluous technicalities out of them, and bringing them within the comprehension of beginners. The terminus a quo of our author may for the present be fixed at about 1600 A. D., the time when Gadadhara flourished. Annambhatta rarely refers to any previous writer or work that might enable us to fix his age accurately. He however notes the controver- sy about area, first started by Raghunatha, the author of Didhitt*; while in another passage of the Dipikâ, he seems to quote directly from the Didhiti, for the sentence प्रतियोगितावच्छेदकारोप्य’ etc, which occurs at the bot- tom of p. 62 infra and which is misread in many Mss. of Dipika, appears to have been taken from a corresponding passage in the Didhiti.† It has been shown elsewhere that Raghunatha Širomani the anthor of Didhiti lived in the first quarter of the 16th century. The Didhiti must have been written about 1520 A. D. and Annambhatta neces-

Page LIII supra.

† See Note 5 under Sect 80 p. 371, infra.

I See Introduction P. LII supra,

LXII

Tarka-Sangraha.

sarily came after it. Gadadhara came two generations after Raghunatha with whose grand pupil Raghudeva he was contemporary. Gadadhara therefore lived about the end of the 16th century, either in Mithila or Nuddea; and if it be true that Annambhaṭṭa taught his works in his own college in the far-off town of Kaunḍinya- pura, some time must have elapsed between Gadadhara and Annambhatta to allow the fame of the former’s works to reach the Southernmost province of India. The story of Annambhaṭṭa teaching Gadadhara’s work in his College derives support from another tradition, according to which the Tarka-Dipika was specially composed for the use of those who could not understand Gadadhara’s larger work, and came to be called area on account of its being an epitome of the erudite commentary of the Great School- man. It may be therefore fairly presumed that Annam- bhaṭṭa lived some time after Gadâdhara i. e. after 1600 A. D. If Visoaratha, the author of the Siddhânta-Muktâvali also preceded him, this terminus will have to be shifted still further. Višranátha and his brother Rudrabhaṭṭa, who wrote a commentary on the Didhiti, lived most probably in the first quarter of the 17th century, and Annambhaṭṭa could not have lived earlier.

The terminus ad quod of our author may be fixed at 1700 A. D. The Tarka-Sangraha must have become a stan- dard work, and a difficult one also in the latter part of the 18th century, since Śrikrishna Dhúrjați wrote his com- mentary called Siddhanta-Chandrodaya about that time for the instruction of Rajasimha, son of King Gajasiṁha who flourished in 1774 A. D. The Tarka-Chandrikå by Vaidya- nátha Gadgil seems to be an earlier commentary on the Tarka-Sangraha, for a Ms. of it in the Deccan College Library gives as the date of its composition, Sake 1644 i. e. 1722 A. D. This Vaidyanatha is probably identical with Tatsat Vaidyanatha, the pupil of Nagesa and the author of a commentary on his Udyota. Nâgesa Bhaṭṭa is known to have been invited to a grand sacrifice in 1714 by Savai Jayasimha, and his pupil Vaidyanatha may therefore

See Introduction p. LIII. supra.Annambhatta and his works.

LXIII

have written his commentaries in the next decade. Ob- riously Annambhatta must have lived before this time. The evidence of Mss. of the Tarka-Sangraha is conclusive on the point. Stein mentions a Ms. of T. S. dated 1740 A. D. and another of T. D. dated 1735 A. D. The oldest known Ms. however of these two works is the one now in the possession of Dr. Jacobi of Bonn and marked J in the present edition. It is dated Sake 1634 i. e. 1712 A. D. As this Ms. contains several corrections and marginal addi- tions, it will not be wrong to assume that the two works were written several years before they were copied. Hence we can safely place Annambhatta before the beginning of the 18th century. The period from A. D. 1625 to A. D. 1700 is neither too long nor too short to cover one life- time, and if we can place Annambhaṭṭa between these two termini the result ought to be regarded as pretty satisfac- tory under

the present circumstances. Besides if Mr. Godbole’s statement that Annambhaṭṭa visited Mallikarjuna temple at the age of 55 has any foundation, he must have lived upto an advanced age and may, for aught we know, have covered the whole of the period above indicated.

All attempts to push Annambhatta’s date before the first quarter of the 17th century must therefore fail. The colophon of a Ms. of T. S. mentioned by Weber† is said to give the date 1425 A. D. which if true would conclusively prove him to have lived at least two centuries before the time we have assigned to him. But this is not possible. The verse runs thus:-

तपोमास्यसिते कृष्णे चन्द्रनागान्धिचन्द्रकैः ।

वाराणस्यां मिते वर्षे स्वार्थमिन्दुलिलेख वै ॥

Here the expression चन्द्रनागान्धिचन्द्रकैः has been incor- rectly taken to mean Samvat 1481 or 1425 A. D. u ought to be taken for 7 and not 4, and then the date becomes 1725 A. D., making the Ms. 12 years later than that of Dr.

Stein:-Catalogue of Sk. Mss, at Jammu. † Weber’s Berlin Catalogue, No 683, p. 203.

LIIV

Tarka-Sangraha.

Jacobi. Whatever uncertainty may still remain on the point, one thing is unquestionable that Annambhatta could have by no means been anterior to Raghunâtha whose date is now tolerably settled.* It has also been suggested that the Tribhuvana-Tilaka of Kanchi mentioned in T. D.† may be some king contemporary with our author; but this is also not possible, for no king of that name is to be found in the genealogies of Kanchi after the 12th century. Even if the Tribhuvana-Tilaka be a real personage he must have lived before the 10th century, for the illustration in T. D. is literally copied from Sridhara’s Nyaya-Kandali which was written in 991 A. D. No inference can therefore be drawn from the mention of Tribhuvana-Tilaka as to the date of our author.

Annambhaṭṭa was the son of Tirumala who is styled Acharya and whose name is preceded by the honorific title of errarend in the colophons of several of our author’s works. The colophon,§ which by the bye has been most useful in proving the identity of the several Annambhaṭṭas, is found only in Dr. Jacobi’s copy of Tarka-Dipikâ ( mark- ed J). It however occurs at the end of two other works of Annambhaṭṭa, namely Mitáksharâ, which is a commentary on the Brahma-Sûtras of Bâdarâyaṇa, and the fragment of a grammatical work named Vivaraṇodyotana, or Bhâshya-pra- dipodyotana consisting of annotations on Kaiyyaṭa’s celebrated gloss on Patanjali’s Mahâbhúshya. Tirumala father of Annambhatto, appears to have been a Rigvedi Smarta, Brahmana learned in the Vedanta philosophy and descend- ed from a great man named Raghava who performed a Soma sacrifice. It is not known whether Tirumala wrote any works, but several authors of that name are mentioned by Aufrecht. Annambhatta appears to have been an all-round scholar, for he has left works on at least four sciences, uamely Nyaya, Vedanta, Vyakarana and Púrva-Mimâmsâ. Besides the Tarka-Sangraha and the Tarka-Dipikâ, Aufrecht

See Introduction p. LIII supra,

† See p. 50 infra,

‡ See Introduction p. XLV supra ; P. B. Ben. ed. p. 6.

§ See p. 67 infra,

Annambhatta and his Works.

LXV

mentions the following works as having been composed by Annambhaṭṭa:- 1 Mitakshara, Tattca-Bodhini-Tika, 3 Nyaya-Parisishta-Prakasa and 4 Subodhini-Sudhására, otherwise called Râņakojjivini. Of these the first is a short commentary on Bâdarâyana’s Brahma-Sûtras and is un- doubtedly written by the author of the Tarka-Sangraha, since it has the same colophont as is found in our Ms. of the Dipika marked J. As to the other three nothing can be said with certainty as I have not been able to procure any copy of them. The second appears to be a commentary on some work named Tattva-Bodhini, nnd Aufrecht marks it as a Nyaya work, apparently on the authority of Oppert.‡ Aufrecht does not however mention any Nyaya work of the name Tattva-Bodhini, and possibly both he and Oppert were misled. We know only three works bearing the name Tattva-Bodhini, namely, a commentary on Sankshepa-Śári- raka by Nrisimha, a Tantric work by Krishnananda, and thirdly a commentary on Bhattoji’s Siddhânta-Kaumudi. So Annambhatta’s Tika may be a commentary on either the first or the last. Or it is also possible that a Ms. of Annam- bhaṭṭa’s Vivaranodyotana, presently to be mentioned, has been mistaken by Oppert for an independent work of this name. The third work Nydya-Pariśishta-Prakáśa is said to be a commentary on Udayanâchârya’s Nyâya-Parisishta and may possibly be Annambhatta’s Magnum Opus on the Nyaya system. The fourth is said to be a commentary on Ranaka or Nyaya-Sudha of Somesvara which in its turn is a commentary on the Tantra-Vártika of Kumarila. Besides these, Aufrecht and Hall mention two other works on grammar called Kâtyûyana-Prâtiśâkhya-Vyâkhyâna and Mahû-Bhâshya-Vivaranodyotana written by an author named Annambhatta. The author of the first of these was a pupil

[[1]]

Aufrecht; Catalogus Catalogoruin.

This colophon is repeated at the end of each chapter in a Ms. of the work which I had seen.

Aufrecht: Catulagus Catalogorum. p. 20.

§ Hall: Bibliographical Index of Indian Philosophical systems p.68,69,

LXYI

Tarka-Sangraha.

of Sumangala and may or may not be the same as the son of Tirumala. But the second work Visuranodyotana also called

Bhashyapradipodyotana which consists of notes on Kaiyata’s commentary on Patanjali’s Mahábhûshya can now be safely ascribed to the author of the Tarka-Dipika. Two Mss. of a fragment of this Udyotana are mentioned in Hultz’s recent Catalogue of Sanskrit Mss. in Southern India (Vol. I p. 66), the colophon at the end of which tallies exactly with that found at the end of the Dipika and the Mitâkshara. Hall’s later opinion therefore that this Udyotana was written by some other Annambhaṭṭa cannot be accepted. Chandrasekhara Sastri of Madras mentions two other works of Annambhaṭṭa: Tattva-Chintâ- manyáloka–Siddhâñjana and a Brahmasûtra-Vritti, while he calls Mitakshará a gloss on Panini’s sûtras according to Kâśikâ. Annambhatta thus appears to have been a versatile writer, since he has written at least three works on Nyaya, one on Púrva-Mîmâmsâ, one or two on Vedanta, and two if not three on grammar. Annambhatta is also said to have had an elder brother Ramakrishna bhatta who wrote Siddhânta- Ratna, a commentary on Bhattoji’s Siddhânta-Kaumudi.

Of all the works of Annambhaṭṭa, only the Tarka-San- graha and the Dipika appear to have attained any wide cele- brity. They are the most popular works of their kind, and they have been for several generations used as text-books for beginners. The Tarka-Sangraha is a model work, because it combines in a remarkable degree the three essential qualities of a good manual, namely, brevity, accuracy and lucidity. It was intended to supply an easy compendium of the main principles of Nyaya and Vaiseshika systems, and the author has done his work admirably. Of course the work is not entirely free from faults. Some of its passages are marred by ambiguities of language or confusion of thought such as make them almost unintelligible without the aid of a teacher or a commentary; and even positive errors have crept in one or two places. These occasional lapses were however inevitable, because they are mostly due to the author’s anxiety to avoid all subtleties and controversial topics that may be beyond the comprehension of beginners. The attempt

Annambhatta and his Works.

LXVII

to frame broad and accurate definitions without descending into the niceties of scholastic Nyaya was a difficult one, and it is highly creditable to our author that he has succeeded even so well. Passages like those referring to scor, qerasi, #r, and a, as well as several others in the Dipika, only prove that even a clear-headed writer like Annambhatta could not avoid some of the pitfalls that are so plentiful in the path of a student of Nyaya.

The most glaring fault of the Tarka-Sangraha, however, is that it errs too much on the side of brevity; and the defect is sought to be cured by supplying some of the deficiencies in the Dipika. In fact, the Dipika is more like a revised and enlarged edition of the original than a mere commentary upon it. It appears to have been written some time after the Sangraha, for in several places the author introduces additions and corrections in the commentary, which are obviously later thoughts but which could not be conveniently inserted in the text after its circulation. The clause AFIAT- सिद्धत्वे सति * which is proposed to be added to the definition of aror is one instance out of many showing how serious omissious in the text are supplied in the commentary.The way in which some of the new topics are introduced in the Dîpikâ also shows that they were most probably suggested when the author was actually teaching his primer. It is not there- fore unreasonable to suppose that the Dipika came to be written when the author saw by experience the necessity of elucidating the many obscurities that remained in the Sangra- ha. The practice of writing a commentary on one’s own work was not uncommon among Nyaya writers. In Mediæval times Dinnaga and Dharmakirti had written commentaries on their own works. Similarly Varadaraja the author of Târkika-Raksha wrote its commentary the Vyâkhyâ, and Viśvanátha, the author of Bháshá-Parichchheda and Siddhanta-Muktávali immitated him. Annambhatta seems to have taken iśvanatha’s works as his models.

Although Annambhaṭṭa rarely quotes or refers to any previous writer, there can be no doubt that he was aware of

See T. D. p. 26 infra.

LXVIII

Tarka-Sangraha.

the latest views on the many controversial points. He does not slavishly follow any particular master, nor does he confine himself wholly to any of the ancient or modern schools of Naiyayihûs. He chooses his doctrines from all writers with the sole view of constructing a fairly consistent and intelligible system. As the Sangraha and the Dipiká are professedly mixtures of both the Nyaya and the Vaiseshika systems, the author borrows from writers of both schools; but unlike others who have adopted the same plan, he generally adheres to Gotama’s views with respect to matters coming under logic proper, i. e. in the sections treating of Buddhi and its subdivisions, but follows Kanada in the rest of the book. In cases of conflict between the ancient and modern Naiyâyikas he mostly prefers the ancient view as being the simpler or more striking, and generally adopts the older definitions as far as possible. He has greater sympathy with the older Âcharyas than with the modern ever-innovating writers of the Nuddea school. But although a conservative in this sense he generally keeps an impartial attitude and steers clear of all disputes without identifying himself with any particular side. It is this characteristic which distin- guishes his works from other manuals, and which makes them as primers for beginners preferable even to the otherwise superior treatises of Viscanatha.

Instances of specific borrowing are too numerous to mention. Many of his definitions of categories and their subdivisions he has copied literally from the scholium of Prasastapada e. g. those of द्रव्य, रूप, रस, गन्ध, स्पर्श, सङ्ख्या, परिमाण विशेष, and several others. Sometimes he adopts the emendation suggested by Sridhara, and sometimes he rejects Praśusta- pada’s definition in toto in preference to a modern one, e. g. in the case of art and gr. Occasionally he borrows even long passages from Prasastapada, e. g. the passage begin- ning with a far in Sec. 10 p. 6 Infra. He also appears to have borrowed largely from the writings of Sridhara, Udayana and Śivâditya, as well as the principal writers of the Nuddea school, Gangesa, Raghunatha and Gadadhara. Outside the circle of Nyaya writers, Annambhaṭṭa has the

Annambhatta and his works:

LXIX

greatest sympathy with the Vedanta school. He often quotes the views of the Mimâmsakas, and even inserts a short disquisition on fa in the concluding portion of the Dipika.

Besides the Tarka-Sangraha and the Dipika, the present edition includes another commentary on the Sangraha named Nyayo-Bodhini by Govardhana. It does not possess any peculiar feature that requires special notice. It is on the whole rather discursive, treating of some topics elaborately and omitting others altogether. Nothing is known about the writer; but from his work he appears to have been well- versed in the subtleties of the later Nyaya. He is apparently different from the writer of a commentary on Kesavamiśra’s Tarha-bhisha. He makes valuable suggestions here and there, but his frequent indulgence in scholastic hair-splitting makes the work somewhat difficult for novices. The obscurity of the style and the want of a reliable Ms. are also great drawbacks in the case of this commentary. It is included in this edition for two reasons, first because it is taught to advanced pupils in many parts of India, and secondly because it will familiarize students with the controversial method and formulæ of the modern Naiyayikas.

The popularity of Annambhaṭṭa’s works can be best measured by the host of writers who have commented upon them. The commentaries on the Sangraha are too numerous to notice here, but a list of them, complete as far as our present knowledge goes, is given in Appendix B. Only two of these need special mention, the Vakya-Vritti of Meru Śâstri, and the Siddhanta-Chandrodaya of Śrikrishna Dhúrjați. The former is very short but always to the point, and usually gives the meaning of the author in a few pithy sentences. The writer was a celebrated Pundit of modern times, and his remarks in cases of doubt or ambiguity are entitled to great weight. The Siddhanta-Chandrodaya being perhaps too copious and exhaustive is useful to beginners but not always reliable. The best guide to the Sangraha and the Dipika, however is the Tarka-Dipika-Prakāśa of Nilakantha, popularly known as Nilakanthi.

LXX

Tarka-Sangraha.

Nilakantha appears to be a recent author. According to Pundit Mukunda Jha of Darbhanga he was a son of Râmabhaṭṭa surnamed Pani of Kaandinya gotra and was born in Andhra country. In his later years he lived at Benares and died in 1840. His son Lakshmi-Nṛisimha who also lived and died at Benares wrote a commentary, Bhaskarodayć on Nilakantha’s Prakâśa.

ABBREVIATIONS.

B. P.-Bhâsha-Parichchheda by Viśvanatha Pañchânana, edited and translated by Dr. E. Roer (Bibliotheca

Indica).

Brahm. Sût. -Brahma-Sutras of Bâdarayana with the

scholium of Sankaracharya.

Brih. Up.

Brih. Ar. Up. Brihadaranyakopanishad.

Din. -Dinakart or Siddhanta-Muktâvali-Prakáśa by Divâ-

kara Bhaṭṭa.

G. S. —Gotama-Satra or Gotama’s Aphorisms of Nyaya. J. B. B. R. A. S.-Journal of the Bombay Branch of the

Royal Asiatic Society.

Jaimi. S.-Jaimini’s Sutras on Pûrva-mimâṁsâ.

Kath. Up.

Kus.

N. B.

Kathopanishad.

Kusumâñjali of Udayanâchârya edited and translated by E. B. Cowell. (Calc. 1864.)

Nyâya-Bodhini by Govardhana.

Nil. or Nilakaṇṭha. -Tarka-Dîpikâ-Prakasa by Nilakantha. Nyaya-B. -Nyâya-Bindu edited by Dr. P. Peterson ( Bibli.

Ind.)

Nyâya-B. T. -Nyaya-Bindu-Tika by Dharmottarâcharya

edited by Dr. P. Peterson.

Nyâya. K. -Nyâya-Kosha by Bhîmâcharya 2nd ed. (Bombay

Sanskrit Series. )

P. B. —Prasastapâda’s Bhashya with Sridhara’s Nyâya- Kandali edited by Vindhyesvarîprasâd (Vizianagaram Series, Benares. )

Sânkhya-T. K. —Sâñkhya-Tattva-Kaumudi by Vâchaspati- miśra edited by Târânâth Tarka-Vâchaspati(Calc.1871.) Sarv, D. S. Sarva-Darśana-Sangraha by Madhavâcharya

(Calc. ed.)

S. C. —Siddhânta-Chandrodaya, a commentary on Tarka-

Sangraha by Srikrishna Dhurjati.

LXXII

Tarka-Sangraha.

S. M. –Siddhânia-Muktávali by Viśvanatha Pañchânana.

S. P.

Sapta-Padarthi by Sivaditya.

T. A. -Tarkûmrita by Jagadisa.

T. B.

T. D.

Tarka-Bhasha by Kesava Misra, edited by S. M. Paranjpe (Poona. )

Tarka-Dipiki.

T. K.-Tarka-Kaumudi by Laugâkshi Bhaskara, edited by

M. N. Dvivedi ( Bombay Sanskrit Series. )

Tarka-Sangraha.

T. S.

vât.

Vâtsyâyana’s Commentary on Gotama-Sûtra edited by Jibananda ( Cal. 1874. )

www.www.g

Ved. Par. Vedanta-Paribháshá, by Dharmarajâdhvarîndra

(Cal. ed.)

V. S.-Vaiśeshika-Sutra or Aphorisms of Vaiseshika philo-

sophy by Kanada.

V. S. Up-Vaiseshika–Sûtropaskara by Sankara Misra, edited by Jaya Nârāyaṇa Tarka Pañchânana (Cal. 1861). V. S. Vritti. Vaiseshika-sútra-Vritti by Viśvanatha Pañch-

ânana ( Cal. ed.)

V. V. —Vákya-Vritti, a commentary on Tarka-Sangraha by Meru Sastri (Bombay 1873 ).अथ

तर्कसङ्ग्रहः

तर्कदीपिकया न्यायबोधिन्या च सहितः

[१]

निधाय हृदि विश्वेशं विधाय गुरुवन्दनम् । बालानां सुखबोधाय क्रियते तर्कसङ्ग्रहः ॥

अथ तर्कदीपिका

विश्वेश्वरं साम्बमूर्तिं प्रणिपत्य गिरं गुरुम् । aini शिशुहितां कुर्वे तर्कसङ्ग्रहदीपिकाम् ॥ चिकीर्षितस्य ग्रन्थस्य निर्विघ्नपरिसमात्यर्थं शिष्टाचारानुमितश्रुतिबो- धितकर्तव्यताकमिष्टदेवतानमस्कारलक्षणं मङ्गलं शिष्यशिक्षार्थं निब- श्विकीर्षितं ग्रन्थादौ प्रतिजानीते— निधायेति ।

ननु मङ्गलस्य समाप्तिसाधनत्वं नास्ति । मङ्गले कृतेऽपि किरणा- वल्यादौ समास्यदर्शनात् मङलाभावेऽपि कादम्बर्यादौ समाप्तिदर्शनाद - न्वयव्यतिरेकव्यभिचारादिति चेन्न । ‘किरणावल्यादौ विनबाहुल्यात्समा- हयभावः । कादम्बर्यादौ तु ग्रन्थाद्वहिरेव मङ्गलं कृतमतो न व्यभिचारः ॥ ननु मङ्गलस्य कर्तव्यत्वे किं प्रमाणमिति चेत् । न । शिष्टाचारानुमितश्रुते-

1 Nil, gives as a 1. forri es and explains it far@ortorarget- टारम् Y a.s0 reads fine. 2 A and Frea निविपरिमाया

but all other copies omit नि विन; P has असमाप्ति. ’ 3 Mhas बौद्धग्रन्थादौ for कादम्ब- aft in this and the following sentence. Fand Q interchange

काउम्बर्याद and किरणावल्यादौ rebaining the remaining Cent- ence as above, N reads differ- eutly मङ्गलाभावेऽपि किरणावल्या- दौ समाप्तिदर्शनाद मङ्गलसस्त्रेऽवि arraat समाप्तयदर्शनात्, and gives the other . I. in a footnote. See Note loe, ’ cit,

[[२]]

तर्कसङ्ग्रहः

[ SECT. 1.

रेव प्रमाणत्वात् । तथाहि– मङ्गलं वेदवोधितकर्तव्यतार्क, अलौकिकावि- गीतशिष्टाचारविषयत्वात् दर्शादिवत् । भोजनादौ व्यभिचारवारणाया- लौकिकेति । रात्रिश्राद्धादौ व्यभिचारवारणायाविगीतेति । शिष्टपदं स्पष्टा- र्थम् । " न कुर्यान्निष्फलं कर्म" इति जलताडनादेरपि निषिद्धत्वादिति ॥

तर्कसङ्ग्रह इति । तन्ते प्रतिपाद्यन्त इति तर्का द्रव्यादिसप्त- पदार्थास्तेषां सङ्ग्रहः सङ्क्षेपेण स्वरूपकथनं क्रियत इत्यर्थः । कस्मै प्रयो- जनायेत्यत आह-सुखबोधायेति । सुखेनानायासेन बोधः पदार्थ- ज्ञानं तस्मा इत्यर्थः ॥ ननु बहुषु तर्कग्रन्थेषु सत्सु किमर्थमपूर्वग्रन्थः क्रियत इत्यत आह-बालानामिति । तेषामतिविस्तृतत्वाद्बालानां बोधो न भवतीत्यर्थः । ग्रहणधारणपटुर्बलः, न तु स्तनन्धयः । किं कृत्वा क्रियत इत्यत आह-निधायेति । विश्वेशं जगन्नियन्तारं शिवं हृदि निधाय नितरां स्थापयित्वा सर्वदा तद्ध्यानपरो भूत्वेत्यर्थः । गुरूणां विद्यागुरूणां वन्दनं नमस्कारं विधाय कृत्वेत्यर्थः ॥

अथ न्यायवोधिनी

अखिलागमसञ्चारि श्रीकृष्णाख्यं परं महः ध्यात्वा गोवर्धनसुधीस्तनुते न्यायबोधिनीम् ॥ चिकीर्षितस्य ग्रन्थस्य निर्विघ्नपरिसमाप्त्यर्थमिष्टदेवतानमस्कारात्मकं मङ्गलं शिष्यशिक्षार्थं ग्रन्थादौ निबध्नाति — निधायेति ॥

[ २ ] द्रव्यगुणकर्मसामान्यविशेषसमवायाभावाः सप्त पदार्थाः ॥

त. दी. — पदार्थान्विभजते– द्रव्येति । पदस्यार्थः पदार्थ इति व्युत्प- ज्याभिधेयत्वं पदार्थसामान्यलक्षणम् ॥ नन्वत्र विभागादेव सप्तत्वे सिद्धे समग्रहणं व्यर्थमिति चेत् । न । अधिकसङ्ख्याव्यवच्छेदार्थत्वात् ॥ नन्वति-

1 Some Mss. ada “समातिकालेो

मङ्गलमाचरेत् " इति श्रुतेः ।

the addition is not warrant- ed as the context refers to

अनुमितश्रुति only. 29 pade पदार्थाः सप्रैव-

3 AF X and Padd लभ्यते and also inserts i before it 4 AF and Paddrug before ères.

unnecessarily; Y Z read ga for सिद्धे; Q has किमर्थे for व्यर्थम्.

SECT. 3. 1 तर्कदीपिकया न्यायबोधि

च सहितः

रिक्तः पदार्थः प्रमितो न वा । नाद्यः प्रमितस्य निषेधायोगात्, नान्त्यः प्रति- योगितामेतिं विना निषेधानुपपत्तेरिति चेत्। न । पदार्थत्वं द्रव्यादिसप्तान्यत- मत्वव्याप्यमिति व्यवच्छेदार्थत्वात् ॥ ननुं सप्तान्यतमत्वं सप्तभिन्नभिन्नत्व- मिति वक्तव्यम् । एवं च सतभिन्नस्याप्रसिद्धत्वात्सप्तान्यतमत्वं कथमिति चेन्न द्रव्यादिसप्तान्यतमत्वं द्रव्यादिभेदसतकाभाववत्वमित्युक्तत्वात् । एवमग्रेऽपि द्रष्टव्यम् ॥

न्या. वो..

.-अथ पदार्थान्विभजते - इव्येति । तत्र सप्तग्रहणं पदा- र्थत्वं द्रव्यादिसप्तान्यतमत्वव्याप्यमिति व्यातिलाभाय । ननु शक्तिपदार्थ- स्याटमस्य सत्त्वात्कथं सर्वैवेति । तथाहि वह्निसंयुक्तेन्धनादौ सत्यपि मणि- संयोगे दाहो न जायते तच्छून्ये तु जन्यते । अतो मणिसमवधाने शक्तिर्नश्यति । मण्यभावदशायां दाहानुकूला शक्तिरुत्पद्यत इति कल्प्यते । तस्माच्छक्तिरतिरिक्तपदार्थ इति चेत्र । मणेः प्रतिबन्धकत्वेन तदभावस्य दाहकारणत्वेनैव निर्वाहे मणिसमवधानासमवधानाभ्यामनन्तशक्तितत्तद्धं- सतत्तत्प्रागभावकल्पनाया अन्याय्यत्वात् । तस्मात्सतैव पदार्था इति सिद्धम् ॥

[ ३ ]

।

तत्र द्रव्याणि पृथिव्यतेजोवाय्वाकाशकालदिगात्ममनांसि नवैव ॥

त. दी. द्रव्यं विभजते— तचेति । तत्र द्रव्यादिमध्ये द्रव्याणि नवैवेत्यन्वयः । कानि तानीत्यत आह- पृथिवीत्यादि । ननु तमसो दशमद्रव्यस्य विद्यमानत्वात्कथं नवैव द्रव्याणि । तथाहि नीलं तमश्चलती- त्यबाधितप्रतीतिबलाञ्चीलरूपाभारतया क्रियाधारतया च द्रव्यत्वं ताव- सिद्धम् । तत्र तमसो नाकाशादिपञ्चकेऽन्तर्भावो रूपवत्त्वात् । अत एव न वायौ, स्पर्शाभावात्सदागतिमत्त्वाभावाच्च । नापि तेजसि, भास्वररूपाभावा-

1 Qomits इति वक्तव्यम् und soulm

stitute तदर्थत्वात् lorइत्युक्तत्वात L omits the whole passage from नजु to उक्तावाद; NaM also appears to have had doubts about its authenticity. See Note Ice. cit.

A and Fadd afterganga verse

तमः खलु चर्ल नील परापरविभाग- यत् । प्रतिवैवनों में- तुमर्हति; but it seems to be in- terpolated from some other commentary. J omits rem also.

A and J omit ernfurata.

तर्कसङ्ग्रहः

[[1]]

[ SECT. 3.

दुष्णस्पर्शाभावाच्च । नापि जले, शीतस्पर्शाभावान्नीलरूपाश्रयत्वाच्च । नापि पृथिव्यां गन्धवत्त्वाभावात्स्पर्शरहितत्वाच्च । तस्मात्तमो दशमद्रव्यमिति चेन्न । तमसस्तेजोऽभावरूपत्वात् । तथाहि - तमो हि न रूपेवद्रव्यमालो- कासहकृतचक्षुर्ग्राह्यत्वादालोकाभाववत् । रूपिद्रव्यचाक्षुषप्रमायामालो- कस्य कारणत्वात् । तस्मात्प्रौढप्रकाशकतेजःसामान्याभावस्तमः । तत्र नीलं तमश्वलतीति प्रत्ययो भ्रमः । अतो नव द्रव्याणीति सिद्धम् ॥

[[1]]

द्रव्यत्वजातिमत्त्वं गुणवत्त्वं वा द्रव्यसामान्यलक्षणम् ॥ लक्ष्यैकदे- शावृत्तित्वमव्याप्तिः, यथा गोः कपिलत्वम् । अलक्ष्यवृत्तित्वमतिव्याप्तिः, यथा गांः शृङ्गित्वम् । लक्ष्यमात्रावर्तनमसम्भवः यथा गोरेकशफत्वम् । एतदूषणत्रयरहितो धर्मो लक्षणम् । स एवासाधारणधर्म इत्युच्यते । लक्ष्यतावच्छेदकसमनियतत्वमसाधारणत्वम् । व्यावर्तकस्यैव लक्षणत्वे व्यावृत्तावभिधेयत्वादौ चातिव्याप्तिवारणाय तद्भिन्नत्वं धर्मविशेषणं देयम् । व्यवहारस्यापि लक्षणप्रयोजनत्वे तु न देयम्, व्यावृत्तेरपि व्यवहारसा - धनत्वात् ॥ ननु गुणवत्त्वं न द्रव्यसामान्यलक्षणम् । आद्यक्षणे उत्पन्न- विनष्टद्रव्ये चाव्याप्तेरिति चेन्न । गुणसमानाधिकरणसत्ताभिन्न जातिमत्त्वस्य विवक्षितत्वात् ॥ नन्वेवमप्येकं रूपं रसात्पृथगिति व्यवहाराद्रूपादावति- व्याप्तिरिति चेन्न । एकार्थसमवायादेव तादृशव्यवहारोपपत्तौ गुणे गुणा- नङ्गीकरणात् ॥

न्या. बो. - द्रव्याणि विभजते- पृथिवीति । नन्वन्धकारस्य दशम- garer सवारकथं नवैवेति । तथाहि नीलं तमश्वलतीति प्रतीतेनीलरूपा- श्रयत्वेन क्रियाश्रयत्वेन च द्रव्यत्वं सिद्धम् । न च क्लृप्तद्रव्येष्वन्तर्भावा- त्कुतो दशमद्रव्यत्वमिति वाच्यम् । आकाशादिपञ्चकंस्य नीरूपत्वाद्वायो- रपि नीरूपत्वान्न तेष्वन्तर्भावः । तमसो निर्गन्धत्वान्न पृथिव्यामन्तर्भावः ।

1 AF & Q. read रूपि for रूपवत्. 2 A Fand Q here insert zur NT: सानादिम, while P aud Y bave यथा गोः सानादिमध्ये सति शृङ्गिस्वम; but the words are found in no other

Gopy.

3 Nil. notices’ लक्ष्यत्वे as . 7. for लक्षणत्वे, and remarks that the two readings are identical in

Snse.

4 M adds संयोगसमवायिकारणता-

वच्छेदकतया द्रव्यत्वजातिः.

Ecr. 6.] तर्कदीपिकया न्यायबोधिन्या च सहितः

जलतेजसोः शीतोष्णस्पर्शवत्त्वान्न तयोरन्तर्भावः । तस्मात्तमसो दशम- द्रव्यत्वं सिद्धमितिचेन्न । तमसस्तेजोऽभावत्वेनैवोपपत्तावतिरिक्तद्रव्यकल्प- नायां मानाभावात् । न च विनिगमनाविरहातेज एवान्धकाराभावस्व- रूपमिति वाच्यम् । तेजसोऽभावस्वरूपत्ये सर्वानुभूतोष्णस्पर्शस्याश्रय- बाधाद्द्रव्यान्तरकल्पने गौरवात् । तस्मादुष्णस्पर्शरूपमुणाश्रयतया तेजसो द्रव्यत्वं सिद्धम् । तमासे नीलरूपप्रतीतिस्तु भ्रान्तिरेव दीपासरणक्रि- याया एव तत्र मानात् ॥

[ ४ ] रूपरसगन्धस्पर्शसङ्ख्यापरिमाणपृथक्त्व संयोगविभागपत्वापर- त्त्वगुरुत्वद्रवत्व स्नेहशब्दबुद्धिसुखदुःखेच्छाद्वेषप्रयत्नधर्माधर्म संस्का- राश्चतुर्विंशतिगुणाः ॥

।

त. दी. -गुणं विभजते- रूपेति । द्रव्यकर्मभिन्नत्वे सति सामा- न्यवान्गुणः । गुणत्वजातिमान्वा । ननु लघुत्वमृदुत्वकठिनत्वादीनां विद्यमा- नत्वात्कथं चतुर्विंशतिगुणा इति चेन्न लघुत्वस्य गुरुत्वाभावरूपत्वात् मृदुत्वक ठिनत्वयोरवयवसंयोगविशेषरूपत्वात् ॥

[4]

उत्क्षेपणावक्षेपणाकुञ्चनप्रसारणगमनानि पर्श्व कर्माणि ॥

त. दी. -कर्म विभजते उत्क्षेपणेति । संयोगभिन्नत्वे सति संयोगासमवायिकारणं कर्म । कर्मत्वजातिमद्वा ॥ ननु भ्रमणादेरप्यति- रिक्तस्य कर्मणः सत्त्वात् पञ्चेत्यनुपन्नमितिचेत्रं । भ्रमणादीनामपि गम- नेऽन्तर्भावान्न पञ्चविधत्वविरोधः ॥

[६]

परमपरं चेति द्विविधं सामान्यम् ॥

sud W read स्पर्शाश्रियद्रव्यं. 2 D. Lab मीत्यादि and Wards

एवं कर्मवत्ताप्रतीतिरपि

8 N here adds सामान्यवानित्युक्ते ऋव्यकर्मणोरतिव्याप्तिरतस्तनिरा- सार्थे श्रव्यकर्मभिस्वे सतीति । द्र- व्यकर्मभित्र इत्युच्यमाने सामान्या-

हिष्वतिव्याप्तिरत उक्त सामान्यवा- निति; but the passage is nei- ther noticed by Nil. nor found in any other copy.

4 A and F add qe after qa. 5 Some Mss. omit this sentence.

तर्कसङ्ग्रहः

T SECT. 6.

त. दी. - सामान्यं विभजते —— परमिति । परमधिकदेशवृत्ति । अपरं न्यूनदेशवृत्ति । सामान्यादिचतुष्टये जातिर्नास्ति ॥

[ ७ ]

नित्यद्रव्यत्तयो विशेषास्त्वनन्ता एव ॥

त. दी — विशेषं विभजते-निश्येति । पृथिव्यादिचतुष्टयस्य परमाणव आकाशादिपञ्चकं च नित्यद्रव्याणि ॥

समवायस्त्वेक एव ॥

[ ८ ]

त. दी.. .– समवायस्य भेदो नास्तीत्याह – समवायस्त्विति ॥

[8]

अभावश्चतुर्विधः । भागभावः प्रध्वंसाभावोऽत्यन्ताभावोऽन्यो- न्याभावश्चेति ॥

त. दी. अभावं विभजते - अभावेति ॥

[१०]

गन्धवती पृथिवी । सा द्विविधा नित्यानित्या चं । नित्या परमाणुरूपा । अनित्या कार्यरूपा । पुनस्त्रिविधा शरीरेन्द्रियवि - षयभेदात् । शरीरमस्मदादीनाम् । इन्द्रियं गन्धग्राहकं घ्राणं नासा- ग्रवर्ति । विषयो मृत्पाषाणादिः ॥

त. दी. तत्रोद्देशादिक्रमानुसारात्पृथिव्या लक्षणमाह - गन्धव- तीति । नाम्ना पदार्थसङ्कीर्तनमुद्देशः । उद्देशक्रमे च सर्वत्रेच्छैव निया- मिका । ननु सुरम्य सुरभ्यवयवारब्धे द्रव्ये परस्परविरोधेन गन्धानुत्पादाद- व्याप्तिः । न च तत्र गन्धप्रतीत्यनुपपत्तिरिति वाच्यम् । अवयवगन्धस्यैव तत्र

1 A omits देश.

2 ADFKQ. W. and I add तन्त्र before गन्धवती; See Note Toe. cit

3 A and B add इति after च. 4 All c pies except A B aud F Wr before पुन See Note loc, ait.

omit

SECT. 11. ] तर्कदीपिकया न्यायबोधिन्या च सुहितः

न्यून देोवर्तित्वं प्रतीतिसम्भवेन चित्रगन्धानङ्गीकारात् ॥ किं चोत्पन्नविनष्टघटादावव्याप्ति- रिति चेन्न गन्धसमानाधिकरणद्रव्यत्वापरजातिमत्त्वस्यैव विवक्षितत्वात् । ननु जलादावपि गन्धप्रतीतेरतिव्यातिरिति चेन्न अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां पृथिवीगन्धस्यैव तत्र मानाङ्गीकारात् । ननु तथापि कालस्य सर्वाधारतया । सर्वेषां लक्षणानां कालेऽतिव्यातिरिति चेन्न सर्वाधारताप्रयोजकसँबन्ध-

भिन्नसम्बन्धेन लक्षणस्याभिनतत्वात् ॥

पृथिवीं विभजते–सा द्विविधेति । नित्यत्वं ध्वंसाप्रतियोगित्वम् । ध्वंसप्रतियेगित्वमनित्यत्वम् । प्रकारान्तरेण विभजते- पुनरिति । आत्मनो भोगायतनं शरीरम् । यदवच्छिन्नात्मनि भोगो जायते तद्भो- गायतनम् । सुखदुःखान्यतरसाक्षात्कारो भोगः ॥ शब्दतरोद्भूतविशे- षगुणानाश्रयत्वे सति ज्ञानकारणमनः संयोगाश्रयत्वमिन्द्रियत्वम् । शरीरे- न्द्रियभिन्न विषयः ॥ एवं च गन्धवच्छरीरं पार्थिवशरीरम् गन्धवदि- न्द्रियं पार्थिवन्द्रियम् गन्धवान्विषयः पार्थिवविषय इति तत्तल्लक्षणं बोध्यम् ॥ पार्थिवशरीरं दर्शयति-शरीरमिति । पार्थिवेन्द्रियं दर्शयति — इन्द्रियमिति । गन्धग्राहकमिति प्रयोजनकथनम् । घ्राणमिति सञ्ज्ञा । नासामेत्याश्योक्तिः । एवमुत्तरत्रापि ज्ञेयम् । पार्थिवविषयं दर्शयति-विषयेति ॥

न्या. बो. - गन्धवतीति । गन्धवत्त्वं पृथिव्या लक्षणम् । लक्ष्या पृथिवी । पृथिवीत्वं लक्ष्यतावच्छेदकम् । यद्धर्मावच्छिन्नं लक्ष्यं स धर्मो लक्ष्यतावच्छेदकः । यो धर्मो यस्यामवच्छेदकः सा तद्धर्मावच्छिन्ना लक्ष्यता। तथा च लक्ष्यतावच्छेदकं पृथिवीत्वं, लक्ष्यता पृथिवीत्वावच्छिन्ना । एवं शीतस्पर्शादिलक्षणेषु जलादीनां लक्ष्यता जलत्वादीनां लक्ष्यतावच्छेकत्वं च बोध्यम् ॥

[११]

शीतस्पर्शवत्य आपः । ता द्विविधाः नित्या अनित्याच । नित्याः परमाणुरूपाः । अनित्याः कार्यरूपाः । पुनस्त्रिविधाः शरीरेन्द्रियवि-

1 A and B insert ær: before ga..

See Note on ær in the last

pre

ceding sections

तर्कसङ्ग्रहः

[ SECT. 11

षयभेदात् । शरीरं वरुणलोके । इन्द्रियं रसग्राहकं रसनं जिह्वा - ग्रवर्ति । विषयः सरित्समुद्रादिः ॥

epipe

त. दी. - अपां लक्षणमाह– शीतेति । उत्पन्नविनष्टजले ऽव्याप्ति- वारणाय शीतस्पर्शसमानाधिकरणद्रव्यत्वापर जातिमत्त्वे तात्पर्यम् । शीतं शिलातलमित्यादौ जलसम्बन्धादेव शीतस्पर्शमानमिति नातिव्यातिः । अन्यत्सर्वं पूर्वरीत्या व्याख्येयम् ॥

[१२]

उष्णस्पर्शवत्तेजः । तद्विविधं नित्यमनित्यं च । नित्यं परमाणु- रूपम् । अनित्यं कार्यरूपञ् । पुनस्त्रिविधं शरीरेन्द्रियविषयभेदात् । शरीरमादित्यलोके । इन्द्रियं रूपग्राहकं चक्षुः कृष्णतार ग्रवर्ति । विषयश्चतुर्विधः । भौमदिव्यौदर्याकरजभेदात् । भौमं वन्ह्यादिकम् । अबिन्धनं दिव्यं विद्युदादि । भुक्तस्य परिणामहेतुरौदर्यम् । आ- करजं सुवर्णादि ॥

त. दी. - तेजसो लक्षणमाह-उष्णस्पर्शवदिति । उष्णं जल- मिति प्रतीतेस्तेजः सम्बन्धानुविधायित्वान्नातिव्याप्तिः । विषयं विभजते- भौमेति । ननु सुवर्णं पार्थिवं पीतत्वाद्गुरुत्वाद्धरिद्रादिवदिति चेन्न । अत्यन्तानलसंयोगे सति घृतादौ द्रवत्वनाशदर्शनेन, जलमध्यस्थघृतादौ द्रवत्वनाशादर्शनेन, असति प्रतिबन्धके पार्थिवद्रव्यद्रवत्वनाशाग्नि- संयोगयोः कार्यकारणभावावधारणात् । सुवर्णस्यात्यन्तानलसंयोगे सत्य- नुच्छिद्यमानाद्रवत्वादिकरणत्वेन पार्थिवत्वानुपपत्तेः । तस्मात्पीतद्रव्य- द्रवत्वनाशप्रतिबन्धकतया द्रवद्रव्यान्त सिद्धौ नैमित्तिकद्रवत्वाधिकरण- तथा जलत्वानुपपत्तेः, रूपवत्तथा वाय्यादिष्वनन्तर्भावात्, तैजसत्व- सिद्धिः । तत्रोष्णस्पर्शभास्वररूपयोरुपटम्भकपार्थिवरूपस्पर्शाभ्यां प्रतिव- न्धादनुपलब्धिः । तस्मात्सुवर्णं तैजसमिति सिद्धम् ॥

1 A B and X add प्रसिद्ध after 2. A inserts qaad after anû-

आदित्यलोके.

करणत्वेन.

SECT. 13. 1 तर्कपिकया न्यायबोधिन्या च सहितः

[१३]

रूपरहितस्पर्शवान्वायुः । स द्विविधो नित्योऽनित्यश्च । नित्यः परमाणुरूपः । अनित्यः कार्यरूपः । पुनस्त्रिविधः शरीरेन्द्रियवि - पयभेदात् । शरीरं वायुलोके । इन्द्रियं स्पर्शग्राहकं त्वक्सर्वशरीर- aff । विषय वृक्षादिकम्पनहेतुः ॥

शरीरान्तःसञ्चारी वायुः प्राणः । स चैकोऽप्युपाधिभेदात्प्रा- णापानादिसञ्ज्ञां लभते ॥

त. दी. वायुं लक्षयति-रूपरहितेति । आकाशादावतिव्याप्तिवा- रणाय : पर्शवानिति । पृथिव्यादावतिव्याप्तिवारणाय रूपरहितेति । ननु प्राणस्य कुत्रान्तर्भाव इत्यत आह- शरीरेति । स चेति । एक एव प्राणः स्थानमेवात्प्राणापानादिशब्दैर्व्यवह्नियत इत्यर्थः । स्पर्शानुमेयो वायुः । तथाहि - योऽयं वायौ वाति सत्यनुष्णाशीतस्पर्शो भासते स स्पर्शः कचिदाश्रितो गुणत्वाद्रूपवत् । न चास्य पृथिव्याश्रय उद्भूतस्प वितः पार्थिवस्यरूपवत्वनियमात् । न जलतेजसी, अनुष्णाशीत- स्पर्शवत्त्वात्। न विभुचतुष्टयं, सर्वत्रोपलब्धिप्रसङ्गात् । न मनः, परमाणु- स्पर्शस्यातीन्द्रियत्वात् । तस्माद्यः प्रतीयमानस्पर्शाश्रयः स वायुः ॥ ननु वायुः प्रत्यक्षः प्रत्यक्षस्पर्शीयत्वावदिति चेन्न । उद्भूतरूपवत्त्वस्यो- पाधित्वात् । यत्र द्रव्यत्वे सति वहिरिन्द्रियजन्यप्रत्यक्षत्वं तत्रोद्भूतरूप- तवमिति घटादी साध्यव्यापकत्वम् । यत्र प्रत्यक्षस्पर्शाश्रयत्वं तत्रोद्भूत- रूपवन्यं नास्तीति पक्ष साधनाव्यापकत्वम् । न चैवं तप्तवारिस्थतेजसो ऽ- प्यमत्यक्षत्वापत्तिः । मत्वात् । तस्माद्र्परहितत्वाद्वायुरप्रत्यक्षः ॥ -

इदानीं कार्यरूपपृथिव्यादिचतुष्टयस्योत्पत्तिविनाशक्रमः कथ्यते । ईश्वरस्य चिकीर्षाव्शात्परमाणुषु क्रिया जायते । ततः परमाणु- यसंयोगे सान्ते द्व्यणुकमुत्पद्यते । त्रिभिर्द्यणुकैख्यणुकम् । एवं चतुरणुका- दिक्रमेण महती पृथिवी महत्य आपो महत्तेजो महान्वायुरुत्पद्यते । एवमुत्पन्नस्य कार्यद्रव्यस्य सञ्जिहीर्षावशात्परमाणुषु क्रिया । क्रियया

[[१०]]

तर्कसङ्ग्रहः

[ sEcr. 13

परमाशुद्रयविभागे सति यणुकनाशः । ततस्त्रयणुकनाशः । ततश्चतुर- णुकस्येत्येवं महापृथिव्यादिनाशः ॥ असमवायिकारणनाशाद्व्यणुकनाशः, समवायिकारणनाशात्त्र्यणुकनाश इति सम्प्रदायः । सर्वत्रासमवायिकार- णनाशाद्द्रव्यनाश इति नवीनाः ॥

[[1]]

किं पुनः परमाणुसद्भावे प्रमाणम् । उच्यते । जालसूर्यमरीचिस्थं सूक्ष्मतमं यद्रज उपलभ्यते तत्सावयवम्, चाक्षुषद्रव्यत्वात्पटवत् । त्र्यणु- कावयवोऽपि सावयवो महदारम्भकत्वात्तन्तुवत् । यो द्व्यणुकावयवः स परमाणुः । स च नित्यः । तस्यापि कार्यत्वे ऽनवस्थाप्रसङ्गात् । सृष्टिप्रलय- सद्भावे " धाता यथा पूर्वमकल्पयत्” इत्यादि श्रुतिः प्रमाणम् । सर्व- कार्यद्रव्यध्वंसोऽवान्तरप्रलयः । सर्वभावकार्यध्वंसो महाप्रलय इति विवेकः॥

न्या. बो. — एवं पृथिव्यादि त्रिकं निरूप्य वायुं निरूपयति– रूपरहितेति । रूपरहितत्वे सति स्पर्शवत्त्वं वायोर्लक्षणम् । सतिसप्त- म्या विशिष्टार्थकतया रूपरहितत्वविशिष्टस्पर्शवत्त्वं वायोर्लक्षणम् । विशे- पणानुपादाने स्पर्शवत्त्वमात्रस्य लक्षणत्वे पृथिव्यादित्रिकेऽतिव्याप्ति- स्तवारणाय विशेषणोपादानम् । तावन्मात्रेोपादानं आकाशादिपञ्चके - तिव्याप्तिस्तत्रापि रूपरहितत्वस्य सत्त्वात् । अत उक्तं स्पर्शेति । अति- व्याप्तिर्नामालक्ष्ये लक्षणसत्त्वम् । यथा गोः शृङ्गित्वं लक्षणं कृतं चेद- लक्ष्यभूतगोभिन्नमहिष्यादावतिव्याप्तिस्तत्रापि शृङ्गित्वस्य विद्यमानत्वात् । अव्याप्तिर्नाम लक्ष्यैकदेशावृत्तित्वम् । लक्ष्यतावच्छेदकाश्रयीभूते क्वचिल्लक्ष्ये लक्षणस्यासत्वमेवाव्याप्तिरित्यर्थः । यथा गोनलरूपवत्त्वं कृतं चेच्छे- तगवि नीलरूपाभावादव्याप्तिः । असम्भवो नाम लक्ष्यमात्रे कुत्रापि लक्षण सत्त्वं यथा गोरेकशफत्वं गोसामान्यस्य द्विशकत्वेनैकशफवत्त्वस्य

1 AFN. Q. and W add after this तथाच मेरुसर्वपयोरपि समान- परिमाणत्वापत्तिः, F reads ‘पत्तेः. N has तुल्यत्वप्रसङ्गः for समान- परिमाणत्वापत्तिः, while Q. has तु- ल्यपरिमाणापत्तेः; but as all other copies omit the sentence it seems to be an interpolation.

2 A 0, N, PY Z put the first

part of the sentence in the form of a पूर्वपक्ष as ननु सृष्टिप्र- लयसद्भावे किं प्रमाणमः A CKZ omit ननु; AK X read मानम् for प्रमाणम.

3 V and W omit this sentence,SECT. 15. 1 तर्कदीपिकया न्यायबोधिन्या च सहितः

कुत्राप्यसत्वात् । अतिव्याप्तयव्याप्तयसम्भवानां निष्कृष्टलक्षणान्युच्यन्ते । लक्ष्यतावच्छेदकसमानाधिकरणत्वे सति लक्ष्यतावच्छेदकावच्छिन्नप्रति- योगिताकभेदसामानाधिकरण्यमतिव्याप्तिः । अव्याप्तिस्तु लक्ष्यतावच्छे- दकसमानाधिकरणत्वे सति लक्ष्यतावच्छेदकसमानाधिकरणात्यन्ताभाव- प्रतियोगित्वम् । असम्भवस्तु लक्ष्यतावच्छेदकव्यापकीभूताभावप्रति- योगित्वम् !!

[ १४ ]

शब्दगुणमाकाशम् । तच्चैकं विभुं नित्यं च ॥

त. दी. आकाशं लक्षयति शब्दगुणमिति । नन्वाकाशमपि किं पृथिव्यादिवन्नाना । नेत्याह तच्चैकमिति । भेदे प्रमाणाभावादित्यर्थः । एकत्वादेव सर्वत्रोपलब्धेर्विभुत्वमङ्गीकर्तव्यमित्याह — विभ्विति । सर्व- मूर्तद्रव्यसंयोगित्वं विभुत्वम् । मूर्तत्वं परिच्छिन्नपरिमाणवत्त्वं क्रियावत्त्वं वा । विभुत्वादेवात्मवन्नित्यमित्याह— नित्यं चेति ॥

न्या. बी. आकाशं लक्षयति । शब्दगुणकमिति । अत्र गुणपद- माकाशे शब्द एव विशेषगुण इति द्योतनाय नत्वतिव्याप्तिवारणाय । समवायेन शब्दवत्वमात्रस्य सम्यक्त्वात् । तदुक्तं । रूपं गन्धो रसः स्पर्शः स्नेहः सांसिद्धिको द्रवः । बुद्ध्यादिभावनान्ताश्च शब्दे वैशेषिकागुणाः ॥ तचैकमिति । अनेकत्वे मानाभावादितिभावः । विभ्विति । सर्वमूर्त - द्रव्यसंयोगित्वं विभुत्वम् । मूर्तत्वं च क्रियाश्रयत्वम् । पृथिव्यप्तेजोवायु- मनांसि मूर्तीनि । पृथिव्यप्तेजोवाय्वाकाशपञ्चकं भूतपदवाच्यम् । भूतत्वं नाम बहिरिन्द्रियग्राह्यविशेषगुणवत्त्वम् ॥

[१५]

अतीतादिव्यवहारहेतुः कालः । स चैको विभुर्नित्यश्च ॥

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त. दी. - कालं लक्षयति—अतीतेति । सर्वाधारः कालः सर्व- कार्यनिमित्तकारणं च ॥

1 V rends निर्दलक्षणमुच्येत for निष्कृष्टलक्षणान्युच्यन्ते,

ર

तर्कसङ्ग्रहः

( SECT. 15.

न्या. बो. कालं लक्षयति-अतीतेति । व्यवहारहेतुत्वस्य लक्ष- णत्वे व्यवहारहेतुभूतघटादावतिव्याप्तिस्तद्वारणाय अतीतेति विशेषणो- पादानम् ॥

[१६]

प्राच्यादिव्यवहारहेतुर्दिक् । सा चैका विश्व नित्या च ॥ त. दी. - दिशो लक्षणमाह- प्राचीति । दिगपि कार्यमात्र नि- मित्तकारणम् ॥

न्या. बो. –दिशो लक्षणमाह–प्राच्येति । उदयाचलसन्निहिता दिक्प्राची । अस्ताचलसन्निहिता दिक्प्रतीची । मेरोः सन्निहिता दिगुदीची । मेरोर्व्यवहिता दिगवाची ॥

[ १७ ]

ज्ञानाधिकरणमात्मा । स द्विविवः परमात्मा जीवात्मा च । तत्रेश्वरः सर्वज्ञः परमात्मैक एंव । जीवात्मा प्रतिशरीरं भिन्नो विभुर्नित्यश्च ॥

त. दी. - आत्मनो लक्षणमाह-ज्ञानेति ॥ आत्मानं विभजते- सद्विविध इति । परमात्मनो लक्षणमाह-तत्रेति । नित्यज्ञानाधि- करणत्वमीश्वरत्वम् ॥ नन्वीश्वरस्य सद्भावे किं प्रमाणम् । न तावत्प्र- त्यक्षम् । तद्धि बाह्यमाभ्यन्तरं वा । नाद्यमरूपिद्रव्यत्वात् । नान्त्यमात्म- 1. सुखादिव्यतिरिक्तत्वात् । नाप्यनुमानं लिङ्गाभावादिति चेन्न । क्षित्य-

। ङ्करादिकं कर्तृजन्यं कार्यत्वाद्धृटवदित्यनुमानस्य प्रमाणत्वात् ।

1 A BCF. Q. and I read far विभ्वी च, but the reading ad- opted in the text is better as it agrees with the definitions of काल and आत्मा. 2 A BX जीवात्मा परमात्मा च O,

G जीवः for जीवात्मा.

3 A B add सुखदुःखादिरहितः atter

एव.

4 AF and C. insert नाप्यागमस्त-

थाविधागमाभावात् atter लिङ्गामा- बात,

but the words appear to be interpolated and are inconsis- tent with the Vedic text cited further on Z has नान्युपमानं सादृश्याभावात् नापि शब्दः शब्दस्य वेदात्मकस्येश्वरीक्तत्वेन प्रामाण्या- दीश्वरासिद्धौ तत्प्रामाण्यासिद्धः-

SECT, 18. ] तर्कदीपिकया न्यायबोधिन्या च सहितः

[[१३]]

यः सर्वज्ञः

उपादानगोचरापरोक्षज्ञानचिकीर्षाकृतिमत्त्वं कर्तृत्वम् । उपादानं समवा- यिकारणम् । सकलपरमाण्वादिसूक्ष्मदर्शित्वात्सर्वज्ञत्वम् । स सर्वविद्" इत्याद्यागमोऽपि तत्र प्रमाणम् ॥

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जीवस्य लक्षणमाह— जीव इति । सुखाद्याश्रयत्वं जीवलक्षणम् । ननु " मनुष्योऽहं ब्राह्मणोऽहम् " इत्यादौ सर्वत्राप्रत्यये शरीरस्यैव विषयत्वाच्छरीरमेवात्मेति चेन्न । शरीरस्यात्मत्वे करपादादिनाशे सति शरीरनाशादात्मनोऽपि नाशप्रसङ्गात्। नापीन्द्रियाणामात्मत्वम् । तथात्वे " योऽहं घटमद्राक्षं सोऽहमिदानीं त्वचा स्पृशामि " इत्यनुसन्धाना - भावप्रसङ्गादन्यानुभूतेऽन्यस्यानुसन्धानायोगात् । तस्माद्देहेन्द्रियव्यतिरिक्तो जीवः । सुखदुःखादिवैचित्र्यात्मतिशरीरं भिन्नः । स च न परमाणुः शरीरव्यापि सुखाद्यनुपलब्धिप्रसङ्गात् । न मध्यमपरिमाणः । तथा सत्य - नित्यत्वप्रसङ्गेन कृतनाशाकृताभ्यागमप्रसङ्गात् । तस्मान्नित्यो विभुर्जीवः ॥

न्या. बो. आत्मानं निरूपयति - ज्ञानाधिकरणमिति । अधिकरणपदं समवायेन ज्ञानाश्रयत्वलाभार्थम् ॥

[१८]

सुखाद्युपलब्धिसाधनमिन्द्रियं मनः । तच्च प्रत्यात्मनियतत्वाद- नन्तं परमाणुरूपं नित्यं च ॥

त. दी. -मनसो लक्षणमाह सुखेति । स्पर्शरहितत्वे सति क्रियावत्त्वं मनसो लक्षणम् । मनो विभजते- तचेति । एकैकस्या- त्मन एकैकं मन इत्यात्मनामनेकत्वान्मनसोऽप्यनेकत्वमित्यर्थः । परमा- गुरूपमिति । मध्यमपरिमाणत्वेऽनित्यत्वप्रसङ्गादित्यर्थः । ननुं मनो नाणु किन्तु विभु, स्पर्शरहितद्रव्यत्वादाकाशवदिति चेन्न । मनसो विभुत्व आत्ममनः संयोगस्या समवायिकारणस्याभावाज्ज्ञानानुत्पत्तिप्रसङ्गात् । न विभुदयसंयोगोऽस्त्विति वाच्यम् । तत्संयोगस्य नित्यत्वेन सुषु- मयभावप्रसङ्गात् । पुरितद्व्यतिरिक्तप्रदेश आत्ममनःसंयोगस्य सर्वदा

1 A Binsert दुःख after सुख quite

unnecessarily.

2EH read अणुरूपं.

ક

तर्कसङ्ग्रहः

[ SECT. 18.

विद्यमानत्वात् । अणुत्वे तु यदा मनः पुरीतति नाड्यां प्रविशति तदा सुषुप्तिः । यदा निःसरति तदा ज्ञानोत्पत्तिरित्यणुत्वसिद्धिः ॥

न्या. बो. - मनो निरूपयति सुखादीति । उपलब्धिर्नाम साक्षा- स्कारः । तथा च सुखादिसाक्षात्कारकारणत्वे सतीन्द्रियत्वं मनसो ल- क्षणम् । इन्द्रियत्वमात्रोक्तौ चक्षुरादावतिव्याप्तिरतः पूर्वदलम् । विशे- व्यानुपादान आत्मन्यतिव्याप्तिरात्मनो ज्ञानादिकं प्रति समवायिकारण- स्वात् । अत इन्द्रियत्वोपादानम् ॥

[१९]

चक्षुर्मात्रग्राह्यो गुणो रूपम् । तच्च शुक्रनीलपीतरक्तहरितकपि- शचित्रभेदात्सप्तविधं पृथिवीजलतेजोवृत्ति । तत्र पृथिव्यां सप्तविधम् । अभास्वरशुक्लं जले । भास्वरशुक्रं तेजसि ॥

।

त. दी. रूपं लक्षयति-चक्षुरिति । सङ्ख्यादावतिव्याप्तिवारणाय मात्रपदम् । रूपत्वेऽतिव्याप्तिवारणाय गुणपदम् । प्रभाभित्तिसंयोगे ऽति- व्याप्तिवारणाय चक्षुमीत्रग्राह्यजातिमत्त्वं वीच्यम् । रूपं विभजते—-त- चेति ॥ नन्वव्याप्यवृत्तिनीलादिसमुदाय एव चित्ररूपमिति चेन्न । रूपस्य व्याप्यवृत्तित्वनियमात् । ननु चित्रपटे ऽवयवरूपस्य प्रतीतिरस्त्विति चेन्न । रूपरहितत्वेन पटस्याप्रत्यक्षत्वप्रसङ्गात् । न च रूपवत्समवेतत्वं प्रत्यक्षत्व - प्रयोजकं गौरवात् । तस्मात्पटस्य प्रत्यक्षत्वानुपपत्त्या चित्ररूपसिद्धिः ॥ रूपस्याश्रयमाह – पृथिवीति । आश्रयं विभज्य दर्शयति तन्त्रेति ॥

1_A, B, X read अभास्वरं शुक्लै and भास्वरं शुक्लं च respectively,J,K, have the same as A without the last च; E, G, I have शुद्धं भास्वरं. The reading adopted in the text is that of C, D, and Sc., and is preferred as making the sense clearer. अभास्वर and आस्वर, when prefixed to शुरू, serve to distinguish the parti- cular kind of geofas from

Hostin

that of तेजस्; while, taken separately, they can give pro- per sense only if construed as adverbs modifying शुक्रं. 2 N has विशेष्यपदं देयं for क्षुमो- त्रग्राह्यजातिमत्त्वं वाच्यम्. C, Y, Z omit the sentence प्रभाभिनि &c. ; while A omits the next sentence रूपं &c. G. L, M, P and W. omit both sentences.

SECT. 20. 1 तर्कदीपिकया न्यायबोधिन्या च सहितः

[[१५]]

न्या. बो. – रूपं लक्षयति– चक्षुर्मात्रेति । चक्षुर्मात्रग्राह्यत्ववि - शिष्टगुणत्वं रूपस्य लक्षणम् । विशेष्यमात्रोपादाने रसादावतिव्याप्तिः । अतश्चक्षुर्मात्रग्राह्येति । तावन्मात्रोपादाने रूपत्वेऽतिव्याप्तिः । यो गुणो यदिन्द्रियग्राह्यस्तन्निष्ठा जातिस्तदभावस्तदिन्द्रियग्राह्य इति नियमात् । तद्वारणाय विशेष्योपादानम् । चक्षुर्मात्रग्राह्यत्वं नाम चक्षुर्भिन्नेन्द्रिया- ग्राह्यत्वे सति चक्षुर्ग्राह्यत्वम् । मात्रपदानुपादाने सङ्ख्यादिसामान्यगुणेऽ- तिव्याप्तिः सङ्ख्यादावपि चक्षुर्ग्राह्यत्वविशिष्टगुणत्वस्य सत्त्वात् । अत - स्तद्दारणाय मात्र पदम् । सङ्ख्यादेश्चक्षुर्भिन्नत्वगिन्द्रियग्राह्यत्वाच्चक्षुर्मा- ग्राह्यत्वं नास्ति । अतीन्द्रिये गुरुत्वादावतिव्याप्तिवारणाय चक्षुर्या- ह्येति । अत्र लक्षणे ग्राह्यत्वं नाम लौकिकप्रत्यक्षविषयत्वम् । अग्राह्यत्वं नाम तविषयत्वम् । तथा च चक्षुर्भिन्नेन्द्रियजन्यत्वाचसाक्षात्कारा- विषयत्वे सति चक्षुर्जन्यचाक्षुषप्रत्यक्षविषयत्वमिति फलितार्थः । ननु प्रभाभित्तिसंयोगे रूपलक्षणस्यातिव्याप्तिस्तस्य चक्षुमीत्रग्राह्यगुणत्वादिति चेन्न । गुणपदस्य विशेषगुणपरत्वात् । न चैवं विशेषगुणघटितलक्षणे सङ्ख्यादावतिव्याप्तयभावान्मात्र पदवैयर्थ्यमिति वाच्यम् । जलमात्रवृत्ति- सांसिद्धिकद्रवत्त्वेऽतिव्याप्तिवारणाय तदुपादानात् ॥ अथवा चक्षुर्मा- त्रग्राह्यजातिमद्गुणत्वस्य लक्षणत्वान्न प्रभाभित्तिसंयोगादावतिव्याप्तिः संयोगत्वजातेश्र्वक्षुर्मात्रग्राह्यत्वाभावापटसंयोगस्य त्वगिन्द्रियग्राह्यत्वा- चद्रतजातेरपि त्वगिन्द्रियग्राह्यत्वात् । अत्र जातिघटितलक्षणे गुण- स्वानुपादाने चक्षुर्मात्राद्यजातिमति सुवर्णादावतिव्याप्तिः । अतस्तद्वा- रणाय तदुपादानम् ॥ एवं रसादिलक्षणे विशेषणानुपादाने लक्ष्यभि नगुणादावतिव्याप्तिः । विशेष्यानुपादाने लक्ष्यमात्रवृत्तिरसत्वगन्धत्वादा- पतिव्याप्तिः । अतो विशेषणविशेप्ययोरुभयोरुपादानम् ॥

[२०]

रसनग्राद्यो गुणो रसः । स च मधुराम्ललवणकटुकषायतिक्त- भेदात्षड़िधः । पृथिवीजलवृत्तिः । पृथिव्यां षड़िधः । जले मधुर एव ॥ त. दी. - रसं लक्षयति- रसनेति । रसत्वेऽतिव्याप्तिपरिहाराय

[[१६]]

तर्कसङ्ग्रहः

[ SECT. 20.

गुणपदम् । रसस्याश्रयमाह – पृथिवीति ॥ आश्रयं विभज्य दर्शयति

पृथिव्यामिति ॥

[२१]

बाणग्राह्यो गुणो गन्धः । स च द्विविधः सुरभिरसुरभिश्व । पृथिवीमात्रवृत्तिः ॥

त. दी. – गन्धं लक्षयति- घाणेति । गन्धत्वेऽतिव्याप्तिवारणाय गुणपदम् ॥

[२२]

त्वगिन्द्रियमात्रग्राह्यो गुणः स्पर्शः । स च त्रिविधः । शीतोष्णा- नुष्णशीतभेदात् पृथिव्यप्तेजोवायुवृत्तिः । तत्र शीतो जले । उष्णस्ते- जारी । अनुष्णाशीतः पृथिवीवाय्वोः ॥

[[1]]

त. दी. - स्पर्श लक्षयति-त्वगिति । स्पर्शत्वेऽतिव्याप्तिवारणाय गुणपदम् । संयोगादावतिव्याप्तिवारणाय मात्रपदम् ॥

न्या. बो. स्पर्श लक्षयति-त्वगिन्द्रियमात्रग्राह्य इति । अत्रापि मात्रपदं सङ्ख्यादिसामान्यगुणादावतिव्याप्तिवारणाय । अन्यविशेषणकृत्यं पूर्ववद्बोध्यम् । ग्राह्यत्वपदार्थोऽपि पूर्ववत्प्रत्यक्षविषयत्वरूप एव बोध्यः ॥ [ २३ ]

रूपादिचतुष्टयं पृथिव्यां पाकजमनित्यं च । अन्यत्रापाकजं नित्यमनित्यं च । नित्यगतं नित्यम् । अनित्यगतमनित्यम् ॥

त. दी. – पाकजमिति । पाकस्तेजः संयोगः । तेन पूर्वरूपं नश्यति रूपान्तरमुत्पद्यत इत्यर्थः । अत्र परमाणुष्वेव पाको न व्यणुकादौ । . आमपाकनिक्षिप्ते घटे परमाणुषु रूपान्तरोत्पत्ती श्याम घटनाशे पुनर्झणु-

1 V

reads सङ्ख्यादावतिव्याप्ति which is perhaps preferable. 2 N Z and Val. omit पाक. Other readings are आपाक and अपाक; but all are equally un-

satisfactory. The one adopted in the text may mean

a fur- nace if interpreted as a Bahu- wrihi compound आमस्य (घटस्य) पाको यस्मिन्

SECT. 23. ] तर्कदौपिकया न्यायबोधिन्या व सहितः

कादिक्रमेण रक्तघटोत्पत्तिः । तत्र परमाणवः समवायिकारणम् । तेजः- संयोगो ऽसमवायिकारणम् । अष्टादिकं निमित्तकारणम् । द्यणुकादिरूपे कारणरूपमसवायिकारणम् इति पीलुपाकवादिनो वैशेषिकाः । पूर्वघटस्य नाशं विनैवावयविन्यवयवेषु परमाणुपर्यन्तेषु च युगपद्रूपान्तरोत्पत्तिरिति पिठरपाकवादिनो नैयायिकाः । अत एव पार्थिवपरमाणुषु रूपादिकमनित्य- मित्यर्थः ॥ अन्यन्त्रेति । जलादावित्यर्थः । नित्यगतमिति । परमाणुगत मित्यर्थः ॥ अनित्यगतमिति । द्यणुकादिनिष्टमित्यर्थः । रूपादिचतुष्टय- मुद्भूतं प्रत्यक्षमनुद्भूतमप्रत्यक्षम् । उद्भूतत्वं प्रत्यक्षप्रयोजको धर्मः । तद- भावोऽनुद्भूतत्वम् ॥

न्या. बी. रूपादिचतुष्टयं पृथिव्यां पाकजमिति । एतत्तत्त्व- निर्णयश्चेत्थम् । पाको नाम विजातीयतेजः संयोगः । स च नानाजा- तीयः । रूपजनको विजातीयः संयोगस्तदपेक्षया रसजनको विजा- तीयः । एवं स्पर्शादावपि । एवम्प्रकारेण भिन्नभिन्नजातीयाः पाकाः कार्यवैलक्षण्येन कल्पनीयाः । तथाहि तृणपुञ्जनिक्षिप्त आम्रादौ उप्मलक्षणविजातीयतेजःसंयोगात्पूर्वहरितरूपनाशे रूपान्तरस्य पीता - देरुत्पत्तिः पूर्वरसस्याम्लस्यैवानुभवात् । क्वचित्पूर्वहरितरूपसत्त्वेऽपि रसपरावृत्तिर्दृश्यते विजातीयतेजःसंयोगरूपपाकवशात्पूर्वतनाम्लरसनाशे मधुररसस्यानुभवात् । तस्मादुपजनकापेक्षया रसजनको विलक्षणः । एवं गन्धजनको विलक्षण एवाङ्गीकार्यो रूपरसयोरपरावृत्तावपि पूर्व- गन्धनाशे विजातीयतेजःसंयोगेन सुरभिगन्धोपलब्धेः । एवं स्पर्श - जनकोऽपि पाकवशात्कठिनस्पर्शनाशे मृदुस्पर्शानुभवात् । तस्माद्रूपादि- जनका विजातीया एव पाका यथाकार्यमुन्नेयाः । अतएव पार्थिवपरमा- णूनामेकजातीयत्वेऽपि पाकमहिम्ना विजातीयद्रव्यान्तरानुभवः । यथा गोमुक्ततृणादिनामापरमाण्वन्तं भं तृणारम्भकपरमाणुषु विजातीयतेजः- संयोगवशात्पूर्वरूपादिचतुष्टयनाशे तदनन्तरं दुग्धे यादृशं रूपादिकं वर्तते तादृशरूपरसगन्धस्पर्शजनका स्तेजः संयोगा जायन्ते । तदुत्तरं तादृशरूपरसादय उत्पद्यन्ते । तादृशरूपादिविशिष्टपरमाणुभिर्दुग्धद्यणुक- मारभ्यते । ततख्यणुकादिक्रमेण महादुग्धारम्भः ॥ एवं महादुग्धारम्भकैः

[[१८]]

तर्कसङ्ग्रहः

[ SECT. 23.

परमाणुभिरेव दध्यारभ्यते । एवं पाकमहिम्नैव दध्यारम्भकैः परमाणु-

भिर्नवनीतारम्भ इति दिक् ॥

[ २४ ]

एकत्वादिव्यवहारहेतुः सङ्ख्या । नैवद्रव्यवृत्तिरेकत्वादिपरार्ध- पर्यन्ता । एकत्वं नित्यमनित्यं च । नित्यगतं नित्यमनित्यगतमनि- त्यम् । द्वित्वादिकं तु सर्वत्रानित्यमेव ॥

त. दी. –सङ्ख्यां लक्षयति– एकत्वेति ॥

[ २५ ]

मानव्यवहारकारणं परिमाणं । नवद्रव्यवृत्ति । तच्चतुर्विधम् अणु- महद्दीर्घं ह्रस्वं चेति ॥

त. दी. - परिमाणं लक्षयति- मानेति । परिमाणं विभजते- तदिति । भावप्रधानो निर्देशः । अणुत्वं महत्त्वं दीर्घत्वं ह्रस्वत्वं चेत्यर्थः ॥ [ २६ ]

पृथग्व्यवहारकारणं पृथक्त्वं । सर्वद्रव्यवृत्ति ॥

त. दी. – पृथक्त्वं लक्षयति — पृथगिति । इदमस्मात्पृथगिति व्य- वहारकारणमित्यर्थः ॥

[ २७ ]

संयुक्तव्यवहारहेतुः संयोगः । सर्वद्रव्यवृत्तिः ॥

त. दी. संयोगं लक्षयति–संयुक्तेति । इमौ संयुक्ताविति व्यवहा-

1 ABC insert असाधारण be-

tween

व्यवहार and हेतु here and in the following definitions of

परिमाण, पृथक्त्व and संयोग, but

copies is preferred. See Note loc. cit.

2 A B insert सr before नवद्रव्य-

वृत्तिः.

the reading of the majority of 1 30EK Xomit नित्यमनित्यं च.

SEcr. 29. ] तर्कदीपिकया न्यायबोधिन्या व सहितः

रहेतुरित्यर्थः । सङ्ख्यादिलक्षणेषु सर्वत्र दिक्कालादावतिव्याप्तिवारणाया- साधारणेति पदं दयम् ॥ संयोगो द्विविधः कर्मजः संयोगजश्व । आयो हस्तक्रियया हस्तपुस्तकसंयोगः । द्वितीयो हस्तपुस्तकसंयोगात्काय पुस्तक- संयोगः । अव्याप्यवृत्तिः संयोगः । स्वात्यन्ताभावसमानाधिकरणत्वमव्या- प्यवृत्तित्वम् ॥

[ २८ ]

संयोगनाशक गुणो विभागः । सर्वद्रव्यवृत्तिः ॥

त. दी. विभागं लक्षयति-संयोगेति । कालादावतिव्याप्तिवार- णाय गुण इति । रूपादावतिव्याप्तिवारणाय संयोगनाशक इति । वि- भागोऽपि द्विविधः कर्मजो विभागजश्व । आद्यो हस्तक्रियया हस्तपुस्तक- विभागः । द्वितीय हस्त पुस्तक विभागात्कायपुस्तकविभागः ॥

न्या. बो. - विभागं लक्षयति-संयोगेति । संयोगनाशकत्वविशि- ष्टगुणत्वं विभागस्य लक्षणम् । विशेषणमात्रोपादाने क्रियाया अपि संयो- गनाशकत्वात्तत्रातिव्याप्तिवारणाय गुणत्वं विशेष्यम् ॥

[ २९ ]

परापरव्यवहारासाधारणकारणे परत्वापरत्वे । पृथिव्यादिचतुष्ट- यमनोवृत्तिनी । ते द्विविधे दिकृते कालकृते च । दूरस्थे दिकृतं परत्वम् । समीपस्थे दिकृतमपरत्वम् । ज्येष्ठे कालकृतं परत्वम् । कनिष्ठे कालकृतमपरत्वम् ॥

त. दी . - - परत्वापरत्वयोर्लक्षणमाह-परेति । परव्यवहारासाधारण- कारणं परत्वम् । अपरव्यवहारासाधारणकारणमपरत्वमित्यर्थः । परापरत्वे विभजते-ते द्विविधे इति । दिकृतयोरुदाहरणमाह–दूरस्थ इति ॥ कालकृते उदाहरति– ज्येष्ठ इति ॥

I HJ omit असाधारण, but most 2 EG HJ and X omit greenfa

of the copies agree in retain- otc

ing it.

तर्कसङ्ग्रहः

[ ३० ]

[ SECT 30.

आद्यपतनासमवायिकारणं गुरुत्वं । पृथिवीजलवृत्ति ॥

।

त. दी. गुरुत्वं लक्षयति–आद्येति । द्वितीयादिपतनस्य वेगा- समवायिकारणत्वाद्वेगेऽतिव्याप्तिवारणायाद्येति ॥

न्या. बी. गुरुत्वं लक्षयति- आद्येति । द्वितीयादिपतनक्रियायां वेगस्यैवासमवायिकारणतात्तत्रानिव्याशिवारणायाद्येति । उत्तरत्र स्यन्दन आद्यविशेषणमपि पूर्ववदेव योजनीयम् ॥

[ ३१ ]

आयस्यन्दनासमवायिकारणं द्रवत्वं । पृथिव्यप्तेजोवृत्ति । तद्वि- विधं सांसिद्धिकं नैमित्तिकं च । सांसिद्धिकं जले नैमित्तिकं पृथि वीतेजसोः । पृथिव्यां घृतादावग्निसंयोगजन्यं द्रवत्वम् । तेजसि सुव- र्णादी’ ॥

न. डी. – द्रवत्वं लक्षयति-आद्यस्यन्दनेति । स्यन्दनं स्रवणम् । तेजःसंयोगजन्यं नैमित्तिकद्रवत्वम् । तद्भिन्नं सांसिद्धिकद्रवत्वम् । पृ- थिव्यां नैमित्तिकद्रवत्वमुदाहरति- घृतादाविति । तेजसि तदाह- सुवर्णादाविति ॥

[ ३२ ]

चूर्णादिपिण्डीभावहेतुर्गुणः स्नेहः । जलमात्रवृत्तिः ॥

त. दी. – स्नेहं लक्षयति-— चूर्णेति । कालादावतिव्याप्तिवारणाय गुण इति । रूपादावतिव्याप्तिवारणाय चूर्णादीति ॥

न्या. बो. – खेहं लक्षयति– चूर्णादीति । चूर्णादिपिण्डीभावहेतुत्वे

। सति गुणत्वं स्नेहस्य लक्षणम् । पिण्डीभावो नाम चूर्णादेर्धारणाकर्षणहेतु- भूतो विलक्षणः संयोगः । तादृशसंयाङ्गे स्नेहस्यैवासाधारणकारणत्वम् । न

10DJ road संयामनं. 2 D omits तेजसि सुवर्णादी.

GJ Y Z omit g after

नैमित्तिक.

4AGJY Z read पिण्डीभावेति;

A huss or for रूप wrongly.SECT. 34. ] तर्कदीपिकया न्यायवोधिन्या च सहितः

तु जलादिगतद्रवत्वस्य । तथा सति द्रुतसुवर्णादिसंयोगे चूर्णादेः पिण्डी- भावापत्तेः । अतः स्नेह एवासाधारणकारणम् । विशेषणमात्रोपादाने काला- दावतिव्याप्तिस्तद्वारणाय विशेष्योपादानम् । वस्तुतस्तु द्रुतजलसंयोगस्यैव पिण्डीभावहेतुत्वम् । स्नेहस्य पिण्डीभावहेतुत्वे मानाभावात्। जले द्रुतत्व- विशेषणात्कारकादिव्यावृत्तिः ॥

[ ३३ ]

श्रोत्रग्राह्यो गुणः शब्दः । आकाशमात्रवृत्तिः । स द्विविधो ध्व- न्यात्मको वर्णात्मकचेति । व्वन्यात्मको भेर्यादौ । वर्णात्मकः संस्कृतभाषादिरूपः ।

त. दी. - शब्दं लक्षयति-श्रोत्रेति । शब्दत्वेऽतिव्याप्तिवारणाय गुण इति । रूपादावतिव्याप्तिवारणाय श्रोत्रेति ॥ शब्दस्त्रिविधः । संयोगजो विभागजः शब्दजश्चेति । तत्राद्यो भेरीदण्डसंयोगजन्यः । द्वितीयो वंश उत्पाटयमाने दलद्वयविभागजन्यश्चटचटाशब्दः । भेर्यादिदेशमारभ्य श्री -

पर्यन्तं द्वितीयादिशब्दाः शब्दजाः ॥

न्या. बी. ― शब्द लक्षयति-श्रोत्रेति । शब्दत्वेऽतिव्याप्तिवार- णाय गुणपदम् । रूपादावतिव्याप्तिवारणाय श्रोत्रेति । स त्रिविधः । संयो- गजो विभागजः शब्दजश्वेति । भेरीदण्डसंयोगजन्यो भाङ्कारादिशब्दः । हस्ताभिघातसंयोगजन्यो मृदङ्गादिशब्दः । वंशे पाठ्यमाने दलद्वयविभाग- जश्चटचटादिशब्दः । शब्दोत्पत्तिदेशमारभ्य कर्णविवरपर्यन्तं वीची- तरङ्गन्यायेन कदम्बमुकुलन्यायेन वा निमित्तपवनेन शब्दधारा जायन्ते । तत्रोत्तरशब्दे पूर्वशब्दः कारणम् ॥

[ ३४ ]

सर्वव्यवहारहेतुर्बुद्धिर्ज्ञानम् । सा द्विविधा स्मृतिरनुभवश्च ।

1 Vhas उत्तरोत्तरशब्दे पूर्वपूर्वशब्दः 2 O K add qor: after ¡g: A E

G X read ‘हेतुर्ज्ञानं बुद्धिः See

Mota loc. cit,

[[२२]]

तर्कसङ्ग्रहः

संस्कारमत्रिजन्यं ज्ञानं स्मृतिः । तद्भिन्नं ज्ञानमनुभवः ।

[ SECT. 34.

त. दी. बुद्धेर्लक्षणमाह - सर्वेति । जानामीत्यनुव्यवसायगम्यज्ञा- नत्वमेव लक्षणमित्यर्थः । बुद्धिं विभजते - सेति ॥ स्मृतेर्लक्षणमाह— संस्कारेति । भावनाख्यः संस्कारः । संस्कारध्वंसेऽतिव्याप्तिवारणाय ज्ञानमिति । घटादिप्रत्यक्षेऽतिव्याप्तिवारणाय संस्कारजन्यामिति । प्रत्यभिज्ञायामतिव्याप्तिवारणाय मात्रेति ॥ अनुभवं लक्षयति- तद्भिन्नमिति । स्मृतिभिन्नं ज्ञानमनुभव इत्यर्थः ॥

न्या. बो. - बुद्धेर्लक्षणमाह — सर्वेति । व्यवहारः शब्दप्रयोगः । ज्ञानं विना शब्दप्रयोगासम्भवाच्छब्दप्रयोग रूपव्यवहारहेतुत्वं बुद्धलक्षणम् । बुद्धिं विभजते-साद्विविधेति ॥ स्मृतिं लक्षयति–संस्कारेति । बहि- रिन्द्रियाजन्यत्वविशिष्टसंस्कारजन्यत्वविशिष्टज्ञानत्वं स्मृतेर्लक्षणम्। विशे- षणानुपादाने प्रत्यक्षाद्यनुभवेऽतिव्याप्तिः । तद्दारणाय विशेषणोपादानम् । संस्कारध्वंसेऽतिव्याप्तिवारणाय विशेष्योपादानम् । ध्वंसं प्रति प्रतियोगिनः कारणत्वात्संस्कारध्वंसेऽपि संस्कारजन्यत्वस्य सत्वात् । प्रत्यभिज्ञायामति- व्याप्तिवारणाय मात्र पदम् ॥ अनुभवं लक्षयति- तद्भिन्नमिति । तद्भि- [नत्वं नाम स्मृतिभिन्नत्वम् । स्मृतिभिन्नत्वविशिष्टज्ञानत्वमनुभवस्य लक्षणम् तत्र विशेषणानुपादाने स्मृतावतिव्याप्तिः । विशेष्यानुपादाने घटादावति- व्याप्तिः । अतस्तद्वारणाय विशेषणविशेष्ययोरुभयोरुपादानम् ॥

1 J omits मात्र, while the word and the commentary on it are added in G in a marginal note. Sc. also notices the omission of the word in several MSS,,while the absence of the sentence referring to it in several copies of TD makes it probable that the word may not have existed originally. It is however retained in accord- ance with Nil. See Note on मात्र loc. cit.

2 N and Q add कालादावतिव्या-

शिवारणाय ज्ञानमिति । रूपादाव- तिव्याप्तिवारणाय सर्वव्यवहारोत while Q has for

गुण ज्ञान; but the passage is not found any. where else, nor noticed by Nil. 3 A CJLPY Z omit this sen-

tence, and G adds it in the margin; but it is retained on the authority of M N Q W and Nil.

4 All copies except V read

ज्ञानस्य. 5CKR omit बहिरिन्द्रियाजन्य-

त्वविशिष्ट.

SECT. 35. ] तर्कदीपिकया न्यायबोधिन्या व सहितः

[ ३५ ]

[[2]]

[[२३]]

सद्विविधो यथार्थोऽयथार्थश्च । तद्वति तत्प्रकारकोऽनुभवो यथार्थः ‘यथा रजत इदं रजतमिति ज्ञानम् । स एव प्रमेत्युच्यते । तदभाव- वति तत्प्रकारकोऽनुभवोऽयथार्थः । यथा शुक्ताविदं रजतमिति ज्ञानम् ॥

त. दी. - अनुभवं विभजते– स द्विविध इति । यथार्थानुभवस्य लक्षणमाह - तद्वतीति । ननु घटे घटत्वमिति प्रमायामव्याप्तिः घटत्वे घटाभावादिति चेन्न । यत्र यत्सम्बन्धोऽस्तितत्र तत्सम्बन्धानुभव इत्यर्थाद्ध- टत्वेऽपि घटसम्बन्धोऽस्तीति नाव्याप्तिः । स इति । यथार्थानुभव एव शास्त्रे प्रमेत्युच्यत इत्यर्थः । अयथार्थं लक्षयति-— तदभाववतीति । न- न्विदं संयोगीति प्रमायामतिव्याप्तिरिति चेन्न । यदवच्छेदेन यत्सम्बन्धाभाव- स्तदवच्छेदेन तत्सम्बन्धज्ञानस्य विवक्षितत्वात् संयोगाभावावच्छेदेन संयोग- ज्ञानस्य भ्रमत्वात्,संयोगावच्छेदेन संयोगसम्बन्धस्य सत्त्वात्, नातिव्याप्तिः ॥

न्या बो. —— अनुभवं विभजते- सद्विविध इति । यथार्थानुभवं लक्षयति तद्वतीति । तद्वतीत्यत्र सप्तम्यर्थो विशेष्यकत्वम् । तच्छब्देन प्रकारीभूतो धर्मो धर्तव्यः। तथाच तद्वद्विशेप्यकत्वे सति तत्प्रकारकत्वं यैथा- र्थानुभवस्य लक्षणम् । उदाहरणं । रजत इदं रजतमिति ज्ञानम् । रजतत्व-

1 CHJK omit this sentence;

EGQX have instead यथायं घट इतिः Badds सत्य before रजतः

2 The reading in all copies of T. S. and T. D. except J is सैव; but a ga is adopted as being. grammatically more correct.

3 Q. omits अनुभवः while CE

have तत्प्रकारक

4 0 H J F and Q. omit this sentence. D adds further रज- तत्वाभाववति शुक्तौ रजतत्वप्रकारक ज्ञानमययाथज्ञानं; but this as

well as A’s addition सेवाप्रमे- त्युच्यते seem to be interpo- lations.

G reads यदभावः for यत्सम्बन्धा-

भावः-

6 A has संयोगज्ञानस्य प्रमात्वात् for संयोगसम्बन्धस्य सत्त्वात्ः I reads विद्यमानत्वात् for सत्त्वात्. Vadds ज्ञान before प्रकारीभूतः, perhaps better.

8 ST and W. read agencË

सत्यनुभवत्वं, perhaps better,

ક

तर्कसङ्ग्रह

[ SECT. 35.

अन्यथा यथाश्रुते

वद्विशेष्यकत्वे सति रजतत्वप्रकारकं ज्ञानम् । तद्वन्निष्टविशेष्यतानिरूपित-

तन्निष्टमकारिताशालित्वमिति

निष्कर्षः

रङ्गरजतयोरिमे रजतरङ्गे इत्याकारकसमूहालम्बनभ्रमेऽतिव्याप्तिः । तत्रापि रजतत्ववद्विशेष्यकत्वरजतत्वप्रकारकत्वयोः, रङ्गत्ववद्विशेष्यकत्व रङ्गत्व- प्रकारकत्वयोश्र्व सत्त्वात् । उक्तनिष्कर्षे तु दर्शितभ्रमे नातिव्याप्तिः । रज- तत्वप्रकारताया रजतत्ववद्रजतविशेष्यतानिरूपितत्वाभावात्, एवं रङ्गत्वप्र- कारताया रङ्गत्ववद्रङ्गविशेष्यतानिरूपितत्वाभावाञ्च । किन्तु समूहालम्बने भ्रमस्य रङ्गांशे रजतत्वावगाहित्वेन रजतांशे रङ्गत्त्वावगाहित्वेन च रजत- त्वप्रकारतायाः रङ्गत्ववद्विशेष्यतानिरूपितत्वात् । एवं रजतांशे रङ्गत्व- प्रकारताया रजतत्ववद्विशेष्यतानिरूपितत्वाच्चेति ॥

अयथार्थानुभवं लक्षयति—तद्भाववतीति । अत्रापि पूर्व- वत्तदभाववद्विशेष्यतानिरूपिततन्निष्ठप्रकारताशालिज्ञानत्वं विवक्षणीयम् । अन्यथा रङ्गरजतयोरिमे रङ्गरजते इत्याकारकसमूहालम्बनप्रमायामति- व्याप्तिरेतत्समूहालम्बनस्य रजतरङ्गोभयविशेष्यकत्वेन रजतत्वरत्वो - भयप्रकारकत्वेन च रजतत्वाभाववद्रङ्गविशेष्यकत्वरजतत्वप्रकारकत्वयोः, रङ्गत्वाभाववद्रजतविशेषकत्वरङ्गत्वप्रकारकत्वयोश्च सत्त्वात् । उक्ताने- कर्षे तु न तत्रातिव्याप्तिः । तादृशप्रमार्याः रजतांशे रजतत्वावगाहित्वेन रङ्गांशे रङ्गत्वावगाहित्वेन च रजतत्वप्रकारताया रजतत्वाभाववद्रङ्ग- निष्ठविशेष्यतानिरूपितत्वाभावादेवं रङ्गत्वप्रकारताया रङ्गत्वाभाववद्रजत- निष्टविशेष्यतानिरूपितत्वाभावाच्च । उदाहरणं । यथा शुक्ताविति ॥

[ ३६ ]

यथार्थानुभवश्चतुर्विधः प्रत्यक्षानुमित्युपमितिशाब्दभेदात् । त त्करणमपि चतुर्विधं प्रत्यक्षानुमानोपमानशब्दभेदात् ॥

त. दी. - यथार्थानुभवं विभजते— यथार्थेति । प्रसङ्गात्प्रमाकरणं विभजते– तत्करणमिति । प्रमाकरणमित्यर्थः । प्रमायाः करणं प्रमाण-

मिति प्रमाणसामान्यलक्षणम् ॥

1 W. reads differently; U adds

नानामुख्य विशेष्यताशालिज्ञान

समूहालम्बनं.

2 The reading is taken from W.

C. 38. ] तर्कदोपिक व्याययोधिन्या च सहितः

न्या. बी. - यथार्थानुभवं विभजते— यथार्थानुभव इति । तत्क- रणमिति । फलीभूतप्रत्यक्षादिकरणं चतुर्विधमित्यर्थः । प्रत्यक्षादिचतुर्विध- प्रमाणानां प्रमाकरणत्वं सामान्यलक्षणम् । एकैकप्रमाणलक्षणं तु वक्ष्यते प्रत्यक्षज्ञानेत्यादिना ॥

[ ३७ ]

असाधारणं कारणं करण ।

त. दी. – करणलक्षणमाह- असाधारणेति । साधारणकारणे दिक्कालादावतिव्याप्तिवारणायासाधारणेति ॥

।

न्या. बी. करणलक्षणमाह–असाधारणमिति । व्यापारवदसा- धारणं कारणं करणमित्यर्थः । असाधारणकारणत्वं व कार्यत्वव्याप्यं- धर्मावच्छिन्नकार्यतानिरूपितकारणताशालित्वम् । यथा दण्डादेर्घटादिकं प्रत्यसाधारणकारणत्वम् । कार्यत्वव्याप्यवम घटत्वादिरूपधर्मः तद- बच्छिन्नकार्यता घण्टे । तन्निरूपितकारणता दण्डे । अतो घटं प्रति द- ण्डोऽसाधारणकारणम् । भ्रम्यादिरूपव्यापारवत्वाच करणम् । साधारण- कारण कार्यत्वावच्छिन्नकार्यतानिरूपित कारणताशालित्वम् । यथा ईश्व- राष्टादेः कार्यत्वावच्छिन्नं प्रत्येव कारणत्वात्साधारणकारणत्वम् ॥

[३८] कार्यनियतपूर्वद्वात् कारणम् ।

1 All e ples execpt B and K fort व्यावाक्यम् botore gaTaT em: iz J the word is saded in mrgiu, apparently by another

But the gate in all cuties of TD and the remarks of No. conclusively show that it lu not exist originally. On

foe. cit.

जति जन्यजनक व्यापार, but the surdition is unwarranted.

2 N here inserta aga azkarrà जननीये चक्षुः संयोगरूपो व्यापारः । नत्राविन्याविवारणाय व्यापारवाह

स्वरि देव. Yadds घरं प्रति कपा- लवसंयोगवारणाय व्यापारवदिति; bus neither passage is found in any other copy.

3 C and W have अतिरिक्त for

व्याध.

4 The reading in the text is

taken from & KQX, as being most probably the correct one. 480DF prefix अवन्यथा- सिद्ध 10 कार्यनिया’ 3 adds the word in margin. E has w7- व्यथासिद्धत्वे सति नियत’, while If readis कार्येऽन्यथासिद्धिशून्यत्वे साथ नियत’. See Note lon. cit

[[२६]]

तर्कसङ्ग्रहः

SEC. 38,

त. दी. - कारणलक्षणमाह — कार्येति । पूर्ववृत्ति कारणमित्युक्ते रासभादावतिव्याप्तिः स्यादतो नियतेति । तावन्मात्रे कृते कार्येऽतिव्याप्ति- रतः पूर्ववृत्तीति ॥ ननु तन्तुरूपमपि परं प्रति कारणं स्यादिति चेन्न । अनन्यथासिद्धत्वे सतीति विशेषणात् । अनन्यथासिद्धत्वमन्यथासिद्धिवि- रहः । अन्यथासिद्धिश्च त्रिविधा । “येन सहैव यस्य यं प्रति पूर्ववृत्तित्वम- वगम्यते तं प्रति तेन तदन्यथासिद्धम् यथा तन्तुना तन्तुरूपं तन्तुत्वं चपटं प्रति । अन्यं प्रति पूर्ववृत्तित्वे ज्ञात एव यस्य यं प्रति पूर्ववृत्तित्व- मवगम्यते तं प्रति तदन्यथासिद्धम् । यथा शब्दं प्रति पूर्ववृत्तित्वे ज्ञात एव घटं प्रत्याकाशस्य । अन्यत्र क्लृप्तनियतपूवर्वर्तिनैव कार्यसम्भवे तत्सहभूतम- न्यथासिद्धम् । यथा पाकजस्थले गन्धं प्रति रूपमागभावस्य । एवं चान- न्यथासिद्धनियतपूर्ववृत्तित्वं कारणत्वम् ॥

[[1]]

न्या. बो. - कारणं लक्षयति–कार्यनियतेति । कार्यं प्रति निय- तत्वे सति पूर्ववृत्तित्वं कारणत्वम् । नियतत्वविशेषणानुपादाने पूर्ववर्तिनो रासभादेरपि घटादिकारणत्वं स्यादतो नियतेति विशेषणम्। नियतपूर्वव- तिनो दण्डरूपादेरपि घटकारणत्वं स्यादतोऽनन्यथासिद्धपदमपि कारण- लक्षणे निवेशनीयं दण्डरूपादीनामन्यथासिद्धत्वात् ॥

[ ३९ ]

कार्य प्रागभावप्रतियोगि ॥

त. दी. कार्यलक्षणमाह-कार्यमिति ॥

न्या.

बो. कार्य लक्षयति - प्रागिति । प्रागभावप्रतियोगित्वं का- यस्य लक्षणम् । उत्पत्तेः पूर्वमिह घटो भविष्यतीति प्रतीतिर्जायते । एत- त्प्रतीतिविषयोऽभावः प्रागभावस्तत्प्रतियोगि घटादिरूपं कार्यम् ॥

[ ४० ]

कारणं त्रिविधं समवाय्यसमवायिनिमित्तभेदात् । यत्समवेतं कार्यमुत्पद्यते तत्समवायिकारणम् । यथा तन्तवः पटस्य पट स्व- गतरूपादेः । कार्येण कारणेन वा सदैकस्मिन्नर्थे समवेतत्वे सति

SECT. 40.] तर्कदीपिकया न्यायबोधिन्या च सहितः

यत्कारणं तदसमवायिकारणम् । यथा तन्तुसंयोगः पटस्य तन्तुरूपं पटरूपस्य । तदुभयभिन्नं कारणं निमित्तकारणम् । यथा तुरीवेमादिकं

पटस्य ।

त. दी. कारणं विभजते-कारणमिति। समवायिकारणस्य ल- क्षणमाह-यत्समवेतमिति । यस्मिन्समवेतमित्यर्थः । असमवायिकारणं लक्षयति — कार्येणेति । कार्येणेत्येतदुदाहरति तन्तुसंयोग इति । कार्येण पटेनैकास्मिंस्तन्तौ समवेतत्वात्तन्तु संयोगः पटस्यासमवायिकारण- मित्यर्थः । कारणेन सहेत्येतदुदाहरति– तन्तुरूपमिति । कारणेन पटेन सहैकास्मिंस्तन्तौ समवेतत्वात्तन्तुरूपं पटरूपस्यासमवायिकारणमित्यर्थः । निमित्तकारणं लक्षयति तदुभयेति । समवाय्यसमवायिभिन्नं कारणं निमित्तकारणमित्यर्थः ॥

।

न्या. बो. कारणं विभजते-कारणमिति । समवायिकारणं ल- क्षयति-यत्समवेतमिति ॥ यस्मिन्समवेतं सत् समवायेन सम्बद्धं सत् कार्यमुत्पद्यते तत्समवायिकारणमित्यर्थः । उदाहरणं - यथा तन्तव इति । तन्तुषु समवायेने सम्बद्ध सत् पटात्मकं कार्यमुत्पद्यते इति तन्तवः सम्मवायि- कारणमित्यर्थः । सामान्यलक्षणं तु समवायसम्बन्धावच्छिन्नकार्यतानिरूपि- ततादात्म्यसम्बन्धावच्छिन्नकारणत्वं समवायिकारणत्वमिति । समवायसन्न - न्धेन घटाधिकरणे कपालादौ कपालादेस्तादात्म्यसम्बन्धेनैव सत्त्वात् ।

समवायसम्बन्धावच्छिन्नघटत्वावच्छिन्नकार्यतानिरूपिततादात्म्यसम्बन्धाव- च्छिन्नकारणतायाः कपालादौ सत्त्वाल्लक्षणसमन्वयः । समवायेन जन्य - भावत्वावच्छिन्नं प्रति तादात्म्यसम्बन्धेन द्रव्यस्यैव कारणत्वाज्जन्यभावेषु

1 E and Q supply गत् and तत् which though not absolutely necessary are inserted as mak- ing the sense clearer.

2 K reads पटगतरूपस्य.

3 N here adds इर्ड्स च कारणत्रयं भा-

कार्यस्यैव । अभावस्य तु निमित्त-

। मात्रम, but the words are not found in any other copy.

4 WW inserts here कपालत्वापन-

चित्र.

सर्भसङ्ग्रहः

SEOT. 40.

द्रव्यगुणकर्मसु त्रिषु नृपमेव समवायिकारणम् । द्रव्ये द्रव्यावयवाः समवायिकारणम् । अतो गुणादावपि द्रव्यमेव समवायिकारणमित्याशये- नाह एव स्वगतरूपमादेरिति । समवायिकारणमित्यनुषज्यते । असम- बायिकारणं लक्षपति - सार्येति । असनवायिकारणं द्विविधम् । कार्येण सहैकस्मिन्नर्थे समवेत सत् कारणमसमवायिकारणमित्येकम् । कारणेन सहैकस्मिन्नर्थे समवेतं सत् कारणमसमवायिकारणमित्यपरमि- त्यर्थः । अत्र कारणेनेत्यस्य स्वकार्यसमवायिकारणेनेत्यर्थः । जन्य- द्रव्यमात्रे ऽवयवसंयोगस्यैवास नवा विकारणत्वात्पात्मककार्ये तदवयवर्त- न्तुसंयोगस्यैवासमवायिकारणतं दर्शयन्यथम मुदाहरति यथा वन्तु संयोगः पटस्येति । पढात्मककार्येण सहैकस्मिन्नर्थे तन्तौ समवेतं सत् समवायसम्बन्धेन वर्तमानं सत्पात्मककार्य प्रति तन्तुसंयोगात्मकं कारणमसमवायिकारणमित्यर्थः । द्वितीयसमवायिकारणं दर्शयति-कार- णेन सहेत्यादिना । तदुदाहरति-तन्तुरूपमिति । कीरणेन पटरूप- समवायिकारणीभूतपटेन सहैकस्मिन्नर्थे तन्तुरूपेऽर्थे समवेतं सत् समवा- यसम्बन्धेन वर्तमानं सत् तन्तुरूपं पटगतरूपं प्रति कारणं भवति । अतोऽसमवायिकारणं तन्तुरूपं पटरूपस्य । सामान्यलक्षणं तु समवाय- सम्बन्धावच्छिन्नकार्यतानिरूपिता या समवायस्वसमवायिसमवेतत्वान्य- तरसम्बन्धावच्छिन्ना कारणता तदाश्रयत्वम् । सम्मवायसम्बन्धावच्छिन्ना

। कपालद्वयसंयोगनिष्ठा कारणता कपालद्वयसंयोगे वर्तते । एवमाद्यपतन- क्रियायामाद्यस्यन्दनक्रियायां च गुरुत्वद्रवत्वे असमवायिकारणे भवतः । आद्यपतनक्रियां प्रत्याद्यस्यन्दनक्रियां प्रति च तयोः समवायसम्बन्धेनैव कारणत्वात् । अवयविगुणादौ त्ववयवगुणादेः स्वसमवायिसमवेतत्वसं- बन्धेनैव कारणत्वात्तत्सम्बन्धावच्छिन्न कारणताश्रयत्वमवयवगुणादौ वर्तते । अवयवभूतकपालतन्तुरूपादेः स्वशब्दग्राह्यकपालरूपतन्तुरूपसमवायिक

1 The following two sentences

are omitted in O K R. 2 W reads differently. 8 Before समवाय” S T insert क्रव्यसमवायिकारणीभूतावयवसंय- ये तु समवायसम्बन्धावच्छिनघट-

त्वावच्छिन्नकार्यतानिरूपित", but all other copies omit the words. S T also read संयोगत्वा- वच्छिन्ना for संयोगनिष्ठा. w reads differently.

SECT. 42.] सर्कदीपिका व्यास वेधिन्या व सहितः

पालतन्तुसमवेतत्वसम्भन्थेग व संस्वात् ॥ निमिषकारणं लक्ष- यति तदुभयपनि व्यक्तमवविधिनमित्यर्थः ॥

तदुभयमिनियम

तस्त्रिविकारभमचे दारण कारणं तदेव करणम् ॥

॥

त. श्री. करमलकममुपसंहा कोतदिति ॥

न्या. बी. करणलक्षणम् - सहित । माधारणमि- त्यत्र व्यापारचे सतीत्यपि पृरुणीय । अन्यथा तन्तुकपालसंयोगयोरति- व्यातिः तन्धुपालसन्नोवयोगी कार्यव्यातिरितपत्ववदत्वावच्छिन्नं प्रतिकारस्यादसा मारणदीप जतन करणत्ववारणाय व्यापार- वत्वे सतीति करणलक्षणे विशेष । यातु जन्यत्वे सति तज्जन्यजनकत्वम् । नवति हि

इण्डन्यपटजनकता - म्यादेर्दण्डव्यापारस्य । एवं कपास तवेराचे कपालतन्त्वादि ब्यापारत्वम् । कपालसंयोगस्य कपासे कति कपालजन्यचटजन- कत्वादवं तन्तुसंयोगस्वटजनकत्वात् । करणलक्षणेऽसाचारापासून ईश्वराधादे व्यापारवत्वा-

।

त्करणत्वं स्यात्तत्रातियाना साधारणेति ॥

।

[ ४२ ]

नत्र प्रत्यक्षज्ञानकरणं प्रत्यक्ष ॥ इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षजन्यं ज्ञानं प्रत्यक्षम् । वह्निपि निर्विक्रयकं विकके चेति । तत्र निष्ण- कारकं ज्ञानं निर्विकल्पकं पद कल्पकं यथा डित्थोऽयं ब्राह्मणी

[[1]]

W read the passagu dulio» what differently, though the tense is the save; thus go. विगुणप

सूतकपालतन्तुरूपादेः स्वपदवाय- पालतन्तुरूपादिसमवायिकपाल- त्वादिसमवेतत्वधेनैव कारण- स्वातत्सम्बन्धावच्छिन्नकारणताय- स्वमवयवगुणभूतक पारूप रूपा- at वर्तत इति लक्षणसङ्गतिः-

। समकारकं ज्ञानं सवि- श्यामीऽयमिति ॥

2 instead of this has fer- Feat regretaगाहिज्ञानम; G J Q Lad X omit the words altogether.

3 E dds gaisa, but the addition thonal Cosirable giving an instance or क्रिया is zo supperied by any other

।

तर्कसङ्ग्रहः

[ SECT. 49.

त. डी. - प्रत्यक्षलक्षणमाह– तचेति । प्रमाणचतुमध्य इत्यर्थः ।

। प्रत्यक्षज्ञानस्य लक्षणमाह– - इन्द्रियेति । इन्द्रियं चक्षुरादिकम् । अर्थो घटादिः । तयोः सन्निकर्षः संयोगादिः, तज्जन्यं ज्ञानमित्यर्थः ॥ ताविभ- जते- तद्विविधमिति । निर्विकल्पकस्य लक्षणमाह— निष्प्रकारक- मिति विशेषणविशेष्यसम्बन्धानवगाहि ज्ञानमित्यर्थः ॥ ननु निर्विकल्पके किं प्रमाणमिति चेन्न । गौरिति विशिष्टज्ञानं विशेषणज्ञानजन्यं विशिष्टज्ञानत्वाद्दण्डीति ज्ञानवादित्यनुमानस्य प्रमाणत्वात् । विशे-

। षणज्ञानस्यापि सविकल्पकत्वे ऽनवस्थाप्रसङ्गान्निर्विकल्पकसिद्धिः ॥ सवि- कल्पकं लक्षयति–सप्रकारकमिति । नामजात्यादिविशेषणविशेष्य- सम्बन्धावगाहि ज्ञानमित्यर्थः । सविकल्पकमुदाहरति–यथेति ॥

।

न्या. बो. – षडिधेन्द्रियभूतप्रत्यक्षप्रमाणस्य लक्षणमाह– तन्त्रेति । प्रमाभूतेषु प्रत्यक्षात्मकं यज्ज्ञानं चाक्षुषादिप्रत्यक्षं तत्प्रति करणं व्यापा- रवदसाधारणकारणमिन्द्रियं भवति । अतः प्रत्यक्षज्ञानकरणत्वं प्रत्यक्षस्य लक्षणम्।आद्यसन्निकर्षातिरिक्तचतुर्विधसन्निकर्षाणां समवायघटितत्वेनेोन्द्र- यजन्यत्वाभावाद्व्यापारत्वं न सम्भवतीतीन्द्रियमनः संयोगस्यैव षधिप्रत्यक्षे जननीय इन्द्रियव्यापारता बोध्या । मानसप्रत्यक्षे त्वात्ममनः संयोगस्यैव सा बोध्यौ । प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणलक्षणमुक्त्वा प्रत्यक्षप्रमालक्षणमाह । इन्द्रिया- सन्निकर्षेति । आदौ लक्षणं जन्यप्रत्यक्षस्यैव लक्ष्यत्वाभिप्रायेण । ईश्व- रमत्यक्षसाधारणं लक्षणं तु ज्ञानाकरणकम् । ज्ञानाकरणकमिति प्रत्यक्ष- मालक्षणं । ज्ञानं व्याप्तिज्ञानं सादृश्यज्ञानं पदज्ञानं च तदेव करणं येषां तानि ज्ञानकरणकानि अनुमित्युपमितिशाब्दानि, तद्भिन्नत्वमित्यर्थः । प्रत्यक्ष इन्द्रियाणामेव करणत्वान्न ज्ञानस्य करणत्वम् । इदं लक्षणमीश्वर- प्रत्यक्षसाधारणमीश्वरप्रत्यक्षस्याजन्यत्वात् । जन्यप्रत्यक्षस्यैव लक्ष्यत्वा-

1AGJY Z omit the sentence. * S U and W read are for

षड्रिध.

BOKRVomit this sentence,

and perhaps it is spurious. O hore adds विशेष्यमात्रोको स्वता- बतिव्याप्तिर्विशेषणमात्रोक्तौ तई- वेनिव्याभिर्स प्रति स्वमभियोग-

नः कारणत्वादत उभयोरुपादानम्.

V is nearly to the same effect. 4 The reading of U and W is adopted as being more intel- ligible. Other copies trans- pose the sentences. 0 adds क्षेपकं लक्षणमिदं very appropri- ately. See Note, lec, cit.SECT. 43. ] तर्कदीपिकया न्यायबोधिन्या च सहितः

भिप्रायेणोत्तरमाह– इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षेति । जन्यप्रत्यक्षस्यैव लक्ष्य- स्वाभिप्रायेणेदं लक्षणम् ॥ प्रत्यक्षं विभजते - निर्विकल्पकमिति । तल्लक्षयति-निष्कारकमिति । प्रकारताशून्यज्ञानत्वमेव निर्विकल्प - कत्वमित्यर्थः । निर्विकल्पके चतुर्थी विषयता स्वीक्रियते । न तु त्रिविधविषयतामध्ये कापि तत्रास्ति । अतो विशेषणताशून्यत्वमिव वि- शेष्यताशून्यत्वं सन्निकर्षताशून्यत्वमित्यपि लक्षणं सम्भवति ॥ सविकल्पकं लक्षयति सकारकमिति । विषयताया ज्ञाननिरूपितत्वात् ज्ञानस्य विषयतानिरूपत्वेन प्रकारतानिरूपकज्ञानत्वं सविकल्पकस्य लक्षणम् । एवं विशेष्यतानिरूपकज्ञानत्वं सन्निकर्षतानिरूपकज्ञानत्वमित्यपि लक्षणं सम्भवति । उदाहरणं यथेति । इदन्त्वावच्छिन्नविशेष्यतानिरूपितडित्थत्वप्र- कारताशालिज्ञानं ब्राह्मणत्वप्रकारताशालिज्ञानं च सविकल्पकमित्यर्थः ॥

[ ४३ ]

प्रत्यक्षज्ञानहेतुरिन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षः परिधः । संयोगः, संयुक्तसं- मवायः, संयुक्तसमवेतसमवायः, समवायः, समवेतसमवायो, विशे- षणविशेष्यभावेचेति । चक्षुषा घटप्रत्यक्षजनने संयोगः सन्निकर्षः । घटरूपप्रत्यक्षजनने संयुक्तसमवायः सन्निकर्षः, चक्षुः संयुक्ते घटे रू- पस्य समवायात् । रूपत्वसामान्यप्रत्यक्षे संयुक्तसमवेतसमवायः सन्निकर्षः, चक्षुःसंयुक्ते घटे रूपं समवेतं तत्र रुपल्यस्य समवायात् । श्रोत्रेण शत्रे समवायः सन्निकर्षः, कर्णविवरवृत्त्याका- शय सन्दत्याकाशगुणत्वान्, गुणगुणिनोश्च समवायात् । शब्दारे समवेतसमवायः सन्निकर्षः, श्रोत्रसमवेते शब्दे शब्दत्वस्य लगवायात् । अभावनत्यसे विशेषणविशेष्यभावः सं- निकर्पो, घटाभाववडूतलमित्यत्र चक्षुःसंयुक्ते भूतले घटाभावस्य

1 A B join the words in a com- pound; freads विशेषणता चfor विशेषणविशेष्यभावन-

2 Kinscrts ज्ञान after प्रत्यक्ष

necessarily.

3 KG read प्रत्यक्षे for प्रत्यक्षजनने, and omii सन्निकर्षः in the follow- ing sentences.

।

ह

[ BRCE. 43.

विशेषणत्वात् । एवं सन्निकर्षष्ट्र त्र्यं यानं प्रत्यक्षम् । तत्करण- मिन्द्रियम् । तस्मादिन्द्रियं प्रत्यक्षामाणमिति सिद्धम् ॥

।

रा. दी. - इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षं विभजते–प्रत्यदेति । संयोगसनिक- र्षमुदाहरति-चक्षुपेति । द्रव्यप्रत्यक्षे सर्वत्र संयोगः सन्निकर्ष इत्यर्थः । आत्मा मनसा संयुज्यते, मम इन्द्रियेण इन्द्रियमर्थेन, ततः प्रत्यक्षज्ञानमु- त्पद्यते । संयुक्तसमवायमुदाहरति-दरूपेति । तत्र युक्तिमाह-चक्षुः- संयुक्त इति । संयुक्तसमवेतसमवाय बुदाहरति-रूपत्येति । समवाय-

। मुदाहरति-श्रोत्रेणेति । तदुपपादयति-कर्णेति । ननु दूरस्थशब्दस्य

। कथं श्रोत्रसम्बन्ध इति चेन्न वीचितर न्यायेन कदम्बमुकुलन्यायेन वा शब्दाच्छन्दान्तरोत्पत्तिक्रमेण श्रोत्र जातस्य शब्दस्य श्रोत्रसम्बन्धात्प्र- त्यक्षत्वसम्भवात् । समवेतसमवायमुदाहरति-शब्दत्येति । विशेषणविशे- ग्यभावमुदाहरति-अभावेति । तदुपपादयति-घटाभाववैदिति । भूतले घटो नास्तीत्यत्र घटाभावस्य विशेष्यत्वं द्रष्टव्यम् । एतेनानुपलब्धेः प्रमाणा- न्तरत्वं निरस्तम् । यद्यत्र घटोऽभवि यत्तर्हि भूतलमिवाद्रक्ष्यत् । दर्शना- ! भावान्नास्तीति तर्कितप्रतियोगिसत्त्वविरोध्वनुपलब्धिसहकृतेन्द्रियेणैनाभा- बज्ञानोपपत्ती अनुपलब्धेः प्राणान्त त्वासम्भवात् । अधिकरणज्ञानार्थम- पेक्षणीयेन्द्रियस्यैव करणत्वोपपत्तायः करणत्वस्यापकर्त्वात् । विशे । पणविशेष्यभावो विशेषणविशेष्यस्वरू नेव, नातिरिक्तः सम्बन्धः । प्रत्यक्षज्ञा-

।

1K here aids भूतलस्य विशेष्यत्वा- a. As to the correct reading of this passage, soo Hote los. :

9 has ‘बहुजं.

$ I omits इन्द्रियं and reade त्यक्षं प्रमाणं for प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणे. 4 0 G J L M N Y omit

RG,

and A C F L M P Q omit

शब्दस्य, but are retained as helping to make the sense clear. For भोवदेशे P rasda अन्यदेशे

which gives

somewhat Cifferent though equally good muoniug.

5 AF Q here add qué fièreÝ serunt ftsvert which is

ma warranted ard misleading 6 N here inserts नतु विशेषणषि- सष्यभावसन्निकर्षस्य लक्षणावाका- तत्वात्कर्श संवन्धत्वमिति चेन्न, but the passage appears to be interpolsted.

SECT. 43. ] तर्कदीपिकया न्यायबोधिन्या व सहितः

[[३३]]

AAY,

नमुपसंहरस्तस्य करणमाह - एवमिति । असाधारणकारणत्वादिन्द्रियं प्रत्यक्षज्ञानकरणमित्यर्थः । प्रत्यक्षमुपसंहरति–तस्मादिति ॥

न्या. बो. - चाक्षुषादिप्रत्यक्ष कारणीभूतान् षड़िधसन्निकर्षान्विभ- जते - संयोग इत्यादिना । द्रव्यवृत्तिलौकिकविषयतासम्बन्धेन चाक्षुष- त्वावच्छिन्नं प्रति चक्षुःसंयोगस्य कारणत्वम् । द्रव्यसमवेतवृत्तिलौकिक- विषयतासम्बन्धेन चाक्षुषत्वावच्छिन्नं प्रति चक्षुः संयुक्तसमवायस्य कारण- त्वम् । द्रव्यसमवेतसमवेतवृत्तिलौकिकविषयतासम्बन्धेन चाक्षुषत्वाव- च्छिन्नं प्रति चक्षुः संयुक्तसमवेतसमवायस्य कारणत्वम् । द्रव्यग्राहकाणी - न्द्रियाणि चक्षुस्त्वङ्मनांसि त्रीण्येव । अन्यानि घ्राणरसनश्रवणानि तु गुण- ग्राहकाणि । अतस्त्वगिन्द्रियस्थले द्रव्यवृत्तिलौकिकविषयतासम्बन्धेन त्वा- चत्वावच्छिन्नं प्रति त्वक्संयोगस्य कारणत्वम् । एवं द्रव्यसमवेतत्वाचत्वाव- च्छिन्नं प्रति त्वक्संयुक्तसमवायस्य कारणत्वम् । द्रव्यसमवेतसमवेतोष्णत्व- शीतत्वादिजातिस्पार्शनप्रत्यक्षे त्वक्संयुक्तसमवेतसमवायस्थ कारणत्वम् । एवमात्मरूपद्रव्यमानसप्रत्यक्षे मनःसंयोगस्य कारणत्वम् । आत्मसमवे- तसुखादिमानसप्रत्यक्षे मनः संयुक्तसमवायस्य कारणत्वम् । आत्मसमवेत- समवेतसुखत्वादिमानसप्रत्यक्षे मनः संयुक्तसमवेतसमवायस्य कारणत्वम् । रसनप्राणयोस्तु रसगन्धतद्वतजातिग्राहकत्वेन द्वितीयतृतीययोः सन्निकर्ष- योरेव रसगन्धादिप्रत्यक्षे हेतुता वाच्या । श्रवणेन्द्रियस्थाकाशरूपत्वेन शब्दस्याकाशगुणत्वेन श्रवणेन्द्रियेण च समं शब्दस्य समवायः सन्नि - कर्षः । शब्दसमवेतशब्दत्वादिजातिविषयकश्रावणप्रत्यक्षे समवेतसमवायस्य हेतुता ॥ अभावप्रत्यक्षे विशेषणविशेष्यभावो नाम विशेषणतासन्निकर्षः ॥ पञ्चसन्निकर्षेषु मध्ये संयोगस्थाने संयुक्तपदं घटयित्वा समवायस्थाने सम- वेतपदं घटयित्वा अभावस्थले निर्वाह्यम् । तथाहि द्रव्याधिकरणका -

IN adds प्रत्यक्षप्रमाकरणत्वादि-

स्पर्थः.

2 S T V omit this sentence. 3 The whole passage from qa-

fer to इति सङ्क्षेपः seems to be corrupt. The reading of W is adopted as being the most intelligible.

ક

तर्कसङ्ग्रहः

[ SECT. 43.

भावप्रत्यक्षे संयुक्तविशेषणता । द्रव्यसमवेताधिकरणकाभावप्रत्यक्षे संयुक्त- समवेतविशेषणता च । द्रव्यसमवेतसमवेताधिकरणकाभावप्रत्यक्षे संयुक्त- समवेतसमवेतविशेषणता च सन्निकर्षः । तत्र घण्टे घटत्वाभावः संयुक्त- विशेषणतया गृह्यते । घटसमवेतघटत्वादौ पृथिवीत्वाभावः संयुक्तसमवेत- विशेषणतया गृह्यते । घटसमवेतसमवेतरूपत्वादौ नीलत्वाभावश्र्व संयुक्तसमवेतसमवेतविशेषणतया गृह्यत इति सङ्क्षेपः ॥ इति प्रत्यक्षपरि- च्छेदः समाप्तः ॥

[ ४४ ]

[[1]]

अनुमितिकरणमनुमानम् । परामर्शजन्यं ज्ञानमनुमितिः । व्याप्तिविशिष्टपक्षधर्मताज्ञानं परामर्शः । यथा वह्निव्याप्य धूमवा- नयं पर्वत इति ज्ञानं परामर्शः । तज्जन्यं पर्वतो वह्निमानिति ज्ञान- मनुमितिः । यत्र यत्र धूमस्तत्राग्निरिति साहचर्यनियमो व्याप्तिः । व्याप्यस्य पर्वतादिवृत्तित्वं पक्षधर्मता ॥

त. दी. अनुमानं लक्षयति - अनुमितिकरणमिति । अनुमि- तेर्लक्षणमाह - परामर्शेति । ननु संशयोत्तरप्रत्यक्षेऽतिव्याप्तिः, स्थाणुपु- रुषसंशयानन्तरं, पुरुषत्वव्याप्यकर। दिमानयमिति परामर्शे सति, पुरुष ए- बेति प्रत्यक्षजननात् । न च तत्रानुमितिरेवेति वाच्यम् । “पुरुषं साक्षात्क- रोमि" इत्यनुव्यवसायविरोधादिति चेन्न । पक्षतासहकृतपरामर्शजन्यत्वस्थ विवक्षितत्वात् । सिषाधयिषाविरह सहकृतसिद्ध्यभावः पक्षता । साध्यसि - द्धिरनुमितिप्रतिबन्धिका । सिद्धिसत्वेऽप्यनुमिनुयामितीच्छायामनुमितिद- र्शनात् सिषाधयिषोत्तेजिका । ततश्वोत्तेजकाभावविशिष्टमण्यभावस्य दा- हकारणत्ववत् सिषाधयिषाविरहसहकृतसिद्ध्यभावस्याप्यनुमितिकारण- त्वम् ॥ परामर्श लक्षयति-व्याप्तीति । व्याप्तिविषयकं यत्पक्षधर्मताज्ञानं

1 E and X omit ज्ञानं परामर्शः

and perhaps for the better; G

omite अयम्-

SECT. 44. ] तर्कदीपिकया न्यायबोधिन्या च सहितः

[[३५]]

स परामर्श इत्यर्थः । परामर्शमभिनीय दर्शयति-यथेति । अनुमितिम- मिनयति तज्जन्यमिति । परामर्शजन्यमित्यर्थः ॥ व्याप्तेर्लक्षणमाह-यत्रे- ति । यत्र धूमस्तत्राग्निरिति व्याप्तेरभिनयः । साहचर्यनियम इति लक्षणम् । साहचर्यं सामानाधिकरण्यं, तस्य नियमः । हेतुसमानाधिकर णात्यन्ता-

दर्भ अन्ति

भावाप्रतियोगिसाध्य सामानाधिकरण्यं व्याप्तिरित्यर्थः । पक्षधर्मतास्वरूप- माह-व्याप्यस्येति ॥ हेतुः धूमः

न्या. बो. – अनुमानं लक्षयति - अनुमितिकरणमिति । अनु- मितौ व्याप्तिज्ञानं करणं, परामर्शो व्यापारोऽनुमितिः फलं कार्यमित्यर्थः । परामर्शस्य व्याप्तिज्ञानजन्यत्वे सति व्याप्तिज्ञानजन्यानुमितिजनकत्वाञ्च तज्जन्यत्वे सति तज्जन्यजनकत्वरूपव्यापारलक्षणमुपपन्नम् । अनुमिति- करणत्वमनुमानस्य लक्षणम् । अनुमानं च व्याप्तिज्ञानम् । एतस्य परा- मर्शरूपव्यापारद्वाराऽनुमितिं प्रत्यसाधारणकारणतयाऽनुमितिकरणत्वमु- पपन्नम् । परामर्शजन्यमिति । परामर्शजन्यत्वविशिष्टज्ञानत्वमनुमि- तेर्लक्षणम् । तत्र ज्ञानत्वमात्रोपादाने प्रत्यक्षादावतिव्याप्तिरतस्तद्वारणाय परामर्शजन्यत्वे सतीति विशेषणोपादानम् । विशेषणमात्रोक्तौ परामर्श- ध्वंसेतिव्याप्तिरतस्तद्वारणाय ज्ञानत्वोपादानम् । अनुमितिलक्षणघटकी- भूतपरामर्शलक्षणमार्चष्टे - व्याप्तिविशिष्टेति । व्याप्तिविशिष्टं च तत्पक्ष - धर्मताज्ञानं चेति कर्मधारयः । अत्र विशिष्टपदस्य प्रकारता परत्वात् पक्षधर्म- ताया ज्ञानमित्यत्र षष्ट्या विषयत्वबोधनात् पक्षधर्मतापदस्य पक्षसम्बन्धा- र्थकत्वात्कर्मधारयसमासे समस्यमानपदार्थयोरभेदसंसर्गलामेन च व्या- प्तिप्रकारकाभिन्नं यत्पक्षसम्बन्धविषयकं ज्ञानं तत्परामर्श इति लभ्यते 1

1 N here adds व्याप्यो नाम व्या- प्त्याश्रयः स च श्रमादिरेव तस्य पर्व- तादिनिरूपितवृत्तित्वं पक्षधर्मतेत्य- र्थः, but the wording of the sentence as well as its absence in any other copy prove its

[[1]]

spuriousness.

50KRY omit the sentence अनुमिति- माचष्टे, and give the full detinition of परामर्श in- stead of the following प्रतीक.

[[३६]]

तर्कसङ्ग्रहः

[ SECT. 44.

एवं सति धूमो वह्निव्याप्य आलोकवान्पर्वत इति समूहालम्बनेऽप्युक्तप- रामलक्षणमस्तीत्यतिव्याप्तिः, तद्वारणाय पक्षनिष्ठविशेष्यतानिरूपितहे- तुनिष्ठप्रकारतानिरूपितव्याप्तिनिष्ठप्रकारताशालिज्ञानं परामर्श इति निष्कर्षः । एतादृशपरामर्शजन्यत्वे सति ज्ञानत्वमनुमितेर्लक्षणम् । अनुमिति परामर्शयोर्विशिष्य कार्यकारणभावश्चेत्थम् । वह्नित्वावच्छिन्न- संयोगसम्बन्धावच्छिन्नविधेयतानिरूपित - पर्वतत्वावच्छिन्नोद्देश्यताशाल्य- नुमितित्वावच्छिन्नं प्रति वह्नित्वावच्छिन्नप्रकारतानिरूपित - व्याप्तित्वाव- च्छिन्नप्रकारतानिरूपित-धूमत्वावच्छिन्नप्रकारतानिरूपित - पर्वतत्वावच्छि- न्नविशेष्यतानिरूपित - विशेष्यिताशालिनिर्णयः कारणम् । वह्नित्वावच्छि- न्नप्रकारतानिरूपित-व्याप्तित्वावच्छिन्नविशेष्यताया धूमत्वावच्छिन्नविशेष्य- तानिरूपित–याप्तित्वावच्छिन्नप्रकारतायाश्च अभेदानङ्गीकर्तृमते वह्नित्वा- वच्छिन्नप्रकारतानिरूपित - विशेष्यत्वावच्छिन्नव्याप्तित्वावच्छिन्नप्रकारता- निरूपित - विशेष्यत्वावच्छिन्नधूमत्वावच्छिन्न प्रकारतानिरूपित - पर्वतत्वा- वच्छिन्नविशेष्यतानिरूपितविशेष्यिताशालिनिर्णयः कारणमिति वाच्यम् । सच निर्णयो वह्निव्याप्यधूमवान् पर्वत इत्याकारको बोध्यः ॥

यत्रेति । यत्रपदवीप्सावशात् धूमाधिकरणे यावति वह्निमत्त्वलाभात् यावत्पदमहिम्ना वह्नेर्धूमव्यापकत्वं लब्धम् । तदेव स्पष्टयति - साहचर्य - यम इति । नियतसाहचर्यं व्याप्तिरित्यर्थः । नियतत्वं व्यापकत्वं । साहचर्य सामानाधिकरण्यम् । तथा च धूमव्यापकवह्निसामानाधिकरण्यं व्याप्तिरि- त्यर्थः । वह्नेर्धूमव्यापकत्वं च धूमसमानाधिकरणात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगितानव- च्छेदकधर्मवत्त्वम् । तथाहि धूमाधिकरणे चत्वरमहानसादौ वर्तमानोऽभावो घटत्वाद्यवच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकाभावः, न तु बह्नित्वावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिता- काभावः । कुतः । चत्वरमहानसादौ वह्नेः सत्त्वात् । एवं सति धूमाधिक- रणे पर्वतचत्वरादौ वर्तमानस्य घटाद्यभावस्य प्रतियोगितावच्छेदकं

1 The passage, which follows,

seems to have been much tam- pered with. O KR V gene- rally agree among themselves, though they materially differ

from the above.

2 The passage is taken from S

and W, but is not found in other copies,

SBOT. 45. ] तर्कदीपिकया न्यायबोधिन्या व सहितः

[[३७]]

घटत्वादिकमनवच्छेदकं वह्नित्वं वह्नौ वर्ततेऽतो धूमव्यापकत्वं वह्नौ व॑र्तते । इयमन्वयव्याप्तिः सिद्धान्तानुसारेण । पूर्वपक्षव्याप्तिस्तु प्रतियो - गिव्यधिकरण- साध्याभाववदवृत्तित्वम् । साध्यतावच्छेदकसम्बन्धावच्छि- न - साध्यतावच्छेदकावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताक - प्रतियोगितावच्छेदकसम्ब-

न्धावच्छिन्न-प्रतियोगितावच्छेदकावच्छिन्नवैय्यधिकरण्यावच्छिन्नाभावव- निरूपितहेतुतावच्छेदकसम्बन्धावच्छिन्न-वृत्तित्वावच्छिन्न- प्रतियोगिता- काभावो व्याप्तिरित्यर्थः । तच केवलान्वयिन्यव्याप्तमिति सिद्धान्ता- नुसरणम् ॥

[ ४५ ]

अनुमानं द्विविधं स्वार्थ परार्थं च । तत्र स्वार्थ स्वानुमितिहेतुः । तथा हि स्वयमेव भूयो दर्शनेन यत्र धूमस्तत्राग्निरिति महानसादौ व्याप्तिं गृहीत्वा पर्वतसमीपं गतस्तद्गते चाम्रौ सन्दिहानंः पर्वते धूमं पश्यन्व्याप्तिं स्मरति यत्र धूमस्तत्राग्निरिति । तदनन्तरं वह्निव्या- प्यधूमवानयं पर्वत इति ज्ञानमुत्पद्यते । अयमेव लिङ्गपरामर्श इ- त्युच्यते । तस्मात्पर्वतो वह्निमानिति ज्ञानमनुमितिरुत्पद्यते । तदे- तत्स्वार्थानुमानम् ।

यत्तु स्वयं धूमादग्निमनुमाय परप्रतिपत्त्यर्थे पञ्चावयववाक्यं प्रयुङ्क्ते तत्परार्थानुमानम् । यथा तो वह्निमान्धूमवत्त्वात् । यो यो धूमवान्स वह्निमान् यथा मानसः । तथा चायम् । तस्मात्तथेति । अनेन प्रतिपादिताल्लिङ्गात्परोप्यनिं प्रतिपद्यते ॥

1 S W here adds तथाच धूमव्या- पकवह्निसामानाधिकरण्यं व्याप्ति- रिति फलितम्.

2 D adds परार्थ परप्रतिपत्तिहेतुः 3 ABCDF H have rear for गतः probably substituted to svoid repetition of गतः. For तद्वते H has तत आर्द्रेन्धने, further emendation not war-

rinted by the context. 4 ft reads अनुमितिरूपम् for अनु-

मितिः; X omits it.

5 ABCD read परं प्रति बोधयितुं

which makes the construction awkward ; I reads प्रतीति for प्रतिपत्ति, and C प्रयुज्यते for प्र- युद्धे G has पञ्चावयवोपेत for प- Parara..

म

तर्कसङ्ग्रहः

[ SECT. 45.

त. दी. - अनुमानं विभजते - अनुमानमिति । स्वार्थान्नुमितिं दर्शयति– स्वयमेवेति । भूयोदर्शनेनेति । धूमाग्न्योन्यतिग्रहे सा- ध्यसाधनयोर्भूयैः सहचारदर्शनेनेत्यर्थः । ननु पार्थिवत्व लोह लेख्यत्वादौ शतशः सहचारदर्शनेऽपि वज्रादौ व्यभिचारोपलब्धेर्भूयादर्शनेन कथं व्याप्तिग्रह इति चेन्न व्यभिचारज्ञानविरहसहकृतसहचारज्ञानस्य व्याप्ति- ग्राहकत्वात् । व्यभिचारज्ञानं द्विविधम्, निश्वयः शङ्का च । तद्विरहः क्वचित्तर्कात्क्वचित्स्वतःसिद्ध एव । धूमाग्निव्याप्तिग्रहे कार्यकारणभावम- प्रसङ्गलक्षणस्तर्को व्यभिचारशङ्कानिवर्तकः ॥ ननु सकलवह्निधूमयोर- सन्निकर्षात्कथं व्याप्तिग्रह इति चेन्न । धूमत्ववह्नित्वरूप सामान्यलक्षणप्रत्या- सत्त्या सकलधूमवह्निज्ञानसम्भवात् ॥ तस्मादिति । लिङ्गपरामर्शादित्यर्थः । परार्थानुमानमाह-यत्त्विति ॥ यच्छन्दस्य तत्परार्थानुमानमिति तच्छब्देनान्वयः ॥ पञ्चावयववाक्यमुदाहरति यथेति ॥

न्या. बो. - अनुमानं विभजते- स्वार्थमिति । स्वार्था- नुमानं नाम न्यायप्रयोज्यानुमानम् । तत्प्रयोज्यानुमानं परार्थानुमानम् ॥ न्यायत्वं च प्रतिज्ञाद्ययवपञ्चकसमुदायत्वम् । अवयवत्वं च प्रतिज्ञा-

द्यन्यतमत्वम् ॥

[ ४६ ] प्रतिज्ञाहेतूदाहरणोपनयनिनानि पञ्चावयवाः । पर्वतो व- ह्निमानिति प्रतिज्ञा । धूमवत्त्वादिति हेतुः । यो यो धूमवान्स सो- ऽग्निमन्यथा महानस इत्युदाहरणम् । तथा चायमित्युपनयः । तस्मात्तथेति निगमनम् ॥

1 JY omit this sentence. A adds स्वार्थानुमानं विविच्य दर्श- यति - तथाहीति which is super- #nous. Fand Q here add तद्द्वै- विध्यं दर्शयति-स्वार्थमिति । तत्रे- ति । उभयोर्मध्य इत्यर्थः ।

2 The passage is taken from N.

A omits the whole of it, while other copies retain भूयोदर्शने- नति, omitting the latter part, which, however, appears to be

necessary to complete the ex- planation.

3 MN omit वज्रादो व्यभिचारो-

पलब्धेः, while J Y Zomit वज्रादौ only; I reads वज्रमणौ, P हीरके, and Q मण्यादी.

4 The reading is that of D H K;

J gives the same minus one सः and with महानसं CE omit

यथा महानसः, while A B F re- tain only the first three words,

Sacr. 47. ] तर्कदीपिकया न्यायबोधिन्या च सहितः

।

[[३१]]

त. दी. - अवयवस्वरूपमाह-प्रतिज्ञेति । उदाहृतवाक्ये प्रतिज्ञा- दिविभागमाहे - पर्वतो वह्निमानिति । साध्यवत्तया पक्षवचनं प्रतिज्ञा ॥’ पञ्चम्यन्तं लिङ्गप्रतिपादकं वचनं हेतुः । व्याप्तिप्रतिपादकमुदाहरणम् । पक्षधर्मताज्ञानार्थमुपनयः । अबाधितत्वादिकं निगमनप्रयोजनम् ॥

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स्वार्थानुमितिपरार्थानुमित्योर्लिङ्गपरामर्श एव करणं । त-

स्मालिङ्गपरामर्शो ऽनुमानम् ॥

त. दी. अनुमितिकरणमाह — स्वार्थेति ॥ ननु व्याप्तिस्मृतिपक्ष-

1 A GL PY Z have विशेष for

विभाग-

2 The passage from पञ्चम्यन्तं to the end appears to have been tampered with. All copies except G N and Z agree in reading it as above. N and Z give a materially different version:–पञ्चम्यन्तं तृतीयान्तं वा लिप्रतिपादकं वचनं हेतुः । व्याप्ति- प्रतिपादकं दृष्टान्तवचनमुदाहरणम्।

व्याप्तिविशिष्टलिङ्गप्रतिपादकं वच- नमुपनयः । हेतुसाध्यवत्तया पक्षप्र- तिपादकं वचनं निगमनच पिक्षज्ञानं प्रतिज्ञाप्रयोजनम्। लिङ्गज्ञानं हेतु- प्रयोजनम् । व्याप्तिज्ञानमुदाहरण- प्रयोजनम् । पक्षधर्मताज्ञानमुपनय- प्रयोजनम् । अबाधितत्वादिकं निग- मनप्रयोजनम् । Gand Q agree with this from व्याप्तिविशिष्ट to the end. The repetitions and fuller explanation in this passage show that it is an interpolation. Nil. dres not seem to be aware of it, espe- cially its latter half begin-

ning with पक्षज्ञानं प्रतिज्ञाप्रयो- जनम् Having explained the definitions as read by N, Nil. notices the reading adopted in our text as th v. 1 and remarks पक्षधर्मताज्ञानार्थमुपनय इति पाठे तु ’ प्रयुज्यते ’ इति शेष- पूरणेन प्रदर्शितार्थ एव यथाकथं- fad सङ्गमनीयः । This shows that even Nil. found the text corrupt, and was not satisfied with the reading usually met with. It is possible that some later writer corrected the loose detinitions of उपनय and निगमन given by Annambhatta and the latter being retained three more प्रयोजनघटित sen- tences were added to complete the list.

3 Curiously enough all copies except G K X read which is clearly a mistake. In J the vertical bar appears to have been erased afterwards,

तर्कसङ्ग्रहः

[ SECT. 47.

धर्मताज्ञानाभ्यामेवानुमितिसम्भवे व्याप्तिविशिष्टलिङ्गपरामर्शः किमर्थमङ्गी- कर्तव्य इति चेन्नावह्निव्याप्यधूमवानयमिति शाब्दपरामर्शस्थले विशिष्टपरा- मर्शस्यावश्यकतया लाघवेन सर्वत्र परामर्शस्यैव करणत्वात् । लिङ्गं न कर- णम् । अतीतादौ व्यभिचारात् । व्यापारवत्कारणं करणमिति मते परामर्श- द्वारा व्याप्तिज्ञानं करणम् । उज्जन्यत्वे सति तज्जन्यजनको व्यापारः ॥ अनुमानमुपसंहरति — तस्मादिति ॥

।

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लिङ्ग त्रिविधम् । अन्वयव्यतिरेक केवलान्वयि केवलव्य - तिरेकि चेति । अन्वयेन व्यतिरेकेण च व्याप्तिमदन्वयव्यतिरेकि । यथा वह्नौ साध्ये धूमवत्त्वरः । यत्र धूमस्तत्राग्निर्यथा महानस इ त्यन्वयव्याप्तिः । यत्र वह्निास्ति तत्र धूमोऽपि नास्ति यथ म- हाह्रद इति व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिः । अन्वयमात्रव्याप्तिकं केवलान्वयि यथा घटोsभिधेयः प्रमेयत्वात्पटवत् । अत्र प्रमेयत्वाभिधेयत्वयो- व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिर्नास्ति सर्वस्यापि प्रमेयत्वादभिधेयत्वाच्च । व्यतिरेक- मात्रव्याप्तिकं केवलव्यतिरेकि यथा पृथिवीतरेभ्यो भिद्यते गन्ध- वत्त्वात् । यदितरेभ्यो न भिद्यते न तद्गन्धवत् यथा जलम्, न चेयं तथा, तस्मान्न तथेति । यगन्धवत्तर्दितरभिन्नमित्यन्व- यदृष्टान्तो नास्ति पृथिवीमात्रस्य पक्षत्वात् ॥

त. दी. - लिङ्गं विभजते - लिङ्गमिति ॥ अन्वयव्यतिरेकि लक्ष- यति - अन्वयेनेति । हेतुसाध्ययोर्व्याप्तिरन्वयव्याप्तिः । तदभावयोर्व्याप्ति- व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिः ॥ केवलान्वयिनो लक्षणमाह अन्वयेति । केवलान्व-

1 A F and Q omit the words व्यामिलिङ and विशिष्ट before परामर्श.

2 After व्याप्तिज्ञानं A and i add पक्षज्ञानं साम्यज्ञानं लिङ्गज्ञानं य- त्किञ्चिजन्यज्ञानमात्रं वा परामर्श-

व्यापारकम्.

3 For व्याप्तिमद O reads यत्र

व्याप्तिस्तत्.

4 here adds यत्सत्वे तत्सत्त्वमन्य- यः । यदभावे तदभावो व्यतिरेकः, but the words are found no- where else.

5 CG H read रेभ्यः F has इसर-SECT. 48. ] तर्कदीपिकमा न्यायबोधिन्या व सहितः

[[1]]

ર

यिसाध्यकं केवलान्वयि । अत्यन्ताभावाप्रतियोगित्वं केवलान्वयित्वम् । केवलान्वयिनमुदाहरति यथा घटोभिधेयः प्रमेयत्वादिति । ईश्वरप्रमावि- tयत्वं सर्वपदाभिधेयत्वं च सर्वत्रास्तीति व्यतिरेकाभावः ॥ केवल- व्यतिरेकिणो लक्षणमाह — व्यतिरेकेति । केवलव्यतिरेकिणमुदाहरति - पृथिवीति । नन्वितरभेदः प्रसिद्धो वा न वा । आये यत्र प्रसिद्धस्तत्र हेतुसत्त्वेऽन्वयित्वम् असत्त्वेऽसाधारण्यम् । द्वितीये साध्यज्ञानाभावात्कथं तद्विशिष्टानुमितिः। विशेषणज्ञानाभावे विशिष्टज्ञानानुदयात् । प्रतियोगि- ज्ञानाभावाद्व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिज्ञानमपि न स्यादिति चेन्न । जलादित्रयोदशा- न्योन्याभावानां त्रयोदशसु प्रत्येकं प्रसिद्धानां मेलनं पृथिव्यां साध्यते । तत्र त्रयोदशत्वावच्छिन्नभेदस्यैकाधिकरणवृत्तित्वाभावान्नान्वयित्वासाधा- रण्ये । प्रत्येकाधिकरणे प्रसिद्ध्या साध्यविशिष्टानुमितिर्व्यतिरेकव्याप्ति- निरूपणं चेति ॥

न्या. बो. - अन्वयेनेति । साध्यसामानाधिकरण्यरूपान्वयव्याप्ति -

। मानित्यर्थः । व्यतिरेकेणेति । व्यतिरेको नामाभावः । तथा च साध्या- भावहत्वभावयोर्व्याप्तिर्व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिः । इयं च व्याप्तिः यत्र यत्र वह्नयभावस्तत्र तत्र धूमाभाव इति । यत्रपदवीप्सया वह्नचभाववति यावति धूमाभावग्रहणे यावत्पदस्य व्यापकत्वपरतया धूमाभावे वह्नय-

1 A JY Z omit this sentence. G replaces this and the next sen- tence by a single one व्यतिरेकि दर्शयति–व्यतिरेकमात्रेति.

SM inserts अभावज्ञानाभावेन

after प्रतियोगिज्ञानाभावाद

3 The concluding passage of TD beginning with is un- doubtedly corrupt, and is absolutely unintelligible as it is read in most of the printed editions and Mss. Only N and J seem to give an appro-

मे

ximately correct and intel- ligible reading. I have sub- stituted भेद for साध्य and changed प्रत्येकाधिकरण into ° करणे, on the single anthority of N, because the emendations make the meaning clearer. J F and Q alone make नान्वाये- ‘वासाधारण्ये part of the pre- vious sentence as it certainly ought to be. F and Qinsert साध्याभावव्यापकीभूताभावप्रति- योगित्वमिति before व्यारेक Bee Note for ot

[[४२]]

तर्कसङ्ग्रहः

[ SECT. 48.

भावव्यापकत्वं लब्धम् । एवं च वह्नयभावनिष्ठा व्याप्तिः स्वाश्रयीभूतव- ह्रयभावव्यापकीभूताभावप्रतियोगित्व सम्बन्धेन धूमनिष्ठतया गृह्यत इति व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिमत्त्वेन व्यतिरेकित्वेन धूमव्यापकवह्निसामानाधिकरण्य- रूपान्वयव्याप्तिमत्त्वेनान्वयित्वेन च गीयते । व्यतिरेकपरामर्शस्तु वह्नय- भावव्यापकीभूताभावप्रतियोगिधूमवान् पर्वत इत्याकारकः ॥

केवलान्वयिनो लक्षणमाह— अन्ययेति । व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिशून्यत्वे सत्यन्वयव्याप्तिमत्त्वं केवलान्वयित्वम् । साध्ये केवलान्वयित्वमभावाप्रति- योगित्वम् । तथा चाभावाप्रतियोगिसाध्यकत्वं केवलान्वयिहेतोर्लक्षणम्’ । एतल्लक्षणं हेतोर्व्यतिरेकित्वेऽपि सङ्गच्छते । साध्यस्य केवलान्वयित्वाद्व्य- तिरेकव्याप्तेरभावादन्वयमात्रव्याप्तिकं केवलान्वयीति मूलोत्तलक्षणमुप- पन्नम् । अत्यन्ताभावाप्रतियोगित्वं केवलान्वयित्वम् । न चैवमाकाशा- भावे संयोगाभावे चाव्याप्तिरिति वाच्यम् । स्वविरोधिवृत्तिमदत्यन्ता भावाप्रतियोगित्वस्यैव तदर्थत्वात् । एकजातीय सम्बन्धेन सर्वत्र विद्यमा नत्वं केवलान्वयित्वमिति नव्याः ॥ केवलव्यतिरेकिणो लक्षणमाह- व्यतिरेकेति ॥ अन्वयव्याप्तिशून्यत्वे सति व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिमत्त्वं केवल- व्यतिरेकित्वम् । यथेति । अत्र पृथिवीत्वावच्छिन्नं पक्षः । पृथिवीतर- जलादिभेदः साध्यः । गन्धवत्त्वं हेतुः । अत्र यगन्धवत्तदितरभेदवादित्य- न्वयष्दृष्टान्ताभावात् गन्धव्यापकेतरभेदसामानाधिकरण्यरूपान्वयव्याप्ति- ग्रहासम्भवात्, नास्त्यन्वयव्याप्तिः ॥ किन्तु यत्र यत्र पृथिवीतरभेदाभावस्तत्र तत्र गन्धाभावो यथा जलादिकमिति । व्यतिरेकदृष्टान्तभूतजलादावितरभे- दाभावरूपसाध्याभावव्यापकता गन्धाभावे दृश्यते । इममेवार्थं मनसि निधाय यदितरेभ्यो न भिद्यते न तद्न्धवद्यथा जलमिति ग्रन्थेन मूलकारो व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिमेव प्रदर्शितवान् । एवं व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिग्रहानन्तरम्, इतरभेदा- भावव्यापकीभूताभावप्रतियोगिगन्धवती पृथिवी इत्याकारकव्यतिरेकपराम-

1 S and W read the passage a

little differently.

2 Instead of this sentence S and W have अथवा केषान्वपिसा-

ध्यकत्वं तव ।

3 W reads तथाच तयोः एकजातीय- सम्बन्धन सर्वत्र विद्यमानत्वाळा- व्यूतिः ।

[[४३]]

SECT. 50.] तर्कदीपिकया न्यायबोधिन्या व सहितः

शत् पृथिवीत्वावच्छिन्नोद्देश्यतानिरूपितेतर्भेदत्वावच्छिन्नविधेयताका पृथिवी इतरभेदवती इत्याकार कानुमितिर्जायत इति तत्त्वम् । यथा जल- मिति। जलमितर भेदाभावव्यापकगन्याभाववदिति । न चेयं तथेति । इतर- भेदाभावव्यापकीभूतगन्धाभाववती न, किन्तु तदभावाभाववत्त्वाद्गन्धवती- त्यर्थः । तस्मान्न तथेति । तच्छब्देन गन्धाभावाभावरूपस्य गन्धस्य परा- मर्शेन तस्मादिति पञ्चम्यन्ताद्गन्धवत्त्वादित्यर्थोपलब्धेस्तथेतर भेदाभावव- तीत्यस्यायं भावः । तथा चेतरभेदाभावाभाववतीतरभेदवतीत्यर्थः ॥

[ ४९ ]

सन्दिग्धसाध्यवान्पक्षः । यथा धूमवत्त्वे हेतौ पर्वतः ॥

त. दी. पक्षलक्षणमाह-सन्दिग्धेति । ननु श्रवणानन्तरभावि- मननस्थलेऽव्याप्तिः । तत्र वेदवाक्यैरात्मनो निश्चितत्वेन सन्देहाभावात्किं च प्रत्यक्षेऽपि वह्नौ यत्रेच्छयानुमितिस्तत्राप्यव्यातिरिति चेन्न । उक्तपक्ष- ताश्रयत्वस्य पक्षलक्षणत्वात् ॥

न्या. बो. — पक्षलक्षणमाह-सन्दिग्धसाध्येति । साध्यप्रकारक- सन्देहविशेष्यत्व पक्षत्वम् । सन्देहश्व पर्वतो वह्निमान्न वा इत्याकारकः । अनु- मितेः पर्व साध्यसन्देहो नियमेन पक्षे जायत इत्यभिप्रायेणेदं लक्षणं प्राची- नैः कृतम् । गगनविशेष्य मेघप्रकारक सन्देहाभावदशायामपि गृहमध्यस्थ- पुरुषस्य घनगर्जितश्रवणेन गगनं मेघवदित्याकारकानुमितिर्जायते । गग- नत्वावच्छिन्नोद्देश्यतानिरूपितमेघवत्त्वावच्छिन्नविधेयताकानुमितिदर्शना- त्माचीनमतं विहाय नवीनैरनुमित्युद्देश्यत्वं पक्षत्वमिति स्थिरीकृतम् ॥

[५० ]

निश्चितसाध्यवान्सपक्षः । यथा तत्रैव महानसः ॥

त. दी. सपक्षलक्षणमाह-निश्चितेति ॥

1 The following pissage secm

to be corrupt. The reading of O, K is adopted. 8 U and W

give a materially different reading.

[ SECT. 50.

न्या. बी. - सपक्षलक्षणमाह-निश्चित साध्येति । साध्यप्रकारक- निश्वयविशेष्यत्वं सपक्षेत्वम् । निश्चयश्च महानसो वह्निमानित्याकारकः ॥

[ ५९ ]

निश्चितसाध्याभाववान्विपक्षः । यथा तत्रैव महाहृदः ॥ त. दी. - विपक्षलक्षणमाह– निश्वितेति ॥

न्या. बी. - विपक्षलक्षणमाह-निश्चितेति । साध्याभावप्रकारक - निश्वयविशेष्यत्वं विपक्षत्वम् । निश्चयश्व हदो वह्नचभाववानित्याकारकः॥

[ ५२ ]

सव्यभिचारविरुद्धसत्प्रतिपक्षासिद्धवाधिताः पञ्च हेत्वाभासाः ॥

त. दी. एवं सद्धेतुं निरूप्यासद्धेतुं निरूपयितुं विभजते– सव्य- भिचारेति । अनुमितिप्रतिबन्धकयथार्थज्ञानविषयत्वं हेत्वाभासत्वम् । न्या. बो. - एवं सद्धेतन्निरूप्य हेत्वाभासान्निरूपयति सव्यभि- चारेति । हेतुवदाभासन्त इति हेत्वाभासाः दुष्टहेतव इत्यर्थः । दोषाश्व व्यभिचारविरोधप्रतिपक्षासिद्धिबाधाः । तद्विशिष्टा दुष्टहेतव इत्यर्थः । हेतौ दोषज्ञाने सत्यनुमितिप्रतिबन्धो जायते व्याप्तिज्ञानाप्रतिबन्धो वा जायते । अतो वादिनिग्रहार्थं वादिनोद्भावितहेतौ दोषोद्भावनार्थं दुष्टहेतु- निरूपणमिति भावः ॥

[[1]]

[ ५३ ]

सव्यभिचारोऽनैकान्तिकः । स त्रिविधः । साधारणासाधा- रणानुपसंहारिभेदात् । तत्र साध्याभाववद्वृत्तिः साधारणोऽनैका- न्तिकः । यथा पर्वतो वह्निमान्प्रमेयत्वादिति प्रमेयत्वस्य वह्नयभाव- वृति दे विद्यमानत्वात् । सर्वसपक्षविपक्षव्यावृत्तोऽसाधारणः ।

10 F K Q and V omit the

sentence.

2 G J omit विपक्ष ; 2 inserts

पक्षमात्रवृतिः before असाधारण.

sEcT. 54. ] तर्कदीपिकथा न्यायबोधिन्या व सहितः

વ્ય

यथा शब्दो नित्यः शब्दत्वादिति । शब्दत्वं सर्वेभ्यो नित्ये- भ्योऽनित्येभ्यश्च व्यावृत्तं शब्दमात्रवृत्ति । अन्वयव्यतिरेकदृष्टान्तर- हितोऽनुपसंहारी । यथा सर्वमनित्यं प्रमेयत्वादिति । अत्र सर्व- स्यापि पक्षत्वादृष्टान्तो नास्ति ॥

त. दी. - सव्यभिचारं विभजते-स विविध इति । असाधारणं लक्षयति–तत्रेति । उदाहरति—यथेति । असाधारणं लक्षयति-स- वैति । अनुपसंहारिणो लक्षणमाह–अन्वयेति ॥

न्या. बो. सव्यभिचारं विभज्य दर्शयति- साधारणेति । सा- धारणाद्यन्यतमत्वं सव्यभिचारसामान्यलक्षणम् । साधारणत्वं साध्याभाव- वद्वृत्तित्वम्म् । पर्वतो वह्निवान्प्रमेयत्वादित्यत्र प्रमेयत्वहेतौ वह्न्यभाववद्वृत्ति- त्वरूपव्यभिचारे ज्ञाते वह्न्यभाववदवृत्तित्वरूपव्याप्तिग्रहप्रतिबन्धः फलम् । असाधारण इति । सर्वसपक्षविपक्षव्यावृत्तत्वम् साध्यवद्वृत्तित्वावच्छिन- प्रतियोगिताकाभावः ।

हतौ साध्यासामानाधिकरण्ये निश्चिते साध्यसामाना- धिकरण्यरूपव्याप्तिज्ञानप्रतिबन्धः फलम् ॥ अनुपसंहारिणं लक्षयति— अन्वयेति । उभयदृष्टान्ताभावादन्वयव्याप्तिज्ञानव्यतिरेकव्याप्तिज्ञानोभय- सामग्री नास्तीत्यर्थः । सर्वस्यैव पक्षत्वात् पक्षातिरिक्ताप्रसिद्धे- रितिभावः ॥

[ ५४ ]

साध्याभावव्याप्तो हेतुर्विरुद्धः । यथा शब्दो नित्यः कृतक- त्वादिति । कृतकत्वं हि नित्यत्वाभावेनानित्यत्वेन व्याप्तम् ॥

त. दी. विरुद्धं लक्षयति साध्येति ॥

1 G J omit अनित्येभ्यश्र्व.

2 The passage from सव्यभिचारं विभज्य to वृत्तित्वम् is not

found in O K RV,

3 The sentence is omitted in O KR and V; ū has निश्चित-

तर्कसङ्ग्रहः

[ SECT. 654.

न्या. बो. विरुद्धं लक्षयति-साध्याभावव्यात इति । सा- ध्याभावव्याप्तिः साध्याभावनिरूपितव्यतिरेकव्याप्तिः साध्यव्यापकी- भूताभावप्रतियोगित्वम् । तथा च पक्षविशेष्यकसाध्याभावव्याप्यहेतु- प्रकारकज्ञानात्पक्षविशेष्यकसाध्यपकारकानुमितिप्रतिबन्धः फलम् ॥

[44]

यस्य साध्याभावसाधकं हेत्वन्तरं विद्यते स सत्प्रतिपक्षः । यथा शब्दो नित्यः श्राव गत्वा च्छन्दत्ववदिति । शब्दोऽनित्यः कार्यत्वावदिति ॥

त. दी. – सत्प्रतिपक्षं लक्षयति-यस्येति ॥

न्या बो. ― एवं सत्प्रतिपक्षेऽपि । विरुद्धसत्प्रतिपक्षयोर्विशेषस्तु विरुद्धे हेतोरेकत्वेन सत्प्रतिपक्षे हेतोर्द्वित्वेन च ज्ञातव्यः । सत्प्रतिपक्षं लक्ष- यति - यस्येति । साध्याभावसाधको हेतुः साध्यसाधकत्वेनोपन्यस्त इत्यसामर्थ्य सूचनमपि भवति ॥

[ ५६ ]

असिद्धस्त्रिविधः । आश्रयासिद्धः स्वरूपासिद्धो व्यापत्वासि- वेति । आश्रयासिद्धो यथा गगनारविन्दं सुरभ्यरविन्दत्वात्स- रोजारविन्दवत् । अत्र गगनारविन्दमाश्रयः । स च नास्त्येव । स्वरूपासिद्धो यथा शब्दो गुणश्चाक्षुषत्वात् । अत्र चाक्षुषत्वं शब्दे नास्ति शब्दस्य श्रावणत्वात् । सोपाधिको व्याप्यत्वासिद्धः साध्यव्यापकत्वे सति साधनाव्यापक उपाधिः । साध्यसमाना- धिकरणात्यन्ताभावाप्रतियोगित्वं साध्यव्यापकत्वम् । साधनवनि-

1 A B place यस्य after हेत्वन्तरं B omits वियता G has विद्यते

यस्य,

2 Q has अनित्यः for गुणः, and

adds रूपवद.

AB0DF and Q insert हेतुः after सोपाधिकः-

40HQU and W have व्यापक-

त्वमुपाधिः, while ‘व्यापकत्वाधित्वद.

E reads

ECT. 56.] तर्कदीपिकया न्यायबोधिन्या च सहितः ष्ठात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वं साधनाव्यापकत्वम् । पर्वतो धूम- वान्वह्निमत्त्वादित्यत्रार्द्रेन्धनसंयोग उपाधिः । तथाहि । यत्र धूमस्त- चायनसंयोग इति साध्यव्यापकता । यत्र वस्त्रान्वन संयोगो नास्त्ययोगोलक आर्द्रेन्धनसंयोगाभावादिति साधनाव्यापकता । एवं साध्यव्यापकत्वे सति साधनाव्यापकत्वादान्धनसंयोग

उपाधिः । सोपाधिकत्वाद्वह्निमत्त्वं व्याप्यत्वासिद्धम् ॥

त. दी. आसद्धं विभजते- असिद्ध इति ॥ आश्रयासिद्धमुदा- हरति-गमनेति ॥ स्वरूपासिद्धमुदाहरति– शब्देति ॥ व्याप्यत्वा- सिद्धस्य लक्षणमाह-सोपाधिक इति । उपाविलक्षणमाह—-सा- ध्येति । उपाधिश्चतुर्विधः । केवलसाध्यव्यापकः पक्षधर्मावच्छिन्नसाध्य- व्यापकः साधनावच्छिन्नसाध्यव्यापक उदासीनधर्मावच्छिन्नसाध्यव्यापक- वेति । आय आर्द्रेन्धनसंयोगः । द्वितीयो यथा - वायुः प्रत्यक्षः प्रत्यक्षस्प- शश्रियत्वादित्यत्र बहिर्द्रव्यत्वावच्छिन्नप्रत्यक्षत्वव्यापकमुद्भूतरूपवत्त्वमुष तृतीयो यथा- प्रध्वंसो विनाशी जन्यत्वादित्यत्र जन्यत्वावच्छिन्नानि - त्यत्वव्यापकं भावत्वम् । चतुर्थो यथा- प्रागभावो विनाशी प्रमेयत्वादित्यत्र जन्यत्वावच्छिन्नानित्यत्वव्यापकं भावत्वम् ॥

न्या. बो. - आश्रयासिद्ध इति । आश्रयासिद्धिर्नाम पक्षताव - बच्छेदकविशिष्टपक्षाप्रसिद्धिः । यथा गगनीयत्वविशिष्टपक्षासिद्धेः सौर-

1 Come copies omit तथाहि.

2 CUK X and W omit इति

साधनाध्यापकता.

For querererisrqzara C. JL MY Z rend प्रमेयत्वाद which is perhaps b. tter.

4 G here adds सत्यामो मैत्रीतन-

पखदेयत्र

पत्र मैतनयत्वामविस-

श्यामत्वस्य व्यापकः शाकायाहार-

परिणाभेदः । प्रकारान्तरेण तृतीयो यथा। but this is undoubtedly interpolated.

5 JN MQ and Y read grTHTË

for were and are supported by the high authority of Ni, See Note Tue,

तर्कसङ्ग्रहः

[ SECT. 56.

भ्यानुमितिर्न सम्भवेति । स्वरूपासिद्धिर्नाम पक्षे हेत्वभावः । तथा च हेत्व- भावविशिष्टपक्षज्ञानात्पक्षविशेष्य कहे तुप्रकारकपरामशीनुत्वच्या परामर्श- प्रतिबन्धः फलम् ॥ व्याप्यत्वासिद्ध इति । प्रकृते धूमव्यापकत्वमा - न्धने संयोगे गृहीतं चेम आर्द्रेन्धनसंयोगव्याप्यत्वं गृहीतम् । एवं बह्नयव्यापकत्वमार्द्रेन्धनसंयोगे गृहीतं चेद्वह्नौ तद्व्याप्यत्वं गृह्यते तदेव व्यभिचारित्वम् । तथाचेोपाधिव्यभिचारित्वं साधने गृहीतं चेदुपाधिभू- तार्द्रेन्धनसंयोगव्याप्यधूमव्यभिचारित्वं गृहीतमेव । अनुमानप्रकारश्व पूर्वानुमानहेतुं पक्षीकृत्य वह्निर्धूमव्यभिचारी धूमव्यापकार्द्रेन्धनसंयोग- व्यभिचारित्वाद्घटत्वादिवद्यो यत्साध्यव्यापकव्यभिचारी स सर्वोऽपि साध्यव्यभिचारी । एवं प्रकारेण प्रकृतानुमानहेतुभूतपक्षे साध्यव्यभिचा- रोत्थापकतया दूषकत्वमुपाधेः फलम् । तथा च धूमाभाववद्वृत्तित्वरूपधू- मव्यभिचारे गृहीते वह्नौ धूमाभाववदवृत्तित्वरूपव्याप्तिग्रहप्रतिबन्धः फलम् । न च व्याप्यत्वासिद्धेर्व्यभिचाराभेद इति वाच्यम् । धूमाभाववद्वृत्तित्वाभा - वाभावत्वेन व्याप्यत्वासिद्धत्वं धूमाभाववद्वृत्तित्वेन व्यभिचारत्वमि - तिभेदात् ॥

[ ५७ ]

यस्य साध्याभावः प्रमाणान्तरेण निश्चितः स बाधितः । यथा वह्निरनुष्णो द्रव्यत्वादिति । अत्रानुष्णत्वं साध्यं तदभाव उष्णत्वं स्पार्शनप्रत्यक्षेण गृह्यत इति बाधितत्वम् ॥

त. दी. बाधितस्य लक्षणमाह-यस्येति । अत्र बाधस्य ग्राह्या- भावनिश्वयत्वेन सत्प्रतिपक्षस्य विरोधिज्ञानसामग्रीत्वेन साक्षादनुमितिप्रति-

1 U and W read the passage

differently.

20 K RV omit the following

two sentences.

3 K reads पदार्थत्वात् forद्रव्यत्वाव 4 The reading adopted is that of

ADEK; GEJ read genera

only which amounts to the same. B hss स्पर्शेन प्रत्यक्षेण, and O स्पर्शनेन. Sc. seems to prefer the latter. Possibly both zgrefer and rusia may have been later insertions. See Note los. mit.

SECT. 58. ] तर्कदीपिकया न्यायबोधिन्या च सहितः

बन्धकत्वम् । इतरेषां तु परामर्शप्रतिबन्धकत्वम् । तत्रापि साधारणस्या- व्यभिचाराभावतेया विरुद्धस्य सामानाधिकरण्याभावतयो व्यापकत्वाति- द्धस्य विशिष्टव्याप्त भावतयोऽसाधारणानुपसंहारिणोर्व्याप्तिसंशयाधाथ- कत्वेन च व्याप्तिज्ञानप्रतिबन्धकत्वम् । आश्रयासिद्धस्वरूपासिद्धयोः पक्ष- धर्मताज्ञानप्रतिबन्धकत्वम् । उपाधिस्तु व्यभिचारज्ञानद्वारा व्याप्तिज्ञान- प्रतिबन्धकः । सिद्धसाधनं तु पक्षताविघटतया आश्रयासिद्धेऽन्तर्भवतीति प्राञ्चः । निग्रहस्थानान्तरमिति नवीनाः ।

न्या. बो. यस्येति । यस्य हेतोः साध्याभावः स च प्रमाणान्त- रेण निश्चितः स बाधित इत्यर्थः । तथा च प्रात्यक्षिकसाध्याभावनिश्वयेन साध्यानुमितिप्रतिबन्धः फलम् । बाधितसाध्यकत्वाद्धेतोर्हेतुरपि बाधित इत्युच्यते ॥ इत्यनुमानपरिच्छेदः ॥

[ ५८ ]

उपमितिकरणमुपमानम् । सञ्ज्ञासञ्ज्ञिसम्बन्धज्ञानमुपमितिः । तत्क- रणं सादृश्यज्ञानम् । अतिदेशवाक्यार्थस्मरणमवान्तरव्यापारः । तथाहि कर्श्विद्रवयशब्दार्थभजानन्कुतश्चिदारण्यकपुरुषाद्गोसदृशो गवय इति श्रुत्वा, वनं गतो, वाक्यार्थे स्मरन्गोसदृशं पिण्डं पश्यति । तदनन्तरमसौ गवयशब्दवाच्य इत्युपमितिरुत्पद्यते ॥

त. दी. –उपमानं लक्षयति-उपमितीति ॥

1 A and Q ‘भाववन्तया.

2 The reading is that of N and

Nil. A C L P omit grer: leav- ing af which then becomes redundant. G JY Z omit gla प्रावः- A inserts + before निग्रह’ and M roads निग्रहस्था- नानन्तरम् both of which are clearly wrong.

3 QN and W omit this sen-

tence. F omits the rest of the

passage.

4 ABD omit कश्वित्ः K adds पुरुषः; ABD and Qrend माध्यम for अर्थम. N bas पदार्थ for शब्दार्थम.

5 KH add वाक्यं after इति. 6 0 adds विशिष्टं after सदृशं; H reads सादृश्यविशिष्टं and A and W सहपिण्डं : Jorita पिण्डं.

तर्कसङ्ग्रहः

[ SECT. 58.

न्या. बी. -उपमानं लक्षयति उपमितिकरणमिति । उपमिति लक्षयति- सञ्ज्ञासञ्ज्ञीति । सञ्ज्ञा पदं । सञ्ज्ञी पदार्थः । तयोः सम्बन्धः शक्तिः । तथा च पदपदार्थसम्बन्धज्ञानमुपमितिरित्यर्थः । उपमानमतिदेश- वाक्यार्थज्ञानम् । अतिदेशवाक्यार्थस्मरणं व्यापारः । उपमितिः फलम् । गोसदृशो गवयपदवाच्य इत्याकारकागोसदृशत्वावच्छिन्नविशेष्यकगवय- पदवाच्यत्वप्रकारकं ज्ञानं जायते तदेव करणम् ॥ इत्युपमानपरिच्छेदः ॥

[ ५९ ]

आप्तवाक्यं शब्दः । आप्तस्तु यथार्थवक्ता । वाक्यं पदसमूहः । यथा गामानयेति । शक्तं पदम् । अस्मात्पदादयमर्थो बोद्धव्य इती- श्वरसङ्केतः शक्तिः ॥

त. दी. शब्द लक्षयति- आप्तेति । पदलक्षणमाह- शक्तमि- ति । अर्थस्मृत्यनुकूलः पदपदार्थसम्बन्धः शक्तिः । सा च पदार्थान्तरमिति मीमांसकाः । तन्निरासार्थमाह– अस्मादिति । डित्थादीनामिव घटादी

।

। नामपि सङ्केत एव शक्तिः, न तु पदार्थान्तरमित्यर्थः॥ गवादिशब्दानां जाता- वेव शक्तिर्विशेषणतया जातेः प्रथममुपस्थितत्वात् व्यक्तिलाभस्त्वाक्षेपादि- ना इति केचित् । तन्न, गामानयेत्यादौ वृद्धव्यवहारात्सर्वत्रानयनादेर्व्यक्ता- वेव सम्भवेन जातिविशिष्टव्यक्तावेव शक्तिकल्पनात् । शक्तिग्रहश्च वृद्धव्यव- हारेण । व्युत्पित्सुर्बालो गामानयेत्युत्तनवृद्धवाक्यश्रवणान्तरं मध्यमवृद्धस्य प्रवृत्तिमुपलभ्य गवानयनं च दृष्ट्वा मध्यमवृद्धप्रवृत्तिजनकज्ञानस्यान्वयव्य- तिरेकाभ्यां वाक्यजन्यत्वं निश्चित्याश्वमानय गां बधान इति वाक्यान्तर आवापोद्वापाभ्यां गोपदस्य गोत्वविशिष्टे शक्तिरश्वशब्दस्याश्वत्वावशिष्टे शक्तिरिति व्युत्पद्यते । ननु सर्वत्र कार्यपरत्वाद्व्यवहारस्य कार्यवाक्य एव व्युत्पत्तिर्न सिद्धपर इति चेन्न । काञ्चयां त्रिभुवनतिलको भूपतिरित्यादौ

1 W omits this. Q adds si

इण्डेन after आनय.

1 ABD and F insert gOST after far unnecessarily. O more corrently reads ईश्वरे-

च्छारूपसङ्केतः.

3 N and Q here add A

लक्षयति-वाक्येति.

4 F and Q have वृद्धव्यवहारेण. 5 A and M read काइयां.SECT. 59.] तर्कदीपिकया न्यायबोधिन्या च सहितः

[[५१]]

सिद्धेऽपि व्यवहारात्, विकसितपझे मधुकरे इत्यादौ प्रसिद्धपदसमभिव्यव- हारात्सिद्धेऽपि मधुकरादिपदे व्युत्पत्तिदर्शनाच्च ॥ लक्षणापि शब्दवृत्तिः । शक्यसम्बन्धो लक्षणा। गङ्गायां घोष इत्यत्र गङ्गापदवाच्यप्रवाहसम्बन्धादेव तीरोपस्थितौ तीरेऽपि शक्तिर्न कल्प्यते । सैन्धवादौ लवणाश्वयोः परस्पर- सम्बन्धाभावान्नानाशक्तिकल्पनम् ॥ लक्षणा त्रिविधा। जहल्लक्षणाऽजहल्लक्ष- णा जहदजहल्लक्षणा चेति । यत्र वाच्यार्थस्यान्वयाभावस्तत्र जहती, यथा मञ्चाः क्रोशन्तीति । यत्र वाच्यार्थस्थान्वचस्तत्राजहती, यथा छत्रिणो ग- च्छन्तीति । यत्र वाच्यैकदेशत्यागेनैकदेशान्वयस्तत्र जहदजहती यथा तत्त्वमसीति । गौण्यपि लक्षणैव लक्ष्यमाणगुणसम्बन्धरूपा । अग्निर्माणवक इति ॥ व्यञ्जनापि शक्तिलक्षणान्तर्भूता । अर्थशक्तिमूला चानुमानादिनान्य- थासिद्धा ॥

तात्पर्यानुपपत्तिलक्षणावीजम् । तत्प्रतीतीच्छयोच्चरितत्वं तात्पर्यम् तात्पर्यज्ञानं च वाक्यार्थज्ञाने हेतुः । नानार्थानुरोधात्तु प्रकरणादिकं तात्पर्यग्राहकम्। वारमित्यादौ पिधेहीति शब्दाध्याहारः । नन्वर्थज्ञानार्थ- त्वाच्छन्दस्यार्थमविज्ञाय शब्दाध्याहारासम्भवादर्थाध्याहार एव युक्त इति चेन्न, पदविशेषजन्यपदार्थोपस्थितेः शाब्दज्ञानहेतुत्वात् । अन्यथा घटः कर्मत्वमानयनं कृतिरित्यत्रापि शाब्दज्ञानप्रसङ्गात् ॥

पङ्कजादिपदेषु योगरूढिः । अवयवशक्तिर्योगः । समुदायशक्ती रूढिः । नियतपद्मत्वज्ञानार्थं समुदायशक्तिः । अन्यथा कुमुदेऽपि प्रयोगप्रसङ्गः । इतरान्विते शक्तिरिति प्राभाकराः । अन्वयस्य वाक्यार्थतया मानसं - भवादन्वयांशेऽपि शक्तिर्न कल्पनीयेति गौतमीयाः ॥

1 MN F and Q add wyf fouta after मधुकरः but wrongly ; T J supplies the ellipsis by farf more correctly. A reads fre for प्रसिद्ध incorrectly. 2 Ghere add सोऽयं देवदश इति च. 3 The text of T D is here an- doubtedly tampered with. J alone gives the reading adopt- ed, which seems to be the

correct one as it is supported by Nil. A Lomit before लक्षणान्तर्भूता A LOP make अर्थशक्तिमूला च part of the pre- vious sentence. F N and Q add शब्दशक्तिला before and M. पदशक्तिमूला after अर्थशक्ति- बूला. QY Z make the two sentences one. Y Z have स्वास्

and मूलत्वात् for सूता and मूला respectively.

भूम-

ર

तर्कसङ्ग्रहः

[[1]]

[ SECT. 59.

न्या. बी. शब्द लक्षयति-आतेति । पदज्ञानं करणम् । वृत्ति- ज्ञानसहकृत पदज्ञानजन्यपदार्थोपस्थितिर्व्यापारः । वाक्यार्थज्ञानं शाब्द- बोधः फलम् । वृत्तिर्नाम शक्तिलक्षणान्यतररूपा । शक्तिर्नाम घटादिविशेष्यक घटादिपदजन्यबोधविषयत्वप्रकारकेश्वरसङ्केतः । ईश्वर- सङ्केतो नामेश्वरेच्छा सैव शक्तिरित्यर्थः । शक्तिनिरूपकत्वमेव पदे शक्तत्वम् । विषयतासम्बन्धेन शक्त्याश्रयत्वमर्थे शक्यत्वम् । शक्यसम्बन्धो लक्षणा । सा द्विविधा । गौणी शुद्धा चेति । गौणी नाम सादृश्यविशिष्ट- लक्षणा यथा सिंहो माणवक इत्यादौ सिंहपदस्य सिंहसादृश्यविशिष्टे ल- क्षणा । शुद्धापि द्विधा जहल्लक्षणाऽजहल्लक्षणा चेति । लक्ष्यतावच्छेदक- रूपेण लक्ष्यमात्रबोधिका जहल्लक्षणा यथा गङ्गायां घोष इत्यत्र गङ्गापद- शक्यप्रवाहसम्बन्धस्य तीरे सत्त्वात् तादृशशक्यसम्बन्धरूपलक्षणाज्ञानात् गङ्गापदात्तीरोपस्थितिः । लक्ष्यतावच्छेदकरूपेण लक्ष्यशक्योभय- बोधप्रयोजिकाऽजहल्लक्षणा । यथा काकेभ्यो दधि रक्ष्यतामित्यत्र काक- पदस्य दध्युपघात के लक्षणा । लक्ष्यतावच्छेदकं दध्युपघातकत्वं तेन रूपेण दध्युपधातकानां काकविडालकुक्कुटसारमेयादीनां शक्यलक्ष्याणां सर्वेषां बोधात् । जहदजहल्लक्षणा वेदान्तिनां मते ॥

[ ६० ]

आकाङ्क्षा योग्यता सन्निधिश्च वाक्यार्थज्ञानहेतुः । पदस्य पदान्तरव्यतिरेकप्रयुक्तान्वयाननुभावकत्वमाकाङ्क्षा । अर्थाबाधो योग्यता । पदानामविलम्बेनोश्चारणं सन्निधिः ॥

1 S T and Winsert here six sentences explaining the पद- हृत्य of the definition of शब्दः but they are absent in older Mss. U prints them in brac- kets as an interpolation,

2 The reading is that of U V and K. Komits शक्तिर्नाम and T and W omit घटादिविशेष्यक; while reads simply शक्ति- ममेिश्वरेच्छा । सैव शक्तिरित्यर्थः.

3 ST and W read त्रिविधा for

द्विविधा and add जहदजहल्लक्षणा as a third species.

4 In the place of this short sentence S T and W have शक्यतावच्छेदकपरित्यागेन व्यक्ति- मात्रबोधनाज्जहदजहल्लक्षणा । इयं- च लक्षणा जीवब्रह्मणोरैक्यं वदतां वेदान्तिनां सिद्धान्तरीत्या-

SECT. 62. ] तर्कदीपिकया न्यायवोधिन्याच सहितः

क्ष

[[५३]]

त. दी. - आकाङ्केति । आकाङ्कादिज्ञानमित्यर्थः । अन्यथाकाङ्क्षा- दिभ्रमाच्छाब्दभ्रमो न स्यात् । आकाङ्क्षां लक्षयति–पदस्येति ॥ योग्य- तालक्षणमाह - अर्थेति ॥ सन्निधिलक्षणमाह–पदानामिति । अवि- लम्बेन पदार्थोपस्थितिः सन्निधिः । उच्चारणं तु तदुपयोगितया युक्तम् ॥

न्या. बो. - आकाङ्केति । अव्यवहितोत्तरत्व। दिसम्बन्धेन यत्पदे यत्पद- प्रकारज्ञानव्यतिरेकप्रयुक्तो यादृशशाब्दबोधाभावस्तादृशशाब्दबोधे तत्पदे तत्पदवत्त्वमाकाङ्क्षयं । तादृशाकाङ्क्षाज्ञानं शाब्दबोधे कारणम् ॥ अर्थबाध इति । बाधाभावो योग्यतेत्यर्थः ॥

[ ६१ ]

आकाङ्क्षादिरहितं वाक्यमप्रमाणम् । यथा गौरवः पुरुषो हस्तीति न प्रमाणमाकाङ्क्षाविरहात् । अग्निना सिश्चदिति न प्र- माणं योग्यताविरहात् । प्रहरे प्रहरेऽसहोच्चारितानि गामानये- त्यादिपदानि न प्रमाणं सान्निध्याभावात् ॥

त. दी. - गौरश्व इति । घटः कर्मत्वमित्यनाकाङ्क्षोदाहरणं द्रष्टव्यम् ॥

न्या. बो. - अग्निना सिञ्चेदिति । अत्र सेककरणत्वस्य जलादि - धर्मस्य वह्नौ बाधनिश्वयसत्त्वान्न तादृशवाक्याच्छाब्दबोधः सम्भवति ॥ सन्निधिं निरूपयति–असहोच्चारितानीति ॥ असहोचारितानि वि- लम्बेनोवारितानि ॥

[ ६२ ]

वाक्यं द्विविधम् । वैदिकं लौकिकं च । वैदिकमीश्वरोक्तत्वा- त्सर्वमेव प्रमाणम् । लौकिकं त्वाप्तोक्तं प्रमाणम् । अन्यदप्रमाणम् ॥

त. दी. वाक्यं विभजते

1 R prefixes यत्पदविशेष्यक to अ-

व्यवहित".

2 8 U and W here insert a long

वाक्यमिति । वैदिकस्य विशेषमाह-

explanation of आकाङ्क्षा.

3 CH read सन्निध्यभावाद perhaps

better.

જી

तर्कसङ्ग्रहः

I SECT. 62.

वैदिकमीश्वरोक्तत्वादिति । ननु वेदस्यानादित्वात्कथमीश्वरोक्तत्व- मिति चेन्न । वेदः पौरुषेयो वाक्यसमूहत्वाद्भारतादिवत् । न च स्मर्यमाण- कर्तृत्वमुपाधिः । गौतमादिभिः शिष्यपरम्परा वेदेऽपि कर्तृस्मरणेन साध- नव्यापकत्वात् । " तैस्मात्तेपानात्त्रयो वेदा अजायन्त " इति श्रुतेश्व ॥

ननु वर्णा नित्याः ’ स एवायं गकार’ इति प्रत्यभिज्ञाबलात् । तथा च कथं वेदस्यानित्यत्वमिति चेन्न, उत्पन्नो गारो नटो गकार इति प्रतीत्या वर्णानामनित्यत्वात् सोऽयं गकार’ इति प्रत्यभिज्ञायाः सेऽयं दीपज्वालेति- वत्साजात्यावलम्बनत्वात्, वर्णानां नित्यत्वेऽप्यानुपूर्वी विशिष्टवाक्यस्या- नित्यत्वाच्च । तस्मादीश्वरोको वेदः ॥ मन्वादिस्मृतीनामाचाराणां च वेद- मूलकतया प्रामाण्यम् । स्मृतिमूलवाक्यानामिदानीमनध्ययनात्तन्मूलभूता काचिच्छाखोच्छिन्नेति कल्प्यते । ननु पठ्यमानवेदवाक्योत्सादस्य कल्प- यितुमशक्यतया विप्रकीर्णवादस्यायुक्तत्वान्नित्यानुमेयो वेदो मूलमिति चेन्न । तथापि वर्णानुपूर्वीज्ञानाभावेन बोधकत्वासम्भवात् ॥

न्या. बो. वैदिकं लौकि चेति ॥ वैदिकं वेदवाक्यमित्यर्थः । इदमुपलक्षणम् । वेदमूलकस्मृत्यादीन्यपि ग्राह्याणि । लौकिकमिति । वेदवाक्य भिन्नमित्यर्थः । आप्तत्वं प्रयोगहेतुभूते यथार्थज्ञानवत्त्वम् ॥ इति शब्दपरिच्छेदः ॥

[ ६३ ]

वाक्यार्थज्ञानं शाब्दज्ञानम् । तत्करणं शब्दः ॥

त. दी. नन्वेतानि पदानि स्वस्मारितार्थसंसर्गवन्ति आकाङ्क्षादिमत्प- दकदम्बकत्वात्, सद्वाक्यवदित्यनुमानादेव संसर्गज्ञान सम्भवाच्छब्दो न प्र- माणान्तरमिति चेन्न । अनुमित्यपेक्षया शाब्दज्ञानस्य विलक्षणस्य शब्दात्प्र- त्येमीत्यनुव्यवसायसाक्षिकस्य सर्वसम्मतत्वात् ॥

INF and Q here add इत्यनुमानेन पौरुषेयत्वसिद्धेः Z adds इत्यनु-

मानाव

2 A reads कर्तुः स्मर्यमाणत्वेन; N F and Q have सकर्तुकत्वस्मरणेन. 3- Q inserts aq: before auiara 4 This is the reading of L and M; O J N P Y Z have the same without before star®;

A reads सोऽयं दीप इति प्रत्यभि- ज्ञानवज्जात्यालम्बनत्वात्.

A and i have तथा सति for तथापि.

6 K R and V omit this sentence, while S and W omit the next.

7 F and Q insert here गामानय

दण्डेन इति मद्वाक्य •

SECT. 63. ] तर्कदीपिका न्यायबोधिन्या च सहितः

नन्वर्थापत्तिरपि प्रमाणान्तरमस्ति ‘पीनो देवदत्तो दिवा न मुङ्क्ते’ इति दृष्टे श्रुते वा पीनत्वान्यथानुपपत्त्या रात्रिभोजनमर्थापत्त्या कल्प्यत इति चेन्न । देवदत्तो रात्रौ भुङ्क्ते दिवाऽभुञ्जानत्वे सति पीनत्वादि- त्यनुमानेनैव रात्रिभोजनस्य सिद्धत्वात् । शते पञ्चाशदिति सम्भवो - ऽप्यनुमानमेव । इह वटे यक्षस्तिष्ठतीत्यैतिह्यमज्ञातमूलवक्तृकः शब्द एव । चेष्टापि शब्दानुमानद्वारा व्यवहारहेतुरिति न मानान्तरम् । तस्मा - त्प्रत्यक्षानुमानोपमानशब्दाश्चत्वार्येव प्रमाणानि ॥

सर्वेषां ज्ञानानां तद्वति तत्प्रकारकत्वं स्वतो ग्राह्यं परतो वेति विचा- येते । तत्र विप्रतिपत्तिः । ज्ञानप्रामाण्यं तदप्रामाण्याग्राहकयावज्ज्ञानग्राहक- सामग्रीग्राह्यं न वा । अत्र विधिकोटिः स्वतस्त्वम् । निषेधकोटिः परत- स्त्वम् ॥ अनुमानग्राह्यत्वेन सिद्धसाधनतावारणाय यावदिति । ‘इदं ज्ञान- मप्रमेति’ ज्ञानेन प्रामाण्यग्रहाद्वाववारणायाप्रामाण्याग्राहकेति । इदं ज्ञान- मप्रमेत्यनुव्यवसायनिष्ठप्रामाण्यग्राहकस्याप्रामाण्याग्राहकत्वाभावात्स्वत- स्त्वं न स्यादतस्तदिति । तस्मिन्प्रामाण्याश्रयेऽप्रामाण्यग्राहक इत्यर्थः । उदाहृतस्थले व्यवसायेऽप्रामाण्यग्राहकस्याप्यनुव्यवसाये तदग्राहकत्वा- त्स्वतस्त्वसिद्धिः ॥ ननु स्वत एव प्रामाण्यं गृह्यते, घटमहं जानामीत्यनु- व्यवसायेन घटघटत्वयोरिव तत्सम्बन्धस्यापि विषयीकरणात्, व्यवसाय- रूपप्रत्यासत्तेस्तुल्यत्वात्, पुरोवर्तिनि प्रकारसम्बन्धस्यैव प्रमात्वपदार्थत्वा- दिति चेन्न । स्वतःप्रामाण्यग्रहे जलज्ञानं प्रमा न वेत्यनभ्यासदशायां प्रमात्वसंशयो न स्यात् । अनुव्यवसायेन प्रामाण्यस्य निश्चितत्वात् । तस्मात्स्वतो ग्राह्यत्वाभावात्परतो ग्राह्यत्वम् । तथाहि । प्रथमं जलज्ञानानन्तरं प्रवृत्तौ सत्यां, जललाभे सति पूर्वोत्पन्नं जलज्ञानं प्रमा समर्थप्रवृत्तिजन- कत्वात्, यूनैवं तत्रैवम्, यथाश्रमा, इति व्यतिरेकिणा प्रमात्वं निश्चीयते ।

प्रभात ज

स। परिशेषोषि अनुमाय्यैव, Luc the words seem to be spurious as no other copy ootaina them. They are also super-

Autá, as agter has already once been referred to, while it is doubtful whether परिशेष is recognized as an indepen- dent proof.

[[५६]]

तर्कसङ्ग्रहः

[ sEcT. 63.

द्वितीयादिज्ञानेषु पूर्वज्ञानदृष्टान्तेन तत्सजातीयत्वलिङ्गेनान्वयव्यतिरेकि- णाऽपि गृह्यते ॥

प्रमाया गुणजन्यत्वमुत्पत्तौ परतस्त्वम् । प्रमाऽसाधारणकारणं गुणः । अप्रमाऽसाधारणकारणं दोषः । तत्र प्रत्यक्षे विशेषणवद्विशेष्यसन्निकर्षो गुणः, अनुमितौ व्यापकवति व्याप्यज्ञानं, उपमितौ यथार्थसादृश्यज्ञानं, शाब्दज्ञाने यथार्थयोग्यताज्ञानम् इत्याद्यूहनीयम् । पुरोवर्तिनि प्रकारा- भावस्य व्यवसायेनानुपस्थितत्वादप्रमात्वं परत एवं गृह्यते । पित्तादि- दोषजन्यत्वादुत्पत्तौ परतस्त्वम् ॥

ननु सर्वज्ञानानां यथार्थत्वादयथार्थज्ञानमेव नास्ति । न च ‘शुक्ता- विदं रजतमिति ’ ज्ञानात्प्रवृत्तिदर्शनादन्यथाख्यातिसिद्धिरिति वाच्यम् । रजतस्मृतिपुरोवर्तिज्ञानाभ्यामेव प्रवृत्तिसम्भवात् उपस्थितेष्टभेदाग्रहस्यैव सर्वत्र प्रवर्तकत्वेन [नेदं रजतमित्यादावतिप्रसङ्गाभावादिति चेन्न । सत्य- रजतस्थले पुरोवर्तिविशेष्यकरजतत्वप्रकारकज्ञानस्य लाघवेन प्रवृत्ति- जनकतया शुक्तावपि रजतार्थिप्रवृत्तिजनकत्वेन विशिष्टज्ञानस्यैव कल्पनात् ॥

[ ६४ ]

अयथार्थानुभवस्त्रिविधः संशयविपर्ययतर्कभेदात् । एकस्मि- न्धर्मिणि विरुद्धनानाधर्मवैशिष्ट्यावगाहि ज्ञानं संशयः । यथा स्थाणुर्वा पुरुषो वेति । मिथ्याज्ञानं विपर्ययः । यथा शुक्ताविदं रजतमिति । व्याप्यारोपेण व्यापकारोपस्तर्कः । यथा यदि वह्नि- र्न स्यात्तर्हि धूमोऽपि न स्यादिति ॥

त. दी. - अयथार्थानुभवं विभजते-अयथार्थेति । स्वप्नस्य मानसविप- र्ययरूपत्वान्न त्रैविध्यविरोधः ॥ संशयलक्षणमाह-एकस्मिन्निति । ‘घट- पटा’ विति समूहालम्बनेऽतिव्याप्तिवारणाय एकेति । ‘घटो द्रव्य मित्यादाव-

1 The passage is

passage is variously

worded in different copies. The reading in the text is that of A B D F U and Sc; OGH Qand Whave वैशिष्ट्य-

ज्ञानस्, while Bf read विशिष्ट- ज्ञानम. E differs from all in giving विरुद्धनानाकोटिकं ज्ञानम्. 2 X has यद्ययं निर्वह्निः स्यात्तर्हि

निर्श्वमपि स्यात्.

SEcr. 66. ] तकैदीपिकया न्यायबोधिन्या च सहितः

तिव्याप्तिवारणाय विरुद्धेति । ‘पटत्वविरुद्धघटत्ववानि’ त्यत्रातिव्याप्ति- वारणाय नानेति ॥ विपर्ययलक्षणमाह-मिथ्येति । तदभाववति तत्प्र- कारकनिश्चय इत्यर्थः ॥ तर्क लक्षयति — व्याप्येति । यद्यपि तर्कों विपर्ययेऽन्तर्भवति तथापि प्रमाणानुग्राहकत्वाद्भेदेन कीर्तनम् ॥

न्या. बो. – यथार्थानुभवं निरूप्यायथार्थानुभवं विभजते- संशयेत्यादिना । एकेति । एकधर्मावच्छिन्नविशेष्यतानिरूपितभावा- भावप्रकारकं ज्ञानं संशय इत्यर्थः । भावद्वयकोटिकसंशयप्रसिद्धेः स्थाणुर्दे - त्यत्र स्थाणुत्व स्थाणुत्वाभावपुरुषत्वपुरुषत्वाभावकोटिकः संशय इत्यर्थः ’ विपर्ययो नाम भ्रम इत्यर्थः ॥ व्याप्यारोपेणेति । तर्फे व्याप्यस्य व्या पकस्य च व्यतिरेकनिश्वयः कारणम् । अन्यथानाधनिश्चयाभाव इष्टा पत्तिदोषे तर्कानुत्पत्तेः ॥

[ ६५ ]

स्मृतिरपि द्विविधा । यथार्थाऽयथार्था च । प्रमाजन्या यथार्था । अप्रमाजन्याऽयथार्था ।

त. दी. स्मृतिं विभजते - स्मृतिरिति ॥

[ ६६ ] सर्वेषामनुकूलतया वेदनीयं सुखम् ॥

10KY omit this sentence, but us besides S T it is found in li also in a slightly different form, it is retained. The sent - euce as it stands in both S and E is corrupt and is there- fore amended as above. S reads स्थाणुर्वेत्यादेः which is not intelligible, while R in- sorts एक before last कोटिक quite superfluously.

2 U and W read बाघ for व्यतिरेक. 3EHJK omit द्विविधा aud

join the two sentonces. K adds इति after चः

4 It is impossible to ascertaiu the true reading of this and the next passage. A BCH JU and Q together with Se. and Vy agree in reading अनु- हलवेदनीय aud प्रतिकूलवेदनीयं respectively; while the other variants अनुकूलतया and प्रति कुलतया वेदनीयं are found in DEGK, as well as Vil I have adopted the latter as be- ing grammatically more cor- rect, and being supported by the high authority of Nil.

[[५८]]

तर्कसङ्ग्रहः

[ SECT. 66.

त. दी. सुखं लक्षयति– सर्वेषामिति । सुख्यहमित्याद्यनुव्यव- सायगम्यं सुखत्वादिकमेव लक्षणम् । यथाश्रुतं तु स्वरूपकथनमिति द्रष्टव्यम् ॥

न्या. बी. - सुखं निरूपयति-सर्वेषामिति । इतरेच्छाऽनधीनेच्छा- विषयत्वमिति निष्कर्षः । यथाश्रुतेऽनुकूलत्वप्रकार कवेदनाविशेष्यत्वस्य घटोsनुकूल इत्याकारकज्ञानदशायामनुकूलत्वप्रकारकज्ञानविशेष्यत्वस्य घटादावपि सत्त्वाद्वटादावतिव्याप्तिरिति निष्कृष्टलक्षणमुक्तम् । भोजना- दावतिव्याप्तिवारणायेतरेच्छानधीने च्छाविशेषणम् । सुखेच्छायाः सुख- त्वप्रकारकज्ञानमात्रजन्यत्वात् ॥

[ ६७ ]

सर्वेषां प्रतिकूलतया वेदनीयं दुःखम् ॥

न्या. बो. – दुःखं निरूपयति प्रतिकूलेति । अत्रापीतरद्वेषान- धनद्वेषविषयत्वमिति निष्कृष्टलक्षणम् । द्वेषविषयत्वमात्रोक्तौ सर्पादावपि द्वेषविषयत्वसत्वात्तत्रातिव्याप्तिवारणायेतरद्वेषानधीनेति द्वेषविशेषणम् । सर्पजन्यदुःखादौ द्वेषात्सर्पद्वेष इति सर्पद्वेषस्य सर्पजन्यदुःखद्वेषजन्यत्वा- दन्यद्वेषानधीनद्वेषविषयत्वरूपलक्षणस्य सर्पादावसत्त्वान्नातिव्याप्तिः । फलेच्छो पायेच्छां प्रति कारणं । अतः फलेच्छावशादुपायेच्छा भवति । एवं फलद्वेषादुपायद्वेषः ॥

[ ६८ ]

इच्छा कामः ॥

[ ६९ ]

क्रोधो द्वेषः ॥

[ ६० ]

कृतिः प्रयत्नः ॥

[ ७१ ]

विहितकर्मजन्यो धर्मःः ॥

1K inserts गुणः after ‘जन्यः । unnecessarily.

SECT. 75. ] तर्कदीपिकया न्यायकोधिन्या च सहितः

निषिद्धकर्मजन्यस्त्वधर्मः ॥

[ ७२ ]

[[५९]]

न्या. बो. — धर्माधर्मौ निरूपयति–विहितेति । वेदविहितेत्यर्थः । निषिद्धेति । वेदनिषिद्धेत्यर्थः ॥

[ ७३ ]

बुद्ध्यादयोऽष्टावात्ममात्रविशेषगुणः ॥

[ ७४ ]

बुद्धीच्छाप्रयत्ना द्विविधाः । नित्या अनित्याश्च । नित्या ईश्व- रस्य । अनित्या जीवस्य ॥

[ ७५ ]

संस्कारस्त्रिविधः । वेगो भावना स्थितिस्थापकश्चेति । वेगः पृथिव्यादिचतुष्टयमनोवृत्तिः । अनुभवजन्या स्मृतिहेतुर्भावनाऽत्म- मात्रवृत्तिः । अन्यथा कृतस्य पुनस्तदवस्थापादकः स्थितिस्थापकः कटादिपृथिवीवृत्तिः ॥

त. दी. - संस्कारं विभजते- संस्कार इति । संस्कारत्वजातिमा- संस्कारः । वेगस्याश्रयमाह वेग इति । वेगत्वजातिमान्वेगः । भावनां लक्षयति- अनुभवेति । आत्मादावतिव्याप्तिवारणायानुभवेति । अ- नुभवध्वंसेऽतिव्याप्तिवारणाय स्मृतीति । स्मृतेरपि संस्कारजनकत्वं नवी- नैरुक्तम् ॥ स्थितिस्थापकं लक्षयति-— अन्यथेति ॥ सङ्ख्यादयोऽष्टौ नैमि- त्तिकद्रवत्ववेगस्थितिस्थापकाः सामान्यगुणाः । अन्ये रूपादयो विशेष-

1 C and X read आत्मनो विशेष’, snd K आत्माने विशेष ; Dcmits

विbre.

2 G J QUW X omit faftur:

and join the two sentences.

3 C K red स्थितस्थापकः-

4 HJ X have वेगाख्यः ; DG X

insert मात्र after मनः- 5 DH J read तादवस्थ्यापादकःः0 and Sc. have तद्वत्स्थापकः-

දීප

तर्कसङ्ग्रहः

[ SECT. 75.

गुणाः । द्रव्यविभाजकोपाधिद्वयसमानाधिकरणावृत्ति द्रव्यकर्मावृत्ति-जा- तिमत्त्वं विशेषगुणत्वम् ॥

न्या. बो. - संस्कारं विभजते– संस्कार इति । भावनां लक्षयति । अनुभवेति । अनुभवजन्यत्वे सति स्मृतिहेतुत्वं भावनाया लक्षणम् । अत्रानुभवजन्यत्वे सतीति विशेषणानुपादाने आत्ममनः संयागेऽतिव्याप्ति- रात्ममनःसंयोगस्य ज्ञानमात्रं प्रत्यसमवायिकारणत्वेन स्मृतिं प्रत्यपि कारणत्वादतस्तदुपादानम् । आत्ममनः संयोगस्यानुभवजन्यत्वाभावान्ना- तिव्याप्तिः । तावन्मात्रे कृतेऽनुभवध्वंसेऽतिव्याप्तिः, ध्वंसं प्रति प्रतियोगिनः कारणत्वेनानुभवध्वंसस्याप्यनुभवजन्यत्वात् । अतः स्मृतिहेतुत्वोपादानम् । अनुभवध्वंसे स्मृतिहेतुत्वाभावान्नातिव्याप्तिः ॥

[ ७६ ]

चलनात्मकं कर्म । ऊर्ध्वदेशसंयोगहेतुरुत्क्षेपणम् । अधोदेश- संयोगहेतुरपक्षेपणम् । शरीरंसन्निकृष्टसंयोगहेतुराकुञ्चनम् । विप्र- कृष्टसंयोगहेतुः प्रसारणम् । अन्यत्सर्वं गमनम् । पृथिव्यादिचतु- ष्ट्रयमनोमात्रवृत्ति ॥

त. दी. कर्मणो लक्षणमाह– चलनेति । उत्क्षेपणादीनां कार्य- भेदमाह — ऊर्ध्वति । शरीरेति । वक्रत्वसम्पादकमाकुञ्चनम् । ऋजुता- सम्पादकं प्रसारणमित्यर्थः ॥

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नित्यमेकमनेकानुगतं सामान्यं । द्रव्यगुणकर्मवृत्ति । तदद्विविधं परापरभेदात् । परं सत्ता । अपरं द्रव्यत्वादिः ॥

1 Instead of द्रव्यकर्मावृत्ति N has गुणवृत्ति Zadds गुण after जातेि- मत्. Other copies omit the word altogether, but wrongly. 2 K adds तत्पञ्चविधम.

3 AB Dhave शरीरस्य; EHJX insert शरीर before विप्रकृष्ट also in the next sentence.

4 K omits मात्र; Gadd कर्म after वृत्ति, perhaps better Q

U and W omit the whole

sentence.

5 O E G J QUX and W omit तद्विविधं परापरभेदात्. X has instead परमधिकवृत्ति । अपरं न्यूनवृत्ति । H has परमपरं चोत for परापरभेदात्, before द्रव्यगुण- कर्मवृत्ति. ABDF insert जातिः

before द्रव्यत्वादिः.SECT. 79.] तर्कदीपिकया न्यायबोधिन्या च सहितः

[[६१]]

त. दी. - सामान्यं लक्षयति नित्यमिति । संयोगादावतिव्या- प्तिवारणाय नित्यमिति । परमाणुपरिमाणादावतिव्याप्तिवारणाय - अने- केति । अनुगतत्वं समवेतत्वं । तेन नाभावादावतिव्याप्तिः ॥

न्या. बी. - सामान्यं निरूपयति-नित्यमेकमिति । नित्यत्वे सत्यनेकसमवेतत्वं सामान्यलक्षणमित्यर्थः । नित्यत्वविशेषणानुपादाने संयोगादावतिव्याप्तिस्तत्राप्यनेकद्रव्यसमवेतत्वस्य सत्त्वात् तद्वारणाय नि- त्यत्वोपादानम् । अनेकसमवेतत्वानुपादान आकाशादावतिव्याप्तिस्तद्वार- णायानेकसमवेतत्वविशेषणम् । अनेकत्वानुपादान आकाशगतैकत्वपरि- माणादौ जलपरमाणुरूपादौ चातिव्याप्तिर्जलादिपरमाणुगतरूपादेराका- रागतैकत्वपरिमाणादेर्नित्यत्वात्समवेतत्वाच्च । अतोऽनेक इति समवेत-

विशेषणम् ॥

[ ७८ ]

नित्यद्रव्यवृत्तयो व्यावर्तका विशेषाः ॥ त. दी. - विशेषं लक्षयति-नित्येति ॥

न्या. बो. — नित्यद्रव्यवृत्तय इति । नित्यद्रव्येषु परमाण्वादिषु वर्तमानाः । अत एव व्यावर्तका इतरभेदानुमितिहेतवः । नित्यद्रव्य- वृत्तित्वरूपपक्षधर्मताप्रयोज्येतरभेदानुमापकशालिन इत्यर्थः ॥

[ ७९ ]

नित्यसम्बन्धः समवायः । अयुतसिद्धवृत्तिः । ययोर्द्वयोर्मध्य एकम- विनश्यदपराश्रितमेवातिष्ठते तावतसिद्धौ । यथावयवावयविनौ गुणगुणिनौ क्रियाक्रियावन्तौ जातिव्यक्ती विशेषनित्यद्रव्ये चेति ॥

IN pinces this sentence after tha noxt, omitting आदि. Other copies except a JY omit the sentence altogether, Y omits the next sentence. Q and F insert घटात्यन्ताभावो घटातु-

तोष्यसमवेतः hefore नाभावा’.

तिन

2 The passage is variously read by K RVS U and W. Mes.

C and V end here. SEGHK add अनन्ता एव after विशेषाः X adds पृथिव्यादिचतु-

यस्य परमाणवः आकाशादिपञ्चकं नित्यद्रव्याणि ।

4 This is a portion of M long abstruse passage in W not found in other Mss. 5 ABEJ omit erfaresza which is however necessary.

6 EG only insert ; but their reading has been adopted as making the sentence more grammatical,

[[६२]]

तर्कसङ्ग्रहः

[ SECT. 79.

त. दी. - समवायं लक्षयति-नित्येति । संयोगेऽतिव्याप्तिवार- णाय नित्येति । आकाशादावतिव्याप्तिवारणाय सम्बन्ध इति । अयु- तसिद्धलक्षणमाह-योरिति । नीलो घट इति विशिष्टप्रतीतिर्विशेषण- विशेष्यसम्बन्धविषया विशिष्टप्रत्ययत्वाद्दण्डीति प्रत्ययवदिति समवाय- सिद्धिः । अवयवावयविनाविति । द्रव्यसमवायिकारणमवयवः । तज्ज- न्यद्रव्यमवयवि ॥

न्या. बो. समवायं निरूपयति-नित्येति । सम्बन्धत्वं विशिष्ट- प्रतीतिनियामकत्वम् । तावन्मात्रोक्तौ संयोगेऽतिव्याप्तिरतो नित्येति विशेष- म् ॥ ययोर्मध्य इति । यन्निष्टकालनिरोपिताधेयतासामान्यं यदव- च्छिन्नं तदुभयान्यतरत्वमयुतसिद्धत्वमित्यर्थः ॥

[ ८० ]

अनादिः सान्तः प्रागभावः । उत्पत्तेः पूर्वं कार्यस्य । सादिरन- न्तः प्रध्वंसः । उत्पत्त्यनन्तरं कार्यस्य । त्रैकालिकसंसर्गावच्छिन्न- तियोगिताकोऽत्यन्ताभावः । यथा भूतले घटो नास्तीति । तादा- त्म्यसम्बन्धावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकोन्योन्याभावः । यथा घटः पटो

न भवतीति ॥

त. दी. – प्रागभाव लक्षयति — अनादिरिति । आकाशावदतिव्या- निवारणाय सान्त इति। घटादावतिव्याप्तिवारणाय -अनादिरिति । प्रति- योगिसमवायिकारणवृत्तिः प्रतियोगिजनको भविष्यतीति व्यवहारहेतुः प्रागभावः ॥ प्रध्वंसं लक्षयति– सादिरिति । घटादावतिव्याप्तिवारणाय -अनन्त इति । आकाशादावतिव्याप्तिवारणाय - सादिरिति । प्रतियोगि- जन्यः प्रतियोगिसमवायिकारणवृत्तिर्ध्वस्तव्यवहारहेतुर्ध्वसः ॥ अत्यन्ता- भाव लक्षयति– त्रैकालिकेति ॥ अन्योन्याभावेऽतिव्याप्तिवारणाय सं- सर्गावच्छिन्नेति । ध्वंसप्रागभावयोरतिव्याप्तिवारणाय त्रैकालिकेति ॥ अन्योन्याभाव लक्षयति - तादात्म्येति । प्रतियोगितावच्छेदकारोप्य-

1 ST and W omit this sentence, 2 Q and U omit भवति.

and K. R. omit the next.

[[६३]]

SEcr. 80. ] तर्कदीपिकया न्यायबोधिन्या व सहितः संसर्गभेदादेकप्रतियोगिकयोरप्यत्यन्ताभावान्योन्याभावयोर्वहुत्वम् । के- वलदेवदत्ताभावो दण्ड्यभाव इति प्रतीत्या विशिष्टाभावः । एकसत्त्वे द्वौ न स्त इति प्रतीत्या द्वित्वावच्छिन्नोऽभावः । संयोगसम्बन्धेन घटवति समवायसम्बन्धेन घटाभावः । तत्तद्घटाभावाद्यत्वावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिक- सामान्याभावश्वातिरिक्तः ॥ एवमन्योन्याभावोऽपि । घटत्वावच्छिन्नः पटो नास्तीति व्यधिकरणधर्मावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकाभावो नाङ्गीक्रि- यते । पटे घटत्वं नास्तीति तस्यार्थः । अतिरिक्तत्वे स केवलान्वयी ।’

सामयिकाभावोऽत्यन्ताभाव एव समयविशेषे प्रतीयमानः । घटाभाव- वति घटानयनेऽत्यन्ताभावस्यान्यत्र गमनाभावेऽप्यप्रतीतेर्धटापसरणे सति प्रतीतेः । भूतले घटसंयोगप्रागभावप्रध्वंसयोरत्यन्ताभावप्रतीतिनियामक- त्वं कल्प्यते । घटवति तत्संयोगप्रागभावप्रध्वंसयोरसत्त्वादत्यन्ताभाव- स्याप्रतीतिः । घटापसरणे च संयोगध्वंससत्त्वात्प्रतीतिरिति । केवलाधि- करणादेव नास्तीति व्यवहारोपपत्तावभावो न पदार्थान्तरमिति गुरवः । तन्न अभावानङ्गीकारे कैवल्यस्य निर्वक्तुमशक्यत्वात् । अभावाभावो भाव एंव नातिरिक्तः, अनवस्थाप्रसङ्गात् । ध्वंसप्रागभावः प्रागभावध्वंसश्र्व प्रतियोग्येव । अभावाभावोतिरिक्त एव, तृतीयाभावस्य प्रथमाभावरूप- त्वान्नानवस्थेति नवीनाः ॥

न्या. बी. – प्रागभावं निरूपयति - अनादिरिति । ध्वंसं निरूपयति

1 A’s reading is corrupt and makes no sense. The reading of J has been adopted as the most intelligible; although even with it the passage is vague, NFY Q and % agree with J but omit अपि; Whas भिन्नत्वं for बहुत्वं.

2 The passage seems to have been tampered with. The read- ing of A J is retained in the text, as being most probably the original. After qus:

Padds केवलदेवदत्तसद्भावेऽपि द- ण्डाभावे दण्ड्यभावः all other copies read देवदत्ताभावात्, and some of them omit the follow- ing words upto प्रतीत्या.

3 OLMN Y Z omit the word प्रतियोगिताक, which however makes no difference of sense as both expressions are common. 4 N F and Q add gia grea: after एव, but the words seem to be interpolated,

तर्कसङ्ग्रहः

[ SECT. 80.

सादिरिति । अत्यन्ताभावं निरूपयति - त्रैकालिकेति ॥ अन्योन्या- भावं निरूपयति - तादात्म्येति’ ॥

[ ८१ ]

सर्वेषां पदार्थानां यथायथमुक्तेष्वन्तर्भावात्सप्तैव पदार्था इति सिद्धम् ॥

त. दी. –तनु प्रमाण- प्रमेय-संशय प्रयोजन - दृष्टान्त-सिद्धान्ता- वयव- तर्क निर्णय-वाद- जल्पवितण्डा हेत्वाभास - च्छल - जाति निग्रहस्था-

• नानां तत्त्वज्ञानान्निश्रेयसाधिगम इति न्यायशास्त्रे षोडशपदार्थानामुक्त- त्वात्कथं सप्तैवेत्यत आह सर्वेषामिति । सर्वेषां सप्तस्वेवान्तर्भाव इत्यर्थः । ‘आत्मशरीरेन्द्रियार्थमनो बुद्धिप्रवृत्तिदोषप्रेत्यभावफलदुःखाप- वर्गास्तु प्रमेयमि’ति द्वादशविधं प्रमेयम् । वृत्तिर्धर्माधर्मौ । रागद्वेषमोहा दोषाः । राग इच्छा । द्वेषो मन्युः । मोहः शरीरादावात्मभ्रमः । प्रेत्यभावो भरणम् । फलं भोगः । अपवर्गो मोक्षः । स च स्वसमाना- धिकरणदुःखप्रागभावासमानकालीन दुःखध्वंसः । प्रयोजनं सुखं दुःख- हानिचं । दृष्टान्तो महानसादिः । प्रामाणिकत्वेनाभ्युपगतोऽर्थः सि- द्वान्तः । निर्णयो निश्वयः । स च प्रमाणफलम् । तत्त्वबुभुत्सोः कथा वादः । उभयसाधनवती विजिगीषुकथा जल्पः । स्वपक्षस्थापनहीना वितण्डा । कथा नाम नानावक्तृकः पूर्वोत्तरपक्षप्रतिपादकवाक्यसन्दर्भः । अभिप्रा- यान्तरेण प्रयुक्तस्यार्थान्तरं प्रकल्प्य दूषणं छलम्। असदुत्तरं जातिः । साधर्म्यवैधम्यत्कपापकर्षवण्यवर्ण्यविकल्प साध्यप्राप्त्यप्राप्तिप्रसङ्गप्रतिदृ-

ष्टान्तानुत्पत्ति संशयप्रकरणहेत्वर्थापत्त्यविशेषोपपत्त्युपलब्ध्यनुपलब्धिनि- त्यानित्यकार्यकार्यसमा जातयः । वादिनोऽपजयहेतुर्निग्रहस्थानम् । प्रति- ज्ञाहानिः प्रतिज्ञान्तरं, प्रतिज्ञाविरोधः, प्रतिज्ञासन्न्यासो, हेत्वन्तरम्, अर्था-

1 S T U and W omit this, ex- cept त्रैकालिकेति and instead of it give a long passage which is not found in other copies.

2 JK Q and W insert af, and

E एव, after सर्वेषां; they also insert एव after उक्तेषु.

3 This is the reading of O GJ LP Y Z. A has gû qû हानिश्व which makes no sense. N reads प्राप्तिः after सुख-

Ecr. 81. ] तर्कदीपिकया न्यायबोधिन्यां च सहितः

[[६५]]

न्तरं, निरर्थकं, अविज्ञातार्थकं, अपार्थकं, अप्राप्तकालं, न्यूनं, अधिकं, पुनरुक्तं, अननुभाषणं, अज्ञानं, अप्रतिभाविक्षेपः, मतानुज्ञा, पर्यनुयोज्यो- पेक्षणं, निरनुयोज्यानुयोगः, अपसिद्धान्तः, हेत्वाभासश्व निग्रहस्था- नानि । शेषं सुगमम् ॥

[[1]]

ननु करतलानलसंयोगे सत्यपि प्रतिबन्धके सति दाहानुत्पत्तेः शक्तिः पदार्थान्तरमिति चेन्न । प्रतिबन्धका भावस्य कार्यमात्रे कारणत्वेन शक्ते- रनुपयोगात् कारणस्यैव शक्तिपदार्थत्वात् । ननु भस्मादिना कांस्यादौ शुद्धिदर्शनादावेयशक्तिरङ्गीकार्येति चेन्न । भस्मादिसंयोगसमानकाली- नास्पृश्यस्पर्शप्रतियोगिकयावदभाव सहितभस्मादिसंयोगध्वंसस्य शुद्धि- पदार्थत्वात् ॥

स्वत्वमपि न पदार्थान्तरम् । यथेष्टविनियोग योग्यत्वस्य स्वत्वरूप - त्वातु । तदवच्छेदकं च प्रतिग्रहादिलब्धत्वमेवेति ॥

अथ विधिर्निरूप्यते । प्रयत्नजनकचिकीर्षाजनकज्ञानविषयो विधिः । तत्प्रतिपादको लिङादिर्वा । कृत्यसाध्ये प्रवृत्त्यदर्शनात् कृतिसाध्यता- ज्ञानं प्रवर्तकम् । न च विषभक्षणादौ प्रवृत्तिप्रसङ्गः । इष्टसाधनतालि- ककृतिसाध्यताज्ञानस्य काम्यस्थले नित्यनैमित्तिकस्थले च विहित- कालजीवित्वनिमित्तकुज्ञानजन्यस्यैवं प्रवर्तकत्वात् । न चाननुगमः स्व- विशेष णवत्ताप्रतिसन्धानजन्यत्वस्यानुगतत्वादिति गुरवः । तन्न । लाघवेन कृतिसाध्येष्टसाधनताज्ञानस्यैव चिकीर्षाद्वारा प्रयत्नजनकत्वात् । न च नित्ये इष्टसाधनत्वाभावादप्रवृत्तिप्रसङ्गस्तत्रापि प्रत्यवायपरिहारस्य पाप- क्षयस्य च फलत्वकल्पनात् । तस्मात्कृतिसाध्येष्टसाधनत्वमेव लिङाद्यर्थः । ननु " ज्योतिष्टोमेन स्वर्गकामो यजेत इत्यत्र लिङा स्वर्गसाधनकार्यं

1 G rends शुद्धिदर्शनात् शुद्धिः प

दार्थान्तरमितिचेच.

2 AP read प्रत्यवाय for प्रयत्न

which is wrong; M has प्रति वृत्ति which is probably a mis- take for प्रवृत्ति. 3 N and

adds कृतिसाध्येप्रवृत्ति- दर्शनात् after प्रवृत्त्यदर्शनात्, but

[[13]]

it is superfluous. AP wrongly separate ज्ञान from ‘साध्यता and join it to प्रवर्तकम्, which makes no sense.

4 OLMNQY Z put this be fore नित्यनैमित्तिक, A and have ज्ञानजन्यत्वस्य; J is doubtful.

[[६६]]

तर्कसङ्ग्रहः

[ SECT. 81.

प्रतीयते । यागस्याशुविनाशिनः कालान्तरभाविस्वर्गसाधनत्वायोगात्त- द्योग्यं स्थायिकार्यमपूर्वमेव लिङाद्यर्थः ॥ कार्य कृतिसाध्यं । कृतेः सविषयत्वात् । विषयाकाङ्क्षायां यागो विषयत्वेनान्वेति । कस्य कार्यं - मिति नियोज्याकाङ्क्षायां स्वर्गकामपदं नियोज्यपरतयान्वेति । कार्य- बोद्धा नियोज्यः । तेन ’ ज्योतिष्टोमनामकयागविषयकं स्वर्गकामस्य कार्य मिति वाक्यार्थः सम्पद्यते । वैदिकलित्वात् " यावज्जीवमग्निहोत्रं जुहुयात् ” इति नित्यवाक्येऽप्यपूर्वमेव वाच्यं कल्प्यते ।" आरोग्य- कामो भैषजपानं कुर्यात् " इत्यादौ लौकिकलिङः क्रियाकार्ये लक्षणेति चेन्न । यागस्याप्ययोग्यतानिश्वयाभावेन साधनतया प्रतीत्यनन्तरं तन्निर्वा- हार्थमवान्तरव्यापारतया अपूर्वकल्पनात् । कीर्तनादिनाऽनाशश्रुतेर्न यागध्वंसो व्यापारः । लोकव्युत्पत्तिबलात्क्रियायामेव कृतिसाध्येष्टसाध धनत्वं लिङा बोध्यत इति लिङ्त्वेन रूपेण विध्यर्थत्वम् । आख्यातत्वेन प्रयत्नार्थकत्वम् । पचति पार्क करोतीति विवरणदर्शनात् किं करोतीति प्रश्ने पचतीत्युत्तराञ्चाख्यातस्य प्रयत्नार्थकत्वनिश्चयात् । रथो गच्छती- त्यादावनुकूलव्यापारे लक्षणा " देवदत्तः पचति तण्डुलान्देवदत्तेन पच्यते तण्डुलः" इत्यत्र कर्तृकर्मणोर्नाख्यातार्थत्वम् किन्तु तद्गतैकत्वादीनामेव । तयोराक्षेपादेव लाभः । प्रजयतीत्यादौ धातोरेव प्रकर्षे शक्तिः । उप- सर्गाणां द्योतकत्वमेव । न तत्र शक्तिरस्ति ॥

[[1]]

पदार्थज्ञानस्य परमं प्रयोजनं मोक्षः । तथाहि । “आत्मावारे द्रष्टव्यः श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यो निदिध्यासितव्यः” इति श्रुत्या श्रवणादीनामात्म- साक्षात्कारहेतुत्वबोधनात् । श्रुत्या देहादिविलक्षणात्मज्ञाने सत्यप्यसं- भावनाऽनिवृत्तेर्युक्त्यनुसन्धानरूपमननसाध्यत्वात् मननोपयोगिपदार्थ-

1AJ Zomit आदि.

2 A roads wrongly अन्वितस्व- कार्यमिति for अन्वेति कस्य कार्य- मिति

3 This is the reading of J N. A I have वैदिकालिङित्वात्, 1 1. वैदिकालिङत्वात्, M वैदिकालिङ्ग-

स्वात् ८ वैदिकलिङ्गत्वाद, all of which appear to be wrong. 4 This is the reading of Q;

NY and Z read नाऽनाश”, while A reads afdengar ar श्रुतेस्तेन. both of which make no sense; L M Pare also corrupt.

SECT. 81. ] तर्कदीपिकया न्यायबोधिन्या च सहितः

निरूपणद्वारा शास्त्रस्यापि मोक्षोपयोगः । तदनन्तरं श्रुत्युपदिष्टयोगवि धिना निदिध्यासने कृते तदनन्तरं देहादिविलक्षणात्मसाक्षात्कारे सति देहादावहमभिमानरूपमिथ्याज्ञाननाशे सति दोषाभावात्प्रवृत्त्यभावे ध- मधर्मयोरभावाज्जन्माभावे पूर्वधर्माधर्मयेोरनुभवेन नाशे चरमदुःखध्वंस- लक्षणो मोक्षो जायते । ज्ञानमेव मोक्षसाधनं मिथ्याज्ञाननिवृत्तेर्ज्ञानमात्र- साध्यत्वात् " तमेव विदित्वातिमृत्युमेति नान्यः पन्था विद्यतेऽयनाय " इति साधनान्तरनिषेधाच्च । ननु " तत्प्राप्तिहेतुर्विज्ञानं कर्म चोक्तं महा- मुने ” इति कर्मणोऽपि मोक्षसाधनत्वस्मरणाज्ज्ञानकर्मणोः समुच्चय इति चेन्न । " नित्यनैमित्तिकैरेव कुर्वाणो दुरितक्षयम् । ज्ञानं च विमलीकुर्वन्न- भ्यासेन च पाचयेत् । अभ्यासात्पक्वविज्ञानं कैवल्यं लभते नरः" इत्या- दिना कर्मणो ज्ञानसाधनत्वप्रतिपादनात् । ज्ञानद्वारैव कर्म मोक्षसाधनं न साक्षात् । तस्मात्पदार्थज्ञानस्य मोक्षः परमं प्रयोजनमिति सर्वं रमणीयम् ॥

।

इति श्रीमद्वैतविद्याचार्य श्रीमद्राघवसोमयाजिकुलावतंस - श्रीमत्तिरु- मलाचार्यवर्यस्य सूनुनाऽन्नम्भट्टेन कृता स्वकृततर्कसङ्ग्रहस्य दीपिका सम्पूर्णा ॥

न्या. बो. सर्वेषामिति । प्रमाणप्रमेयसंशयप्रयोजनदृष्टान्तसि- द्वान्तावयवत्तर्कनिर्णयवादजल्पवितण्डा हेत्वाभासळलजातिनिग्रहस्थाना- नां तत्त्वज्ञानान्निःश्रेयसाधिगम इति न्यायस्यादिमे सूत्र उक्तानां प्रमाण- प्रमेयादीनामित्यर्थः । विस्तरस्त्वन्यत्रानुसन्धैर्यः ॥

1 After साक्षात् G Vadd तदुक्त- माचार्यैस्तस्मादुपकारकं कर्मेति.

2 This colophon is found in J alone, and is inserted here be- cause it is important. It also occurs in two other works of our author.

3 This is the reading of B and

U B omits प्रमाणप्रमेयार्थः, and join उक्तानां to next sentence. S and W read the passage differently. Different Mss. give various colophans, while S and W add a verse,

which are omited here.

ሪ

तर्कसङ्ग्रहः

काणादन्यायमतयो बलव्युत्पत्तिसिद्धये । अन्नम्भट्टेन विदुषा रचितस्तर्कसङ्ग्रहः ॥

[ SECT. 81.

इति श्रीमहामहोपाध्यायान्नम्भट्टविरचितः स्वकृतदीपिकया श्रीगोव- धनकृतन्यायबोधिन्या च समेतस्तर्कसङ्ग्रहः समाप्तः ॥

NOTES

SECT. I.

महलम्.

“Having enshrined the Lord of the universe in my heart, and having made a salutation to the pre- ceptor, I compose this Compendium of all knowable things for the easy comprehension

Opening prayer.

of beginners.”

Following the usual orthodox practice, the author begins his work with a prayer to the deity and a salutation to the preceptor. This, say the com- mentators, is necessary for the completion of a work, and for two reasons; first because it is enjoined by the S’ruti, and secondly because its necessity is proved by inference. Of course there is no express Vedic text, enjoining the яyʊ, but the existence of such a text can be assumed on the authority of good usage (farerare), by the well-known rule laid down by Jaimini असति ह्यनुमानम् * ’ S’ ruti text is to be inferred when an express one is not to be found.’ The argument for inferring a S’ruti text on the authority of शिष्टाचार is thus stated by T. D. - A मङ्गल is an act enjoined by the Vedas, because it has always been the object (fara) of mneonimon (अलौकिक ) and unprohibited (अविगीत) practice of wise men, like af and other rites. It is obvious that this inference is only available for the assumption of a text, when the शिष्टाचार happens to be अलौकिक (uncommon or sacred and अत्रिगीत ( unprohibited ). An अलौकिकशिष्टाचार is that which is not ameum, i. e, caused by our own inclina- tions, such as the ordinary human acts of eating and drinking, but which is practised as a duty rather than as a pleasure; while it is safe when it is not expressly prohibited by Sruti like the performance of a Sraddha ceremony at night.

Jaim. S. I. 33.

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Tarka-Sangraha.

[ SECT. I.

The Vedic origin of a #y having been thus esta- blished, the additional inference which proves its necessity for the completion of a book is rather of secondary im- portance. It is to be admitted however as a geom ad,

an argument supporting the S’ruti. This inference is based on our experience that a book is finished when it is com- menced with a #, and not otherwise. This experience however, says an objector, is not invariable. We have instances of works which are left unfinished in spite of ample मङ्गल

in the beginning, and also of books that were completed without the superfluous aid of a . The reply given to this objection is hardly convincing. It is founded on the maxim स्थितस्य गतिः समर्थनीया, and can only be justi- fied on the supposition that the necessity of has been

मङ्गल already incontrovertibly proved by the adagia, and that the secondary inference is to be accepted only so far as it supports that S’ruti. The author says that in those cases where the books were left unfinished in spite of the the obstacles must be supposed to have been too numerous to be overcome by the amount of # actually made, while, in the contrary instances of works completed without the , we might presume that the author had offered the required prayer, either in his previous birth or silently in his mind, although he did not insert it in his book.

The jour Anuban- dlure.

(purpose) 3 m

[[9]]

The second line of the stanza indicates, as is usually done, what are called the four Anubandhos. or necessary elements of a literary work. These are:-1 fave (subject matter) 2 grea (connection) and 4 fraft (person for whom the book is written). The nerf in this case is a are, i. e. not an infant (स्तनन्धय ), but one who is ग्रहणधारणपटु able to understand and retain the lessons given by his tutor. Two things are necessary for the acquisition of know- ledge, a supple understanding (g), and a retentive memory (r); and only he who possesses these two qualities is fit to learn this S’astra. S. C. would have the बाल to be one who is अधीतव्याकरणकाव्यकोशोऽनधीतन्याय-SEOT. 1.]

Notes.

arrer: i. c. one who has mastered grammar, poetry and vo- cabulary, but does not know Logic. quarum explains the purpose() why a new work like this is undertaken, when there were already many ably written treatises on the subject. The name ang at once explains the subject matter (far), namely a, as well as its connection with the method of treatment adopted in the book ( सङ्गति). तर्क is defined as andrà viâqura giâ aufi, zeenfquaqqraf:. The word a is employed in Nydya writings in several different senses, but the one intended here is quite unusual. It is rarely met with anywhere except in the titles of a few manuals similar to the present work, such as तर्ककौमुदी, तर्कभाषा तर्कचट्टी and aziga. *ug primarily means a collection but here it signi- fies a compendium or brief exposition. T. D. and T. C. de- fine it simply aqur zrezGE. V. V. and S. C. give a more elaborate definition, making ang comprise three parts, namely, str (simple enumeration), agror (defini- tion) and TT (cxamination or exposition). The present book contains all these three. r from Sec. 2 to Sec. 9 and their ægror and rfræn together from Sec. 10 to the end.

Either the passage нyà zasm etc. is corrupt or the author has committed a strange solecism. I have retained the reading of A, because, while it is found in most of the copies, it is not much worse than the others given by F, Q or N. If Kiranâcali and Kâdambari are the well-known works of that name, they are quite inappropriate as opposite instances of the efficacy of y. Kiraṇávali, if it be the commentary on Pras’astapida’s scholium on the aphorisms of Kanada, by the famous logician Udayanáchârya, is supposed to be an unfinished work, said to extend only as far as the section on f; but the eight Mss. collected by Paudit Vindhyeshwari Prasad Dube for his edition in Benaras Sanskrit Series con- tain only the chapters on 64 and go. It however begins with a me to the Sun and Creator, and may therefore be a fit instance of non-completion in the spite of my. But Ka- dambari too, if it is the same as the well-known work of Bâṇabhaṭṭa, remained unfinished, although it opens with no less than 20 verses of ara. Kadambari therefore cannot

A disputed reading.

Tarks-Sangraha.

SECT. I.

serve as a counter instance of a work completed without a , unless of course we resort to the two-fold supposition, that its completion by the author’s son is to be considered as समाप्ति proper, and that the opening मङ्गल does not form part of the book. The latter supposition is apparently sup- ported by T. D’s subsequent words कादम्बर्यादी ग्रन्थाद्वहिरेव मङ्गलं , which are interpreted by some to mean that the मङ्गल verses are outside the book. But the interpretation is not approved by Nilakantha who takes the word as: to mean जन्मान्तरादौ. Either therefore the author committed a mis- take or he meant some other Kâdambari which is not known at present. The difficulty is no doubt removed in M which reads बौद्धग्रन्थादौ for कादम्बर्यादी, but the reading is not sup- ported by any other copy and is probably an emendation of some one who perceived the mistake. The commentator T. C. also omits Kadambari, and mentions in its stead a war- aftage. The other readings given in F, Q and N, and apparently supported by Nilakantha and S. C. are equally faulty, since although the solecism as regards Kâdombart is removed; a similar one is committed about Kiranávali which is neither completed nor is devoid of. T. C. and S. C. avoid the difficulty about Kiranavali by substituting anar- rent for it. Of course there is the possibility that Kiranâvali may have been finished by its author and a por- tion of it is now lost; but the supposition is improbable, and does not lessen a whit the difficulty as regards the actual presence of . Some have supposed that the Kiranávali mentioned here is a anffaegre, and not the com- mentary of Udayana, but no such work is known. In short whatever reading we accept, the difficulty created by the ention of Kiranávali and Kadambart as opposite instances is insuperable, since both of them, being incomplete in spite of a long or short e, are works exactly of the same nature.

SECT. II. ]

There

The seven categories,

Notes.

SECT. II. qraf:

[[43]]

Co-

are seven Categories:-Substance, Quality,

Action, Generality, Particularity, inherence or Intimate relation and Nega- tion. "

The Dipika following the etymological sense of the word ( qqtu eref: ) defines a ref as ‘a thing having a name’ ( अभिधेयत्वं पदार्थसामान्यलक्षणम् ). अर्थ is a thing to which the senses travel (ográffèxatíür † : ) i. e. any external object which is comprehended by the senses. are therefore, means any object that is nameable. Other definitions of q convey the same sense. S. C. defines पदार्थत्वम् as ज्ञेयत्वम् while T. C. and S. P. as farafa, i. e. any thing which is an object of knowledge. A thing however which is know- able must also have a name; and so knowability ( aura) and uameability ( अभिधेयत्व ) regarded as definitions of पदार्थ are interchangeable. The word is invariably used by the Vais’eshikas in this composite sense.

Aristotle’s

The rendering of the word art by category," though not quite accurate, is convenient ’s categories. and useful for all practical purposes. Ballantyne used the word ‘category,’ while Colebrook translated ref by ‘predicament’; but both renderings are inaccurato, in as much as they imply something which can be predicated of another, while ref implies not only a thing which is predicable of another, but also a thing which is capable of having something predicated of it. Categories, especially in the Aristotelian sense, are a classi- fication of predicates only, and not an enumeration of all nameable things (including both subjects and predicates) as the Padárthas of the Vais’eshikas are.

In this respect, the classification of the Fais’eshikas is superior to that of Aristotle. The latter enumerated ten categories, 1 Sub- stance, 2 Quantity, 3 Quality, 4 Relation, 5 Place, 6 Time, 7 Posture, 8 Appertenance or Property, 9 Activity and 10 Passivity. Of these the last nine only can be properly said to be predicable of something else i. e. substance, but sub-

[[10]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

[ SEOT. I.

stance itself, being assumed to be an Ens (Being) independ- ent of all attributes, cannot be predicated of anything. It cannot be predicated even of itself, because in that case it will be an attribute and not substance. Thus in including substance among the categories Aristotle confounded the no- tion of a predicable with that of a nameable thing; but Ka- nâda is not open to the charge in as much as his Dravya is a nameable thing, and therefore a Padârtha. Notwithstand- ing this distinction, however, the word category has been employed in so many senses by subsequent European philo- sophers that one is almost justified in using it as an equiva- lent of also. In the history of philosophy, the cate- gories have been successively a classification of universal things, or of words, or of forms of thought; and consequently they have now come to mean simply the highest classes to which all the objects of knowledge can be reduced and in which they can be arranged in subordination and system. In this general sense, Kanada’s Padúrthas are as much cate- gories as those of Aristotle or of Kant or of Mill; only that their number and arrangement would vary according to the fundamental principle on which the classification is based, and the purpose for which it is intended. The classification of Aristotle is mainly logical, that of Karáda metaphysical. One concerns with notions and propositions, the other with external objects which give rise to those notions. The seven Padârthas of the Vais’eshikas can therefore be easily appor- tioned among the categories of Aristotle. Dravya and Guna correspond to Substance and Quality, respectively. Aris- totle’s Quantity is classed among the Gunas by Kanâda. Relation is of two kinds: Samyoga and Samarâya, the first of which is a Guna and the second a distinct Padartha. The remaining categories really fall under relation in its widest sense, but some of them are separately recognized by the Vais’eshikas. Thus Time and Place are Dravyas. Activity is Karma while Passivity is simply negation of it. Proper- ty may be Sâmânya, Vis’esha, or any common attribute called by later Naiyayikas an Upadhi. Lastly Posture is der and is at best a Guna. Aristotle does not men- tion Abhava or negation as he deals only with Ens or Being.

SECT. II.]

Classifications of

Padarthas.

Notes.

[[75]]

The various classifications of Padârthas, given by Indian systematists can be likewise reduced to the seven Padârthas and vice versa, if one clearly understands before- hand the particular stand point of ench. Nyâyn writings do not explain the process by which the seven-fold division of Padarthas was first obtained, but if we may make a guess, the process must have been something like this. A notion is either positive or negative, and so the external object of a notion might be भाव or अभाव. w things again are of two kinds, properties and a common substratum in which they reside. The latter is ge. Of the properties again, some reside in many objects conjointly, others in individual things singly. The first is area, while the latter class is again divisible into properties that are stationary and those that are evanescent i. e. gror and af. The remaining two Padar- this समवाय and विशेष are assumed to explain the special theories of Vais’eshikas. Other Indian philosophical schools also have their own classification of things, suited to their particular doctrine or theory. Every system of science or philosophy in ancient times thought it necessary to begin by arranging the Universe into a few elementary classes. Thus Gotama enumerates sixteen Padârthas, necessary for the functions of logic, the Vedantins have two, Chit and Achit; the Ramanujas, one more, İs’vara; the Sankh- yus, twenty-five; the Mimâmsakas eight; and so on. All schools do not use the word qr exactly in the same sense. It is used even more loosely than the word category in Europe, and often-times implies nothing more than topics to be treated in a book.

Why seven.

The Tarka-Dipika says that the word we is used to exclude a larger number. T. D. and other commentaries here give a curious dis- quisition as to whether an eighth Padár- tha can be logically proved. An eighth Padartha is either known or unknown. If it is known, it exists and the res- triction to seven is wrong; if however it is unknown it cannot be negatived, because there can be no negation of an unknown quantity. This dilemma is cleared by defining

[[76]]

Tarka-Sangrahu.

SHOT, II.

पदार्थra to be द्रव्यादिसप्तान्यतमत्वव्याप्य, ie the genus पदार्थ is covered by any one of the seven species, Dravya etc. The passage, however, beginning with ag is of doubtful authen- ticity, as it is questioned by Nilakantha, who remarks, " च बहुषु पुस्तकेषु सप्तान्यतमत्वाप्रसिद्धिशङ्कातत्समाधानपरस्य ‘ननु सप्तान्यत- मत्वमित्यादिग्रन्थस्यासत्त्वेऽपि न क्षतिरिति ध्येयम्.’

Á guess.

It is probable that the word ‘seven’ is used merely to emphasize the seven-fold enumeration of the modern Vais’eshikas as distinguish- ed from the six Padárthas of Kanada and the sixteen of Gotama. The original aphorisms of Kanada mention only six categories, and the seventh, arra, is added by commentators on the ground that the six up to war being all things, i. e. entities, necessarily imply their contradictory the non-entity. Consequently many first di- vide things into are and wr, the former being then sub- divided into six. The sixteen categories of Gotama and several others assumed by other Naiyâyikas, are reconciled with the sevenfold enumeration by T. D. in its concluding passage."

£4

潜

SEcr. III. द्रव्याणि.

Of these seven categories (ax=argerândă 8. C. ) the class Dravya comprises nine, and nine only:-Earth, Water, Light, Air, Ether, Time, Space, Soul and Mind.

Substances.

Out of the seven categories enumerated in the pre- ceding section, the author now mentions the nine sub- divisions of the first, Substance. T. D., T. K., T. C. and S. C. give two definitions of द्रव्य, ic द्रव्यत्वजातिमत्त्वम् and गुणवत्त्वम् to which may be added क्रियावत्त्वम् aud समवायिकारणत्वम् ; but all these, except perhaps the last, are defective. The first appears like a purely verbal definition, or a truism which teaches us nothing new about the thing defined. S. C. how- ever tries to justify it by arguing that grama is independ- ently proved, either by direct perception or by inference. The inference is put thus, द्रव्यवृत्तिर्या समवायिकारणता सा किञ्चि-

P. 64 supra,

#ECT. III. ]

Notes.

ཏ ཝ

दुर्मावच्छिन्ना, कारणतात्वाद्दण्डवृत्तिकारणतावत्, i. e. the intimate causality residing in a Dravya is distinguished by some attribute (which is the genus Dravya or substantiality ) because every causality such as that of a stick has a disting- nishing attribute. The argument of course makes two assumptions which are not yet proved, viz. that only a Dravya can be an intimate cause, and that such a canse must have some attribute to distinguish it. The second definition is superior though still defective. If we say that a sub- stance is anything in which qualities reside, we exclude an important class of substances, namely all created things just at the moment of their production, when according to the theory of the Naiyâyikas they are without any attribute. आये क्षणे निर्गुणं द्रव्यं तिष्ठति is an axiom of Nytya, for if the qualities are supposed to rise simultaneously with the sub- stances and not a moment later, all distinction between qualities and substances will virtually disappear. The defi- uition or will not therefore apply to Dravyas at the first moment of their creation and is therefore rear. The defect is remedied by amplifying it thus, गुणसमानाधिकरण-सत्ताभिन्न जाति- मत्त्वं द्रव्यत्वम्. Although products in the first moment are without attributes, they possess even then a smâ (i. e. sedra in this case) which co-exists with qualities in the same sub- stratum. But such a definition again would be too wide be- cause war (existence) is also a ma that is co-existent with qualities; hence the word

is inserted in the defini-

गुणवत्

tion to qualify . This amplification however makes the latter definition almost as verbal as the first egasnaararı, only that the word er is avoided. Though thus theoreti- eally faulty, the definition is good for all practical pur- poses. The definition awarerurqa is technically correct, for only a Drurya can be the wanderer of a product, but it is quantes as being based on a peculiar doctrine of Vai- šeshikus and is not therefore easily intelligible to ordinary people.

The difficulty of defining a substance accurately arises from its very nature.

A definition which is not to be merely verbal must be an exhaustive enumeration of all essential attributes; but a substance er hypothese is something

[[78]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

[ SEOT. III.

that, while underlying all attributes, is quite distinct from them. Now if the qualities which are enumerated as the defini~ tion of substance are essentially and invariably connected with it, they are part and parcel of substance itself, and not attri- butes distinct from it; while if they are not so connected they do not constitute a definition. This dilemma has per- plexed philosophers of all ages and countries, and conse- quently many of them, like Berkeley in England and the Bauddhas in India, have denied any independent entity such as a substance altogether. This is not a satisfactory solution however, as the necessity of having some substratum for the qualities still remains. To obviate this, others like the Vedantins acknowledge the reality of substance but call its manifestation अनिर्वचनीय indeñinable or माया-

Why nino.

tion of the is a dravya.

What is darkness.

The propriety of is the same as that of ☛w in the last section, the words being used to limit the number of substances to nine only. T. D. here controverts the posi- Bhaṭṭa school of Mîmâṁsakas that darkness Darkness, says the objector, is a substance be- cause it is blue and moves, and therefore the definition of

Dravya, gorfaserad strictly applies to it. But darkness cannot be classed under any of the nine dravyas above enumerated. As darkness has colour it cannot fall under any of the last five, ether, time, space, soul and mind, which are colourless. It is not air because it has neither touch nor constant mo- tion which are the attributes of air. It is not light, as it has neither bright colour, nor hot touch. It is not water be- cause it has neither cool touch nor white colour, the colour of water. Lastly it is not earth, because it has neither scent nor touch. Darkness therefore, not falling under any of the nine dravyas, must be regarded as a tenth one, and so the restriction to nine is wrong. Having thus stated the objector’s argument in full, T. D. answers it by declaring that darkness is, according to the Naiyâyikas, merely the negation of light. A tenth dravya can be either with or without colour; but darkness cannot be the latter as it is blue. Nor can it be a substance having colour, because

SEOT. III. ]

Notes.

[[79]]

every such substance requires light for being perceived with the eyes, while darkness is perceived only when there is no light. Darkness is therefore defined as प्रौढप्रकाश तेजः सामान्या- : i. e. absence of large and illuminating light in general. The S. C. explains the propriety of each word in the defini- tion thus: The word implies that darkness is total absence of any light whatever, and not the absence of a particular light such as that of the sun or the moon or a lamp. The word is necessary because otherwise there will be no darkness wherever there is gold which is classed by Naiyayikas under Tejus. Finally fre excludes the possibility of darkness being negatived even by minute particles of light. How is then the perception of blue colour and motion in darkness to be accounted for? T. D. declares it to be a mis-apprehension. Besides the above two views with respect to the nature of darkness, Madhavâchâryz the author of Sarvadarsana-Sangraha* mentions two more, namely those of Sridhara, the reputed author of Nyâya- Kandali and of a section of Prabhakara school of Mimâṁsa- kas. The first mentions that darkness is nothing more than the blue colour imposed on something else, thus making darkness a quality only; while the latter call it absence of knowledge of light, and not that of light itself. A fifth doctrine would say that instead of regarding darkness as the absence of light we should deem it a drarya and regard light itself as the absence of darkness. But these views are not warranted by experience, and the one propounded above as to darkness being the absence of light is the most satis- factory. The controversy however well illustrates the apti- tude of Indian mind for hair-splitting.

A definition.

Incidentally T. D. gives under this section the three characteristic marks of a perfect de- finition. T. D defines & लक्षण as दूषणत्रय- TÊN ĐẢO Ở. C. an attribute free from the three faults. A more Scientific definition of gu, however, is that given by Vatsyayana उद्दिष्टस्यातत्त्वविवेचकधर्मो लक्षणम्, a

Sarv. D. S. Calc, ed, p. 108.

[[80]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

[SECT. III.

definition is an attribute which differentiates the definitum from all things different from itself.* In other words

is what English logicians call a ‘differentia.’ Another defi- nition of er is carafe which with the qualifications men- tioned by I’. D. means the same thing as the preceding. A fourth definition and of a somewhat different kind is TET- रणधर्मः, and असाधारणत्वम् is defined as लक्षतावच्छेदकसमनियतत्वम् Forgeft, a characteristic mark which exactly covers all (i. e. not more nor less) things denoted by the definitum. From this it will be seen that the idea of a definition entertained by Indian logicians was somewhat narrow. It was not an exclusive enumeration of all the essential characteristics of a thing, but only a differentia, or laying down the boundry" (as the word definition etymologically means) which separated the thing defined from everything else. The function of a defi- nition was more negative than positive; that is, a defini- tion was more often intended merely to exclude all things other than the definitum than to give us any accurate notion of the definitum itself. Accordingly any characteristic that was peculiar to the definitum was made to serve the pur- pose. The consequence was that the definitions of the Naiyâyikas often became merely verbal or nominal, which satisfied the ear as it were but conveyed no idea of the thing defined. द्रव्यत्वजातिमत्त्वम् and पृथग्व्यवहारकारणम्, which are given by Annambhatta as definitions of ger and ya res- pectively, may be mentioned as instances of this kind of in- consequential definitions. Another device employed to es- cape difficulties was first to give a wide description of the definitum and then to narrow it down by the express exclu- sion of superfluous objects by using words like gar or fa as for instance, the definition of इन्द्रिय, शब्दतरोद्भूत etc. For practical purposes however the definitions of Naiyâyikas are generally useful and often ingenious; and a student bearing the above limitations in mind will escape the misconcep tions and prejudices that are likely to arise owing to the peculiar form of many definitions he will meet with in the course of his study.

Våt. on G. S. I, 1, 2.SEOT. IV. ]

Its three defects.

Notes.

[[81]]

The three faults mentioned in the definition of gr

given by T. D. are अव्याप्ति, अतिव्याप्ति and असम्भव. अव्याप्ति is लक्ष्यैकदेशावृत्तित्वम् 2. e. non-pervasion of the characteristic on a portion of (the class denoted by) the definitum. For instance, if we define a cow as a tawny animal, we exclude all black, red or white cows. emasana is extension of the attribute to things not denoted by the definitum, as when we define a cow as a horned animal, and thereby include buffaloes that have horns but are not cows. r is the total absence of the characteristic on the definitum itself, as when we define a cow to be an animal with uncloven hoofs; Of these atva is only a kind of in excelsis. In short a proper defi- nition ought to be neither too narrow, nor too wide, nor totally false. If for instance we define a cow to be an ani- mal having a dew-lap, we avoid all the three faults, since all cows have dew-laps and none but cows have them. It is not possible always to have such a perfect definition. Annambhaṭṭa often employs simple enumeration instead of a regular definition; and when even this is not possible he contents himself with an approximate description. For examples of the first see Sects. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 9, while for the latter see Sects. 8, 11, 12, 20, 25-32. Such enumera- tions or descriptions, besides, are better suited to the un- trained understandings of the beginners for whom this trea- tise is mainly written. The author has wisely relegated all abstruse definitions and discussions to the commentary.

SECT. IV. go

“There are twenty-four qualities, viz. colour, taste, odour, touch, number, dimension or magnitude, seve-

Qualities.

rality, conjunction or contact, disjunction, priority or propinquity,posteriority or remote- ness, weight, fluidity, viscidity, sound,intellect or understanding, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, effort or volition, merit, demerit and faculty.”

[[11]]

Quality define.

Tarka-Sangraha.

[ SHOT. IV

The T. D. dofiues a Guna asteraamaara, possessing the genus Guits, or अव्यकर्मभिन्नत्वे सति सामान्यवान् “possessing generality and being at the same time different from substances and motions.” The first is only a verbal definition, but the latter needs explanation. According to the theory of the Naiya- yikas,” affa or are resides in three Padúrthas only, viz. Dravya, Guya and Karma. The definition ranged would therefore cover all the three, and hence it is restricted to Guna by expressly excluding Dravya and Karma. The same is expressed in another way as हव्यावृति- नित्यवृत्ति-जातिमात् i. e. possessing a sun which permanently inheres in a re- ceptacle other than a Dravya. Here the word fra excludes afaana which, like individual motions, is transitory; while the epithet उव्यादानि excludes both area and सत्ता.

Guna distinguished from Dracya and

Karmth.

The defi-

nition of Guna given in B. P. is fuller, er erfar der fagur निष्क्रिया fatetur promit i. e. Gunas reside in dravyas and are them- selves devoid of attributes and motions. This slightly varies from the original definition of Kanada, which is geur- अय्यगुणवान संयोगविभागकारणमपेक्ष इति गुणलक्षणai The ex- pression wiwsreez is added in the Sûtra to exclude Karma which is the cause of conjunction and disjunction.

Comparing the several definitions of Gana, we find that it is clearly distinguished from Drav- ya as an attribute dependent on something els i. e. drazya, which is self-supported, while it is distinguishable from Karma, as an attribute which is fixed or permanent, and not evana- scent or transitory. Both Guna and Karma, quality and motion, are accidents attaching to Substance, the Ens, which underlies and supports them; but Guna is permanent, while Karma is evanescent. They are as it were two different phases of the same phenomena. Gana in the process of change is action, while karma when made fixed and perma- nent becomes a guna. For instance, the motion of a carriage is action because it may cease at any moment, but

See Infra Notes to Sect. VI and LVII.

† B. P. 85.

V. S. I, 1, 16.

SECT. IV.

Notes.

[[83]]

the motions of the earth and the planets are gunas because they are permanent and belong as it wore to their very nature; Similarly heat which is Guga is produced by mo- tion of molecules, while ger or weight produces the action of falling. This distinction is succinctly put in one of the definitious of Guna given above, zuure-Rea¿ía-allÃ¤n, and will be made still more clear by the following extract

“We understand by a quality that which truly constitutes the nature of a thing–what it is-what belongs to it per- manently, as an individual, or in common with others like it-not that which passes, which vanishes and answers to no lasting judgment. A body falls: it is a fact, an acci- dent; it is heavy: that is a quality. Every fact, every acci- dent, every phenomenon supposes a quatity by which it is produced, or by which it is undergone; and reciprocally every quality of things which we know by experience mani- fests itself by certain modes or certain phenomena; for it is precisely in this way that things discover themselves

to us.

17-*

It is doubtful whether the Naiyayikas of India had ob- tained a correct notion of qualifies, while as to actions they do not seem to have gone vory deep into the matter. The list of 24 gunas is by no means based on a common funda- mentum dirisionis, while subsequently there is no attempt to probe into the real nature of each.

The Tarha-Sangraha like all modern works on Nydya enumerates twenty-four Gunas, but Nunder of gralitics, the original aphorism of Kapada mentioned only seventeen. The Sutra runs:– geacrarf: agmar: «Karan? gred satv@unit qvarvtâ zqu:

परिणाने

वोपविभागीपरत्वापरत्वे sug:û reeîûr games gant To this list commentators add seven more, vem rau dày dear chi wauf and, under the shelter of . S’ankara Misʻra, the author of Upaskara

सुखदुःखे पलाख गुणान

Diet, des Sciences Philosoph. quoted in Fleming’s Vocabulary of Philosophy, p. 398.

1 V. S. I 1, 6.

[[84]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

[ SECT. IV.

explains the omission by saying that these seven are not expressly mentioned in the Sutra because they are too well- known. The addition is expressly made by Pras’astapâda.† It cannot at present be ascertained who had the ingenuity of first discovering this hidden meaning of; but the fact at any rate shows that there was a time when the system was sufficiently elastic to admit material improvements. The modern school of Naiyâyikas reduce the number of guņas to 21, excluding yea aura and gu as being not gunas proper. q and area, they say are accounted for by faveera and ifteera or ज्येष्ठत्व and कनिष्ठत्व, while पृथक्त्व does not differ from अन्योन्याभावः

gupra

Others have tried to increase the number of gunas by further additions. T. D. instances 3 gunas which are not expressly mentioned in the list, viz. लघुत्व, मृदुत्व and कठिनत्व, आलस्य.

, while S. C. adds a fourth are. These, however, it is argued, need not be considered as separate gunas, as all of them are negations or contradictories of some one of the 24 gunas. Thus लघुत्व is nothing but the negation of

गुरुत्व,

while मृदुत्व and कठिनra are simply different degrees of संयोग. आलस्य is the opposite of प्रयत्न. In this way any quality not mentioned in the list can be shown to fall under one of those already mentioned. On the other hand, if it be asked why both fand erf are mentioned since the latter can only be the opposite of the former, it is answered that the Naiyayika idea of eryf is that of something posi- tive, and not simply the negation of . era is actual demerit and not the mere absence of merit. The same remark applies to three other pairs of contrary qualities, संयोग विभाग, परत्व अपरत्व, and सुख दुःख. Logically speaking, these are the contraries and not the contradictories of each other. Some include both fand erf under one head

अदृष्ट.

† P. B. Ben, ed. p. 10.

B. P. 161.

SECT. IV. J

Heariness and light-

ness.

Notes.

[[85]]

The explanations are no doubt ingenious but there appears to be a good deal of confusion of ideas. In saying that agra (lightness) is the opposite of 5, Annambhaṭṭa seems word g, viz., ‘heavi-

to confound the two senses of the ness’ and ‘weight’. ger is opposed to go in the first sense alone, while in the latter and the wider sense, namely weight, it is only a lesser degree of e, both lightness and heaviness marking different degrees of weight. Similarly मृदुत्व and for either of them are also entitled to be classed independent qualities like, for all the three are different degrees of # of particles. r being identical

with fenate or inertia is a positive quality and not merely a negation of effort. The nine qualities from are onwards are peculiar attributes or functions of Soul and ought to have been classed separately. The enumeration of gunas in fact is rather rough and unscientific.

The twenty-four gunas have been distributed in various ways according to the different principles of division adopted. The gunas are either नित्य or अनित्य, सामान्य or विशेष, Some of these

Classification qualities.

एकेन्द्रियग्राह्य, न्द्रियग्राह्य or अतीन्द्रिय, and so on. distributions are given below, as likely to be

dents

useful to stu

I. First, the twenty-four gunas are distributed among the nine substances in the following manner :-

स्पर्शादriset वेगाख्यसंस्कारो मरुतो गुणाः । अष्टौ स्पर्शादियों रूपं द्रवो वेगश्र्व तेजसि ॥ स्पर्शादयोऽष्टौ वेगश्र्व गुरुत्वं च द्रवत्वकम् । रूपं रसस्तथा स्नेहो वारिण्येते चतुर्दश ॥ स्नेहहीना गन्धयुताः क्षितावेते चतुर्दश । बुद्ध्यादिषकं सङ्ख्यादिपञ्चकं भावना तथा ॥ qafuat yon gà amaa: eyagear i सङ्ख्यादिपञ्चकं कालदिशोः शब्दश्व ते व खे ॥

[[86]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

सङ्ख्यादयः पञ्च बुद्धिरिच्छा यत्नोऽपि चेम्बरे ।

परापरत्वसङ्ख्यायाः पञ्च वेगश्व मानसे* ॥

SEOT. IV.

“The qualities of air are touch, number, quantity (di- mension), individuality (severality), conjunction, disjunction, priority, posteriority, velocity and faculty. The same first eight qualities together with colour, fluidity and velocity, are assigned to light.

“Water is the site of 14 qualities, riz. of the eight be- fore mentioned (1. e. traffic), and further, of velocity, gravi- ty, fluidity, colour, taste and viscidity.

“Earth has the same qualities, with the exception of viscidity, and the addition of smell.

The 14 qualities of the soul are intellect, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition (effoit), number, quantity (dimension), severality, conjunction and disjunction, faculty, merit and demerit.

“The qualities of time and place are number, quantitý (dimension), severality, conjunction, and disjunction. The same qualities together with sound belong to ether.

Those five qualities (सङ्ख्या, परिमाण, प्रथक्त्व, संयोग, and f) together with intellect, desire, and volition (effort), are sited in God; the same five qualities with posteriority and velocity, in the mind.”

II.

Gunus are also divided into graper and fast. A विशेष गुण is defined द्रव्यविभाजकोपाधिद्वयसमानाधिकरणावृत्ति-गुणवृत्ति- andarat which in simple English noans a quality that re- sides in one substance only at one time, and not in two or more substances conjointly. rare gunns are those which reside in two or more substances jointly. The HTATET gunas are enumerated as follow :-

gauneng maisar: She: aitutedì ga: 1 अदृष्टभावनाशब्दा अमी वैशेषिका गुणाः ॥

B. P. 23-33.

† Roer’s translation of B. P. Bibl. Judd. p. 13.

‡ T. D. p. 60 Supra.

and

SECT. V.

]

Notes,

[[87]]

सङ्ख्यादिरपरत्वान्तो द्रव सांसिद्धिकस्तथा ।

गुरुत्ववेगौ सामान्यगुणा एते प्रकीर्तिताः ॥ °

“Special qualities are: intellect, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, effort, touch, viscidity, natural fluidity, fate, me- mory and sound. General qualities are: number, quantity (dimension), severality, conjunction and disjunction, priority and posteriority, derived fluidity, gravity, and velocity."†

III. Gumus are also divided into those which are ap- prehended by one external sense only (gana ), vis. colour, taste, odour, and touch; those which are apprehend- ed by two senses, eye and touch (a), viz. number, dimension, severality, conjunction, disjunction, priority, pos- teriority, fluidity and viscidity; and those again which are not perceived by any external sense (erafga ), viz. gravity merit, demerit and faculty.

For other classifications sec M. M. Bhimacharya’s Nyaya-Kośa (second edition) pp. 232-4, and Bhûsha-Pari- chchheda, 85-97.

CAÑANGAN MELANTANIMLANGERASI

Sror. V. कर्माणि.

Motion or Action is of fire kinds onty, viz. tossing or throwing uperards. Dropping or throwing downwards, Contruction. Expansion and Going or Motion in general.

Jullie

The division of Karma is in strict conformity with the aphorism of Kanada.‡ The T. D., as in the case of Guy, offers two definitions of Karma also, of which the first संयोगात्वे सति संयोगासमवाविकारre is a renl one. Mo- tion is the non-intimate cause of conjunction, but is not itself conjunction. The meaning of seafarer will be explained later on it is sufficient to note here that only

❤

B. P. 89-91.

† Roer’s Translation of B. P. Bib, Ind. p. 53.

V. S. 1, 1, 7.

[[88]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

[ SECT. V.

karma and some guans can ever be the non-intimate causes of dravyas or guņas. Karma is supposed to be the non-inti- mate cause of conjunction, as when a hand touches a book the motion of the hand is such a cause of the conjunction of the hand with the book. But sometimes one conjunction is the non-intimate cause of another conjunction, as for in- stance, the conjunction of the hand with the book is the non-intimate cause of the connection of the whole body with the book. This conjunction therefore is expressly excluded by the words संयोगभिन्नत्वे सति.

Other definitions.

The definition of Karma given in Kanada’s sûtra, is more elaborate though essentially the same. एकद्रव्यमगुणं संयोगविभागेष्वनपेक्षकारण- fala zĤegura* means that action inheres in one substance, but is not a quality, and is the direct and immediate cause of conjunction and disjunction. The first two epithets exclude ag and some qualities like संयोग, while the last is practically idential with संयोगासमवायि- Error of T. D. S’ankara Mis’ra mentions several other defini- tions of Karma in his Commentary on V. S. I, 1, 17 (Calc. ed. p. 35). The only one which is worth noting is fanfa- सत्तासाक्षाद्वयाप्यजातिमत्त्वम्, which means that कर्मत्वजाति resides in a thing (f) which is never permanent. The wider genus सत्ता resides in द्रव्य, गुण and कर्म of which the former two are sometimes नित्यः but कर्म is never नित्य, as it is always transitory. Karmu is said to last only for five mo- ments, † and so कर्मत्वजाति is said to be नित्यावृत्ति.
The division of Karma into five kinds does not appear to be very logical. If all miscellaneous motions such as gyration (r), evacuation (a), flow (a), flaming up (ऊर्ध्वज्वलन) and slanting motion ( तिर्यग्गमन) are to be classed under simple going (a), why cannot, it may be

V. S. I, 1, 17. OV.S.1.1.

† Roer’s Transl. B. P. Bibl. p. Ind. p. 4 nots.

#BOT. VI. ]

Notes.

[[89]]

asked, vayur and the other three also be similarly inclu- ded under it? Nilakantha justifies this arbitrary division on the quaint but easily comprehensible ground that it would be sacrilegious on our part to question what is laid down by a free-willed sage like Kanada (नवोत्क्षेपणादीनां गमनेऽन्त भीवोऽस्त्विति शङ्कtter । स्वतन्त्रेच्छस्य नियोगपर्यनुयोगानर्हस्य ऋषेः सम्मतत्वादिति भावः) A closer inspection, however, might reveal some sort of principle even in this arbitrary division. Motion is prim- arily divided into three kinds according to its direction, namely, vertical, horizontal and slanting or miscellaneous. The vertical motion may be from below upwards (r), or from above downwards (err). Horizontal motion also may be twofold, motion nearer to oneself (g) or motion further from oneself (err). All other motions

(प्रसारण). are relegated to the comprehensive class of . It is not of course meant that the above groups exactly correspond to the ordinary conceptions of er etc.; but that some such principle was in the mind of the Sútrakâra when he made the division seems to be highly probable.

SECT. VI. सामाम्यम्.

Genus or Generality is of two kinds, wider or extensive und narrower or limited.

Generality.

In Section LXXVII Annambhaṭṭa defines ATATED AS नित्यमेकमनेकानुगतम्, and adds that this सा- a resides in Dravya, Guna and Karma. There are three characteristics of generality: that 1 it is eternal, 2 it is one, and 3 it resides in many. Conjunction and some other qualities such as farfatuur reside in many, but they are not eternal, and therefore the word far in the definition of er excludes them. The dimension of an atom is both eternal (for atom is eternal) and resides in many; but it is not one residing in many ( एकमनेकानुगत ) and hence the word एकर. अत्यन्ताभाव however

[[12]]

[[90]]

Tarka-Sangraha

SHOT. VI.

अनु

is eternal, one and residing in many. Therefore the word g गतम् is interpreted as समवेतम् or समवायसम्बन्धेन वर्तमानम्, thereby excluding negation which does not reside in things by inti- mate union, while a does. The word Genus is a conve- nient rendering of me as Ballantyne and others have adopted it, although it is not quite accurate.

Genus may perhaps be a more appropriate rendering of a. Genus in English not only means the common characteristic residing in several individuals, but comprehends the individuals also, while सामान्य or जाति denotes only the common characteris- tic. Genus is class, सामान्य or जाति is the common attri- bute which distinguishes that class. Other definitions of Tr are, नित्यत्वे सत्यनेकसमवेतत्वम् and नित्यत्वे सति स्वाश्रयान्योन्याभाव- समानाधिकरणम् which are however not as good as that given by T. D. But they all imply that ware was conceived by later Naiyâyikas to be some attribute having a real external existence in the individual objects comprised in it. The original aphorism of Kanada is ambiguous and conveys a somewhat different notion. सामान्यं विशेष इति बुद्धयपेक्षम् * conveys the sense that the notion of generality depends on the ope- ration of our own intellect. A quality becomes a only if we conceive it as residing in many; while the same is for when we regard it as a differentia. A property for instance exists in a certain number of objects, which are so far of one kind; if we use the property for grouping those objects into one class, it is arreu, if for distinguishing them from all other objects in the world, it is far. Thus an attribute, though inhering in the object, cannot become a

until our intellect has recognised it to be so. long, for example, as I have seen only one elephant and do not know that there are others of the same kind, the genus elephant does not exist, at least so far as I am concerned. Similarly the same attribute e. g. घटत्व, is सामान्य if regarded as residing in all pots, and is a fast if regarded as distin- guishing pots from other things. Such seems to have been the original conception, but subsequently are appears to

V. S. I, 2, 3.

AsSHOT. VI. ]

Notes.

[[91]]

have come to be regarded as an attribute having an absolute and not merely a relative existence externally.

In later times arare

came to be used synony- mously with arfa, and was given an

Annam-

Varieties of Sâmanya. independent and eternal existence apart from the individual objects. This will be clearly seen from the various divisions of सामान्य. bhatta, following the commentators on Kanada’s aphorisms divides सामान्य into पर and अपर, higher or extensive and lower or non-extensive. The instances are (existence) and

(substantiality) respectively. Of course the terms and we are relative only, the same attribute gera for in- stance being a with respect to and qe with respect to चटत्व. Some other writers make a threefold division of सामान्य- The T. A. for example divides me into 34TTE ( widest ) eg. सत्ता, व्याप्य ( narrowest ) e. g. घटत्व and व्याप्य- व्यापक ( middle ) eg. saयत्व. This division obviously regards the common characteristic as existing in itself and absol- utely, while the former two-fold division only sought to fix its relative extent as compared with higher or lower gener- alities.

द्रव्यत्व can be sometimes and sometimes are, but सत्ता must always be व्यापक, and द्रव्यत्व only व्याप्यव्यापक. The terms in the former division were relative; in the latter they are absolute. This is not the place to discuss which division is more consonant with reason, but it may be noted that the latter though apparently simple is beset with difficulties from which the former is free. Annambhaṭṭa therefore was justified in disapproving of the threefold division, if we may accept the interpretation of the word इति after परमपरं च as given by V. V., which remarks अत्रेतिशब्दस्य स्वसमभिव्याहृत-पदार्थ- तावच्छेदक-परत्वापरत्वरूप-द्विप्रकारवत्सामान्यमिति वाक्यार्थः.

पर

सामान्य is again divided into two sorts, अखण्ड and सखण्ड- The first is otherwise called and is de- fined as साक्षात्सम्बद्धं सामान्यम्, that which is directly connected with the thing such as gaur ad etc. The second is called guy and is defined as

Jati and Up&dhi.

[[92]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

[ SECT. VI.

परम्परया सम्बद्धम, indirectly or mediately connected with the object, such as gurura qfuged etc. Every common characte- istic does not constitute a jâti. A number of persons might be blind or lame or black, but blindness lameness or black- ness does not constitute an independent class. The circum- stances which prevent a common characteristic from be- coming a játi are summed up in the following verse of Udayanâchâryarainm

wàriqgen ugîrsenaaïtata: i

रूपहानिरसम्बन्धो जातिबाधकसङ्ग्रहः ॥

The circumstances that prevent generality from becoming a class are six:(1) Unity of the object, e. g. the sky being one all-pervading thing, there is no jâti as erangirea;; (2) Identity of things though the names be different, e. g, aza and grea are not different jatis as both words denote the same thing; (3) Cross-division, e. 9. yaar and far are not játis as they constitute cross-divisions, arrester being a and not मूर्त, and मनस् being मूर्त but not भूत, while the remaining four, पृथ्वी, अपू, तेजस् and वायु, being both भूत and मूर्त ; ( 4 ) Want of finality, e. g. jâti itself cannot have jâti on it, for in that case, there being jâti over jâti ad infinitum, there will be no finality; (5) Violation of essence, e. g. the Viseshas (particularities), though innumerable, cannot have a jâti

va on them, because by hypothesis they are essentially opposed to the conception of jâti; (6) Lastly, want of pro- per connection prevents jati, e. 9. are cannot be a jâti because, as every jati rests on its a by war, there cannot be a समवाय on समवाय, and समवायत्य, if accepted as a játí, cannot have any connection with its rer. All these therefore are mere Upadhis. The student will now be able to understand Annambhaṭṭa’s remark that wer, or more properly its one variety the jâti, can rest on Dravya, Guņa and Karma only, and cannot rest on the last four Padarthas. Even amongst the first three there are many things that cannot have ma, such as ether, time and space. It will be seen from the above that surfer is any characteristic which be- longs to several individuals, while ma is only a particular kind of them, fulfilling certain conditions necessary to consti-

SBOT. VII. ]

Notes.

[[93]]

tute a proper class. These conditions are implied by their opposites in Udayana’s verse quoted above. If you take a hundred persons you can arrange them in various groups, as for instance by their nationality, or the language they speak, or the complexion of their body, or by their education. But each of these groups cannot constitute a class, for in that case there will be the absurdity of one person belonging to several classes, and all notions of genus and species will be confounded. Human being is a class because we can at once recognize certain well-marked characteristics which clearly distinguish human beings from all other animals; but black- ness cannot be a class, for if it be so we shall have to group black men in the same class as black sheep or black stones. This distinction between ama and guma is very important and is one of the subtlest discovered by Indian logicians.

SECT. VII. Aastar:.

The Individualities or Particularities residing in eternal things are innumerable.

Particularity.

The idea of far, particularity, (called meaty by

Kanada) is a counterpart of that of THE (generality), as the one necessarily implies the other. In Sect. LXXVIII, Annam- hhatta defines far as residing in eternal substance and serv- ing the purpose of distinguishing them from each other, while this section further tells us that those particularities are in- numerable, one being assigned to each eternal substance. A more accurate definition of विशेष is स्वतो व्यावर्तकत्वम्, that which distinguishes self from itself. The peculiarity of a Ves’esha is that it performs the double function of differentiating one eternal substance from all others, and also that of different- iating itself from other Viseshas and everything else. The latter assumption is necessary, because otherwise we shall have to suppose a second Visesha over the first to differenti- ate it from others and so on ad infinitum.

[[94]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

[ SHOT. VII.

The eternal substances in which Viseshas inhere are the atoms of the first four substances, earth, water, light and air, together with the remaining five substances, ether, time, space, soul, and mind.

घटा-

Other definitions of Visesha are जातिरहितत्वे सति नित्यद्रव्यमा- वृत्तिः, एकमात्रसमवेतत्वे सति सामान्यशून्यः and अत्यन्तव्यावृत्तिहेतुः, all of which amount to the same thing, namely, that Višesha is a padartha assumed to account for the difference of atoms and other eternal substances from one another. The neces- sity of this assumption is established by S. C. thus:-“ar- दीनां कपालसमवेतत्वादिकं पटादिभेदकमस्ति परमाणूनां तु परस्परभेदकं न किश्चिदस्त्यतोऽनायत्या विशेष आश्रयितव्यः " A jar is distinguished

“A from a piece of cloth because the component parts of the first are distinct from those of the latter ( अवयवभेदादवयविभेदः), and so on we may argue until we arrive at the ultimate con- stituents of matter, namely the atoms. But as an atom has no parts, we cannot account for the distinction of one atom from another by the same process of reasoning. Similarly we cannot account for the mutual distinction of other imper- ishable substances such as ether, time and space. There is therefore no help (arar of S. C.) but to assume a separate individuality in each of these substances to account for its distinctive character. This individuality is called the far of that substance, and they are as innumerable as the atoms and other eternal substances. It is not right to translate this far by difference’ or differentia,’ because the latter words denote the special characteristics of a species as distinguish- ed from genus, while concerns the individual only.*

[[4]]

Why Vis’esha is recognized.

This doctrine of far is supposed to be a peculiar tenet invented by the Vaiścshikas, and one from which they derive their appellation; but it is singular that the original aphorisms of Kanada do not give much prominence to it. It is referred to

See Bain’s Deductive Logic p. 73.

SBOT. VII. ]

Notes.

[[95]]

only incidentally as it were, in the Sarra अन्यत्रान्त्येभ्यो विशेषेभ्यः which, while treating of rare, distinguishes its occasional farat from the well-known ultimate Viseshas, that are called final, because they reside in the final atoms of matter. On this bare reference the commentator Prasastapâda founds the theory of fare which is however wholly repudiated by many of the modern Naiyâyikus who are otherwise followers of the Vaiseshika school. They argue that, granting that Viseshas are necessary to distinguish individual atoms, there must be something else to distinguish the Viseshas them- selves from one another. If however it is said that the latter function is done by the Viseshas themselves by some peculiar inherent faculty, why not theu attribute this inherent faculty to the atoms themselves. If you have to bring in the inhe- rent faculty somewhere, why not suppose it in the individual atom itself and discard the superfinous Višesha altogether, rather than first attribute a l’isesha to the atom and then at- tribute the inherent faculty of self-distinction to the Višesha? The argument is irresistible but not a new one. Prasasta- pada the oldest known commentator on Vaiseshika Sûtra already anticipates and auswers it thus:-“Neufâsıqca परमाणुषु कस्मान्न स्वतः प्रत्ययव्यावृत्तिः प्रत्यभिज्ञानं वा कल्प्यत इति चेन्न, तादात्म्यात् । इह तादात्म्यनिमित्तप्रत्ययो भवति, यथा घटादिषु प्रदीपात् । न तु प्रदीपे प्रदीपात् । यथा च श्वमांसादीनां स्वत एवाशुचित्वं तयोगादन्येषां तथेहापि तादात्म्यादन्त्यविशेषेषु स्वत एव प्रत्ययव्यावृत्तिस्तद्योगात्परमाण्वादि fara. The answer however is hardly satisfactory. It is of course scarcely needful to say that the doctrine of Fisesha is not accepted by other Indian schools of philosophy such as the moderu Naiyayikus, the two sections of the Mîmûmsukus, namely, the Bhâṭṭas and the Prabhakaras, and the Vedantins.

V. S. I, 2, 6.

† See V. S. 1, 2, 3, and our Note under Sect. VI, on p. 90 Supra.

P. B. Ben. ed, p. 322.

[[96]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

SECT. VIII. nana:

Intimate Union is one only.

समवायः

[[4]]

[ SHOT. VIII

Har etymologically means the act of coming together closely, and is therefore used to denote a Intimate Union. kind of intimate union’ between two things which are thereby rendered inseparable so that they cannot be separated without themselves being destroyed. It is therefore more appropriate to translate war by intimate union’ rather than by co-inherance as Ballantyne has done. Annambhaṭṭa defines war in Sect. 79 as a permanent connection existing between two things that are always found inseparable.” The war is called far- सम्बन्ध in contradistinction to संयोग which is a guna and is always अनित्य. The expression अयुतसिद्ध denotes things one of which is always dependent on the other, as the jar on its components or the quality on the substance. ergaff is the opposite of gafa which may be taken to mean either ‘prov- ed to be joined’ or ‘proved to be separated,’ according as we take the verb g in the sense of to join’ or to separate.’ In either case the meaning of gaf is the same. In the first sense garde means things which are proved to have been actually joined and therefore which must have once existed in a state of separation, while in the latter sense gaffe simply denotes things which are proved to have once been separated. Those things therefore which are not thus proved, that is, which have never existed in a separate condition are agafara. The two halves of a jar were separate before they were joined together; their connection therefore is which can be destroyed at any moment by separating them again. But the jar never existed and can never exist separately from the two halves; the connection of the jar with the halves is therefore war. These orgafer things are limited in num- ber. In fact there are only five pairs of things between which amara is supposed to exist, viz. 1 the product and its parts ( adamaqfar ), 2 the quality and the qualified (goryforit ), 3 the motion and the moving (fazanfarargedt ), 4 the indivi-

[[4]]

SKOT VIII. 1

Notes.

[[97]]

dual and the common characteristic (amacant), and lastly 5 particularity and the eternal substance in which it inheres ( Aavazza). The definition in the Sútra is simpler and less * from comprehensive इहेवनिति यतः कार्यकारणयोः स समवायः, which it may be inferred that the notion of war was crude at first, and must have been gradually developed by later writers.

In Sect. VIII Ânnambhatia emphatically says that

Samavâya is one and eternal.

only relative,

r is far in

wary is one and one only, in order to repu- diate the position of the Prabhâkara Mi- mimsakas and a modern school of Naiya- gikas. These latter deny even नित्यत्व to समवाय. The नित्यत्व of aware is proved by the argument that as all positive pro- ducts (भावकार्य )are gouerated in their material cause by समवाय relation, a q if produced will require another and so on ad infinitum. qerare terefore must be regarded un- producible 7. c. Arg. Of course this faerer is and not absolute sneh us that of an atom. the seuse that it eau aoither be produced nor destroyed without producing or destroying the product. Now comes the question why this soporte entity of reary is recognized at all. Here there is a difference of opinion between the Naiya- yikas and the aidesilus, on the old and the modern schools, as S. C. calls them. The former hold that war is observ- ed by perception, and chereibre no other proof is required to prove its existence. The 17’sadilax however, of whom An- nambhatta is uno, deny perceptibility to gare, ou the ground that a convectiou is perceptible only when the two connected things are perceptible, while aware often exists between things une of which ( 6. g. star the waanderror of srz) may be imperceptible. In their opinion war is proved by inference only, and the argument is often put as Annambhatta has put it in his commentary on Sect. 79.

[[6]]

→ V. S. VII, 2, 26.

[[13]]

WASUARDO MENTIONS, ANLAvica tahmund

[[98]]

Samavdya.

Tarka-Sangraha,

REOT. -VIII.

The doctrine of war is very important and may in one sense be said to be the corner stone of The dostrine of Nydya philosophy. It is the war that explains the phenomenon of causality as conceived by the Naiydyikas; and it is this theory that makes them so intensely realistic, in marked opposition to idealistic schools like the Vedanta. The conception of ware is in fact a key to the whole theory of causation as viewed from the Nyaya standpoint, and consequently the doctrine has been strongly animadverted by writers of the Sankhya and Vedantic schools who hold different views. The Bhâṭṭa Mimâṁsakas also agree with the latter in repudiating quary. The theory of atoms for which the Naiydyikas have been so famous is but a necessary result of the doctrine of . Śankard- charya, in his commentary on Brahma-Sutra II. 2. 13, lays his finger accurately on the weakest point in the way theory, namely, the inconsistency of calling war a connection between two distinct things, and at the same time regarding it as of a totally different kind from war. If urπ oxists on the संयोगि dracyus by समवाय, समवाय also requires another समवाय to exist on the समवायिs; and so there is the absurdity of an ad infinitum. To avoid this difficulty waar is rogarded as a distinci padûrtha and not a guna; and the Naiyâyikus add that the first समवाय does not rest

another but is identical

समवाय

with it.

upon the समवायि by Why then, rejoins ur to be identical with the

the Vedântin, do you not take संयोगिs. As to संयोग being a gure and समवाय an independent padartha, says the Vedantin, that is a technicality of your own invention, and we do not accept it. It cannot also be said that समवाय being नित्य is of a different kind from संयोग, and must be treated differently, for we also is sometimes eternal, as for example the संयोग of काल or आकाश with परमाणु, while wara itself is not truly eternal, it being liable to des- truction by the destruction of the product. But the chief

SBOŤ. IX. 1

कारण

Notes.

[[09]]

objection against समवाय is that, if समवाय is to be regarded as identical with its and ar, would it not be better and simpler (ar) to regard the rf itself as identical with the ? Hence the Vedantins and the Sâñkhyas hold the cause and its product to be connected with each other not by समवाय, but by the relation of identity (तादात्म्य). The doctrine of अयुत- fr on which that of wary depends is also ruthlessly criti- cized by S’ankaracharya.* The gist of his criticism is that the notion of cause and effect being orgafe, that is, being con- nected together in an inseparable union, is directly opposed to the hypothesis that the cause is always anterior to the effect. As matter of fact the canse and the effect are one and the same thing, and not two different things joined to- gether inseparably by a fictitions union called war. The whole realistic theory of the Naiyayikos is therefore based on a fiction which has no basis in actual experience. This is not the place to go deeper into this controversy which has been vigorously carried on between the rival disputants from the earliest to the latest times; but what has been said will be sufficient to give the student an idea as to how the doctrine of war and the theory of cansation built upon it lie at the very root of the whole Nya system of philosophy.

SEUT. IX. HET:

Negation is of four kinds-Antecedent, Consequent, Abso- tute and Reciprocal.

Negation.

The ninth section only enumerates the four kinds of ne- gations, reserving the definitions of each for a future occasion. They are antecedent negution or non-production, consequent negation or destruction, absolute negation and reciprocal negat- ion. The word negation used by Ballantyne conveys the idea of Abhava better than non-existence, which is hardly applica-

Brah. Sút. II, 2, 17,

[[100]]

Turku-Sangreha.

SHOT. IX.

ble in the case of adverury. Antecedent negation is that

अन्योन्याभाव. which exists before a thing is produced, and the consequent results after its destruction. Absolute negation exists always and in all places except where the thing itself is. Reciprocal negation is the denial of one thing being any other, such as a jar not being piece of cloth.

Other writers divide rare first into two kinds, oredtear- me and eftertære, and then split the latter into the remain- ing three. Thus Visvandtha says in Bhisha-Parichchheda:—

anng fur ésaraîteornadza: 1

WITHTEERAT Báisturuvarate yZ)

एवं वैविध्यम

gé àfawnya: derviere godt (”

Mutual or reciprocal negation may be defined as the negation of identity. All other kinds of aegation are grouped under daniwia which, literally translated, means negation by contact, the contact being between the thing negatived and thing on which its negation is affirmed. Thus when we say HE HAÒ VÃì auf we affirm the nogation of ag on a particular spot. Similarly the autecedent and the emergent negations also are affirmed with reference to some external szur, with which they are said to be connected, while warra simply denotes the mutual non-identity of two things. In short, in both kinds of era, viz. god and eq, there are always two things referred to; but in the first, one is negativ- ed of the other, while in the other, both are negatived of each other. Thus au seterrere may be resolved into two deaf- भावs. For instance घटः पटो नास्ति is proposition affirming the mutual negation of ve and qe; and it may be split up into two propositions घण्टे पटवं नास्ति and पढ़े घटत्वं नास्ति, both of which are examples of संसर्गाभाव. In अन्योन्याभाव the words expressive of the two things are always in the same caso, i. e. the nominative; while in the other case one word is usually in the locative as denoting the war on which the negation rests. संसर्गाभाव is divided into प्रागभाव, प्रध्वंसाभाव and अत्यन्ताभाव, of which the first two are nothing else but the non-produ-

B. P. 11, 12,

1SBOT. IX.

Notes.

[[101]]

ction and destruction of a thing. samara is absolute negation, and comprises all varieties other than those mentioned. A discussion as to its exact nature will be found under Sect. 80.

Abhava defined.

अभाव.

The simplest definition of me is water, what is distinct from existing things, but other definitions are more elaborate. S. C. defines अभावत्व as प्रतियोगिज्ञानाधीनविषयत्वम् .. padartha the knowledge of which is dependent on the know- ledge of its contradictory. S. M. defines it as nevereur- za padartha in which rest the mutual negations of all the other six padárthas, i. e. which is distinct from the six catagories, substance etc. While really meaning the same as wraft, this definition begs the question by inserting ettearrara, a sub-variety of era, into the defini- tion of me. It is therefore faulty. A third definition, given in Sarva-Daršana-Sangraha, is eamuret exemand- parat, 7. e. crurar not being itself query is not connected with anything else by gara. Naiyayikas hold that rarer is an object of direct perception and is connected with its आधकरण by the relation culled विशेषणता that is, when we say घटाभाववतन we regard घटाभाव as an attribute of भूतल, just as we call us the attribute of qu. This peculiar conception of negation discloses the habit of Naiyâyikas to invent any number of fictitious conventionalities, if they are convenient for practical purposes. Really speaking, to class rare as a padarthu along with the other six is an absurdity. There is not the least resemblance between the two groups, as one is the direct opposite of the other.

mmary.

Ta, can be a padartha only in the most literal sense of the word, namely, the connotation of a word (war), but really speaking it cannot be said to have any external existence. It is non-existence pure and simple, and all varieties of it such as the non-existence of this thing and that thing are mere couventionalities of speech. In what respect, for instance, does a very differ from a germa Really in nothing essentially, for both agree in their simple

Saro, D. S. Calc. ed. p. 109.

[[102]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

SECT. IX.

character of negation. But one might say that we find घटाभाव even where there is a पट and vice versa ; and there- fore the two negations must be different. But this means that we only attribute the difference of the things (f) to their negations. In other words, the gf on the अभाव is simply आरोपित, while as a matter of fact all negh- tion is pure and characterless. It follows that rare cannot really be the विशेषण of भूतल, for a विशेषण, in order to be apprehended, must exist, while the essence of a is non- existence. Vedantins and others therefore who refuse to recognize अभाव as a padartha regard it simply as कैवल्यरूप, that is, as itself and nothing more.

era

[[44]]

수

It seems that the laiseshikas had not originally cou- ceived of as a separate padûrtha. Kanâda’s aphorism* enumerates only six padarthas, omitting er altogether. But the ingenuity of commentators has added a seventh category as being intended though not expressed by the Sûtrakára, the intention being gathered from the occur- rance of the word in some other Sutras, such as **- भावात् कार्याभावः and असतः क्रियागुणव्यपदेशाभावादर्थान्तरम्. f To recognize a separate entity because a word expressive of it occurs somewhere in a work is not indeed a very strong argument. Similarly Cdayanacharya in his Kirandvali remarks “ga qaraf: ( the six mentioned in V. S. 1, 1,3) प्रधानतयोद्दिष्टा अभावस्तु स्वरूपवानपि नोद्दिष्टः प्रतियोगिनिरूपणाधीननिरू– पणत्वात् न तु तुच्छत्वात्. This is more like an apology for the non-mention of or in the original Sûtras than an agu- ment for recognizing it as a separate padartha. Whatever be the case, the recognition of we as an independent entity has been a distinct gain to Indian logic, in as much as it has greatly facilitated the processes of analysis and reasoning. Even those who deny it the status of a padârtha cannot often help clothing their propositions in its terms. The wonderful accuracy of Indian syllogism is in a great measure due to the use of such fictitious but well-understood expressions as अभाव, प्रतियोगी and अनुयोगी.

V.SI, 1, 4. † V. §. 1, 2, I.

V. S. IX, 1, 3.

SECT. X. J

Notes.

[[103]]

Here ends the first chapter of Tarka-Sangraha, which S. C. names पदार्थोद्देशविभागनिरूपणम्. According to the well- known dictum of the scholiast, the Vaiseskika system con- sists of three parts, the enumeration. the division and the definitions of padarthas. The author of Tarka-Sangraha first enumerates the Padarthas in the second section, and then proceeds to state their divisions and subdivisions in Secs. 3 to 9. From the tenth section onwards he enters upon their definitions or a severally, and defines them in the order in which they have been enumerated.

SECT. X. पृथिवी.

Earth is one that has odour. It is of two sorts, eternal and non-eternal. Eternal is atomie, non-eternal is product. It is also threefold, body, organ and object. Body is that like ours; organ is the olfactory sense at the tip of the nose; object comprises the earthy stones and the like,

Earth.

The author defines earth as regat having odour,’ which menus गन्धसमवायिकारणम्, the inti- mate cause of odour. The relation expres- sed by the termination here is war only, for otherwise the definition will overlap on time and space, with which गन्ध is connected by कालिक and देशिक rela- tions respectively. Besides the apparent fazna on time and space, the T. D. notices three other objections against the definition: 1st, it will not apply to a product which, be- ing composed of parts having both good and bad smells, is rendered odourless owing to the two kinds of smell being mutually destroyed; nor can it be said that in that case per- ception of odour is rendered impossible. You will have therefore, says the opponent, either to recognize a f

· variegated odour, which you do not, or your definition will be inapplicable to such a euse. The author denies both alternatives, saying that in such cases we can distinctly ap- prehend the different odours of component parts, and so there is no need of recognizing one variegated odour of the whole. The second objection is the same as in the case of quare as

S. M. Calc. ed. p. 21.

[[104]]

Turka-Sangraha.

[ 8E07. X.

a definition of Dranya, viz. that it will not apply to a pro- duct in the first moment of creation, when it is supposed to be without attribute. The answer to the present objection is also the same, viz. amplification of the definition (p. 77). The third objection is drawn from our experience that even water and other substances besides earth possess smell. The answer is that the smell belongs not to the water but to earthy particles mixed with it. There is a fourth objection which the author does not notice. We see many earthy things such as stones which are odourless, and the definition may not apply to them; but the answer would be that the smell in them is g, that is, though existing, it is not perceived owing to unfavourable circumstances.

अनुद्भूत,

Its attributes,

Although odour is mentioned as the differentiating at- tribute of earth it is not its only attribute. Kandda’s aphorism रूपरसगन्धस्पर्शवती पृथिवी describes earth as possessing four qualities colour, savour, odour and touch, which Sankara Misra con- strues as giving four alternative definitions of earth. Besides these four material qualities, earth is credited with ten others, making in all 14 qualities residing in earth, for which see quotation Supra. p. 85.
Four copies A B D and K add a before wevanî, but the pratikas in all the copies of Dipikô except A, as well as that in S. C. show that the sentence began with eqqat, and that the a got into the text by error, probably from the opening sentence of the Dipika. The ar in the Dipikó is ex- plained by Nilakantha as वृथिव्यादिषु ( नवद्रव्येषु ) मध्य इत्यर्थः-

Earth eternal and non-eternal.

Earth is first divided into eternal and non-eternal: the first being atomic, and the second a pro- duct. T. D. defines नित्यत्य as ध्वंसाप्रतियोगित्वम, its contrary ध्वंसप्रतियोगित्यम् being अनित्यत्व. That which is not liable to destruction is eternal, and its op- posite is the non-eternal. These definitions of T. D. are how- ever incomplete. Vâkya-Vritti defines färger and share more correctly, as नित्यत्वं प्रागभावाप्रतियोगित्वे सति ध्वंसाप्रतियोगित्वम् and

V. S. II, 1, 1.

SEÚT. X. ]

Notes.

[[105]]

afarera arreraप्रतियोगित्वध्वंसप्रतियोगित्वान्यतरवस्त्वं बोध्यम्. The T. D. does not take into account past as well as future eternity, and consequently its definition of नित्यत्व overlaps on प्रध्वंसाभाव which, being indestrnetible, is ध्वंसाप्रतियोगी, but which is not नित्य as it has प्रागभाव. There are some however who regard ध्वंस as eternal;and according to them T. D’s definitions will be correct. नित्यत्व is also defined in another and a simpler way as त्रैकालिक- dentara. “being distinguished by a connection with the three times, past, present and futuro”, ¿.e. existing in all times. Whichever definition we take, products are always an as they do not exist prior to their production. The eternal portion of earth is the atoms which are the ultimate material causes of all earthy products. The atomic theory of the Vaišeshikas will be explained later on. (See note Sect. XIII. )

Another division.

Earth is again divided into three kinds, body, organ of sense and muss. The body is that which belongs to human beings like ourselves; the organ is that of smell which appre- hends odour and is situated at the root of the nose; while mass comprehends all other earthy things, such as stones etc. This threefold division of earth is very ancient, being deriv- ed from the aphorism of Kanada. But there is a difference of opinion as to whether this threefold division is of qfarat in general or offer great only; and the controversy, so far as we are concerned, turns partially, if not mainly, on the cor- rect reading of the passage in Tarka-Sangraha. A reads ar gafafur, but as all other copies of the text as well as the commentaries agree in omitting T before ga: there was no alternative but to omit it here also. The reading r can be defended on the ground that by unmistakably applying the threefold division to arfer graft it makes the meaning of the passage clear, and thus brings the text into harmony, not only with other works like P. B., S. P., S. M., and others, but also with the Kanada’s uphorism aga: greene कार्यद्रव्यं त्रिविधं शरीरेन्द्रियविषयसञ्ज्ञक. The word सा however is not absolutely necessary, since S. C. extracts the same sense out of the word ga:. The chief objection againstær, as also against

V. S, IV, 2, 1.

† Ibid.

[[14]]

[[106]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

SHOT. I.

the interpretation put on the passage by S. C. to make it con- form with the works mentioned above, is that the interpre- tation does not agree with T. D.’s note on the passage - प्रकारा- न्तरेण विभजते. The remark apparently shows that the threefold division is not a sub-division of one of the two kinds of gra first mentioned, namely are, but an altogether inde- pendent division of great itself. Having divided earth into eternal and non-eternal, the author mentions another divi- sion of the same according to its forms and functions. But here comes the question, does Annambhaṭṭa say something which is in direct opposition to Kaņâda’s Sûtra? The Sûtra distin- ctly ascribes the three-fold division to product earth only; and the scholiast Prasastapada also clearly states his op- inion by remarking त्रिविधं वास्याः कार्ये । शरीरेन्द्रियविषयसञ्ज्ञकम् । Annambhatta, by taking in the whole earth (eternal and uon-eternal), would be plainly contradicting the Sûtra and the scholiast, which is highly improbable as the present work is distinctly based on Prasastapāda’s scholium. As a matter of fact, whichever interpretation we take, the ultimate result, as observed by Nilakantha, is the same, namely, that laid down in the Satra. Nilakantha noticing these two ways of interpretation remarks अत्र नित्यपृथिव्याः शरीरेन्द्रियभिन्नत्वरूपविषयलक्षणाक्रान्तत्वेन विषयान्तर्गतत्वमिति पृथिव्यास्त्रिवि- धत्वमत एव मूले पुनस्त्रिविधेत्युक्तिः सङ्गच्छत इति ध्येयम् Even if the. three-fold division be ascribed to a in general, it does. not apply to er gift, that is, atoms, as all the atoms obviously fall into the third of the latter three divisions i. e. विषय. Iu other words, नित्या पृथिवी instead of being the genus of the latter three kinds becomes a variety of one of them. In this way the passage in T. D. can be made to agree with the Sutra, and both views reconciled.

शरीर is defined as आत्मनो भोगायतनम्, but & more accurate definition is अन्त्यावयवित्वे सति चेष्टाश्रयम्, that is, a final product which possesses voluntary action अन्त्यावयवित्व is defined as अवयवज-

The three varie- ties of earth.

P. B. Ben. ed. p. 27. ·

SEOT. X. J

Body.

Notes.

10%

न्यत्वे सत्यवथव्यजनकत्वम, a thing which is produced from parts but does not itself become a producer of another product, such as a jar. Our body is such a final product, because it does not constitute a part of any other larger product; and it possesses the additional character of being the seat of voluntary actions. rer is defined as हिताहितमाप्तिपरिहारार्थक्रिया an act which conduces to the acquisition of the desirable and prevention of the undesir- able. A hand or a foot is also the seat of such rer, but it is not a final product as it forms a part of a larger body. Body is divided into embryonic, and

अयोनिज non-embryonic. The first is शुक्रशोणितमेलनजन्य and belongs to human beings, quadrupeds, birds etc. The second kind is possessed by insects born of perspiration, plants and semi-divine personages, like the sage Manu, who were self- born owing to the influence of age. This classification com- prehends the whole Biology of the Naiyâyikas.

Organ.

The second division of earth is organ of sense, which is also limited to animate nature. siege is de- fined as शब्देतरोद्भूतविशेषगुणानाश्रयत्वे सति ज्ञान- कारणमनः संयोगाश्रयम. “An organ of sense is the seat of that contact of mind which produces knowledge, but is not the seat of any manifested special qualities except sound.” The Naiyâyika theory of perception is given by S. C. thus — आत्मा मनसा संयुज्यते मन इन्द्रियेणेन्द्रियमर्थेन ततः प्रत्यक्षम्. “The organ is united with the external object on the one hand andis on the other connected with the mind which acts as a link with the soul.” So the contact of the mind is with two things at once, viz. the soul and the organ, and both are the causes of knowledge. The first part of the de- finition therefore ending with is therefore inserted to ex- clude the soul, who is the seat of 14 special qualities, *while the organ of sense possesses none. But then one might object that as the organs of sense such as smell and sight partake of the nature of their respective constituants, viz. carth and light, they must possess odour and colour, the special qualities of

Bee quotation p. 85-6 Supra.

[[108]]

Tarka–Sangraha.

(BOT. X.

earth and light. The answer is that they do possess them, but the qualities are not manifested in them, and hence the word is inserted to qualify far. In this form how- ever the definition becomes too narrow, because it does not apply to a, the organ of hearing, which being by hypothesis आकाशस्वरूप possesses on उद्भूतविशेषगुण . शब्द. This defect is removed by excluding शब्द (शब्देतर) from the special qualities that are not manifested in an organ of sense.In this way the definition is made to denote an organ alone. Other and perhaps simpler definitions of इन्द्रिय are शरीरसंयुक्तं ज्ञानकारणमतीन्द्रियम* and स्मृत्यजनक - ज्ञानजनक- मनः संयोगाश्रयत्वम्. + In the first of these अतीन्द्रिय excludes the Soul and external objects, while शरीर- संयुक्तम excludes निर्विकल्पज्ञान which being अतीन्द्रिय is the prox- imate cause of a. In the second definition the words स्मृत्यजनक exclude the Soul. इन्द्रिय is of two kinds, the internal (era) which is mind, and the external ( af?- f) which are five, i. the organs of sight, hearing, taste, smell and touch, corresponding to the five elements. Of these the organs of smell, taste and hearing apprehend qualities only, while the rest apprehend substances as well as qualities.

Object.

8 The third division of earth is far object, which compre- hends the whole mass of inorganic sub- stances. The term fry is used here some- what loosely. It signifies everything that at any time becomes the object of our knowledge. Organs of sense not being objects of direct perception may perhaps be excluded from the class far, but organic bodies, at least of all the living beings beside ourselves, do become the objects of perception and ought therefore to fall under विषय. One’s own body being snbjective ( आध्यात्मिक ) may be ranked apart, but the bodies of other persons are as much objects of knowledge as houses or stones. Why then should they not be included under ? The reason is that the word fra is used here in a restricted sense. It

T. K. p. $.

† Tattva-Chintamani.

SHOT.-X. ]

Notes.

[[100]]

means those things only which are always the object and never the subjects of knowledge. The bodies of living beings though objects of other men’s knowledge are subjective so far as each individual is concerned, while inanimate things like stones not having any knowledge of their own must always remain objects and objects only. This point does not seem to have been clearly understood by commentators, although the difficulty was perceived by them. S. C. for instance remarks “येतदक्षर्ण शरीरादावतिव्याप्तमिति विभाव्यते सदा शरीरेन्द्रियभिन्नत्वमेत्र तदनुसरम् । वस्तुतस्तु शरीरादिकमपि विषय एव । भेदेन कीर्तनं तु बालधीवैश- ar.” that is, although the three-fold division is a cross- division in as much as the usual definition of विषय (भोगोपयोगी fara:) would also apply to bodies and organs, the latter are classed separately for the clear understanding of beginners. This explanation of S. C. is of course copied from a similar one in Muktavali: शरीरेन्द्रिययोर्विषयत्वेऽपि प्रकारान्तरोपन्यासः शिष्य- graf:.* It is difficult to guess how such a cross-divi- sion tends to the easy comprehension of beginners, but prob- ably these commentators, while noting that body and organ are expressly excluded from fa, did not quite realize why the meaning of the word far was thus restricted. It is also significant that Aanambhattre defines विषय simply as शरीरेन्द्रिय- er, and thus carefully abstaius from any reference to भोग or उपभोग.

9 There are two other questions with regard to the extent of the class faq which cannot be so easily answered. The first is whether atoms are included in . The definition ärvirṁ would of course exclude them, for atoms being safe can never be the objects of enjoyment. Besides other works expressly exclude them. Bhasha-Parichchhoda for instance has:–

विषया

णुकादिश्व ब्रह्माण्डान्त उदाहृतः ॥

On the other hand, as observed in a previous note ( Supra p. 106 ) Annambhaṭṭa would seem to include atoms under faq, and the fact that he gives a definition of which

*S. M. Culo, ed. p. 27.

† B. p. 37.

[[110]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

{ RO. XE

applies to atoms as well as products supports the conjecture. The second question is whether plants are to be classed with

f or with f. The question seems to have very much exercised later writers, and there is a difference of opinion. Prasastapâda,includes trees under,†while Viśvanâtha,the author of Siddhânta-Muktâvali declares in favour of the op- posite view. Sankara Miśra discusses the arguments on both sides and arrives at the only reasonable conclusion, an Terrariन्द्रियत्वं च नोद्भिदां स्फुटतरमतो न शरीरव्यवहारः t Annam:– bhatta also would seem to take the same view.

SECT. XI. IT:

Water is a thing having cold touch. It is of two sorts, eternal and non-eternal. Eternal is atom, non-eternal is the product. It is again threefold, body, organ and objeet. Body is in the region of Varuna, organ is the sense of taste perceiving savour and residing on the tip of the tongue; masses are rivers, seas etc.

Water.

Water is defined as having cool touch. Like carth, water is divided, first into eternal and non- eternal, and then into body, organ and mass. The watery body is possessed by beings in the regions of Varuna, the organ is the organ of taste located at the tip of the tongue, and the mass comp- rehends rivers, oceans etc. This and the following paragraph on light closely resemble the last one treating of earth, and appear to have been inserted with an eye to symmetry. They are good examples of how a passion for analogies and sym- metry in everything often leads to unwarranted and absurd con- clusions. Because we see earthy bodies and earthy atoms, we are also asked to believe in watery and luminary bodies as well as atoms in the l’aruna and Aditya regions respectively. Kaṇáda defines water as myraeqsfara enfrzar: rarur:,§ and also affirms.

P. B. Ben. ed. p. 23.

† S. M. Cale. ed. p. p.26.

V. S. Up. Calo, ed. p. 214. § V. S. II, 1, 2.SEOT. XII. ]

Notes.

[[111]]

the coldness of the touch of water, but it is singular that no trace of the subsequent classification is found in his Sûtras. These details in the case of water as well as of light have been supplied by commentators, whose dialectical ingenuity never fails to supply arguments for defending the grossest absurdities. The objection, for instance, that a watery body having no solidity, would be like a bubble of water, incapa- ble of enjoyment, is met by the reply that though such a body would be mainly composed of watery particles, there would be enough of earthy atoms in it to add consistency and cohesion. This watery body is held to be only arr. Another objection that if coldness is the special attribute of water how is it felt in slabs of stones, is answered by attrib- uting the coldness to the presence of water in the stone. The remarks made in the three preceding notes on the last section as to the propriety of the division and cross-division, apply mutatis mutandis to this and the following sections also. For the qualities residing in water see quotation at p. 85 Supra.

SEcr. XII तेजस्.

Light has hot touch. It is of two sorts, eternal and non- eternal ; eternal is atomic, non-eternal is product. It is again threefold, body, organ and mass; body is well-known in the Solar region, organ is the sight which perceives colour and resides in the forepart of the black pupil of the eye; mass is fourfold, earthy, heavenly, gastric and minerul. Earthy (mass) is fire and the like; heavenly is lightning ete. produced from watery fuel; gastric causes digestion of things eaten; mineral is gold and the like.

The only variation in this section over the last two is the sub-division of faqa into four kinds of light: Light.

1 earthy, in the shape of common fire and the light of the glowworm; 2 celestial, in the shape of lightning which is fed by the fuel of water ( peri qe aa), as well as sun-light, moon-light and sub- इन्धनं यस्य marine fire; 3 gastric, which is instrumental in digesting the food eaten; and 4 mineral, such as gold and other metals. The first two kinds are undoubtedly real fires; but it will require

V. 6. II, 2, 5.

[[112]]

Tarha-Sangraha.

[SHOT, XII.

a very strong metaphor to class the latter two among the luminary substances. The gastric juice is called fire because it consumes food like fire, and produces heat in the body. The last case of luminous metals will be discussed further ou.

The threefold division of light and the four-fold sub- division of its third variety are taken from

Was

Varieties of lustre. Prasastapâda’s scholium, while the origi- nal Sutras themselves contain no trace of them. Sankara Misra, the anthor of Upuskara gives an- other four-fold division of light, viz. 1 having both colour and touch manifested, as sun-light; 2 having colour mani- fested but touch unmanifested, as moon-light; 3 having both colour and touch slightly unmanifested, as the lustre of the eye; and 4 having colour slightly unmanifested, but touch fully manifested, as a red-hot postsherd.* This division is of course not compatible with the first, and proves that the symmetrical classification adopted by Annambhuṭṭa regarded by S’ankar Misra as an innovation of the Scholiast not reconcilable with the original Satra. It may he remarked in passing that the organ of sight is located by Naiyayikas at the top of the black ball, but modern science places it still further back on the retina, the black eye-balls being simply windows to let in external light. Another now ex- ploded doctrine of the Naiydyikas was that before an object could be perceived, the organ of sight went out of the eye, reached the object and then returned back to its place car- rying with it the impression of the object; while it is now proved that the organ does not go ont at all but the rays of the sun falling on the object carry its impression to the retina of the eye.

Gold is light.

3 Naiyayikas have spent much argument to prove why gold and other metals are classed under light. The argument by which the luminosity (rear) of gold is established is explained at length in T. D. Gold is light because it can neither be earth, nor water, nor wind. any of the last five dravyas is of course tion. Gold is not earth because the fiuidity

V. S. Up, Calc. Ed. p. 74

Its being out of ques- of melted

SHOT. XII. ]

Notes.

even

[[113]]

gold is not destroyed even by application of extreme heat, while the fluidity of earthy things such as clarified but- ter is generally found to vanish at certain temperature when there is

there is no counteracting force. The fluidity of gold remains intact

in the absence of any counteracting force. Gold cannot therefore be of earthy nature. It cannot be water because its fluidity is occasional and not inherent; nor can it be wind as it has colour. Gold therefore is light, the heat and brilliancy natural to light being concealed by the obstruction of earthy colour and touch. The argument may be put in the follow- ing syllogism:-

सुवर्ण तैजसम् । असति प्रतिबन्धकेऽत्यन्तानलसंयोगे च सत्यप्यनुच्चिय- Heart । यन्नैवं तन्नैवं यथा तम् ।

The fallacy or rather a number of fallacies in this reason- ing can be easily deteced. In the first place, the propositiou that the fluidity of every earthy substance must be destroyed by extreme heat is an arbitrary assumption based on insuffi- cient data. Modern science proves that the solidity and fluidity are not definite qualities belonging to particular kind of substances as the Naiydyikas hold; but they are simply states of matter dependent on temperature. Thirdly the device of accounting for the non-appearance of any quality by the supposition of a counteracting force is often, as here, carried rather too far. If obstructing causes can explain the disappearance of heat and brilliancy of light, why can they not explain the non-destruction of the fluidity of gold? To remove this objection the words amā afdqrqi are introduced in the area, for we often see that when there is an obstructing cause, even earthy substances, such as ghee placed in water, do not lose their fluidity. But how is it to be proved that there is no obstructing cause in the case of gold also? The difficulty of converting metals to gaseous state by the application of strongest possible heat seems to have struck the Indian thinkers early, but owing to the infancy of experimental sciences they did not wait to verify their conceptions of solidity and fluidity. They rather preferred the easier way of solving the difficulty by relegat- ing these apparent exceptions to a different category altoge-

[[15]]

[[114]]

Tarka-Sungraha.

[SBOT. XIII.

ther. The Naiyayikas included the metals under wa to which their peculiar lustre gave them affinity. The Mi- mâmsakas went further and reckoned the metals as a distinct dravya.

SECT. XIII.

Air has touch without colour. It is of two sorts eternal and non-eternal; eternal is atomic, non-eternal is product. It is again threefold, body, organ and mass; body is in the aerial world, organ is the sense of touch, apprehending touch and spread over the whole body, mass is the cause of the shaking of

trees etc.

Air circulating within the body is Prána. Though one, it acquires different names such as Prâņa, Apâna, etc, owing to ( different ) situations.

Air.

This section also is modelled on the three last preced- ing. Air is defined as colourless and pos- sessing touch. It is of two kinds eternal and non-eternal, and again of three kinds, body in the regions of wind, organ of sense in the shape of the airy cuticle extending over the whole surface of our body, and object or mass in the form of the wind that blows and shakes trees.

Breath.

Another variety of air is however mentioned, called vital air or breath, which is nothing but wind moving inside our body. There is a difference of opinion as to how breath is to be classed under wind. Prasastapâda and the ancient school mention breath as a fourth kind of air and distinct from the body, organ, and mass; while later works on Nyaya generally include it under mass. It is doubtful what view Annambhatta takes, but from the unconnected manner in which he has tacked the definition of Tur to the section on ag, he seems to be undecided. While he divides arg into three kinds only, and not into four as Prasastapâda has done, he does not expressly class or under far. In the Dipika also he carefully avoids the point, although the a- तरण " नव प्राणस्य कुत्रान्तर्भावः " would seem to show that he

SECT. XIII. ]

The five breaths.

Notes.

[[115]]

had to say something on the point. He gives however a decided opinion as to the identity of the five breaths. Al- though rur is mentioned as one of the five breaths, it can also be used as a generic name for all of them, as the remaining four are nothing more than the same प्राण called by different names, according to the different parts of body it travels over and the different functions it perfoms. There are not really five breaths but only one passing through five places and performing five functions, each at its proper place. Praśastapada simply says क्रियाभेदादिभिरपानादि- सञ्ज्ञां लभते, the first word आदि including स्थान. Annambhatta has improved upon him by employing the word zum which sig- nifies both far and war. The exact meaning of 3 will be discussed further on. The five breaths are differentiated by their places in an old verse:-

हृदि प्राणो गुदेऽपानः समानो नाभिसंस्थितः ।

SEIC: ENSESTAn encr: adferfren: 11

Prána is situated in the breast, Apâna in the rectum, Samana in the navel, Udana in the throat and Vyana over the whole body.

The functions and names of the five are explained thus:- Barrierri निष्क्रमणप्रवेशनात्प्राणः । मलादीनामघोनयनादपानः । आहा- रेडु पाकार्थे वह्नेः समुन्नयनात्समानः । ऊर्ध्वं नयनादुदानः । नाडीमुखेषु वितन- नाहयानः ।

five breaths also bear mythological

names:-

These

उद्वारे नाग आख्यातः कर्म उन्मीलने स्मृतः ।

ककरः झुत्रो ज्ञेयो देवदत्तो विजृम्भणे ।

न जहाति मृतं चापि सर्वव्यापी धनञ्जयः ॥

As the whole of this peculiarly Pauranic physiology has been imported into modern Nyaya works it cannot be totally ignored, but it is not necessary to dwell on it here any further. It may be noted, however, as a good example how Indian systematists often imported foreign material into their systems, and reconciled it as far as possible with their fundamental doctrines.

[[116]]

Is air visible.

Tarka-Sangraha.

[SECT. XIII.

Air has been defined as devoid of colour, and possess- ing touch; the first epithet distinguishes it from the first three and the second epithet from the last five dravyas. The touch in the air is again neither hot nor cool, and therefore different from the touch in light or water. Air thus occupies a somewhat middle and ambiguous position between the visible and the invisible dravyas; and consequently a hot discussion has been carried on between the ancient and the modern schools of Naiyayikas as to whether air is perceptible or not. The ancients held that air cannot be perceived but can only be known by inference ; and Annambhatta inclines to the same view. The argument, says T. D., that air is perceptible like a jar, as it possesses perceptible touch, is wrong, because manifested colour is a necessary condition precedent to perceptibility. A condition ( उपाधि ) is detined as साध्यव्यापकत्वे सति साधनाव्यापकः, that which is greater in extent than साध्य (the thing to be proved) but is not more extensive than the साधन or हेतु ( reason ). In a good syllogismn / the साध्य must always be greater than, or at least equal in extent to, thee. g. the r fire should always exist wherever there is smoke, the. When however the is greater in extent than the T, there are necessarily found cases where the exists but the area does not; and consequently an argument based on that becomes fallacions. These cases Now let us put the above argument in

r will at once appear:-

are due to an gn. a syllogism, and the

ng: Kera:

प्रत्यक्षस्पर्शाश्रयत्वात्

यो यो र सात प्रत्यक्षस्पर्शाश्रयः स स प्रत्यक्षः यथा घटः ।

AAT ATTEI

तस्मात्तथा ।

Here हेतु is सोपाधिक because thero is an उपाधि intervening between the हेतु and the साध्य. The उपाधि is उद्भूतरूपवस्व (the state of having manifested colour ) and is of course greater in extent than the साध्य and less than the साधन . The उपाधि is greater than the साध्य because we can say यत्र द्रव्यत्वे सति बहिरिन्द्रियजन्य-

SECT. XIII. ]

Notes.

[[117]]

gerged angagq, all substances visible to external sens- es have manifested colour. The words and affia are used in order to make it clear that we are talking of sensuous porcep- tion of substances only, and thus to exclude a and per- ceptible qualities like . We cannot however assert q7 77 प्रत्यक्षस्पर्शाश्रयत्वं तत्रोद्भूतरूपवत्त्वं, wherever there is tangibility there is manifested colour, because we know as a fact that air though प्रत्यक्षस्पर्शाश्रय does not possess उद्भूतरूप. The उपाधि is therefore arvateater. On account of its existence the ama or major premise becomes too extensive, and the whole argument is a fallacy. Separated from its technicalities, the above reasoning amounts to this. According to the hypo- thesis of the ancient Naiyâyikas the term erger has a narrower meaning and is exclusively applied to the cases of ocular perception. Hence substances and qualities that are apprehended by other senses but are not seen by the eye do not become objects of perception. In this restricted sense of gerat, namely, ocular perception, it is evident that

उद्भूतरूपवत्र must be a necessary condition and that air which has no cannot be perceptible.

The modern Naiyayikes who affirm the perceptibility of air, deny this in toto, because they deny the very hypothesis thai. बहिर्ब्रव्यप्रत्यक्षत्व is confined to ocular perception only. Their view is explained by S. C. as being afšdərnəygi mfà महत्त्वविशिष्ट-त्रिभुव्यावृत्तविशेषगुणः महत्त्वविशिष्टोद्भूतरूपोद्भूतस्पर्शान्यतरा

, that is, everything is perceptible that possesses some special quality having age but not fager, as for instance manifested colour or manifested touch, combined with magnitude. On this hypothesis modern Naiyayikas regard air as perceptible, as it is the object of refer as opposed to amarquerer, but atoms are not, because they have no magnitude. Annambhatta holds the ancient view and regards air as infer- able only.

[[118]]

Why air is a dis- tinct entity.

Tarka-Sangraho.

[RECT. XIII.

The inference to prove the existence of erg is stated at length in T. D. The not-hot-not-cold touch which we feel on the blowing of the wind must reside in some substance as it is a qua- lity, because the anâ, àì it go: w w ffaqesuraq: is univer- sally true. Now the touch cannot reside in earth, because all earthy matter having manifested touch has also manifest- ed colour which is not found here. The touch cannot also reside in water or light, because it is neither hot nor cold. It cannot reside in the four all-pervading substances, ether, time, space and soul, for if it did, it ought to be found every- where. Finally it cannot rest in mind, because mind being atomic, any quality residing in it cannot be felt. So there must be a hinth substance, different from these, where this touch may reside, and that substance we call air.

It is not necessary to criticise the above reasoning, because it is too evidently founded on a total ignorance of the nature of atmosphere as determined by modern physical science. The idea that our atmosphere is a mixture of different gases and not one uniform arg, and that it has several distinguish- ing properties besides touch and other special quali- ties,’ never occurred to these Indian physicists. Roughly speaking, पृथिवी, जल and वायु of the Naiyayihas way be identified with the three states of matter, solid, fluid and gaseous, while a is a sort of material embodiment of the energy of heat. The Hindu physicist most probably did not know that heat and luminosity are the results of the same kind of chemical action. Luminosity or ETYGET WAS classed as a variety of colour, while so was a kind of touch. tangible dracyas, which are divided into eternal and non-eternal, the T. D. takes occasion to state the Nydya theory of creation and destruction of mate- rial things. Motion is first produced in the atoms as a result of God’s will. This motion produces conjunction of two monads giving birth to a diad. Three diads or binary atoms make one tertiary. From this last is produced the quadrate, and so on, until the great masses of earth, and water, and light, and atmosphere are formed.

As air is the last of the four

How world is created.

SEOT, XIII.]

Process of destruc-

tion.

Notes.

[[119]]

The destruction of things takes place in the same order, that is, when God wills to destroy effects, motion is produced dividing the monads, and thereby destroying the binary. Thence follows the destruction of the tertiary, and so on, until the mass of earth becomes extinct. This is the process of creation and destruction which is unanimously accepted by all Naiyâyikas; but there is a difference of opi- nion between the ancient and the modern schools as to the precise cause which immediately brings about the destruction of things. The old traditionists (r) held that with one exception the destruction of effects is immediately brought about by the destruction of their canses, the exception being the binaries which are destroyed, not by the destruction of their causes, i. e. the monads which are indestructible, but by the destruction of the union of the monads or primary atoms. In other words, the binaries are destroyed by the dissolution, and the subsequent products by the destruction, of the parts composing them. The dissolution of parts no doubt occurs in the latter cases also, but there it is itself the result of the destruction of parts. The moderns object to this multiplicity of causes on the ground that it is simpler (ra) to assume only one uniform cause in all cases, namely, the dissolutiou of the union binding the parts, than to suppose one cause for the binaries and another for other effects. In their opinion, therefore, there is only one cause for the destruction of all effects, namely the dissolution of the union which is the re- HAT WE or non-intimate cause of the product.
The difference between the two views is much more radical than appears at first. According to the former view, the process of destruction always proceeds from cause to effect, i. e. the destruction of parts always precedes the destruction of effect. When the monads are separated, the binaries are uccessarily destroyed, and the destruction of the latter as necessarily involves the destruction of the tertiaries. In this manner the final product is destroyed the last, just as it is the

[[120]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

[

BEÓT. XIII.

last to be produced. Now this is diametrically opposed to the view held by other schools of Indian philosophers, especially the Vedantins. Bâdarûyana in Brahma-sûtra II, 3, 14 express- ly says that the process of destruction is just the opposite of that of creation; that is, the final product is destroyed first, then its parts, then their parts respectively, until we arrive at the ultimate causes. In other words, destruction is accomplished by the successive resolution of things into their components. This is in accordance with the rule warrant- ed by our experience that analysis or division proceeds in a contrary way to synthesis or composition, whilst the Naiyayika theory lays down that the building and the pulling down processes are accomplished exactly in the same way. This means that as we build a house from the foundation to the top, we should pull it down in the same order. This is certainly an impossibility; for, as Sankaracharya in his com- mentary on the above mentioned Brahmasátra justly points out, if the destruction of effect follows that of parts, there must be an interval when the parts have vanished but the effect remains. Where could the effect reside in this interval? Not on the intermediate parts which are already extinct, nor ou the ultimate atoms between which and the final effect there is no direct connection. The existence of the effect in absence of the parts is as absurd as it would be. impossible to take away the foundation of a house without bringing down the roof. The theory of destruction laid down by the ancient Naiyâyikas is therefore opposed to reason as well as experience. But the view of the moderus is not so incon- sistent with the natural order of things. Their theory that destruction of effects is produced by the dissolution of the union of parts is equally reconcilable with the old Naiyâyika doctrine and the Vedantic doctrine, according as we conceive the process of destruction to begin from the non-intimate cause of age and end with that of the final product, or vice versa. - The old Naiyayiku theory is positively opposed to the order of nature, while the modern is reconcilable with it.SHOT. XIII. ]

Notes.

[[121]]

The Naiyayikus accept the old mythological idea of two cosmic dissolutions, au egiacgoq (intermediate dis- solution) when all tangible products only are destroyed, and a Harga ( universal dissolution) when all things, material and immaterial, are merged in the primum mobile, that is, the atoms. These periodical creations and destructions, says T. D., are proved on the authority of the Śruti text rar war- qfweerga, the Creator made the creation as before, the word before implying that there was a previous creation of which the present one is a copy.

น

[[6]]

The doctrine of atoms.

This is a couveulent place for an explanation of the Sagittika परमाgare or Indian atomic theo- ry, as it is essentially connected with the evolution and ultimate form of the first four substances. Tho Ngoya theory of creation and destruc- tion as explained above presupposes the existence of atoms, while the division of earth, water, light and air, into eternal and non-eterul is fonuded on the same fact. T. D. thererore properly asks and answers here the question what is the proof for the existence of these atoms on which so large a part of Nydya and Vaiseshika doctrines seems to be based. The argument brielly put by T. D. may be explained thus: Every visible thing is composed of parts, for a thing in order to be visible aner have three dimensions, length, breadth and thickness; and these dimensions necessarily presuppose smaller parts. A line has length because it is a succession of many points, while a surface has length and breadth be- cause it is a series of lines placed side-ways. A mathemati- cal point on the other hand having no dimension can never be perceived and is really speaking nothing but a notion. Having established this universal and self-evident proposi- ’tion that every visible thing has parts (यत्र यत्र चाक्षुपद्रव्यत्वं तत्र `anaqara qar q we get the further axiom, also proved by experience, that every object having parts is divisible into any number of smaller parts.

[[16]]

From these two axioms we

[[122]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

[ SECT. XIII.

come to the conclusion that by gradually dividing and sub- dividing a thing howsoever large, we can arrive at particles as minute as we please. But the same experience which gives us the above two self-evident axioms puts a limit to our power of division, and we find that beyond a certain limit we cannot go on dividing a particle ad infinitum. In modern times Chemistry has increased this power of divi- sion largely but still it is not indefinite, and science is forced to assume a limit on which it bases all its calcul- ations. This limit is the Tor of Nyâyɑ and the atom of European scientists, the smallest of the small, and the ultimate constituent of all matter in universe. Human mind cannot think without having some purely simple notions which it combines into complex ideas, and these simple notions must have their counter parts, such as the atoms, in the external world. This is the genesis of the atomic theory, and the Naiyâyika argument to prove the existence of q is essentially the same, although clothed in the phraseology of their peculiar dogmas. The smallest visible particle is the mote in the sunbeam which is called त्र्यणुक, त्रसरेणु, or त्रुटि, that is, a tertiary atom. This mote being visible must have parts. Each of these parts again, called age is divisible into smaller parts because it produces the large magnitude in the , just as the thread of a large piece of cloth is itself divisible. To explain this it must be noted here that in Nyâya theory the, magnitude, is a distinct species of dimension from age, and cannot therefore be produced from it. If gay had no parts and were itself the ultimate particle, its sure would have been incapable of producing the महत्त्व of sयणुकः while by assuming a further subdivision of age into two atoms, we can account for the magnitude of suge by saying that it is the number of atoms compos- ing the binaries forming & ज्यणुक, and not their अणुत्व, that gives rise to the latter’s magnitude. It is for this reason that while two atoms make one binary molecule three binaries are thought necessary to make up a tertiary. The number two only intensifies in the product the qfarer of

SHOT. XIII. ]

Notes.

[[123]]

each part; and thus the compound of two binaries, which are ag, would be agar i. e. still more minute, and not aga as the sque really is. Therefore the number of binaries composing the sque is fixed at three to account for its mag- nitude, while, no such reason existing in the case of ag4, the number of its parts i. e. the atoms, need not be more than two. Hence the mnemonical couplet, cdufferů यत्सूक्ष्मं दृश्यते रजः । तस्य षष्ठतमो भागः परमाणुः स उच्यते ॥ The atom is the sixth part of the little mote which we see in the sun- beam coming through the window.

The question then arises in what respect does the ar

अणुत्व of a binary differ from the age of an atom. That the two are different cannot be disputed, because atoms being parts of binaries must be smaller, and also because their fator has a distinct name quge which is never applied to binaries. Now, according to the law that like produces like, the अणुत्व of & Tणुक must be greater in degree than the पारि- माण्डल्य of & परमाणु, that is, a binary must be more minute than the atom, which is absurd. To obviate this difficulty as well as that about the # in suge, the Naiyayikas make an exception of atoms and binaries to the usual rule that the magnitude of the product is nothing but the magnitudes of parts intensified so many times. They assert that the magnitude of the product is produced by any one of the three causes, viz. the magnitude, the number, or the parti- cular arrangement of parts. Kanada, in the aphorism rur- aga,” by the in which according to commentators we are to understand the two other causes कारणमहत्त्व and प्रचय- fara, lays down this multiplicity of causes, and expressly distinguishes a from in the next aphorism. While

अणुत्व the महत्त्व of products from त्र्यणुक upwards is caused by कारण- महत्त्व as well as प्रचय, अणुत्व is caused by बहुत्व or number of parts only. But here comes the question why we should stop at the sixth part of. There seems to have been a difference of opinion as to why we must go even so far. Some are for stopping at द्व्यणुक and others at त्रुटि or व्यष्ठक

*V, S, VII, 1, 9.

[[124]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

SHOT. XIII-

even;* but no one appears to go beyond the reary, except of course the Vedantins and the Sunkhyus who deny the qgare altogether. The necessity of stopping at this limit is of course founded on the nsual argument of regressus ad infinitum. If we have to stop somewhere it is better that we should stop at the earliest limit available; for, as T. D. puts it, if this year also is a product of still smaller parts, there will be grater. The same argument is often put in another

अनवस्था. way. Why is this jar distinct from or larger or smaller than that piece of cloth or that jar? The answer is that the con- stituent parts of this jar are different or more or less numerons than those in the other. The parts of each are again larger or smaller according as they contain more or less sub-divisions. Reasoning in this way we find that a mountain is far bigger than a mustard seed, because the number of ultimate parts, that is the atoms, is much larger in the first than in the second. These ultimate particles must be all indivisible and of equal magnitude, because so long as there are degrees of size amongst them, there will be a possibility of reducing the larger to the size of the smaller, that is there will be further division. The indivisi- bility of atoms necessarily implies that they are all of equal size. It is nothing but their greater or smaller number therefore that can make one thing, like the mountain Meru, big, and another thing, like a mustard seed, small. To cal- culate these numbers we must have a common unit like परमाणु. If we however do not recognize परमाणु and go on 14iding “¿ infinitum, the number of parts in both things 1. but the parts will vary in magnitude, and the

yone is larger than the

dr will ever remain fore and the mustard

T. us the parts both the seed bung always the sale in number, namely infinite, there is no acson why the one thing should differ in size from the other, and perfect equality ought to exist between the two (qdtegevasey: ). If however, we fix upon a

ཅ

G.S. IV. 2, 17.

SECT. XIII.]

Notes.

[[125]]

unit like arg, we can easily account for their different magnitudes by the varying number of atoms in each. It can be easily guessed from this that the statement made above that the magnitude of a thing depends on the number (aga) or the size ( महत्त्व ) or the peculiar arrangement (प्रचयविशेष ) of its parts was only provisional, the real cause in all cases being the number of ultimate parts, while the latter two causes were simply the variations of the first. This may perhaps account for their omission in the original aphorism of Kanâda.*

A third but not a very convincing argument for proving the necessity of atoms may be stated in Dr. Roer’s words–

“To say that the point where the end is obtained is not eternal would be to admit the production of an effect from a thing which is not in the connection of intimate relation. Therefore this point is eternal. As the continual progress from one great thing to another still greater finds its end in the assumption of the sky and other infinite substances, so there must also be ultimately a cossation of the progress from small to a smaller thing. Thus the necessity of atoms is proved."+

Atomic theory in India and Greece.

Such is the cargar which originally distinguished Vai- seshika philosophy from others, and which was afterwards imported into various other systems. It closely resembles the doctrine of atoms which found acceptance with several Greek philo- sophers. Leucippus considered the basis of all bodies to consist of extremely fine particles, differing in form and nature, which he supposed to be dispersed throughout space and to which the followers of Epicurus first gave the nume of atoms. To these atoms he attributed a rectilinear motion, in consequence of which such as are homogeneons were united, whilst the lighter ones were dispersed thronghout space. The universe was made of matter consisting of ultimate indivisible atoms which are indestructible and

4 V. S. VII, 1. 9.

Roer’s Trans. of B. P. Bib. Ind. p. 16 note.

[[126]]

Tarka-Sangrahu.

[ SEOT. XIII.

eternal. Empedocles and Anaxagoras did not exclude mind and spirit from this atom-born universe, thus partially agree- ing with Kanada who excludes spirit but includes mind and intellect in matter. Leucippus and Democritus excluded both. Epicurus added nothing to the doctrine. The gray-

परमाणु-

of Kanâda also materially agrees with the modern atomic theory of Dalton on which the whole science of chemistry may be said to be founded. The conception of atoms, simple as it seems when once comprehended, is one of the most subtle and shows a considerable advance of philosophical thought. The doctrine has been sharply criticized by S’añkarâchârya and other Vedantic writers, and their criticisms have greatly tended to diminish its popularity; but the credit of originality is none the less due to the philosopher who first discovered it.

SECT. XIV. a.

Âkúša or ether is that which has sound for its (special) quality. It is one, all-pervading and eternal.

This definition of ether differs

Âkása or ether.

from the preceding four in that the word or is inserted in it, when the author might have as well said or शब्दसमवायि आकाशम्. What is then the propriety of the word gur? V. V. and S. C. explain it as intended to controvert the doctrine of Bhâtta Mîmâmsakas that sound is a substance and not a quality; but the explana- tion is rather far-fetched. That of N. B. and Nilakantha is better, namely that the word gru is used for fastqyor and implies that sound is the special quality of ether and ether alone, as distinguished from all other substances. Colour and other qualities are found in several substances, and even odour, the special quality of earth, is often associated with water and air; but sound is always confined to ether. Hence the author defined earth as simply at while he defines ether as शब्दगुणम्. As to the Mimamså doctrine that sound is substance, it is already denied

SECT. XIV. ]

Notes.

[[127]]

by the mention of among the gunas. Âkâśa is also defined as संयोगाजन्यजन्यविशेषगुणसमानाधिकरणविशेषाधिकरणम् * २. ९. ether is the seat of that particularity (f) which coexists with a special quality (sound) that is created but not produced from conjunction. Ether being eternal and all-pervading has a far of its own, but this far is distinguished from that of soul, as it is accompanied by a created special quality ¿.e. sound, and hence the qualification rufaðven etc. But then the particularities in atoms are also accompanied by created qualities and hence they have to be exclud- ed by the further epithet arm, the special quali- ties in atoms such as पाकजरूप being often अग्निसंयोगजन्य. This elaborate definition therefore ultimately amounts to the same as शब्दगुण.

Ether is the best available though not quite accurate English equivalent for Âkāśa because it resembles the latter in being an all-pervading and imponderable substance. Ether however carries light and heat only, and not sound, which function is assigned by mod. ern science to the atmosphere. Ether therefore resembles Akasa in all respects, except its special quality of producing sound. Both ether and Akasa are substances proved by in- ference, that is, their existence is presumed in order to account for certain natural phenomena, such as the diffusion of light and sound which are otherwise inexplicable.

Why sound is the attribute of Ákâś a.

Kanada† concludes sound to be the sign (for) of Âkáś a by process of exhaustion, because no other substance is capable of having sound as its quality. The question in what respects Âkāśa differs from Dik will be discussed under Dik. The fact seems to be that the names of the five elements including Âkāśa came down to the Naiyûyikas from a very ancient source, and that they had no choice but to recognize them if they want- ed to preserve their orthodoxy. They only assigned to each such place and functions as harmonized with their own physical theory of the universe. Our author mentions three characteris- tics of Akasa, that it is one, all-pervading, and eternal. The

Sarv. D. S. Calc ed. p. 104.

† V. S. II, 1, 27.

[[128]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

SBOT, XIV.

epithet one implies that the mention of numerous Âkúsas such as Ter#Tar and wetestar in common parlance is due to 3 and cannot be real. Being one and emitting sound everywhere. ether is necessarily all-pervading; and being all- pervading it must be eternal also. Being fag Akasa is erat-

, imperceptible, and therefore known only by inference. The syllogism may be put thus: शब्दः पृथिव्याद्यष्टद्रव्यातिरिक्त- द्रव्याश्रितः । अष्टद्रव्यानाश्रितत्वे सति समवायिकारणवत्त्वात् । यन्नैवं तन्नैवं,

यथा रूपम्.

Vibhutoa

T. D. definesaga, all-pervasion, aswdedzenumaa, contact with all corporeal objects. Corpo- reality (मूर्तत्व) again is defined as परिच्छिन्न- f, the quality of having definite dimensions. मूर्तत्व is defined by N. B. as क्रियावद्द्रव्यत्वम्. Cor- poreal substances are thus either those that have definite dimensions or that have motion. The second definition prac- tically amounts to the same as the first, because action or motion implies movement of either the parts or the whole from one place to another, and that is not possible unless the substance is limited in space. The corporeal substances are five: earth, water, light, air, and mind. They and their common properties are enumerated as follows:—

क्षितिर्जल तथा तेजः पचनो मन एव च ।

परापरत्वमूर्तत्रक्रियावेगाश्रया अमी ॥ ॥

These however do not constitute a separate class, as they come under Udayana’s exception, cross-division.† The class of five z dracyas crosses with that of five a dravyas, the first four being common to both, but of the one class being replaced by T in the other. The distinction between and is simple. q dracyas are coporeal substances that

भूत are limited in space and have definite dimensions; while the

a dravyas are not necessarily so. They are simply element- al substances which singly or by combination among themselv- es become the material causes of all the products in the world.

B. P. 24. † Vide note supra. p. 92,

SECT. XV. ]

Notes.

[[129]]

Ha thongh atomic does not produce anything else and is not therefore, while are though all-pervading pro- duces sound. The other four substances are of course both ga and xf. He is opposed to farge (all-pervasion ), qa to and face or arterfer (invariability ). Soul is only a substratum of knowledge and not being its material cause cannot be eitzer भूत or मूर्त.

SECT. XV. IG:.

Time is the ( special and instrumental) cause of the use of words) past etc. It is one and all-percading.

Time.

Annambhaṭṭa’s de inition of time is very simple and is best for all practical purposes, although it labours under the fult or being morely a verim! one. This and the succeeding de- finitions based on a are convenient descriptions of the things and are sufficient for their identication, but they do not convey the full counotation of the terms. qgy is defined by V. V. as areaqdmer: i. e. statements such as past time and future time. The word g here, us well as in the fol- lowing definitions where it is applied to agre, is to be understood in the restricted sense of ererarrafafadzica, special and instrumental cause. Time is the instrumental cause of art, as distinguished from Aids which is its material cause. g of course is nothing more than words or sound. Similarly time is the special cause of

alone, as distinguished on the one hand from all other cifects of which time is only the general cause ( aruteorateur), and on the other, from space and other things which are enumerated as racorrcon along with time, and which are therefore the general causes of all effects including rare. Thus the word g, when taken in the above restricted sense, rees the definition of time from three faults, viz. an erfäsama ou ether, a second arama on space and other general causes, and an nunecessary restric- tion (erma) iu calling time the cause of one thing only when it is really the cause of all effects. The deduition in the text, being based on common usage of certain words, teaches us nothing new about the thing itself. The utmost

[[17]]

[[130]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

SECT. XV.

that it tells us is that time is some unknown entity which is necessary to explain why we call certain occurrances as past, others as present and others as future. The fact of there being a common usage of those terms is proved by our daily experience, and the Naiyâyika, finding no better way of explaining it, assumes an independent substance, which is its source but about the real character of which he is as much in the dark as those who deny the substance altogether.

Another and apparently more accurate definition of time is that given by Viśvanâtha :-

जन्यानां जनकः कालो जगतामाश्रयो मतः ।

qerqerading: gumą: venganda: »NÍ

This is compressed into परापरव्यतिकर-यौगपद्यायौगपद्य-चिरक्षिण- प्रत्ययकारणं द्रव्यं कालः । that is, time is the substance which is the (instrumental) cause of our cognitions of priority or post- eriority, simultaneity or otherwise, slowness or quickness.† The only material difference between this and Annambhaṭṭa’s definition is that the latter’s (common пsage) is substituted by a ( cognition ). According to Annambhaṭṭa time is the cause of are, that is a certain kind of speech or language; while according to Viśvanatha and others it is the cause of certain kind of cognitions or mental notions. Now as language and thought are identical, or rather as language is but the outward expression of thoughts, both definitions practically amount to the same thing. There can be no outward expression unless there are mental notions previously, while according to many no thinking is possible without the aid of language. Anything therefore which is an essential element of the one must be so of the other also. Annambhatta stops short at language and is therefore safe; Viśvanátha, in going a step further to thought, treads on debatable ground; for one may, while accepting the instrumentality of time to gras a broad and

indubitable fact, deny that an independent entity like time is

B. P. 44-5.

Sankara Migra on V. S. VII, 1, 25.SEOT. XV.

Notes.

[[131]]

the cause of our particular cognitions. For aught we know, the cognitions may be due to other causes, and when produced they constitute a separate class the common property of which we denote by the word time. It is therefore obvious that Annam- bhatta was wise in purposely making his definition simple and somewhat vague..

The question what is time essentially, apart from its being the canse of any are or, remains to be answered; and it has remained unanswered till now in spite of the various speculations of Indian and European philosophers. Among the Indians, Sânkhyas denied the existence of an independent entity like time, including it under âkâśa, while some modern Naiyayikas identify time and space with God. Time being an incorporeal and imperceptible substance is only inferrible. The argument may be stated thus: qrature सासमवायिकारणके । भावकार्यत्वाद्धरवत. It must be remembered that time being संयोगरूप is the असमवायिकारण of the qualities परत्व and अपरत्व, which have the substances in which they reside for their material causes. The with which time is here identified is the contact of रविक्रिया Or aerपरिस्पन्द (mo- tions of the sun) with material objects like yɛ. These mo- tions of the sun constitute the Upadhis that mark the divisions of time such as moments, days and months.

Time is eternal and all-pervading.

Time is regarded as one, all-pervading and eternal entity like Ahasa, its particular divisions like those of Âkáša, being due to Upâdhi and therefore unreal. Here Annambhaṭṭa probably means to deny the doctrine of a section of Naiyâyikas who assign reality to moments only, and regard time in general as merely a collection of such moments. It is clear from the above that the Naiyâyikas did not apply the test of a searching analysis to the conception of time, just as Kant for instance has done in modern times. In his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant arrives at the conclusion that the conception of time as well as those of space and causality are ultimate facts lying at the basis of all experience and

[[132]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

[SEOT. XV.

are derived from intuition only. We cannot account for it by any theory founded ou experience, because experience itself is possible only when we have first the idea of time. It seems the Nalg yikes had a fint notion of this fact, which they roughly expressed by saying that time is the cause of speech ( sangre ) or thought (47).

SxCT. XVI. T

Space is the (special and insirumental) cause of the employment of words East, etc. It is one, all-pervading and eternal.

The definition of space in the text is modelled on that of time. Viśvanátha gives

Space.

เล

more comprehensive and accurate definition, gerfasfig: the cause of (our) notions of far and near. Another definition of space given in Saro. D. S. is more technical, erro ¤«fairyzur zed, ‘space is that which not being time is सत्यविशेषणा extensive and is devoid of any special quality’. Space, like time, is one all-pervading and eternal, while its varieties which are counted four or ten or any larger number, are due to Opádli. The conception of space very nearly corresponds to that of time, although the two things can be sufficiently distinguished to make them separate entities. The remarks as to time in the preceding notes apply mutatis mutandis to space also. The difference between time and space is slight but clear. Time is the cunse of काfortress space of देशिकपरत्व. The curf which diversifies time is production, or in fact. any kind of action, while the game in the case of space is contact with corporeal objects, जन्यमाने क्रियासाचे वा कालोपाधिः । मूर्तमात्रं fagrams: (8. C.)). This means that the divisions of time are determined by production and destruction of things, while ’those of space by the greater or smaller number of visible

objects that intervene between two spots.

Another distinction between time and space is :-

fàrdingarte: me: i afavdiqregantar fea. †

R. P. 46.

† Sarv. D. S Calc. ed.

P. 104.

I V. S. Up. Calo, ed. p. 115.

SECT. XVI. ]

Notes.

[[133]]

The relations of time are constant, for when a moment of time is said to be present or future with reference to any object or event, it is always so; while the relations of space are often varying, that is, the spot of ground, which may be eastward of one thing at one time, might be westward of the same thing at another or of a different thing at the same time. This means that the divisions of time are fixed and settled, while those of space are relative only. This is not however quite correct, for the relations of time are in fact as varying as those of space. The same object or event which is past in reference to one moment may be future or present with reference to another. The only positive assertion that we can make about the two concep- tions is that they are complementary to each other and cannot vary at the same moment; that is, we can speak of different times only with reference to a particular spot, and of different spaces with reference to a specific moment of time. Like time, space is inferrible only, the inference being expressed in the form : देशिकपरत्वापरत्वे सासमवायिकारणके । भावकार्यत्वाद्धदवत्.

Âkasa and Dik.

It may be asked in what respect does Dik differ from Akasa and why the two are separately recognized. Of course as treated in the Nyaya system the difference between the two is too patent. Âkása is a gaz, Dik not; Âkása is the material cause of sound and has a special quality; Dik does not produce sound and has no special quality; Dik resembles time in being the general cause of all effects, while Âkāśa, like earth and other material substances, produces one kind of effect only, namely, sound. Akasa belongs to the region of matter, Dik to the province of mind; Akasa has an objective existence. Dik is known by subjective experience only. In this way the two can be easily differentiated, but the question goes deeper. The objector will admit that ether and space, as conceived by the Naiyayikas may be different entities, but he may still ask, why they are con- ceived so different at all. In what respect do they differ essentially; and if one is dropped, cannot its functions

[[5]]

[[184]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

SEOT. XVI.

be assigned to the other? It is not easy to answer the question in this form, because the conceptions of ether and space are extremely vague and general. It appears however that the Naiyâyikas recognized the two entities, because they could not reconcile the notion of a material cause of sound with that of a general cause of all effects. A thing which produces a positive material quality like sound must be material; but then it cannot be the instrumental cause of mere relations like परत्व and अपरत्व, which constantly vary and have, so to say, only a mental existence. Besides it is possible that Akasa had already taken its place in the popular mind as one of the five elements before the time of Naiyayikas, and they had therefore no choice but to incor- porate it into their system, while they invented a new sub- stance called Dik to account for ideas and notions, that could not be attributed to Âkâŝa as it was then conceived. Whatever may be the case, the distinction between the two as defined in the Nyaya system is perfectly clear.

SECT. XVII, AKAT.

The Soul is the Substratum of Knowlege. He is two-fold, Human and Supreme. Of these the Supreme Soul is the All- powerful, Omniscient God, decoid of pleasure and pain. The Human Soul is different in euch body and is all-pervading and eternal.

Soul.

The eighth substance is Soul, which is defined as ’the substratum of knowledge.’ The word en- here implies that the knowledge re- sides in the soul by intimate relation (war); otherwise the definition might overlap time and space, which are the receptacles of all things ( wafurr ) by

des and are relations respectively. This soul is of two kinds, Supreme and Human, of whom (a) the Supreme Soul, namely God, is One and Omniscient, while the human Soul is all-pervading, eternal, and different in each body. The soul being is inforrible only, the argument being that the existence of organs of sense and their appropriate objects implies a distinct knower who can use them. करणव्यापारः सकर्तृकः । करणव्यापारत्वात् । द्विदिक्रियायां वास्यादिव्यापार- Ta The activity of organs must have an agent to ac- count for it, for every instrument requires an agent to handle it, as for instance, an axe in cutting. Kanada’s aphorism

SECT. XVII. ]

Notes.

[[135]]

likewise runs इन्द्रियार्थप्रसिद्धिरिन्द्रियार्थेभ्योऽर्थान्तरस्य हेतुः * The followers of Gotama however confine this inference to the Supreme Soul only, holding the human soul to be capable of being perceived. Another argument to prove the existence of soul is बुद्ध्यादयः पृथिव्यायष्टद्रव्यातिरिक्तद्रव्याश्रिताः । पृथिव्याद्र- व्यानाश्रितत्वे सति गुणत्वात् । यन्नैवं तन्नैवं यथा रूपादि । The soul has to be inferred because a substratum is wanted for the quali- ties बुद्धि सुख दुःख इच्छा द्वेष प्रयत्न धर्म and अधर्म, which cannot reside in any one of the eight inanimate substances,

earth etc.

As souls are innumerable it may be said that they constitute a class and have a common property a, residing in all of them. rear therefore may be defined as आत्मत्वसामान्यवानां or अमूर्तसमवेतद्रव्यत्वापरजातिः. According to the latter definition, soul is a species of substanco having a common property that is intimately connected with an incorporeal thing. As there are four incorporeal substances, ether, time, space and soul, of which the first three being single do not form a class. rage will be the only sub-class of that is intimately connected with an incorporeal thing. To this definition however some might object on the ground that as Supreme and human souls are dissimilar in every respect, they cannot be huddled together in one class, and there cannot therefore he any common art as आत्मत्व; at least such & जाति will not reside in ईश्वर. The answer to this objection is that possession of knowledge is a property common to both kinds of souls, whatever Le their other differences, and it is sufficient to make s a a covering both the Supreme and the human souls. This is implied in such general Vaidic texts as ar arst azer:. § The argument is characteristic and very impor- tant too. It is characteristic because it shows how a single common property often suffices the Naiyayikas to form a class notwithstanding that the individuals might dis- agree in all other respects. The argument also explains the

V. S. III, 1, 2.

† T. K. p. 3.

‡ Sarv. D. S. Calc. ed. p. 104.

§ 8. M. Calo, ed. p. 37.

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SHOT. XVII.

anomaly of including such too quite distinct and dissimilar things as Supreme and human souls under one category. No two conceptions can be more opposed to each other than those of God and the human soul. One is Omniscient and One, the other is ignorant and numerous. One is the Creator and Master of the universe, the other is the slave and the plaything of fate. One is entirely free from pleasure and pain, the other is subject to all transient passions. Almost every attribute, that can be predicated of one is necessarily denied of the other. And yet the Naiyayikas have grouped both of them together, because they have the single common characteristic of possession of knowledge. This knowledge again is different in both, being eternal in the Supreme, and evanescent in the human souls, but that does not necessarily make the two souls totally dissimilar. This seems to be the reason why Annambhaṭṭa has given record as a general definition of sur in preference to others that are debatable. The word (life) also seems to be purposely avoided in defining rar, because in the wider sense of the term even plants have चैतन्य, but they fall under विषय as they have no era according to a section of the Naiyâyikas. a can be identified with rear in its narrower sense only, namely, conscious life.

Are the Vais’eshi- kas atheists.

The method of grouping God and man together as sub- divisons of one category as well as the argument with which it is defended appear somewhat arbitrary and have led some writers to suspect that the rear in the original aphorisms of Kanada meant farar only, and the inclusion of God or qar under the same category was due to commentatorial ingennity. It is said that all the descriptions and arguments to prove the existence of soul evidently apply to frame, while there is no clear and specific mention of God in the aphorisms of either Kaṇáda or Gotama. * Some have argued from this circumstance that both the Nyâya and the Vaiseshika systems were at first atheistic.

Bannerjea’s Dialogues on Hindu Philosophy p. 147 et. seq.

SBOT. XVII. ]

Notes.

[[137]]

Without however going so far we might assume that the guess is not very wide of the mark and that Kandda and Gotama might have at first purposely excluded God from their systems, not as being totally non-existent, but as being beyond and above the phenomenal world with which their systems were chiefly concerned. Possibly the aphor- ists confined themselves to a classification and discussion of sublunary things only without minding the supernatural agency, while commentators considering this as a defect, supplied the omission by inserting God under the only category where It was possible to do so. Thus for instance, while Prasastapada says nothing about God, his commen- tator Sridhara classes God along with the human soul, although the former has six and the latter fourteen quai- ities.* Whatever be the truth, the Naiyhyikas do not attach much importance to the inclusion of God under आत्मन and always speak of him as an independent entity whenever occasion requires. When they speak of soul, they generally mean ferar only. This is another illus- tration how a love of symmetry and completeness which characterises Indian systematists often overrides their philosophical accuracy. The student should also note the fact that soul is here mentioned as one of the substances. along with earth, water etc. Nothing can show better the materialistic tendency of Nyaya philosophy, than this in- clusion of spirit under the same category as dead matter.

The T. D. supplies a deficiency in the text as it were by stating in full the celebrated „Naiyâyika argument to prove the existence of God. The argument is a reply to an atheist, like Churcáka or Baudilha, who absolutely denies the ex- istence of God because there is ao positive proof of it. God, say the atheists, cannot be perceived, because, being a colourless substance, He is not the object of external senses; nor can He be perceived mentally, as He is far removed from pain and pleasure felt by the soul. God cunnot also be inferred as no similar instance can be given to

Existence of God.

P. B. Bon. ed, 10.

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Tarka-Sangraha.

SHOT. XVIL.

support the inference. As to am or testimony it is

आगम useless, first because it is not universally accepted as a valid proof, and secondly because the Vedas themselves depend for their authority on God and cannot therefore prove His existence. Our author denies this and declares the existence of God provable by inference based on the universally accepted principle of causality. The argument is

क्षित्यकुरादिकं कर्तृजन्यं । कार्यत्वात् । यद्यत्कार्य तत्कर्तृजन्यं यथा घटः ।

Every effect must have an agent;

The universe is an effect;

.. It must have an agent.

This agent is called God. It should be noted that this argument is founded on several assumptions; viz. 1 that the relation of causality is universal, i. e. every effect must have a cause; 2 that every product must have a sentient and intelligent producer; 3 that this world is such a product; and 4 that its producer must be such an extraordinary Being as God. The first, says the Naiyayika, is a self- evident axiom, known to us intuitively as it were, and cor- roborated by experience. The second is proved by daily observation, because we see that a jar is made by a potter and a piece of cloth is woven by a weaver, without whom they could not have been produced. Creation results from some kind of motion in the atoms, and motion requires previous effort or volition. This last being the quality of sentient soul only, it follows that no creation is possible unless there is a sentient being pre-existing to set the parti- cles of matter in motion. The third assumption, that this world is a product is also based on observation. Plants and - animals are products because we see their birth, growth and death. These occurrances cannot be spontaneous, and there must be some hidden agency to prompt them. Be- sides they happen with such a remarkable regularity that one is forced to think that the agency directing them must be an intelligent one, and not simply Adrishta, fate or

SECT. XVII. ]

Notes.

[[139]]

destiny, which is assumed to be a universal cause of all creation. The last promise necessarily follows from the preceding ones, because a Creator of this multifarions universe must be Omniscient and Omnipotent, and in fact must possess all attributes usually ascribed to God; other- wise he will be either incapable of creating or be himself liable to creation and destruction. This reasoning is of course powerless against an opponent who denies any one of the above premises or the validity of the common ex- perience on which they are founded.

T. 1. defines कर्तृत्व as उपादानगोचरापरोक्षज्ञानचिकीर्षाकृतिमत्त्वम् i.e. the agent is one who possesses (three things) au intimate cognizance of the material cause, a will to act, and an effort. The three attributes, and are closely related to one another as cause and effect. There cannot be an effort (ta) unless there is a will, and a will to produce can only arise when there is previously direct cognition of the material cause on which the will is to operate. aaaa is required because mere knowledge of an absent (47) material cause, such as earth in a pit or cotton on the tree, will not suffice. The material must be at hand and under the agent’s control at the time of creation. It is suggested by some and with great plausibility, that the definition of fee may be con- fined to fame simply, as a being the final stage neces- sarily presupposes the other two and gegr. It follows that the Creator of the universe must have direct knowledge of the atoms of all substances, must have a will to create, and also power to bring about such a creation. He must therefore be Omniscient and Omnipotent.

ज्ञान

इच्छा.

The weakness of the argument to prove a Creator lies in the third and the fourth of the aforesaid four assum- ptious which are not accepted by many. How do we know for instance that this universe is a product? Indi- vidual things in the world may be products in our common acceptation of the term, but that does not necessarily prove that the whole is a product too. The whole does. not always share the nature of the parts, as for instance in a windmill although each particle moves, the whole is stationary. Secondly our human experience being limited

[[140]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

[SECT. XVII.

we cannot positively say that everything in this world is a product and that there is nothing which is not produced. Thirdly, Naiyáyikas themselves accept several eternal things such as atoms, ether, time, space, souls and minds. If these are eternal, they cannot be products and can have no Creator. If they are excepted, the Creator of the remainder cannot be omniscient and oranipotent. Anyhow the Nyaya theory of God is inconsistent with their other doctrines. Fourthly, since every intelligent agent must have a will, God also must have desire and the consequent feelings of pleasure and prin. He cannot therefore be much better than frail mortals. Lastly, to call this world a product or effect is begging the whole question; for cause and effect being merely correlative terms, a thing caunot be called effect unless and until its cause is proved. The universe therefore cannot be called a product unless you first independently prove the existence of its Creator. Such are some of the objections advanced by the Vedantins and other monistic philosophers against the teleological argument of the Naiyagikas. The controversy as to an independent Creator of the Universe ultimately resolves itself into the distinction between daulism and mouism.

The student will do well to master the full armoury of Nydya arguments by which the existence of a personal God outside the universe is proved. These arguments or proofs are summed up by Udayanâchârya in the following verse:-

कार्यायोजनधृत्यादेः पदात् प्रत्ययतः श्रुतः ।

वाक्यात सख्याविशेषाच्च साध्यो विश्वविदव्ययः ॥ *

“From effects, combination, support etc., from traditional arts, from authoritativeness, from S’ruti, from sentences thereof, and from particular numbers-an everlasting Omnis- cient Being is to be established.”

The first of these eight or nine arguments to prove the existence of God is the same as the one discussed above, viz. that a Creator is necessary to account for this pheno- menal world. The second enter or combination’ is ex- plained as the action which produced the union of two atoms forming the binary compound at the beginning of creation,

+Ibid. Cowell’s Trans, Bib. M. p. 64,

黜 Kus. V. 1.SHOT. XVII. ]

[[6]]

Notes.

•

[[141]]

and which being action, required an intelligent actor. The third proof, support’ means that the world depends upon some being who prevents it from falling. The etc. (a) in- cludes destruction of the world and presupposes a destroyer. Pada here means पढादिसम्प्रदायव्यवहार, that is, traditional arts of weaving cloth etc. which could have been invented at first only by some intelligent being. Authoritativeness’ is a certain virtue inherent in the Vedas whereby they produce right knowledge in us, and therefore implying a Being who imparted that virtue. The proof of Śruti establishes a Being who made the Vedas what they are. Again the Vedas consisting of sentences must have been produced by some author just as Mahabharata and other books. The last proof, number, requires a little explanation. It is held that the magnitude of a binary is produced not from the infinitisimality ( unfaruger ) of atoms but from the number (two) of the atoms composing the binary; and it is also a Nyaya doctrine that the conceptions of duality and sub- sequent numbers are produced in things by an effort of the mind. The duality therefore which produced binaries at the beginning of creation must have been first conceived by some intelligent being existing before creation. Number is thus a proof of the existence of God. Udayanâchârya also establishes God’s existence in another way, namely, first by proving Adrishta or destiny, and then arguing that the inanimate destiny must have some intelligent Being to regulate it.† Mauy of these arguments of Nyaya writers are identical with those given by Aristotle and widely used in modern times by Paley and the Christian divines. The idea of God or a Supreme and Omniscient Creator of the world, which was at first rather faint in the Sûtras, came to occupy an important place in the Nyaya system as developed in later times.

God’s attributes.

Nyúyu writers, while unanimous on the point of God’s existence, do not agree as to his attributes. Some hold that God can make creation although He has uo body owing to absence of any Adrishta in his case; others say that God may be

See note p. 123 Supra; and P. B. Ben. ed. p. 131, + Kus, 1, 4.

[[142]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

SEOT. XVII.

sometimes endowed with a body (as in the various incarna- tions) by our Adrishta, just as a woman gets a body according to the Adrishta of her husband. A third school calls the atoms the body of God; and a fourth assigns that honour to ether. A fifth section conceives God to be formed of two bodies, the Creator and the thing to be created, at the beginning of creation; while a sixth one reaches the climax by giving a body to God in the same way as a devil gets oue for itself by possessing some human medium. All these speculations are due to attempts to overcome the difficulty how a Creator could create without having a physical body as well as organs of sense and action. The Nyaya enumerates eight special qualities of God, namely, number, (the greatest) dimension, severalty, dis- junction, intellect, desire and effort. The Supreme Soul differs from the human in not having pain, merit and deme- rit; but there is a controversy as to whether He has pleasure. The modern Naiyâyikas hold on the anthority of texts, such as नित्यं विज्ञानमानन्दं ब्रह्म, that God enjoys eternal happi- ness just as He has eternal knowledge, while the ancients interprete the word आनन्द as meaning simply दुःखाभाव, and deny any positive pleasure or pain to God. Annambhaṭṭu as nsual appears to prefer the ancient view; and hence probably the epithet geganteria which is found interpolated in some Mss. of T. S.

Human Soul.

Having proved the existence of God, T. D. defines the human soul as gurur: thereby exclud- ing God who is devoid of pleasure or pain. जीव is also described variously as इन्द्रियाय- धिष्ठाता, or बन्धमोक्षयोग्य Or जन्यज्ञानवान्, all which epithets are merely contradictories of the attributes of God. The human soul can be casily proved to be distinct from body or organs, and also to be numerous, eternal and all-pervading. The Chârcákus say that our body itself is the soul, because our self-consciousness I am a man I am a Brahman,’ relates to the body; but it is not so, because the self remains the same although the body changes as it grows from infancy to old age. Besides we have the opposite consciousness my

[[2]]

יד

時

SEOT. XVII. ]

Notes.

[[143]]

body, my head’ ctc. and we feel no diminution of self even if parts of body such as arms or legs be cut off. Others maintain that the soul is identical with organs of sense as is proved by our consciousness I am blind I am deaf’; but this is also not true, for the deprivation of any one or all the organs does not injure the soul. Again if the organs are soul, there would be as many different souls in a body as there are organs of sense, and besides, says T. D., we shall not have, as we have now, the identity of consciousness that the same person. i. c. I, who saw the jar at a former time. touch it now. Nor is mind the soul, as mind being atomic would be incapable of simultaneously apprehending inany objects. The soul is therefore something different from all these. The human souls are conceived to be numerous, and not one as the Vedantins hold, in order to account for the variety of experiences of pleasure, pain etc. in different bodies. The same soul however passes through several bodies; otherwise we cannot form certain impressions and habits (such as the sucking of a new-born child) that seem to come to us intuitively as it were, and are really derived from our experience in previous births. Plurality of souls is thus reconciled with the doctrine of transmigration. It follows from this that the human sonl is eternal, for otherwise he cannot pass through several births without losing his identity. He must also be all-pervading, for he can neither be atomic nor of any intermediate magnitude. If atomic he can occupy only a minute spot in the body and thus cannot simultaneously feel pleasure or paiu at distant parts of the body. If the soul has an intermediate magnitude he will be liable to destruction by the enlargement or diminution of that magnitude.. Again, how is this middling magnitude to be determined? It will be either the same size as the body, as the Jainas hold, or it will be different, being larger or smaller. In the latter case the son would be too large or too small to exactly occupy the body as he should. In the former case the difficulty arises as to how a soul which was small in the small body of a child could increase when the child grows to manhood; and similarly how the same soul which in one birth was of the size of an

[[144]]

Tarka-Sangraha

[SBOT. XVII.

elephant could in another birth be accommodated in the body of an ant. If it is said that the size varies, then it is not the same soul, and there will be different souls not only in different births but even at different stages of life. Hence the soul must necessarily be regarded as all-pervading. To this last supposition an objection may be made that each all-pervading soul would occupy all bodies and thus the experiences of all beings would be cognized by every individual. The answer to this objection is that the soul though all-pervading cognises nothing by himself, but by contact with a mind which is separate and confined to each body.

How do we know

soul.

[[4]]

•

€

offer

There is one point with respect to fra which being controversial seems to have been purpose- ly omitted by T. D., namely whether f is perceived or is only to be inferred like ether and other incorporeal substances. The followers of Gotama hold that is perceptible by the mind because it is the object of such mental cognitions as I am happy or I am unhappy. The Vaiseshikas maintain that fr is not perceptible even mentally, because the cognition I am happy’ refers not to the pure Ego, but to the quality of pleasure or pain which thus becomes the sign of the exist- ence of fix. A still greater objection to the perceptibility of soul is that he being the perceiver of everything cannot perceive himself, the knower and the known being always different. f is therefore only inferrible, the inference being खादिसाक्षात्कारो द्रव्याश्रितः । गुणत्वाहूपवत्. जीव may also be inferred from the existence of organs of sense, or of qualities such as which can reside in soul alone. Several of these so- called signs of soul are enumerated in Kanada’s apho- rism- -प्राणापान-निमेषोन्मेष-जीवन-मनोगतीन्द्रियान्तरविकाराः सुखदुः- खेच्छाद्वेषप्रयत्नाश्वात्मनो लिङ्गानि * Amambhatta seems to favour the Vaiseshika view of the inferrible character of soul, though he does not explicitly say so. The human soul has 14 special properties, for which see quotation, p. 85-6 Supra.

V. 8. III, 2, 4.

SEỚT. XVIII. ]

Notes.

[[145]]

SECT. XVIII. Ħa: मनः

Mind is the organ which is the instrument of the cognition of

pleasure etc. Being assigned to each soul,

Mind.

it is countless atomic, and eternal.

Etymologically mind is not simply the instrument of thought, (#àsaa), but in reality its functions are much more extensive, because it is not only the direct cause of internal experience, such as that of pleasure and pain, but is also an aid in the perceptions of external senses. The Naiyáyikas, strangely enough, give much promi- inence to the latter two functions of the mind, and entirely subordinate, if not actually deny, its character as the instru- ment of thinking. Even taking these two functions assig- ned to mind, it has a double character. It is both an organ of sense itself, and an accessory to other organs. Annam- bhatta’s definition, being founded on the former of these two functions, distinguishes miud from other organs which give knowledge of external objects only, while mind brings about internal cognition of such things as lie beyond the province of the other organs. Hence the word उपलब्धि is purposely used here in the restricted sense of direct internal cognition; while means an instrumental cause. By geną, V. V. remarks, are to be understood all qualities that reside in the soul by intimate relation, and which could therefore be perceived by mind alone. The word fe is purposely inserted in the definition to exclude soul as well as the conjunction of mind with soul, both of which are instrumental in bringing about the cognition. If we how- ever take the word arya in the strict sense of a ur, the word seems to be unnecessary and may be dispensed with; for ear will be excluded as being the agent and not the करण proper of a cognition, while आत्ममनःसंयोग being व्यापार is distinct from the करण. Perhaps the word इन्द्रिय is introduced to contradict those theorists who refuse to call mind an organ; but of this later on.

T. D. gives another definition, ersfufgaà nâ fuqar which, though technically correct enough, does not give us much insight into the nature of the thing defined. Of the

[[19]]

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Tarke-Sangraka.

$BOT. XVIII.

five intangible substances, other, time, space, soul and mind, the last alone, having a limited dimension, can act, while the first four being all-pervading can never have any motion. Mind being thus intangible and corporeal is only inferrible, the inference being, as usual in such cases, drawn from the functions assigned to it. The mode of reasoning is to as- sume a certain cause to account for such effects or pheno- mena as are known to be undoubted facts and cannot be explained in any other way. The argument for mind is,- बाविसाक्षात्कारः करणसाध्यः । जन्यसाक्षात्कारत्वाञ्चाक्षुषसाक्षात्कारवत.’ Kandda and Gotama give two different proofs of mind whien are if possible even more convincing than the above. Kandda’s sphorism आत्मेन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षे ज्ञानस्य मावोऽभावश्च मनसो rayer † gives as a proof for mind the fact that ..cwledge is produced or not according as there exists or not the conjun- ction of mind with soul, organs and objects. Gotama lays stress on the fact that our cognitions are always successive and never simultaneous युगपज्ज्ञानानुत्पत्तिर्मनसो लिङ्गम् + There can be only one conjunction at a time, and therefore a succession of cognitions such as we daily experience can be possible only with an intermediate link like the atomic mind.

The minds are as innumerable as there are human souls, one being assigned to each of the latter. The word fe is interpreted by V. V. so as to include both the principal and the accessory functions of the mind-अत्र सममेतकारणत्वे सत्यसम- tentadores faunayoqraf: § i. e. the word fra implies the instrumentality of mind both to the cognition of those things, that are intimately united with soul as well as of those that are not so united. More probably it implies that the same mind is always associated with the same soul and accom- panies him through his successive births; otherwise we cannot account for survival of impressions acquired in previous births. It may also be mentioned here that some assume

residing in all individual minds, while others

as a deny it.

मन-

1. C. loc. cit. † V. 8. III, 2, 1. IG. 8. I, 1, 16.

V. V. los.sit,

BROT.

Notea.

The most important property of mulud is its infinite- simality (sia ), because it is necessary to explain its chief function, that of acting as a connecting link between the soul and the external organs. The Mimâmsakas hold mind to be all- pervading, and their argument is wat fog ↑ erafereETETELKIT- दाकाशबद, or मनो विभु । विशेषणशून्यद्रव्यत्वाद कालवद, or मनो बिभु । शामासमवायिकारणसंयोगाधारत्वादात्मबाद- This inference by an- alogy however is coutradicted by our experience, for if mind be all-pervading it will be in contact with all organs of sense at once, and there will be a variety of perceptions simultaneously. Not only so, but as this contact of mind with the senses will continue always; there will be no sleep or cessation of knowledge. The contact of mind with the organs must therefore be occasional and voluntary, and the mind therefore must have a limited magnitude so that it can be attached to and severed from the organs at pleasure. The argument employed by T. D. is a little different and is not quite correct. If mind be all-pervading, there will be no contact of mind with the all-pervading soul, for it is a Nyaya doctrine that two all-pervading substances can never be mutually in contact. To this the Mimâṁsuka has an obvious reply that he does not accept the Nyaya doctrine, and therefore there is no impossibility of आत्ममनःसंयोग in his theory. T. D. thereupon urges that if such a contact between two all-pervading things be admitted it will be eternal and continuous, and there will be no sleep. The Nydya can account for sleep by supposing that it is induced when the atomic mind enters a particular vein in the body, called gfiaq; but the Mimâṁsaka cannot do so, for even as- suming that आत्ममनः संयोग ceases as soon as mind enters the gaz, there will be still some portion of it outside as, being all-pervading, the whole of it can never be contained in shwa, and the contact of this out-lying portion with soul will never cease. The weakness of this argument of T. D. lies in the assumption that the contact of mind with soul

V. S. Up. Cale. ed. p. 165.

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Tarka-Sangraha.

[ SHOT. XVIII.

ceases as soon as the former enters gaa; but no reason is given for this assumption. Even granting that the mind is atomic, the continuity of its contact with soul cannot be prevented, for the soul being all-pervading must be present wherever the mind may be situated. The diffi- culty in fact will be greater, for in this case the Naiya- yika cannot take shelter behind his doctrine of non-contact of all-pervading things. This difficulty is sought to be re- moved by the arbitrary assumption that the contact of mind with soul euds at the mouth of gaa. As a matter of fact if the soul is all-pervading it should be present in, as well as out of the gfaa, and the contact of mind with it should never cease. An alternative assumption to account for the same phenomenon of sleep is that there is no त्वगिन्द्रिय in पुरीतत्, and that contact of mind with त्वक् is a necessary condition for all knowledge, त्वङ्कनःसंयोगो ज्ञानसामान्ये कारणमित्यर्थः annaaf:;* but this is as arbitrary as the above. The argument based on आत्ममनःसंयोग is not therefore as satis- factory as the other one based on इन्द्रियमनःसंयोग. The phenomena of sleep and knowledge can be sufficiently accounted for by conjunction and severance of mind with organs of sense, even if the आत्ममनःसंयोग is continuous.

Theory of sleep.

The Naiyayika theory of sleep already hinted above is peculiar, fra is an intestine somewhere near the heart and conceived as a sort of a fleshy bag in which the mind remains during sleep. The process is thus described by Dinakar- bhatta:-

“प्रथमं सुषुप्तचनुकूलमनः क्रियया मनसाऽत्मनो विभागः, ततः आत्ममनः- संयोगनाशः, ततः पुरीतदात्मकोत्तरदेशेन मनसः संयोग उत्पद्यतेः सैव सुषुप्तिः । The gra as well as the theory of sleep based upon it are not however pure inventions of the Naiyayikas. Both are more or less fully described in ancient writings, and the originality of the Naiyûyikas consists simply in the way they adapted them to their own pshychological system. Texts like

1. M. Calc. ed. p. 48.

† Din. Bomb, ed. P. 116.

SEOT. XVIII. ]

Notes.

[[149]]

“अथ यदा सुषुप्तो भवति यदा न तस्य च वेद हिता नाम नाड्यो द्वासप्ततिसह- त्राणि हृदयात् पुरीततमभिप्रतिष्टन्ते ताभिः प्रत्यवसृम्य पुरीतति शेते”* had already formulated a physical theory of sleep which all orthodox schools were bound to accept, modifications being permitted only where the Śruti was silent. The above text of Bṛihadâran yakopanishad for instance, vaguely says that he or it entered from the heart to the graa by way of seventy- two thousands of arteries; and hence the Vedantins take that he to be, while the Naiyayikas take it to be . This

मनस्- gfaa, which is said to be joined to the heart by 73000 feeder arteries, is also called agar ret by Yogins and Vedantins, who describe it as opening at the top of the head called rey and as being the path by which the soul of a passes out of the body to the solar region. † The Naiyayikas of course with their usual shrewdness adopted only so much of this anatomy as suited their purpose and substituted mind for the ger of the original. The notion of this entrance of the think- ing element into some narrow vein near the heart was probably derived from the observed slackening of the blood circulation in the arteries, and the consequent slower palpita- tions of the heart during sleep. Anyhow modern anatomy and physiology do not support the theory.

रन्ध्र

Whether the word

Is mind an organ,

is inserted in the definition of mind to exclude आत्ममनःसंयोग or to re- pudiate the docrine of an opponent, it is certain that both the Nyaya and Vaiseshika schools agree in calling mind an ; or rather the Nyaya expressly says so and the dogma is imported into the Vaise- shika system as one that is not explicitly repudiated by Kanada, according to the unsim अप्रतिषिद्धमनुमतं भवति : Mind must be called an orgau, because it is the instrument of in- ternal perception. Other doctrinairs. and especially the Vedan- tins, deny to mind. As the point has considerable. bearing on the Nyaya definitions of perception and inference

Brib. Up. IV. 1, 19.

Sankara-Bhashya on Brahm, Sat III, 2, 7- ‡V41, on G S. I I, 1.

[[150]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

[ SPOT. IVI

as well as on some other kindred topics, it will be worth while here to explain it once for all. weer will be presently defined as इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षजन्यं ज्ञानम. If the mind is not इन्द्रिय, the definition will not cover perception of pleasure and pain, while, if mind is g, it will overlap on a which also results from contact of mind with external objects such as the mountain and smoke. It will be seen further on how Naiyayikas get out of this dilemma, but the fact that it arises has sufficed the Vedantin to deny to mind. The chief consideration however which weighs with the Vedantin is authoritžtive texts of Sruti like " इन्द्रियेभ्यः परार्था अर्थेभ्यश्च TH:”*, in which mind is not only mentioned separately but placed on a higher level than the organs, thereby imply- ing that mind is not fry. As to the other horn of the dilemma, namely that mental perception will not come un- der the given definition of e, Vedantins escape it by repudia- ting the Nyâya definition of perception itself as incorrect. † It must also be remembered that though the later Naiyâyikas stoutly maintain the

of mind, the doctrine is not expressly stated in either of the Sûtras. While Kanada is admittedly silent upon it, Gotama does not include mind in the list of organs,‡ but mentions it separately among his Prameyas. After all the controversy seems to be nothing more than battle of words. So long as all are agreed in distinguishing mind from the five external organs, and treat- ing it as an entity by itself, it does not matter whether you call it इद्रिय or अन्तःकरणवृत्ति or anything else. If mind is an organ it is an internal organ (razu) quite distinct from the external organs, while if it is not an organ it is so much akin to one that it shares many of its properties and functions.

Kath. U. p. III, 10.

† Vedanta-Paribháshá Cale.ød. p. 3,

‡ G. S. I, 1, 12.

§ G. . I, 1, 9

*.SXOT. XIX. ]

Notes.

[[151]]

SECT. XIX. TA.

रूपम्,

Colour is the (special) quality which is cognised by eye alone.

It is of seven kinds, and resides in earth, water, and light. All the seven are found in earth, pale white in water, and brilliant white in light.

Colour.

The definitions of colour, savour, odour and touch are

taken from Prasastapâda’s

Prasastapada’s scholium with the exception of the words and g. The latter words seem to have been excludes

suggested by Sridhara’s comment. The word number which is cognised by eye as well as touch; while ge excludes on one side q which is dravya, and on the other रूपत्वजाति, it being a rule that the जाति and अभाव of a thing are perceived by the same sense as the thing itself. But the , being a guna, will still come in; and to exclude it therefore the word gur is interpreted as four special quality, although T. D. seems to take the word in its general sense. Why then, one might ask, insert a

परमाणुरूप

when

too like u might be excluded by taking or in the sense of fabrwyor ? The answer is that is also necessary to exclude antezea. This is obviously a refinement of a later commentator (S. C.), for T. D. does not notice it. V. V. is not satisfied with the definition in the text, hedged as it is with so many qualifications, because which is imperceptible to the eye is not included in it. V. V. there- fore proposes as & better definition त्वगग्राह्य-चक्षुग्रह्मि एणविभा- raaaaa. The prefix त्वगग्राह्य serves the purpose of मात्र;

• while by saying गुणविभाजकधर्मवत्त्वम्, which is the same as गुणत्वावान्तरजातिमत्त्वम्, instead of mere गुणत्वम्, we include परमाणुरूप which has a गुणत्वावान्तरजाति, namely रूपत्वजाति, although it is not agufer itself. The purpose can equally be served by adopting the enlarged definition suggested by T.D. to exclude . It is needless to remark that gur or cogni- tion means here our ordinary cognition, and not the super- natural perception of Yogins who can perceive anything by any organ of sense they please. Sankara Misrat gives four

P. B. Ben. ed. p. 104. st. sep.

† V. S. Up. Calo. ed. p. 101.

[[152]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

[ SHOT. XIX.

necessary conditions for the perception of colour, viz. 1. large magnitude ( #gror), 2 visibility (egaa), 3 not being overpowered ( sarga), and 4 the property रूपत्व- The colour of atoms is not perceived because atoms have not a large magnitude; the whiteness of the eye is not perceived because it ic ga; the whiteness in com- mon fire and the lustre of rubies are unperceived owing to their being overpowered by earthy matter; while savour and touch are unperceived because they have no रूपत्वजाति. The modern theory first propounded by Newton is that colour belongs to light only and that a ray of white light con- tains all the primary colours which can be separated by a prism of glass. An object appears to have the colour which it reflects. The colours of earth and water are therefore not their own, but are derived from the particular rays reflected from them,

Colour is of seven kinds, white, blue, yellow, red green, tawny and variegated. This enum- eration of seven colours is not known

Varieties of

Colour.

either to Prasastapada or Sridhara, and is probably borrowed from some later writer. The last variety being a mixture of the preceding six, it is naturally asked why is recognized separately. Instead of supposing a new colour why cannot, says the objector, faraq be called simply a mixture of several colours, and a variegated piece of cloth be simply designated as having so many colours. To this T. D. replies that, colour being a rare, there cannot be several colours in one and the same object.

A व्याप्यवृत्तिधर्म is defined as स्वसमानाधिकरणात्यन्ताभावाप्रति- fr !, ¿. e. a quality which never co-exists with its own carma ( absolute negation) in one and the same object.. The opposite of this is an era which is a quality that resides in a portion of the object only, and is therefore co-existent with its own absolute negation residing in another portion of the same object. Thus when a monkey sits on the top of a tree, the monkey touches the top only and not the root of the tree. The is therefore said to be a, residing in the top, while its अत्यन्ताभाव is मूलrarosa residing in the root of the same tree. This संयोग is therefore an अव्याप्यवृत्तिधर्म.

SŠOT. XIX. Î

Notes.

[[153]]

व्याप्यवृत्तिधर्म is a quality which covers the entire thing and not a part of it only, like the whiteness or blueness of a jar which resides in all its parts.

If fast be only a collection of several colours, each in- dividual colour will be a, . e. partial, while there will be no one colour covering the whole. What of it if there be not, rejoins the objector; can we not still perceive the piece of cloth by means of the colours of its parts? You cannot, says the author, for there is no colour in the piece of cloth as a whole, and without a colour you cannot per- ceive an object. But are there not so many instead of one colour in the piece? They are useless, replies the author, to make it visible, because individually they reside in parts only, while collectively they do not form one quality of the whole, it being a peculiar doctrine of the Naiyâyikas that a collection (grr) is not a thing by itself apart from its components. A war, if it exists apart from its parts, would be a pro-

समुदाय, duct different from its parts; but where would it then reside? Not in each part, nor in all put together, since it is distinct from all of them.

is therefore not distinct from the parts and is, like द्वित्वादिसङ्ख्या, only a पर्याप्तधर्म ie & conjoint attribute. Such being the case, a collection of several colours cannot by itself constitute a quality which would make the piece of cloth visible. But here a question arises, why is a colour at all necessary for the perception of a thing? Let the condition precedent for perceptibility be not रूपवश्व, possession of colour, but रूपवत्समवेतत्व, the state of being intimately united with things having colour. So although the piece of cloth may not have a colour of its own, it is in intimate union with parts that have colour, and will be therefore perceptible. The objection to this view is that such a condition precedent (nàær ) for perceptibility is unnecessarily elaborate and therefore not preferable to the usual one रूपवत्व. The result of this dis- cussion is that we must recognize an independent free to account for the perceptibility of a variegated piece of cloth.

The definition and divisions of must have already shown to a critical student that the Naiyayika conception of

[[20]]

[[154]]

रूप-

Tarko-Sangraha.

[ SEOT. XIX.

It is clear that what we ordi-

•

is somewhat restricted. narily call the form or shape of a thing (a), such as its roundness or squareness, is not comprehended under Er. It neither falls under any one of the seven colours, nor does the definition augu apply to it, for form can be apprehended by the eye as well as by touch. Hence is translated here by colour’, although in popular parlance it signifies form as well. Under what head then would this form go? Naiyâyikas call it simply an eqvertizeranââ particular arrangement of parts, and as such would probably include it under er. Other scholas- tics such as the Vedantins do not regard form as in any way distinct from the thing or its parts; for, they say, we recognize the same identical person in a 7 standing and a a sitting although the arrangements of his limbs. (Hayattura) are different in the two cases. noticed here simply to clear a possible doubt.

colours.

The point is

Colour of all sorts resides in earth, while water and light have only one kind, namely white. Distribution of The whiteness of light however being brilliant difers from that of water which is not so.

The meaning of the passage is clear; but curi- ously the reading in the majority of the copies of the text is unsatisfactory if not actually corrupt, rendering the passage almost unintelligible. Only two Mss. in fact give the correct reading which is adopted in the text, others mostly reading अभास्वर शुद्ध and भास्वरं शुद्धं, and thns appar ently making reread and wrer independent attributes of

and not qualifications of whiteness as they really are. There are no separnte colours like भास्वर and अभास्वर, but the words are introduced to distinguish between the parti- cular sort of whiteness that resides in water from that which resides in light. Even with the reading wreat që we can no doubt get the right meaning by taking are to be an adverb modifying the adjective ; but then the construc- tion becomes extremely awkward. In any case there ought to be no doubt as to the real meaning of the passage.

SHOT. XXII. ]

Notes.

SECT. XX, XXI, XXII. :, mai, euafi. (E’, स्पर्शः.

[[155]]

Savour is the quality apprehended by tongue; it is of six kinds: sweet, sour, saline, pungent, astringent and bitter; it resides in earth and water; earth contains all the six varieties; water only the sweet.

Odour is the quality apprehended by nose; it is fragrant and non-fragrant, residing in earth only.

Touch is the quality apprehended by skin only; it is of three kinds: cool, hot, and tepid, residing in earth, water, light and air; of these cool touch is (found) in water, hot in light and tepid in earth.

Savour.

The three qualities of savour, odour and touch are here grouped together as they are treated symmetrically. and mean pungent and bitter respectively, and not vice versa, as Ballantyne translates them wrongly. Earth has all varieties of savour, while water has only one, viz. sweet. Other tastes, such as sourness and salt, which are sometimes apprehended in water, are due to the dissolution of earthy matter in it.

Odour.

Odour is apprehended by the nose and is of two kinds, fragrant and nou-fragrant, residing in earth ouly. f is uot recognized be- cause we never experience it, the several savours when mixed in one substance being in reality appre- hended separately and one after another faara and fचत्र-

f are impossible because their varieties are mutually re- pellent, and cannot therefore reside in o00 substance at one time. The word T is omitted in the definitions of x and

as unnecessary because the two organs apprehend their respective qualities only and nothing else. It is however necessary in the definition of er for the scuse of tonch apprehends other qualities besides toneh, such as number and conjunction which are also porceived by the ere. The word or is retained in the three definitions to exclude the जाति respectively residing in the three malitins, viz. रसत्व, गन्धत्व and स्पर्शत्व. It is needless to remark that the three definitions are to be understood as जातिविशिष्ट (e. g. रसनग्राद्य-

a) in order to include the qualities in atoms.

શું

Annambhatta following old authors divides af into three kinds, hot, cold, and temperate; but some others are for recognizing Freres also, the reason given being

Touch.

the analogy with colour ( चित्रस्पर्शस्तु रूपस्थलीययुक्त्या

[[156]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

[ SEOT. XXII.

स्वीकरणीय एव* ). चित्रस्पर्श however is not so possible in the three-fold division as in the theory of those who divide erf into numerous kinds such as:

mer: qftataddicor: fearysa fare: EC I कठिनश्र्विक्कणः शुक्ष्णः पिच्छलो दारुणो मृदुः ॥ एवं द्वादशविस्तारो वायव्य गुण एव च ।

The idea seems to be that the eye and the organs of touch being the chief organs through which most of our perceptible knowledge is derived, चित्ररूप and fasti have to be recognized to account for the perception of a whole hav- ing variegated parts. No such necessity however exists in the case of objects having different odours or savours, as even if they are never perceived at all, they can be inferred from their qualities. The same is the case with स्पर्श according to those who deny स्पार्शनप्रत्यक्ष to objects hav- ing touch. Hence Sankara Miśra remarks: agûneTİ रसोऽपि चित्र इति वाच्यं । हरीतक्या नीरसत्वे दोषाभावात्.“t

SEcT. XXIII. पाकजापाकजत्वे.

The four qualities, colour etc., are products of hout and non-eternal in earth; elsewhere they are natural and either eternal or non-eternal. Those inhering in eternal things are eternal; those in non-eternal things are non-eternal.

Production of qualities.

The four qualities colour, savour, odour, and touch are both eternal and non-eternal; they are sometimes produced by heat, and some- times they are natural. In earth they are said to be produced by heat, and are consequently non-eternal, while in the remaining three substances they are natural, and are both eternal and non-eternal, the eternal being confined to the eternal atoms, and the non-eternal belong- ing to products which are non-eternal. The author is silent as to whether natural and eternal odour resides in the atoms

*V. S. Up. Calc, ed. p. 292.

† Maha-Bhárala.

V. S. Up. Cale. Ed. p. 286.

SECT. XXIII. ]

Notes.

[[157]]

of earth. If it does, the words

The controversy of Pilupáka and Pitharapâka.

fought to

be supplemented by the further addition अपाकजं नित्यं. The distinction between पाकज and अपाकज appears to be that earth can change its qualities by the application of heat, while water, light and air do not change them. Not that water and air do not become hot by the contact of heat, but the change of touch in their case does not affect the material but belongs to the light that is mixed with them.

T. D. here states briefly the rival theories about पाकजोत्पत्ति, that sharply divide the Vaiseshikas from the Naiyâyikas. The former are called पीलुपाकवादिनः because they explain the change of colour in an unbaked jar by the separate baking of individual atoms, while the Naiyayikas are called flexarsafe: because they supposed the change of colour to be accomplished in the jar itself. पाक is defined as रूपादिपरावृत्तिफलक-विजातीयतेजः संयोगः, application of external heat which effects a change of colour and other qualities. It is of various kinds according to the effects, one changing only colour as in a baked jar, another changing colour, odour and savour asin an artificially ripened mango-fruit, and so on. The word fanta excludes a change by heat in metals, which, being and, are . When a jar is baked the old black jar is, according to Vaiseshikas, destroyed, and its several compounds of binaries etc. are also destroyed. The action of the fire produces the red colour in separate atoms, which are then joined by the same action of fire into new compounds, and eventually produce a new red jar. This complicated process of dissolution and reconstruction of the jar is necessary to allow all the atoms in the jar to be baked, for if the jar remained intact, the fire caunot penetrate it and bake the atoms in the interior. The reason why we cannot perceive this process of dissolution and reconstruction is its great rapidity. The time occupied by this process has been variously computed, some holding it to be nine moments, others ten, others eloven, and a fourth school, five only. The order of nine moments, which is generally

[[158]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

[ SECT. XXIII.

“

" तथाहि

(?) १

accepted, is thus given by Viśvanatha: afriयोगात्कर्म । ततः परमाण्वन्तरेण विभागः । तत आरम्भकसंयोगनाशः । antsugebator: 1 (2) aa: qranoît quranĝera: 1 (3)aðr cageqîa: 1 (४) ततो द्रव्यारम्भानुगुणक्रिया । (५) ततो विभागः । (६) ततः पूर्वसंयोगनाशः । (७) तत आरम्भकसंयोगः । (८) ततो द्यणुकोत्पत्तिः । (९) ततो रक्ताद्युत्पत्तिः “. Of these the first four steps constitute the first moment marking the gradual destruction of the binary, and make up, together with the following eight ones, the total num- ber of nine moments. Those who accept a disjunction arising from disjunction (frama) make ten moments by adding after the third another step बह्निनोदनजन्यपरमाणु-

for TT: cessation of the action in the atoms produced by the original conjunction of fire; while the advocates of eleven moments add another disjunction after the first step. Again, if of the nine moments above described we take the first, the second, then the next two, then the next four, and then the last, we have the time divided into five moments only.† To this fantastical theory the Naiyâyikas who advo- cate fazqurmarg object on the ground that, if the first jar is destroyed and a new one substituted, the identity of the jar can never remain intact. We recognize the jar to be exacty the same jar as before; we observe the same through all stages of baking; and other pots placed over it do not tumble down, as they must if their support is comple- tely destroyed even for a moment. Again how do the num- ber, the shape and even the lines on the jar remain the same? These strong objections are answered by the counter question, how does the identity of a jar remain intact even if we scratch some particles out of it with a needle-point, although the jar after scratching becomes minus some particles and is quite different from the former one? ‡ The followers of Nyâya therefore accept the simpler and on the whole the more reason- able theory of the change of colour being accomplished without

S. M. Calc. Ed. p. 103.

† For further explanation see V. S. Up. Calc. ed. p. 291, Roer’s Trans, of B. P. Bibl. Ind. pp. 57-9, and Sarva, D, S, Cowell’s Trans. p. 154.

IV. S. Up. Calc. ed.

pp. 289-90.

SECT. XXIV. ]

Notes.

[[159]]

the total dissolution and reconstruction of the jar. The objec- tion how fire can reach the atoms is met with by the practical instance of water boiling inside a pot placed over fire without actual touch. In this way the controversy between the

(baking of atoms) and the fare (baking of the pot) has been carried on by their respective partisans with scholastic sub- tility and an amount of energy, that are quite disproportionate to the importance of the result. The doctrine of figure. has in fact become one of the standing test of distinguishing a genuine Vaiseshika from his rival the Naiyayika proper.

The chief points of distinction between the two schools are stated in the following distich:-

Vaiseshikas and Naiyâyikas.

द्वित्वे च पाकजोत्पत्ती विभागे च विभागजे ।

। यस्य न स्खलिता बुद्धिस्तं वै वैशेषिकं विदुः ॥

The Vaiseshika doctrines about द्वित्व aud विभागजविभाग will be explained subsequently. Whatever view of qasiraja we adopt, it is certain that the qualities in earth are non- eternal. According to the Vaiseshika figue, even ser in earthy atoms seems to be non-eternal; but the other theory leaves the point doubtful.

SECT. XXIV. Gea.

“ Number is the (special and instrumental) cause of the common usage of ( words) one, two etc.” It resides in the nine substances from one to Par&rdha. Oneness is eternal and non-eternal, eternal in eternal substances, and non-eternal in non-eternals. Duality and the rest are only non-eternal everywhere.

Number.

The definitions of rear and offer in the text are taken from Prasastapâda.* The word हेतु here, as in the definition of time, is to be understood in the sense of असाधारणनि- मित्तकारण, असाधारण in order to exclude universal causes like time and space, and fafam to exclude ether which is the

P. B. Ben. ed. PP. 111-30.

[[160]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

[

SEOT.“XXIV.

material cause of all age. Number is the first of the com- mon qualities, i. e. those which reside in all the substances. They are enumerated as follows.-

सख्यादिरपरत्वान्तो द्रवः सांसिद्धिकस्तथा ।

readit सामान्यगुणा एते प्रकीर्तिताः ॥ **

Number, dimension, severalty, conjunction, disjunction, priority and posteriority, these seven, together with deri- vative fluidity, gravity and velocity, are qualities common to all substances. They appertain to substances in general, and not to any particular kind of substance; and hence they cannot be due to special characteristics which distinguish one class from another. It will be noticed that all these qualities connote really a state, aspect or arrangement of the thing or its parts, and not any attribute inherent in the thing itself. They are, to adopt modern phraseology, sub- jective or notional rather than objective or material. They are in fact imposed upon the thing by the operation of our own mind; that is, as the Fedantin would say, they are orterea or endiit. It is true that we apprehend them, but we cannot assert positively whether they have a real ex- istence in the external object or are merely conceptions of our own mind imposed upon the object. It will be more correct to say that we conceive them than that we perceive them. The special qualities (for) on the other hand, which have been already enumerated, have a real objective existence. Number of course is pre-eminently a subjective. property and varies at our will, for we can contemplate & number of things, each as one separately, or all as so many, or all as one collection. The Vaiseshikas had undoubtedly realized the true nature of number, for they called duality and the higher numbers अपेक्षाबुद्धिजन्य.

Out of the numbers which are ordinarily counted from one to a parardha or a lakh of lakhs of crores, unity resides in eternal substances like atoms, while the other kinds are found

B. P. 90-1GEOT. XXIV. ]

Notes.

[[161]]

in products. The transientness of non-eternal unity in products arises from the fact that a log of wood ceases to be one when you break it into pieces. Numbers from duality onwards being

are non-eternal. Sankara Miśra regards aga, i. e. an indefinite multitude, as a separate number apart बहुत्व,

which are all definite; but this opinion is not

from

eng

generally accepted.

What is duality.

Note 3 on Sect. XXIII† men-

The verse quoted in

tions as one of the three contested points between Nyaya and Vaiseshika schools. The Vaiseshika view, which is no doubt shared by Annambhaṭṭa, is that all numbers from duality onwards are produced (r) and not simply made known (ज्ञाप्य ) by अपेक्षाबुद्धि. अपेक्षाबुद्धि is defined अनेकैकत्वबुद्धि- af ærs¶ggfagzat, which may be translated as “the notion which refers to many unities is called the engra.” It is difficult to translate

by “comprehending intellect” as Roer does, or by any other exact English equivalent; but its meaning can be easily understood. When two things are brought before us, we do not at once cognize them as two, but first apprehend each one separately, as this one and that one. These separate notions are denoted by the term f. When the conceptions of these two unities are formed in our mind, they are joined together and produce one general notion of duality; and then we get the knowledge that there are two things. The process is thus described :-

तत्र प्रथममिन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षः । तस्मादेकत्वसामान्यज्ञानम् । ततोऽपेक्षा- बुद्धिः । ततो द्वित्वोत्पत्तिः । ततो द्वित्वसामान्यज्ञानम् । तस्माद्वित्वगुणज्ञानम् । ततः संस्कारः ।

First we have the contact of the organ of sense with the object (. e. each of the two jars ); thence arises the knowledge of the genus unity (apart from the individual); then the distinguishing perception,

by which the notion of unity is realized in each of the objects, and we

[[21]]

V. S. Up. Calc. ed. p. 322.

† Supra. p. 159,

‡ B. P. 108.

§ Sarv. D. S. Calc.ed. p. 10.

[[162]]

Tarka- Sangraha.

[ SHOT. XXIV.

apprehend “this is one,” “this is one” etc. then the production of duality by the combination of separate unities; then the knowledge of the abstract genus of duality; then the cognition of that quality of duality as existing in the two things; and lastly the consciousness that we see two things. In this way we derive the complex knowledge of two, three etc. from the simple notions of unity. The reason why द्वित्व is regarded as अपेक्षाबुद्धिजन्य and not अपेक्षाबुद्धिज्ञाप्य is rather subtle. It is that अपेक्षाबाई cannot simply be the ज्ञापक-

off like a stroke which reveals a sound lying dormant in ether; but it is the कारकहेतु of द्वित्व, because it is always found inseparably associated with, while a ras need not be so (अपेक्षाबुद्धिर्द्वित्वादेरुत्पादिका । व्यञ्जकत्वानुपपत्तेः । तेनानुविधी- यमानत्वात् । शब्द प्रति संयोगवत् ). Madhavacharya gives a simpler argument, viz. that the nou-eternal

cannot be

of द्वित्व, which, like the quality वृथक्त्व, resides in several objects conjointly; while star resides in each object sepa- rately, and hence it must be the mid of . The importance of this subtle distinction lies in the different views of fee to which it leads. According to one, fa is an independent reality, different from the several unities of which it is composed and generated by gra; according to the other view it is already comprehended in the unities, and is only revealed when several of them are brought together. It may be further mentioned that both the notion of duality and its generating cause igre vanish away when their purpose is served, that is, when, the objects are actually perceived as two. As soon as yugia, the result of rangi, is produced, the latter which lasts for three moments only is destroyed, and with its destruction, its direct effect, the duality, is also destroyed, and there only remains the cognition ’two dravyas’. The steps follow in this order : 1 एकत्वज्ञानः अपेक्षाबुद्धिः 3 द्वित्वोत्पत्ति and एकत्वज्ञान* नाशः 4 द्वित्वज्ञानः द्वित्वगुणबुद्धि and अपेक्षाबुद्धिनाशः and 6 द्वित्व- नTश and द्रव्यबुद्धि. The reason for this assumed destruction of अपेक्षाबुद्धि and fradia is rather technical, being founded the Vaibeshika doc-

[[2]]

SBOT. XXV. ]

Notes.

[[163]]

trine that all cognitions, being qualities of the all-pervading soul, last for three moments only, and are destroyed by the generation of their effects. The student has been led through this labyrinth of speculative subtility in order to acquaint him with the exact import of Annambhaṭṭa’s simple dictum, द्वित्वादिकं तु सर्वत्रानित्यमेव, that is, duality and other larger numbers are always erfar.

SECT. XXX. परिमाणम्.

Dimension is the (special and instrumental) cause of the common usage of measurement. It resides in the nine substances, and is of four kinds: minuteness, largeness, length and shortness.

Each of the four kinds of dimensions mentioned above may again be divided into two kinds, as re middling and q

Dimension.

extreme.

Thus an atom has extreme minuteness, which is also technically called neer (infinite- simality) from fuse a globular atom; a binary has मध्यमrgra middling minuteness; Arasa has पर He or

y all-pervasion; and all tangible objects such as a jar have wнg intermediate greatness. The comparaive use of these words, as this pearl is minuter or larger than that other, is secondary. The distinction between ag and aga on the one hand and and on the other seems to be that the first two denote magnitudes of two or three dimen- sions i. e. bulk, while the latter two denote one dimension only such as a line. This four-fold division of or is after all rough, many including व्हस्वत्व and दीर्घत्व in अणुत्व and

a respectively. As a matter of fact all of them are relative terms, and denote different numbers of constituent parts or degrees of contact in which they are combined. परिमाण is again divided into नित्य and अनित्य; that residing in eternal things as पारिमाण्डल्य and त्रिभुत्व being नित्य, and all the rest अनित्य- अनित्यपरिमाण is threefold सङ्ख्याजन्य, परिमाणजन्य and y. For the explanation of these see Notes 9 and 10 on Sect. XIII. pp. 121–3, supra.

[[164]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

SECT. XXVI. quran.

[ SEOT. XXVI.

Severalty is the ( special and instrumental) cause of the common usage of one thing being different from another.

The definition in the text is rather crude. A better though a little more abstruse definition Severalty.

of पृथक्त्व is अपोद्धारव्यवहारकरणम् the cause of our practice of separating one thing from all the rest. * अपोद्धार is अपकृत्यावधिमपेक्ष्य य उद्धारो निर्धारणम् सः that is, the determination of the identity of one thing by separating it from all others. The reason why querer is regarded as distinct from

is that the notions conveyed to our mind by the two are of different sorts. When we say. 12: qêt aníta we simply get a negative notion, that a jar is not a piece of cloth; while by qize: qus we get a positive notion that one is quite distinct from the other. gerer there-

पृथक्त्व fore tells us something more than

, for it not

►

only informs us that a jar is not a piece of cloth but also that it is a different thing. The importance of this distinc- tion may be illustrated by another example. We can say that a jar is not the quality of blueness residing in it, but we cannot say that it is distinct from it, the two being inseparably connected. Similarly we can say that a black unbaked jar is not the same red jar when baked, but it is not पृथक् from it. Again we can say दण्डी देवदत्त is not देवदत्त without a que, but the two are not distinct persons. In short q is opposed to objective identity of the things, while अन्योन्याभाव to the sameness of their natures. पृथक्त्व is a material distinction;

notional only. In the same way पृथक्त्व can be distinguished from वैधर्म्य or वैशिष्टय.

SECT. XXVII. ÅÅTT:.

Conjunction is the ( special and instrumental) cause of the common usage of calling two things united.
is also defined as the contact of two things that were first separate ( अप्राप्तयोस्तु या प्राप्तिः सैव

Conjunction.

dùm fa:†); and therefore there can

be no between two all-pervading things which

P. B. Ben, ed, p. 138.

† B. P. 114.

#EOT. XXVII, ]

Notes.

[[165]]

संयोग divides it into two

that produced

are never apart from each other. is always artificial and non-eternal. T. D. kinds, that born of action, and by another conjunction. The contact of the hand with the book is of the first kind, because it is produced by the motion of the hand, while this contact of the hand with the book, produces another conjunction, namely, that of the body, with the book, which is therefore संयोगज. The कर्मज संयोग is again of two kinds, अन्यतरकर्मज and उभयकर्मज. The instance of the first is the contact of the bird with the mountain, in which the bird alone moves while the mountain is stationary. The examples of the second kind are the meetings of two fighting rams, or of two wrestlers, or of two clouds, where both the things move. again is two-fold, that of a thing just produced, such as the contact of an effect with some- thing already connected with its material cause, and that of a thing previously existing, as the contact of the tree in consequence of the contact of the hand and the tree. All kinds of contacts are r, that is, cover only a part of the thing, and are destroyed either by separation or des- truction of the e, namely the things connected.

Three Mss. of T. S. insert the word error after व्यवहार in the definitions of सङ्ख्या, परिमाण, पृथक्त्व and संयोग, but the reading of others who reject it appears to be the right one and has been adopted. Although the qualification crarureur is necessary to exclude universal causes, it can be and is always presumed wherever the words or or occur as in the definitions of and fas and so there is no need of its express mention. There are also other grounds to believe that the word error did not exist originally but was supplied by the Dipika. The words erarara qa qở in the Dipika would of course have been conclusive on the point had they been found in all Mss. of the work. S. C. however is quite explicit, as it remarks - ‘उपदर्शितलक्षणचतुष्टयेऽ- साधारणपर्व देयम् । क्वचित्पुस्तके परिमाणपृथक्त्वलक्षणे ऽसाधारणपदं दृश्यते acrylaðviremâfa ärere. ”

[[166]]

Universal Causes.

Tarka-Sangraha.

[ #EOT. XXVIII.

The Terror (universal cause) referred to in this and the preceding definitions is defined by V. V. as कार्यत्वावच्छिन्नकार्यतानिरूपितकारणम्, which signifies that a universal cause is a cause of all effects as effects, and not as particular products; as for instance, a stick is an instrument of a jar because it is a jar and not any other thing, while time and space are instrumental causes of the same jar because it is a product. These universal causes are eight, God, His knowledge, His will, His effort, (acaràcolea: ) antecedent negation ( प्रागभाव ), time ( काल ), space ( दिक्) and destiny (अदृष्ट ) comprising both merit and demerit. Some add the absence of counteracting influences ( giãerecznie ) as a ninth universal cause. These being universal causes are necessarily implied wherever we speak of a cause or an effect; and conse- quently when a thing is specially mentioned as a cause or an effect of another, they are not meant.

SECT. XXVIII. fπ:,

Disjunction is the quality which destroys conjunction.

Disjunction is not merely the absence of, in which

case it would have fallen under

Disjunction.

and need not have been reckoned as a se- parate quality; but it denotes an actual separation which produces the destruction of a previous contact. Again by disjunction we denote not the act of sepa- rating which is excluded from the definition by the word w but the state which immediately results from the act of separation. Hence Annambhatta defines far differently, and not on the analogy of संयोग 85 विभक्तव्यवहारकारणम् OF विभक्त- gegar, as is done by Visvanatha. The latter definitions being ambiguous may as well denote the state of being separate as the actual act of separation. The order of succession therefore is always this: first, act of separating, then sepa- ration here called विभाग, then पूर्वदेश संयोगनाश, and lastly अपर-

. When we remove a jar from one place to another, we

BHÚT. XXIX. ]

Notes.

[[167]]

have an effort to lift it up,-this is the f; then the jar is lifted. from the ground,-this is far; then its contact with the particular spot is severed,-this is

; and lastly it is placed on another spot, this is अपरदेशसंयोग. विभाग is there- fore the cause of and not the same as संयोगनाश. Two trees on the opposite banks of a river have always remained apart, but there has never been an actual separation of them. has the same varieties as gum, and the examples also are similar, namely, कर्मज ( subdivided into उभयकर्मज and अन्यतर- कर्मज) and विभागजविभाग. There is however a difference of opinion as to the last between the Vaiseshikas and the Naiyayikas proper, the latter not recognizing Funafầum at all.* The instance of a विभागजविभाग is हस्ततरुविभागात् काय- f: separation of the body from the tree, consequent upon the removal of the hand from the tree. Here the separation of the body is not directly caused by the motion of the hand because the two things (विभाग and हस्तक्रिया ) reside in different receptacles, viz. the body and the hand respectively, while there is no motion in the body itself which might cause the separation. This argument by which the necessity of recognizing a far is sought to be proved is founded on the axiom that the motion of a part is not the motion of the whole (as we see in a stationary revolving wheel) and so the motion of the hand is not itself the motion of the body. fummam is also divided into two kinds कारणमात्रविभागज and कारणाकारणविभागज, for which however see Sarv. D. S. Calc. ed. p. 107.

SECT. XXIX परत्वापरत्वे.

Posteriority and priority are the (special and instrumental) causes of the common usage of the words posterior and prior. They reside in the four ( substances ), earth, etc. and the mind. They are twofold, caused by space and time. The posteriority caused by space is in the remote, and priority so caused is in the near. Posteriority caused by time is in the elder, and priority so caused is in the younger.

Priority and pos- teriority.

Posterioty and priority may also be designated re- moteness and proximity respectively. These qualities reside in the first four substances, because they are the only corporeal and non-eternal substances having a limited di-

See verse quoted in Note 3 on Sect. XXIII p. 159 supra,

[[168]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

SEOT. XXIX.

mension. Mind, being corporeal, possesses only one kind of priority and posteriority, namely that made by space fear, but not the other caused by time, as mind is eternal. The last four substances remaining are both eternal and incorporeal and cannot therefore have any kind of परत्व or अपरत्व. Really speaking and are nothing more than relations of corporeal things to time and space, expressed in the form of qualities for the purpose of marking their varying degrees.

SEcr. XXX, XXXI. गुरुत्वम्, द्रवत्वम्.

Gravity is the non-intimate cause of the first fall, and resides in earth and water.

Fluidity is the non-intimate cause of the first flow, residing in earth, water and light. It is two-fold, natural and artificial.

Gravity and Flu- idity.

The definitions of Gravity and Fluidity are analogous, one being called the non-intimate cause of the first act of falling,’ and the other ’ a like cause of the first act of flowing.” The word are is inserted in both definitions to exclude velocity () which is the non-intimate cause of the second and all subsequent acts of falling or flowing. As a matter of fact, falling and flowing are essentially the same acts, one being the coming down of a solid from a higher level, while the other is the same act in a fluid; but the Naiyayi- has do not seem to have realized this. They do not also seem to have known the dynamical theory of falling bodies, as is clear from their calling the cause of the

first falling only, while it is in fact the cause of every act of falling. The confusion of the two meanings of the word, viz. weight and heaviness, is already noticed and commented upon.

Fluidity is of two kinds, natural as that of water, and artificial as that of melted ghee. The distinction between - सिद्धिक and नैमित्तिकद्रवत्व, though spoken of as inherent and absolute, seems to have been made to indicate the fact that some things remain fluid at normal temperature and others

See Note 3 on Sect. IV. p. 85, supra,

#BOT. XXXII. ]

Notes.

[[169]]

not. Those of the first kind such as water are said to pos- sess natural fluidity, while others requiring the application of additional heat have artificial fluidity only. The solidity of snow and hail which are forms of water is exceptional and hence does not affect the proposition.

Unlike gravity, fluidity is assumed in light also namely, in melted gold and other metals, while the gravity of the metals is ascribed to earthy portion in them. It might be urged that, following the analogy of gravity, even the fluidity of metals can be attributed to some watery por- tion in them; but this cannot be, says the Vaiseshika, for in that case it would be if, while the fluidity of metals is really only. Again why cannot the same earthy portion, which accounts for the gravity of metals, also account for its नैमित्तिक द्रवत्व? This is also not possible, for the fluidity of metals is of a different kind, being - guna (indestructible) even by the application of ex- treme heat, while that of earthy substances is ATH· Light in the form of metals must therefore be regarded as having a peculiar fluidity of its own.

SECT. XXXII.

44 Viscidity is the quality which is the (special and ins- trumental) cause of the agglutination of powders and resides in water only.”

The viscidity found in oil, milk and such other earthy

Viscidity.

substances is of course due to the watery portion in them. How can oil, says an objector, inflame fire if there is water in it, while water itself extinguishes fire? Here too, the Vaiseshika is ready with his explanation, viz. ara aer

तैलान्तरे #afzegranegoar, Oil hastens fire because it has a greater amount of viscidity than pure water. It is not explained however whence this greater viscidity in oil comes if it is due to water alone. fquetara means thickening or concen- tration. It is the peculiar combination which holds parti- cles of powder together. The reason why this fquetere requires a special quality and cannot be attributed to

[[22]]

B. P. 156.

[[170]]

Tarha-Sangraha.

[SBOT. XXXII.

is that melted gold which possesses fluidity cannot form lumps of powders. N. B., however, quite appositely remarks that liquid water is alone the real cause, while solid water such as hail and ice is incapable of agglutinating par- ticles. The fact is that the modern scientific theory of molecular attraction and repulsion which induced the three states of solid, liquid and gaseous in all matter was hardly known to Indian physicists, and hence they were often led into giving fantastic explanations of ordinary phenomena.

T. D., N. B. and S. C. say that the propriety of the word qur in the definition of is to exclude time etc.; but this does not seem correct, as time and other universal causes are already excluded by interpreting हेतु as असाधारणहेतु. V. V. explains the word as excluding quf, but this is also incor- rect, since q can be excluded by taking in the sense of Affurur as it has been hitherto taken. It appears more reasonable to understand or as excluding the act of aggluti- nating which is also the special and instrumental cause of पिण्डीभाव. Hence either the line कालादी etc. in T. D., which is retained in this edition because it is found in all copies, is interpolated by some one who failed to understand the text, or Annambhaṭṭa deliberately used the word here in a narrower sense than previously. Probably he borrowed the definition from a more ancient work, without determin- ing accurately the propriety of cach word.*

SECT. XXXIII. :.

शब्द

Sound is the quality which is apprehended by the sense of hearing, and resides in ether alone. It is two-fold, inarti- culate or noise and articulate or words. The noise is (heard) in drums etc.; while words appear in the form of Sanskrit language. 1. Besides the two-fold division in the text, the T. D. gives another three-fold division of sound, mak- ing in all six varieties of it. The latter three divisions are: 1, born of conjunction, such as the sound of a drum produced by the contact of the stick or hand with the drum; 2, born of disjunction, such as the sound produced by splitting a bamboo-stick; and 3 born of sound, such as all subsequent sounds which are produced from the first one.

Sound.

P. B. Ben. ed.

p. 266.SEOT. XXXIII. 1

Notes.

[[171]]

A more elaborate division of sound is the following:-

बुद्धिहेतुकः

स्वाभाविकः

शब्द :

अबुद्धिहेतुकः

o.g. मेघादिशब्दः

Enterfere:

aramfagree:

गीतिरूपः

quote:

सार्थकः

Profes:

STATUT:

अप्रमाणः

लौकिक

वैदिकः

And so on. The articulate sound will be treated further on under शब्दप्रमाण ( Sect. 58-03.)

There is recognized to account for the fact that

The Nyaya the- ory of sound.

sound can be heard at any distance from the place where it is first produced. There are only two senses which apprehend their objects at a distance, namely, sight and hearing. Of these the eye is supposed to go outside to the object, and carry back its impression to the mind. But the organ of hearing being of the nature of all-pervading Akasa cannot move.

or organ of hearing is defined as the Ahasa which is f grogeafood, i. e. the portion of ether limited and severed from the rest of the Akasa by the cavity of the ear. Evidently A cannot go out of the ear-cavity by which it is conditioned, for as soon as it goes out it will be no but common ether. As the organ of hearing cannot go to its object, it is necessary that the object should reach the ear, so that anyhow the two may come into contact. But the sound which is produced in that portion of Âkúša which is immediately in contact with the drum is distant from the ear and cannot itself travel to the ear, being, as a quality, inseparably connect-

[[172]]

Tarka-Sangraha

[SBOT. XXXIII.

ed with a definite portion of the Akasa. Besids it is a doc- trine of the Naiyâyikas that sound is rare and cannot last for more than a few moments. This first sound therefore is supposed to produce a second similar sound in the next piece of Ãkása, and this second a third; and so on, until the train reaches the portion of Âkâsa confined in the ear, that is, the श्रोत्र. It is this last sound produced in the श्रोत्राकाश that is directly perceived by the organ of hearing, and as it is the last of a series generated by the first sound, it is called शब्दज. So far this theory of sound is accepted by all Naiyayikas, but there is a slight difference of opinion as to the mode in which sound travels or rather propagates its species. Some, applying the analogy of ocean-waves (didatguru), say that the series of sounds travels in a straight line in one direction only, namely from the drum direct to the ear. Others apply the analogy of a कदम्ब flower ( कदम्बगोलकन्याय), the filaments of which shoot round about in all directions; and so they say that sound travels not in one direction only but in all directions, that is, innumerable series of sounds start from the central point where it was first produced, and go in every direction. The simple fact that the sound of a drum is heard on all sides and not in one direction only is enough to prove that the latter analogy is nearer the truth than the former. The whole of the above theory of sound is very crude and faulty owing to the inveterate habit of Indian philosophers to indulge in speculations in matters that can be known only by actual observation or experiments. They did not know that the real organ of hearing is the tympanum in the ear which has a closer similarity with the drum than with the Akasa, while the fact of the sound being carried by air by means of successive undulations of air-particles was also andreampt of. Instead of investigating the nature of sound in such practical directions, the Naiyayikas exhausted their energies in discussing whether sound was eternal or non- eternal. The pros and cons as well as the importance of this last controversy in Indian philosophy will be noticed later on.

SROT. XXXIV. ]

Notes.

SECT. XXXIV. qiz.

(

[[173]]

Cognition is the special and instrumental) cause of all communication or intercourse, and it is knowledge. It is twofold, remembrance and apprehension. Remembrance is knowledge produced from mental impression alone. Knowledge other than remembrance is apprehension.

Cognition is the proper equivalent for gas used in the Nyaya system. Ballantyne translates

Cognition.

by understanding, and Roer by intellect; but both renderings ure wrong. The word gf is capable of having three meanings:-1st the act of knowing, which may be called understanding; 2ndly the instrument of knowledge which is intellect;’ and 3rdly the product of the act of knowing, which is ‘cognition.’ It is in this last sense that the word is invariably used in Nyâya and Vaiśeshika philosophies. This should be quite clear from the mention of gf among the qualities, that is, as a property of the soul. A cognition is undoubtedly such a property; while understanding is an act, and intellect being an instrument of knowledge is a substance, and is identified by Naiyâyikas with mind. Other schools of philosophers such as the Sankhyas and the Vedantins designate as an elemental thing under the name nga, and divide it into several faculties performing different functions, namely, अहङ्कार and अन्तःकरण. According to them, therefore, बुद्धि is an instrument of knowledge; but their doctrine is emphatically repudiated by Naiyayikas who regard as a quality of the soul and capable of being perceived, while the direct instrumentality of knowledge is assigned to mind which being atomic is imperceptible. Hence in the definition given in the text is said to be knowledge itself, and not an instrument of knowledge.

व्यवहार is, as V: V. rightly defines it, बुबोधयिषापूर्वकवाक्य- , utterance of words for the purpose of communicating ideas, and not enragen?: as S. C. has it, for the latter is too wide and would include involuntary actions, such as walking in sleep, which are not prompted by knowledge. Briefly speaking, is a property of the soul which prompts articulate language; or, in other words, it is thought clothed in intelligible words. This invariable association of gre and wage makes the above definition too narrow, in as

[[174]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

[ SECT. XXXIV.

much as it does not apply to afara or mere sensation, which is a species of cognition, but which can never be expressed by articulate language. V. V. therefore modifies the definition into तादशव्यवहारजनकतावच्छेदकजातिमत्त्वम्, that is, cognition is the quality having that which characterizes the efficient cause of the above kind of व्यवहार. Thus निर्वि- कल्पज्ञान, though itself not व्यवहारहेतु, has theजातिबुद्धित्व which differentiates the व्यवहारहेतु.

The definition of a given in the text is in many re- spects more convenient in practice than

[[6]]

Other definitions. scientifically accuate. The T. D. there- fore supplies a better definition, जानामीत्य - नुव्यवसाय यज्ञानत्वम्. Cognition is said to be that knowledge () which becomes the subject (r) of the conscious- ness ( agagawa) having the form I know.’ This requires a little explanation. Perceptive knowledge according to Nyaya is acquired by going through three successive steps, viz. इन्द्रियसन्निकर्ष, ज्ञान and अनुव्यवसाय. When an object like & jar is brought before us, our organ of sight first comes into contact with it, and carries an image of the object to the mind which conveys it to the soul. This organ is called the я, efficient cause of perception. This image is then converted into a cognition or बुद्धि having the form अयं वदः < this is a jar. This cognition () again being a property of the soul, the Ego becomes when combined with the ever present into the compound consiousness, घटज्ञानवानहमस्मि OF घटमहं

ย

maana, which I am, ’ results

अनु-

I know a jar.’ This last consciousness is called - व्यवसाय because it always follows व्यवसाय or simple cognition. Hence the cognition This is a jar ( : ) is said to become the subject matter of the consciousness I know.” The peculiarity of this definition consists in the fact that other scholastics, such as the Sankhyas and the Vedantins, do not recognize the ecognition अयं घटः to be the गम्यमान of & farther अनुव्यवसाय, bnt give the name cognition to अनुव्यवसाय itself. The definition thus states a peculiar doctrine of Nyaya.

Another noteworthy definition of given in the

SECT. XXXIV. ]

Notes.

[[175]]

Sapta-Padârthi of Śivâdityâcharya is emery: gærer:, which the commentator Jinarardhana explains, EİVARTÕRKEAR- कारकसकलपदार्थस्यार्थप्रकाशकः प्रदीप इव देदीप्यमानो यः प्रकाशः सा बुद्धिः, knowledge is of the nature of light because it dispels the darkness of ignorance and illuminates all objects to the mind’s eye. The epithet : means residing in the

arЯT: soul as a property, and explains Annambhatta’s definition of आत्मा as ज्ञानाधिकरणम्, बुद्धि and ज्ञान boiug of course synony- mous. Prasastapâda defines merely by giving summu,

ara and requ as its synonyms.*

Reading discus-

sed.

The wording of the definition in four copies is differ- ent, being हेतुज्ञीन बुद्धि; instead of हेतुर्बुद्धि - afe; while two other copies add grup: after quite unnecessarily. The inter- change of and gre: has an importaut bearing on the right understanding of the definition; for the other read- ing is not only ambiguous, but is likely to mislead some into taking to be only one species of knowledge which is व्यवहारहेतुः. As a matter of fact ज्ञान is an independent predicate of gf intended to describe the exact nature of cognition, and probably also to exclude the possibility of

being mistaken for the act or the instrument of know- ledge. It contradicts according to S. C. the doctrine of Sankhyos that gr or age is a material element, produced from प्रकृति and identical with अन्तःकरण the instrument of knowledge. One copy of T. D. inserts कालादावतिव्याप्तिवारणाय

ff, but that is incorrect, as time etc. are excluded by taking हेतु as असाधारणहेतु. Another propriety of the word

noticed by S. C., viz. that here does not mean excess of knowledge as in expressious बुद्धिमान देवदत्तः, is rather far-fetched. The expression is borrowed from Go- tama’s aphorism, बुद्धिरुपलब्धिर्ज्ञानमित्यनर्थान्तरम् and is probab- ly used as a hint to the student that Gotama’s psychology and logic are easily reconcilable with the system of Vai- Seshika padârthas adopted in this book. Whatever may be

P. B. Ben. ed, p. 171.

† G. S. I, 1, 15.

[[176]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

[ SEOT. XXXIV.

the case it is evident that in this and in all the following sections of the book treating of the kinds and proofs of knowledge the author is a consistent follower of Gotama rather than of Kanada, and has attempted with consider- able success to incorporate the Nyaya doctrine of proofs with the Vaiseshika system of padârthas.

Divisons of cog- nition.

Cognition is of two kinds, remembrance and appre- hension. Remembrance is defined as the knowledge which is born of a mental im- pression alone ( संस्कार ) This संस्कार is that particular kind of it, which is called war and which is defined further on (Sect. 75) as being born of apprehen- sion and causing remembrance. So war is properly

भावनासंस्कार speaking the operation (rary) which comes into existence between the product स्मृति, and its cause अनुभव. व्यापार is defined as तज्जन्यत्वे सति तज्जन्यजनकः, that is, an inter- mediate operation born of the cause and producing the thing which is the effect of that cause. व्यापार is therefore a sort of intermediate link between the effect and its cause, which often, as in this case of fa, is separated by a great interval of time.

Definition of Smriti.

The insertion of are in the definition of has been sharply criticised, and as strongly defend- ed. The word, it is said, excludes (reminiscence) which is produced by * but not by it alone, as a direct perception of the object is also an operating cause in it. The difference between प्रत्यभिज्ञा and स्मृति consists in the presence or absence of the thing recollected. When a man, for instance, who has seen an elephant with a driver on its back, sees either the elephant or the driver alone, he at once remembers the other one, his knowledge is said to be remembrance, and is solely due to the impression that had been left on his mind since he saw the elephant with a driver on its back. The thing which brings back to the mind the memory of the absent object by the law of association is called the

SBOT. XXXIV. ]

Notes.

[[177]]

उद्बोधक ( reviver ) of that संस्कार. In प्रत्यभिज्ञा ( reminiscence ) the object recollected is actually before our eyes, and the novelty of the knowledge only consists in the identity of the object now perceived with some one previously seen, as when on seeing one recollects that it is the same whom one saw before. Here the actual perception of gazu is as much the cause of knowledge as the impression left on mind by a former perception; and hence प्रत्यभिज्ञा is not संस्कारमात्र- जन्य but प्रत्यक्ष सहकृतसंस्कारजन्य. Several copies of T. S. and T. D. omit a in the definition in the text as well as the sentence in T. D. referring to it. S. C. appears to have had both readings before him as he expressly prefers the one with मात्र.

Other writers omit from the definition on the ground that even without it the definition does not cover प्रत्यभिज्ञा, because there the immediate cause of the प्रत्यभिज्ञा is not the previous impression, but the remembrance of the identity of the thing ( तत्ता = देवदत्तता ) which is produced from संस्कार. * In a remembrance the impression is the immediate cause, while in a reminiscence the impression produces re- membrance of identity, and then this remembrance of simple identity produces the reminiscence that that identity resided in the object actually seen. Thus प्रत्यभिज्ञा is not संस्कारजन्य at all, and hence is unnecessary. Nilakantha answers this argument by simply remarking that the cause of getter is the impression of identity and not an intermediate remem- brance. Another objection to the definition is that it is असम्भूत and will not cover even स्मृति which is not संस्कारमात्र - जन्या but अनुभवजन्या also ; but the असम्भव can be removed either by taking we in the sense of wine or by constru- ing the definition, as Nilakantha remarks, to mean g जन्यत्वे सति ( and not संस्काराजन्यत्वे सति ) संस्कारजन्यत्वम्. As to

संस्कारध्वंस which is also संस्कारमात्रजन्य it is excluded by ज्ञान.

The author defines as ‘all knowledge other than remembrance,’ i. e. all cognitions which are Apprehension.

newly acquired and are not repetitions of former ones. The negative definition of age in the text is

*T K. Bom, ed. p. 6

[[178]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

[ SEOT, XXXIV.

due to the fact that agar is a simple ultimate operation of the mind which is at the bottom of all other mental opera- tions, including even the act of defining. Besides, a defin- ition of eg is really unnecessary, as by simply excluding or repeated knowledge, the definition of gf will also serve for the residuum, that is erger. This and the subsequent divisions and sub-divisions of gf are according to the system of Gotama. The Vaiseshika division is slightly different and may therefore be profitably compared with that given in the text. Prasastapada divides and subdivides gre as follows:-*

faut

srve ofae स्मात आप

Or अनिन्द्रियज

इन्द्रियज

erfafter

ererdefter

emraar

सक्षय विषय स्वन अनध्यवयाय

सविकल्प

fafter

Of these लैङ्गिक is inference, while आर्ष which is a kind of प्रत्यक्ष is the supernatural perception of Yogins. Others can be easily identified with their corresponding varieties given in the text.

Corresponding English terms.

{

The three words बुद्धि, अनुभव and स्मृति are rendered into

English by ‘cognition,’ apprehension and remembrance,’ because they are their nearest equivalents; but the meanings of the last two require to be clearly defined. Remembrance, re- collection, and reminiscence, for instance, are analogous but easily distinguishable. Remembrance is an idea which recurs

P. B. Ben, ed. p. 172. et, seg;

SEOT. XXXIV. ]

Notes.

[[179]]

to the mind without the operation of an external object on the sensory nerve, and is thus opposed to perception; while it becomes recollection, if it is sought after and found with difficulty and effort.* is remembrance as above defined and probably includes recollection also, as Naiyâyikas do not seem to make a distinction between a spontaneous and an artificial recollection. Remembrance as above defined may seem to be concerned with impressions gained from perception only; but there is no reason why a former inference treasur- ed up in mind or an impression produced from a previous remembrance should not be remembered as well; and hence * properly speaking is general and comprehends all impres- sions however originally derived. Reminiscence is the act by which we endeavour to recall and re-unite former states of consciousness, and is a kind of reasoning by which we ascend from a present consciousness to a former one. This is akin to gear. Apprehension is the simple knowledge of a fact, and is an act or condition of the mind in which it receives a notion of any olject. Simple apprehension is again divided into two kinds, incomplex and complex, which respectively correspond to Naiyayita निर्विकल्पक and सविकल्पक- a. This is not exactly the sgaa of Nyûya, but it is very near it. Cognition is knowledge in its widest sense, embracing sensation, perception, conception, and notion. According to Kant, cognition is the determined reference of certain representations to an object; that is, to cognize is to refer a perception to an object by means of a conception. A dog knows his master, but does not cognize him, because it has not the faculty of forming a mental conception of the mas- ter. An absent-minded man sees an object, but does not cognize it because his mind is not working to form a notion of the object. The Naiyâyikas expressed this idea by saying that in an age, the property of the external obiect must become the r of the corresponding cognition.

sama potępiłękawach ka

Locke: Essay on ITuman Understanding, Bk. II. ch. 19. † Whately: Logic, Bk. II. ch. I, sec, 1.

Haywood Critique of Pure Reason, p. 593.

[[180]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

SECT. XXXV, agua: अनुभवः

[ SEOT. XXXV.

It (apprehension) is twofold: true and false. The true one is the apprehension of a thing having an attribute as possessing that attribute and it is called Pramâ; the false one is the apprehension of a thing not having an attribute as possessing that attribute, e. g. knowledge of silver in a conch-shell.

Apprehension is divided into right (ref) and wrong (errero), the first being usually called Apprehension. प्रभा and the second अप्रमा. यथार्थानुभव is a correct apprehension in which the object is cognized as it is ( यथा भूतोऽर्थो यस्मिन् सः ). It is defined तद्वति तत्प्रकारकः which may be paraphrased as तद्वद्विशे- व्यकस्तत्प्रकारकः, that is apprehension of a certain object pos- sessing an attribute as possessing that attribute.

विशेषण, विशेष्य and प्रकार.

The words विशेषण, विशेष्य and प्रकार should be carefully noted as they constantly occur in Nyâya works. When we see an object, the object becomes the far of our knowledge, while the characteristic, which distinguishes that object and makes it what it is, is called the y of the same knowledge. Thus in the cognition, अयं घटः, घट the object of the cognition is the fa, while a the distinguishing property of is the r of the corresponding cognition. Hence the cogni- tion अयं घटः is defined as घटत्ववद्धटविशे ष्यक-घटत्वप्रकारक, that is, one which has a jar possessing the attribute jar-ness for its object ( विशेष्य ), and has घटत्व for its special characteristic (R). The use of this two-fold terminology is that while the faster describes the form of the cognition, re distin- guishes it from similar cognitions, as for instance a from पटज्ञान. There is a similar distinction between विशेषण and प्रकार. When we see a नीलघट, the quality of नोल becomes &

y of the cognition of the blue jar, while the same quality blueness is a faster of the jar itself. Similarly in the cog- nition अयं घटः, घटत्व is the विशेषण of घट and the प्रकार of घटज्ञान. far is the property of a material object, while say is the property of knowledge. /

The definition of -a asg:can there- fore be paraphrased into घटत्ववद्विशेष्यक-घटत्व- प्रकारकोऽनुभवः, which in simple language means that in a right apprehension that

Prama and Apra-

mâ.SECT. XXXV. ]

Notes.

[[181]]

same characteristic which marks the object must also be the distinguishing property of its notion. Hence V. V. remarks सप्तम्यर्थो विशेष्यत्वम्, meaning that the locative तद्वति denotes that the thing (i. e. घट ) possessing तत् (८. ९. घटत्व) is the object (far) of the apprehension, which has the same तत् for its प्रकार. All this can be briefly expressed by saying that right apprehension is the knowledge of an object as it really exists. The opposite of this is namely, the cognition of a property (an: ) in a thing which does not possess that property (aaa). The cog- nition of silver-ness in a thing which is silver is gar; while the same cognition of silver-ness, if made in a mother-o’pearl which is not silver, becomes T. The use of the quali- fication in the definition of T is made apparent in a combined knowledge of two or more things. Suppose we perceive and qe simultaneously and together, but in- stead of cognizing घट as घट and पटas पट we take घट to be पट and rice versa. Here we have a knowledge which has both घट and re for its objects ( विशेष्य ) and also sara and पटत्व for its properties ( प्रकार ) ; but it is not a मा because घटत्व- प्रकार belongs to the part-cognition which is पदविशेष्यक and vice versa. Hence the necessity of saying that the know- ledge must be तत्प्रकार with reference to the object itself (तइति).

A very subtle objection to the definition is suggested and answered by T. D. The definition Some objections. applies to a cognition of a when we can interpret तद्वति as घटत्वाधिकरणे; but it can- not apply to a cognition of vec itself as residing in a va, for aere is uot the अधिकरण of घट or any other thing : so the expression af is meaningless in this case, and the defini- tion will be अव्यात. The difficulty can be avoided by tak- ing as to mean तत्सम्बन्धवति, so that as घट is the अधिकरण of घटत्वसम्बन्ध, 50 घटत्व is the अधिकरण of घटसम्बन्ध, and the defi nition comprehends both. Similarly the definition of err is too wide as it will apply even to a right cognition, This is in union.’ For conjunction being a partial ( cremerara)

[[182]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

[ SEOT. XXXV.

as well as

property, the same thing is always संयोगाभाववत् ; and a cognition इदं संयोगी will be both प्रभा as well as T- But this is not so, for in a wrong cognition the knowledge is obtained from a part where there is a negation of संयोग, while in a right cognition the संयोग is known to be on the part having . Again although a thing resides in another by संयोग and not समवाय, its absolute negation subsisting on the same substratum by anarqu does not make it a wrong cognition.

All this scholastic subtility does not lessen even a bit the inherent ambiguity of the definitions. The practical difficulty is, which of the many properties of a thing is denoted by a. and is therefore to be taken as the test of right apprehen- तत् : sion. That they are the vera of ve and year of qz will of course be the prompt reply; but do we and yea, it may be asked, convey any definite ideas apart from and e? We cannot understand घटत्व or पटत्व unless we first know what घट or पद is. How can then घटत्व or पटत्व become the test of judg- ing the validity of the knowledge that we see a truly when we properly speaking we cannot see we have first recognized the thing to be easy to overcome this dilemma.

of a or

observe

in the

? It is said

a in it, but thing unless . It is not

also, according to

Other philosophers such as the Sankhyas and the Vedantins reject the Nyaya definitions and define as अनधिगताबाधितार्थविषयत्वम्, a cognition having for its object a thing that was not apprehended before and that is never contradicted. अनधिगत excludes स्मृति and

may be omitted if the definition is to apply to both right appre- hension and right remembrance. Annambhatta (see Sect. 65 infra), is divisible into erref and arraf, though its validity depends on other reasons; but according to some Naiyâyikasis of one kind only. As to the three kinds of errerafga see Sect. LXIV and notes thereon. There is no reason why the following four divisions of प्रमा should not also be applicable to अयथार्थानुभव. Thus there may be a wrong perceptive knowledge owing to defect of organs and other causes, or a wrong judgment due to fallacious reasoning, or a false analogy, or a misunderstanding of words.

SEOT. XXXVI. ]

Notes.

[[183]]

All these, it seems, will fall under the second division of erref, namely, far, unless of course they have the ad- ditional characteristics of संशय and तर्क.

SECT. XXXVI. aguanter:

Right apprehension is divided into four kinds: Percept, Judgment, Analogy and Verbal knowledge. The instruments of these are also four, namely: Perception, Inference, Com- parison and Word or Language.

The superiority of Sanskrit terminology is proved

here by the fact that except in the case of

Right apprehension

is of four kinds.

ar the same root supplies two distinct and appropriate names, one for the instru ment, and another for the result of knowledge, while in English we are often obliged to employ the same term for both. Even in Sanskrit much confusion often results from the ambiguous use of the word for both knowledge and its instrument. I have therefore borrowed some new terms from English logic, so as to provide different names for each of these. Perception is commonly applied to knowledge, its instrument, as well as the act of knowing; but I have restricted it to the instrument only, or rather the instrument in the act of knowing: while a new term Percept is used on the authority of Max-Müller to denote the particular notion acquired by perception. The act of reasoning is denoted by Inference, while the conclusion reached is called Judgment, which according to Mansel is a combination of two concepts related to one or more common objects of possible intuition.” râ and sqara are respectively rendered by Analogy and Comparison, the latter denoting the act of establishing similarity between two things, while the former implies the similarity so established. There is no appropriate name for

authority’ and ’tradition’ which are sometimes employed

• Max Müller: Science of Thought p. 20.

† Mansel: Prologom. Log. p. 60.

[[184]]

What is Pramâņa.

Tarka-Sangraha.

शब्द

SHOT. XXXVI.

meaning quite different things. Verbal Knowledge and Word are therefore used for ara and a respectively.

शाब्दज्ञान 2. The four varieties of ser as well as their instruments will be defined and explained later; but it will be useful first to examine the general nature of प्रमाण. The aim of Nydya as that of all sciences being the attainment of truth, a knowledge of proofs’ by which that truth is to be known is necessary, according to the maxim मानाधीना मेयसिद्धिः, ‘knowledge of the thing to be measured depends on a know- ledge of the measure.’ When we have once determined the nature and limits of valid proofs, it is comparatively easy to arrive at true knowledge by employing those proofs pro- perly; or rather the latter function being beyond the pro- vince of any art or science may be left to the judgment and capacity of each individual. The greater part of Nyaya writings is therefore devoted to a consideration of these proofs, and many controversies have raged respecting them among rival systematists. The number of proofs has varied greatly with different schools from one to nine, and all of them have been equally tenacious in holding to their fav- ourite theories. Annambhaṭṭa follows Gotama in recognizing four proofs,* but the assignment of each to the four divi- sions of qr respectively seems to be his own improve- ment प्रमाण (प्रमीयतेऽनेनेति ) is defined in T. D. as प्रमाकरणम्, ’the instrument of right apprehension ‘; but the definition is rather vague, and inapplicable in those cases where the proofs, though perfectly valid in themselves, lead to wrong knowledge owing to extrinsic causes.

The definition given by the author is according some imperfect, as it mentions only one function of a proof, namely,

(production of T), and does not comprehend its other function,

(determination of the validity of the T). Another and a somewhat more accurate definition is साधनाश्रयाव्यतिरिक्तत्वे सति प्रमाव्याप्तम् + ‘proof is that which is always followed by right apprehension (T),

“G, S. I, 1, 3.

† Sare. D. §. Calc. ed. p. 110.

BBOT.

XXXTI,

Notes.

[[185]]

ཝཱ

and is united with the appropriate organ and the receptacle of knowledge, viz. soul. Thus proof is first an invariable condi- tion of THT:

and not merely the cause of प्रमा. प्रमाण has & double function; it not only produces right apprehension, but sometimes also tests its truth. It is not therefore, TSTOT only, but प्रमात्वज्ञापक also; and so the definition प्रमाव्याप्त is more correct as comprehending both. The Naiyâyikas are qra:standaança: i. e. they hold that the validity of a cogni- tion is proved not by itself, but by some other extraneous means. The objection in their view is not therefore very serious. qaror is neither soul, nor mind, nor the organs of sense, for if it had been so there would have been no neces- sity of its separate mention apart from these latter which are already enumerated. The Mimúmsakas define as अनधिगतार्थगन्तु, ’ that which apprehends an object not known before; but this definition, says S. C., is wrong because in a long series of sensations of the same object, the first only thereby becomes ч, while the succeeding sensations will not be gar being afar. The Mimámsaka’s answer to this objection is that each individual sensation is different from its predecessor in as much as it was produced at a different moment. The expression अनधिङ्गत is intended to prevent भावना- संस्कार being called the proof of स्मृति. The Naiyáyikas restrict all proofs to age or new cognitions and call a mere repeti- tions thereof caused by r from previous impressions.

Before proceeding further, it will be worth while to notice two varieties of knowledge recog- nized by European logicians, which are apparently left out of Naiyâyika’s classi- fication of gf, namely, intuitions and beliefs. Au intuition is any knowledge whatsoever, sensuous or intellectual, which is apprehended immediately, that is, without the instrumen- tality of any sense or mental faculty. Axioms in Geometry, and the notions of time, space and causality are such intuitions, which do not come under any of the heads of aga of the Naiyayikas. Some of these are accounted for otherwise, as by the recognition of time and space as independent entities which are inferred from their effects. The rest will be probably included under a as reminiscen-

[[24]]

Intuition and * Belief.

[[180]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

ces of previous births retained by

Ì SECT. XXXVI.

. The doctrines of

gg and transmigration enable Indian philosophers to ex- plain many facts that are incomprehensible to Western thinkers. The other kind of knowledge that is apparently left unnoticed is belief or fuith, which differs from cognition in that it denotes “those exercises of the mind in which we believe in the existence of an object, not now before us and under immediate inspection. “* We often entertain many notions which are not self-evident and yet which we do not know to be positively true. These are beliefs. The Naiyâyikas, it seems, would include them, if authoritative, under anala, and if not, under . In this way the classification of gr may claim to be exhaustive.

SECT. XXXVII, SOE.

An instrument is a cause which is peculiar.

Proximate Cause.

[[4]]

A ror is defined as a cause which is peculiar.

According to V. V., S. C. and Nilakantha, असाधारण is inserted to exclude general causes such as time and space; but this does not seem to be the sole purpose of the word. The word must also be intended to exclude other causes, such as the intimate and the non-intimate canses of a thing, which are neither universal nor. rarury is better paraphrased by Nilakantha as यद्विलम्बात्मकृतकार्यामुत्पादस्तत्कारणत्वम्, that is, — a cause without which a desired effect will never be produced;’ but this also is not strictly accurate. Ar properly speaking is the immediate or proximate cause that gathers together the scattered materials and gives final shape to the product. It is the cause which, other accessories being present, is absolutely necessary for the completion of the effect. This seems to be the meaning of error here, which consider- ably differs from the sense in which it is used in other passages.† But even so much restriction is not sufficient to

M’Cosh: Intuitions p. 196.

† See Sec. 29, and the reading of several copies in Secs. 24-5-6-7.

SEOT. XXXVII. ]

Notes.

ensure perfect accuracy in the definition of

[[181]]

. For exam-

ple, दण्ड is an असाधारण निमित्तकरण of घट and is therefore its करण; but a दण्ड in a forest ban never be the करण of a घट, although the definition would equally apply to it, as it is potentially if not actually an efficient cause of e. To exclude que in the forest, the ancient Naiyâyikas inserted an additional qualification व्यापारवत्वे सति, so that only a इण्ड, which is actually employed in the act of producing a jar, is its or, while a qug in the forest having no carry is excluded. व्यापार is defined by S. C. as द्रव्येतरत्वे सति तज्जन्यत्वे सति तज्जन्यजनकः, that is, an operation which, not being a ger, is the product of a thing ( a ), and produces the effect of that thing. When an axe lops off a tree, the axe is the or, the cutting is the final product, and the contact of the axe with the wood is the rare, because it is produced from the axe and produces the cutting. The words mazā af are inserted in the definition of sure to prevent an intermediate product (anaaa). such as 2 कपाल, being व्यापार, although it is produced from atoms and produces the jar. So the complete definition of a per according to the ancient view is curaraquarai ancora i. e. a peculiar and

व्यापारवदसाधारणं कारणम् .. operative cause.

The modern view.

This has given rise to an important controversy bet- ween the ancients and the, moderns. The latter disapprove of the ancient definition of er above given and propose one of their own फलायोगव्यवच्छिन्नं कारणम, ie a cause which is invariably and immediately followed by the product. This of course excludes us in the forest as well as all universal and-special causes, which are not necessarily and immedi- ately followed by the effect. The difference between the two views is not merely verbal but fundamental, for quite different things are designated or according as we accept either of the definitions. The definition of the ancients requires the to be ; and therefore strictly speak-

व्यापारवद

करण

[[188]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

[ SHOT XXXVII.

ing it must always be a substance in which actions and qualities that constitute a rare may inhere; while according to moderns it is this itself which becomes the r as it is even more proximate to the effect than the material of the ancients. When an object for instance is visible the organ of sight comes into contact with the object. This contact ( इन्द्रियसन्निकर्ष ) is the व्यापार, and the organ of sight would be the or in the act of perception according to the ancients; while the moderns would call the

itself

the

or, as the (percept) immediately follows from it, but is not necessarily produced from. In an infer- ence the ancients are rather inconsistent in calling foşara or व्याप्तिज्ञान the करण of अनुमितिः since, being a cognition te a gun, the cannot properly speaking possess a which is either guna or karma and as such can inhere in a substance alone. In अनुमिति the परामर्श is called the व्यापार by the ancients, and the or by the moderns. Another inconsis- tancy of the ancient view is that on the analogy of g there is no reason why mind should not be the करण of अनुमिति instead of व्याप्ति; and mind being also the करण of सुखादिप्रत्यक्ष, अनुमिति and मानसप्रत्यक्ष would be confounded. These are some of the reasons which make the moderns reject the definition व्यापारवत् and define a करण as simply फलायोगव्यवच्छिन्नम् or more briefly फलव्याप्तम्, that is, one which is invariably associated with the . This difference of definitions results in the important distinction of the E of the ancients becoming the r of the moderns; while the of the ancients merges, according to the modern view, into the general category of simple causes.

Origin of the dif- ference.

The original notion of a ur seems to be that convey- ed in Kesava Miśra’s definition #ramad कारणं, which is explained as प्रकृष्टं कारणं, अ cause par excellence.” Many causes contri- bute to produce an effect but some of them are related to the effect more closely than others. Of two murderers one

T. B. Bom. ed. p. 10.

SECT. XXXVII. ]

व्यापारवत्

Notes.

[[189]]

who strikes the blow has certainly a greater share in the murder than the other who simply holds the victim. Some causes are most active and also most essential in production, while others simply aid it. The horse which draws the car- riage is certainly more efficient than the wheels which only facilitate motion by lessening friction. These are causes pre-eminently so called, and are distinguished from other causes by the special name. The , pre-eminence of ther, is therefore said to consist in its activity or effici- ency ( व्यापारवत्व). Hence & करण came to be defined as व्यापार- aqui. But here comes another difficulty. The definition area is obviously inaccurate since it applies to an agent also who is by far the most active in the production, but who is not called a vor. Somehow or other the notion of an instrument or means is involved in that of T, and the agent therefore ought to be excluded. Hence in discussing the definition of प्रमाण as प्रमाकरण, Kejara Misra remarks सत्यपि प्रमातरि प्रमेयेच प्रमानुत्पत्तेरिन्द्रियसंयोगादी तु सत्यविलम्बेनैव प्रमो- त्पत्तेरिन्द्रियसंयोगादिरेव करणम्, * that is, अविलम्बेन कार्योत्पात (im- mediate production) constitutes the r of a , and this is found only in the case of इन्द्रियसन्निकर्ष. Other efficient causes, such as the knower and the object of knowledge are not called करण even though they may be व्यापारवत् because the result is not produced even if they exist. This restriction of करण necessarily led to the abandonment of व्यापारवत्त्व, and the substitution instead of अविलम्बेन कार्योत्पादकत्व, or more accurately फलायोगव्यवच्छिन्नत्व, as a definition of करण. But this farther restriction went too far, as it exclued organs of sense, and in fact all instruments from the class of ru. The moderns boldly accepted this as an er, but the an- cients could not assent to it as the idea of ur was inextri- cably involved in their mind with the notion of an instru- ment. They therefore satisfied themselves by retaining and excluding the agent expressly by inserting in the definition of प्रमाण some such limitation as अनुभवत्वव्याप्य- जात्यवच्छिन्नकार्यतानिरूपितकारणताश्रयत्वे सति. आत्मा or प्रमाता is ex-

*T. B. Bom, ed. p. 26.

[[190]]

Tarka-Sangraha. [SECT. XXXVII.

cluded because he is the namorar (i. e. the cause) of many other effects besides a gar which is a species of अनुभव ( अनु – जाति). This is the gist of the controversy about करण, which has furiously raged between the ancient and modern Naiyayikas.

The two

Author’s view.

views being thus distinct, the question naturally occurs which of them is adopt- ed by Annambhaṭṭa. Before answering this question, it is necessary to discuss the reading व्यापारवदसाधारणं कारणं करणम्, which occurs in most of the copies of the text, but which has been for various reasons rejected in this edition. Although

A reading discus- sed.

is necessary to complete the definition, it is almost certain that the word did not exist there originally. The Pratikas in T. D., N. B., S. C. and Nil. prove that the definition began with errare; while the fact that both S. C. and Nil. ex- pressly quote व्यापारवत्कारणम् as an ancient substitute for अ- साधारणं कारणम् shows that in their opinion at least व्यापारवत् did not form part of Annambhaṭṭa’s definition. Besides if it had been there the author ought to have defined rare and explained the propriety of aura either in the text or in the commentary, which he does not do. One Ms. no doubt inserts the words तज्जन्यत्वे सति तज्जन्यजनको व्यापारः after the definition of TT in the text; but the addition is clearly spurious; and the readings of N and Y are equally unauthenti- cated. In Sect. 41 again, the author repeats that कारण alone is करण without mentioning व्यापारवत, while in Sect. 47 he calls लिङ्गपरामर्श itself the करण of अनुमिति, al- though it cannot be so according to the definition - a. But as if not wishing to leave the point in any doubt, the author himself, in the Dipika on Sect. 47, quotes arqreertoi as a

sqrqreqared as a distinct view which he disapproves, remarking emphatically लाघवेन सर्वत्र परामर्शस्यैव करणत्वात्. On the other hand, at the end of Sect. 43 he as emphatically declares इन्द्रिय to be the करण of प्रत्यक्ष which can only be true if we accept the ancient definition. Simi- larly he calls सादृश्यज्ञान the करण of उपमिति, and mentionsSEOT. XXXVÍL.]

Notes.

[[191]]

अतिदेशवाक्यार्थस्मरण as a distinct व्यापार. In the case of शाब्दज्ञान again he seems inclined to prefer the modern doctrine.

The question therefore which view was accepted by Annambhaṭṭa must still remain involved in doubt. Probably he had formed no decisive opinion on the point, and was wavering between the two conflicting views. That there is a clear inconsistency between his calling on the one hand इन्द्रिय and सादृश्यज्ञान the करण of प्रत्यक्ष aud उपमिति respectively and on the other his preference for परामर्श as the करण of grafa is undeniable; but it is hard to believe as some have supposed, that such a glaring inconsistency was due to an oversight of the author. Most probably he was fully consci- ous of it, and accepted it as inevitable in an elementary treatise like the present, which, being intended for begin- ners, preserved as much consistency and accuracy as was compatible with simplicity and clearness. If he had accepted either of the two views in toto, he must necessarily have launched into the controversy as to the comparative merits of the rival views, which from its subtility and intricacy is quite beyond the capacity of beginners. He followed the ancient view in प्रत्यक्ष and उपमिति, because it was inore easily comprehensible by beginners, while by accepting rest to be the करण of अनुमिति, he certainly made his treatment of inference simpler, more rational and more methodical. Thus practical expediency rather thin theoretical consis- tency seems to have weighed with the author in his accepting different doctrines in different places. That he purposely did this seems evident from his employment of such a vague word as error in the definition of ror and the total absence of any allusion to Tra either in the text or in

व्यापारवत् the commentary of the present section. This omission must have been deliberate, for the controversy about surarea had raged furiously, and was too important to be passed over through inadvertancy by such a careful writer as Annam- bhatta. The conclusion seems irresistible that he purposely used an ambiguous word like sterarrer which might apply to either of the two views of aor.

[[192]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

SECT. XXXVIII. TRUE.

[ SHOT. XXXVIII.

A cause is one that invariably precedes the effect.

The definition of or having referred to a r, the latter is now defined as one that invari-

Cause.

[[6]]

ably ( नियत ) precedes ( पूर्ववृत्ति ) its effect

(f). That a canse must precede its

effect is evident, for otherwise it will not be a cause. T. D. remarks that gaf is inserted to exclude f itself. But all antecedent things are not necessarily causes. The pot- ter’s ass that carries the earth of which jars are made, pre- cedes the jar, but it is not an invariable antecedent, for earth can be brought in hand or in a cart, and so the jars can be made without the aid of the ass. Hence the word faza is

inserted to exclude all but invariable antecedents.

The definition in the text is not however sufficiently ac- curate, and hence T. D. adds another qualification r~ fara, which means “provided the antecedent thing is not connected with the effect too remotely.” The father of the potter for instance invariably precedes the jar, for without him the potter would not be born, and without the potter there could be no jar; but the potter’s father and all his ancestors are not causes of the jar. Again while is the cause of the jar, the que is not, although it is as much an invariable antecedent as the qug itself. To exclude these the limitation and is added, so that all things, which though invariably preceding are not immediately connected with the effect, are excluded. S. C. paraphrases the definition as कार्यान्नियता (अवश्यम्भाविनी) पूर्ववृत्तिः (पूर्वक्षणवृत्तिः) यस्य तत्तथा नियतपूर्ववृत्तित्व is explained as अव्यवहितपूर्वकालावच्छेदेन कार्यदेशे area awa¤, i. e. “existence in the same place as the effect at the moment immediately preceding its production.” This will exclude the ass, the potter’s father and even the अरण्यस्थ दण्ड if necessary ; but

दण्डरूप and

and दण्डत्वजाति would still come in, and can be excluded only by a separate qualification such as

. Accordingly V. V. sums up the complete definition of कारण as नियतान्य-

सत्वम्,

Notes.

[[198]]

SHOT. XXXVIII. ↑

थासिद्धभिन्नत्वे सति कार्याव्यवहितपूर्वक्षणावच्छिन्न-कार्याधिकरणदेशनिरूपि - ताधेयतावद-भाव - प्रतियोगितानवच्छेदकधर्मवत् कारणम्. The whole of this long and terribly involved expression means nothing more than that a cause must be invariable (fra), must not be too remote (ergenfefta) and must not be the counter- entity (प्रतियोगितानवच्छेदकधर्मवत् ) of a negation (अभाव) that resides in the place of the effect ( कार्याधिकरणदेशनिरूपिताधेयता- वत्) at the moment immediately preceding production ( कार्या- व्यवहितपूर्वक्षणावच्छिन्न ). All these circumlocutions have no doubt their use in the Nyaya system, but the whole defini tion does not after all amount to much more than Mill’s definition of a cause as an unconditional and invariable

antecedent’.

The word sun

A Reading dis

cussed.

कारण,

being thus necessary to complete the definition of r, it may be asked why it is omitted in the text of this edi- tion, especially when it is found in almost

all copies. The reasons for dropping venue from the text are not indeed as strong as those for omitting a from the preceding definition, but they are sufficiently cogent to warrant the guess that the word did not originally exist in the text but was probably added afterwards by the Dipika. The reading in the text is taken from four authentic Mss. as being what the author probably wrote at first. Five copies prefix mang to the definition, while two others read अनन्यथासिद्धत्वे सति and कार्ये अन्यथासिद्धिशून्यत्वे सति respec tively before fua etc. In J,the oldest of the Mss. available, the word is absent in the body but is added in the margin by a later corrector. V. V. and S. C. appear to take a

as part of the definition; but N. B. is evidently of the contrary opinion, its remark अतोऽनन्यथासिद्धमपि पदं कारणलक्षणे निवेशनीयम् show- ing that it did not find the words in the original. Any doubts on the point however should be removed by the fre in T. D. which is the same in all copies and which shows that the definition began with the word . Besides the wording of T. D. अनन्यथासिद्धत्वे सतीति विशेषणात् also implies that the words were added by the commentary and did not

[[25]]

[[194]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

[ SBOT. XXXVIII.

stand in the text at first. The different readings of E and H also bear a very close and therefore suspicious resemblance to the remark in T. D., and suggest the infer- ence that they were inserted into the text from T. D. by some later copyist to supply the imperfection of the original definition. It may therefore be presumed that the word अनन्यथासिद्ध was at first left out of the definition of कारण, either inadvertently or purposely as being too obscure for the easy comprehension of beginners, and the omission was supplied by the author himself in the Dipika which is evidently intended for advanced scholars. Later copyists however, who could not bear to see the definition in a standard book being so palpably imperfect, tried to supply the omission from the commentary and supplied it differently.

अनन्यथासिद्ध is the opposite of अन्यथासिद्ध, which means ‘proved to be antecedent through another,’

Propriety of the qualification.

thu

that is, a thing the antecedence of which is due to the antecedence of another thing

by ‘super-

to the effect. Roer translates the word aan fluous causality, probably on the authority of some writers who explain even as denoting a cause which is not necessary for the production of effect.* But this view is wrong as will appear from the following quotation from S. C., which, after explaining अन्यथासिद्ध as अवश्यक्कृप्तनियतपूर्व- वर्तिन एव कार्यसम्भवे तत्सहभूतम्, remarks " केचित्तु अन्यत्रक्लृप्तनियतपूर्व - वर्तन एव कार्यसम्भवे तद्भिन्नमन्यथासिद्धं यथा रूपप्रागभावशून्यस्थले कृत- नियतपूर्ववर्तिनों गन्धप्रागभावादेव पाकजस्थलेऽपि गन्धरूपकार्य सम्भवे तद्भिन्नो रूपप्रागभावो गन्धप्रागभावेनान्यथासिद्ध इति वदन्ति तदसत् । दण्डत्वादेर- न्यथासिद्धत्वानापत्तेः.” The argument of S. C. is that अन्यथासिद्ध is not merely a cause that is unnecessary for production, but everything that accompanies a necessary antecedent; others wise दण्डत्वजाति will not be अन्यथासिद्ध as it is quite necessary for

Beer’s trans. of B. P. Bibl. In. p. 10.

SEOT. XXXVIII. ]

Notes.

[[195]]

the production of a jar, because without que there will be no que and consequently no also. Roer’s rendering is therefore incorrect and the word really means a thing which is proved to be antecedent (canse) to the effect, through another or because it accompanies another,’ that is, a secondary cause deriving its character through the primary and real cause.

T. D. mentions three varieties of these secondary antecedents, which Annambhatta, says Nilakantka, borrow- ed from Gangesa, the author of Tattva-Chintâmani viz:- (1) first, the things that are connected by समवायसम्बन्ध with कारण, and are therefore antecedent to

effect through it, as for instance the तन्तुरूप and तन्तुत्व, which, being intimately united with a, are antecedent to its effect ч; (2) secondly, the things that are antecedent to rur, and are therefore a fortiori antecedent to the effect, such as the potter’s father who being anterior to the potter must be antecedent to the jar also, or as ether which is antecedent to a jar, because it is the intimate cause of the word e that always precedes the thing ; (3) and thirdly, all other concomitants of that are not connected with it by - वाय, such as रूपप्रागभाव which is not the cause of गन्ध, al- though in a baking jar or a ripening mango it co-exists with गन्धप्रागभाव which is the real cause of गन्ध. This classification does not claim to be exhaustive, and in fact, the first two classes are obviously included in the last.

Others mention five varieties of me which are thus summed up by Viśvanatha:-

येन सह पूर्वभावः (1) कारणमादाय वा यस्य (3) 1 अन्यं प्रति पूर्वभावे ज्ञाते यत्पूर्वभावविज्ञानम् (3) ॥ जनकं प्रति पूर्ववर्तितामपरिज्ञाय न यस्य गृह्यते (4) 1

अतिरिक्तमथापि यद्भवेन्नियतावश्यकपूर्वभाविनः (5) ॥

And these are illustrated thus:-

एतेः पञ्चान्यथासिद्धा दण्डत्वादिकमादिमम् ।

[[198]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

घटादौ दण्डरूपादि द्वितीयमपि दर्शितम् ॥

तृतीयन्तु भवेद्योम कुलालजनकोऽपरः ।

पञ्चमो रासभादिः स्यादेतेष्वावश्यकस्त्वसौ # ॥

SHOT. XXXVIII,

Of these the first two correspond to the first class of Annambhatta, the third and fourth to his second class, and the fifth to his third. The splitting of the first two varieties mentioned in T. D. is based on minute distinctions between the illustrations which are of no special importance. “ fre being thus described and its need to complete the definition being proved, an objection may be made to the retention of the word fava in the definition of reur as its purpose is served by the last kind of अन्यथासिद्धि, the instance coming under that head. a is not however useless, for, though an individual ass may be

as regards & particular घट, रासभत्व in general is not so with respect to , and hence fun is necessary to exclude it. It may also be pointed out that the word argunes is too vague and general, and

a helps to make its meaning

more definite.

SECT. XXXIX, nig.

Effect is the counter-entity of antecedent negation.

Effect.

As the definition of cause is framed in terms of the effect, we cannot fully understand it unless we know what effect is. Effect is therefore defined as a thing that is the counter- entity of ( its ) anterior negation; in other words an effect is that which has a beginning. r will be subsequently explained as the negation of a thing before it comes into existence; and so, to say that an effect has a is tantamount to saying that it has a beginning ( m ) and is not eternal. Eternity may however be limited on both sides, past and future, of which past non-eternity alone corresponds to कार्यत्व. Both प्रागभाव and ध्वंस are non- eternal, but we having a beginning but no end is ard,

B. P. 18-21.

SEOT. XXXIX, ]

Notes.

[[197]]

Hence

while प्रागभाव having an end but no beginning is not कार्य. is defined as the ff (contradictory ) of प्रागभाव is not a कार्य, as it cannot be a प्रतियोगी

प्रागभाव.

of itself.

What is a Prati- yogin.

Now what is & प्रतियोगी ? The idea of a प्रतियोगी is one of those conceptions which are more easy to understand than to define; and conse- quently various definitions of प्रतियोगिता are given according to the standpoints from which the writers view it. far is no doubt a relation; but how can there be any relation between existence ( a ) and non- existense, between a thing and no-thing? sure however is an independent entity according to Nyaya; and hence this relation is possible. Besides radar is not an objective connection between two external things; it is truly speak- ing a purely subjective relation existing between the sub- jecive notions of those things. Though the things may be non-existent and immaterial, their notions are real enough to allow a relation between them. Thus an may be pure negation, but the notion of er is positive and really exists in the mind; and it must therefore have some external object to which it corresponds. ra itself can- not be this object because it has no positive existence; and hence this object by which the notion of era is produced and is to be explained must be found among the six positive padarthas. That were therefore by which a particular notion of अभाव is explained is called the प्रतियोगी of that STHTEL. A घट is thus called the प्रतियोगी of घटाभाव, and पट of qerara, because the notions of those two negations depend for their existence on the prior knowledge of ae and q respectively. This is one kind of gradìmaráda, and is call- ed विरुद्धत्व (opposition ). Another kind is called वित्तिवेद्यत्व and exists between a thing and its attribute, or rather between two objects and the relation between them, as for instance, when we say that a face is like the moon, प्रतियोगी of the सादृश्यसम्बन्ध residing in मुख.

moon is the

In this case

[[198]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

SEOT. XXXIX.

also the notion of a depends on the prior knowledge of the moon, but this far differs from the former The first in having a corresponding external object.

far is a relation between two things of which one exists and the other does not, while the second lies between things which are both positive and existing. The first may be called contrariety as that between and war; the second co-existence as that between moon and its attri- bute the , meaning of course those qualities which it has in common with . Similarly the thing in rela- tion to which this far is spoken of is called the egin of the relation. Thus g of which the likeness to the moon is predicated is the अनुयोगी of the सादृश्य ; while the भूतल of which घटाभाव is likewise predicated is called the अनुयोगी of that अभाव. Now घट is प्रतियोगी of घटप्रागभाव; and पट of पटप्रागभावs so कार्य in general is the प्रतियोगी of the प्रागभाव of all products, that is of प्रागभाव in general.

The definition of a

The theory of Causality.

given in the text involves a very important principle which is one of the cardinal doctrines of Nyaya philoso- phy, and which, as having been the subject of bitter controversy, requires some notice. The doctrine is that an effect is non-existent before production, and is quite distinct from its cause. This apparently simple doctrine, involving as it does many wider issues, sharply divides the Nyaya-Vaiseshika from other schools of philosophy, and is as a matter of fact the keystone of its realistic philosophy. There are four principal theories of causation accepted by different Indian philosophers, which are thus summed up by Madhavacharya:-“f कार्य- कारणभावे चतुर्धा विप्रतिपत्तिः प्रसरति । असतः सज्जायत इति सौगताः सङ्गिरन्ते । नैयायिकादयः सतोऽसज्जायत इति । वेदान्तिनः सतो विवर्तः कार्यजातं न तु वस्तु सदिति । साङ्ख्याः पुनः सतः सज्जायत इति * ।

Şarva-D. S. Calc, ed. p. 147,

SECT. XXXIX. ]

Notes.

[[199]]

While the Bauddhas hold that a real effect is produced. from an unreal cause, that is, from absolute non-existence, the Vedantins maintain the opposite view of the reality of the cause and the total unreality of effect. The Naiyâyikas and Sâñkhyas accept the reality of both cause and effect, but while the latter hold both of them to be always and simul- taneously existing, the Naiyâyikus consider the effect to be non-existing before creation. In the Baudha system, creation is the production of a thing out of nothing; in Nydya it is the production of a new thing out of an old one; in Sâñkhya it is merely the evolution of the latent properties of the cause itself; in Vedanta it is a mental conception only, and corres- ponds to no actual change in the cause itself.

Realism and idealism.

The Bauddha view is opposed to the celebrated Aristo- telian maxim Ex nihilo nihil fit, and has been severely criticised by all orthodox schools,* while the third, viz. the Vedântic view being involved in the general doctrine of Mâyû stands by itself. The bitterest controversy has raged between the Sânkhyas and the Naiyâyikas, as regards their particular views, namely, the सत्कार्यवाद and the असत्कार्यवाद as they are re- spectively called. The Nydya view is admirably summed up in Annambhaṭṭa’s definition of, that an effect being the arm of arra in general is totally non-existent before creation.

The rare of the Sânklyas as well as the argu- ments by which it is supported are thus summarized in Isvarakrishna’s tenth Kárika :-

असदकरणात्, उपादानग्रहणात्, सर्वसम्भवाभावात् ।, शक्तस्य शक्यकरणात्, कारणभावाच्च, सत्कार्यम् ॥

Five reasons are given for rejecting the Nyaya doctrine of non-existent effect, and holding that the effect does exist latently in the cause, even before creation. First, that which

† Sankhya-T. K. 10.

[[200]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

SECT. XXXIX.

does not exist can never be created, for a blue colour cannot be changed into yellow even by a thousand artizans. Second- ly, the material cause is always found associated with the effect, as sesamum with oil; and as there can be no associa- tion with a non-existing thing the effect must be exist- ing in its cause. Thirdly, if it be said that a cause might produce an effect even though totally unconnected, any- thing can be produced from anything for there will be no reason to determine that a particular effect shall be produc- ed from a particular cause only; while as a matter of fact we find this to be actually the case, and hence the effect must be pre-existing in the cause. Fourthly, if it be main- tained that an unconnected cause produces the effect owing to some inherent faculty in itself, is this power or faculty, it may be asked, connected in any way with the effect? If it is, then it is as much as saying that the effect pre-exists in the cause; while if it is not, the previous difficulty recurs as to how a particular effect only is produced from the power. Lastly, as cause and effect are of the same nature, one cannot be always existing while the other is non-existent. Both of them ought therefore to co-exist. All these arguments can be summed up in one objection against the Nyaya doctrine that if the effect is totally distinct from the cause there can be found no determining principle to establish the relation of causality between the two things, and the doctrine will approximate to the Bauddha view that the effect is produced from nothing. This may be the reason why the followers of Nyâya-Vaišeshika are often taunted as being er (Semi-Buddhists) by their ortho- dox opponents. And as the Bauddha doctrine is opposed to nature, Nyaya theory also must be rejected as having the same tendency.

The chief argument by which the Naiyâyikas defend their view is that unless effect is supposed to be quite distinct from its cause we cannot account for the obvious difference between the two. A e must be some- thing different from its constituent parts,for otherwise it wouldSECT. XXXIX. ]

not be qe at all.

Notes.

[[201]]

The same atoms can be used to make a jar and a saucer;

and if cause and effect are not distinct, Loth ye and ger will be identical with the atoms, and therefore will be identical with each other according to the axiom that things equal to the same thing are equal to one another. But a is certainly not a rera, for it has a certain form or shape (a) which is not found in the latter. The Vedanting who hold warfare avoid this difficulty by deny- ing the axiom itself. Again the particular shape (qurar- (कम्बुग्रीवा- दिमत्त्व of a jur, O2 आतानवितानयत्तन्तुमत्त्व of a piece of cloth, ) is not found in the parts either separately or collectively. Whence does it come then? It cannot be said that it does exist latently in the cause, and that production is nothing but its manifestation; for this manifestation irseif, being an effect, must itself have existed previously. The SHETTÏTÊT and all other properties which distinguish a ve from its parts must therefore have been newly produced. As the Nyaya theory of red has a tendency to the Buddhistic nibilism ( शून्यबाद ), the Sankhya doctrine of सत्कार्य or परिणाम ultimately merges into the pantheism ( or retarg ) of the Vedantins. If an effect is materially indistinct from the cause, its special properties must be real or unreal. real, they must have been newly produced (as the Na’ydyikas say), or only manifested; in the latter case their manifesta- tion will require another manifestation, and so on ad infin- itum. If the properties are unreal, they can be only notional, and attributed to the effect by a subjective error (erearer ), which is the doctrine of fat. Thus the contro- versy ends practically in a draw, and the problem remains insoluble.

A little consideration will suffice to show that the असत्कार्यवाद is the basis of Realism, while सत्कार्यवाद fuovitably leads to all sorts of Ideal and Pantheistic theories. All the important conceptions of Nyaya, such as those of atoms. God, souls, Samucâya, Višesha and Abhire will be found, if properly analyzed, to depend ultimately on this fundamental doctrine of non-existent effect, and it was therefore to be wished that the anthor had said something about it in the

[[26]]

[[202]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

[SECT. XXXIX.

text. But he probably avoided all reference to it, as being too intricate and controversial for beginners. A student however can never clearly understand the Nyaya-Vaiseshika systems, unless, he has thoroughly grasped their peculiar view of causality.

The instrumental and non-intimate

causes.

It is of course needless to point out that the cause over which this controversy has arisen is the material cause, or as it is gene- rally called. As to the instrumental causes there is no difference of opinion, while the non-intimate cause is not recognized by any systematist except the Naiyayikas. This last is an arbitrary assumption necessitated by the Nyaya theory of causation and is inse- parable from it.

about causation.

The recognition of a non-intimate cause has made the Naiyâyikas liable to a severe attack by The controversy their usual opponents, the Mimâmsakas who advocate सत्कार्यवाद. The arguments on both sides of this controversy are so strong and cogent and yet so irreconcilable, that one is inevitably led to suspect that, as both cannot be right, both of them must be wrong. It is not easy to find out where their error lies, but the fact that so much philosophical subtility should have been spent without advancing a single step naturally sug- gests the inference that they must have misunderstood the question altogether, or must have been seeking for the true solution in a wrong direction. This is partially true, but partially only, for as a matter of fact the difficulty of get- ting a right solution is to a considerable extent inherent in the subject itself. The chief cause of the error of these Indian schoolmen appears to be their want of a true Induc- tive method by which alone the true notion of causality could be attained. Instead of determining the nature of causation as it is actually found in the world outside, they started from a limited experience and began to analyze their own a priori notions of cause and effect. Of course this

SEOT. XXXIX. ]

Notes.

[[203]]

deductive reasoning they carried to perfection, but it could not avail them very far. The result has been that though the subsequent speculations are good specimens of correct logic, the preliminary notions on which they are based remain crude and often groundless. Thus, while the defini- tion of a r is guarded on all sides from the usual three faults of a definition by carefully chosen qualifications, no attempt is made to explain the fundamental notions involved in it.

A cause for instance is said to be that which is not rar- सिद्ध. But what is अन्यथासिद्ध ? No accurate and comprehensive definition of the word is given, and the classification too is merely illustative and not exhaustive; so that we are ulti- mately left to our own unaided intuition to discover whether a particular thing is a true cause or is rane. The potter’s father is declared to be af, but what about the potter himself? The doer or agent is nowhere expressly mentioned as a cause; the potter therefore must be either the निमित्तकारण of घट like के दण्ड, or must be अन्यथासिद्ध. An

a intelligent agent is required to set the particles in motion, and as the motion is the immediate cause of the product, the agent may in one sense be said to become अन्यथा- by this intervention of the motion. But the agent is commonly received as a cause, and oftentimes the most important cause. He is in fact the most indispensable cause; and yet, strange as it may seem, he is classed along means such as que

Agent.

with inanimate and often optional

aud चक्र.

The difference between an intelligent agent and other causes does not seem to have weighed much with the Naiyâyikas.

Again the distinction between material and instrumental

The material and instrumental caus-

causes is not made quite clear. A jar is made of particles of earth that are held together by water by means of a peculiar property in it named स्नेह. Is this water an उपादान or * निमित्त- only? Properly speaking it should be the first, for it

es.

[[204]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

[SECT. XXXIX.

is inseparable from the jar. The jar will weigh something over and above the particles of earth composing it, and the excess is unquestionably the weight of the water. The water should therefore be as much a wæarterror as the earth; and yet the Naiyayikas appear to include it among instrumental causes. Similarly in every product formed by the combina- tion of several ingredients it is absurd to call one material and the others instrumental canses only; but the Naiyay kas nowhere recognize the possibility of several intimate causes forming one product. Perhaps they may silently acquiesce in it; but the fact is positively irreconcilable with the rival theory of radar. According to this latter doctrine, the jar must before creation be latent in both its material canses, namely earth and water; but how is this possible, when the two ingredients might have perhaps been separated by hundreds of miles. The earth of the Himalayas and the water of the Ganges might go to form a jar which could not have certainly existed at one time in both those places. If this is the case with mechanical mixtures, much greater difficulties will occur in what we now call chemical combi- uations where the properties of the constituents and often- times the constituents themselves are either disguised or completely transformed in the process of production.

Where the error lies.

The above-mentioned objections are after all super- ficial and can be removed by speculative artifices. But there are others which lie deeper, and which strike at the very foundation of both the rival theories. The common assump- tions which seem to underlie these theo- ries is that every effect has one cause and that there is invariable concomitance between the two; but this is not warranted by experience. The disturbing influence of what Mill calls Plurality of canses and intermixture of effects, has been totally ignored by Indian systematists, and consequently their theories. have often been at marked variance with observed phenomena. The same effect may be produced from several alternative causes, while the same number of ingredients differently

SECT. XXXIX. ]

Notes.

[[205]]

combined might produce totally different products. Heat for instance may be produced either by friction or by electricity; and therefore neither can be the cause of heat according to the Nyaya definition of a cause, as neither is invariably (fra) antecedent (a) to the ard. Perhaps the Naiyayika will include both friction and electricity among efficient canses which may be optional, or he will call them and, the vibrations of particles by either being the real proximate ruuse of heat; but that will not improve his position very much. Besides while the two controversialists have confined themselves to material causes they have not given much attention to the efficient ones which are generally as impor- tant as, if not often more so than, the material causes. The controversy has been in fact carried on more on spemlative than on practical gronnds; and consequently the result also has been barren. Bacon’s strong condemnation of the sel.ool- men of medaival Europe applies in a great measure to their prototypes, the Indian systematists.

The real difficulty of the solution lies in the metaphy- sical conception of causality, which when analyzed resolves itself into mere sequence of things or successive events. Kant’s explanation of the insolubility of this problem is that the conception of causation is intuitive like those of time and space, and cannot be proved by reasoning as it is anterior to and is itself in fact the basis of all process of reasoning. The Vedantins alone of all Indian systematists appear to have sufficiently grasped this idea of causality, and have expressed it in their own way by calling कार्यत्व, anu आरोपित or f. The realism of the Naiyāyikas prevents them from accepting any such view.

[[206]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

SECT. XL. Roma Cause is of three kinds, • intimate,

The three Causes.

[SHOT. XL.

}

• non-intimate and instrumental’ or ’efficient.’ The inti- mate cause is ’that in inseparable union with which the effect is produced,’ as the threads are of the cloth or the cloth is of the colour on it. The non-intimate cause is one which is inseparably united in the same object either with the effect or with the ( intimate) cause, as the conjunction of threads is of the cloth, or the colour of threads is of the colour of cloth. A cause different from both these is an 278- trumental cause, as the shutile or the loom.

Intimate cause.

The threads constitute the intimate or material cause of

the piece of cloth, because the latter is connected with the former by intimate union ( समवेतम् = अवयवित्वात् समवायसम्बन्धेन g). Similarly the colour in the piece of cloth being a quality resides in it by समवाय (गुणगुणिनोः समवायः ), and hence the piece of cloth is the intimate cause of the colour. All constituent parts of a substance and all substances are intimate canses of their products as well as inhering qualities and actions respectively. The substratum is deemed a cause in the latter case because the qualities and actions cannot exist without it.

Non-intimate

Cause.

The non-intimate cause is a link as it were between the initimate cause and the product. It is of two sorts. One is intimately connected with the material cause, and is thus rar- fr with the product. The conjunction with which the separate threads are held together and which enables them to form the cloth-piece is the non-intimate cause, because being a quality it resides in the threads by wary, and is thus समानाधिकरण with पट. This तन्तुसंयोग is a neces- sary cause because it makes the q what it looks, and distinguishes it from a mere bundle of threads. The example of the second kind of non-intimate cause is arg which is the non-intimate cause of q, because it is inti- mately united with the ( intimate ) cause.(ag) of the substance ( पट ) which is the intimate cause of पटरूप. The colour of the threads is not the intimate cause of

SHOT. IL. ]

Notes.

[[207]]

the colour of the cloth-piece because they are far, and so there can be no connection between them. ey and पटरूप are not समानाधिकरण, for while तन्तुरूप resides in the threads, the y resides in the cloth. They are therefore connected only indirectly (data), which is explained by S. C. as पटरूपसमवायिकारणीभूतपदसामानाधिकरण्यस्य तस्त्रे सत्त्वात् परम्परासम्बन्धेन पदरूप सामानाधिकरण्यमपि सुलभमेवेतिभावः । परम्परा- सम्बन्धश्व समवायिसमवायः ; that is, while तन्तुसंयोग is समानाधि- करण with पट by the समवाय relation, the तन्तुरूप is so with पट- रूप by the combined relation, समवायिसमवाय . . समवाय with the पट the समवायिकारण of पटरूप. Both तन्तुसंयोग and तन्तुरूप are however called the असमवायिकारण of पट and पटरूप respectively. S. C. therefore gives, as a joint definition of the two sorts of non-intimate causes, समवाय स्वसमवायिसमवाया- न्यतरसम्बन्धेन कार्येण सङ्कस्मिन्नर्थे समवायेन प्रत्यासन्नत्वे सति आत्मविशेष- gonga íà ##antur; that is, a non-intimate cause should reside by war, in a common thing in which कार्य resides either by समवाय OF समवायसमवाय, and should at the same time be different from the special qualities of the soul. The latter saving clause is needed to prevent cogni- tions produced from them, simply because both are inti- mately united with the same for the soul. It is of course needless to remark that the word error in the defini- tion of असमवायिकारण in the text is to be taken for समवायि-

कारण.

The class of efficient causes comprises everything else that is necessary for the production of the effect but is not inseparable from it, such as the loom and the shuttle-cock in the

Instrumental

cause.

case of the cloth-piece. Instrumental causes are of two sorts, universal’ which are eight (:, avaient, दिक्काली, and अदृष्टम् including धर्म and अधर्म) aud special, ’ which are innumerable. The agent also appears to be in- cluded in this third class, which is as a matter of fact miscellaneous, and comprehends everything that is not in- cluded in the first two. Others first divide cause into two sorts, principal (ger) and accessary (erger), and then split

[[208]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

[SECT. XL.

up the principal cause into the above three classes, the group of accessaries consisting of all those minor circumstances which are required before production. Of the three sorts of causes mentioned above, the intimate canse is always a sub- stance, because no other padartha is capable of being the substratum of an intimate union; the non-intimate cause must be either an action or a quality, and nothing else; while the instrumental causes may be of any kind. The above three sorts of causes exist, it is said, in the case of positive things only, the are having only an instrumental cause. Mere negation cannot have an intimate or a non- intimate cause as it does not reside in anything by intimate union. A remark to this effect is found in one copy of T. D., but its authority was not sufficient to warrant the addi- tion in our text.

The name or is rather misleading, as it does not properly denote a cause which is not connected by ##¶¶ with the effect. In this sense निमित्तकारण will also be असम- वायि, while one species of असमवायि proper will be excluded. The origin of the name can be explained only by supposing that the Naiyayikas first divided causes into two classes, those which are separable, and those which are inseparable from effects. The first are instrumental; the second are of two sorts, material or समवायि and non-material or असमवायि. So an area simply means an inseparable cause which is different from समवायिः The असमवायिकारणं is not recognized by other systematists, and is an invention of the Naiyayihas who, holding the theory of the utter distinctness of effect from cause, are obliged to assume a link to join the two. The advocates of war regard cause and effect as united by the relation of identity (a). Nor do they re- cognize ч. In their opinion therefore causes are only two-fold, material ( zarara ) and instrumental ( fatha ).

समवाय.

Classification of

It may be useful here to compare briefly the Nyaya classification of causes with those of Wes- tern philosophers. Aristotle mentions four kinds of causes: First, the Form proper to each thing, called the formal cause or Quiddity by schoolmen.

causes.

SEOT. XL. ]

Notes.

[[209]]

When a potter makes a jar, he must first have in his mind an idea of what a jar is; or when a house is built, the architect must first draw a plan on paper. This is the causa formalis of Aristotle, and appears to combine in itself two different conceptions of the Naiyâyikas, namely, that of ana which is regarded as antecedent and necessary to the production of all things, and that of ergaangery which often being a

y corresponds to the plan or shape of the product. The second cause of Aristotle, causa materialis, is identical with the उपादान or समवायिकारण. The third is the principle of movement that produced the thing, called causa efficiens, corresponding to the fafaware of Nyayu. The fourth is the reason and good of all things, called causa finalis. There is nothing corresponding to a final cause in the Nyâya system, except perhaps the universal cause, destiny (Haw). A jar is made for carrying water, and so Aristotle would say that its final cause is the purpose for which it is to be used, namely, carrying water; A Naiyâyika would say that a particular jar was produced by the potter for the ultimate use and enjoyment of some unknown person who would buy it; and so the age of that buyer may be said to be a cause in the production of that jur. This notion of sg being a cause to every product seems to have been invented, like the final cause of Aristotle, to satisfy our moral intuition that nothing exists in this world without a purpose, and perhaps also to account for many phenomena in the world that can- not be explained more naturally. Bacon inveighed strongly against the final cause of Aristotle; and similarly in India the universal causality: of are also came to be ignored by later systematists, although it was never express- ly repudiated.

In addition to the above four causes, the model or exemplar was considered as a necessary cause by the Pythagoreans and Platonists, which model was numbers according to the former, and ideas according to latter. Naiyâyikas conceived * जाति ( घटत्व or गोल्द ) to be eternally existing, in imitation of which the particular jars or cows were formed. In ad- dition to the platonic enumeration of causes, Seneca insisted

[[27]]

[[210]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

[ SHOT. XL.

that time, space and motion ought to be regarded as causes. Naiyayikas included the first two under the head of univer- sal causes, and assigned a peculiar position to the last under the name of a. Modern science has practically abandoned all these distinctions as useless and often impos- sible. As has been pointed out, it is sometimes very difficult to single out the material cause of a compound product from the efficient causes, while the formal and final causes are often nothing more than the thing itself. The only real distinc tion perhaps is that between material and non-material or instrumental causes, that is, those which are inseparable from the product and those which are separable. Consequent- ly Vedantins mention only two causes (material) and fat ( instrumental).

[[44]]

SECT. XLI, TOH करणम्

Of the three sorts of causes just mentioned that alone which is peculiar is the करण.

"”

In order to exclude the intimate and non-intimate causes which can never be qur, we should either insert before 7- साधारण the additional qualification व्यापारवत्त्वे सति as N. B. suggests, or take the word error itself as implying that condition. therefore is that efficient cause which directly and immediately produces the effect by its own action. The present section seems to have been copied from Kesava Miśra’s remark तदेवं तस्य त्रिविधकारणस्य मध्ये यदेव कथमपि साति- शयं तदेव करणम्. * Annambhatta substitutes : असाधारण for साति- , but probably intends to convey the same meaning. Hence असाधारण may be taken to mean फलायोगव्यवच्छिन्न and almost corresponds to what English lawyers call a proximate cause. This section sums up the intervening discussion about causality.

*T. B. Bom, ed.

P. 25.SECT. XLII. ]

Notes.

SECT. XLII. HEYHA प्रत्यक्षम्

[[211]]

Perception is the peculiar cause of Perceptive knowledge. Perceptive knowledge is the knowledge born of the contact of the organ with (external) object. It is two-fold, un- differentiated and differentiated. Of these, undifferentiated is the knowledge of a thing without its qualities, e. g. this is something. Differentiated is the knowledge of a thing with all its qualities, e. g. he is Dittha, he is a Brahmin, he is black. 1. करण, कारण, and कार्य being thus defined, the author now proceeds to define in order the four proofs and the four kinds of apprehension which stand in the relation of causes and effects respectively. Annambhaṭṭa uses the word ger for both the proof and the resulting knowledge, but other writers have done better in giving a separate name to the latter, viz. साक्षात्कार, so that the proof is defined as साक्षात्कारज्ञानकरणम्. Others again define प्रत्यक्ष as प्रत्यक्षप्रमाकरणम् * or साक्षात्कारिप्रमा-

Percept and per- ception

,† but Annambhaṭṭa seems to have deliberately used in order to include both right and wrong apprehensions. The four divisions of T are equally applicable to ear, and there is no need of defining them separately as the same Ur usually gives rise to both kinds of apprehensions. The rightness or wrongness of a perception is determined by quite extraneous reasons such as rr, and not by any difference of red. Of course the rightness or wrong- ness when determined would affect the proof also, and make it either correct or incorrect. The etymology of er in the sense of प्रमाण is explained as प्रतिगतमक्षम or अक्षस्य gíafaq giâ:, the presence of an organ at each object. In the sense of, the same word is explained differently as अक्षमक्षं प्रतीत्योत्पद्यते or प्रतिगतमाश्रितमक्षम्, knowledge which is obtained through each organ. The era is defined as that knowledge which is produced by the contact of organs with external objects. The word is here used to exclude सन्निकर्षध्वंस which is also सन्निकर्षजन्य, while the epithet इन्द्रि

rf differentiates rerer from other kinds of knowledge.

The process of perception is thus described by Vatsya- yana : आत्मा मनसा संयुज्यते । मन इन्द्रियेण । इन्द्रियमर्थेनेति + Why then is one of only singled out as the cause of

T. K. Bom, ed. p. 8.

†T. B. Bom. ed. p. 27. Vat, on by G. S. I. 1. 4.

[[212]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

[SEUT. XLII.

a percept (a) when as a matter of fact three come into operation? The reason, says the commentator, is that the last is peculiar to g while the former two, viz. the contact of soul and mind and that of mind and organ are common to all kinds of knowledge. This definition of percep- tion is literally borrowed from Gotumu’s aphorism, which however limits its scope by adding three more epithets - पदेश्यमव्यभिचारि व्यवसायात्मकम्. Of these अव्यभिचारि, denoting uncontradicted knowledge, excludes अप्रमा which comes under ज्ञान; while अव्यपदेश्य (unnameable) and व्यवसायात्मक (differentiated) denote the two kinds of werer, faffzers and सविकल्पक ज्ञान. Annambhatta’s definition includes प्रत्यभिज्ञा (reminiscence) and also gea, such as that of pleasure, pain etc. as well as that of Soul. No organ of sense is needed in the case of the last as there is mind which is accep- ted to be इन्द्रिय-

An objection.

The definition however is defective in one important respect, namely, that it does not include Features which, being नित्य, is not इन्द्रिय- सन्निकर्षजन्य. Another definition of प्रत्यक्ष is therefore given by N. B. which applies to both divine and human_knowledge, viz. ज्ञानाकरणकं ज्ञानं प्रत्यक्षम् . Percept requires no previous knowledge for its करण. अनुमिति is caused by व्याप्तिज्ञान, शाब्द by शब्दज्ञान, उपमिति by सादृश्यज्ञान and स्मृति by अनुभव ; but no such previons knowledge is required for perceptive knowledge. This latter definition also is not perfect for it excludes the most important portion of perceptive knowledge namely, the weerung, which is born out of निर्विकल्प प्रत्यक्ष. Some no doubt exclude the whole adequate from the province of perception, and so according to them the definition will be accurate; but of this later S. M . gives only इन्द्रियजन्यज्ञानम् as the definition of प्रत्यक्ष, but this, besides involving all faults chargeable to Annam- bhaṭṭa’s definition, is liable to the serions objection of being applicable to all kinds of knowledge, since all cognitions are products of mind which is an . Hence Annambhaṭṭa’s defini-

SBOT. XLII. ]

Notes.

[[213]]

tion is the best,and has been most commonly accepted. Its अव्याप्ति on ईश्वरप्रत्यक्ष can be explaind away, as N. B. remarks, by an admission that the definition being borrowed from Gotama himself than whom no higher authority can be cit- ed, must be regarded as not intended to apply to ईश्वरप्रत्यक्ष- - God’s knowledge in fact stands on an altogether different level from our own, and the divisions and definitions of the human knowledge ought not to be extended to the divine. The divisions and sub-divisions of g, for instance, given above do not at all apply to God’s knowledge. There can be no past remembrance, or recollection in the case of God, for all His knowledge is presnt and eternal. There is no fare for Him. Similarly neither inference, nor comparison, nor any other operation of derivative know- ledge can be attributed to Him, who being Omnicient perceives all things directly and does not require the aid of any mediate proof. All knowledge of God is therefore

g; and being of so different a kind from our own will require a separate definition for itself. The defect of a on that account is not therefore of much weight.

Perceptive knowledge is of various kinds. The divisions and sub-divisions will be as follows:-

fa i. e. divine

सविकल्पक

प्रत्यक्ष

अनित्य ie human

निर्विकल्पक

अलौकिक

लौकिक

घाणज

रासन चाक्षुष स्पार्शन

श्रोत्रिय

मानस

न्यलक्षण ज्ञानलक्षण योगज

[[214]]

Divisions of प्रत्यक्ष-

यत्र

ज्ञानलक्षणा

Tarka-Sangraka.

[ SBOT. XLII.

प्रत्या-

The distinction between सविकल्पक and निर्विकल्पक प्रत्यक्ष will be explained later. The first is divided into ordinary, namely, that derived from organs of senses, and extraordinary, that not so derived. The ordinary percept is six-fold, accord- ing to the six organs, smell, taste, vision, touch, hearing, and mind. The extraordinary percept, otherwise called - सत्ति, is three-fold. The first सामान्यलक्षणा ( सामान्य लक्षणं विषयो a) is that in which the knowledge of a general notion, e. g, Tea, is comprehended immediately upon the direct perception of e. When we see a jar we do not know the jar alone but get also the general class-notion of jar; this latter is derived by extraordinary perception, because a ma is not perceptible by any organ of sense. The second kind called agar is that in which one percept gives rise to another, as when one perceives a piece of sandal-wood at a distance, one at once knows that it is fragrant. Here the fragrance could be perceived neither by the eye, nor by the nose as the sandal-piece was at a distance; it is therefore apprehended by a kind of extraordinary perception. The third kind der belongs exclusively to Yogins who, by means of their superhuman powers, can perceive objects im- perceptible to others.* It can be easily seen that while the third kind of extraordinary perception is hypothetical, the first two are varieties of associated knowledge, and should properly go under judgments derived by what is called immediate inference. Annambhaṭṭa does not mention these, and therefore it is doubtful whether he accepted them. Probably he did, as there is nothing in his book inconsistent with them.

As the author himself declares at the end of the next section that इन्द्रिय is the करण of प्रत्यक्ष, there ought to be no doubt on the point, but it should be noted that so far as the definition of grama is concerned, it is applicable to either view of करण† If compared with the definition of अनुमिति ( परामर्शजन्यं ज्ञानं ) it favours the view of सन्निकर्ष being the

T. K. Bom. ed. p. 9; B. P. 63-4,

See Note 2 under Sect. 37, p. 187, Supra.

#MOT. XLII. ]

Notes.

[[215]]

प्रत्यक्षकरण just as परामर्श is that of अनुमितिः bnt the word जन्य need not be here strictly construed in the sense of being directly or immediately produced.

Nirvikalpaka.

A percept is of two kinds, indeterminate and determi- nate, or if we may adopt Whately’s terms, Savikalpaka and incomplex and complex. When a thing gradually comes within the range of our sight, we first simply apprehend that there is something, aud it is after some time and after we have observed the thing more closely that we recognize it to be a particular thing having particular qualities. The first is called faces or निष्प्रकारक, while the second is freeye or समकारक. निर्विकल्पक ज्ञान is defined as that knowledge in which there is no प्रकार- ता.’ while सविकल्पक is that in which it exists.’ प्रकारता is already explained as the property of a particular cognition which distinguishes it as the cognition of a particular object from other cognitions, eg acre is the प्रकारता of घटज्ञान which distinguishes it from पटज्ञान. It is evident that the सप्रकारकज्ञान presupposes the previous knowledge of प्रकारता, that is, we cannot know that a particular thing is qe unless we first know what qe is. The maxim is argftafaarquit बुद्धिर्विशेष्यमुपसङ्क्रामति, that is, we cannot apprehend the qualified without first knowing the qualification. The - ¬ is essentially the knowledge of the qualified object, for its game is nothing more than the qualities of the object, while the rare, being a knowledge of the object itself without the qualities, clearly precedes the gases. T. D. defines सविकल्पक a8 नामजात्यादिविशेषणविशेष्य सम्बन्धावगाहि

‘knowledge which comprehends the relation of the qualified and the qualifications such as name, class, etc.’ We already possess a previous knowledge of घटत्व, नीलरूप and other qualities, acquired by former experience. We then see some unknown thing come within our vision. At first we only feel that it is some thing; that is, we apprehend only the most general of its attributes, namoly, war or

See Note under dec. 35, p. 180, Supro.

[[216]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

[ SHOT. XLII.

भावरूपता; this is the निर्विकल्पक or indeterminate knowledge, for in it the thing is not yet determined or distinguished from other things. At this stage we have two separate knowledges, the knowledge of the object as some thing, and the previous knowledge of a; but there is no connec- tion between the two, and hence both these individual knowledges are

. They are then combined to- gether and form a joint knowledge azara az in which () appears as the art of the other. Those which were at first separate are combined and connected with each other and thus the joint knowledge becomes Hä¶πe or सरकारक. In this way we first apprehend qualities separately and then tackle them to the object. These qualities are chiefly of four sorts, गुण, क्रिया, जाति and सञ्ज्ञा Iu the sentence श्यामो देवदत्तो ब्राह्मणः पचति we have instances of the four kinds, श्याम being गुण ( quality ), देवदत्त being a सञ्ज्ञा ( proper name ), ब्राह्मणत्व being जाति ( class ), and पचति denot- ing the action vs. Each of these properties as well as the individual in whom they reside are first apprehended separately, and then results the complex perception ex- pressed in the sentence.

kalpaka recognized.

The two kinds of knowledge being thus distinguished, the question arises why they are both re- Why is Nirvi cognized. The war is the subject of our daily consciousness and cannot be ignored; but the

according to Naiyâyikas is not actually perceived and is to be inferred only. The in- ference is stated by T. D. and is briefly expressed in the maxim quoted above, नागृहीतविशेषणा बुद्धिर्विशेष्यमुपसङ्क्रामति. The Nydya theory therefore clearly appears to be that the सप्रकारक ज्ञान alone constitutes percept proper, while निष्प्रकारक is simply assumed as a necessary condition of it.

SHOT, XLI.

The difficulty about Nirvikalpaka.

Notes.

[[217]]

It may not be amiss here to go a little deeper into the merits of this theory of two sorts of perceptive knowledge. In the first place it should be noted that although orthodox systematists generally agree in the Nyaya doctrine of the two kinds of knowledge, the Bauddhas radically differ from alone to be the true per-

them in taking the far

ceptive knowledge, and the

to be neither real nor

perceived. The qualities according to them having no objective existence, the

cannot be real, but only a sub- jective conception like a barren woman’s son, while the f f being concerned with the thing itself is real. This argument of the Bauddhas is no doubt based on their general theory of the falsity of material existence, but its im- portance to us consists in its pointing out the weakness of the Nyaya doctrine. Even taking the Nyaya definition of प्रत्यक्ष it is evident that सविकल्पक ज्ञान can hardly be called a as it is merely a combination of the several knowledges of the qualities with the indeterminate knowledge of the property-less object.

therefore is not simple and direct knowledge gained immediately through the contact of the senses with the objects; it is complex and mediate like अनुमिति or उपमिति and does not therefore deserve to be if we accept the definition of a given in

called प्रत्यक्ष,

the book.

The निर्विकल्पक alone is really derived from इन्द्रियसन्निकर्ष, while the सविकल्पक consists of inferences based partly on निर्वि-

and partly on previous knowledge. When a ship for instance appears on the ocean near the horizon, we first see only a black spot, which gradually enlarges. From this and from like observations made before, we infer that the lines above the spot must be the masts and the thing must be a ship. Similarly in a we first see indistinctly a thing which appears to have the same form as that of a jar with which we are familiar; and hence we infer that the round thing must be a . This is virtually the same process as the proof a by which a gayal is likened to a cow. Besides we must have the knowledge of the name ve before

Sânkhya-T. K. p 93. † V. S. Up. Culo. ed. 358.

[[28]]

[[218]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

[SECT. XLII.

we can cognize the thing as ; and hence car also is necessary for faeces gegr. Determinate knowledge is there- fore properly speaking a mediate cognition obtained by the operation of several other proofs. The remarks of an English writer on Logic are very apposite on this point.

“What we term a fact or an observation, is seldom an ab- solutely single or individual conscious impression. We speak of the fact that high water at Leith follows high water at London by a certain definite interval; but this is far beyond any individual impression upon our senses. It is a generality of considerable compass, the result of the comparison of many separate observations. *** There is a process of induction requisite in order to establish such a fact; and all the securities for soundness in the inductive proofs are called into play.”*

And again:-

“It is from previous knowledge that we know that we are looking at a needle (magnet), and that its direction is north. The simplest observation is thus a mixture of intuition and inference ; and our habit of joining the two is one cause of error in the act of observing.”

Are not the Bauddhas then nearer the truth when they call the निर्विकल्पक the percept proper, and the सविकल्पक a mere combination of conceptions that are according to them devoid of external reality? And are not Naiyayikas inconsis- tent in including

under which is ex hypothese born off only? But this conclusion cannot be accepted; for once accept it, the dispairing of the Bauddhas, that all the world is a falsity and a mirage, necessarily follows. afqueq being indeterminate cannot give us any mental notion; while if it be the only g, all other proofs which essentially depend upon rer as their start- ing point will be without basis and therefore void. It is the age that forms the real basis of all our mental processes. To deprive it of its primary and authentic charac- ter is therefore to take away the very foundation of our knowledge of the external world and thus to reduce it to a mere delusion and a snare.

Bain: Deductive Logic p. 36-7,

SEOT. XLII.

A partial solution.

Notes.

[[219]]

Here indeed we have a dilemma which cannot be solved by observation or reasoning, be- cause it lies at the root of observation itself. Various solutions, more or less plausible, have been offered, out of which we are concerned with only that which is furnished by later Naiyâyikas, and which, though not quite satisfactory, at least absolves them from inconsistency. fafates according to this school of Naiyáyihas is neither प्रत्यक्ष, nor अनुमिति, nor any other kind of g, and can hardly come under itself, as it gives rise to no व्यवहार.

It can be neither प्रमा nor अप्रमा for as it has no प्रकारता neither the definition तद्वति तत्प्रकारवत्त्वं Dor अतइति तत्प्रकारवत्वं applies to it. It is no doubt ज्ञान, but of a peculiar kind and quite distinct from other

ज्ञान. cognitions. While other cognitions have defined objects (fassar ), propertics (vertar) and relations (werfer), faft- ***, says Nilakantha, has none of these ; and so it is altogether of a different kind. Its position therefore under ought to be not as a subdivision of verer as Annambhatta has placed it, but rather as a subdivision of अनुभव above प्रभा ; thus :—

अनुभव ( apprehension )

fafoners (indeterminate)

सविकल्पक ( determinate)

अपक्षा

fafarere having no प्रकारता is thus discriminated from all determinate cognitions such as percepts, judgments, analogies and verbal knowledge, and may be given the name of sensa- tion, while the g may be called percept proper. This is in accordance with Kant’s division of apprehension into perception proper and sensation proper. This restric- tion of the meaning of the words perception and percept and their discrimination from sensation proper are accepted by a high authority. “Sensation,” says Prof. Fleming, “pro- perly expresses that change in the state of the mind which is produced by an impression upon an organ of sense (of which change we can conceive the mind to be concious, without any knowledge of external objects) : perception on the other

[[220]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

SECT. XLII.

hand expresses the knowledge or intimations we obtain by means of our sensations concerning the qualities of matter; and consequently it involves, in every instance, the notion of externality or outness which it is necessary to exclude in order to seize the precise import of the word sensation. “** This restricted use of perception to denote the cognitions of external objects through the senses was introduced by Reid and Kant and is now generally accepted. So that we may very well call निर्विकल्पकज्ञान sensation and सविकल्पकप्रत्यक्ष percep tion or rather percept. In this way the dilemma hinted above can be removed partially at least.

The determinate cognitions will have many varieties, ac- cording as they are more or less mediate, and the medium is of different kinds. If it is the cognition of a real external object it is rer; if it is a judgment obtained by a combina- tion of two or more propositions, it is fa; if an analogy between two objects known by comparison, it is ; aud if a notion derived from the meaning of words, it is verbal knowledge. The

therefore may be mediate and yet sufficiently distinguishable from other cognitions. Nor is the definition for quite

इन्द्रियसन्निकर्षजन्य inapplicable to afâacqueurg; for although it is not solely due to सन्निकर्ष and although & सन्निकर्ष of one kind or another is present in all kinds of apprehension, the ad is the direct and immediate cause of सविकल्पज्ञान while in अनुमिति etc. other operations of the mind intervene. The constituant cognitions, which by combining form the complex - कल्पकप्रत्यक्ष, are necessarily obtained by सन्निकर्ष, while in अनुमिति they need not be so obtained. The निर्विकल्पकज्ञान as well as the process of combining the separate cognitions of qualities so as to form one af

which comes after सन्निकर्ष may be called the अबान्तरव्यापार. In this way the Nyaya doctrine may with some modifications be reconciled with our common experience. Kesava Miśra attempts a very curious compromise which though easily comprehen- dible, is faulty as it reduces any and are to mere relative notions. He lays down three varying pairs of σ and व्यापार for प्रत्यक्ष, viz. इन्द्रिय, इन्द्रियसन्निकर्ष and निर्विकल्पकज्ञान.

Fleming : Vocabulary of Philosophy p. 443.

*T. B. Bom. ed, p. 27.SECT. XLII. Î

Notes.

[[221]]

When निर्विकल्पकज्ञान is फळ, इन्द्रिय is the करण, and सन्निकर्ष is व्यापार; when सविकल्पक is फल, सन्निकर्ष is the करण and निर्विकल्पक is व्यापार; and when इच्छा which results from knowledge is फe, fafonere is the करण and सविकल्पक is व्यापार. But this compromise is not accepted by later writers.

SECT. XLIII. vid.

The contact of organ and object, which is the cause of Perception, is of six kinds:-1 Conjunction, 2 Intimate union with the conjoint, 3 Intimate union with the intimately united with the conjoint, 4 Intimate union, 5 Intimate union with the intimate- ly united, and 6 Connection of the attribute with the subject. Conjunction is the contact producing perception of the jar by the eye. Intimate union with the conjoint is the contact producing the perception of the colour of a jar, as the colour is intimately united with the jar which is conjoint with the eye. Intimate union with the intimately united is the contact in perceiving the genus of colour, as colour is intimately united with the jar conjoint with eye, and the genus of colour is intimately united therewith. Intimate union is the contact in the perception of word by the organ of hearing, as the organ of hearing is the ether in the cavity of the ear, (since) word is the quality of ether and the quality and the qualified are intimately united. Intimate union with the intimately united is the contact in cognizing the genus word, as the genus is intimately united with word which is intimately united with (organ of) hearing. The connection of the attribute and subject is the contact in the perception of negation, as the negation of a jar is an attribute of a place in contact with the eye wherever a place is devoid of a jar. The knowledge thus produced from the sixfold contact is Percept. Its peculiar cause is the organ. Hence organ is perception.

Having defined

The six contacts.

rar as the product of the contact of the organs of sense with their appropriate objects, the author now enumerates and illustrates the six varieties of this contact, that is, six ways in which the different organs may come in contact with their objects. Three of these contacts are primary, viz. संयोग, समवाय and विशेषणविशेष्यता, and the other

T. B. Bom. ed. P. 27.

[[222]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

[SECT. XLIII.

three are combinations of the two former, viz. #gmawala, संयुक्तसमवेतसमवाय, and समवेतसमवाय. The organ of sight be - ing a ger comes in actual contact with a substance like a jar when it sees it; and so the सन्निकर्ष is संयोग the ordinary conjunction. The eye perceives also the colour of e, as colour is the special quality of light of which the eye is formed, but the organ being a cannot have direct conjun- ction with the quality of another substance; and hence the contact of the eye with घटरूप is संयुक्तसमवाय, intimate union with the conjoined, the being intimately united with the घट which is conjoined with the organ. The जाति on घटरूप is also perceived by the organ of sight, because the Naiydyikns have laid down a maxim, येनेन्द्रियेण यद्गृह्यते तेने- न्द्रियेण तद्वतं सामान्यं तत्समवायस्तदभावश्व गृह्यते, * the organ which apprehends a thing also apprehends the जाति and समवाय on that thing as well as its negation.’ qaqa is therefore per- ceived by the eye by means of the contact संयुक्तसमवेतसमवाय, intimate union with a thing (er) which is intimately united with a substance (a) that is in conjunction with the organ. The fourth contact is simple intimate union, as that of orgau of hearing, which being arearrant, is intimately united with its product the sound. The differ- ence between and other organs is that, while the latter are products (f) of their corresponding elements, such as the eye of light, the nose of earth and the taste of water, the s is the all-pervading ether itself in its elemental form, defined and conditioned by the cavity of the ear. Sound therefore as a product of the ether has direct intimate nnion with , while other qualities are not so directly brought into contact with their corresponding organs. being apprehended by समवाय, its जाति शब्दत्व is obviously ap- prehended by समवेतसमवाय, intimate union with a thing ( शब्द ) intimately united with the organ. The last सन्निकर्ष will be noticed further on.

In the case of other organs also the same contacts will be found efficient. The only organ besides the eye which, ac- cording to some, apprehends substances and therefore has conjunction with them is the organ of touch. The three external organs, प्राण, रसन and श्रोत्र apprehend qualities only; and the kind of contact operating in the case of each object apprehended by these senses can be easily determined.

*T. K. Bom. ed. p. 10.

SEOT. XLIII. ]

What things are perceived and how.

Notes.

[[223]]

The subject is involved in some intricacy owing to the difference that exists in the perceptive capa- city of the various organs. Some organs are said to perceive substances and qualities, while others perceive qualities only. Hence we must distin- guish between the perception of substances and the percep- tion of qualities, actions and generalities. गुण, कर्म and सामान्य are, according to all, perceived by their respective organs and by means of appropriate contacts. Perception of these therefore is divided into six kinds according to the six organs of sense, namely घ्राणज, रासन, चाक्षुष, स्पार्शन, श्रोत्रिय, and Я, while the things perceived are respectively the qualities, odour, savour, colour, touch, sound, pleasure, and pain, as well as their generalities and negations.* Substan- ces, however, are held to be perceivable by two senses only, the sight and the touch, the remaining four organs being capable of perceiving qualities only. As to the perception of substances by sight there is not and cannot be any doubt, but there is a difference of opinion as to whether the organ of touch is capable of perceiving a substance. The ancient Naiyayikas answer is in the negative, asserting that

Perception by

touch.

is a necessary condition for every external perception of a substance, while the moderns answer in the affirmative saying can be also efficient for external perception. The controversy has been already explained in a previ- ous Note.†

that

Viśvanátha lays down a rule which is as it were a compromise between the two views:-

उद्भूतस्पर्शवद्रव्यं गोचरः सोऽपि च त्वचः ।

रूपान्यच्चक्षुषो योग्यं रूपमत्रापि कारणम् ॥

“A substance having a manifested touch is apprehended by the organ of touch, and also touch. Everything except colour that is perceived by the eye is perceived by the organ of touch also; but (manifested) colour is necessary even in

B. P. 51.

† See Note p. 117, Supra.

‡ B. P. 25.

[[224]]

त्वक्

Tarka-Sangraha.

[ SHOT. XLIII.

these cases.” is thus declared to be capable of perceiv- ing, but only when the thing is also visible to the eye; and the same will probably be the case with the other organs. Thus neither touch nor savour, nor odour can be perceived in atoms which have no manifested colour. This compromise however is not tenable, for if strictly taken, the touch in air and the sound in ether should always be imperceptible as the two substances have no manifested colour: but this cannot be accepted, and so the necessity of a for all perceptions must be confined to substances only. This is the ancient view and also that of Annambhaṭṭa. He has declared air to be imperceptible and inferrible from the existence of touch, while touch itself is defined as a quality perceived by the aerial cuticle (carat gur: ). It is clear therefore that he accepts the capacity of to perceive qualities, but not

त्वक् substances unless the latter possess 3. Similarly the can preceive sound but not ether, both because it has not g and also because it is not distinct from the

उद्भूतरूप organ. As regards are it is to be noted that while pleasure, pain etc. are perceived by the mind, the human soul is perceptible according to the Naiyâyikas, but not according to the Vaiseshikas. * Annambhaṭṭa holds the Vaiseshika view. By thus distinguishing the perception of substances from that of qualities we can, it seems, remove the apparent discrepancy between several passages of T. S. and T. D., in some of which the author appears to limit the term प्रत्यक्ष to चाक्षुषप्रत्यक्ष only, while in others as in the pres- ent, he talks of the perception by other organs such as T and In the case of substances there is gч only,

Falco

त्वाच

and perhaps also; while in the case of qualities there are six kinds which though nowhere expressly mentioned by the author can be inferred from his mentioning in the present passage. In conclusion he declares the. organ itself to be the प्रत्यक्षप्रमाण that is the करण of प्रत्यक्ष, thereby removing any doubt as to whether he takes इन्द्रिय or इन्द्रिय- सन्निकर्ष to be the करण

B. P. 49; see Note 6 under Sec. 17, p. 144, Supra.

† See on this Note p. 191, Supra

SHOT. XLIII, ]

Notes.

[[225]]

The sixth contact,

अभाव.

The five contacts account for the perception of the first four categories विशेष being के परमाणुधर्म is unpercepti- ble. The cases of and errer are specially provided for by the sixth सन्निकर्ष called विशेषणविशेष्यभाव - This last is of a peculiar kind, and is assumed to ac- count for the perception of negation and intimate union according to those in whose opinion both are perceptible, and of negation only according to those who deny the perceptibility of समवाय. Visvanatha says : - अभावप्रत्यक्षे समवायप्रत्यक्षे चेन्द्रियसम्बद्धविशेषण- ताहेतुः । वैशेषिकमते तु न समवायः प्रत्यक्षः *# The Naiyayikas hold

ga समवाय to be perceptible by विशेषणविशेष्यभाव, while the Vai- śeshikas regard it as eff and inferrible only. Annam- bhatta as usual holds the Vaiseshika view, as may be easily guessed from his proving art by inference in T. D. on Sect. 79. The faşıqulaqwara is therefore confined, accord- ing to our author, to the perception of negation, which re- quires a special contact because neither संयोग nor समवाय is possible in the case of a Negation not being a sub- stance cannot exist by itself; nor can it reside in any other substance by ar, as it is neither quality, nor action, nor जाति. How does it then exist in the world, and how is it apprehended? It is conceived, replies the Naiyâyika as a property (T) of its fur, that is, of the thing on which it exists. Thus in a cognition घटाभाववडूतलम् the घटा- भाव is spoken of as the विशेषण of the भूतल which is the विशेष्य, their relation विशेषणविशेष्यभाव being expressed by the termination. Now let us see how this cognition takes place. We observe the spot of ground and see no jar on it. The spot of ground being a substance is perceived by the contact, that is, it is physically connected with the कृष्णताराग्रवर्ति चक्षुः ; but the घटाभाव on भूतल can come into contact with the eye through a only. The there

सन्निकर्ष - fore by which the घटाभाव on भूतल is perceived is the contact between the चक्षुस् and भूतल, . . संयोग, plus that between मूतल and घटाभाव, . ९. विशेषणविशेष्यभाव, the combined contact

i. e.

S. M. Cale. ed. p. 53.

[[29]]

[[226]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

SEOT. XLIII.

being named संयुक्तविशेषणविशेष्यभाव, or rather इन्द्रियसम्बद्धविशेषण- विशेष्यभाव. Now the relation विशेषणविशेष्यभाव existing be- tween भूतल and घटाभाव though spoken of as one may be split up into two, that is, the relation of घटाभाव with भूतल may be called विशेषणता, and that of भूतल with घटाभाव विशेष्यता. Hence विशेषणविशेष्यभाव is often spoken of as two contacts, विशेषणत्तासन्निकर्ष and विशेष्यतासन्निकर्ष, or taking them in their enlarged form, इन्द्रियसम्बद्धविशेषणता and इन्न्द्रियसम्बद्ध- विशेष्यता. Thus the perception of घटाभाव on भूतल is effected by means of two contacts, not of course jointly but alterna- tively; that is, either of the two contacts serves the purpose. But why should two contacts operate in the perception of Eerभra, when one only suffices for the perception of घट ? The reason is that the existence of घटाभाव on भूतल may be expressed in two ways, घटाभाववडूतलमस्ति or भूतले घटाभावोऽस्ति, both of which propositions, though conveying the same meaning, namely, the negation of घट on भूतल, are different in grammatical form and therefore produce different cogni- tions. In घटाभाववद्भूतलम्, भूतल is the विशेष्य and घटाभाव its विशेषण, while in भूतले घटाभावोऽस्ति, घटाभाव being in the nominative is the विशेष्य, and the locative भूतले is its विशेषण. The first cognition is principally that of a as possessing घटाभाव (घटाभावविशिष्ट ), the second cognition is that of घटा- भाव as residing in भूतल ( भूतलनिष्ट ); or to use technical ex pressions already explained, the first cognition has a for its विशेष्य and घटाभावविशिष्टत्व for its प्रकारता, while the second has घटाभाव for its विशेष्य and भूतलनिष्टत्व for its प्रकारता (property )★ Thus the two cognitions being different in form and having a different ar respectively, the contacts operating to produce them are also different. In the first घटाभाववद्भूतलम्, the eye is संयुक्त with भूतल of which घटाभाव is विशेषण, and therefore the सन्निकर्ष is संयुक्तविशेषणता; in the second भूतले घटाभावः, the eye is संयुक्त with भूतल of which घटा- भाव is विशेष्य, and therefore the सन्निकर्ष is संयुक्तविशेष्यता. As these two cognitions though differing in form are identical in meaning, they are conjointly and briefly

SBOT. XLIII.

[[1]]

Notes.

[[227]]

expressed in the text as being produced by the compound contact विशेषणविशेष्यभाव.

One might ask here, why should there not be two cog- nitions in the perception of similar to those in the perception of घटाभाव ? We can say घटबद्भूतलम् as well as भूतले घटोऽस्ति, 50 that in one case घट is the विशेषण of भूतल, and in the other भूतल is the विशेषण of घट; and therefore there ought to be two contacts corresponding to these two cognitions in the perception of are also. But this is not so, for we never perceive arra by itself but only as a property of way, and so the double relation subsisting between and we is required to be taken into account; while we perceive qe by itself, and there is no necessity of bringing in . In the case of घटाभाव, the eye is directly connected with भूतल and through it with the area; while in the case of it is directly connected with itself, and therefore there is only one सन्निकर्ष, namely संयोग.

ed.

Areading discuss

भूतल-

V. V. reads simply विशेषणता instead of विशेषणविशेष्यभावः in the text, and mentions as a reason for his preference that the T. S. gives an example of fiqurar only, and so may have intended to limit the f to that alone. But it will be clear from the above explanation that V. V.’s reading as well as the reason for preferring it are both wrong. Although T. S. gives an instance of faqurar only, T. D. supplies the desideratum which V. V. seems not to have noticed.

Varieties of the sixth contact.

As the negation of घट on भूतल is perceived by संयुक्तविशे- पणतासन्निकर्ष, so the negation of घटरूप on घटसङ्ख्या or vice versa is perceived by संयुक्त- समवेतविशेषणता, the eye being संयुक्त with घट which is समवेत with सङ्ख्या of which रूपाभाव is a विशेषण. Simi- larly the negation of पटरूप on घटसङ्ख्यात्व is perceived by संयुक्त (घट) समवेत (सङ्ख्या) समवेत ( सङ्ख्यात्व) विशेषणता; and so on with other organs and the negations of their corresponding objects. शब्दाभाव however is perceived by simple विशेषणता not इन्द्रिय- संयुक्तविशेषणता, for शब्दाभाव is the विशेषण of श्रोत्र itself as

[[228]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

[ SEOT. XLIII.

the organ is identical with array which is the real nor of शब्दाभावः शब्दत्वाभाव (ie the अभाव of are on खत्ब) is appre- hended by इन्द्रियसमवेतविशेषणता. * Both विशेषणता and विशेष्यता are therefore of two kinds, इन्द्रियविशेषणता - शेष्यता simply, and इन्द्रियसम्बद्धविशेषणता - शेष्यताः the first two in the perception by श्रोत्र and correspond to समवाय and समवेतसमवाय contacts, the latter two in the case of other organs and correspond to the other three contacts. विशेषणविशेष्यभाव mentioned by Anam- bhaṭṭa is therefore not a simple contact but has five varieties, corresponding to the first five contacts, although all of them are comprised under one name as they all have a common element विशेषणता or विशेष्यता.

[[4]]

Anupalabdhi

proof.

T. D. here introduces a discussion as to why a fifth proof called agar which is accepted by Mi- mâmsakas and Vedantins is not recognized by the Naiyaykas. The former hold that arra is not perceptible because there can be no manner of contact between a substantial organ and a pure negation, and have therefore to account for the apprehension of negation by a fifth proof called

(non-perception); while the Naiyagikas hold that erre is perceptible by the same organ which perceives its प्रतियोगी, but by means of a peculiar सन्नि- कर्ष called विशेषणविशेष्यभाव. So that one party assumes & separate proof to account for rear, and the other as- sumes a separate . The arguments on both sides are equally specious and interminable, and the controversy is at last reduced to a determination of the comparative simplicity (a) of the two rival assumptions. The Naiyayikas however cannot wholly dispense with अनुपलब्धि. अभाव is not a thing that is independently known. The cognition of era neces- sarily depends on the previous knowledge of its counter- entity (v) and its support (as). Now the fact that we never perceive TT wherever there is a shows

घटाभाव that there is a relation of contrariety between the

*T. K. Bom. ed. P. 9, S. M. Calc. ed. p. 53-4,

SHOT. XLIII. ]

Notes.

[[228]]

two, and that the absence of the one must be ascertained before the other can be apprehended. This ascertainment of the absence of घट, or अनुपलब्धि, is therefore deemed to be a necessary condition for the perception of IA; that is, अनुपलब्धि is a सहकारी ( accessory ) of the चक्षुरिन्द्रिय which perceives घटाभाव on भूतल. Now what is this अनुपलब्धि ? It is not simply the not-perceiving or not-finding; for though we do not perceive e in darkness, we do not also perceive aarara there. The gyfer (non-perception) must be तर्कितप्रतियोगिसत्त्वविरोधि, that is, must be inconsistent with the hypothetical assumption of the existence of its af T.’ It is not sufficient that we do not perceive qe; we must not perceive it in a place, where from all surrounding cir- cumstances we would naturally expect to find it, but do not owing to its actual absence. The age must therefore be preceded by an ascertainment that no unfavourable circum- stances such as darkness exist which would prevent even a present from being perceived. T. D. ’s expression afta- प्रतियोगिसत्त्वविरोध्यनुपलब्धि has been dissolved and interpreted by Nilakantha in two ways both of which really convey the same meaning. The simpler method is तर्कितमारोपितं यत्प्रति- योगित्वं तद्विरोधिनी याऽनुपलब्धिः ’ that non-perception which is inconsistent with the assumed existence of प्रतियोगी ’ तर्क is an assumption or hypothesis (a reductio ad absurdum as it is sometimes called) which is for a moment taken for granted for the purpose of proving the contrary. So here we first assume the प्रतियोगिसत्त्व, e the existence of घट, in the place, and then reject it as false because that adfer is not perceived although all the conditions are favourable. Our reasoning is यद्यत्र घटोऽभविष्यत्तर्हि भूतलमिवाद्राक्ष्यत्, if there had been here, we would have necessarily perceived it just as we perceive ‘,’ the perception of a showing that the usual conditions for rug are existing. By this

we hypothecate the existence of in the place. But this hypothecation is inconsistent with the actual fact that we do not perceive the e, and must be therefore rejected. In this way our non-perception of a which was doubtful at first is made certain by the intermediate hypothecation

[[230]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

[ SEOT. XLIII.

and its rejection. It is this fully ascertained non-perception that assists the eye in apprehending vara. The compound also be dissolved as तर्किता आपादिता प्रतियोगिनो घटादेः may सत्त्वस्य सत्त्वप्रसक्तेः विरोधिनी या उपलब्धिः तत्प्रतियोगिकोऽभावोऽनुपलब्धिः that non-perception which is opposed not to the real exis- tence of but to its assumed existence.’ Either way the result is the same, that the non-perception must be first ascertained by a proper inquiry that there does not really exist. But even this periphrasis is not enough to guard the definition from a fault. Merit (f) and demerit (ere) being qualities of the soul are imperceptible; if therefore one after looking for them in vain concludes that they do not exist at all, he will be quite wrong, for the imperceptibility of merit and demerit is inherent and not due to their non-existence. अनुपलब्धि is therefore qualified with यौग्य, so that the ascer- tained non-perception must be of a thing capable of being perceived. In the Naiyâyika view therefore arra is perceived by the विशेषणविशेष्यभाव - सन्निकर्ष (ie as a property of its support भूतल ) with the accessory aid of a योग्यानुपलब्धि, that is, an ascertained non-perceptible object. The Naiyayikas have thus to make two assumptions, one of a new f सन्निकर्ष and another of its accessory aquaey; while the Mîmâṁsakas are satisfied with one assumption only, namely that of a new प्रमाण or प्रमाकरण. T. D. thinks that the first two being only subordinate, there is greater ga in assuming those two than in assuming the last one; because it is simpler to assume two operations (TT) than to recognize a separate instrument (करण ). Besides the relation विशेषणविशेष्यभाव is not really a new thing; but it is identical with the T भूतल itself, for when we say that there is घटाभाव on भूतल we really mean nothing more than that there is भूतल and nothing else. Hence Nilakantha defines fastqur-

विशेषण विशेष्यभाव as स्वरूपसम्बधावच्छिन्नाधाराधेयभावः- The only new assumption is that of agua which is also common to the Mimâmsakas. The difference between the two schools is simply that the one calls it accessory, the other principal.SEOT. XLIII. ]

Notes.

[[231]]

It may not be out of place here to notice a distinction between a cognition and its appropriate proof. Cognition resulting from

perception is a percept; but the contrary is not true; a percept does not necessarily arise from perception alone. It may arise from another kind of proof, such as q or agusta. Both Nyâya and Mi- mámsá agree in holding that er

अभाव an object of perception. But the gra of a thing according to M- mdmsa does not depend upon its resulting from प्रत्यक्षप्रमाण. A Vedantic writer remarks on this point, न हि फलीभूतज्ञानस्य प्रत्यक्षत्वे तत्करणस्य प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणतानियमत्वमस्ति । दशमस्त्वमसीत्यादि- वाक्यजन्यज्ञानस्य प्रत्यक्षत्वेऽपि तत्करणस्य वाक्यस्य प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणभिन्नप्रमाण- angqua* Perceptive knowledge is not necessarily caused by perception; it may be caused by agroffughju or by argar, just as in the sentence, “Thou art the tenth,” the cogntion of being the tenth, though a percept, is not caused by perception, but by word.

樂

The Nyaya view of Preception as distinguished from that of others.

The remark of the Vedanta-Paribhâshâ quoted at the end of the last preceding Note is important as showing that the Nyaya ideas of percep tion and percept materially differ from those of other schools, and that Annam- bhaṭṭa’s definitions of them will not at all be accepted as correct by Vedantic writers. The Naiyayika theory of per- ception and in fact of all knowledge is essentially physical. All cognitions ( : ) are conceived to be merely qualities residing in the soul which is a substance, and exactly in the same way as the quality of blueness or whiteness resides in the jar. These cognitions again are all primarily derived from perceptive experience which is again founded on the physical contact of senses with external objects. There is nothing idealistic or supersensuous in this matter of fact and almost mechanical theory of the origin of our ideas. This is the reason why the Nya-Vaišeshika system has become so thoroughly realistic, and why it is strenuously opposed by the ideal and pantheistic philo- sophers of the Sâmkhya and Vedantic schools. The Nyaya theory of perception has a very close resemblance to Locke’s doctrine of sensationalism, and may be described.

Veddata-Paribháshá, Cale, ed, p. 25.

[[232]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

SHOT. XLIII.

almost in his own words. Locke considers that all our knowledge is derived from experience which is two-fold, “observation employed either about external sensible objects or about the internal operations of our minds, per- ceived and reflected upon by ourselves.” These two sources of our ideas are thus described:-

First. Our senses conversant about particular sensible objects, do convey into the mind several distinct perceptions of things, according to those various ways wherein those objects do affect them; and thus we come by those ideas we have of yellow, white, heat, cold, soft, hard, bitter, sweet, and all those which we call sensible qualities; which when I say that the senses convey into the mind, I mean, they from external objects convey into the mind what produces there those perceptions. This great source of most of the ideas we have, depending wholly upon our senses, and derived by them to the understanding, I call, sensation.

Secondly. The other fountain from which experience furnisheth the understanding with ideas, is the perception of the operations of our own minds within us as it is employed about the ideas it has got; which operations when the soul comes to reflect on and consider, do furnish the understanding with another set of ideas which could not be had from things without; and such are perception thinking, doubting, believing, reasoning, knowing, willing, and all the different actings of our own minds; which we being conscious of and observing in our- selves, do from these receive into our understanding as distinct ideas, as we do from bodies affecting our senses.” **** «The understanding seems to me not to have the least glim- mering of any ideas which it doth not receive from one of these two. External objects furnish the mind with the ideas of sensible qualities, which are all those different perceptions they produce in us; and the mind furnishes the understand- ing with ideas of its own operations. “*

This may almost be mistaken for a translation of a pas- sage in some Nyâya work. Locke’s theory of senses has

Locke : Essay on Human Understanding, Bk, 11, ch. 1. Sec, 3, 4.

SHOT. XLIV. ]

Notes.

[[253]]

now been partially abandoned chiefly owing to the powerful criticism of Kant, but its enormous influence on subsequent philosophical thought cannot be doubted. Similarly the Naiyayika’s doctrine of af was afterwards considerably modified by Vedantins and others, but not before it had given a decided turn to philosophical speculations in India.

SECT. XLIV. AZAAR. अनुमानम्.

Inference is the peculiar cause of a judgment; judgment is the knowledge that springs from чf or consideration; Con- sideration is the knowledge of reason as distinguished by invariable concomitance, as for instance, the knowledge that this mountain has smoke which is invariably accompanied by fire is Consideration, while the knowledge born of it that mountain is fiery is Judgment. Invariable concomitance is the certainty of association that wherever there is smoke, there is fire. The existence of an invariably concomitant thing on objects like mountain makes it the characteristic of a ч or Receptacle.

Judgment Inference.

The chapters on Inference contain the science of Indian logic as developed and skilfully dovetailed into the general system of metaphysics evolved by the Vaišeshikas. अनुमान or inference is the instrument, अनुमिति the resulting judgment, and as the intermediate operation. fafa अनुमिति is thus said to depend upon परामर्श. This परामर्श occupies a very important place in Nyaya logic; because when once a valid qerf is obtained a sound conclusion or agrarà neces- sarily and immediately follows, just as cloth is produced as an invariable consequence of the motion of the loom. Hence Nyâya writers mainly devote themselves to a discus- sion of this reef and its two constituent parts and लिङ्ग लिङ्ग or हेतु is the thing from which the existence of another thing invariably concomitant with it is inferred; ema is this invariable concomitance existing between the लिङ and the other thing inferred from it, namely साध्य.

Inference anaTM lyzed.

It will be clear from the above that an inference when simplified always consists of three terms denoting respectively हेतु, साध्य and their mutual relation of invariable concomit- ance, any two of which when given necessarily lead to a

[[30]]

[[234]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

[ SECT. XLIV.

knowledge of the third. Of these the T is of course the thing which is always to be proved; and consequently the other two terms, हेतु and the हेतुसाध्यसम्बन्ध or व्याप्ति as it is called, must be known before any inference is possible. In the Aristotelian syllogism they correspond to the first two premises which, being connected together by a common middle term, lead to the conclusion; but the Aristotelian syllogism is defective in so far as it merely implies this cou- nection between the two premises, and has no separate premise to express it. The Nyaya syllogism on the other hand actually expresses this connection by joining the two premises, or rather the two terms denoting and ea into one; that is, it does not merely state the two terms or premises separately, and then at once jump to the con- clusion, but after stating them fully gives a third premise which combines the previous two terms, and thus gives a unity as it were to the two separate cognitions of and व्याप्ति. This combined premise is called the परामर्श, which immediately gives rise to the conclusion and is therefore said to be its करण.

Paramarsa.

af has been said to be a combination of two dis- tinct notions, that of and am. But how is this combination effected? Not simply by placing them side by side, nor by putting them in a sentence as subject and predicate, but by joining them inseparably as faster and far or subject and attribute. The fastquare being indissoluble is the

विशेषणता सम्बन्ध closest union between two things, and consequently the perfect unity of परामर्श is attained by making व्याप्ति the विशे- षण of हेतु, that is, by making the हेतु व्याप्तिविशिष्ट. A परामर्श may therefore be defined as the knowledge not merely of व्याप्ति and हेतु but of व्याप्तिविशिष्टहेतु…

however defines sf as the knowledge of व्याप्तिविशिष्टपक्षधर्मता. Does this latter definition differ from that noted above? In other words, does are differ from what we have called the? Really not, for rear is nothing more than a particular kind of gar; or rather it is gar under particular circumstances. It is not any that

The author

Anthor’s defini-

tion.

bata a Ma

SBOT. XLIV. ]

will give rise to

Notes.

[[235]]

rest, but only such a one as besides being As a matter of fact

व्याप्तिविशिष्ट is also पक्षधर्मताविशिष्ट. a हेतु is always व्याप्तिविशिष्ट and is already stated to be so in the ear, just as in the major premise of the Aristotelian sylogism. When for instance We say यत्र यत्र धूमस्तत्र तत्र वह्निः Οι “all men are mortal,” we always lay down the invariable concomitance of and for humanity and mortality; that is we state धूम to be वह्निव्याप्यता (व्याप्ति )विशिष्ट, and मनुष्यत्व to be मर्त्यत्व- mafafare. But this alone is not sufficient to produce a new conclusion, for besides the major we also require a minor premise in which the range of is restricted, that is, we speak of it not generally as in the major premise, but in connection with a particular place or a particular occasion only. Hence in addition to being fare, the must also be qualified by another limitation, namely quıfar ( the fact of its being a property of er or place). For a proper conclusion therefore the हेतु must be व्याप्तिविशिष्ट, and must also be known as a rf residing in var; in other words it must be known to be invariably associated with the T, and must also be cognized as being in a particular place (rar). So that we have two separate cognitions respectively expressed by Aristotle’s major and minor premises, namely, that the is invariably concomitant with area and that it exists in a particular place. These separate cognitions combined together produce the joint cognition that that

which is known to be invariably concomitant with w exists in the particular place; or to take a concrete ex- ample, that the smoke which is knowu to be arra ex- ists on the mountain. This joint cognition afganga, वह्निव्याप्यधूमवान् qda: which is formed by the combination of the two in- dependent cognitions of हेतु as पक्षधर्म and as व्याप्तिविशिष्ट is called verf. Annambhatta’s definition of gerast how- ever requires some further elucidation before it can be fully understood.

Comparison of the

The preceding remarks are equally applicable to both the Aristotelian and the Naiyâyika syl- logistic systems; and they are intended to show that both systems though widely differing in their ultimate forms are really founded on identical analysis of our thinking process. The

Aristotelion with the Naiyayika syl- logism.

[[236]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

[ SEOT XLIV.

two systems materially agree with each other until we arrive at the two cognitions expressed by Aristotle in the form of major and minor premises, and by the Naiyâyikas as me and qerar respectively. But from this point they diverge, chiefly on account of their different ways of combin- ing these two cognitions; and the divergence though slight at first ultimately leads to the different forms of syllogism in the two systems. Aristotle first cognises as invaria- bly concomitant with (in the major premise), and then finds this invariably concomitant in a particular

place in the minor; that is, he first makes sure of an as a general truth, and then determines the existence of this साध्यव्याप्यहेतु on the पक्ष. The Naiyayika reverses the order, by first determining the y on var, and then joining to it the notion of invariable concomitance which being derived from past experience is remembered as soon as the is perceived on the war. In Aristotle’s system, is deter- mined first and then पक्षधर्मता ; in Nyaya first पक्षधर्मता of the हेतु is known and then the recollected notion of am is added to it. To adopt Sanskrit terminology, the combination of the two notions, i. e. the qr, is expressed in Nyaya as व्याप्तिविशिष्टपक्षधर्मता; while Aristotle would probably have described it as पक्षधर्मताविशिष्टव्याप्ति, if of course he had laid down any third premise corresponding to परामर्शवाक्य. As a matter of fact we do not find this last form in Aristotle’s syllogism, because the mixture of the two notions of me and पक्षधर्मता designated परामर्श is only implied and not ex- pressed in the Aristotelian inference. If however we introduce a premise into the latter syllogism corres- ponding to us, we shall find that it assumes exactly the form indicated above, viz. पक्षधर्मताविशिष्टव्याप्ति. Take for example:-

}

All men are mortal; Socrates is a man ;

Socrates is mortal.

A Naiyâyika will put this as :-

Humanity (gourd) is invariably concomitant with

mortality (मर्त्यत्वव्याप्यं) :

SECT. XLIV.

]

Notes.

[[237]]

There is humanity in Socrates;

… There is mortality in Socrates.

This syllogism is defective according to Nyâya, because just before the conclusion there is wanting a step combining the two premises into one proposition. This graf would be “the humanity in Socrates is invariably concomitant with mortality;” that is, we cognize aga not as mefecur generally, but as refacere in a particular individual Socrates. In other words, the surf which was first universal is here limited by पक्षधर्मता, i. e. पक्षधर्मताविशिष्टव्याप्ति. On the other hand, the same argument put in the Nyaya syllogism

would be:-

ॐ देवदत्तो मर्त्यः ( मर्त्यत्वविशिष्टः ) ।

हेतु मनुष्यत्वात् ।

उपयो यो मनुष्यः स मर्त्यत्वविशिष्टः । यथा यज्ञदत्तः ।

पत्तथा चायं देवदत्तः ( मर्त्यत्वव्याप्यमनुष्यत्वविशिष्टः ) ।

Sprachraut (Zaqui nef: ) 1

The only difference between this and former syllogism is that here in the fourth step ie परामर्श we predicate मर्त्यत्व- व्याप्यमनुष्यत्वविशिष्टत्व of देवदत्त, while in the former we predicat- ed मर्त्यत्वव्याप्यत्व of देवदत्तनिष्ठमनुष्यत्व. The result of course is the same, and the conclusion is as valid in the one as in the other syllogism.

The above distinction between the forms of the Aristotelian syllogism and Sanskrit Nyaya is no doubt rather subtle, and cannot be fully grasped by a student in a prelimi- nary stage; but it is very important as it explains the peculiar form assumed by the syllogism of the Naiyayikas. It is referred to here in order to show the exact significance of Annambhaṭṭa’s defintion of quest. The Naiyâyika grâfa is essentially based on परामर्श, and the form of परामर्श is largely

[[238]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

[ SEOT. XLIV.

due to the peculiar structure of the Nyaya syllogism. The necessity and the form of the r have been much criticized by writers imperfectly acquainted with the Nyaya .system; but the above analysis will show that is not only natural, but absolutely essential in every process of inference. Only that it must be looked at from its proper standpoint. Persons accumstomed to Aristotle’s syllogism find it difficult at first to comprehend the Nyaya theory of inference, involved as it is in endless technicalities and intri- cacies extremely puzzling to beginners. These technical- ities however are not meaningless; on the contrary they will be found on a proper examination to be the result of a deep and far-reaching analysis of our process of thinking. To understand the Indian logical method, it is quite necessary to view all its parts in their proper light. The above compa- rison of the Indian and Aristotelian syllogisms will therefore be useful as showing how both, though starting from the same common principles, differ in their outward form owing to a difference in the manner of applying those principles.

What is Anumiti,

अनुमितिः- The gist of अनुमान has been succinctly put by Keśava Miśra in the following statement, अनुमानस्य द्वे अड़े व्याप्तिः पक्षधर्मता चेति । तत्र व्याप्त्या साध्यसामान्यसिद्धिः । हेतोः पक्षधर्मताबलात् साध्यस्य पक्षधर्मत्वविशेषः सिध्यति । * This means that of the two parts of an अनुमान, व्याप्ति and पक्षधर्मता, the first proves the invariable association of wre within general, while the latter proves the same on . The inference therefore consists in proving existence of साध्य on पक्ष from that of हेतु. Väts- yāyana explains the derivation of अनुमान as मितेन लिङ्गेनार्थस्य पश्चान्मानम्, the ‘subsequent ascertaining of a thing (साध्य ) from a sign already known.† The same scholiast defines as लिङ्गलिङ्गिनोः सम्बन्धदर्शनम् : or rather प्रत्यक्षेण अप्रत्यक्षस्य सम्बन्धस्य :. The last definition is certainly the simplest, though not very accurate. It describes aga as the process by which from the perceived we get at the knowledge of an associated

T. B. Ben ed. p. 41.

Vat on. G. S. I, I, 3. Vat, on. G. S. 1, 1, 5, 【bid II, 2, 2.

SEOT. XLIV..]

Notes.

[[239]]

unperceived. It is free from some objections to which Annam- bhatta’s definition is liable. One such objection is noted and answered by T. D., namely, that the definition of eg- अनु- मिति ( परामर्शजन्यज्ञानत्वं ) would extend to संशयोत्तरप्रत्यक्ष, which too is produced by a kind of intermediate ref. When one sees indistinctly some elongated substance standing at a distance, one first doubts whether it is a post or man. Then the observer examines it carefully, and on perceiv- ing hands and feet to it he concludes that it is a man and not a post. This last conclusion ought to be an a for it is derived from a हेतु, करादिमत्त्व. We reason पुरुषत्व- विशिष्टोऽयम् । करादिमत्त्वात् । यो यः करादिमान् स स पुरुषः । यथा देव दत्तः । and so on. This would be an अनुमिति, although we usually call it erg because we actually perceive the man after the intermediate reasoning. Vatsyâyana’s definition would obviously exclude it, for here although we reason we do not infer an unperceived thing from the perceived, both and being actually perceived. The answer given by T. D. is somewhat different. Similarly there will also be अतिव्याप्ति on सविकल्पकज्ञान which is got after some sort of an unconscious process of reasoning. We first see a thing indistinctly and cognize its property piangere separately; then we infer from the latter that the thing is a jar. Similarly cognitions derived from qura and gree also fall under and are actually so included by the Vaiseshikas and Bauddhas. But we cannot include these cognitions under for they give rise to a different consciousness ( अनुव्यवसाय ) such as साक्षात्करोमि or उपमिनोमि wiile in an अनुमिति the consciousness is अनुमिनोमि. The definition of agafa is therefore faulty, in as much as it applies to cognitions that are not aga. T. D. gives one answer to both this and the former objection, viz. that although there is परामर्श in संशयोत्तरप्रत्यक्ष, it is not accompanied by qerar which is a necessary condition of an

अनुमान

[[240]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

[ SEOT. XLIV.

inference. It is therefore necessary to understand what पक्षता really signifies.

Pakshatâ.

पक्ष

An inference has been already described as the application of a general truth to a particular instance. When we infer that Socrates is mortal, we simply realize in Socrates that property of mortality which we already know generally as being invariably associated with humanity. This particular instance is called rg and may be an in- dividual, a substance, a place or any other thing, of which an inferrible property can be predicated. gar is the characteristic which distinguishes the qr for the time being, from other things of the same or of different nature. Thus any mountain is not qr, but it becomes one as soon as we observe smoke on it, and desire to infer fire there- from.: पक्ष is first defined as सिद्ध्यभाववान्, ‘possessing the non-ascertainment of a thing,’ that is, having on it a thing (ere) which is unascertained but which is to be inferred. Why not then simply say are rar, rather than saying सिद्ध्यभाववान् पक्षः : Because although the पक्ष, as a mountain for instance, may have fire on it, we do not know it at first. In the beginning we simply know that the fire is not ascertained, that is, we know of the non-ascer- tainment of the साध्य (सिद्ध्यभाव); but not of the साध्य itself. Where fire is actually perceived its existence is ascertained and there is no knowledge of non-ascertainment, and conse- quently no erat. But suppose we desire to infer fire from smoke even though we know of its existence from another source. There is no far here, but the inference would be still valid. In a qurigere again there is already previously ascertained by the speaker; and so if qaar were

पक्षता simply defined as few all such inferences would be excluded. The ascertainment (f), therefore, the absence of which constitutes qera, is qualified as being that which is accompanied by सिषाधयिषाविरह ’ absence of any desire to infer.’ The compound fra: is to be dissolved 28 सिषाधयिषाविरहसहकृता या सिद्धिः तस्या अभावः, and not ‘सहकृतो यः fargene:; that is, for year there is required not only anSECT. XLIV. ]

Notes.

[[241]]

absence of सिद्धि, but also an absence of सिषाधयिषाविरह, or rather the absence of a सिद्ध which is सिषाधयिषाविरहसहकृत. In

● परार्थानुमान or in the case above mentioned where fire though actually perceived is sought to be proved by infer- ence, although there is the f, it is not accompanied by सिषाधयिषाविरह ; and consequently there is still an अभाव of such a सिद्धि as is सिषाधयिषाविरहसहकृत.

This latter अभाव

results from the non-existence of either of its constituents ( viz. ferarufaanfae or far), and exists both where there is no f as in an ordinary gera, and also, where there is सिद्धि but there is no सिषाधयिषाविरह, ie where there is

i. e. fr. Of the two conditions therefore mentioned above, namely, non-ascertainment of area and a desire to infer, either may suffice to constitute पक्षता. In & संशयोत्तरप्रत्यक्ष there is no such rar, because the man and his perceived simultaneously there is no tained and also no desire to infer it.

पक्षता

being

rear left to be ascer- The above definition of ear which is taken by Annambhatta from Tattva-Chin- tamani of Gangesa is the most common one; but it is open to an objection. When a man in the interior of the house hears a loud noise in the sky, he at once concludes it to be thunder. This is undoubtedly an inference, but there is no Tarar according to the above definition, because there is no far, the ascertainment of thunder instantly following. the hearing of the sound; nor is there any ff on the part of the hearer, as there is no sufficient interval between the hearing and the fra for such a desire to arise. The whole operation is instantaneous and almost involuntary. Annambhatta’s definition would have the effect of excluding such inferences from the class of ega. Nor can they be

, because the hearer being in the interior of the house. never sees the clonds. Hence N. B. on Sect. 51, having stated the objection, remarks: प्राची लक्षणं विहाय नवीनैरनुमि- त्युद्देश्यत्वं पक्षत्वमिति स्थिरीकृतम्. This new definition of पक्षता adopted by the moderns in preference to the one accepted by Annambhatta is अनुमित्युद्देश्यत्वम् or अनुमितिप्रयोजनकत्वम्, which being very wide is not likely to exclude any thing.

[[31]]

[[242]]

Tarka-Sangraka.

[SHOT, XLIV.

As regards the time-honoured definition it is necessary to add a remark of S. M. सिषाधयिषाविरहकाले यादृशसिद्धिसत्त्वे- नानुमितिस्तादृशी सिद्धिर्विशिष्य तत्तदनुमितिप्रतिबन्धिका वक्तव्या,

that is, the ascertainment spoken of must be of the particular sert intended in the inference, so that although one might have ascertained fire upon a mountain from light, he should not be further debarred from inferring the same fire from smoke. In Sect. 51 further on Tar is defined as diferererezata, ‘a thing on which the existence of area is doubted; but the definition does not differ from the one given above as the word e implies both the absence off and the presence of सिषाधयिषा f

Paksha-dharmată.

•

qerasfar.-gerar being thus determined, it will be com- paratively easy for the student to under- stand qgraefar the knowledge of which is said to constitute qraf. It is defined as ( हेतोः ) पक्षवृत्तित्वम् + or पक्षसम्बन्धः ( V. V. ) ’ the residence of on yer;’ but this does not convey the idea accurately. There are many things on the mountain such as trees and stones, but smoke alone is called agraf because smoke alone leads to the inference of fire in the particular case. There may be other things such as light or burnt-up ashes which may equally conduce to an inference of fire; but they are ir- relevant in an inference from smoke, and so are not rundt. Again as all things on the mountain are not que, so all smoke in the world is not also graf, although the whole of it be age. Only that particular line of smoke which is seen issuing from the top of the mountain is graf, because the knowledge of that alone is effective in giving an infer- ence of fire on the mountain. All our previous knowledge about the invariable concomitance of smoke and fire will avail us nothing if we do not observe a particular r

S. M. Calo, ed. p. 69.

For further remarks see Note on Sect. 51 infra.

B. P. 69.

SHOT. XLIV. ]

Notes.

[[243]]

on the top of the mountain. This is the reason, as has been already pointed out, why qraf is defined as the knowledge of quar, and not that of merely; for it is not any smoke but smoke when cognized as a f of the gr that produces egna. Nor is it sufficient to .cognize smoke on any mountain, but the cognition must take place on a mountain which is a qr, that is, which possesses the rear as above defined. Hence far may be fully defined as पक्षतावच्छेदकावच्छिन्नविषयता which is paraphrased as सिषाध- सिद्ध्यभावरूपा या पक्षता तस्या अवच्छेदकं यत्पर्वतत्वं तेनावच्छिन्न विषयो यस्य स धूमस्तत्ता, ’ the smoke as conditioned by the mountain which determines in this case the sphere of agrar.’ The knowledge of smoke so conditioned leads to eat when additionally qualified by a knowledge of the व्याति. व्याप्ति विशिष्टपक्षधर्मताज्ञानम् cannot be dissolved, says Mitakantha, ag व्याप्तिविशिष्टे या पक्षधर्मता तस्य ज्ञानम्, ’ cognition of पक्षधर्मता in a smoke that is already known to be afr.’ This would accord with Aristotle’s method, as has been already pointed out, which first states the sun in the major premiss, and then realizes it in the thing denoted by the minor term; but such a dissolution, says Nilakantha, would exclude an inference of the kind which is always based on ક contrary negative concomitance, and in which the agrafar belongs not to the thing which is enarrare but to it contradictory. The compound therefore must be taken as a कर्मधारय, being dissolved व्याप्तिविशिष्टं च तत्पक्षधर्मताज्ञानं च, know- ledge of पक्षधर्मता as qualified by the ( knowledge of ) व्याप्ति ’ Mere knowledge of veraar is obtained by perception when one sees the line of smoke on the mountain-top, but it alone does not produce अनुमिति. It becomes परामर्श when combined with a knowledge of व्याप्ति after व्याप्तिस्मरण. Hence the remark of T. D. व्याप्तिविषयकं यत्पक्षधर्मताज्ञानम्. Technically expressed व्याप्ति is not a विशेषण of पक्षधर्म ( smoke ), but & प्रकार of the again it is a property of the perceptive knowledge of smoke on the mountain, and not a quality of the smoke

[[244]]

Tarka–Sangraha.

BHOT. XLTE

itself. The reason is obvious. zu is a subjective conception, not a material quality residing in an external object such as smoke. धूम itself cannot therefore be व्याप्तिविशिष्ट, but धूमज्ञान can be व्याप्त्यवच्छिन्नप्रकारतानिरूपित. Hence the complete definition of परामर्श is व्याप्त्यवच्छिन्नप्रकारतानिरूपित–पक्षतावच्छेदकावच्छिन्न- विशेष्यताशाली निश्वयः (Nil.). This परामर्श is illustrated in the cognition बह्निव्याप्यधूमवान् पर्वतः, which always precedes the egreta ‘qdar aigua.

English equiva-

lents.

There is no English word which can convey the exact notion of q. Ballantyne trans- lates it by logical antecedent’ but the rendering is not appropriate. The expres- sion ’logical datum’ is also not very happy as it implies- that of is an assumption made to serve a logical purpose, and is not a necessary step in every natural process of thinking. The word er af etymologically means consideration, but the latter word does not convey the full idea of erf as used by the Naiyayikas. It is however issued by Roer and Max- Müller,, and I have adopted it for want of a better one. For ergrama I have adopted the term Judgment on the authority of Whately, while its instrument the agar is denoted by Inference. s is invariable concomitance’, and not ‘pervading inherence’ as Roer renders it, because it is not an inhering attribute of a material object, but a relation of the notions of two things. There is a difficulty about the proper rendering of var. It is not correct to translate Tr by ‘minor term’, as Roer and others probably misled by notions of Aristotelian logic, have done. Minor term would be a proper equivalent for, and not for gr itself. The rendering of ar by subject’ is perhaps better, as qer like Aristotle’s minor term is the subject in the conclusion, but it also is liable to misapprehension.

MENSION •

I have therefore contented myself with the ordinary word

[[6]]

place to express the idea of ar. For the same reason it is misleading though not positively incorrect to translate

Whately Elements of Logic Bk. ii, Ch. 1, 1.

SHOT. XLIV. ]

[[6]]

Notes.

[[245]]

’ middle term,’ as some have done. हेतु or rather हेतुवाक्य, as a part of the five-membered syllogism, can best be render- ed by ‘reason,’ and corresponds to minor premiss, while can be translated by sign. Terms of the formal syl- logism ought not to be indiscriminately applied to things which form part of the previous process of thinking. The same caution is required in applying other terms derived from European logic to their Sanskrit counterparts.

व्याप्तिः -The word व्याप्ति is perhaps the most difficult as it is also the most important term occurring in connection with the subject of inference. and has been translated as

Vyapti.

ma is to valid. We involved in

€

invariable concomitance; and the author defines it in the text save: (invariability of concomitance) which means the same.

But what does concomitance mean, and what does its invariability signify? The illustration (enter) of व्याप्ति,

Wherever there is sinoke there is fire, gives no doubt some idea of this invariable concomitance, but it does not furnish us with a sure test as to how be found out and under what conditious it is must therefore further analyze the two notions * व्याप्ति, viz. that of साहचर्य • co-existence ’ or • concomi- tance,’ and that of universality or rather the invari- ability ’ of this साहचर्य. साहचर्य is the सामानाधिकरण्य, Co- existence in one and the same place, of and wrer; and when this coexistence of one thing with another is observed wherever the other thing exists, the ad is called fava ( fauna adari ) or invariable, and the thing so found co- existing is said to be of the other thing. Thus fire is always found where smoke exists, and is therefore of ; while as smoke is not always observed along with fire as in a red-hot iron-ball, smoke is not the ear of a. There is no doubt a am between fire and smoke, but the uma is of fire on smoke, and not vice versa; for fire, besides existing in all places occupied by smoke, exists in others

[[246]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

SBOT. XLIV.

where there is no smoke, and is thus more extensive. The

therefore not only means co-existence or concomitance, but also involves the idea, of a greater extent. A aura is generally greater in extent than the area, though not neces- sarily so; for in the exceptional case where both may be co-extensive, both are ear and s of each other. To cover this exceptional case Noiyayikas detine su simply as invariable co-existence, which is of course found both when the rear is greater than or equal in extent to the साधन.

The words extent and extensive are ambiguous as they are likely to be misunderstood in the sense of volume such as bulk or quantity or area.

Thus a field of 20 acres would be said to be more extensive than another of 10 acres as it would include the latter and would still leave some of its parts unoccupied; but it is not

in the

sense in which the term is used in Nyaya. This will be clear by another example. Of the two sums of 100 and 50 rupees respectively, the larger obviously includes the smaller, but a Naiyayika would call the smaller sum the of the larger, because it is found in a greater number of places than the other. The number fifty exists wherever there is the hundred, and in many other places besides, e. g. where there are numbers between fifty and hundred. If, for instance, we bring together twenty people having salaries above fifty, of whom only five get hundred rupees or more, the sum of hundred occurs in five instances only, while that of fifty is found in twenty. Fifty invariably co- exists with hundred, but not vice versa; and hence the Nai- yayikas would say that fifty is the surge and hundred 1 the व्याप्य सङ्ख्या. Any inference from hundred as a हेतु to fifty as a re, such as A has fifty cows because he was seen with a hundred, would therefore be valid, so far as ma is concerned. Of course these being immediate inferences, they may not perhaps be called deductions proper, but the व्याप्ति is true all the same. Tq therefore, though primarily involving the ideas of extension and inclusion, is often the opposite of them; for it is not

SECT. ILIV.

Notes.

247-

the bigness of the thing itself, but the number of instances in which it is found that makes it व्यापक. Hence व्याप्ति is defined in terms of co-existence or concomitance, and not as extension or pervasion.

Except in the rare case where and we are co- extensive, ma is a unilateral relation between them; that

व्याप्ति is, if any two things are taken, one of them is at once deter- mined to be the व्यापक of the other, and their व्याप्यव्यापकभाव does not vary so long as the two things are taken in the same sense and with the same qualifications. The reaf far is therefore the invariable co-existence of sary with the and not vice versa; and as in a valid inference, the साध्य must always be the व्यापक of हेतु, that is, must be more extensive than or at least co-extensive with the the definition of sun in T. S. must obviously be taken in a limited sense. This limitation is fully brought out in the enlarged definition of व्याप्ति given by T. D., हेतुसमानाधिकरणा- त्यन्ताभावाप्रतियोगिसाध्य सामानाधिकरण्यम्, which is explained by Nilakantha thus : वह्निमान् धूमादित्यादौ (सद्धेतौ ) धूमसमानाधिकरणो योऽत्यन्ताभावः (घटात्यन्ताभावः ) तदप्रतियोगी (बह्निः), तत्सामानाधि- करण्यै धूमेऽस्ति इति कृत्वा लक्षणसमन्वयः । The सामानाधिकरण्य, ac- cording to this definition, is of the are on the a, . e. of the व्यापक on the व्याप्य. But how do we know that the साध्य is the TT? To clear this doubt a qualification is added

व्यापक to the r, that it must be a thing which is not a counter- entity (maarfi) of any absolute negation ( i. e. an absolute. negation of anything) co-existing with the Smoke for instance can co-exist with the अत्यन्ताभाव of घट, or पट, or in fact of every thing that is not necessarily associated with it; and hence those things are counter-entities of while fire is not so, because there can be no smoke in the absence of fire. The expression समानाधिकरणात्यन्ताभावाप्रति- योगि is nothing but a paraphrase of the word नियम which occurs in T. S., for the invariable presence of a thing is the same as the absence of its co-existent negation. Com- mentators however are not satisfied even with this circum-

[[248]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

SEOT. XLIV..

locution, for there is still a doubt as to whether the and grey are all things denoted by the words or only in- dividual things referred to on particular occasions; or in other words, whether the smoke said to be are is smoke in general, or the particular gr observed on the mountain. That the former meaning is to be taken is made clear by the insertion of the word

; and the definion is thus enlarged: हेतुसमानाधिकरणात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगितानवच्छेदक- साध्यतावच्छेदकावच्छिन्न - साध्यसमानाधिकरणवृत्ति हेतुतावच्छेदकत्वम् ( N. ). व्याप्ति is thus a धर्म of हेतु ( हेतुतावच्छेदक ), residing (a) in a thing co-existent with a reer that is distinguish- ed (अवच्छिन्न ) by an अवच्छेदकधर्म (वह्नित्व) which characterizes the area ( i, e. resides in the Fre), but does not pertain to * प्रतियोगि ( प्रतियोगितानबच्छेदक ) of any of the ( countless) ab solute negations coexisting with (w). This frightful periphrases is intended to signify nothing more than that the aqua lies between the generalities of fire and smoke and not between the individual and ; that is, fire is the care of smoke as fire in general, and not as a particular fire in the kitchen or the hearth.

Various defini- tions of Vyapti.

Before adverting to the question how this an is known, it may be useful to consider a few definitions of sana, given by other writers, in order to further elucidate the Naiyâyika notion of suma, as well as to indicate briefly the general character and drift of the endless controversies carried on about it. There is in fact no other single topic in the Nyaya philosophy, which has evoked such an amount of subtle hair-splitting from scholastic dispuntants, as the definition of ear. Whole works have been written for the purpose of settling a correct definition, and every writer of some pretensions has endeavoured to start a separate sohool ad- vocating a particular definition. Viśvanatha gives two definitions of a of which he prefers the second. He first defines व्याप्ति as साध्यवदन्यस्मिन्नसम्बन्ध : ’ absence of the हेतु on any thing except the one having साध्य.

But this

• B. P. 67.

SKOT. XLIV. ]

Notes.

器

[[249]]

definition is अव्याप्त as it does not apply in a केवलान्वयि अनुमान, such as इदं वाच्यं ज्ञेयत्वात्, where वाच्यत्व and ज्ञेयत्व being pro- perties of all knowable things, there is no object that can be called साध्यवदन्य, and hence व्याप्ति in such cases cannot be known. Consequently this definition of the ancients is abandoned by modern writers. The other definition of Viscanatha is हेतुमन्निष्टविरहाप्रतियोगिसाध्यैकाधिकरण्यम which is identical with the one given by T. D., amater cor- responding to हेतुसमानाधिकरणात्यन्ताभाव Here also, as in T. D’s definition, the area is to be understood as inñaragsbee and arevarades. † Again the TIGHTERUT is to be by the same सम्बन्ध such as either समवाय or संयोग. Otherwise fire not residing in the parts of smoke by intimate union will not be

or with it. Now, an objector may ask, will not the definition be inapplicable to an inference like अयं कपिसंयोगी, एतदृक्षत्वाद । where संयोग being an अव्याप्यवृत्ति गुण, both it and its अभाव are समानाधिकरण with the

वृक्षत्व of the tree? The answer is no, because it is a rule that अभाव and its प्रतियोगी are never एकाधिकरण. In this way rival disputants go on starting and answering objections, most of which are technical and scarcely add to the know- ledge of the student.

15 व्याप्ति is divided into two sorts, अन्वयव्याप्ति and व्यतिरेक- aan, of which the first again is of two Kinds of Vyápti. kinds, पूर्वपक्षव्याप्ति and सिद्धान्तसिद्धव्याप्ति + अन्वयव्याप्ति is the one already explained, where साध्य has नियतसाहचर्य with हेतु. Its two sub-divisions पूर्व- the grammar and fargrafagena seem to be invented chiefly for dialectical purposes, and are of uo scientific value. Each of these classes comprises a number of definitions arranged on a system of gradation, the simpler preceding the more difficult. Of these the

genes are comparatively few and simple; but the other class comprises those on

P. B. 68.

† See p. 35 1. 4 and the preceding Note 13 on p. 248. Supra,

1 B. P. 141-3.

[[32]]

[[250]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

[ SEÓT. XLIV.

which Indian schoolmen like Raghunatha and Gadadhara have exhausted their whole dialectical ingenuity. The class of gaugemas comprises in all twenty one definitions, of which five form one group called groft, fourteen another group called groft, and the last two are independent, having the quaint names

and gr respectively. The five definitions in q together with the last two being,

like the first of Viśvanátha noticed above, based on the or अभाव of साध्य do not apply to केवलान्वाये inferences, and are accepted only by the school of Gangesa. The fourteen definitions comprising groft are applicable to all the three kinds of inferences, as they are based on the doctrine that things might be as well defined by properties they do not possess as by those they do. The doctrine was first enunciated by Saundadopadhyaya, and is technically known as व्यधिकरणधर्माविच्छिन्नाभाव. These details are quite sufficient to frighten away an ordinary student from the tangled web of dialectic subtility, named are, that has been woven round the broad and quite intelligible rule, नियतसाहचर्य

:. Annambhatta has wisely kept clear of all this mass of superfluous refinement by contenting himself with a simple definition suited to a manual for beginners.

Anvaya-vyâpti and Vyatireka- vy-apti.

and

The other kind of व्याप्ति is व्यतिरेकव्याप्ति and is the con- verse of the अन्वयव्याप्ति. व्यतिरेकव्याप्ति is ex- plained by S. C. as व्यतिरेकः साध्याभावहेत्व- भावयोः साहचर्यम् तत्प्रयोज्या (व्यतिरेकेण ) व्याप्तिः- Every अन्वयव्याप्ति has a व्यतिरेकव्याप्ति corres- ponding to it, because if qarqara exists between

TE,it must also exist between their negations taken in the in- verse order. Thus if the propositionYA YA YAWE JE uf: is true, its converse यत्र यत्र बन्ह्यभावस्तत्र तत्र धूमाभावः must also be true. The difference between the two is that while in अन्नय व्याप्ति, साध्य is व्यापक and हेतु व्याप्य in a व्यतिरेकव्याप्ति the हेत्वभाव becomes व्यापक, and are becomes art. In other words the premise stands as if we are actually inferring धूमाभाष, from बन्ह्यभाव. It is clearSHOT. XLIV. ]

Notes.

[[251]]

therefore that the same proposition यत्र बन्ह्यभावस्तत्रधूमाभाव would be व्यतिरेकव्याप्ति if the resulting अनुमिति is पर्वतो वह्निमान् and would be an अन्वयव्याप्ति if the अनुमिति is पर्वतो धूमाभाववान्, the in the latter case being are. Udayana according- ly defines व्यतिरेकव्याप्ति as साध्याभावव्यापकीभूताभावप्रतियोगित्वम्, which Visvanātha puts in simple language “साध्याभावव्यापकत्वं हेत्वभावस्य यद्भवेत्. * There is much difference of opinion about व्यतिरेकव्याप्ति, which will be noticed when we come to the व्यतिरेकि अनुमान; but it may be remarked here that according to many Indian scholastics, and according to European logicians generally, व्यतिरेकव्याप्तेि is not a different व्याप्ति but a mere restatement of the array obtained by a sort of conver- sion of the major premise. The process however is not simple conversion, but corresponds to what Prof. Bain calls Obverted Conversion or Contraposition. The predicate in a Universal Affirmative proposition being always more ex- tensive than the subject, it requires to be either limited or obverted when the proposition is converted. Hence the con- version of an A proposition always requires two processes first Obversion and then Conversion. Obversion is the denial of the predicate, while Conversion is the transposition of the subject and the predicate. Thus to give Prof. Bain’s own example of the Obvertive Conversion of an A proposition,†

All X is Y

gives by Obversion

No X is not-Y

which by simple Conversion ( of E ) is

Or,

No not-Y is X.

All men are mortal;

by Obr. No men are immortal;

by Cono.No immortals are men.

Now let us put the Nydya stock instance into the general form All X is Y, and we shall see how the same process gives us its व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिः-

B. P. 142.

† Bain: Deductive Logic, p. 116.

[[252]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

SHOT. XLIV.

यो यो धूमवान् स स बह्निमान् = All smoking things are fiery;

By Obe. =यो यो धूमवान्

- - ECURIERI No smoking things are non-fiery;

स न

By Cone. =यो यो बन्ह्यभाववान

स स न मवान Or

यो यो वन्ह्यभाववाद स धूमाभाववान

No non-fiery things are

smoking.

It will be thus seen that à fa is only a repeti- tion of the syna in another form of language, and con- sequently no change is made in the nature of the proof or in the अनुमिति by its substitution for the अन्वयव्याप्ति. Sometimes and especially in a drearतिरेकि inference where अन्वयव्याप्ति cannot be had it is very useful, and hence it has been re- cognized as a distinct species.

परार्थ

SECT. XLV. arð qod a

Inference is of two kinds:- One’s Own and Another’s. Of these One’s Own is the source of one’s own inference. Since a man having himself ascertained by frequent observation the generalization, wherever there is smoke there is fire as in a kitchen, approaches a mountain, and suspecting fire thereon and seeing smoke on the mountain, remembers the generalization, wherever there is smoke there is fire. Then the knowledge is produced that the mountain has smoke accompanied by fire. This is called Consideration. Thence arises the inference viz. the knowledge that mountain is fiery. This is One’s Own inference. When, however, after inferring fire from smoke oneself, a five-membered syllogism is employed to enlighten another person, it is Another’s inference: e, g. Mountain is fiery, because it smokes; whatever smokes is fiery, as a kitchen; this is so; hence this is fiery. By this means even another man apprehends fire from a sign (so) propounded.

Inference for one- self and for an- other.

ed mologically ref and

The division of a into ref and r, though not found in the aphorisms of Gotama or Kand- da is considerably old, being first mention- in Prasastapâda’s scholium. Ety- ref respectively mean what is intend- ed for oneself and what is for another ( स्वस्य परस्य वा अर्थः प्रयो ad awara aa ); but they can be better named informal and formal, or primary and secondary respectively. Fanyigara is useful for removing one’s own doubt, while grafgaar is employed when a conviction is sought to be produced in the mind of another. refer therefore presupposes

SHOT. XLV. ]

Notes.

[[253]]

on the

and is based upon a carefgara, for one man cannot con- vince another without being first convinced himself. The distinction between the two is founded presumption that as in a refgure we deal with pre- mises immediately known to us and derived from our own experience, we do not require them to be stated with exact formality, while in a verfew, the premises which are discovered by one man and imparted to another through the medium of language are liable to be misunderstood or misconstrued, and therefore require to be stated with precision. The speaker cannot express himself fully and clearly, or the hearer may be incapable of comprehending his meaning, or he may be misled by his own pre-conceived notions, or the words used may be ambiguous or incorrect, too general or too narrow in sense. There is in fact a greater likelihood of what we call fallacies of language being commit- ted and other fallacies being disguised in a qyref than in a स्वार्थ caref ergara; and hence the condition is laid down in the

अनुमानः former that each proposition must be stated in a prescribed form. The etymological sense of the two words has therefore merged into the later and more intelligible distinction between the two kinds of inference, namely, that qqufgera is syllogistic or formal, and ref is the opposite of it. N. B. defines them as न्यायप्रयोज्यं and न्यायाप्रयोज्यं respectively, meaning that ra or syllogism is essential to a qref but not to a fare egara. Similarly Dharmottaráchârya, the commentator on Nyúya-Bindu, remarks quofgard petarė i स्वार्थानुमानं तु ज्ञानात्मकमेव । * Praśastapāda also says पञ्चावयवेन वाक्येन स्वनिश्चितार्थप्रतिपादनं परार्थानुमानम् ।

Of the two kinds the term a is properly applica- ble to the स्वार्थ only for it is the real करण of अनुमिति. Whether we take the अनुमितिकरण to be लिङ्गज्ञान, व्याप्तिज्ञान or परामर्शज्ञान, it is undoubtedly ज्ञानात्मक as the स्वार्थ is, while परार्थ being शब्दात्मक should naturally fall under शब्दप्रमाण. But परार्थानुमान is included under अनुमान for the sake of con- venience. The explanation given by the author of Nyaya- Bindu is कारणे कार्योपचारात, ’the word अनुमान is used in a second-

Nyáya-Bindu-Tiko Bibl. Ind. p. 21. † P. B. ed. p. 251.

[[254]]

Tarha-Sangraha..

Ì SHOT. XLV.

ary sense to denote परार्थ which is बचनात्मक because the बच्चन (syllogism) is the cause of conveying to the hearer’s mind लिङ्गज्ञान which is the real अनुमान.’ The अनुमिति in a परार्था- तुमान is the notion पर्वतो बहिमान generated in the hearer’s mind. This notion is not conveyed to him directly by words as in शाब्दबोध, but he is made to infer it from a previous notion similarly conveyed by words वह्निव्याप्यधूमवान् पर्वतः This latter notion exactly corresponds to the qerasf in a tarugere, and is likewise & combination of व्याप्ति and पक्षधर्म- ताज्ञान. Hence the definition of अनुमिति, viz. परामर्शजन्यं ज्ञानम applies to a vicarious (परार्थ) judgment as much as to an original (ref) one. The real gear of this qerefafara is then the notion of परामर्श or व्याप्ति or लिङ्ग as comprehended by the hearer; but we have no knowledge of this notion except through the air or syllogism which produced it. Hence the अनुमितिकरure which really belongs to the notion in the mind of the listener is attributed to its cause the पञ्चाaraatक्य by a sort of लक्षणा : उपचार. Nilakantha therefore remarks:- raft परार्थामानशब्दस्य परस्य मध्यस्थस्यार्थः प्रयोजनं साध्यानुमितिरूपं यस्मादितिव्युत्पश्या परसमवेतानुमितिकरणलिङ्गपरामर्शोऽर्थः । अतएव स्वार्था- नुमिति परार्थातुमित्योर्लिङ्गपरामर्श एवं करणमित्याद्यग्रिममूलमपि साधु सङ्ग- च्छते । तथापि परार्थानुमानप्रयोजके पञ्चावयववाक्ये परार्थानुमानशब्दस्योप- चारिकः प्रयोग इति मनसिकृत्य मूलमवतारयति. Nilakantha means that the author is not inconsistent in calling here the पञ्चा- arcartr the परार्थानुमान, and again in stating subsequently that लिङ्गपरामर्श is the करण of both स्वार्थ and परार्थ अनुमिति, because the use of the word verigar to denote the syllogism is only secondary. Except in this one particular, both kinds of inferences agree in all respects, and the same rules and conditions apply to both equally. The distinction between the two is useful for no other purpose than to emphasize the fact that,though in practice the syllogistic form, .e. the rafgara, absorbs almost all our attention owing to its being subject to rules of logic, the mental process called स्वार्थानुमान, whether’ original or induced by words in the hearer’s mind, constitutes

SEOT. XLV. ]

Notes.

[[255]]

the real inferential operation. Practically every mental operation can be clothed in words, while on the other hand every syllogism presupposes a mental inference; so both are one, or rather they form two parts of the same process of inference. Consequently Aristotle takes account of syllogism only, ignoring the rear altogether, and the Naiyâyikas also have done the same. Prof. Max Müller is therefore totally wrong when he remarks:– “What is called by Annambhatta the conclusion for one- self, corresponds totidem verbis with the first form of Aristotle’s syllogism. What is called the conclusion for others seems more irregular on account of its five members, and of the additional instances which seem to vitiate the syllogism.” It appears that Prof. Max Müller like many other Western scholars failed to understand the real signi- ficance of the division of ref and teref.

Annambħaṭṭa gives a circumstantial and fairly accurate description of the process by which we first, infer fire on a smoking mountain, and then communicate our knowledge to another in the same order. We first observe smoke on the mountain, then suspect that there is fire, and then re- member the व्याप्तिः at last joining this व्याप्तिस्मरण with the qgruffarara got by actual perception, we obtain the complex परामर्श denoted by वह्निव्याप्यधूमवान् पर्वतः. This परामर्श is variously called लिङ्गपरामर्श or तृतीयलिङ्गपरामर्श. S. C. explains the former term as व्याप्तिबलेन लीनमर्थं गमयतीति लिङ्गं तच धूमादि- स्तस्य परामर्शो ज्ञानविशेषः ’ knowledge of लिङ्ग in the peculiar form defined as a परामश ’ It is also called तृतीयलिङ्गपरामर्श because it is the last of the three cognitions of smoke that are requisite for the inference of fire. The first cognition is the knowledge of smoke as associated with fire in the kitchen room (me); the second is the perceptive knowledge of smoke on the mountain; and the third is the complex and derived knowledge of the same smoke as invariably concomitant with fire. This qf necessarily

Thomson’s Laws of Thought Appendix p. 293. † S. C. loc. cit. and T. K. Bom. ed.

P. 10-1.

[[256]]

Tarka-Sungraha.

स्वार्थानुमिति-

[ XLV.

gives birth to rafft. When this process is put in the form of a syllogism for the edification of another it be- comes परार्थानुमान-

Other divisions of inference.

There are however other classifications of ear which are based on real distinctions. Gotama divides अनुमान into three kinds: – पूर्ववत्, शेषवत् and सामान्यतो दृष्ट. * This division appears to be the most ancient as well as the most generally accepted. पूर्ववत् is पूर्व कारणं तद्वत्, कारणलिङकमित्यर्थः ’ reason- ing from cause to effect,’ as an inference from the appearance of thick clouds that a shower of rain will ensue, because f clouds are known to eanse rain. शेषवत् is शेषः कार्ये तद्वत्

कार्यलिङ्गकं यथा नदीच्या दृष्ट्यनुमानम्, an inference of a past shower of rain from the overflow of the river, because the latter is known to be the effect of the former. BrAreaði zg comprises all other inferences that are neither from cause to effect nor from effect to canse. Vatsyayana adds another interpretation of the words. according to which the distinc- tive marks of the three varieties differ slightly. Accord- ing to this second interpretation,† gefa is an inference from a precedent, i. e., an inference of one from the other of two things that were formerly observed to be closely asso- ciated together. The ordinary inference of fire on the mountain from smoke, and in fact all deductions proper are of this kind. is the inference by elimination, i. e. the determination of an object to be something because it is not any other thing, just as sound is proved to be a quality because though a product it is neither substance nor action. Te is the deduction of the nature of an invisible thing from a general law previously known, such as the law of causality. Soul for instance is invisible, but its existence is proved by the necessity that and other qualities must reside in a substance according to the

*G. S. I, 1, 5,

† Vat, on G. S. I, 1, 5.

SBOT. XLV. ]

*Notes.

[[257]]

general law that every quality must have a substratum. wara ge is thus in one sense opposed to qua, the latter, as Váchaspati remarks, being reasquetaraf qy, while the former is अदृष्टस्वलक्षणसामान्यविषय. * पूर्ववत् is the inference of an object whose peculiar property (gu), which is also the common characteristic (rare) of its class such as the बह्नित्व of बह्नि, is previously observed (a), while the स्वलक्षण of an

invisible object inferred by maredat ze is never perceived. Váchaspati classes these two kinds under one head, fargar, that is, an inference through an affirmative generalization (अन्वयव्याप्ति); while शेपवत् differs from them both in being based on a negative generalization (sulatescuma).

Another division of अनुमान is into three kinds केवला- न्याय, केवलव्यतिरेकि and अन्वयव्यतिरेकि, the fundamentum divisionis being the affirmative or negative character of the rather of the surfa. A judgment derived from an saft g or * व्यतिरेकि हेतु alone is केवलान्वयि or केवलव्यतिरेकि, while one to which both kinds of gare applicable is u or अन्वयव्यतिरेकि. arvageafates. The difference between this classification and the former one is that while the former is based partly on the nature of the conclusion or agafa, aud partly on the mode of reasoning employed, the latter is entirely based on the character of the org. The distinction of अन्वय and व्यतिरेक portains to the हेतु alone, and not to the resulting judgment which is the same whether derived from an अन्वयि or a व्यतिरेकि हेतु- Anambhatta therefore very properly treats this last classification as a division of लिङ्ग and not that of अनुमान. f The first classification also seems to have rather gone out of fashion with the modern school of Naiyâyikas, owing probably to its vagueness and want of a common principle of division. The distinction between ref and ref inferences was probably invented by the Vaiseshikas.
Prasastapāda sub-divides ref erg into and

Sankhya-T. K. p. 16.

† See Sect. 48, Notes 3 & 4 p. 237. Infra.

[[33]]

[[258]]

ཐ

Tarka-Sangraha.

[ SBOT. XLV.

ararat fy, the difference between the two being that, in the inferred thing is exactly of the same kind as its prototype, as when we infer a cow from our previous know- ledge of cows having dew-laps, while in grarea reza property is inferred in a thing from its observation in a quite different kind of thing, as causality is inferred in dead matter because it is observed in animals. There is probably a confusion of ideas here, for the illustration of eg is more like a case of forevere or a mere स्मरण than an inference proper, while the example of the second is only a particular application of the general method of inference as described above.

Induction in the Nyaya system.

Having noticed the different kinds of agar mentioned by Sanskrit writers, it will be useful to compare these classifications with those of Aristotle and the modern European logicians. The most obvious defect in the Nyây system and one that has been chiefly dwelt upon by its European critics is the non-recognition of anything corresponding to what we now call inductive reasoning. The same objection formed the gist of Lord Bacon’s indictment against Aristotle and the logic of medieval schoolmen; but a closer study of Aristotle’s work has now shown that he did not actually ignore induction but attached less importance to it than we are prone to do now. The same thing is true of the Nyâya system. Like Aristotle, Naiyayikas were aware of the inductive method, but considered it as subservient to the purposes of deduction which was the agar proper. Every deduction is based on a generalization, and this generalization is obtained by an accumulation of particular instances by a process known as induction. A Naiyayika would therefore value induction only as a means for discovering a which is necessary for a proper . How then is this Induction

treated of in the Nyaya system? To get an answer to this question we must consider the Naiyayika doctrine as to how a ama is obtained.

*P. B. Ben. ed. p. 205,

#BÓT. XLV. ]

Notes.

[[259]]

It will be remembered that

Vyapti.

was defined as fa-

साहचर्य of हेतु and साध्य; and the exact meaning of this phrase was also explain-

ed. But how are we to make ourselves sure of this fun? What is in fact the means of arriv- ing at, and the test of determining this invariability of concomitance? Annambhuṭṭa supplies the answer to this question in Sec. 45. In describing arfgara he says that surf is obtained by repeated observation of the association of fire with smoke, or in other words by the accumulation of numerous instances in which this association is found. But this would certainly not suffice to give us a valid sama. Observation of a fact, repeated howsoever often, is no guarantee against the possibility of the existence of a contrary fact. We may observe the association of fire and smoke in ninty nine cases, but we cannot from thence conclude that it must exist in the hundredth case also. It is impossible for one man to examine all the cases of a particular nature, and our widest generalizations are there- fore based on a limited number of instances. The possibi- lity of a contrary fact, therefore, still remains, and the remains at best a doubtful hypothesis. To prevent this व्यभिचार, T. D. adds that the knowledge of साहचर्य produces sama not by itself, but when combined with the absence of the knowledge of afar (contradiction ). The fa

नियम साहचर्य which constitutes व्याप्ति is therefore defined as अव्यभि- aaa, absence of any contradiction;’ that is, in order to know and not only is it necessary to observe the associa- tion of fire and smoke in numerous instances, but there must not also be a single instance in which smoke is found dissociated from fire. साहचर्यज्ञान and व्यभिचारज्ञानविरह are. therefore the two causes of the knowledge of am, and as such correspond to the Method of agreement and the Method of difference that are employed in Induction. These two are not however collateral or independent canses of arra, but the latter is subservient to the first, and both constitute one joint cause. The process therefore closely resembles Mill’s Joint Method of agreement and difference.*

Mill: System of Logic, People’s Ed. p. 259.

[[260]]

Contradictory Instances,

འ

Tarka-Sangraha.

[ SEOT. XLV.

Now arrencar may be the certainty of a contrary fact or a mere suspicion, because both are equally effective in destroying the certainty of व्याप्ति. Again the व्यभिचारनिश्वय may be well-grounded or ill-grounded; if the former, it is true, and ther is invalid. If it is ill-grounded, or if there is only a suspicion of ferre, it can be dispelled either by reason- ing or by a sort of intuitive knowledge. Instances of the latter are what we call necessary truths, such as the axioms of Geometry which are self-evident and require no proof. When they are not so they can be proved to be true by the reductio ad absurdum method of reasoning which is called तर्क in Nyaya. * Take for example the व्याति यत्र धूमस्तत्र वाह्नः.

mậ: If this is not true, its contradictory, ciz. that smoke is sometimes not accompanied by fire, must be true. Then in those cases where smoke is found without fire, it must have for its cause something else. Hence fire is not the invariable antecedent of smoke and it cannot therefore be its cause, which is inconsistent with our knowledge that fire is the cause of smoke. The conclusion being thus absurd, the assumption from which it was derived must be wrong; and its contradictory, namely the a, must be right. In this way by means of an assumed hypothesis (a), which when carried to its legitimate conclusion leads to ref rug of fire and smoke, we prove the invariable conco- mitance of those two things. The reductio ad absurdum reasoning consists in taking for granted an hypothesis exactly opposite to the proposition to be proved and then drawing from it a conclusion which is evidently false, and the falsity of which vitiates the hypothesis and thus proves its contradictory. In this way too may be said to be indirectly obtained by aqara. In the particular instance of fire and smoke, we can indeed derive the generalization of their invariable concomitance from a still wider generali- zation, namely the law of causality, by the direct syllogi- stic method, thus:-

Every effect is invariably associated with its cause;

See Sec, LXIV Note 3, p. 361 infra.SEOT. XLV. ]

Notes.

Smoke is the effect of firc;

.. Smoke is invariably associated with fire.

[[261]]

But this syllogism is quite different from the a des- cribed above and is practically useless as it involves an argu- ment in a circle. If smoke is invariably associated with fire, because it is the effect of fire, how do we know that it is such an effect? This referera of smoke and fire can only be deduced from the observed invariable concomitance of the two, and hence the syllogism is defective as assum ing a minor premise that is really derived from the conclu sion. The therefore must ultimately rest on the arg✯

with its accessary व्यभिचारज्ञानविरह-

Inductive syllo-

The by which sun is obtained finds its analogy in Aristotle’s system where he attempts to prove that induction is only a variety of syllogism. The central idea of the syllogism, as defined by Aristotle, is that of a conclusion following from given premises by necessary sequence,-an idea, by the way, which is already implied in the Naiyâyika doctrine that परामर्श is the करण of अनुमिति. To bring induc- tion under syllogism it must be shown that the generaliza- tion follows as a necessary consequence from the premises, viz. the accumulation of particular instances. The proposi- tion for instance that all bile-less animals are long-lived is deduced from particular cases of a horse, an ass, etc. Here Aristotle assumes that we have ascertained the attribute to belong to all the particulars, and that the inductive in- ference consists merely in passing from all of them to the class-term, animal. The passage from premises to con- clusion is here necessary, for to grant the premise and yet to deny the conclusion involves a contradiction, i. e. the a of Nyaya. The fallacy of this reasoning evidently lies in the deduction per saltum from a few particulars to the whole class. Mr. Grote’s criticism on it is so just and so pertinent to our subject that the passage is worth quoting :-

We can never saya Grote “observe all the particulars of a class, which is indefinite as to number of particulars and definite

[[262]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

SROT. ILV.

only in respect of the attributes connected by the class term. We can only observe some of the particulars, a greater or smaller pro- portion. Now it is in the transition from these to totality of particulars that the real inductive inference consists: not in the transition from the totality to the class-term which denotes to- tality and connotes its determining common attribute. In fact the distinction between the totality of particulars and the mean- ing of class-term is one not commonly attended to; though it is worthy of note in an analysis of the intellectual process, and is therefore brought to view by Aristotle.”*

This is exactly what is implied in the objection stat- ed in T. D. सकलवह्निधूमयोरसन्निकर्षात्कथं व्याप्ति-

The Nydya ex- pedient.

:. The objection shows that the Naiya- yikas clearly saw the error into which Aristotle fell, and they tried to escape from it in a way peculiar to themselves. The difficulty is two-fold. In the first place, there is the obvious impossibility of our observ- ing all the particulars denoted by the class-term ( e. g. ¿H); and secondly, even granting that we have ascertained all the cases, how do we arrive at the general notion of an, com- prising those cases but certainly distinct from them?

धूख

may be seen to exist in this case, and in that, and in a third, and so on; but how do we get the superadd- ed knowledge that it exists everywhere? The notion of everywhere is distinct from and additional to the totality of particular cognitions. The expedient by which this two-fold difficulty is avoided by the Naiyayikas is very characteristic, and at once distinguishes them from Aristotle, who regards induction as a mode of syllogism, and also from modern logicians like Mill, who regard it as an inde- pendent method of reasoning. J. S. Mill defines Induction as “that operation of the mind by which we infer that what we know to be true in a particular case or cases will be true in all cases which resemble the former in certain assignable respects.” Like Deduction Induction too is a process of

Grote’s Aristotle, Vol. 1. p. 278.

† Mill: Syaten; of Logic, People’s. Ed. p. 188.

SHOT. XLV. ]

Notes.

[[263]]

inference, proceeding from the known to the unknown, the unknown in its case being the general notion which is derived from the known particulars. Naiyayikas however will not accept this, because they regard Induction not as an infer- ence but as a kind of extraordinary perception (starea ). T. D. says that although we can never actually observe all the cases in which fire is associated with smoke, the invari- able concomitance obtaining between the class fire and the class smoke is known by the अलौकिकप्रत्यक्ष called सामान्य- लक्षणा प्रत्यासति. This kind of extraordinary perception has already been explained as the process by which after perceiv- ing an individual thing such as a Te, we at once cognize its an ea, by the law of association. When two things are closely associated together, the perception of one neces- sarily leads to the immediate apprehension of the other. This is not an inference, for there is neither q, nor any

. It is not also ordinary perception, because there is no fquiffet with smoke in all the cases. The process is there- fore something intermediate between perception proper and inference proper, quasi-perception, or a quasi-inference. gearera is thus a kind of immediate inference, and is there- fore more akin to perception than to ergara which concerns with mediate truths only. But how is this explanation to be reconciled with the preceding statement of T. D. that व्याप्ति is prored by तर्क or reductio ad absurdum mode of reasoning? The answer is that it is not that is known by a or any other syllogistic mode of reasoning, as Aristo- tle seems to say, but it is the after that is so known.

व्याप्ति is directly produced by साहचर्यज्ञान which is the result of actual perception, while the तर्क which proves व्यभिचारज्ञान- fe is accessory to it only so far as it dispels all doubts, and makes the knowledge of a certainty. It is not therefore correct to say that Naiyayikas did not know Inductive reasoning. They were quite aware of it and have even described it pretty accurately; but they included it under æg. This is quite clear from Kesava Miśra’s. statement, तथा च सत्युपाध्यभावजनितसंस्कारसहछतेन भूयोदर्शनजनित-

प्रत्यक्ष.

[[264]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

[ SBOT. ILV.

संस्कारसहरुतेन साहचर्येणारिणा प्रत्यक्षेणेन माग्न्योन्यतरवधार्यते । * अनु- fifa is essentially a mediate judgment, and cannot therefore include a generalization which is known immediately. Again this generalization has no use of its own beyond serving as a basis for a further deduction. Whether they were wrong or right in thus excluding Induction from inference proper is a different question, and need not occupy us here.

Corresponding va- rieties in Indian and Western logic.

Other varieties of gara mentioned in a preceding note may also find their equivalents in Euro- pean logic. qua is deduction proper; while weredig is either a deduction, or induction in the wider sense of the term used by Mill, namely, inference from several particulars, not to a generality, but to a distinct particular. vaa is the process of elimination, which closely resembles Plato’s method of Logical Dicision. Aristotle regarded Logical Division as only a fragment of the syllogistic pro- cess; and similarly Naiyayikas class rea under an अनुमान. The three-fold division of अनुमान into अन्याय, व्यति- रेकि and उभft chiefly concerns the हेतु, and is suffici-

the, ently accounted for by the obversion and conversion of propositions.

[[3]]

SECT. XLVI. qaragar:

The five members are:-1 Proposition, 2 Reason, 3 Examples, 4 Application and 5 Conclusion. Mountain is fiery,-this is Proposition. Because it has smoke,-this is Reason. Whatever smokes etc,—this is Example. This is like it, this is Appli- cation. Hence it is so,-this is Conclusion.

syllogism.

Having distingnished the परार्थानुमान from the स्वार्थ in the preceding section, the author now goes The five-membered on to enumerate its five component parts. परार्थानुमान is technically called a न्याय, which is detined as क्रमिकप्रतिज्ञादिसमुदायः ‘collection of the five proposi- tions, etc. in a regular order.’ Gungesa defines are inore accurately as अनुमितिचरमकारणलिङ्गपरामर्शप्रयोजकशाब्दज्ञानजनकबा -

, ‘a proposition or a series of propositions producing the

T. B. Bom. ed, P. 35.

Visvandtha: Gotama-Sûtra-Vritti, 1, 5.

See Note 16 under Sect. 44, p. 251, Supra.

SECT. XLVI. ]

Notes.

[[285]]

verbal knowledge which gives rise to the quasf ( i. e. in the hearer’s mind) which is the last and immediate cause of अनुमिति’ In other words न्याय is a series of propositions that produce in another’s mind the same kind of gufanana as has already been produced in the speaker’s mind by his own mental reasoning. This fairly corresponds to Aristotle’s notion of syllogism which is defined “a speech (or enunciation) in which certain things (the premises) being supposed, something different from what is supposed (¿.e. the conclusion,) follows of necessity; and this solely in virtue of the supposi- tions themselves.”* Unlike Aristotle however who gives three premises to the syllogism, the Naiyâyikas make it consist of five parts or limbs (aqua), namely, Assertion (a), Reason () Proposition or Example (TET), Application ( ) and Deduction or Conclusion (fanax). Assertion is defined as the declaration of the

साध्यनिर्देशः साध्य as existing on the पक्ष’ f or साध्यवत्तया पक्षवचनं, as T. Do puts it, ‘speaking of чr as possessing the T.’ Its purpose is to prepare the hearer beforehand as to what thing he should except to be proved by the syllogism, and it is therefore analogous to the Problema or Questio of the older European logicians. After the Assertion is made, one is naturally tempted to ask, whence, or why, or what evidence; and their answer to this query is the Reason which declares the mark or evidence that proves the existence of साध्य on पक्ष, and which is generally but not necessarily in the ablative case. Every word in the ablative is of course not a , as for instance, in the sentence अयं न दण्डात् । दण्डसंयोग- जन्यद्रव्यत्वात् । दण्डात् is not a हेतु, although the word is in the ablative, because it does not declare the f. Here it may be remarked that the two words and fay, though often used indiscriminately, slightly differ in meaning, f being the mark such as y, while is the लिङ्गप्रतिपादकवचन ’the sentence which declares that mark. The लिङ्ग as expressed in the हेतुबाक्य may be similar or

[[34]]

।

Aristotle : Prior. Analyt, Bk. i, Oh, 1, Sec. 7. † G. S. I, 1, 33.

[[266]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

[SECT. XLVI.

is of two kinds wear

dissimilar to the area, and thus the and eqraf. When the Reason is given, the question would naturally arise why should the prove that grew, or in

[[3]]

other words what connection can there be between the fire and

the smoke which makes us infer the one from the other? To satisfy this query, the third premise gera or eqretor is employed to show the invariable concomitance of fire and smoke. Well, says the objector, let there be this invariable concomitance, but how is it relevant to the point before us? To show this the surf is incorporated with far and, and the combination results in qraf which is expressed by the fourth sentence, Application or उपनय

The last, viz. Conclusion, brings together all those several elements into one proposition, and thus enables the hearer to comprehend the result at once. f is defined by Gotama as the repetition of the star as proved by the g,* and Vatsyâyana. explains it as निगम्यन्ते समर्थ्यन्ते सम्बध्यन्तेऽनेन प्रतिज्ञाहेतूदाहरणो- qaar yešā fāna. Its purpose, says T. D., is to exclude the possibility of any uncertainty or contradiction as to the existence of rear. The last three will be obviously either positive or negative according as the हेतु is अन्वधि or व्यतिरेकि.

The forms of these five premises are also settled by convention. First there is the Assertion पर्वत वह्निमान, in which the पक्ष ( पर्वत ) is the subject, and the Te is spoken of as its property. The Reason is generally in the ablative, but sometimes in the instrumental also. The fa or Pro- position has two forms; in one the rer and are whose concomitance is spoken of are used as properties of their common substratum, which is the subject in both the principal and the relative sentences, as in यो यो धमवान् स वह्निमानः while in the other form the substratum is put in the locative and there and ar are expressed in the nominative,

The five pre- mises

*G. S. I. 1, 34-5.

SHOT. XLVI. ]

Notes.

[[267]]

as in यत्र यत्र धूमस्तत्र तत्र बाहेः Of these the first is pre- ferred as agreeing with the

the form of other premises, althongh the second expresses the am better and more naturally. The squarer has of course the for its sub- ject with the rear as its qualifying attribute, and it is indicated by the general formula तथा वायम, अयम् denot- ing the r and r its qualification. The far does not differ in form from the far, but that it is different in reality is plainly indicated by its formula ænta agr, in which ar denotes the sense conveyed by the star, and ara sums up the result of the intermediate premises.

पक्ष

The Indian and the Aristotelian “syllogisms com-

pared.

The most

The five-membered ear as described above considerably differs from the tripartite syllogism of Aristotle, but a little consideration will show that the difference lies more in the form than in the essence in which the two have been shown to agree remarkably. obvious distinction between the two syllogisms is of course the different number of premises, being five in one and three in the other; and as both give equally valid conclu- sions, one is naturally tempted to conclude that either two premises in the one must be superfluous or the other must be defective to that extent. As a matter of fact, neither alternative is true. Human mind being alike everywhere, it is no wonder that philosophers in the East and the West independently followed the same laws of thought and adopted the same process of reasoning. But though there is no difference in our thinking process, there is much in our respective modes of conveying our thoughts to others. Hence is it that while the essential requisites of a valid inference are the same according to both Gotama and Ari- stotle, their manner of clothing those essentials in the form of promises varies considerably. Aristotle’s premis- es are nothing more than the absolutely necessary consti- tuent parts of an inference connected together by the slender tic of mere juxtaposition. The limbs of the Naiyayi- ka on the other hand constitute a fully reasoned out

[[268]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

SEOT. XLVI.

argument whose parts follow one after another in their natural sequence. Aristotle’s premises are as it were a simple en- umeration of the several steps in a deductive reasoning; the Sanskrit r is a regularly constructed debate in minia- ture. Aristotle’s syllogism only furnishes the skeleton, and the reader or hearer fills up the interstices; in its Sanskrit counter-part, the speaker himself goes through all the steps and the hearer has only to follow him. Thus one is rather analytical or demonstrative, the other is expository and rhetorical. There is more useful in discovering the conclusion; Aristotle’s syllogism is better fitted to test its validity. Each has a different purpose and is best suited to achieve it. In this respect, the Sanskrit era is more akin to the rhetorical mode of argumentation which was so popular with the Sophists before Aristotle and which at- tained its height in the Socratic method of cross-examina- tion and Plato’s Dialectics.

The Nyaya.

A sanskrit ry is in fact nothing but a model dialogue in which the questions of one party are omitted and are to be inferred from the an- swers given. The five-membered syllogism is designed to convince a doubting adversary who asks questions and raises objections at each step, which questions and objec- tions are answered by the successive premises. It is in fact an axiom with the Naiyâyikas that there can be no argu- mentation without an in, a sort of doubt accompanied by a desire to have it solved. But how can there be an mia in the beginning when the debate is not yet com- menced and neither of the disputants has spoken. This rig is therefore artificially created by the dogmatic assertion (a) of the proposition that is to be ulti- mately proved. Gangesa in his Tattva-Chintamani ex- pressly says “कथायामाकाङ्क्षाक्रमेणाभिधानामति प्रथमं साध्याभिधानं विना ’ कुतः’ इत्याकारकहेत्वाद्याकाङ्क्षाभावात् प्रोथम्येन प्रतिज्ञाप्रयोगः " This is the reason why the Sanskrit begins with var and not, like Aristotle’s syllogism, with the -

or major premise, for the sa, being an undis- puted generalization, will not give rise to any emigr

आकाङ्क्षा

SBOT. XLVI. ]

Notes.

[[269]]

or doubt, and so the agrument would never proceed. The Sanskrit syllogism seems to be purposely framed so as to keep this rig alive until the conclusion is reached. The five members of the Sanskrit thus form a series of doubts and answers in a logical sequence, and the grafgaa formed by them is a demonstrative deduction mainly intend- ed for the enlightenment of another.

The five-membered

The five-membered argument has been subjected to much undeserved criticism, both for and syllogism criticized. against it. Those seeking brevity and compactness censure it as being a rude. and clumsy form of syllogism, while others prefer it to the Aristotelian syllogism as exhibiting “a more natural mode of reasoning than is compatible with the compressed limits of the syllogism.”* Both the praise and the blame however are only partially true. The five-membered Nyaya reflects no doubt more accurately the actual method followed in a debate, but it is for that very reason unsuited to be a test of the validity of the reasoning. The five-membered form is much more loose and affords greater facilities for falla- cies to creep in undetected than the compact Aristotelian syllogism. It does not provide fully for the correct in- dication of the quantification, qualification and modality of each proposition. The distinction between Universals and Particulars is not observed, while the distinction between Affirmative and Negative is only partially recognized in the form of अन्वय and व्यतिरेक. Consequently there are no figures and no moods. Aristotle starts from the generalization and inquires what conclusion can be legitimately deduced from it. He is therefore obliged first to determine the exact scope of the proposition that stands as the major premise and so the most common fallacies, such as the Petitio Principii, which generally underlie the major premise, are at once excluded. Not so with the Naiyâyika who starting with the conclusion as a प्रतिज्ञा and having to find out a व्याप्ति most suited to prove it, does not pay much heed to the wording of the q or of any other premise so long as his meaning is

उदाहरण

Sir G. Haughtan’s Prodromus p. 215, quoted in Ballantyne’s Lectures on Nyaya Philosophy,

[[270]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

SEOT. XLVI.

intelligibly conveyed. It would in fact have been impossible to raise upon the fre-membered Nydya the splendid super- structure of Deductive Logic that Aristotle has construct- ed on the basis of his syllogism. On the other haud as a controversial weapon, the fire-membered syllogism is far superior to that of Aristotle, since it forces the debate to run in a particular channel, and thus prevents the adversary from straying away from the point.

It is also very well adapted for the exposition of simple truths to the instructed mind, as it requires no assumption and does not tax the brain at all. The best illustration of this is to be found in Euclid’s geometrical theorems. Enclid’s method closely resem- bles the five-membered syllogism. First, there is the hypothesis or enunciation (sfaar) that all the angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles. The three angles together constitute the qer, and the equality to two right angleos is the साक्ष्य. The particular enunciation and the determination are only a special application of the facts declared in the hypothesis. Strictly speaking the particular enunciation is the real far while the hypothesis is a further generalization derived from it. Then comes the demonstration which first gives reasous (g) and then quotes authorities (agger). The demonstration ends with a summing up corresponding to qraf and introduced by ‘Where’; Lastly comes the conclusion ( faqua) beginning with ‘Therefore,’ and identical with the enunciation. The whole is then wound up with a flourish of trumpets in the shape of a Quod erat demonstrand im (Q. E. D. ) Euclid employed the dialectical syllogism prevailing before Aristotle, as most suited to his purpose; and a similar one was adopted by the Indian Pandits in instructing their pupils.
As already noted, the five-membered syllogism, not- withstanding the difference of form, is Essential com - essentially the same as that adopted by ponents of the syl- Jogism.

Aristotle and the modern European logic- ians. In a legitimate syllogism, says J. S. Mill, it is essential that there should be three and

Mill: System of Logic, People’s Ed. p. 108.SECT. XLVI. ]

DAT

Notes.

[[271]]

no more than three propositions, namely, the conclusion and the two ( major and minor) premises. It is also essential that there should be three and no more than three terms, namely the major nad the minor terms which respectively form the prediente and subject of the con- clusion, and a third one named the middle term, which acts as a link between the two. Similarly there are three and no more thau thres Gerais in a Sanskrit Nydya, namely, the rear the major term and pediente of the con- clusion, the minor term and sniject of the conclusion, and for the middle torm, which being cognized as a geraff acts as a link to connect the greg with the 7. But what about the three and no more the three propositions that form the syllogism? A little examination will show that they too have their counterparts in the five members of the Nyaya. The fauna and far are the same, and so one of them the war for instance may be safely dispensed with. It has also been pointed out that the mental operation corresponding to veraf and denoted by a is a repetition or rather a particular application of the g, and is taken as understood between the minor promise and the conclusion in Aristotle’s syllogism. Either way or may therefore be omitted as superfluous. There remain thus three proposi- tious only, the gor a which is the minor premise, the उदाहरण which is the major one, and the निगमन or con- clusion.

The component parts of the two syllogisms being the

Mutual conver- sion of the two syl- logisms.

same they can be easily converted into each other. Simply by transposing the two remaining premises in the five-mem- bered Nyaya, we get a perfect Aristolelian syllogism in Burbara of the First Figure. Take for exam- ple the hackneyed instance of a smoking mountain :-

( प्रतिज्ञा ) - पर्वतो वह्निमाद ।

( हेतु ) धूमात् ।

( उदाहरण ) यो यो मवान् स स वह्निमान् यथा महानसः ।

See Note 5 pp. 236-7, Supra.

[[272]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

[ spor. xuvi.

( उपनय ) - वह्निव्याप्य धमवानयं पर्वतः ।

( नियमन ) - तस्माद्वह्निमान् पर्वतः ।

Omitting the प्रतिज्ञा, the उपनय and the illustration यथा महानसः appended to the उदाहरण, and likewise transpos- ing the two premises हेतु and उदाहरण, we get :

यो यो धूमवान् स स वह्निमान् ।

धमात् = पर्वतस्य धूमवत्त्वात्

(By dropping the useless ablative )

पवतस्य धूमः or पर्वतो धूमवान् ।

पर्वतो वह्निमान् ।

When translated the premises will run :-

Whatever smokes is fiery;

This mountain is a thing that smokes:

…This mountain is fiery.

This is evidently a Universal Affirmative in Barbara, corresponding to

All B is A,

All Cis B,

…All C is A.

Similarly an Aristotelian syllogism in Barbara can be converted into the Sanskrit Nyaya by the reverse process, namely transposition of premises and addition of raar and उपनय. Thus :

All men are mortal,

Socrates is a man,

… Socrates is mortal.

Which is the same as,

Whoever has humanity has mortality,

Socrates has humanity,

… Socrates has mortality.

Transpose the premises and translate :–

देवदत्तो मनुष्यत्ववान ( मनुष्यः )

यो यो मनुष्यत्ववान ( मनुष्यः ) स स मर्त्यत्वबाद (मर्त्यः ) देवदत्तो मर्त्यत्ववाद ( मर्त्यः )

SEOT, XLVI. ]

Notes.

[[273]]

Add qaşır and sq77 and put the in the ablative form, and the syllogism becomes a full-fledged Nyâya-s

şaçı səfalafare: ( x=&: ) i मनुष्यत्वविशिष्टत्वात् ( मनुष्यत्यात् ) ।

îr ûi ngwafaide: (nya:) v nefattar: (n:) aaraaga:1

PUT ARE!

We might arrive at the same result by taking only the first three members, प्रतिज्ञा हेतु and उदाहरण, as the Mimamsakas do, and by ignoring the rest; only that in this case we shall have to invert the order of all the three propositions when converting them into an English syllogism. The easiest mode of conversion however is to omit the first two proposi- tions and altogether, and then take the remaining three in their order, so that the erger would be the major premise, the minor, and fan the conclusion of the English syllogism. In this way we shall avoid the neces- sity of transposing the premises, and also remove the awk- wardness of changing the ablative into nominative.

Reduction.

As to the Second, Third and Fourth Figures, as well as the remaining three Moods of the First Figure, conversion can be easily effected by first reducing them to Barbra and then converting them in the above manner. The last three figures being always reducible to the first may be left out of consideration. Of the three remaining Moods of the First Figure the two particular Moods, Darii and Ferioque are not possible in the Sanskrit Nyaya, as it does not recognize a particular conclusion. The reason why particular conclusions were disregarded by the Naiyayikas appears to be their use- lessness. What the Naiyayikas wished to gain from an inference as from all other proofs was war, right and definite knowledge, for it is this area alone that has any scien- tific value. A particular conclusion is obviously a vague and imperfect judgment. The very form of the five-membered

[[35]]

[[274]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

SOOT. XLVI

syllogism points to the impossibility of having a particular conclusion. A conclusion in I or 0 can be had only when its subject, that is, the minor term or qy denotes only some individuals of a class; but in the sanskrit syllogism, the qe must be a definite thing, that is, either an individual object like this or that mountaia ( as is generally the case), or at best the whole class denoted by a class-name and looked upon as one object. Otherwise there can be no ver and

red there can be no varawaraw having a particular object like the mountain for its ye. In cases where the area is infer- red on a number of things which do not however form the whole class, there is really no particular conclusion, but there are as many inferences and conclusions as there are things. The minor term being thus always universal, the conclusion must be universal too. The case of Celarent (EAE) is more complex but can be explained in the same way. Although the Naiyayika does not deny the possibility of a negative judgment (after fa), it seems that his conclusion (age) is alwa,s affirmative in form, the change from negation to affirmation being made by the sim- ple expedient of prefixing the negative particle (er or sa), or adding the word are to the predicate. Thus a Ninyûyika will say, not great treat artka, but greisfeife or gr far- carandstæ. His gray and Ông, which are identical, must always assert something of another thing, even though that some thing is an : the fa therefore cannot be purely negative although the aura or fay be satans. Besi- des purely negative knowledge cannot strictly speaking be a Я, because there can be no gare in faqe and the defini- tion agra acercava will be inapplicable. Hence Celarent too is not possible in Sanskrit. Whenever therefore we have a negative judgment, we have always to turn it into an affirmative one by the addition of rare or its synonym भेद, as is generally done in a केवलव्यतिरेकि अनुमान ०. प्र. पृथिवीतरभेदवती, which simply translated means Earth is not anything else. It is obvious therefore that there can be only one form of syllogism in Sanskrit, namely, the Universal

SEOT. XLVI. ]

Notes.

[[975]]

Affirmative (Barbara). Even Aristotle has shown that all kinds of syllogism can be ultimately reduced to the first two Moods of the First Figure, and the distinction between these two is easily removed by the above expedient. This explains why the Sanskrit Nydys, though so much limited in its scope, never fails to give a valid conclusion under any circumstances.

Other syllogisms accepted by Indian systematists.

The five-membered syllogismn though generally popular is not universally accepted even in India. An ancient school of Naiydyikas was not satisfied with the five limbs, but add- ed five more, namely, Curiosity (frame) (जिज्ञासा) Doubt (a), Power of the proofs to produce knowledge (शक्यप्राप्ति), Aim (प्रयोजन) and Removal of objections ( संशय- ger). But they are, says Valsydyana, only aids to the inference, not members of the syllogism, because the definition of an cara (cumque) does not apply to them. The five- membered syllogism thus became the type for all Naiyûykas and was accepted even by the Vaiseshikas. Other systema- tists however carried the pruning process still further. The Mimdiisakas recognized three members only, व्रतिज्ञा, हेतु and उदाहरण, while another school recognized हेतु, उदाहरण and eqar. The Vedinting also insist on having three members only, but they are not particular as to whether the first three or the last three should be taken. Thus Vedanta- Paribhasha remarks:-अवयवाळ वय एवं प्रतिज्ञाहेतूदाहरणरूपा उदा- हरणोपनयनिगमनरूपा वा न तु पक्ष । अवयवववेक व्याप्तिपक्षधर्मयोरुपदर्श- aureataiayaqyer erdarat The Bauddhas recognize only two, zaregur and q7. The author of Nyúya-Bindu who was a Buddhist likewise mentious two only, a and b, making the grea or surft a part of the . Thus it will be seen that the weight of opinion outside the Nyûya and Valleshika schools inclines towards the acceptance of a

Grote’s Aristotle Vol I. p. 223.

Vat. on G. S. I, 1, 32.

Vedanta-Paribhúshd. Calc. ed. p. 14.

[[276]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

SBOT. XLVI.

three-membered syllogism, which is practically identical

with that of Aristotle.

Other names.

Although there is so much difference of opinion as to the number of the members of a Nyaya, there is a general agreement about the form and the import of the several members; only that the Vaiseshikas have a second set of significant names for the five members, viz. qfar (Promise), अपदेश (sign), निदर्शन ( IIInstation ), अनुसन्धान (Scrutiny) and TT (Repetition). Which of these two sets of the names is the older one is not known at present.

Why the third member is called Uddharaṇa.

[[2]]

The case of one of the five members, viz. q or

उदाहरण surf, is somewhat peculiar, and requires farther examination, as it is likely to throw much light on the history of the five-membered syllogism. It must have been noticed that while the names of other members are significant, there is apparently no reason why the proposition stating the व्याप्ति should be called उदाहरण or दृष्टान्त, except the accident of its containing, as a sort of an appendage, the illustration यथा महानसः. It is the first part of the उदाहरण containing arm that is really essential to the syllogism, while the illustration is not only unnecessary, but is often omitted. It is certainly anomalous that the most important premise in the syllogism, on which in fact the inference chiefly rests, should be reduced to the position of a mere zarea, and thus be deprived of its essential character, viz. universality. How are we to account for this anomaly ? Nay the presence of the illustration in the ger has been actual- ly made the ground of censure against the Indian syllogism by some superficial critics; while even those who have defended it offer rather an apology than a well-grounded ex- planation of its existence. Ritter† for instance says that two of the five members of Kanddu’s argument “are manifestly super-

V. S. Up. Calc, ed. p. 397.

† Ritter: History of philosophy Vol. IV. p. 365,

[[0]]

SBOT. XLVI. ]

Notes.

[[277]]

fluous, while by the introduction of an example in the third the universality of the conclusion is vitiated.” The conclu- sion is vitiated because the addition of the example puts some sort of limitation on the general proposition, and thus takes away its universality. The most that Ballantyne

could say to justify the example was that it is “a matter of rhetorical convenience, designed to bring to the recollection of the hearer examples, in regard to which all parties are unanimous, and which are such as should constrain him to admit the universality of the principle from which the con- clusion follows.”* But this explanation is not at all satisfactory. The universal proposition, if true and unani- mously accepted, does not get any additional weight by a stray example, while if it is false or unfounded, the citation of a single example only serves to mislead the hearer, and is therefore quite out of place in a valid syllogism. The example, say the critics, is either superfluous or mis- chievous, and ought therefore to be discarded altogether. It was so discarded by the Vaiseshikas who limited the pro- position to the mere statement of the surf, but the general practice of the Naiyâyikas has still retained it.

Max Müller starts another theory to explain away the difficulty. “But if we inquire more carefully,” says he, “we find that the instance in Gotama’s syllogism has its own distinct office, not to strengthen or to limit the uni- versal proposition, but to indicate, if I may say so, its modality. Every Vyapti must of course admit at least one instance. These instances may be either positive only, or negative only, or both positive and negative.” This means that the instance is intended to show whether the व्याप्ति is अन्वयि or व्यतिरेकि The theory is no doubt plansi- ble, and seems to have been suggested by the two kinds of instances, सपक्षहृष्टान्त and विपक्षदृष्टान्त recognized by the Naiya - yikas; but it neither solves the real difficulty, nor is it ab- solutely correct. As a matter of fact the array and sufate are indicated, so far as they can be so indicated, in the surfa

Ballantyne Lectures on Nyaya Philosophy p. 36. + Thomson’s Laws of Thought, Appendix p. 290.

[[278]]

itself, and not the

दृष्टान्त

Tarka-Sangraha.

[ SHOT. XLVI.

; while the latter takes its own

Take for

character from the ear. It is the erf which makes a हृष्टान्त either अन्वयि 01 व्यतिरेक, and not vice versa. instance the proposition यत्र वह्निर्नास्ति तत्र धूमोऽपि नास्ति यथा महान्हदे, that is sty, यत्र वन्ह्यभावस्तत्र धूमाभावः यथा महान्ददे. This is a व्यतिरेकव्याप्ति, if बहि is the साध्य and धूम the साधन, and महान्हद will be a fवपक्षeera. But suppose the साध्य to bo TT and the area to be wear, that is, we infer not fire from smoke but absence of smoke from the absence of fire; then the same will be an errageena and the area will be a सपक्षदृष्टान्त. So it is really the साक्ष्य and साधन that first determine the modality of the T, and then of the gera. The will therefore be practically useless for determining the modality of the universal proposition, for when we know what sort of gera it is, the modality is already determined. Of course the gera may often assist us in understanding the scope of the na; but the question before us is not whether it may be occasionally useful where it is put, but whether it is absolutely necessary. Besides, the theory even supposing it to be correct does not explain the anomaly how the universal proposition came to be called a mere sqeror or gera. In one sense, however, Max Müller is right, probably without being aware of it. We shall presently see how.

An explanation suggested.

The real explanation, if a conjecture may be hazard- ed, is rather historical than logical. It is not that the instance was tacked to the universal proposition for the purpose of satisfying some logical necessity; but it appears more probable that the instance was the original part, and the generalization itself is a later addition. There seems to have been at first only the instance and nothing else in the third member when the five members received their designations. and that the portion stating the ear was added afterwards when its necessity came to be perceived. We can clearly discover traces of the process by which this enlargement of the third member was brought about, if we examine the

SEOT. XLVI. ]

Notes.

[[999]]

various references to it in different works on Nyaya. Modern writers like Annambhatta define उदाहरण ०३ व्याप्तिप्रतिपादिकं वाक्यम्, but there is no trace of this a¶r in Gotama’s de- finition, साध्यसाधयति तद्धर्मभावो दृष्टान्त उदाहरणम्, * which means that the reor is an instance which possesses an essential property of the area by similarity’. This definition obviously applies to the agra alone which possesses the साध्यधर्म

व्यातिवाक्य. arerad agata, and not to the array. At the time of Gotama’s Sûtras, therefore, the five-membered syllogism seems to have run thus : पर्वतो वह्निमान् । धूमवत्त्वात् । यथा महा- नसः । तथा चायम् । तस्मात्तथा । This primitive form of the syllogism at once explains two things. First it accounts for the third member being called or g, because

[[2]]

there is obviously nothing but the instance in it. Secondly, it explains why the g which follows

began with aur, which seems to have been first used as a co-relative of यथा in the उदाहरण. The उदाहरण and the उपनय appear in fact to have formed one complex sentence, AAT HETAHEATSŤ qfa: ( As was the kitchen so is this mountain smoking), of which the sage beginning with a formed the relative half, and the gua beginning with ar was the principal part. On some such supposition aloue can we understand why Gotuma defines उपनय as उदाहरणापेक्षस्तथेत्युपसंहारः. उदाहरणा- पेक्ष, says Vatsydyana, moans उदाहरणवश ’ depending on the उदाहरण,

TET,’ depending of course in the sense that the co- relative sentence aørsa qda: can be properly understood only from its relative antecedent यथा महानसः.

But this does not convey the full idea of squ; so it is further called in grégre, ́ a summing up’ as it were, i. e. an application of the sense conveyed in the erg to the present case of the mountain, which application is of course implied by the word arr. Gotama’s definition of q is however quite unintelligible if applied to the syllogism as it stands at present, for the server which begins with cannot be the relative antecedent of the q, and so there is no word of which we might be a co-relative.

*G. S. I, 1, 36.

† G. S. I, 1, 38.

[[280]]

Tarka-sangraha.

SEOT. ILVİ.

The above hypothesis as to the original form of the syllogism is not conjectural only; for the skeleton syllogismı mentioned above is actually found in all the ancient works on Nyaya, which rarely mention the ear. Dharmakirti, for instance, the author of Nyâya-Bindu, gives, as an illus- tration of a faulty दृष्टान्त, the syllogism, अनित्यः शब्दः । कृतक- ara i strangiaq*; while in another place of the same work he quotes the stock instance thus, यत्र धूमस्तत्रवह्निः । यथामहान- सादौ । अस्तिचेह धूम इति । ( p. 109 ). This was therefore the original five-membered syllogism, but it was soon found to be imperfect. There was nothing in it to determine the arenâvae of ag, that is, to show the invarible concomitance of the area with the . At first the grea itself was made to convey this sense, but it was obviously inadequate to serve the purpose, and a door was opened to many fallacies arising from imperfect generalizations. To guard against this danger the universal proposition

: etc. was

inserted. If a guess can be hazarded, the aura was possibly at first inserted in the हेतुवाक्य as a विशेषण of साध्यव्याप्य हेतु, as is shown in the above quotation from Nyaya-Bindu, and later it was transposed to grevor. Being thus originally a subordinate adjunct of, it became later on an independent and the chief premise. Before the व्याप्तिवाक्य had come into the syllogism, the अन्वय and sufate of the ag were determined by the grea, according as it had similarity (साधर्म्य ) or dissimilarity (धर्म्य ) with the साध्य; but it was rendered practically useless after the व्याप्तिवाक्य had settled down as a necessary part of the syllogism. Max Müller’s theory about the instance being indicative of the modality, may therefore have been true when the garea was the sole member of the gangquarey. The commentator of Nyâya-Bindu declares in fact the same thing when he says, तस्माद्दृष्टान्तव्यतिरेकेण हेतोरन्वयो व्यतिरेको वा न शक्यो दर्शयितुम. “The अन्वय or व्यतिरेक of the हेतु cannot be indicated except by the gera. After the car had become the chief and neces- sary part of the r, this function of the era was naturally shifted to it, and the era gradually sunk to the level of an useless appendage. The conservative Naiyâ- * Nyâya-Bindu-Tiká, Bibl. Ind. p. 118.

† Ibid. p. 90..SHOT. XLVII. 1

Notes.

[[281]]

yikas have persisted in retaining it, but a modern writer Laugåkshi Bhûskara in his Nyaya-Siddhanta-Mañjari- Prakasa, has the courage to declare gerarding ¤ÊÃÉÌ ¤ fa:, the employment of the instance is purely conven- tional and not necessary. In this way the ear, which was at first the gist of the or, came to be positively

ignored.

A singular analogy to the Naiyâyika zergσ is to be found in the Argument from Example, noticed by Aristotle, and apparently very common before him in Greece. Aristotle gives as an illustration:-

The War of Athens against Thebes (gr) was mischievous ( साध्य );

Because it was a war against neighbours ();

Just as the war of Thebes against Phokis was (egrea). *

Both the ancient Sanskrit syllogism and the Greek Argu- ment by Example appear to be cases of an inference from particulars to particulars which, according to J. S. Mill, was the original and true type of an inference. †

SECT. XLVII. quasi:

Consideration of the sign is alone the cause of both One’s Own and Another’s judgment. Hence the Consideration is the Inference.

The proximate cause of Anumiti.

qt has already been explained, and it has also been shown why it is called लिङ्गपरामर्श ox तृतीयलिङ्गपरामर्श $ Annambhatta purposely uses the word fegreraf, instead of simple परामर्श, in order to emphasize his view that the real करण of अनुमिति is the लिङ्गपरामर्श and not लिङ्ग merely, as some say, and that the name अनुमान is properly applicable to the लिङ्गपरामर्श alone. In T. D. he briefly notices the three views that have prevailed about the real proximate cause of अनुमिति. The girar, according to these three schools of opinion,

[[36]]

Grote Aristotle Vol. I. p. 274.

† Mill: System of Logic, People’s Ed. p. 126. † Vide Note 3 on Sec. 44, p. 234, Supra. § See Note 3 on Sec, 45 p. 255, Supra,

[[282]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

[ SEOT. XLVII.

is either लिज्ञान, व्याप्तिज्ञान or परामर्श. The first is the view of the Vaiseshihas, who accordingly name अनुमिति as लैङ्गिकज्ञान- Šaňkara Miśra the author of Upaskára sums up this view in the following couplett—

نگانه یان لالایی

अनुमेयेन

सम्बद्धं प्रसिद्धं च तदन्वित ।

॥

aquà g arða afgyAgatywa 11*

’ लिङ्ग is the अनुमितिकरण, because it is connected with साध्य (अनुमेय ) on the पक्ष, is known to exist wherever साध्य exists, and is never found where r is absent. Sankara Miśra argues that q7f, having no er after it, cannot be the करण which is always व्यापारवत्, while if लिङ्ग be the करण, परामर्श itself becomes its व्यापार. This view is summarily rejected by Annambhatta on the ground that it leads to the absurdity that even a past or a future f, that is, smoke which was once observed but does not now exist on the mountain or smoke which is not yet seen on the mountain, would produce the graf of the present existence of fire. If smoke alone is the

a there is no reason why the smoke of yesterday or the smoke of to-morrow should not produce an inference of a fire existing on the mountain to- day. Hence the necessity of the condition that fa, in order to be effective for अनुमान, must be first observed as a पक्षधर्म, that is, as a property of the mountain actually existing at the time of the inference. In other words it is the qaramfararı, otherwise called quasf, and not fayar merely, that is the real करण of अनुमिति.

But one might ask why create a new or of grain the form of the composite परामर्श which is a mixture of व्याप्तिज्ञान and qaramfarara, when you can as well look upon the last two themselves as severally the arms of sigrara. To this Annam- bhatta replies that it is simpler to hold the complex st as the one of fat than to recognize two separate करणs in the shape of व्याप्तिस्मृति and पक्षधर्मताज्ञान. Besides we might have even agreed to this latter alternative if the qer-

f could have been altogether dispensed. with; but that is not possible, because qef is necessary to account for the

T. S. Up. Oslo. ed. p. 392.

SECT. XLVII. ].

Notes.

[[283]]

cognition which is conveyed by the उपनय in & परार्थानुमान, and which thereupon produces the aft in the hearer’s mind. If then qraf must be recognized as the r of a पराथानुमिति, why have separate करr for the स्वार्थानुमिति, when the same can do for both? This reasoning is faultless, except that according to those who define करण 28 व्यापारवद- साधारणं कारण, परामर्श cannot be the करण as it has no व्यापार coming after it. Hence the advocates of this definition of

करण.

Tor, namely, the ancient Naiyâyikas, propose amara to be the करण and परामर्श to be its व्यापार, while the moderns who deny the necessity of व्यापारवत्त्व and define करण 25 फला- योगव्यवच्छिन्नं कारणं regard परामर्श itself as the करण. Annam- bhatta seems really to be vascilating between these two views, although in the text he has made the emphatic decla- ration लिङ्गपरामर्श एव कारणम्, and his vascilation is due to his non-preference for either of the two definitions of . At least there is a glaring inconsistency between this pas- sage and the concluding remarks of Sect. 43 where he de- clares इन्द्रिय to be the करr of प्रत्यक्ष * Had it not been for those remarks, it could have been said with much plausibi- lity that, notwithstanding his obvious indecision as to the real definition of a ror, Annambhatta adopted the modern in preference to the ancient view. Probably he did so, and the statement about the of erg was made simply in deference to the popular convention which from time im- memorial has regarded इन्द्रिय to be the करण of प्रत्यक्ष and has thereby made the very word करण synonymous with इन्द्रिय- The book being intended for beginners the author appears to have avoided all fruitless controversies as much as possible, and hence sometimes fell into inconsistencies.

The reading arm in the first part of this section is obviously wrong, although it is found in all Mss. except two. It is probably an emendation of some later copyist, who having noticed the inconsistency of this passage with Sect. 41 thought of removing it by improving the text.

*See p. 32; and Note 3 thereon p. 224, Supra,

[[284]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

SECT. XLVIII. fam

[ SHOT. XLVIII.

Mark or Sign is of three kinds : 1 positive and negative, 2 purely positive, and 3 purely negative. That which pervades both positively and negatively is positive-negative, as for instance, smokiness when fire is to be proved. “Where there is smoke, there is fire as in a kitchen” is positive concomitance.” Where there is no fire there is no smoke as in a lake” is negative con- comitance. Purely positive is that where there is positive concomitance only, e. g. pot is nameable because it is know- able like cloth. Here there is no negative concomitance of nameability or knowability as all things are knowable and nameable. Purely negative is that which has a negative concomit- ance only, e. g. earth differs from other things because it has smell; that which does not so differ has no smell, as water ; this is not like it; and hence it is not so. Here there is no positive instance (of a thing) that has smell ( and yet ) differs from others, because the whole earth forms the subject. 1. Having described the typical syllogism, the author now procdees to treat of the mark or middle term, which determines the character of the syllogism and also makes the inference valid or invalid. A mark may be true or false, and accordingly & हेतु is either सद्धेतु or असद्धेतु, the latter be - ing usually termed arr. Before adverting to this dis-

हेत्वाभास. tinction, it is necessary to tell what a mark in general means and how it usually stands in a syllogism. The author therefore first describes the three kinds of “The mark

The reason ‘mark.’

•

is of three sorts, positive and negative, merely positive, and merely negative. Of these the first is in invariable con- comitance with the Tr both affirmatively and negatively, as smokiness is with fire. The second has the invariable concomitance affirmatively only; and the third negatively only. An instance of the

it is knowable,’ because and

is A jar is nameable, for

साधन

the

renameability’ and the ‘knowability’ being here co-extensive, a negative concomitance of theirs, that is, a concomitance of their absolute negations is impossible. The properties of name- ability and knowability reside in all things, and so there is no विपक्षष्टान्त on which the अभाव of साध्य exists, and hence there

SEOT, XLVIII.

[[7]]

Notes.

[[285]]

is no aften. The example of the third kind is Earth is distinct from all other padarthas, because it has odour. In this case there is a fargera where there is neither odour nor are as in water or air, but there is no सपक्षवृष्टान्त where both गन्ध and इतरभेद are con- comitant. In the second case therefore we can have only an अन्वयव्याप्ति, such as यत्र यत्र प्रमेयत्वं तत्राभिधेयत्वं यथा घटे, but no व्यतिरेकव्याप्ति, such as यत्राभिधेयत्वं नास्ति तत्र प्रमेयत्वमपि afa, owing to the impossibility of finding a corresponding दृष्टान्त. In the third case we have a व्यतिरेकव्याप्ति, यत्र इतरभेदो नास्ति तत्र गन्धवत्त्वमपि नास्ति, because we have no less than 14 odourless things (the 8 dravyas besides earth, plus the remaining 6 padarthas), on which the gar

इतरभेद (difference of earth from all other things) does not exist; but obviously we cannot have any area in this case, as neither गन्ध nor पृथिवीतरभेद, which is the same as पृथिवीत्व, exists anywhere but on graft. In the first case however we have both kinds of e, because we can have both similar and contrary instances. We can say यत्र यत्र धूमस्तत्र वाह्नः यथा महानसे, as well as यत्र वह्निर्नास्ति तत्र धूमोऽपि नास्ति यथा जलन्हदे । The chief test therefore of discovering to which of these three kinds a mark belongs is to see whether there is any सपक्षहान्त, that is, an instance in which the साध्य coexists with the g, and also a farger or a contrary instance in which साध्याभाव co-exists with हेत्वभाव. If both kinds of in- stances are available then they as well as the inference in which it is employed are safe; secondly, if the first kind of instance alone is found and not the second, they are ; and lastly if the second only is found but not the first, they are केवलव्यतिरेकि.

Anvaya and Vya- tireka.

and

gear is defined by T. D. as the invariable concomit- ance of हेतु and साध्य while व्यतिरेक, literally meaning ra, is a similar concomitance of their absolute negations. The ear व्यापक interchange places in the व्यतिरेकव्याप्ति, that is, the अभाव of वह्नि which is the व्यrपक in the अन्वयव्याप्ति becomes व्याप्य of the अभाव of धूम the original व्याप्य. This can be

[[386]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

SBOT. XLVIII.

best illustrated by three squares drawn with two sides of each coinciding thus:–

धूल

बहि

वह्नयभाव

Let the largest square A C represent any class larger than a such as e, the intermediate figure A F represent the sphere of ar, and the smallest A K represent that of . Now it is clear that the whole space of # is covered by

धूम that of बह्नि, and so we can say यत्र धूमस्तत्र वह्निः. The square A K will therefore comprise all similar instances such as महानस, यज्ञशाला etc. The gnomen EK G will comprise all instances such as are:five where there is fire but no smoke. In a contrary inference from a toy, the gnomen

धूम, EK G will correspond to an उपाधि ( आर्द्रेन्धनसंयोग ) which vitiates a व्याप्ति like यत्र यत्र वह्निस्तत्र धूमः, The gnomen BFD comprises instances where rara is co-existent with

धूमाभाव वह्नयभाव. This is the region of विपक्षदृष्टान्त which will justify the ama, यत्र वह्न्यभावस्तत्र धूमाभावः. The figures also show that the square of a being larger than that of धूम, वाह्न is व्यापक of भ्रम. Similarly, the gnomen BKD representing gum is larger than the gnomen B F D which represents बयभाव, and hence धूमाभाव is व्यापक

represents, of r, the intermediate gnomen E K G again

SEOT. XLVIII. ]

Notes.

[[287]]

representing the gun if the am is reversed. The pro- per व्यतिरेकव्याप्ति therefore runs यत्र यत्र वह्नयभावस्तत्र धूमाभावः, यथा जलन्हदे ।

Keralânvayi.

T. D. defines & केवलान्वयि लिङ्ग as ’that the साध्य of which is केवलान्वयिः’ and a साध्य is केवलान्वयि when its erarara exists nowhere, that is, when the साध्य, e. g. अभिधेयत्व, is co- terminous with the whole class of existing things. It should also be noticed that the age, which T. D. defines as अत्यन्ताभावाप्रतियोगित्व, is that pertaining to the wer, and not that of the , for the total absence of an अत्यन्ताभाव of the हेतु is not necessary for a केवलान्वयि अनुमान- For instance, the syllogisin घटोभिधेयः । चटत्वात् । is केवलान्वयि, as there is no व्यतिरेकव्याप्ति, यत्राभिधेयत्वं नास्ति तत्र घटत्वमपि नास्ति; but the हेतु in it is not अत्यन्ताभावाप्रतियोगि, since घटाभाव ex- ists in many places. The essence of a qr therefore consists in the r being co-existent with all existent things. But an objector might say that the illustration iu the text is incorrect, since there are many things in the universe which have no names, and which we do not and cannot know, and yet of which the अभाव of प्रमेयत्व or अभि-

can be predicated. But, says T. D., the way and r referred to are not those determined by our own limited capacity; they are absolute, and so though a thing may be unknown and unnamed to us, it is still the object of the omniscience of God.

The case of tragautame is rather complicated. Its essence consists in the re being coter- Kevala-vyatireki. minous with qg, as in the example, grat इतरभेदाभाववती । गन्धवत्त्वात्.

Here we can-.

not have an अन्वयव्याप्तिः यत्र पत्र गन्धवत्त्वं तत्र पृथिवीतरभेदः, be- cause everything that has गन्धवत्त्व as well as पृथिवीतरभेद 2. c. afratra, being included in पृथिबी itself, there is no दृष्टान्त apart from the r. There are plenty of instances, however, on which the arsurura, & 6 qiitfacitqrunz or graatacar, is

[[288]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

[SHOT. XLVIII.

found coexistent with गन्धाभाव- Any of the eight sub- stances excepting ger or any of the remaining six cate- gories will serve for such a विपक्षदृष्टान्त.

How earth is prov- ed distinct from other substances.

Here T. D. indulges in a little argument which is typical of the scholastic subtilities for which Naiyayikas have become so famous. An objector starts up saying that garîq cannot be proved by inference on पृथिवी, and he puts down a dilemma. The साध्य . . इतरभेद is either previously known or not; if it is known to exist somewhere (elsewhere than earth of course), then the ( u ) either co-exists with it or not. Now if the co-exists with the साध्य in the other thing, then that is clearly & सपक्षदृष्टान्त and there is an en; but if the co-exists with it in no other thing than earth, then it is a peculiar characteristic of the qer, and there can be no sar and no inference based on it. On the other hand, if the itself is unknown, then of course there can be no agrafa; and for this reason. An अनुमिति, such as पर्वतो बह्निमान्, is a विशिष्टज्ञान, that is, knowledge of a mountain, not pure and simple, but as af- E’ characterized by fire.’ But there is a maxim that a farare thing cannot be known without the previous know- ledge of the faiq; for how can we know a quga unless we first know what a quis. The knowledge of ada can- not therefore be had without our first having the knowledge of the वह्नि. But by our hypothesis the साध्य, २ . इतरभेद, is unknown ; and hence there can be no अनुमिति like इतरभेदवती पृथिवी. Similarly as the knowledge of an अभाव depends on the knowledge of its प्रतियोगि, the इतरभेदाभाव is also un- known, and hence there can be uo व्यतिरेकव्याप्ति, यत्र इतरभेदाभाव- स्तत्रगन्धवत्त्वम् A केवलव्यतिरेकि syllogism is therefore an impos-

sibility.

The above dilemma is fairly nettling, although our author does attempt to give some sort of a reply to it in the concluding portion of the commentary. The passage is involved in considerable obscurity. As read by all copies except one

A passage in Tarka-Dipikâ ex- plained.

SEOT. XLVIII. ]

Notes.

[[289]]

or rather two, it is quite unintelligible, and is probably corrupt; and I have therefore ventured to correct it, on the high authority of Nilakantha and the Ms. J, by transferring the words far to the preceding sentence, and splitting प्रत्येकाधिकरणप्रसिद्ध्या into प्रत्येकाधिकरणे प्रसिद्ध्या. Read thus, the gist of the reply is briefly this. The re in the inference in question is not the cumulative difference of fourteen padarthas (8 substances +6 categories) from earth, which being unobserved on anything other than earth may be unfit to be & साध्य. What is really intended to be proved on earth is the simultaneous existence of the thirteen mutual negations of those fourteen padârthas. Mutual nega- tion exists between two things, and so there are thirteen mutual negations, corresponding to the thirteen couples that can be formed out of fourteen padarthas, water etc., and residing in thirteen things, excluding that of which the negation is spoken of. Thus resides in the thirteen

e things, light etc.; and are resides in all things excepting light. Thus the thirteen mutual negations reside in thirteen things at a time, but on none of the fourteen things do all of them exist at one and the same time. They do however so exist on earth, and in this respect earth is distinguished from the fourteen things. Our area therefore here is ur- दशत्वावच्छिन्नभेदस्यैकाधिकरणवृत्तित्वम्, the simultaneous exis- tence of the thirteen mutual negations on one thing.’ And as no instance is known on which the existence of this r is previously ascertained, we cannot know whether the exists there or not; and having thus no knowledge of the

positive or negative, we can neither call it saft, nor arare. Thus the first horn of the objector’s dilemma is disposed of. The second, that the re being unknown there can be no e, is also weak, because we have seen that the area which we have taken, namely en- *, ’ aggregate of the thirteen mutual negations of water etc.’ is already known by the previous ascertainment of its thirteen components, the thirteen mutual negations

[[37]]

[[990]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

[ SHOT. XLVIII.

severally. But, the objector rejoins, though your thirteen negations may be severally known, their aggregate is still unascertained ; how can then the साध्य be called प्रसिद्ध ? Well, replies the undaunted Naiyâyika, I do not recognize an aggregate() as a separate thing from its com- ponents, and my are here is not a fictitious thing like

, but the several negations themselves, which, being ascertained on their respective substratin (प्रत्येकाधिकरणे प्रसिद्ध्या), may be inferred conjointly on earth. Consequently there ought to be uo difficulty in obtaining a साध्यविशिष्टानुमिति 8 well as a व्यतिरेकव्याप्ति. The केवलव्यतिरेकि inference is there- fore quite possible and valid.

Propriety of ke- vala-vyatireki.

We have followed the tedious argument in T. D. simply to show into what absurdities the Naiyayikas have fallen by recognizing a hamariतरेक अनुमान. The essence of it, as केवलव्यतिरेकि is pointed out above, is that there is co-terminous with a. The we cannot therefore be anything but a peculiar characteristic of ar. Now how can the peculiarity of a thing be known except by actual observation? The syllogism is quite incapable of discovering it. The conclusion in an inference is a particular deduction from the general proposi- tion, and being already contained in it, is not a new piece of knowledge. But an af is ex hypothese a new error fact, and capable of being known only by observation or by induction. This is the gist of the dilemma stated above. while the answer given by T. D. is most unsatisfactory.

Why then did the Naiydyikus at all recognize surattas

7 which involved them into so much absurdity. Two reasons might be suggested for this; oue is historical while the other is purely dialectical. The three-fold division of लिङ्ग and अनुमान is comparatively modern, but it is derived from Gotama’s division of हेतु into साधम्र्येण and वैधम्र्येण. * The

G. S. I, I, 34-5.SECT. XLVIII. ]

Notes.

[[291]]

two kinds of हेतु made the उदाहरण, उपनय and निगमन also two- fold; and thus the whole syllogism changed its character according as the was through similarity or dissimilarity.

became and the

The साधर्म्य or वैधर्म्य referred to was that of दृष्टान्त, and thus the gera was as it were the key to the whole syllogism. When the दृष्टान्त was enlarged by the addition of the व्याप्तिवाक्य, and thereby sank itself into insignificance, the the means of determining the character of the अनुमान as regards their साधर्म्य and वैधर्म्य, or to use their modern equivalents अन्वयित्व and व्यतिरेकित्व. So long as the distinction was confined to surf, there was nothing absurd or unintelligible about the doctrine; but the modern school of Naiyayikas in their zeal to carry each and every doctrine of the ancients to its ultimate result, discovered three ways in which the two kinds of a might be used in a syllogism, namely, either each alone by itself, or both optionally. In this way the mark (fay) became three-fold, according as it was followed by a व्याप्ति that was purely अन्वयि, or purely ana, or both alternatively. Hence modern writers like Annambhatta define a लिङ्ग as one having an अन्वयव्याप्ति 01 व्य- fata or both. As most inferences have both kinds of व्याप्ति the class of अन्वयव्यतिरीके लिङ्ग is the largest and also the most general one, while the other two are exceptional cases which are classed apart bacause they cannot be included in the general category.

Objectons.

In one sense both the केवलान्वाये aud केवलव्यतिरेकि may be said to be defective syllogisms, as lacking one or more characteristics that are re- quisite for a sound deduction. Properly speaking a deduction ought to be the inference of a particular or a less general proposition from a wider one; but in a - grafy the arfafarzigfafa is not only no particular case included in the af, but there is actually co-terminons with the widest generality, namely, Existence (T). Similarly in a केवलव्यतिरेकि, the साध्य being co-terminous with

the पक्ष

there is no middle term between the two, or if there happens to be one it is co-extensive with q and are (as

[[292]]

Turka–Sangraha.

[SECT. XLVIII.

in the example given in the text. The three terms being co-extensive, all the premises become equally wide and practically tautologous. The Naiyayikas themselves seem to have been half conscious of the precarious case of the - af, for the reply they give to a strong objection, some- times advanced against it, is anything but convincing. The objection is directed against व्यतिरेकव्याप्ति itself. अनुमिति is the result of परामर्श, and परामर्श is व्याप्तिविशिष्टपक्षधर्मताज्ञान, that is, साध्यव्याप्यलिङ्गज्ञान which can arise only when the साध्यव्याप्यत्व is known to reside in लिहू. Now in a व्यतिरेकव्याप्ति, the साध्या- भाव is the व्याप्य of हेत्वभावः and hence the व्याप्यत्व or व्याप्ति resides in साध्यभाव. But how can 1 व्याप्ति residing in one thing, namely wear, be the faşıq of a quite different thing, namely साधन or लिङ्ग, and thus produce the व्याप्तिविशिष्ट- qgwfarana ? The Naiyâyikas, try to meet this difficulty by making व्याप्तिविशिष्टत्व & property not of पक्षधर्म but of पक्षधर्मता- ज्ञान. .* The force of the objection is not however thereby much lessened. The difficulty in short is how can we infer fire from smoke from the invariable concomitance of their negations? Or to make it still more clear, if a

tenger be put in the English Celarent ( E A E ), of which the major premise, i. e. fata, is negative, the conclusion also must be negative, while in the Sanskrit Nyaya, we derive a positive conclusion ( qdar afgura) from a negative major premise. This is absurd. The reply of the Naiyâyikas is that though the व्याप्ति may reside in साध्याभाव, the साधन is still known as the प्रतियोगि of its अभाव which is व्यापक; and that sort of knowledge of the re being an accessory suffices to produce the requisite परामर्श. Hence S. C. says साध्याभावव्यापकी- भूताभावप्रतियोगित्वेन साधनस्य पक्षवृत्तित्वज्ञानं सहकारि. But this is a lame explanation after all.

The use of kevala- vyatireki.

The true reason for recognizing a safari agara seems to have been to avoid the necessity of having a fifth proof called afqra (Presumption). The instances which the Mimâmsakas give of अर्थापत्ति are all included by Naiyayikas in their केवलव्यति- रोके अनुमान. The analoguons reasoning from तर्क or Reductio

Vide Note p. 243, Supra.

SECT. LI. ]

Notes.

[[293]]

ad absurdum would also come under the same head, and in fact all conclusions that cannot be proved directly (e. g. जीवत् शरीरं सात्मकं प्राणादिमत्त्वात् ) will be proved by the Naiyayi- kas by baefat. Those of course who, like the Mimamsa~ kas and the Vedûntins, accept refufar as proof, dispense with not only the केवलान्वयि and केवलव्यतिरेकि but the whole anate agane altogether. The strictures passed by the Vedanta-Paribhasha upon the Nyaya doctrine of fa

व्यतिरेके inference are instructive and deserve to be quoted in full:- तच्चानुमानमन्वयिरूपमेकमेव न तु केवलान्वयि सर्वस्यापि धर्मस्यास्मन्मते ( अद्वैतमते ) ब्रह्मनिष्ठात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वेनात्यन्ताभावाप्रतियोगिसाध्य- कत्वरूपकेवलान्वयित्वस्यासिद्धेः । नाप्यनुमानस्य व्यतिरेकिरूपत्वं साध्याभावे साधनाभावनिरूपितव्याप्तिज्ञानस्य साधनेन साध्यानुमितावनुपयोगात् । कथं तर्हि धूमादावन्वयव्याप्तिमविदुषोऽपि व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिज्ञानादनुमितिः । अर्था- पत्तिप्रमाणादिति वक्ष्यामः ॥

SECTIONS. IL, L, LI. पक्षः, सपक्षो विपक्षश्च.

A subject is one where the thing to be proved is doubted, as mountain when smokiness is the reason.

A similar instance is one where the thing to be proved is ascertained, as kitchen in the same case.

Paksha, Sapak- sha and Vipaksha.

A contrary instance is that where the absence of the thing to be proved is ascertained, as a lake in the same case.

In these three short sections, Annambhaṭṭa defines three terms which constantly occur in connec- tion with the syllogism. “Aq, place or subject, is, that on which the existence of the thing to be ascertained is doubtful, as the mountain in an inference of fire from smoke. A gr or similar ins- tance is that on which the existence of the thing to be ascertained is already known, as the culinary hearth in the same inference. A far or contrary instance is that on which the negation of the thing to be ascertained is definitely known, as a great lake in the same inference.” Annambhaṭṭa has given the simplest definitions of the terms, probably copied by him from Gungesa’s Tattva-Chintamani, while most of the others such as that of N. B. are merely variations of it. The rer and fer of later Naiyayikas of course correspond respectively to the instances by simi-

Ved. Par. Calc, ed. p. 14.

[[294]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

SEOT. LI.

larity and dissimilarity mentioned by Gotama, and are employed to illustrate अन्वयव्याप्ति and व्यतिरेकव्याप्ति respectively.

An objection.

The definition of q is however open to an objection. It is prima facie incorrect because it does not apply to cases where we infer a thing, even though it may have been previously ascertained by other proofs such as Perception or Word. We have for instance the injunction of the Śruti, eta arst E54: श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यो निदिध्यासितव्यः * in which आत्मा is first direc- ted to be heard and then reflected, and then contemplated upon. aur is acquiring the knowledge of the Soul from the Vedas, while comprehends reasoning or inference. But how can inference work if the Soul is already ascertained by saur, and is therefore no longer? And yet the injunction being that of infallible Śruti cannot be groundless. It is not necessary therefore that the q in an inference must be af. Besides even in ordinary life we often practise inference, although the wre is actually observed or otherwise ascertained, as when we wish to corroborate our observation of fire on the mountain by the additional evidence of an inference. The definition of g is therefore inaccurate. The anthor’s reply to this objection is not quite clear. The true definition of ver, says T. D., is “a thing which is the sub- stratum of the पक्षता as already defined, 2. सिषाधयिषाविरहसह- Gafferua:”.† That is quite, true, but does the author there- by admit that the definition of ver given here is wrong? And if so, why did he insert it at all? The difficulty will, however, be removed by taking the word in the sense of, not doubtful absolutely, but doubtful for the time being, or doubt- ful in the precise way in which an inference ascertains the are. The star for instance might have been known from Śruti, but mere verbal knowledge of a thing is not sufficient to dispel all doubts and questionings which often obstruct the free working of the intellects. Arguments of both wre and

Brihad. Îr. Up. IV. 5, 6.

† Vide Note 6 Under Sect. 44, p. 240, supra.

SECT. LI. ]

Notes.

[[205]]

aree kinds are needed to remove these doubts and make our knowledge absolutely certain. Similarly though fire may have been actually observed, our senses often mislead us, and there is no positive certainty until independent reasoning corroborates the evidence of our senses. In this sense of course there is still doubtful, even though it has been previously known.

What is a good hetu.

It is rather strange that Amnambhaṭṭa, after having described the general nature of a mark, did not, before proceeding to the re or invalid reasons, mention the distinctive characteristics of valid marks. The desideratum however has been supplied by the writers of other manuals, such as Tarka-Kaumudi and Tarkamrita. These essentials of are five, and are thus described in T. K.:-ami æÊ योऽन्वयव्यतिरेकी स पञ्चरूपोपन एवं स्वसाध्यं सावयति । तानि पञ्च रूपाणि पक्षधर्मत्वम्, पक्षे सक्षम, विपक्षाद्व्यावृत्तिः, अबाधितविषयत्वम्, असत्प्रति-

The five requisites of a good are,-(1) existence on the qr, of course at the time of making the inference; (2) existence on gra zzrea; (3) non-existence on the g; (4) non-contradiction of the subject matter by another stronger proof; and (5) absence of a counter-balancing reason on the other side, proving the negation of area. The first three conditions are obviously deducible from what has been already said about the nature of the पक्ष, सपक्ष and विपक्ष. The latter two belong to the matter rather than to the form of the inference. These fire requisites are necessarily present in an अन्वयव्यतिराक हेतुः Int the other twe, केवलान्वयि and केवल- u, being exceptional, are by their very nature wanting in one requisite each, and therefore pass ou with four only. The केवलान्वयि cannot have विपक्षच्यावृत्ति because thore is no विपक्ष in its cases while & केवलव्यतिरेकि cannot have सपक्षसत्त्व owing to the absence of war itself. With these two excep- tions, the requisites are essential to all inferences, and the absence of any one of them gives rise to the several fallacies. Thus the want of पक्षधर्मra produces आश्रयासिद्ध and स्वरूपासिद्ध;

*T. K. Bom. ed. p. 12.

[[206]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

[ SECT. LI.

that of सपक्षसत्त्व, असाधारण सव्यभिचार and अनुपसंहारः that of विपक्षासत्व, व्याप्यत्वासिद्ध, विरुद्ध and साधारण सव्यभिचार; and the absence of the last two gives rise to बाधित aud सत्प्रतिपक्ष respectively. This will be fully understood when the nature of the several fallacies has been explained.

Another view.

The author of Nyaya-Bindu mentions only the first three as the requisites of a good, omitting the last two, perhaps because they pertain more to the matter than to the form of the, and involve what are called material fallacies. He describes this त्रिरूपहेतु thus :– " त्रैरूप्यं पुन- र्लिङ्गस्यानुमेये (०. पक्षे ) सत्त्वमेव । सपक्ष एव सत्त्वम् । असत्पक्षे चासत्त्व- à fata † The Vaiseshikas too would seem to recognize * त्रिरूपहेतु. The whole Nydya theory of valid reasons and the five kinds of fallacies is as a matter of fact deduced from this three-fold character of the .

SECT. LII.

ATET:.

There are five fallacies, viz: -1. Discrepancy, diction, 3 Ambiguity, 4 Futility and 5 Falsity.

Fallacies.

2 Contra-

The next six sections deal with the five groups of fallacies, an accurate knowledge of which is necessary to ensure sound reasoning. It is often as necessary to know what we are to avoid as to know what we are to accept, and hence a treatise on Logic can never be complete without a descrip- tion of the various fallacies to which an inference is liable. The word game is capable of two derivations and two meanings. It means a fallacious reason, (getag:) if dis- solved either as that which looks like a but

हेतुवदाभासते is not हेतु, ’ or as हेतोराभासः सदृशः ’that which resembles a हेतु. ’ If dissolved as bat: bat arssærer: the word would mean a fallacy (Tiq: ). i. e. the error which underlies the ap- parent and makes it invalid. The difference between the two meanings is important, because it must be noted that the five-fold divison of fallacies is really based on the different kinds of हेतुदोष and not on those of दुष्टहेतु..

V. S. Up. Calc. ed. p. 160.

† Nyaya-Bindu-Tika Bib. In. p. 104,

SBOT. LII. ]

Notes.

[[297]]

The reason of this distinction is that a single may often be vitiated by two or more errors occurring at once, each of which would fall under oue or the other of the five classes; but their combination will not make a separate: kind of हेत्वाभास. Such a हेतु might in fact be classed under as many heads as there are fallacies involved in it. Thus if we take the syllogism, वायुर्गन्धवान स्नेहात् । the हेतु स्नेह will be found to fall under all the five heads ofrere. Simi- larly in घटः पढोऽस्ति कुड्यत्वात्, the हेतु कुज्यत्व has fallacies of all kinds, In -हदो वह्निमान् धूमात्, the हेतु is of three kinds: बाधित, सत्प्रतिपक्ष and स्वरूपासिद्ध; while in पर्वतो धूमवान् वह्नेः, the हेतु would be both साधारणसव्यभिचार and व्याप्यत्वासिद्ध. If the division had been applied to geig instead of gety, how could these mixtures of several fallacies have been classed ? They can neither be put under one only of the possible heads, nor form an independent class. Hence Naiyayikas have adopted the better plan of classifying all the fallacies or errors that are possible in a g, and then denominating a हेतु

which possessed one or more of them as fallacious in so many ways. The author of Didhiti remarks to the same effect : ’ एकस्यैव स्नेहस्य ‘अनैकान्तिकः, ’ ’ विरुद्धः ’ इत्यादिपञ्चत्वव्यव- हारः कथम् इत्याशङ्कायामुत्तरम् -’ उपाधेयसङ्करेप्युपाध्यसङ्करः’ इति न्यायाsोपगत सङ्ख्यामादाय दुष्टहेतौ पञ्चत्वादिसङ्ख्याव्यवहारः that is, ⚫ the fallacious reasons are divided into five classes not be- cause only five varieties of them are possible, but because the errors which underlie them are of so many kinds. The correct method for a Nyaya writer would therefore be to classify and define the five rs or fallacies and then to define a geag as one that is infected with one or more of them.

[[3]]

Annambhaṭṭa has avoided the difficulty by simply enumerating in the text only the five kinds of gigs without defining हेत्वाभास (दुष्टहेतु ) in general, and then adding the definition of a 4 as added in T. D. The remark of Nilakantha shows that the word arrer is used by the author in two different senses in the text and in the com- mentary. In the text it means a grad, since the five class- names given are names of thes, while the definition in T. D. is that usually given of a. The five errors in a corresponding to the five as mentioned in the text

[[38]]

[[208]]

Tarha-Sangraha.

[SECT. LII.

are given by N. B., as anar (discrepancy), fatru (con- trariety), arg (counter-balance) efa (inconclusive- ness) and are (absurdity). The five apparent reasons which derive their names from these errors are respectively called

fare ( discrepant, or inconsistent), fase ( contrary ), सत्प्रतिपक्ष ( counter-balanced ), असिद्ध ( inconclusive ) and बाधित (absurd or futile ).

of reason.

T. D. defines a हेतुदोष as अनुमितिप्रतिबन्धकयथार्थज्ञानविषयः, ’that which is the subject of a right know- Errors or defects ledge which prevents a judgment. The errors named above prevent a conclusion that would otherwise follow from the reason given. Thus in the syllogism हद वह्निमान् धूमाल, the judgment that the lake is fiery would follow in due course, if it were not for our certain knowledge that there is no smoke on the lake. This knowledge becomes theretore अनुमितिप्रतिबन्धक, and the subject of that knowledge, namely the absence of smoke ou the lake, becomes a हेतुदोष. But why say यथार्थज्ञान : The word warf is used to prevent an erroneous knowledge of a दोष from obstructing even a valid अनुमिति. As for example, our familiar syllogism पर्वतो बाह्नमान् धूमात् may be opposed by an erroneous perception that there is uo fire on the mountain. The game however being only a ¥¤ ought not to make the हेतु in पर्वत ह्निमान् बाधित etc.; and hence the restriction that the knowledge of ar or any other must itself be right, knowledge, and not a w merely.
The definition however is imperfect in another way, because it does not cover those हेतुदोषs, such as व्यभिचार, विरोध, साधनाप्रसिद्धि and स्वरूपासिद्धि, which do not prevent ar अनुमिति directly but only indirectly, by preventing व्याप्तिज्ञान or हेतुज्ञान or परामर्श, and are thus अन्यथासिद्ध themselves so far as grâtāvarer is concerned. Nilakantha therefore remarks, तत्रातुमितिपदमजहल्लक्षणयाऽनुमितितत्करणान्यतरपरम् । तेन व्यभिचारादिज्ञानस्य परामर्शप्रतिबन्धकतयैव निर्वाहादनुमित्यप्रतिबन्धकत्वेऽपेि व्यभिचारादिषु नाव्यातिः. The word अनुमिति in the definition is to be cnlarged so as to include अनुमितिकरण that is परामर्श, व्याप्तिज्ञान or

SEOT. LII. ]

Notes.

[[299]]

लिङ्गज्ञान, whatever it may be. In this way व्यभिचार and other दोषs which directly affect the अनुमितिकरण only but not the sara, will be included in the definition. The same result might be obtained, says the author of the Didhiti, by taking अनुमिति to mean not a simple judgment पर्वतो वह्निमाद, but faforeigîata, as angeurergmara våd af. Other writers like T. K. avoid the difficulty by actually introducing the word तत्करण after अनुमिति in the definition.

Erroneous reasons or fallacies.

After knowing what a r is, it is easy to define a दुष्टहेतु as निरुक्तदोषवान्. Another definition of a ty given by T. B. and Śankara Misra is यस्य हेतोर्याबन्ति रूपाणि गम- कौपयिकानि तदन्यतररूपहीनः ’ wanting in any of the five or four requisites of a good. This latter definition is simpler as well as more scientific, because it takes away the necessity of recognizing so many geres, all of which can in fact be reduced to the absence of one Or more of the five requisites of a सद्धेतु.
Although all writers are practically agreed as to the definition of a rare, there is no such unanimity about their number. The chief divergence of views is between the Nai- yâyikas, who on the authority of Gotama recognize five fallacious reasons mentioned by Annambhatta, and the Vais- eshikas, who following Kanada accept only three, namely, सव्यभिचार, विरुद्ध and असिद्ध. The divergence is not however radical, for the last two, a¶g and anfura, which Gotama enumerates separately, are included by Vaiseshikas either under आश्रयासिद्ध or under सव्याभिचार or अनैकान्तिक as it is often called. Again the names of the several genres are not the same in all books. Gotama names the five as weura- चार विरुद्ध प्रकरणसम, साध्यसम aud अतीतकाल. + of these the first two are identical with those given by Annambhaṭṭa. or is defined as that which leaves the conclusion

V. S. Up. Calc. ed. p. 159.

† Ibid p. 150

‡Q S. I, 2, 45.

[[300]]

Tarka–Sangraha.

SEOT. LII.

doubtful, owing to the opposition of an equally strong argu- ment on the other side,* and is therefore the same on our सत्प्रतिपक्ष. A साध्यसम हेतु is that which is as doubtful as the साध्य, and which is therefore असिद्ध. कालातीत corresponds to our af. Kanada’s aphorism† is a little obscure, but his doctrine is unmistakably summed up in the verse of an un- known writer, quoted by Prasastapâda, federa¤íog artrutsaatत् । ’ Kasyapa or Kanada declared three false reasons, विरुद्ध, असिद्ध and सन्दिग्ध ’ Of these विरुद्ध and असिद्ध are the same as ours, while सन्दिग्ध corresponds to सव्यभिचार or अनैकान्तिक• A fourth one named अनध्यवसित is also added by some writers, but it is, says Sankara Misra, identical with अनुपसंहारि and therefore comes under अनैकान्तिक. Bad- dhists, like the author of Nyâya-Bindu, adopt the enum- eration and terminology of Kanada. The sub-divisions of सव्यभिचार and असिद्धappear to be the work of modern writers.

Formal and Mate- rial fallacies.

It is obvious that the difference between Gotama and Kanada mainly lies in the recognition of सत्प्रतिपक्ष and बाधित. These together form a separate group of material fallacies, as distinguished from the other three,which may for convenience be called formal fallacies. Many European logicians regard material fallacies as being out of the province of logic, and a similar reason may have prompted Kanada to exclude re- तिपक्ष and बाधित from his list of हेत्वाभासs. The exclusion of असत्प्रतिपक्षत्व and अबाधितत्व, ( which correspond to the two treteras सत्प्रतिपक्ष and बाधित) by some writers from among the five requisites of a good may be accounted for on the same ground. It must. however be stated to prevent any misunder- standing, that there is in Indian Logic no such clearly-marked division of formal and material fallacies as was laid down by Aristotle under the two names of fallacia in dictione, and fallacia extra dictionem. It will be found later on that some varieties of अनैकान्तिक and असिद्ध when reduced to an English syllogism, disclose material fallacies, while others are formal

G. S. 2, 48. † V. S. III. I, 15.SECT. LIII. ]

Notes.

[[301]]

fallacies. The fact is that the peculiar form of Sanskrit syllogism did not permit a clear demarkation of formal form material fallacies, nor are the two so separated in practice. Most of the so-called formal fallacies involve material miscon- ceptions or over-statements, while almost all the material fallacies can be avoided by a strict adherence to the syllogistic form. The distinction is purely artificial, and has not been

observed by the Naiyâyikas.

SECT. LIII,

affair:

The discrepant reason is one that coexists partially. It is threefold, over-wide, peculiar and non-exclusive. One that coexists with negation of the thing to be proend is over-wide; e, g, mountain is fiery because it is knowable, since knowability exists with absence of fire on a lake. Peculiar is that which is not found either in similar or contrary instances; e. y. Sound is eternal because it is Word. The genus word is absent from all eternal and non-eternal things, and resides in Sound only. Non-exclusive is that which has neither similar nor dis- similar instances; e. g. Every thing is transitory because it is knowable. Here everything being the subject of inference there is no separate example.

Discrepant rea-

SOB.

हूँ

सव्यभिचार is व्यभिचारेण सह वर्तमानः ’that which involves a zafrane or discrepancy of the g with the साध्य.’ It is defined as अनेकान्तिक, or co- existing with the art only partially.’ Thus if one says नित्यः शब्दोऽस्पर्शत्वात्, यत्र यत्रास्पर्शत्वाभावः (स्पर्श- ari ) तत्र तचानित्यत्वं यथा मृत्कुम्भे , the हेतु will be अनैकान्तिक or aufrufta, because there are the earthy atoms which though स्पर्शवत् are नित्य just as there is बुद्धि which is both अस्पर्श and अनित्य. Hence the व्याप्ति is not correct; that is, the हेतु co- exists partially with the साध्य, partially with the साध्याभाव, and entirely with neither. Vatsyayana explains the word अनैकान्तिक as, नित्यत्वमेकाऽन्तः । अनित्यत्वमेकोन्तः । एकस्मिन्नन्ते विद्यत इतेि ऐकान्तिकः विपर्ययादनैकान्तिक उभयान्तव्यापकत्वात् * । The word सव्यभिचार implies the same thing, for व्यभिचार or सव्यभिचारत्व has been defined साध्यसन्देहजनको भयकोट्युपस्थापकतावच्छेदकरूपवत्त्वम्, that is, it is a property which leads to the proof of both साध्य and its negation, and thus causes donbt about the साध्य’- The सव्यभिचार has a tendency to prove both साध्य and its negation because it is coexistent with both; and the

Fat. on. G. §, 1, 2, 56.

[[302]]

Tarka-Sangraha..

[ SEOT. LIII.

simultaneous knowledge of these two extremes, produces सन्देह of the साध्य which is उभयकोटिकज्ञान. Hence Kanidr calls अनैकान्तिक by the name of सन्दिग्ध.

Its three varieties.

Over-wide mark.

•

raefeart is sub-divided into three varieties साधारण (Over-wide), असाधारण, (Peculiar) and अनुप - संहारी (Non-exclusive ). Of these साधारण or the over-wide mark is that which is found both on the rg and the farer, that is, which co-exists both with are and its negation. Annambhaṭṭa defines a rar simply as one that coexists with rear, but the full definition would be that given by T. K. सपक्षविपक्षवृत्ति. The reason why Annambhatta omits सपक्षातत्व from his definition is that it is necessarily implied in an अन्वाये हेतु such as the साधारण is, and need not therefore be particularly mentioned. As an illustration of error the author gives “Mountain is fiery, because it is knowable”; where the reason knowability,’ exists both in things known to possess fire as the ordinary hearth, and also things that have no fire, as a lake. The प्रमेयत्व being thus associated with both वह्नि and बह्नवभाव, there is no reason why one should be inferred from it and not the other; but both cannot exist together and hence the g is fallacions. Similarly in पर्वतो धूमवान् वह्नेः, the हेतु वह्नि is साधारण, being found to co-exist both with a in agra

धूमाभाव in अयोगोलक.

{

and with

The असाधारण or Peculiar is just the opposite of साधारण, being found neither in सपक्ष nor in विपक्ष. Its absence in the farer is of course natural. because even a good is non-existent in

Peculiar mark.

विपक्ष; but the fallacy of असाधारण consists in its being absent in er also. If the Tor is over-wide, owing to its trespassing in the forbidden reason of विपक्ष, this is not wide enough as it does not even cover the legitimate ground of . One errs on the side of excess, the other on that of defect; and thus both are equally falla- cious. The असाधारण, in fact, as its

its name denotes

SEOT. LIII. ]

Notes.

[[303]]

is a peculiar characteristic of the qr which exists nowhere else, and for which therefore no agere can be found. As for example, if we say, “Sound is eternal, because it has the nature of sound,” the nature of sound, a, is a peculiar characteristic of sound; and being so, can lead to no valid conclusion. In this case the Ter instances, e. g. those having the area fer, would be ether and other eternal things, while the far instances would be all non-eternal products, such as a jar. They exists in neither, and

hence it is called असाधारण-

Non-exclusive

mark.

The third variety of सव्यभिचार is अनुपसंहार (Non-exclu- sive) which is defined in the text as one that has neither & सपक्ष nor a विपक्ष दृष्टान्त, ’ that is, which is never present where the TET is present, excepting of course the r itself. Now this can happen only when all things in this world are in- cluded in qr, and so nothing is left outside the range of ver that can be denominated सपक्ष or विपक्ष. The definitions given in T. K. and T. A. make this quite clear. They are, वस्तुमात्रपक्षकः or सर्वपक्षकः, ‘one in which the universality of things is the qer,’ that is one in which the wrer is unascer- tained ( vara ) of all things in the world, and there is there- fore no सपक्ष or विपक्ष where the साध्य or its negation might be said to be ascertained (fra). The example given in the text is “All things are transient, because they are know- able " where सर्व being the पक्ष, there is no सपक्ष or विपक्ष apart from it. But why cannot the individuals, says an objector, serve as we or far that is, why cannot we argue, सर्वमनित्यं । प्रमेयत्वात् । यत्र यत्र प्रमेयत्वं तत्रानित्यत्वं । यथा घटे पटे कुडचे वा । ? It cannot be said that the साध्य being सन्दिग्ध in सर्व, it is necessarily so in घट, पट and कुडच ; for first the साध्य ( प्रमेयत्व ) may be निश्चित in the पक्ष at one time, and be सन्दिग्ध at another; and secondly uncertainty as to the whole does not necessarily imply an equal uncertainty as to individuals or some parts of that whole. घट and पट therefore which are certainly transient might very well serve as #THEZIFA to prove enfara ou af. To remove this objection modern

[[304]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

SMOT. LIII.

Naiyayikas define un अनुपसंहारि 05 केवलान्वयिधर्मसाध्यकः ‘one in which the is only positively connected with the and so there is neither & व्यतिरेकव्याप्ति nor & व्यतिरेकदृष्टान्त. But this latter definition also is faulty, as it would apply even to & केवलान्वाये सद्धेतु. The proper answer to the first objection would be that in an agrégnfè, although there may be indi- vidual things in which the ear is ascertained, there is no व्याति either of the अन्वयि or of the व्यतिरेकि kind, since the conclusion itself constitutes the widest possible genera- lization. The name gift, (Non-exclusive) is given to this fallacy because the a being universal nothing is excluded from it.

Now it may be asked, why are these three fallacies, ap- parently so dissimilar, and the last a quite anomalous case, classed under

? A closer examination of the definitions and examples of the three varieties will how- ever show that there is a common principle underlying the division, and that principle is derived from the general definition of ear itself.

A wahrene or discrepant reason has been defined as one which is not uniformly concomitant with are, that is, which uniformly exists neither with साध्य nor with साध्याभाव. It

The three-fold di- vision explained.

[[9]]

two requisites of a gag, Now there are four and

is neither purely अन्वयि, nor purely व्यतिरेकि, nor both com - pletely, but half of this and half of that. It is thus defective in either or both of the namely, सपक्षसत्त्व and विपक्षव्यावृत्ति. only four ways in which the two properties may be pre- dicated of a , namely, both may be present, both may be absent, or either may be present when the other is absent. Thus we have four cases: (1) presence of both wygra and fargsurfer; (2) absence of both of them; (3) presence of सपक्षसत्त्व, but absence of विपक्षव्यावृत्ति; (4) absence of सपक्ष सत्व but presence of fargranata. The first is undoubtedly a case of wag, as both the requisites are present, and may therefore he left out.. In the latter three cases the is

SMOT. LIII. 1

Notes.

[[305]]

obviously defective, and is respectively called agrégn?, साधारण and असाधारण अनुपसंहारि has been defined as one that has neither a सपक्ष nor a furereटान्त; that is, there is no सपक्ष on which the हेतु co-exists with साध्य, nor a विपक्ष from which the हेतु is व्यावृत्त just as the साध्य is. अनुपसंहारि has therefore neither of the two properties, सपक्षसत्त्व and विपक्षव्यावृत्ति. The third case is that of a rerror which is defined as existing both on the सपक्ष and the विपक्ष; that is, there is सपक्षसत्त्व but no विपक्षव्यावृत्ति. The fourth is असाधारण which, as non- existing on both wer and far instances, possesses only विपक्षव्यावृत्ति, but not सपक्षसत्त्व. The three varieties are thus nothing but the three possible ways in which the fanffata (defectiveness) of a fer may occur.

Kevalânvayi and Kevalavyatireki distinguished.

One more point remains to be noticed in connection with these, and especially the last two साधारण and असाधारण, namely, in what re- spect they do respectively differ from - लान्वयि and केवलव्यतिरेकि सद्धेतुs. The in- stances of साधारण and असाधारण given in the text are very similar to those given for केवलान्वयि and केवलव्यतिरेकि, and no distinction can at first sight be made between the two pairs. A comparison of the illustrations will however show the difference. Thus पर्वतो वह्निमान् प्रमेयत्वात् is a साधारण, while पर्वतोऽभिधेयः प्रमेयत्वात् is a केवलान्वयि. The difference bea tween the two lies in the r which is co-extensive with the in the latter case, but not so in the first. Similarly पृथिवीतरेभ्यो भियते पृथिवीस्वात् or गन्धवत्त्वाद । is केवलव्यतिरेकि while पृथिवी नित्या पृथिवीत्वात् will be असाधारण, the difference being the same, namely, that there in a baccurate is co-extensive with the, but not so in the rear. Now why should this difference make one a good and the other a bad inference? The reason is obvious. When the T and

coincide with each other, there is no are or discre pancy between the two, although we cannot always have a पक्ष or freeष्टान्त. The essence of साधारण and असाधारण lies not so much in the absence of सपक्ष or विपक्ष हृष्टान्त, but in the imperfect generalization, the absence of the area only indi- cating the व्याभिचार or defect in the व्याप्ति.

[[39]]

[[306]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

SECT. LIV. Aaza:

[ SHOT. LIV

Contrary reason is that which is percnded by the negation of the thing to be proved, e. y. Sound is eternal because it is created. Creatibility is covered by the negation of eternity or“, - transitoriness.

for contrary reason is that which is less ex- tensive than the negation of me and is never coexistent with greq.’ As when we

Contrary reason.

扇

say, Sound is eternal, because it is artifi- cial,’ the reason, artificialness’ coincides with fear or अनित्यत्व and not with नित्यत्व. We have the व्याप्ति, यत्र यत्र arera तत्रानित्यत्वं यथा घण्टे, but not यत्र यत्र कृतकत्वं तत्र नित्यत्वम्. The हेतु area being thus नित्यत्वाभावव्याप्य, it becomes a साधक or हेतु of that अभाव, and not of its प्रतियोगि नित्यत्वs that is, the artificialness of sound is exactly the reason why sound should be non-eternal. Thus the fallacy consists in drawing a conclusion just contrary to that which would be justified by the reason. This accords well with Gotama’s definition fagra- सभ्युपेत्य तद्विरोधी विरुद्धः ’ विरुद्ध is that which is contrary to the conclusion desired to be drawn.’

विरुद्ध differs from साधारण सव्यभिचार in never existing on the ч as the latter does; while it differs from errareor in existing on the unlike the latter which does not. The chief distinction between far and face is that in the former the r is only imperfect or defective, while in the latter it is actually contrary. There is only a discre- pancy in the first; there is direct opposition in the second.

SECT. LV.

enfàgg:

The ambiguous or inconclusive reason is that wherein there is another reason proving the negation of the thing to be proved; e. g. Sound is eternal, because it is audible like any other sound; and sound is non-eternal, because it is a creation like a jar.

*G. S. I, 2, 47.

SBOT. LY.

Notes.

[[307]]

The rear differs from a fa in this, that while in the latter the very same which ought to prove arra is given as a reason for proving the साध्य, in सत्प्रतिपक्ष the हेतु which proves साध्याभाव is different ( हेत्वन्तर ) from

Satpratipaksha or Counter-balanced

reason.

that actually given. For example, if we say ‘Sound is eternal, because it is apprehended by the organ of hearing’, the given, namely श्रवणत्व, does not prove नित्यत्व; but neither does it prove नित्यत्वाभाव. The अनित्यत्व however is proved by another, a, in such an inference as, Sound is non- eternal, because it is artificial. In the is incon-

विरुद्ध हेतु sistent with are in the same inference; in erfarer it is incon- sistent with the साक्ष्य in a contrary inference. सत्प्रतिपक्ष is classed by Vaiseshikas under faa, of which it is in one sense a species; but there is a clear distinction between the two. In afaa the wrer of the inference in question is actual- ly disproved by a stronger proof of another kind, such as perception; as for instance, if one says “Fire is cold be- cause it is a substance,” the area is proved to be false by our actual perception of the heat of fire, according to the maxim प्रत्येक्षणानुमानं बाध्यते. In सत्प्रतिपक्ष there is no such बाध of the inference by a stronger proof, but only a counter- balancing of two inferences, which being of equal weight, are mutually destructive, but neither prevails over the other. This peculiarity of fare was well expressed by the more significant name,

(Inconclusive) which Gotama gave it, Gotama’s definition of प्रकरणसम is यस्मात्प्रकरणचिन्ता स निर्णयार्थमपदिष्टः प्रकरणसमः । * प्रकरण is an argument, and its चिन्ता is the curiosity (जिज्ञासा) or expectancy (आकाङ्क्षा) which is creat- ed in the course of the argument, and remains until it is satisfi- ed by a certain and well-grounded conclusion. An inference which is inconsequential owing to being counter-balanced [or opposed by a contrary inference of equal weight] does not remove this प्रकरणचिन्ता; and hence & प्रकरणसम is defined as a which though propounded for the purpose of giving a certain conclusion (farang:) leaves the expecta- tion of a certain conclusion unfulfilled.’ It is therefore sur¬ सम) that is, as Vatsyayant explains it, प्रकरणमनतिवर्तमानः always remaining in the stage of a non-concluded argu.. ment. The word water also conveys the same sense, but rather distantly. The author of dhiti interprets it as a

G. S. I, 2, 48.

प्रकरण-

[[308]]

Tarha-Sangraha.

[ SHOT. LV.

( विद्यमानः ) विरोधिव्याप्तयादिभत्तया परामृश्यमाणो हेतुः विरोधिपरामर्शो वा यस्थ परावृश्यमाणस्य हेतोरसी सत्प्रतिपक्षः । To understand this derivation, it must be observed that when there are two mutually destructive inferences containing the two as that are warfarer of each other, the judgment is impeded because the two gs give rise to distinct as leading to quite contrary conclusions. It is needless perhaps to point out that a weaver is such, only so long as it is of equal weight with its contrary ( तुल्यबलयोरेव सत्प्रतिपक्षत्वं नातुल्यबलयो- रिति नियमः). As soon as the प्रतिपक्ष becomes stronger by any reason, the former ceases to be a farer, and becomes a a Thus if there are two arguments, one in harmony with the Śruti or any other rar, and the other opposed to it, the other one is an on account of the greater weight of the former.

SECT. LVI.

fère:

Futile reason is of three sorts: having non-existent subject, nonexistent reason, and non-existent concomitance. Non-existent subject is thus:-Skyey lotus is fragrant because it is a lotus like a lotus in a lake. Here skyey lotus is the subject, but it does not exist at all. A Non-existent reason is this Sound is a quality because it is ocular. Here Sound is not ocular as it is audible. Non-existent concomitance is one which in- volves a limitation or condition. Condition is that which pervades the thing to be proved, but is not pervaded by the reason. Pervasion of the thing to be proced means not having absolute negation co-existent with the thing; while non-per- vasion by reason means having absolute negation co-existing with the reason. In ’the mountain is smoky because it has fire,’ contact with wet fuel is the condition. For instance, wherever there is smoke there is contact of wet fuel. Wherever there is fire, there is no contact of wet fuel; e. g. there is no contact of wet fuel in an iron ball. Thus wet fuel is the condition because it pervades the thing to be proved and is not pervaded by the reason. Fieriness is a futile reason owing to the condition.

The fourth हेत्वाभास is असिद्ध ’ inconclusive or unproved reason, which Gotama calls wa(similar to ), on account of its being as doubt- ful as the साध्य. * An असिद्ध हेतु is one that

eng

Asiddha or Incon- clusive reason.

[[7]]

has the दोष called असिद्धि, and असिद्धि is defined by Udaya-

G. S. I, 2, 49.

SHOT. LVI. ]

Notes.

[[309]]

fare (which gives rise knowledge of परामर्श. As

ndcharya as व्याप्तस्य पक्षधर्मतया प्रमितिः सिद्धिस्तदभावः ’ absence of the सिद्धि which consists in the true cognition of the साध्य- व्याप्यहेतु as a property of the पक्षः’ or, briefly speaking, असिद्धि is the non-production of परामर्श. Hence असिद्धि has been defined as any cause, other than a to सव्यभिचार ), which obstructs the परामर्श (व्याप्तिविशिष्टपक्षधर्मताज्ञान) is composed of three elements, corresponding to the three terms of the syllogism, namely व्याप्ति, पक्षता and पक्षधर्मतr or हेतुता, the obstruction to the knowledge off will be caused by a defect or error in the apprehension of any of its three constituents. Thus an naturally resolves into three varieties, formed according as the error lies in the knowledge of, or of or of व्याप्ति. The first is called आश्रयासिद्ध, the second स्वरूपासिद्ध, and the third व्याप्यत्वासिद्ध.

First kind of Asiddha.

Annambhaṭṭa only enumerates the three varieties, without defining either are in general or its first two varieties. erg is defined as पक्षतावच्छेदकाभाववत्पक्षकः, that is ‘a हेत the subject or place of which is devoid of the distinctive character of the supposed qr.’ Thus in the example, “A sky-lotus is fragrant, because it is a lotus,” the reasoning would be correct if the qr sky-lotus had been a real thing; but being only an imaginary thing, it is devoid of the essence of the supposed, namely, a. Here the qr is not अरविन्द simply, but गगनीयत्वविशिष्ट Or गगनीयत्वावच्छिन्न अरविन्द, and hence the पक्षतावच्छेदक or the essence of पक्षता is गगनीयत्व which never exists on an arr. In this case, being misled by the metaphorical application of the word अरावेन्द्र to गगनारविन्द्र we attribute the qualities of a real lotus to a fictitious thing,the existence of which is quite hypothetical or unproved. Here the rearrच्छेदकधर्म is गगनीयत्य, because it distinguishes गगनार- विन्द, the पक्ष in this ense, from other lotuses; and as अरविन्द itself is a real thing, the falsity of mare must be due to the non-existence of its er, the andru, according to the maxim, when a property predicated of a qualified thing (fare) cannot reside in the qualified (fast), it is attri- buted to the qualification ( सति विशेष्ये बाधे विशिष्टा बुद्धिर्विशेषण- मुपसङ्क्रामति ). In the present instance there is on the पक्ष the

[[310]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

[SHOT. LVI.

non-existence of the पक्षतावच्छेदकधर्म, that is, गगनीयत्व. An आश्रय or पक्ष however may be असिद्ध in two ways, either by being altogether non-existent, as in the above example, or by wanting the character of पक्षता, that is, सिषाधयिषाविरह etc. Take, for example, शरीरं हस्तादिमत्, हस्तादिमत्तयाप्रतीयमानत्वात्. Here the हेतु being identical with the साध्य ( हस्तादिमत्त्व ), the argument is mere fara, ‘proving what is already proved.’ As there is no fa here, the rar is wanting in the essential character of T, and is therefore en. Hence T. D. remarks under the next section that according to ancients सिद्धसाधन comes under आश्रयासिद्ध, while moderns regard it as a separate fur and not a fallacy.

पक्षता,

The second variety

The second kind,

and non-existence, is so called, because in it the हेतु itself is असिद्ध, .. non-existent on the q; as in the example given in the text, the gargar does not

हेतु चाक्षुषत्व exist on शब्द. Other examples of स्वरूपासिद्ध are व्हदो वह्निमान् धूमाद, घटः पृथिवी पटत्वात् सामान्यमनित्यं कृतकत्वात्, or शशादि- pat faaríorara, in all of which it will be marked that the हेतु is non-existent on the पक्ष. It differs from आश्रयासिद्ध in this, that in the latter the errare is either false or not a proper पक्ष, while in the former, both हेतु and आश्रय may be real things but there is no connection between them, or rather the negation of हेतु, and not the हेतु, resides in the पक्ष स्वरू पासिद्ध has many sub-varieties, such as शुद्धासिद्ध, भागासिद्ध, विशेषणासिद्ध aud विशेष्यासिद्ध, all of which ultimately resolve into the general characteristic that the, as it is taken, is non-existent on the rer. In this respect

may be said to be complimentary to सव्याभिचार, सत्प्रतिपक्ष and बाधित. The three varieties of ere, as has been already shown, turn on the existence or the non-existence of two of the five requisites of a सङ्केतु, namely सपक्षसत्त्व and विपक्षव्यावृत्ति, while matary and are due to the neglect of the last two requisites, and is due to the absence of the first and the most important requisite, namely rare. Not that the is unreal or non-existent in itself, but that it lacks the

! 1SHOT. LVI.

Notes.

[[311]]

essential character of हेतुता, namely पक्षधर्मता. The real deti - nition of a स्वरूपासिद्ध therefore is हेतोः पक्षावृत्तित्वम्.

The third kind.

erant, non-existent concomitance or improper limitation, is defined by Annambhatta as ‘a mark which has a ( suppressed ) condition (a), that is, which is true conditionally only. T. K. and the older writers generally define it as साध्यव्याप्यतावच्छेदकरहितो हेतुः ’ & mark which is devoid of the distinguishing attribute that is necessary to make it re- व्याप्य. When the, in the form in which it is given, is not known to be invariably accompanied by the re, it is not माध्यव्याप्य, that is, its व्याप्यत्व is असिद्ध or doubtful. Such a हेतु is wanting in the proper व्याप्यतावच्छेदकधर्म, either by excess when it is too generally stated, or by defect when it is unnecessarily restricted by a limitation that might be totally false or superfluous. Any way the is different from what it ought to be, and its rear is therefore questionable. A स्वरूपासिद्ध हेतु does not exist on the पक्षः while a व्याप्यत्वासिद्ध is not invariably associated with साध्य. In one the grafar is vitiated; in the other the ma is faulty. The stock example is पर्वतो वह्निमान काञ्चनमयधूमात ’the mountain is fiery because it has golden smoke.’ Here although mere धूम is वह्निव्याप्य, काञ्चनमयधूम is not, for the additional epithet makes it a different thing which is not invariably associated with fire. In this example the su स्वावच्छेदक धर्म is not mere yaa but काञ्चनमयधूमत्व or rather काञ्चनमयत्व, which does not exist on the हेतु : and hence धूम is व्याप्यत्वासिद्ध.

Difference bel- ween ancients and moderns.

So far there is not much difference of opinion, but an- cients and moderns are as usual divided as to the exact scope of this fallacy. In the above example, the epithet renner is not only superfluous, but makes the unreal. Suppose how- ever we have पर्वतो वह्निमान् नीलधूमात्. Here although the adjective is superfluous, it does not make the actually false, and the argument will in spite of it be valid. Hence

[[312]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

[ SECT. LVI.

the moderns do not regard it as a case of errer, but only a fault of language, called aft (tautology). The ancients. however include the case under व्याप्यत्वासिद्ध, becanse नीलer, being a needless limitation of, is as misleading as FÆFATT, and cannot therefore be the proper व्याप्यतावच्छेदक धर्म. The reason why this is regarded as sertranfire fallacy by the ancients appears to be that the addition of the qualifica- tion are conveys by implication that unqualified v is not वह्निव्याप्य, and that it is the limitation नीलवत्त्व that brings it within the pale of the व्याप्ति. नीलत्त्र thus becomes zurcqarodge, which it really is not.

Now this en

Non-concomitance is of two kinds.

of and may occur in two ways, either when the concomitance is not proved owing to its non-observance in any other place, or when it is actually proved to be false owing to the presence of some 3 or condition. Accordingly there are two varieties of व्याप्यत्वासिद्ध, (1) साध्ये- नासहचरितः ’ Dot concomitant with साध्यः’ and ( 2 ) सोपाधिक- साध्यसम्बन्धः ’ concomitant with साक्ष्य only conditionally. The instance of the first is शब्दः क्षणिकः सत्त्वात । यद्यत्सत्तत्क्षणिकं यथा धनः, where the invariable concomitance of सत्त्व and क्षणिकत्व is not proved. The cases of काञ्चनमयधूम and नीलधूम would also apparently come under this class, because there too the an is not proved. The other variety is that of a conditional व्याप्ति and is ordinarily known as सोपाधिक हेतु. The familiar example of & सोपाधिक is पर्वतो धूमवान् वह्नेः, where वह्नि is not absolutely, but becomes so only when we add the condition andqìà wiâ; that is, fire in general is not invariably accompanied by smoke, but fire in contact with wet fuel is. Hence the in this case, namely af, is maders- व्याप्य only when we add to it the limitation आर्द्रेन्धनसंयोगवान्. The is too widely stated and requires to be restricted to make the arra true. In one sense this case is the converse of

я. In that case the fallacy consisted in the addition of an unnecessary restriction, while in this, it con- sists in the omission of a necessary one. In both cases, however,

SHOT. LVI. ]

Notes.

[[313]]

the squaredge is equally false, and hence the general defini- tion of a crane applies to both.

Annambhaṭṭa’s definition.

After having comprehended what are really is, the student will be in a position to understand and correctly estimate An- nambhatta’s statement that a me ty is व्याप्यत्वासिद्ध. There is a difference of opinion as to the true meaning of this statement. S. C. takes it as a definition of sangenare, but it will be seen from what has been said above that can properly be a definition of only one kind of an, and does not at all apply to instances like. On the other hand Nilakantha seems to take the statement not as a definition, but as a reply to those who class सोपाधिक as a separate हेत्वाभास. The inter- pretation of Nilakantha would undoubtedly be preferable, as it saves the author from a palpable error; but there is against it the unequivocal statement of T. D. - व्याप्यत्वासिद्धस्य लक्षणमाह सोपाधिक इति. We have no choice therefore bnt to agree with S. C. in taking the sentence as a definition. There are only two suppositions on which Annambhaṭṭa’s definition can be reconciled with the general doctrine of व्याप्यत्वासिद्ध. Either he included instances like काञ्चनमय- धूमात् and शब्दः क्षणिकः Hara ander सोपाधिक itself, or he relegated them to some other head of Tre. Both sup- positions are plausible and may be partly true. In the in- ference, for example, शब्दः क्षणिकः सस्वात् we can conceive of an उपाधि such as उत्पत्तिमत्वे सति, or ध्वंसप्रतियोगित्वे सति, so that ether and other eternal things may not be grfor simply be- cause they exist. Thus the हेतु सत्व will be सोपाधिक. Simi- larly we might regard काचनमयधूमाद as an instance of स्वरूपा- fire, since, there being no such thing as awwwym in the world, the is non-existent on the war. In this manner we can perhaps justify Annambhatta’s definition; but the fact that it is inconsistent with the express views of other eminent authorities such as Gangesśa, Raghunatha, and Viś- vanátha is undeniable. On the other hand there is a distinct school of writers who exclude even the

[[40]]

ÊRE

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Tarka-Sangraha.

[ BBQT. LVI.

proper from the class of असिद्ध हेतु, and put it under सव्याभ- चार; and their reasoning is very plausible. उपाधि, they say, vitiates व्याप्ति, which in its turn destroys परामर्श उपाधि is therefore not a direct cause of अनुमितिप्रतिबन्ध उपाधि pro- duces व्यभिचार of व्याप्ति, and that व्यभिचार obstructs the अनु- मिति० उपाधि therefore being अन्यथासिद्ध is not itself & हेतुदोष, the real दोष in all the सोपाधिक हेतुs being the व्यभिचार which springs from उपाधि Hence सोपाधिक is in fact only & spe- cies of guftar. The difference between this view and the generally accepted opinion is that the former includes the सोपाधिक under सव्यभिचार because there is the व्यभिचार, while the latter includes it under

because there

is the असिद्धि of व्याप्ति.

Asiddhi distin- guished from Vya- bhichara.

A question here arises as to what distinction can be made between व्याभचार and असिद्धि of व्याप्ति ? The distinction is important, because it is that on which the difference between a व्याप्यत्वासिद्ध and & साधारण सव्यभिचार depends. Apparently the two are identical, because both of them denote the break of the invariable concomitance of and g. The distinction is rather nicely drawn, but it is real. It is that व्यभिचार is positive while व्याप्यत्वासिद्धि is negative.

far is the cause which actually disturbs the invariable concomitance; &ff is only the absence of that concomitance. व्यभिचार is the certainty that the व्याप्ति is false, असिद्धि is the uncertainty that it is real. Tar is therefore stronger and more palpable, while an occurs more frequently in practice and is not easily detected. Instances often occur in which we strongly suspect that the generalization is imperfect, but we cannot positively say why it is so. The example शब्दः क्षणिकः सत्वात् is of this kind, for we can neither say that for and are associated, nor that they are not. To take a common instance, both gravity and elasticity being common properties of all matter are found in- variably associated with each other; and yet we cannot say that

SHOT. LVI. ]

Notes.

$15

one is er of the other. The concluding remark of N. B., where this distinction is expressed in a peculiarly technical language, though somewhat obscure, amonnts to the same thing. T.D.’s dictum that in साधारण there is an अव्यभि- चाराभाव, . . व्यभिचार, while in व्याप्यत्वासिद्ध there is विशिष्ट- व्याप्तयभाव, , is really the same distinction expressed in a slight- ly different way. In are we are assured of the non- existence of व्यभिचाराभाव, ie of the actual existence of व्यभिचार, while in असिद्ध we are certain only of the non-exist - ence of af, but cannot positively say whether there is au actually व्यभिचरित व्याप्ति.

व्याप्यत्वासिद्ध has been defined as सोपाधिक, but the mean- ing of the latter phrase cannot be under- stood unless we know what an

Upadhi.

is.

सोपाधिक is a हेतु that is true conditionally ; but what is a condition? Etymologically the word en is interpreted by Udayanacharya as उप समीपवर्तिनि आदधाति सङ्क्रा aafa tari धर्ममित्युपाधिः. It is a thing which imparts its own property to another object placed in its vicinity, as a red Hower which makes the crystal placed over it look like a ruby by imparting to it its own redness, not really but seem- ingly. The flower is therefore the 3. Similarly the all- pervading Akasa appears to have dimensions and form when circumscribed in a jar, because the fear of its gqr the घट is for the time being imparted to it. उपाधि is therefore the condition or the surrounding circumstances, individually and collectively, which give a thing its distinctive cha- racter for the time being, and make it look as it appears to us. Although therefore a thing may generally belong to a class, its specific character by which we usually distinguish the thing from other species or individuals of the same class is given to it by its 34. Thus though

उपाधि. smoke may be generally said to be produced from fire, the specific and immediate cause of its production is the pre- sence of wet fuel, for it is wet fuel that, when ignited, in- variably gives out smoke. There is therefore an invariable concomitance (cama) between wet fuel and smoke, for the smoke

[[316]]: Tarka-Sangraha.

CBOT. LVI.

cannot exist without is entr It is not however &

being the immediate effect of wet fnel, its cause, the wet fuel. In other words and आर्द्रेन्धनसंयोग is the व्यापक of धूम. general rule that wet fuel exists wherever there is fire, for fire may exist on dry fuel or without any fuel at all, as in a red-hot iron ball. Therefore आर्द्रेन्धनसंयोग is not the व्यापक of बहेि. Thus आर्द्रेन्धनसंयोग, which is the उपाधि of धूम, that is, the invariable condition on which the production of smoke depends, may be described as भूमव्यापकत्वे सति वह्न्यव्यापकः, that is, it is more extensive than and less extensive than It is intermediate between the two, and is in fact the differ- ence by which the range of ga is smaller than the range of

. If we take the figure on p. 286 it will correspond to the gnomen EKG, which added to the smaller square of smoke makes the larger one representing tire. When therefore we reason पर्वतो धूमवान् वह्नेः, this उपाधि invariable checks us. For if this syllogism is valid, r being the are must be the व्यापक of the हेतु वह्नि. But आर्द्रेन्धनसंयोग is already shown to be the व्यापक of धूमः a fortiori आर्द्रेन्धनसंयोग, must be the व्यापक of वह्नि. It is however shown to be the अव्यापक of बह्नि. The same thing thus becomes both व्यापक and अव्यापक of वाह्न, which is absurd. Hence the inference पर्वतो धूमवान् वह्नेः cannot be valid, that is, the हेतु बाह्ने is not a सद्धेतु but a हेत्वाभास.

We can deduce the same conclusion by direct reasoning. आर्द्रेन्धनसंयोग is the व्यापक of धूम and बह्नि is the व्यापक of the संयोग. A fortiori बाह्ने is always the व्यापक of धूम, and can never be a proper for inferring the , since a must be always the art of its area. A syllogism therefore, having for its साध्य, and बह्नि for its हेतु or साधन isrendered invalid on account of the presence of the उपाधि, . ८. आर्द्रेन्धनसंयोग, which being धूमाव्यापक and बह्वयव्यापक may by expressed by the general formula, साध्यव्यापकत्वे सति साधनाव्यापकः This is in fact the de- finition of 3 given by Annambhatta, a definition which he has borrowed from Udayanacharya. In a valid syllo- gism, such as पर्वतो वह्निमान् धूमात, there is no such उपाधि

SHOT. LVI. ]

Notes.

[[317]]

because there बह्नि and धूम being साध्य and साधन respectively आर्द्रेन्धनसंयोग is not साध्यव्यापक and साधनाव्यापक. The defini- tions of साध्यव्यापकत्व and साधनाव्यापकत्व given in the text are easily understood. The first is the quality of never being the fan of any absolute negation co-existing with the rar, or more shortly, the property of never being absent where the area is present. The second of course is just the opposite of this.

Four kinds of Upadhi.

T. D. notices four kinds of guna:-(1) that which co- vers the re absolutely, that is, universal ly; (2) that which covers it only in that- form in which it exists on the gr; (3) that which covers it only when it is associated with araw; and lastly (4) that which exists in the

independently. -

egg is an instance of the first kind, because it co-exists with smoke everywhere: An instance of the second kind is उद्भूतरूपवत्त्व ( manifested colour ) in the inference वायुः प्रत्यक्षः प्रत्यक्षस्पशश्रियत्वात्, because प्रत्यक्षस्पर्शाश्रयत्व co-exists with प्रत्य- क्षत्व only when it is accompanied by उद्धूतरूपवत्त्व. But this उद्भूतरूपवत्त्व is not a necessary condition for प्रत्यक्षत्व of all kinds since it does not exist in मानसप्रत्यक्ष. उद्भूतरूपवत्त्व is necessary for only that kind of which is possible in the case of a thing like air, that is, the ggr of external objects. Hence उद्धृतरूपवत्त्व is an उपाधि for बहिर्द्रव्यप्रत्यक्षत्व only, that is, प्रत्यक्षत्व as limited by a property ( बहिर्द्रव्यत्व ) residing in the पक्ष, viz.

वायु.

The third is still more complex. In the instance set विनाशी जन्यत्वात्,

भावत्व is the उपाधि because the व्याप्ति, ययजन्यं तत्तद्विनाशि is true of भाव things only and requires to be limited by the qualification भावत्वे सति necessary condition for a thing being अनित्य, the thing is a product, since

भावत्व is &

only when

a though not a warg is

both अजन्य and अनित्य- भावत्व is therefore the उपाधि of the ena of products, not of nou-products, that is, it is aerar- वच्छिन्नानित्यत्वव्यापक. But in the above instance जन्यत्व being the साधन, and अनत्यत्व the साध्य, भावत्व is साधनावच्छिन्नसाध्यव्यापक- Alakantha here reads प्रागभावो विनाशी जन्यत्वात्, thus making

[[318]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

SBOT. LVI.

प्रागभाव instead of ध्वंस the पक्ष of the syllogism, and adds the remark अत्र जन्यत्वं पक्षधर्मो न सम्भवतीति साधनावच्छिन्नसाध्यव्यापकत्व - adaogua. But this appears to be wrong, for the syllogism, as put by Nilakantha, will be an instance of

where

हेतु does not exist on the पक्ष, and not of सोपाधिक or व्याप्यत्वा- f. The appended comment is also incorrect, because the उपाधि here is साधनावच्छिन्नसाध्यव्यापक not because जन्यत्व is not a पक्षधर्म, but because the उपाधि itself cannot be & पक्षधर्म- Another instance of this kind of उपाधि is गर्भस्थो मित्रातनयः श्यामः, मित्रातनयत्वात्, मित्रातनयवत् ’the unborn son of the woman named Mitrâ is dark-coloured, because he is a son of Mitra, like his elder brothers. Here

is an gure because

the dark colour is found only in those sons of Mitra who were born when their mother had eaten only vegetables and not ghee. Other sons of Mitra born after eating ghee are not dark-coloured, while eating of vegetables is not known to produce dark colour anywhere except in Mitrâ’s sons.

The fourth kind of उपाधि is प्रागभावो विनाशी प्रमेयत्वात्, where भावत्व is उपाधि because only those knowable things that are भावरूप ( and not अत्यन्ताभाव ) are destructible. But again भावत्व is a condition for far only when the thing is a product; that is, it is the उपाधि of जन्यत्वावच्छिन्नानित्यत्व, where जन्यत्व being neither the साधन nor a पक्षधर्म is an उदासीनधर्म. Hence in this case the उपाधि is उदासीनधर्मावच्छिन्न. *

SECT. LVII. antia:

A reason is false where the negation of the thing to be proved is established by another proof, e. y. fire is cold as it is substance. Here coldness is the thing to be proved, and its negation is hotness which is cognized by touch-perception. Hence it is futile.

The special characteristic of art has been already ex-

plained in distinguishing it from सत्प्रतिपक्ष Annambhaṭṭa defines it as a designed

हेतु to prove a , the negation of which is

Absurd or Contra- dicted reason.

For a fuller explanation of the doctrine of a see B. P. 137-9 and S.M. luc. cit. calc. ed .pp. 123-5. See also Appendix A to this edition.

† See Note under Sec. 54 p. 307 Supra,

SBOT. LVII. ]

Notes.

[[319]]

ascertained by another and presumably a more authoritative proof;’ for if the other proof is not stronger, it will not prevail and the first will not be a or contradicted. Annambhaṭṭa’s definition of fra is in conformity with the opinion of the ancient school that the knowledge of the r obtained by the other proof must be a certain and right knowledge (). Raghunatha Širomani and other moderns, however, think that it need not be E. Gangesa’s definition प्रमितसाध्याभाववत्पक्षको बाधितः, of which Annam bhaṭṭa’s definition is only a paraphrase, is simple and toler- ably correct; but it requires one important qualification, vis. eqafaga, in order to prevent it from applying in the case of an अव्याप्यवृत्ति धर्म. Thus when we say कपिसंयोगवानयं वृक्षः, the same पक्ष वृक्ष will have the साध्य i. c. संयोग in one part (शाखावच्छेदेन), and संयोगाभाव in another part (मूलावच्छेदेन); and yet the inference will not be ama. It is therefore de- clared that in are the ascertainment of rear must be with respect to the whole ar, and not a part of it only. The complete definition therefore is पक्षनिष्ठानवच्छिन्नसाध्याभाव- a. The varieties of this area are enumerated, according as the thing apprehended by the other proof is पक्ष, or साध्य- प्रतियोगि, or हेतु, and according as the other proof is प्रत्यक्ष, अनुमान, उपमान, or शब्द.

It may be remarked by the by that there exists much

confusion as to the correct reading of Correct reading. qafavargior, among different copies and commentators, probably owing to the doubt whether there can be a स्पार्शनप्रत्यक्ष of उष्णत्व ; but there ought to be no reasonable doubt on the point after what has been already said as to the perception of qualities. †

A classification

The five “fallacious reasons” having been explained, we may now take a brief survey of all of them together, in order to understand, if possible, what general principle underlies the classification given in the text, and with what limita-

of the fallacies.

Bhimacharya : Nyûya-kośa, 2nd ed. p. 554.

† See Note 2 under Sec. 43 p. 222 Supra,

[[320]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

SBOT. LVII.

tions it is to be accepted. In the first place, eveu a cursory glance will show that the five carrers do not exhaust all the kinds of fallacies that are liable to be committed in the course of reasoning. They are professedly arres only, that is, fallacies of the or middle term of the syllogism. But our daily experience shows that the other terms, the major and the minor are equally capable of hiding fallacies of their own, even though the middle be faultless. The two Illicit Processes of major and minor in English logic are distinctly fallacies of this latter kind. Again there are other fallacies which are as it were extra-logical, and which can- not be said to belong to particular terms, either because a premise is false in fact though correct in form as in a Petitio Principii, or because the argument is totally irrele- vant, as in an Ignoratio Elenchi. What place is provided for these in Sanskrit logic? Or is it that they were not re- garded as fallacies in India? The latter case is certainly not posible, for an argument once invalid is invalid wher- ever you go. So that either these fallacies must be includ- ed in some one or other of the five classes of garra men- tioned above, or that there must be a separate group or groups of fallacies not alluded to by Annambhatta. A perusal of the standard works on Nyaya shows that both surmises are partially true. Like the arrers some writers treat of other kinds of erreres also, such as a gererer and a ger-arwra, which are as much fallacies as the yearwres, and many of which have their exact equivalents in English logic. And that is just as it should be, for if the is liable to be mis-conceived and mis-stated, so are the TT, the art and the gera. Many of these errs and especially those of gera are enumerated in old works.* Again Gotama mentions numerous fallacies of argument under the two heads of जाति and निग्रहस्थान, of which the हेत्वाभासs form only a sub- division. Apart from these there are found in practice many

See for instances of these Vyâya-Bindu Tikâ, Bibl. Ind, p. 91 et. seq.SBOT. LVII.

Notes.

[[321]]

complex cases of bad reasoning such as अन्योन्याश्रय, अनवस्था and. Strictly speaking therefore the so-called s mentioned in Nyaya manuals form only a part of the possi- ble fallacies.

A little consideration however will show that all the varieties of आभास can be reduced to a हेत्वा-

All fallacies re- ducible to hetvâ- bhasas

. A fallacy, in whatever part of the syllogism it may lie, can by stating the syllogism in a logical form be reduced to some improper use of the middle term in one or both the premises. The middle term, being the link which connects the subject and the predicate of the conclusion, determines in fact the character of the whole syllogism; and so if the latter is invalid the invalidity must in one way or another arise from some defect in the connecting link. Not that other parts of the syllogism may not be faulty, but the faults can, by re-stating the syllogism in a suitable form, be transferred to the middle term. This is rendered much easier in the Sanskrit syllogism than in the English, owing to the peculiar form of the former. The chief thing re- quired for a valid अनुमिति in Sanskrit is a correct परामर्श; and a परामर्श, which is composed of three constituent elements, पक्षता, पक्षधर्मता and व्याप्ति, is correct only when its three com - ponents are faultless. Hence all the faults of a syllogism must belong to some one of these three things. When the fault lies in the पक्षधर्मता or हेतुता, it is of course & हेत्वाभास proper. The fault lies in varar only when the q or minor term is a totally unreal thing, such as me, or when it is a thing on which the does not reside. Either way the or middle term cannot be predicated of the minor, and the two cases fall under आश्रयसिद्ध and स्वरूपासिद्ध respectively. A third case occurs in English logic, namely that of Illicit Process of minor in which the term is nndistributed in the premise, though distributed in the conclusion. But this case is not possible in the Sanskrit syllogism, because there, as has been already pointed out,* the qer or minor term is

See Note on p. 274, Supra.

[[41]]

[[322]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

[ SECT. LVII.

always universal. The minor premise, i. e. the art, be- ing always in the universal affirmative, the minor term is never undistributed in the premise. Lastly when the fault lies in the व्याप्ति, it can always be traced to a व्यभिचरित or & सोपाधिक हेतु.

Fallacies in Eu- ropean Logic.

Leaving aside all material or non-Logical fallacies which are ultimately reducible to some fault in the sun, the strictly Logical or formal fallacies recognized by European logicians fall under four heads, 1. Undistributed middle, 2. the two Illicit Processes (of major and minor), 3. Negative premises for affirmative conclusion and vice versa, and 4. four or more terms*. Now the first of these expressly per- tains to the middle term, while the Illicit Processes have been shown to be impossible in Sanskrit. The Illicit major is impossible, because if the major term is to be distributed in the conclusion, the conclusion must be negative; but a negative conclusion is inadmissible in Nyaya logic. An Illicit Minor would require an undistributed minor term in the premise which is also impossible in Sanskrit. The other two kinds are resolvable into Ambiguous Middle. All the Semi-Logical fallacies also come under Ambiguous Middle. So all possible fallacies are reduced to three classes, non- logical fallacies coming under aary, the Undistributed Middle and the Ambiguous Middle. Of these the Undistri- buted Middle is not possible in Sanskrit, as the which corresponds to the major premise is always in the form of a universal proposition, and must have a universal middle for its subject. But more of this later. The Ambigu ous Middle is nothing more thån an असिद्ध or अप्रसिद्ध हेतु • Thus we see that all fallacies are ultimately reducible to some defect in the or middle term. The same can be shown to hold good in the English syllogism if all the moods, are reduced to the only valid and proper mood, Barbara.

Whately: Elements of Logic, Bk. III, § 2.

SHOT. LVII. ]

Fallacies mention- ed in old works.

Notes.

[[323]]

Now let us consider the fallacies mentioned in the older works on Nyaya, which do not apparently belong to the . The twenty-four mas mentioned by Gotama* are nothing more than arguments based on false analogy or false distinction, and can be easily reduced to arr. Of the twenty-two fus or points where an adversary can be caught or defeated, some like अर्थान्तर, पुनरुक्त and निरर्थक are merely tricks usually resorted to by a disputant in order to confound his rival, and which his rival is therefore taught to expose at once.

Others like अविज्ञातार्थ, अननुभाषण, अप्रतिभा and पर्य- quarteror are only possible in long-continued controversies, and have nothing to do with the syllogism. They are dia- lectical lapses rather than fallacies of a particular argu- ment, and belong therefore to the province of Rhetoric, not Logic. Only seven of these twenty-two ‘catching points,’ viz. प्रतिज्ञाहानि, प्रतिज्ञान्तर, प्रतिज्ञाविरोध, प्रतिज्ञासन्न्यास, हेत्वन्तर, अप- सिद्धान्त and हेत्वाभास, can have any pretentions to be called logical fallacies. Of these the first four and the last but one are manifestly cases where the disputant is inconsistent with himself, and his conclusion does not therefore follow from his premises. et occurs where he employs one in हेतुवाक्य and another in the व्याप्ति. All these are cases of व्यभिचरित हेतु. The fallacies proper are therefore included in the last निग्रहस्थान, named हेत्वाभास. Similarly it can be shown that there can be no पक्षाभास or व्याप्तयाभास or दृष्टान्ताभास apart from the हेत्वाभास पक्षाभास or a misleading minor falls under आश्रयासिद्ध. व्याप्तयामास or false generalization is nothing but & व्यभिचरित or असिद्ध व्याप्ति, and is included in अनैकान्तिक or व्याप्यत्वासिद्ध हेत्वाभास दृष्टान्ताभास also falls under the same, as it is not a in itself, but acts by vitiating the

. If we say नित्यः शब्दोऽमूर्तत्वात् घटEc, the example घट is a दृष्टान्ताभास, because neither are nor are exists on . Again, if we say रागादिमानयं पुरुषो मरणधर्मत्वाद्रध्यापुरुषवत्, the रथ्यापुरुष is a दृष्टान्ताभास because रागादिमत्त्व being doubtful in the man pass-

G. S, V, I, 1; and T. D. p. 64,

[[324]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

[SHOT. LVII.

ing in the street, the area is not far. All such cases of false or doubtful instances give rise to undertasuna and go under अनैकान्तिक Or असिद्ध. There are some miscellane- ous fallacies such as साधनाप्रसिद्धि, साध्याप्रसिद्धि etc. which are mags under different names. Lastly the complex fallacies known as अन्योन्याश्रय, अनवस्था and चक्रक are only series of two or more invalid syllogisms. In this way the five arres named in the text can be shown to include all the possible cases of fallacious arguments.

The advantage of the five-fold classi- fication.

The narrowing down of the circle of fallacies to the single head of has the great advan- tage of facilitating their detection. In the English syllogism you have first to examine all the three terms separately, then the form of each premise, and then the material truth of the major premise. In Sanskrit you have only to look to a single term, namely the, and see whether it possesses all the five requisites of a good. If it lacks any one of them you can at once pronounce that the argument is invalid. Then find out which requisite is wanting. If qgrusa is absent, the fallacy is either आश्रयासिद्ध or स्वरूपासिद्ध. If सपक्षसत्त्व is wanting, it is असाधारण ox अनुसंहार. If विपक्षव्यावृत्ति is not found, it is साधारणानैकान्तिक Or व्याप्यत्वासिद्ध. In

or f the ana is just the opposite of that assumed, and hence you will find both सपक्षसस्a and त्रिपक्षव्यावृत्ति not only absent, but actually reversed, that is, you will find सपक्षव्यावृत्ति and विपक्षसत्त्व. The last two हेत्वाभासs are only special cases of false or imperfect generalization. Of these varieties the two that are most insidious and occur most fre- quently in practice are साधारण and व्याप्यत्वासिद्ध; and as these are caused by incorrect generalization, you have only to state the व्याप्ति in the form already provided यथत् तत्तत् or यत्र यत्र-तत्र तत्र, and then see whether the surf as stated is warranted by ex- perience. If it is not, it is eff and the syllogism is in- valid. In the Aristotelian syllogism the multiplication of

SEOT. LVII. ]

Notes.

[[325]]

figures and moods only breeds confusion and makes the de- tection of fallacies often difficult. The Naiyayikas, profiting by the vast resources of the Sanskrit language, have con- siderably minimized this difficulty by providing a single form of syllogism which is both the simplest and the most elas- tic at the same time. It is capable of conveying even the most complex ideas in the fewest words possible. For ex- ample nothing is more difficult in English than to obvert a proposition, that is, to change an affirmative into negative and vice versa; and yet in Sanskrit you can do this at once by simply adding era to the word. This has enabled the Naiyayikas to dispense with all negative moods and thus reduce the syllogism to the single form_Barbara.* They have thereby avoided all fallacies arising from non- distribution of terms. In this way they have narrowed the circle of formal fallacies to the single case of ambiguous’ middle,’ and reduced all material fallacies to a rafta or असिद्ध व्याप्ति.

Conversion of Nai- yayika and Aristo- telian syllogisms.

It is a useful exercise to convert the Aristotelian and the Sanskrit syllogisms into each other. They have each their special characteris- tics, and allowance must be made for them before an English syllogism is cou- verted into Sanskrit or vice versa. The principal rule of conversion is, always reduce an English syllogism to the form Barbara before converting it into Sanskrit, and that conversely when a Sanskrit is to be put into an English garb, make such modifications as are necessary to put it in the most natural form sanctioned by the rules of English logic. In a valid argument the rule may be sometimes ignored without much inconvenience, but when the argu- ment is fallacions, its neglect is likely to mislead the stu- dent by making the detection of fallacies difficult. The most striking difference between English and Sanskrit logic is the absence in the latter of any distinction correspond- ing to the formal and material fallacies, or as Aristotle

Vide Note p. 274, Supra.

[[326]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

SEOT. LVII.

termed them, fallacies in dictione ( in form ) and those extra dictionem (outside-form). The reason of this has been already explained. The form of the Sanskrit syllogism is so strict and circumscribed that an argument put into it is at once reduced to a mere mathematical equation. The chance of any fallacy lurking in words is therefore reduced to a minimum. Wha- tely divides the formal fallacies into two groups, one of purely logical, comprising the two Illicit processes and the Undistributed middle, and the other of Ambiguous middle, called semi-logical. We have seen that fallacies of the first group are totally absent in Sanskrit since they are strictly formal. The semi-formal or semi-logical fallacy of ambiguous middle is found, exactly because it is partly material; and even that, when stated in Sanskrit, assumes the character of a material fallacy, namely. The ambiguity of the middle term becomes the gun in Sanskrit, and when once that is ascertained, we immediately know that the व्याप्ति is व्यभिचरित, which is a material fallacy. Not that no formal fallacies are possible in Sanskrit. There are some of them of the kind known in English as the fallacy of four terms or paronymous terms; but when analysed they are reduced to either स्वरूपासिद्ध or व्याप्यत्वासिद्धः

Now we shall illustrate our remarks by a few examples:-

I. Take, an Illicit Process of Major: Whatever is universally believed is true; God’s existence is not universally believed;

… It is not true.

Examples of Eng- lish syllogisms.

Or stated more simply:-

All universally-believed things are true;

God’s existence is not a universally-believed thing;

God’s existence is not true.

This is an invalid mood (AEE) of the first figure and the major term ’true’ is distributed in the conclusion but un-

SECT. LVII. ]

Notes.

[[327]]

distributed in the premise. As we must have all affirmative propositions in Sanskrit, obvert the minor premise and the conclusion in the above : so we have:-

All universally believed things are true;

God’s existence is a not-universally-believed thing; .. God’s existence is a not-true ( untrue ) thing. Translated into Sanskrit this will run :

ईश्वरसत्त्वमप्रमाणम् ।

‌

असर्वपरिगृहीतत्वात् or सर्वपरिगृहीतत्वाभावात् ।

यत्र यत्र सर्वपरिगृहीतत्वं तत्र प्रमाणत्वम् यथा घटादी ।

Here it will be seen that the sun is not proper because the two terms in it do not correspond to हेतु and साध्य. But the general proposition is trne; hence its correct व्यतिरेक will be यत्र यत्राप्रमाणत्वं तत्र तत्र सर्वपरिगृहीतत्वाभावः; that is, अ- प्रमाणत्व which is the साध्य in the syllogism here is सर्वपरिगृही- तत्वाभावव्याप्य • ९. साधनव्याप्य. Thus the हेतु in this syllogism is the व्यापक of साध्य and not साध्यव्याप्य, as it always is in a valid syllogism ; hence it is सोपाधिक or व्याप्यत्वासिद्ध. Or after translating the syllogism into Sanskrit, we may supply & व्याप्ति of our own that will suit it, namely यत्र यत्र सर्वपरिगृही- तत्वाभावस्तत्राप्रमाणत्वम् यथा शुक्तिरजते. Here if we had any विपक्षदृष्टान्त where the हेतु (असर्वपरिगृहीतत्व) co-existed for certain with the साध्याभाव ( प्रमाणत्व ), the fallacy whould have been साधारण. Now the व्यतिरेक of this latter व्याप्ति is यत्र यत्र प्रमाण- त्वं तत्र सर्वपरिगृहीतत्वम्, which when retranslated into English becomes : “ All true things are universally believed “; but this is not the true converse of the major premise already given, and hence it is false. Thus an Illicit process of major in English becomes व्याप्यत्वासिद्ध in Sanskrit; while & व्याप्य- त्वासिद्ध, when converted into English, will be either an Illicit major or a material fallacy, named by Whately the Fallacy of undue assumption.

II. Take now an example of an " ambiguous middle.”

[[328]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

Ï SEOT. LVII.

All angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles;

A B C is an angle of a triangle;

.. A B C is equal to two right angles.

This is called a Fallacy of Division and Composition, be- cause the middle term, ‘angles of a triangle’ is taken collec- tively in the major and distributively in the minor premise.

In Sanskrit it will be:

अयं कोणो द्विसमकोणसमः ।

त्रिकोणस्थितकोणत्वात् ।

ये ये त्रिकोणस्थिताः कोणास्ते द्विसमकोणसमाः ।

This is स्वरूपासिद्ध, and the fallacy at once appears by ox - pressing the व्याप्ति correctly, यत्र यत्र त्रिकोणस्थितकोणसमुदायत्वं तत्र द्विeacturerrare. The real साध्यव्याप्य हेतु is not ‘कोण simply but ‘कोणसमुदाय, which does not exist on the पक्ष; hence the हेतु is स्वरूपासिद्ध. Or you can say that the real हेतु is त्रिकोणस्थितको- णान्यतरत्व, which is not साध्यव्याप्य; and then the fallacy will be असाधारण.

III. Take another example of an “ambiguous middle, " called Fallacia accidentis or Fallacia a dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter:-

What is bought in the market is eaten;

Raw meat is bought in the market;

Baw meat is eaten.

Which converted into Sanskrit becomes:-

कृव्यं भक्षणीयम् ।

आपणक्रीतत्वात् ।

यद्यदापणक्रीतं तत्तद्भक्षणीयम् ।

Here the हेतु is सोपाधिक and the व्याप्ति is incorrect because there is an implied condition भक्षणयोग्यत्वे सति. In the orig-

SEOT. LVII. ]

Notes.

[[329]]

inal, the middle term, ‘a thing bought in the market’ implies in the major premise “as to its substance only,” in the minor “as to its condition and circumstances.” It is therefore

ambiguous.

IV. Take this argument in a circle:-

Every rule has exceptions;

This is a rule;

.. This rule (viz. that every rule has exceptions)

has exceptions.

.. Some rules have no exceptions.

In Sanskrit it will be:-

‘foranti व्यभिचरतीति नियमों व्यभिचारी ।

नियमत्वात् ।

यत्र यत्र नियमत्वं तत्र तत्र व्यभिचारित्वं ।

This is साधारण because there is no विपक्षहृष्टान्त on which both are aud era are known to be absent.

V. Take another case of an Ambiguous middle.

Water is liquid;

Ice is water;

.. Ice is liquid.

This equals to:-

हिमं द्रवरूपम् ।

जलीयत्वात् ।

ययज्जलीयं तद्रवरूपं यथा सरित्समुद्रादि ।

This is also साधारण, for we know that जलीयत्व resides on

the बिपक्ष करकादि where there is no द्रवत्व.

VI. Take this syllogism in the third figure:-

All books are liable to err;

[[42]]

[[330]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

All books are human productions;

[ SEOT. LVII.

.. All human productions are liable to err.

Here the conclusion is right but it does not follow from the premises, the only legitimate conclusion from them being Some human productions etc.,’ when it will be Darapti in the Third Figure. The fallacy is Illicit Minor. Translated into Sanskrit, the above syllogism will be:

मानवकृतिमात्रं प्रसादार्हम् ।

पुस्तकत्वात् ।

यत्र यत्र पुस्तकत्वं तत्र तत्र प्रमदाईत्वम् ।

This is clearly भागासिद्ध.

VII. Lastly take this stock instance of Undistributed Middle:-

All is not gold that glitters;

Glass glitters;

.. Glass is not gold.

Some things that glitter are not gold;

Glass is a thing that glitters;

.. Glass is not gold.

= काचो न सुवर्णम् ।

तेजस्वित्वात् ।

यत्र यत्र तेजस्वित्वं तत्र तत्र सुवर्णत्वाभावः यथा हीरके ।

Here the व्याप्ति is व्यभिचरित, because there is no विपक्षदृष्टान्त which तेजस्वित्व is absent, and hence the fallacy is साधारण.

To convert a Sanskrit syllogism into English is much easier because there you have the argument already put into a syllogistic form.

Examples of Sans- krit Syllogisms.

I. Thus take for example:-

anftar fearsenfter affør iSEOT. LVII. ]

farandi

Notes.

या या हिंसा साsधर्मस्य जनिका ।

[[331]]

This is सोपाधिक with निषिद्धत्व as उपाधि, and will become

in English:-

Animal-killing is sinful;

A sacrifice is killing of an animal;

..A sacrifice is sinful.

Here if you insert ‘all’ before the subject in the major premise, it becomes false, and the fallacy is that of undue assumption; or the word killing’ may be said to be used in two different senses in the major and minor premises, when it is ambiguous middle’ or ’the fallacy of four terms.’ If you do not insert ‘all’ in the major premise, then it is a fallacy of Undistributed middle.

II. Or take an असाधारण - सव्यभिचार :-

जीवच्छरीरं व्यापारवत् ।

प्राणादिमत्त्वात् ।

ययत प्राणादिमत्तद्व्यापारवत् ।

Which in English is equal to:-

All living things have motion;

Our body is a living thing;

..Our body has motion.

Here the major term is not distributed in the premise, and hence the fallacy is an Illicit process of major. The illustrations given in this as well as in the last preceding note will show that no hard and fast rule can be laid down as to the correspondence of any are with any particular English fallacy or vice versa. It is the mode of conversion that determines them, and cases often occur in which the

same are when converted differently gives different

हेत्वाभास

fallacies.

[[332]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

SECT. LVIII. 3UHINE.

[SECT. LVIII.

Comparison is the immediate Cause of Analogy. Analogy is the knowledge of the connection of a name with the object denoted by it. The knowledge of similarity is its proximate Cause. The recollection of an authoritative direction is the intermediate operation.

The third kind of proof is Comparison which is the immediate cause of the apprehension -

Analogy and Com- parison.

) known as Analogy.’ Analogy is de- fined as ’the knowledge of the relation ex- isting between a name (-a) and the thing denoted by it (i-qar). The immediate cause of this is the knowledge of the similarity of ray with , which is there- fore called उपमान. The process of acquiring this उपमिति may be described thus: A man who has never seen a gayal, nor knows what it is like, is told by some forester (who being daily familiar with gayals is n worthy to be believed ‘) that a gayal (Bos Gaveas) is like a cow. He then goes to a forest and there sees a strange animal unknown to him before. He then perceives in that animal some resemblance to the cow which of course he knows full well. The perception of this similarity with the cow reminds him of the former direction (a) of the forester that a gayal is like a cow. Then, combining this reminiscence with his actual perceptive knowledge of similarity between the cow and the new animal, he at last concludes that the animal which he sees before him is a gayal. This last cognition namely This is a gayal” is the ea, for it is a knowledge of the denotative relation of the word gayal with the object perceived. This is a gayal (at :)” means “This

nay:) object bears the name, or is denoted by the name gayal (eri hercere:),” that is, there exists between this

अयं गवयपदवाच्यः object and the word gayal the relation of denotation (- areकभाव ). This relation is the सञ्ज्ञासञ्ज्ञिसम्बन्ध, and the know- ledge of it is qua. Two previons cognitions are required to produce this era, namely, the verbal knowledge of the forester’s direction (aggrefana) and the actual perception of the resemblance to the cow that was existing in the animal gayal.

SEOT. LVIII.]

The proximate cause of Upamiti.

Notes.

[[333]]

Both these previous cognitions are indispensible to a valid analogy; but the question still re- mains which of these is the करण of उपमिति, and which is, that is, which is more immediate, and which is only accessory. The ancient and the modern schools of Naiyayikas are diametrically op- posed on this point; the former, i. e. the ancients, regard अतिदेशवाक्यार्थज्ञान as the करण and सादृश्यज्ञान & सहकारि, while the moderns prefer just the opposite view. The recollec- tion of the eagereref is of course the are according to both. Annambhaṭṭa here evidently accepts the view of the moderns, for he expressly says that the reavana, i. e. the गवयनिष्ट - गोसाहश्यप्रत्यक्ष, is the करण of उपमिति. He does not however seem to follow the moderns in taking the exact form of the उपमिति to be गवयो गवयपदवाच्यः, and not अयं or असौ गवयपदवाच्यः the difference between the two being that the second cognition would inform him that the particular object alone is denoted gayal, while the first conveys that the whole class of which that object is an individual is denoted by the name gayal. Viśvanátha, who is a modern in toto, says न त्वयं गवयपदवाच्य इत्युपमितिः । गवयान्तरे शक्तिग्रहा - भावप्रसङ्गात्. * Although the करण of उपमिति is declared to be the सादृश्यज्ञान, it is not the sole करण, for an उपमिति may arise even from a knowledge of dissimilarity or a mere pecu- liarity. Hence S. C. divides gara ( cqfânâsyr) into three kinds : तच्चीपमानं त्रिविधम् । सादृश्यविशिष्टपिण्डज्ञानं, असाधारणधर्म- faráterqvsari, àuriâfefqusará a. उपमान is of three kinds, viz. the knowledge of an amimal possessing (1) a similarity, (2) a peculiar property or (3) a dissimilarity.’ uz qqq: is an example of the first kind; that of the second is नासिकालसदेकशृङ्गः खमृगः (a rhinoceros has one horn adorning its nose); the example of a dissimilarity would be उष्ट्रो नाश्वादिवत्समानष्पृष्टहस्वग्रीवशरीरः ( a camel does not possess a level back and short neck like a horse). The word res in the text is therefore to be taken as illus- trative (gror) of the other two.

सादृश्य

S. M. Calc. ed, p. 78.

[[6]]

[[334]]

Comparison as an independent proof.

Tarka-Sangraha.

[ SEOT. LVIII.

In accepting उपमान and शब्द as independent proofs Annambhatta follows Gotama. The Vai- śeshikas as well as the Sankhyas do not accept var as a separate proof. They include it under अनुमान. Vachaspati explains this view thus : गवयशब्दो गोसदृशस्य वाचक इति प्रत्ययः सोप्यनुमानमेव । योऽहि शब्दो यत्र वृद्धैः प्रयुज्यते सोऽसति वृत्त्यन्तरे तस्य वाचकः । यथा गोशब्दो गो- त्वस्य । प्रयुज्यते चैवं गवयशब्दो गोसदृश इति तस्यैव वाचक इति तज्ज्ञानमनु- मानमेव । *

The Naiyâyika’s reply to this argument may be given in Niiakantha’s words :- वैशेषिकास्तु पदवाच्यत्वव्याप्यसादृश्यादिपरामर्शा- त्पदवाच्यत्वस्यानुमितिरेवाती नोपमानं प्रमाणान्तरमित्याहुः । तञ्चिन्त्यं, व्याप्ति- ज्ञानमन्तरेणापि पदवाच्यत्वप्रमितेरनुभवसिद्धत्वात् । The अनुमान framed by the Vaiseshihas would be अयं पिण्डो गवयपदवाच्यः । गोसाहयत्वात् । यत्र यत्र गोसादृश्यं तत्र गवयपदवाच्यत्वं । But our daily experience tells us that such a sun is not necessarily true, nor is it essential for the knowledge that a certain word denotes a certain object. Hence उपमान is different from अनुमान. The fact is that the concepts derived from analogy are generally approximate or tentative only, not positive like those of perception or inference. They are very useful in practical life, and a distinct proof must be assumed to account for them. Udayanacharya from whom Annambhatta has borrowed his definition of eff has made this clar in the following verse in Kusumânjali :

सम्बन्धस्य परिच्छेदः सञ्ज्ञायाः सञ्ज्ञिना सह । प्रत्यक्षादेरसाध्यत्वादुपमानफलं विदुः ॥

The certain knowledge (परिच्छेद) of सञ्ज्ञासञ्ज्ञिसम्बन्ध is regard- ed as the result of an independent proof उपमान, because it cannot be obtained by any other known proof such as Per- ception.

SECT. LIX, शब्दः

Word is a sentence spoken by an authority. Authority is a person who speaks truth. Sentence is a group of words, e. g. bring a cow. Word is a thing having power (of conveying meaning). Power is a convention made by God that certain sense be understood from certain word.

Sânkhya-Tat-K. p. 278.

† Kus., Cowell’s Ed. III, 8. and 31.

SHOT. LIX. Ì

Notes.

[[335]]

The author now proceeds to the fourth proof, Word, It is defined as “the sentence or proposition

Word.

of (uttered by) a credible or authorita- tive person.” An authoritative person’ (a) again is “he who speaks the truth.” Truth (d=argatsef: ) is “ object as it exists in reality.” The verbal knowledge (51=zata) of truth is the representation of a thing just as it exists. A proposition (a) which conveys such true verbal knowledge is यथार्थवचन, and he who asserts such a proposition is यथार्थ- वक्ता or आप्त. V. V. therefore defines an आप्त as प्रकृतवाक्यार्थ- विषयक यथार्थशाब्दबोधविषयकतात्पर्यवान्, he who conveys a meaning (ar), that is the subject of a true verbal knowledge concerning the sense of the sentence uttered; that is, a person is era when the words spoken by him convey यथार्थशाब्दबोध, and a शाब्दबोध is यथार्थ when it accords com - pletely with the external reality of things.These definitions of आप्त and यथार्थ are very characteristic because they clearly show that according to Naiyâyikas the ultimate test of the truth of verbal knowledge was not the authority attaching to the speaker himself, but the fact of his words being in harmony with the reality of things. Having defined an T, the author defines a are as “a collocation of words such as, ‘Bring a cow,” while a word is “that which possesses the power (a) of coveying a meaning.”

These definitions of a ar

The Nyaya and

Mimâmsa theories

of verbal knowledge.

and a

are very impor-

which distinguishes

other schools, and

tant, because they embody a particular theory of art

the Naiyâyikas from

which has become the subject of several interminable controversies. The Naiyâyikas, are on this point particularly opposed to the Mimâmsakas who hold the doc- trine of पदानामन्वयविशिष्टे शक्तिः, while the Naiyayihas maintain the contrary view, पदानामन्वय एव शक्तिः-

The two theories contrasted.

The Mimâmsa theory of the import of propositious is rather complicated. Along with the gram- mariaus they hold that the verb is the prin- cipal word in a proposition (nenaqur ar), because it is the verb that forms the copula as it were to connect a number of words into a sentence. If one only says

[[336]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

SECT. LIX.

देवदत्तः ग्रामम्, we can make nothing out of those disconnected words; but as soon as the verb is added, the whole forms a connected proposition conveying the idea of Deva- datta’s motion to the town. The idea of motion is the chief significance of the sentence, the word

[[2]]

and

simply

serving to specify and define as it were that motion. denotes motion in general; the addition of a limits the sense to the motion of a particular individual, while the further addition of are still more restricts this limited mo- tion of an individual to one in a particular direction and towards a particular place. The whole sentence thus means देवदत्तकर्तृक- ग्रामकर्मक-गमनक्रिया, in which क्रिया is the विशेष्य while the other two expressions simply act as limiting qualifications. All the words of a sentence are interdepen- dent,because the predicate is too vague and general to convey any sense unless otherwise determined, while the substan- tives and other words are merely subordinate members of the sentence. By themselves the words of a sentence import nothing, but placed in the sentence they denote the as happening in a particular thing. Thus e alone signifies no- thing, but when we join ve with ara, we at once know it to be आनयनक्रियानिरूपितकर्मव्यक्ति, that is, we know घट not independently, but only as standing in some relation to the action of bringing.’ When each word is thus apprehended, as related in some way to the far, we get the meaning of the whole sentence in the form of that T as conditioned and particularized by the several substantives. This doctrine is expressed by saying क्रियान्वित एव पदानां शक्तिः, or as Annam- bhatta puts it at the end of his commentary, RT-(1647-) न्विते शक्तिरिति प्रभाकराः-

The followers of Gotama, adds T. D., deny the neces- sity of thus apprehending each word separately before combinig them in a sentence, when the meaning of the whole sentence can as well be conveyed at once in the form of the collective sense of all the words; that is, according to Naiyâyikas the resides in the arquitself,and not in the snares. Single words, say they, like që që etc., convey no sense, not because they are, but because the

#BOT. LIX.

Notes.

[[339]]

three requisites of शाब्दबोध, namely, आकाङ्क्षा, सन्निधि and योग्यता, are not satisfied. A proposition or sentence is nothing but a number of significaut words ( शक्तपद ) which possess आकाङ्क्षा, योग्यता and सन्निधि; and the collective meaning of such words will be apprehended even though there be no fare in

वाचकपद the sentence, eg . काञ्च्यां त्रिभुवनतिलको भूपतिः which designates a king in the town of Kâñchi without attributing any action to him. Similarly we say : aer:, although no fur- araq can be supplied there; for the only possible verbs applicable to त्रयः कालाः are सन्ति or ( जीवन ) ज्ञायन्ते, but the first is inapplicable, as there is no specification in ay: start of any particular time, past, present or future, while ara is inappropriate, because ’time’ is unknowable by human beings. There can therefore be no ferea in 7: er: and yet the words convey a sense because the above three requi- sites are satisfied. According to Mimamsakas and grammarians a proposition is धात्वर्थमुख्यविशेष्यक, that is, चैत्रस्तण्डुल पचति would be interpreted as चैत्रकर्तृक- तण्डुलकर्मक- पाकक्रिया. But. the above example shows that this is not always possible; and therefore in such cases a proposition is quærardgeqta- शेष्यक only, that is, the illustration wonld mean चैत्रनिष्टकृति- जन्यपाकजन्य - फलशाली तण्डुलः. The consequence of this nice dis- tinction is that according to Mimamsakas ICTZZ or farearer is alone legitimate, while a सिद्धार्थबोधकवाक्य, which they call refere, has no independent significance, and can exist ouly as a part of another क्रियाबोधक वाक्य. The Naiyayikas of course consider both kinds of sentences equally significant and independent. Hence the definition of a argy in the text is (3), which implies, as V. V. says, that पदसमूहादेव शाब्दबोधों नेकस्मादिति भावः ‘Verbal knowledge is obtained not from one word (such as a furate) but from all the words together.”

On a proper analysis it will be found that a proposition consists of a subject, a predicate and a copula. The predicate is always resolvable iuto an attribute residing in the subject and the copula is the counceting link showing the relation that exists between the subject and the attribute predicated of it. Thus in the sentence “Man is mortal”, the attribute of mortality is predicated of man, and the verb is the copula connecting the two. In मर्त्यत्ववान् मनुष्यः or गमनशीलो देवदत्तः we denote substantivos possessing attributes. This view is very similar to the Natyayika doctrine.

[[43]]

[[338]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

SEOT. LIX.

From the import of proposition we pass on to the

Import of words.

import of single words. A word is defined as a thing that is

significance.’ But what is

implies

having power or

Annambhaṭṭa

defines it as “the convention made by God that such and such a meaning should be understood from such and such a word” Some copies here read ईश्वरेच्छासङ्केतः, but the word इच्छा is redundant as

T. According to this definition language is the creation of God, and each word is capable of conveying a particular sense because God has so willed it. The definition is in accordance with the view of the ancients. The moderns say TAT :, meaning that even the will of man can give significance to words, as in proper names like a,a, fer etc. The ancients do not deny the significance of these latter kind of words, but call them simply unne or conventional, while only those derived from God are gr in the proper sense of the term. But this is not quite satisfactory. for one might say that although the two kinds of words may be named separately, no difference is really observable between their power of deuoting particular objects.

deuotes an individual exactly in the same way as denotes a jar although one word is of human and the other of divine origin. A later writer therefore defends the ancient view by attributing even a words to divine origin. The author of Tarka-Prakasa says “sefà far ara पिता नाम कुर्याद’ इति श्रुतिः । तथा च ’ द्वादशाहः कालीनपित्रायुच्चरितनामत्यादिना नामवाच्यः शिशुः’ इत्याकारकेच्छयेश्वरेण तादृशश्रुतिप्रणयनादाधुनिकेऽपि antar farbars “* But this is going rather too far, or,

ईश्वरसङ्केतोऽस्त्येव । as Sanskritists say,, supporting one absurdity by another. We know that new phraseology is invented by men in different countries to convey new ideas or denote new inventions and discoveries. Innumerable words un- known before are thus added to the language. The exist- in the world is the strongest proof of the absurdity of the theory of a divine origin of any particular language.

It is probably to avoid this controversy that our author

gives another and a better definition of शक्ति in the commentary, अर्थ स्मृत्यनुकूलः पद- पदार्थसम्बन्धः शक्तिः ‘Power is the relation

[[1]]

ence of many distinct and nuconnected languae exist-

tion.

Another defini-

Bhimacharya Nyaya-kośo, 2nd ed. p. 782,

SECT. LIX. ]

Notes.

[[339]]

ร

of a word and an object, that always serves to revive the memory of that object (whenever the word is spoken).’ This definition, says Nilakantha, is purposely made vague so as to apply to f, whether it is regarded as an independent r as the Mimâmsakas do, or whether it is identified with the will that makes the convention, as the Naiyayikas hold. The Mimâmsaka’s arguments for regarding as a separate varû are summed up in the couplet:-

a cat quefaang gorenfant:car i

ammenfèy gràa firqurarcat fè ET II

Power is not a substance as qualities inhere ( in them); it is also distinct from qualities and actions. It resides in genus and other categories. It must therefore be regarded as a separate category.

The Naiyayikas however refuse to recognize T as a separate category on the ground that, as each substance e.y. पङ्कज, कुमुद etc. is the object of several शक्तिs, to accept the independent existence of them all would involve rea

गौरव. is therefore properly speaking only a power in a word to denote the meaning imposed upon it by divine or human will.

Conflicting theo-

ries.

But the question still remains where this gær m

is apprehended. In other words, what does a word like a denote primarily: the object jar. or the common property jar-ness that resides in it, or both together? This is an important question. as it lies at the basis of the several antagonistic theories of are proposed by different schools. The opinions on this point are as varions and numerous as are possible to be on any single topic. Of these, views four are the most important, naniely, केवलजाति, केवलव्यक्ति, जातिविशिष्टव्यक्ति and

. The first is adopted by the mamsakas, the second by modern Naiyayikas, the third by ancient Naiyayikas. and the last belongs to the Bauddhas.* The advocates of each of these views look at the significant word from different stand- points. When one says . the speaker undoubtedly desires the thing, jar, and not the class-notion. jar-ness to be brought to him. That the jar’ must be somehow or other implied by the word az is therefore necessary, for

Mammața : Kánya-Prakāśa Boin. Ed. Ch. II, p. 30

[[340]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

[ SEOT. LIX.

unless it is so implied the hearer can never fetch the object. Modern Naiyiyikas rely on this simple fact, and say that the word we primarily deuotes the area. The capacity of being the subject of any act (ereffstrafra) resides in the concrete object () alone, and hence it is the on which the is made. But there are insuperable objections to this view. If e denotes a particular, we would require as many separate words as there are jars in the world, and the on each would have to be learnt separately as they can have no connection with each other. As a matter of fact however there is only one word . and when we once know its significance as expressing a कम्बुग्रीवादिमद्वस्तु, we apply it to denote all objects having that shape. we therefore denotes not a particular घटव्यक्ति, but the property कम्बुग्रीवादि- #. Further the word we conveys many notions besides that of the ; it implies that the thing denoted belongs to a particular class of substances having some common properties, and it also distinguishes the s from other dissimilar substances. Thus the word e performs three functions; it points out a particular object jar, it signifies that the particular jar is similar to all the jars in the world, and it distinguishes that jar from all other things, such as stones, walls and trees. When we say, we at once denote the गोव्यक्ति, the class-notion गोत्व, and the peculiarity सास्ना- fe which distinguishes a cow from other animals. In other words, गो signifies व्यक्ति, जाति and आकृति at the same time; or as a writer pnts it, जाती व्यक्तौ वैशिष्ट्ये व पदानां शक्तिः. This was the view of the ancient Naiyayikas, and is apparently the one preferred by Annambhaṭṭa.

According to modern Naiyayikas words denote the a only, and the attributes come in by implication; that is, words are primarily concrete names. But according to the man Mîmâṁsakas words are purely abstract names denoting the an only. The ancient Naiyayikas seem to have adopted a middle course between these extremes by holding that words denote neither केवलव्यक्ति nor केवलजाति, but जातिविशिष्टव्यक्तिःSECT. LIX. ]

Notes.

[[341]]

that is, a particular objecte as possessing the class-notion wew. The reason given by T. D. for rejecting the e- Tis, that the actions of bringing’ and ‘binding’ express- ed in the propositions घटमानय and गौरनुबन्ध्यः, are possible in the respective as only. If a word signified na only, the sentence would mean घटत्वमानय and गोत्वमनुबन्ध्यम, which is absurd because qe and me cannot be separated from the concrete objects. The Mimâmsakas however maintain that the fact that घere or गोत्व cannot be separated from the concrete object (afanua ) is exactly the reason why the significance of the word we or should, for the sake of लाघव, he confined to the जाति, while the notion of व्यक्ति may be conveyed by art or necessary implication. This view जातावेव शक्तिर्व्यक्तिलाभस्त्वाक्षेपात was held by the Mimdi- sakas, grammarians and rhetoricians, and is rejected by Annambhaṭṭa.

The last of the four views above mentioned which was held by the Bauddhas was that the primary import of words was only अपोह or अतद्व्यावृत्ति, distinction of all other different objects from it. What do we understand, they argued, by a word such as ? Not an external object because we never really know external objects; nor the ma, because, ma is nothing more than a mere conception formed by our mind and imposed upon what we call external objects. What e then really signifies is that a certain thing possesses some peculiarities which distinguish it from all other things. We never know what we or vea is; we only know what it is not, viz. that it is not org. We have therefore only a negative knowledge of things, and consequently the import of words must also be negative. The Vedantins by way of harmonizing the above views, each of which expresses a part of the truth, have started the theory that the power of a word resides in both the and the af, but in different ways; that is, it is active or expressive in a, and passive or latent in the The Vedânia-Paribhâsha says, ren??- पदानां व्यक्तौ शक्तिः स्वरूपसती न तु ज्ञाता । जाती तु सा ज्ञाता हेतुः । This appears to mean that a word primarily signifies ma

Ted. Pur. Cale. ed.

P. 17.

[[342]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

[SBOT. LIX.

but its capability of signifying the class-notion is derived from its acknowledged connection with the concrete objects comprised in that class. Thus effa signifies the general notion of a trunked animal; but it does so because the property ’trunk’ was found in the actual object elephant.

It must have been noticed that the distinction between the denotation and the connotation of words insisted upon by Mill and other English logicians does not strictly speaking find a place in any of these views. But if we may use those terms as applying to the signification of ft and m respectively, we might say that in far words

केवलव्यक्तिवाद are purely denotative, while in or they are

केवलजातिवाद purely connotative. Similarly in the arfafardigan are of the ancient Naiyayikas they are both denotative and connotative, while in the theory of a they connote only the differentia.

The two-fold power of words.

or implied. The

(implication). The

A पद is defined as शक्त, but शक्ति does not exhaust the whole import of words. Every word is cap- able of conveying two meanings, one pri- mary or direct and the other secondary relation by which a word signifies par- ticular thing is called ara, which is of two kinds, g or afar (expression) and first is created by and is inseparable from the word; the second operates in the absence of the first, and being derived from it is entirely dependent on it. Hence the defini- tion of a पद as शक्त is not अव्याप्त on a लाक्षणिकपद, for a पद can. never be argfore unless it is also . Each of these two kinds of a or special relation is subdivided into three sorts, thus:

शक्तिः

af:

लक्षणा

योगः रूढिः योगरूढिः

जहलक्षणा अजहल्लक्षणा जहदजहल्लक्षणा

SEOT. LIX. ↑

The expressive power.

Notes.

[[343]]

The expressive power (f) of words is of the above three kinds; and so words are divided into three classes according as they operate through any one of these modes. or etymology is defined

the power of the several roots or component parts of the words.’ Age is therefore one which adheres to its etymological meaning and conveys nothing more nor less than what is implied in the parts, e. g. q which, being compounded of the root पच and the कर्तरिप्रत्यय, signifies पचनकर्ता. रूढि or customary significance is defined garraf, the power of the whole word without any reference to its parts. Not that such words have no etymology, for there is an influential school of grammarians who assert that all words are derived from roots; but these words have completely abandoned their original signification and acquired a new sense.

Thus वट signifies jar not because it is derived from or any other root, but because convention has attached that mean- ing to it. Majority of simple words in Sanskrit belong to the third kind, namely, words in which both the etymological and the customary meanings are partly re- tained. Words like पङ्कज, मधुकर or हस्तिन have no doubt &u etymological sense, but it is restricted by custom to a par- ticular object or kind of object comprised in the original meaning. Etymologically might mean any thing pro- duced in mud, such as a lotus or a frog. But custom has narrowed the meaning of the word to a lotus. Similarly

a has come to denote only one out of many animals hav- ing a, such as elephants men and monkeys. Some mention a fourth variety named यौगिकरूढ, such as उद्भिद, which may be interpreted either by etymology or by customary sense independently.

All these varieties require the knowledge of the da, either on the अवयव or on the समुदाय or on both; and this

How Convention is known.

in various ways of which the वृद्धव्यवहार

described by T. D. is one. coguized modes of learning following couplet:-

Eight

is learnt by the child

of these generally re-

are mentioned in the

[[344]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

[ SEOT. LIX.

शक्तिग्रहो व्याकरणोप मानकोशातवाक्याइयवहारतश्च ।

anraer aufgendefèa niftra: faqrrer zar: 11

The import of words is learnt in any of the following ways: (1) Grammar, as the meaning of roots, terminations and cases; (2) Comparison, as when the meaning of a is known by the similarity of a gayal with a cow; (3) Dictionary, as of synonyms af, ata etc.; (4) Express asser- tion of a credible person, as by: Margaret:; (5) Usage of elders as when one elder person says to another ‘Bring cow,’ or ‘Bring a jar,’ the child eliminates the common word ‘bring’ and thus determines the meanings of and w; ( 6 ) Context, as in the vedic text qafaff the exact meaning of a is known by a concluding passage; ( 7 ) explanation by synonyms or paraphrase as E: 680:, redna që ed; and lastly (8) Contiguity with a well- known word, as in इह सहकारतरौ मधुरं पिको रोति the meaning of पिक is known by its association with सहकार and मधुर. Some also add signs of hand etc. as the ninth, as when one points a finger to a woman and says to the child इयं ते माता,

ar, the gesture imparts to the child the knowledge of the word माता-

The other kind of a is axur Implication, which is defined as स्वशक्यसम्बन्धः ( स्वं लाक्षणिकं पत्रं तस्य

Lakshand or Im- plication.

शक्यः वाच्योऽर्थः तत्संयोगः ) ’ connection with the expressive sense of the word.’ It is resorted to only when there is gerafgqqf inapplicability of the primary sense in the context.’ - In agri : for in- stance, the primary sense of T, namely the stream, is inapplicable because a hut cannot stand on the current ; and hence is made to signify the bank of the river which is

गङ्गा connected with the current by. If Annambhaṭṭa accepted the views of the ancient Naiyayikas about The follows the moderns with regard to rur. According to the anciente the essential condition for लक्षणा was अन्वयानुप- पत्ति ’ unsuitability of the अवय or meaning of the sentence’; but there is no such अन्वयानुपपत्ति

SECT. LIX. ]

Notes.

[[345]]

examples like काकेभ्यो दधि रक्ष्यतां or यष्टीः प्रवेशय, which by themselves give a fair sense without any, although that sense is clearly not the one intended by the speaker. Hence T. D. says तात्पर्यानुपपत्तिर्लक्षणाबीजम्. लक्षणा is resorted to when the primary sense is unsuited, not to the array, but to the वक्तृतात्पर्य. The three-fold division of लक्षणा into जहत्स्वार्था, अजहत्स्वाथा and जहदजहत्स्वार्था is also taken from the moderns.

जहल्लक्षणा

g is that where the primary sense is wholly abandon- ed and a new one substituted, as in मञ्चाः क्रोशन्ति, where н signifies a child sleeping on a cot and not the cot itself. In graf the word retains its primary sense and conveys something more, as in

a where both those who have umbrellas and those who have not are implied, or as in काकेभ्यो दधि रक्ष्यताम् where all birds including crows are to be kept off. The examples of जहदजहत्स्वार्था are सोऽयं देवदत्तः or af, where only a part of the primary meaning is retain- ed and a part is left out as being inapplicable. In ürsü aça: means तत्कालीनो देवदत्तः while अयम् means एतत्कालीनों a: and so to establish the identity of the two we leave out the qualifications तत्कालीन and एतत्कालीन. In तत्त्वमसि the तत denotes निर्गुणब्रह्म and त्वम् denotes सगुणजीव; so we leave out the properties निर्गुणत्व and सगुणत्व and make the two substances identical. A fourth kind fragen is also recognized by some, as in fan which primarily signifies the word way and through it the object, bee. N. B. repudiates the last kind on the part of the Naiyâyikas, and ascribes it to Vedantins.

सः

sion.

Another division of gror is into ror ger and off, otherwise called quit. Most of the Another sub-divi- above examples are of the first kind where the implication solely rests on the un- suitability of raref. In soft implication is resorted to in order to suggest a third sense called प्रयोजन. As in गङ्गायां घोष the qualities of coolness and holiness which really belong to the current are transferred to the bank. This suggested third sense is called agar and is supposed by rhetoricians to be conveyed by a third mode called sumar.

[[44]]

$46

Tarka-Sangraha.

[ SECT. LIX.

व्यञ्जना is of two kinds शाब्दी and आर्थी, but Naiyayihas re- cognize neither. T, they say, as in the

Vyañjanú not re- cognized.

above example, is invariably included in the four and so need not be regarded as a separate mode. erraff is found in such examples as :-

nog negia anata, tuna: acg à far: 1 ममापि जन्म तत्रैव भूयाद्यत्र गतो भवान् ॥

Here the meaning conveyed by the speaker is प्रियगमनो- at À quàdini wawa; but this sense, says T. D., is obtained by inference, and so the art process becomes . According to Naiyayikas therefore there are only two modes of conveying sense, expression ( 1 ) and impli- cation (arr), of which the latter being secondary is based on the former. The definition of पद ( शक्तं पदं ) is therefore applicable in both cases.

SEcT. LX, AND LXI. आकाङ्क्षा - योग्यता - सन्निधयः

Expectancy compatibility, and juxtaposition are the causes of the knowledge of the meaning of a sentence. Expectancy is the inability of a word to convey the meaning of a sentence on account of the absence of some other word. Compatibility is the non-contradiction of the sense. Juxtaposition is the consecutive utterance of words.

A sentence devoid of expectancy, etc. is unauthoritative; e. g. ( words) cow, horse, man, elephant are not authoritative, being devoid of expectancy, etc. (Sentence). sprinkle with fire is unauthoritative for want of compatibility; (words) Bring o cow pronounced at intervals are not authoritative owing to want of juxtaposition.

a proposition.

शब्द has been defined as a वाक्य, but an intelligible sen

tence cannot be formed simply by stringing Three requisites of together any number of words, as 2: 2: गां भित्तिः. In order to convey the combined Turf the words require the aid of some accessory proper- ties, which are three, आकाङ्क्षा (Expectancy), योग्यता (Compa- tibility) and (Juxtaposition).

The simplest definition of आकाङ्क्षा is अभिधानापर्यवसानम्

Expectancy.

€

non-completion of the sense ‘owing

to the absence of some other word or words. Annambhatta, defines it as ’the inability of a word ( पदस्य ) to convey (अननुभावकत्वं ) the

SEOT. LXI. ]

Notes.

[[347]]

whole meaning of the sentence (err), which inability

is caused (g) by the absence

of some other word desire is at once

( पदान्तर ). If one says simply घटम्, created to know what about the jar, and when we supply some such word as en the sense. This desire to know is called pends generally on the exact

is satisfied only which completes TT and de- form of the words used.

Thus aeamy conveys four notions, a jar (), the objective relation (34), the act of bringing (ar) and the command (the termination of Imp. 2nd sing. ); and if any of these notions is wanting the sense remains so far incom- plete. The imperfection cannot however be made up by saying घटः कर्मत्वं आनयनं कृतिः although these words import the same thing as घटमानय, because no आकाङ्क्षा is raised in this case.

Compatibility.

raar or compatibility is “the non-contradiction of sense. A word is said to have योग्यता with another when the meanings conveyed by the two are not inconsistent with each other. Thus we cannot say argar freak or vða qua, because the notions of fire and sprinkling as well vs of water and burning are inconsistent and incompatible with one another. A sentence like this would therefore be meaningless owing to the impossibility of combining the two incongruous notions in one अन्वय .

Juxtaposition.

The third requisite is सन्निधि or आसत्ति which consists in “the utterance of consecutive words one after another without interval between any two of them.” A arra is made up by the combination of the several notions of words, and it is therefore necessary that the impression made by each should remain fresh until this combination is effected. If however a long break occurs in the middle of a sentence, the previous impressions vanish before the sentence is finish - ed, and the sense would remain incomplete. What consti- tutes far is, as T. D. remarks, the unbroken apprehension of all the words; and hence actual utterance of words is not absolutely necessary. In a written or printed book for

[[348]]

Tarka–Sangraha.

[ SEOT. LXI.

instance we have no utterance, and yet we understand the arf because the words are placed in juxtaposition. STEET, Par, and af, T. D. further adds, are neces- sary preliminaries for the comprehension of a sentence, not in themselves, but as known; that is, it is their know- ledge that is required irrespective of their actual existence or absence. If a man wrongly conceives them to exist in a sentence when they really do not, he will make out a meaning of the sentence, while he will not understand a sentence possessing all the three, if he fails to detect their presence.

Intended sense.

}

Viśvanatha adds a fourth requisite arqua’know- ledge of the intention of the speaker,’ which is often as much necessary for the right understanding of a sentence as any of the preceding three. For instance, the sentence #qa#ma might convey two distinct senses Bring salt, and Bring a horse. ’ आकाङ्क्षा, योग्यता and सन्निधि, which are all satisfied here, are not in themselves able to tell us which of the two senses is to be accepted on a particular occasion, that is which of the two things is intended by the speaker. This can be determined only by knowing the are, which again is to be gathered from the circumstances under which or the occasion on which the sentence is spoken. If the speaker is dining he almost certainly orders salt, while if he is dressed and is going out, he orders a horse. Without this knowledge of the speaker’s intention, it will be impossible to interpret a sentence wherever a word is ambiguous or has more than one sense. Perhaps this speaker’s intention may be included in the second requisite ar, as compatibility of a meaning must always be judged with reference to the particular occasion or the probable intention of the speaker.

Although Annambhaṭṭa does not mention in this section, his reference to it in connection with gror in the commentary ou the preceding section leaves no doubt that he accepts its necessity. His definition of तात्पर्य, namely तत्प्रतीती- yaraan, is however faulty. Words which convey a sense are not necessarily uttered with an intention to convey that

B. P. 81.

SEOT. LXII. ]

Notes.

[[349]]

sense. A fool or an idiot sometimes utters words which he does not understand but which are intelligible to others; a parrot pronounces words which have a meaning in ordinary language; and yet there is no intention of the speaker in such cases. It may be urged against this that they are not real words at all, although appearing to be so. But what if a Vedic text is repeated by a person who understands nothing of it. The text is there and you cannot deny it, and yet there can be noa. Again if a teacher expounds such a text wrong- ly the meaning which he intends is at variance with the truth and can never be conveyed by the text. Or suppose one reads such a text in a book; there is no speaker here and there can be no तत्प्रतीतीच्छयोच्चरितत्व. It cannot be argued that the original intention of the author of the text, viz. God, is to be assumed in such cases; because there are many, says Vedanta-Paribhasha, who do not recognize God as the author of the Vedas and yet are able to understand the meaning of them. The Paribháshá therefore proposes as a better definition तत्प्रतीतिजननयोग्यत्वे सति तदम्यप्रतीतीच्छया नोच्चरि- acu arada’ fitness of the words to express a particular meaning, while there is no utterance with an intention to convey a different sense.’* The second clause is added to prevent a doubt in examples like Arqama where, although is fit to express both salt and a horse, the intention is always to convey only one meaning and not the other. Even in cases where two meanings are intended to be simultane- ously expressed, as in TT, the definition will apply since a will comprehend both the senses.

तत्

[[2]]

SECT. LXII. TAIL

A sentence is of two kinds, sacred (f) or profane (); the sacred, being pronounced by God, is always trustworthy, while a profane sentence is trustworthy if pro- nounced by a credible person: Any other is untrustworthy.

Ved. Par. Calc. ed. p. 20.

[[350]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

SECT. LXII.

Having defined gr, word, as the fourth proof in general the author devides it into two sorts,

Two kinds of divine and profane. The

sentences.

area is of

four kinds श्रुति, स्मृति, इतिहास and पुराण, of which the preceding is of a higher authority than the next following. The definition in the text applies only to the ga, as other compositions are of human origin. g or Vedas proper are four ऋक्, यजुस्, सामन, and आथर्वण, each of which is divided into three parts मन्त्र or संहिता, ब्राह्मण, and आरण्यक the last including eur. All these being of divine origin are to be implicitly believed. is an authority only when श्रुति is silent or not inconsistent ( विरोधे स्वनपेक्षं स्यादसति ह्यनु- मानं ) . * इतिहास and पुराण are of comparatively slender weight and are brought into requisition only when no higher au- thority is to be found.

The two-fold division of a ar into sacred and profane is chiefly made for the purpose of imply- The authority of ing that the rules laid down in the pre- ceding three sections apply to लौकिक वाक्य

the Vedas.

only; but the unquestioned authority of the area is not therefore inconsistent with them, since all the conditions of validity implied by them are taken for granted in the case

of the Vedas.

T. D. here refers to two points which have long served as good bones of contention between Mimâisakas and Naiyâyikas. The first is whether the Vedas are eternal or are special com- positions by God. It must be remembered that there is no question here as to the human origin of the Vedas, since both the schools, being orthodox, agree in repudiating the notion of the Vedas being human creations like any other book. The word which frequently occurs in this controversy solely refers to God; while means eternal, having no author at all. The Mimâmsakas claim eternity for the Vedas on two grounds; first, no tradi- tion is known ascribing the authorship of the Vedas to any individual, the several Rishis mentioned as seers of hymns (Hasen:)‘having only seen the hymns and not composed them.

Jaimini: Mimamsá-Satras. I, 3,3,

вSEOT. LXII.

Notes.

[[3]]

[[581]]

On the other hand we know the authorship of all human productions, as अष्टादशपुराणानां कर्ता सत्यवतीसुतः. Secondly, the Vedas themselves declare their own fer in several texts, such as ’ बाचा विरूपनित्यया, ’ ’ अस्य महतो भूतस्य निश्वसितमेतद्यदृग्वेदो. यजुर्वेदः- The Naiyayika meets these arguments by contrary texts, such as तस्मात्तेपानात्त्रयो वेदा अजायन्त, and ’ इदं सर्वमसृजत ऋचो यजूंषि सामानि ’ Their strongest weapon however is the अनुमान, वेदः पौरुषेयो वाक्यत्वाद्भारतादिवत् or वेदवाक्यरचना वक्तृ- aurýarqarûznagai, वाक्यरचनात्वात्, अस्मदादिवाक्यरचनावत्. The Mimâmsakas try to refute this argument by calling it सोपाधिक, the उपाधि being स्मर्यमाणकर्तृकत्व; that is, they mean that the above reasoning is applicable only to those works whose authorship is known. The Naiyâyikas answer that even the authorship of the Vedas was known since it was remembered by Rishis like Gotama by the tradition of teaching. Besides if the Vedas had been eternal, all the words and letters in them would be co-existing, and so there would be no order of words (ofagaff) etc., without which there can be no आकाङ्क्षा and no शाब्दबोध. The Vedas there - fore must have been produced by some one, and as no human origin is possible in the case of works containing such transcendental wisdom, they must be the work of God. The Vedantin, who is eminently a compromiser, tries to reconcile these opposite views, by supposing that the Vedas as they exist at present are af, but they are merely copies of similar compositions existing in the previous cycles, the authority for this opinion being the text, यथा पूर्वमकल्पयत्. This in short means that the Vedas are eternal as to substance (), but non-eternal as to form ( आनुपूर्वी ).’

Non-eternity of

Bound.

The question of the eternity of the Vedas is involved in the larger question whether sound is eternal. Sound is a quality of Âkása and is eternal like it,

and other accidental causes only serving to reveal it to our ears. We always recognize the letter as the same, and so it connot vanish away the moment it is pronounced. The Naiyâyikas

*Ved. Par. Calc. ed. p.

[[352]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

[ SEOT.

LXII.

prove the non eternity of sound by अनुमान thus : - शब्दोऽनित्यः । सामान्यत्वे सति बहिरिन्द्रियजन्यलौकिकप्रत्यक्षविषयत्वात्, लौकिकप्रत्यक्ष- विशेष्यत्वाद्वा । घटवत्. Gotama gives three reasons for the non-eternity of sound: -1 that it has a beginning, 2 that it is perceived by organ of sense, and 3 that the attributes of a product are ascribed to it.* The identification of one ĦĦIT with a former one can be accounted for by similarity just as we identify one lamp-flame with another that for- merly stood in its place.

SECT. LXIII.

Verbal knowledge means the knowledge of the meaning of

a sentence; its proximate cause is the Word.

Annambhaṭṭa winds up the discussion of

The proximate cause of verbal knowledge.

by the

declaration that it is the knowledge of the meaning conveyed by the whole sentence which is the real verbal know- ledge, that is, the , mentioned above as the fourth kind of apprehension. The special cause of this is the or the sentence which conveyed that sense. This emphatic declaration seems to be made in order to repudiate the view of the modern Naiyayikas, that it is not the पद but the पदज्ञान that is the real करण of शाब्द- बोध- a. Viśvanatha who prefers the modern view says in B. P. 80:-

पदज्ञानं तु करणं द्वारं तत्र पदार्थधीः । शाब्दबोधः फलं तत्र शक्तिधीः सहकारिणी ॥

He then goes on in his commentary a spend d करणम्, पदाभावेऽपि मौनिश्लोकादौ शाब्दबोधात. If the word itself be taken as the करण of शाब्दबोध, how do we under- stand a verse written by a dumb man without utter- ing a single word ? It is therefore the knowledge of the word, whether heard orally or seen in writing, that really produces the

. The distinction is prac-

G. S. II, 2, 14.

† S. M. Calc. ed. p. 78.

SECT. LXIII. ]

Notes.

[[353]]

tically unimportant, although it has great historical signifi- cance, since it marks the stage when, writing having come to take a large place previously occupied by oral tradition, the absurdity of defining in terms of actual utterance was perceived and the difference between writing and oral tradition was abolished. Apparently Annambhatta’s opinion differs from both the above views, since he makes the करण and defines शब्द as a वाक्य or पदसमूह and not a पड़ But this is not so, because according to Naiyâyikas a qram is not different from its components, the several vs. Perhaps hy शब्द Annambhatta may be meaning शब्दज्ञान or पदज्ञान, just as in a former section he interpreted T etc. as e- Tra; and if this is the case his view will agree with the modern one. At any rate his laxity of expression on this point shows that he did not regard the distinction as very material.

Why word is separate proof.

(

T. D. here briefly notices the argument of the Vai

śeshikas, who recognize only two proofs, Perception and Inference, viz. that Word is not a distinct proof as it can be included under Inference. The syllogism by which the connection f ) between a word and its sense is to be known may be stated either as T. D. puts it, or as a rei: qrqrdan- चन्तः । आकाङ्क्षायोग्यता सत्तिमत्पदस्मारितत्वात् । दण्डेन गामानयेतिपद- स्मारितपदार्थवत्; that is, the पक्ष in the inference may be either the qy as T. D. makes it, or the rare as is done in the syllogism given here. Either way, the inference is incap- able of producing ra, for the knowledge conveyed by words is of an altogether distinct kind from that imparted by an inference, and besides produces the consciousness, I know from words, which differs from the consciousness I know by inference. ‘This is not a very satisfactory reply since it rests on self-consciousness which may vary with different persons. Udayanâchârya gives a more convincing refutation of the Vaiseshika view : -अनैकान्तः परिच्छेदे सम्भवे च न निर्णयः । aff: * An inference like the above is impossible; for the

[[45]]

Kus. Cowell’s ed. III, 13.

•

[[354]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

[ SECT. LXIII.

conclusion of it can only be a certainty () or a mere possibility (a); if it is the former the syllogism involves an अनैकान्तिक हेत्वाभास as a certain conclusion is not warranted by the premises; while if the latter, there is no ascertainment (सिद्धि) of the साध्य, and consequently no शाब्दबोध. Hence शब्द must be recognized as a distinct proof, producing a cognition of a peculiar sort.

Other proofs.

The description of the four proofs is concluded here, and the rest of the passage in T. D. dis- cusses two points having reference to the whole chapter on proofs.’ The first point is whether the four proofs, hitherto described, exhaust the number of valid proofs. The variety of opinions on this head amongst the different schools is almost perplexing. The total number of proofs thus recognized by one or more schools is ten, namely, 1 g ( Perception ), 2 agara ( Inference ), 8 उपमान ( Comparison ), 4 शब्द ( Word ), 5 अर्थापत्ति (Pre- sumption ), 6 af (Non-perception ), 7 #wa (Inclusion), 8 (Tradition), 9 er (Sign), and 10 R$¶ (Eli- mination). Of these each of the known philosophical schools recognize only a particular number varying from one to ten. Thus, the Charvâkas or Atheists accept only, Perception, repudiating the validity of all the rest; the Vaiseshikas, the Bauddhas and the Jainas accept two, Perception and Infer- ence; the Sankhyas, Yogins, Lawyers, and a section of Vedan- tins accept three, the above two with Word; the Naiyâyikas add a fourth, Comparison; the Mimâmsakas and some Vedan- tins accept two more, Presumption and Non-perception; the Pauranikas or Mythologists add further Probability or Inclus- ion, and Tradition ; while the ninth, Sign, is recognized by Tantrikas only. Elimination also, though only a species of in- ference, is regarded as a distinct proof by some Mimâmsakas. Annambhatta having accepted the Naiydyika doctrine of four proofs disposes of the rest by short references. #, ऐतिह्य and ar are easily disposed of by including the first

SEOT. LXIII. ]

Notes.

[[355]]

. Non-perception has

in age and the latter two in been already discussed under a previous section* and declared to be only an accessory to the perception of negation.

The severest contest lies round अर्थापत्ति.

अर्थापत्ति. The Naiyâyikas strenuously try to include it in Inference, while the Mimâmsakas as strenuously maintain that it is an inde- pendent proof, The stock example of अर्थापत्ति is पीनो देवदत्तो दिवा न भुङ्क्ते । अर्थात् रात्रौ भुते । • Devadatta being fat does not eat in daytime; and so he must be eating at night.’ Night-eating is thus presumed on the ground of the known impossibility of remaining fat without eating, unless of course as Nilakantha suggests, the fatness is due to disease or supernuman power. The exceptions of course need not be taken into account here. This area which is advo- cated by Prabhakara Mimâṁsakas is of two kinds, zerafata and श्रुतार्थापत्ति. When the knowledge देवदत्तो दिवा न भुङ्क्ते on which the presumption is based is obtained by actual sight, it is the first; when it is got by hearsay from another person it is the second. Both these kinds of art are included by Naiyayikas in अनुमान. The inference is of केवल- व्यतिरेकि kind, देवदत्तो रात्रिभोजनकर्ता, दिवाभुञ्जानत्वे सति पीनत्वात्, यन्नैवं तन्नैवं यथा रात्रावभोजी यज्ञदत्तः । Presumption is therefore not a separate proof, for all cases of it are accounted for by केबलव्यतिरेकि अनुमान. The difference between Nyaya and Mimâmsa views on this point is only of era and . The Mimâmsakas recognize a fifth proof

to account for all kinds of presumptions and thereby dispense with the a inference, while the Naiyâyikas accept the latter and repudiate stuff. The dispute between them is therefore reduced to the question which view has area on its side; that is, whether it is simpler to recognize a new proof or a new variety of inference. Apparently the Naiya- yikas have the better of it; but if we take into account the difficulties and absurdities into which the Naiyâyakas

Vide T. D. on Sect. 43 and Note 8 thereon, p. 228 Supra,

[[356]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

[SECT. LXIII.

have involved themselves by their recognition of a- effe fog, we cannot certainly commend them for their ap- parent simplicity.’

The validity of knowledge.

The second point noticed by T. D. is of the utmost importance, as it in fact lies at the very root of the whole theory of proofs. see a jar and have the cognition अयं घटः or gemi arana; but how do we know that we really see the , and that our perceptive knowledge is not a mis-appre- hension of something that is not ? That is, how do we in practice distinguish a ar from We may or we may not see the reality of , but what test is there to prove that we see the reality and not a shadow? A qar has been defined as तद्वति तत्प्रकारकं ज्ञानं ’ knowledge of a thing possessing any property as possessed of that pro- perty.’ It is thus comparatively easy to define what y is; but how are we to ascertain whether a given piece of knowledge is a प्रमा or अप्रमा ? The necessity of this as- certainment is obvious, for without it there can be no certainty of knowledge and all human intercourse would be impossible. The question therefore how to determine the truth of our cognitions becomes a necessary corollary to any theory of knowledge.

The question is resolved into the alternative whether right knowledge is स्वतःप्रमाण ’ self-proved’ or परतः प्रमाण proved by something else.’ Madhavâchârya quotes two verses which summarize the four principal veiws on this point:-

PAINETAAjgâ en: vicar: vænètar: i

नैयायिकास्ते परतः सौगताश्वरमं स्वतः ॥

प्रथमं परतः माहुः प्रामाण्यं वेदवादिनः ।

प्रमाणत्वं स्वतः प्राहुः परतश्वाप्रमाणताम् ॥

“Of the two things ‘authoritativeness’ (THT) and ’non- authoritativeness’ (TT), the Sankhyas consider both to be self-proved; the Naiyayikas hold both to be known extern-

Sarv, D. S. Calc. ed. P. 129.

SEOT. LXIII. ]

Notes.

[[357]]

ally; the Bauddhas think that non-authoritativeness’ is self-proved but the other is proved externally. Lastly, teach- ers of the Vedas, i. e. the Mimâmsakas maintain that

is self-proved but a diversity of opinions about rætur may be stated briefly by saying that according to Sankhyas both the truth and falsity of a cognition are known intuitively; according to Naiyâyikas both are proved by independent reasoning and therefore neither can be presumed until thus proved; according to Bauddhas a cognition is prima facie incorrect and true if only proved to be so by special evidence; while the Mîmâmsa- kas regard a cognition as presumably correct, but false when actually proved to be so. As we are mainly interested in determining a only, the contest chiefly lies between the Naiyayika view of ear and the Mimamsa doctrine of a: T. D. first states the Mimâmsd view fully as a पूर्वपक्ष, and then refutes it in order to establish the firarea of Nyâya that the truth of knowledge is proved externally.

requires external proof.” This

The स्वतस्त्व of प्रामाण्य is defined, तदप्रामाण्याग्राहकयावज्ज्ञानग्रा- हकसामग्रीग्राह्यत्वम्, the property of being apprehended by the same entire body of the means which produce the knowledge, but do not prove its falsity.’ Three conditions are implied in this definition, that the truth of knowledge is apprehended by the same means which produce the knowledge, that the means include every thing that is instrumental in producing the knowledge, and that they should not include anything that affects the truth of the knowledge. The necessity of the two latter qualifications is shown by T. D. The definition speaks of the totality of means in order to include an infer- ence that may be sometimes used to prove, although it may have been previously known by ; and it ex- cludes a contrary cognition इदं ज्ञानमप्रमा which, being बाधक, may prevent the apprehension of я, provided of course this contrary cognition arises with reference to the know- ledge itself and not to the subsequent age. Besides, the Naiyayikas themselves in a way assent to स्वतः प्रामाण्य,

[[358]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

[ SEOT. LXIII.

since, as they go so far as to accept that we, va as well as the सम्बन्ध of the two, are cognized by अनुव्यवसाय, they should have no difficulty in accepting the cognizability by the same agovary of the respective knowledge of those things. The Naiyâyika however rejects this last view, viz. that agerar cognizes घट, घटत्व as well as their सम्बन्ध, and then refutes the wholera. The chief objection of the Naiyayika against स्वतः प्रामाण्य is that it leaves no room for the possibility of a doubt, which as a matter of fact we often feel, whether a certain cognition is true or not. If the game is intuitive and is known along with the cognition itself, such a doubt can never arise. The validity of any cognition is therefore de- termined by a subsequent fat inference which is bas- ed on the intervening actual experience of the thing. first we believe we see water; then this belief produces (for the water), which produces rafa (towards it). This ra is satisfied if the water really exists there, but not if it is simply a mirage. Hence the satisfaction of af is a proof of the reality of our perception; that is, the truth of our perception is determined by external evidence. Similarly the truth of words is ascertained by their being qur, i. e. being in harmony with external things.

Thus

The advocates of परतःप्रामाण्य think that a प्रमा is pro- duced by the presence of some positive gur, which varies with the nature of the प्रमा, that is, in perception it is विशेषणवद्वि- शेष्य सन्निकर्ष and so on; while an अप्रमा is caused by the presence of some such as distance, defective sight etc.* According to the other side, no positive is required for ч but simple is quite sufficient. The chief objection of xaa- aar against the Naiyâyika view is that if the truth of one cognition is to be determined by an extra inference, the vali- dity of that inference again will have to be ascertained by a third inference, and so on ad infinitum. In this way there will

B, P. 130-3.

SBOT. LXIV.

Notes.

[[350]]

be no certainty of knowledge* It is unnecessary to enter further into this interesting but endless controversy. The reason why it was persued with so much vigour on both sides seems to be its important bearing on the question of the authority of the Vedas. If शब्द is स्वतःप्रमाण as the Mima msakas held, the truth of the Vedas was self-evident, and they required no external sanction to prove their claim to unflinching obedience; while if शब्द was परतः प्रमाण, the Vedas required some external proof of their authority, such as the fact of their being composed by Omniscient God. The Bauddhas denied the authority of the Vedas altogether, while the Naiyayikas made it dependent on God’s author- ship. This may be one reason why the Naiyâyikas and Vaiseshikas were termed by their more orthodox rivals, erif-

mps or Semi-Buddhists.

T. D. incidentally notices another doctrine of the Prabhakara school of Mimâmsakas that all knowledge is true (of course so far as it goes), and consequently the distinction between प्रमा and अप्रमा is unfounded. If प्रवृत्ति-

is the test for the reality of knowledge, then the erroneous apprehension of silver on mother-o’pearl also sometimes produces a ra, and will therefore be a while that a can be fully accounted for by the recollection of the formerly-seen silver and the percept of the object pre- sent. This cannot be, says the Naiyayika; because there is much लाघव in ascribing प्रवृत्तिजनकत्व to the actual प्रमा itself. The erroneous apprehension of silver on gf may appear to be true so long as it lasts, but it is not , because it is

not तद्वति तत्प्रकारक ज्ञान.

SECT. LXIV. STAHT.

Wrong appehension is of three kinds, doubt, error and false assumption. Doubt is the apprehension of various contrary properties in one object, e. g. Is it a post or a mun?

Error is false knowledge, as silver in a conch-shell. False assumption is the deduction of a wider thing by the wrong hypothesis of a narrow one, e. g. if there be no fire there would be no smoke.

Having treated fan, the author in the present section enumerates the varieties of T- aruigwa ‘wrong apprehension’ because to

Wrong knowledge.

For a fuller discussion see Sarva, D. S. Calc. ed. pp. 129–32, and Ved. Par. Calc. ød. P. 27.

[[360]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

SHOT. LXIV.

understand true apprehension fully we also require a know- ledge of its opposite misapprehension. avaraigua is already defined as “the cognition of a thing as possessed of an attri- bute which in fact it does not possess.” 77# It has been well said that truth is one, but falsehood is various. Hence the definition of ergerdana contains no restriction as to certainty. Misapprehension may therefore be first divided into Certitude ( निश्र्वr or भ्रम) and In-certitude ( संशय ). Certitude again may be either conscious or unconscious, that is, it may either have been voluntarily and purposely assumed (eng), or it may have been caused by some ad- ventitious circumstance called दोष ( अनाहार्य ). The first is called and is assumed with a full consciousness of its falsity: the second is called विपर्यय or विपर्यास and is invol- antary. संशय or doubt is always involuntary ( अनाहार्य ), because as soon as the error is perceived it is at once dispelled.

Varieties of mis- apprehension.

Thus Misapprehension naturally splits into three kinds: Doubt, Error and False Assumption or Hypothesis. Some include तर्क in विपर्यय for the obvious reason that though vol- untarily made on the part of one of the two disputants it does not essentially differ from any other kind of error; but Annambhatta gives prominence to it by mentioning it sep- arately, because although invalid itself it is often useful in argumentation and assists the valid proofs in obtaining right knowledge. Dream, says T. D., is included under faqda, while the fallacies of inference already mentioned will also fall under the same head.

Doubt is defined as “the knowledge of various con- trary properties in one and the same ob- ject.” The propriety of each of the three limitations एकस्मिन् धर्मिणि, विरुद्ध and

Doubt.

ATT, is explained by T. D. Doubt has three charac- teristics, that the knowledge must be of several properties,

Vide Sect. 35, and Notes 3, 4 and 5 thereon.SECT. LXIV.

Notes.

[[361]]

that they must be irreconcilable with one another, and that they must be apprehended in the same thing. The definition however is not quite satisfactory, for it contains the word

which is not very easy to define. There is no certain test to determine what properties are contrary to one another and what not. Roughly we may say that those which are never observed together as existing in one object are irreconcilable. For example, era and gare, one might say, because they are never observed together; but suppose a centaur which is half-man and half-horse is actual- ly found on earth, then they will no longer be fa. Besides even supposing that they are properties and that a

centaur does not really exist, the definition of a would still apply to the imaginary notion of a centaur which is undoubtedly a knowledge of several contrary properties in one thing. This last objection may however be answered by saying that a centaur being wholly an imaginary being there is no qff on which the contrary properties are to be imposed. A better definition is एकस्मिन् धर्मिणि विरुद्धनानाकोटिकं ज्ञानम्. कोटि is an alternative, and the contrary कोटिs are the property and its negation. Thus when we have a doubt नित्यो न वा नित्यत्व is one कोटि and अनित्यत्व is the other ; and the संशय is said to be द्विकोटिक. When we have a doubt अयं स्थाणुर्वा पुरुषो वr, it is चतुष्कोटिक, for there we have four possible cases अयं स्थाणुः, अयन्न स्थाणुः अयं पुरुषः and अयं न पुरुषः-

[[9]]

Error and argu- ment by Reductio ad absurdum.

ว

fada (Error ) is of course any false notion; and is the mis-apprehension proper. Reductio ad absurdum requires some explantion. The definition of in the text is rather vague. Literally it signifies the imposition of a more extensive thing through the assump- tion of the less. The example given is however quite misleading. बह्रयभाव is व्याप्य and धूमभाव is व्यापक; therefore we assume the existence of age and deduce from it by means of a regular syllogism the existence of arra, as in the sentence यादे वह्निर्न स्यात्तार्ह धूमोऽपि न स्यात् which implies that वह्नचभाव necessarily leads to धूमाभाव. This is called व्याप्यrरोपेण व्यापकारोपणम्, and this according to Annambhatta’s definition would be . But no one can say that the pro-

[[46]]

[[362]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

SECT. LXIV.

position, ‘भाव necessarily leads to धूमाभाव,’ is a mis- apprehension, since it is perfectly correct and does nothing more than express the वह्निव्याप्यत्व of धूम negatively. As a matter of fact the proposition only expresses them by which the conclusion, denominated, is arrived at. Properly speaking a is neither the process of hypothetical reasoning in which a false conclusion is deduced from a wrongly assumed hypothesis (as some have erroneously supposed), nor is it the sun on which such conclusion is based, as Annambhatta’s illustration has led others to believe. Such a mistake seems to have been committed by Roer who translates by ‘discussion and by Ballantyne who translates Annambhatta’s : by “consists in

व्यापकारोपः establishing the pervader etc. " + आरोप is not the act of आरो- पण but the conclusion that is आरोपित, namely, अत्र (पर्वते ) धूमो . This conclusion which is called af is false, because it is contradicted by our actual perception of smoke on the mountain.

The process of arriving at this Reductio ad absurdum conclu- sion is this. Suppose one observes smoke on the mountain and wishes to infer fire from it. He thereupon declares the प्रतिज्ञा and हेतु, पर्वतो वह्निमान् धूमात्, and then states the अन्वयव्याप्ति, यत्र यत्र धूमः etc. But his adversary may not admit the व्याप्ति to be correct. How is he then to proceed? He cannot infer fire from smoke, unless the invariable concomitance of the two things is accepted by the adversary. He therefore resorts to the reverse process of reasoning called Reductio ad absurdum, in which he grants, for the sake of argument, the groundless contention of his adversary, namely, that the mountain is not fiery, and deduces from it by a regular and correct syllogism, a conclusion (Moun- tain has no smoke ) which is palpably absurd as it is directly contradicted by the observed fact of smoke. And the absur- dity of this conclusion of course proves the absurdity of the hypothesis from which it was deduced, namely, the contention of the adversary. In order to do this he begins by asking qat

•

Roer’s Trans. of B. P. Bibl. In. p. 69-70.

† Ballantyne Lectures on Nyaya Phil. p. 52,

SEOT. LXIV. 1

Notes.

[[363]]

agara a ar. If the former alternative is accepted, then of course his conclusion is admitted, and he need not proceed; but if the adversary accepts the latter, then he goes on:- पर्वतो वह्निमान् न स्यात् तर्हि स धूमवानपि न स्यात्. If the adver- sary questions this he is at once asked to produce an in- stance where smoke is found in the absence of fire; but this he cannot do since धूम being the कार्य of बह्लेि can never exist apart from it. The adversary is therefore forced to accept the व्याप्ति, यत्र यत्र वन्ह्यभावस्तत्र धूमाभावः । Now his assumption is पर्वतो बह्वभावबान्; therefore he reasons पर्वतो धूमाभाववान् । वह्न्यभाववत्त्वात् । यत्र यत्र वन्ह्यभावः etc. Thus he gets at the conclusion पर्वतो धूमाभदान; but this must be false as it is directly opposed to the observed fact qfar gary. The as- sumption therefore from which this absurd conclusion is derived, namely qfar aguuraara, must be false, and its con- tradictory qfar af must be true. Here the speaker first imposes or assumes the existence of व्याप्य २. ९. बह्वचभाव on the mountain, and from that (error) deduces the ex- istence of व्यापक . e. धूमाभाव, both of which impositions be- ing false are properly termed आरोप. The deduced आरोप, namely the absurd conclusion, is called . The real sense of Annambhaṭṭa’s definition is thus brought out in Nila- kantha’s paraphrase, आहार्यव्याप्यवत्ताभ्रमजन्य आहार्यव्यापकवत्ताभ्रम-

:, that is, an obviously wrong notion as to the existence of व्यापक on the पक्ष, derived from a similar palpably wrang assumption of the existence of art in the same place.

The differs from farfar in being formed by one who knows its falsity, while it differs from a fùa egiala in being only subsidiary to the establishment of its con- tradictory. Ancient Naiyâyikas mentioned eleven kinds of तर्कs, of which the moderns accept only five, viz. आत्माश्रय (Ignoratio Elenchi ), xräturau ( Dilemma ), da (Circle), अनवस्था (Regressus ad infinitum ) and प्रमाणबाधितार्थप्रसङ्ग ( Re- ductio ad absurdum). The example usually given comes under the last head, while the first four are only varieties of सव्यभिचार and असिद्ध fallacies framed in particular forms. The तर्क or केवलव्यतिरेकि अनुमान is very useful in proving

[[364]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

[ SECT. LXIV.

things which cannot be proved by positive inference, and is particularly indispensable in theological discussions. Religious commands which transcend our limited reason can be justified only by such special arguments; Manu there- fore says:-

आर्य धर्मोपदेशं च वेदशास्त्राविरोधिना ।

यस्तर्केणानुसन्धते स धर्मे वेद नेतरः ॥ (M. S. XII. 106 ).

In matters of religion which are above and beyond positive human experience or contrary inference is often the only method available to satisfy the inveterate doubter or silence a persistent adversary. Kant had to assume a separate faculty of Intuition to account for all such extra-sensuous knowledge. Naiy1yikas solved the difficulty by adopting a inference.

SECT. LXV,

fa:

Remembrance also is of two kinds: true and false; the one arising from true cognition is true, that arising from false cognition is false.

Right and wrong Remembrance.

(Remembrance) has been already defined in Section 34. After treating of the two kinds of apprehensions, true as well as false, the author announces a similar division Remembrance. But the fundamentum divisionis is different in this case. ag is true or false according as it does or does not correspond to the object as it exists externally;while the truth or falsity of a is made to depend entirely on the truth or falsity of the age from which it originates. A remembrance which springs from right apprehension is right, and that which springs from wrong apprehension is wrong. The reason of this difference of tests for अनुभव and स्मृति probably lies in the fact that being a mediate knowledge is not directly connected with external objects. Besides a remembrance is often considerably removed both in time and

SEOT. LXXII. ]

Notes.

[[365]]

place from the first apprehension, and consequently the test of rare applicable to all first-hand cognitions, namely the inference based on actual verification of the external object, is generally not available in the case of . When we believe we see water, we can at once verify the truth of our perception by touching or drinking the water; but when we only remember to have seen water some time back and at a distant place, it is obviously impossible for us to go to the place and verify the truth of our fa. Hence a different

स्मृति. test of truth is applied to r, a test, by the way, recognized in the case of all mediate cognitions, namely, the correctness or incorrectness of the original notions which produce them. Thus the validity of an aff depends on the validity of the परामर्श, while the truth of शाब्दबोध de- pends on the correct knowledge of the a. Similarly the truth of fa also depends upon the truth of the original

. But there is one drawback to this method. Suppose the original gas was true but the impression left by it is distorted or partially effaced by lapse of time; then the remembrance will be obviously mutilated and false, although the apprehension itself was right. Or suppose both the ap- prehension and the impression were good, but owing to some accidental cause, such as a want of proper i or the pre- sence of any obstruction or inattention, the remembrance does not fully agree with the अनुभव ; yet it cannot be प्रमा. Again dreams are supposed to be

and are often produced by actual experience of the things perceived ; why are then all dreams false? These objections can be ans- wered by saying that every requires to be verified if not with external objects, at least with true cognitions of those external objects.

SECT. LXVI-LXXII, gard yon:

What is experienced by all with agreeable feelings is Pleasure.

What is experienced by all with disagreeable feelings is Pain.

[[360]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

[ SBOT. LXXII.

Desire is yearning.

Aversion is irritation.

Action is effort.

Merit is the product of enjoined actions.

Demerit is the product of prohibited action.

Sections 66 to 72 contain short definitions of the next seven qualities. The group consists of three pairs of co-related qualities, namely सुखदुःख, इच्छाद्वेष, and धर्माधर्म, and one single quality प्रयत्न. The two qualities which form each a pair, though co-related, are not contradic- tories of each other; but both are positive qualities of opposite kinds.
g (Pleasure) is defined in the text, as ’that which is experienced by all with agreeable feelings’, Pleasure and Pain. while :( Pain) is that which is ex- perienced with disagreeable feelings. ’ They are not absolute negations of each other, and may often co- exist, as when a king enjoys much pleasure together with occa- sional grief. The definitions of ge and a given in the text seem to be faulty, and are therefore replaced by better ones in the commentary, for, as Nilakantha remarks, gunê- लक्षणपरं न सम्भवति, परद्रव्योपभोगादिजन्यसुखे साधूनां द्वेषदर्शनादव्याप्तेरि- त्याशङ्कायां मुख्यहमित्यादिप्रत्यक्षप्रसिद्धं सुखत्वादिकमेव लक्षणम्. It is unphilosophical to label once for all certain external objects as सुखकारक and certain others as दुःखजनक, for the same thing may be pleasurable to one man and painful to another. The best criterion in this case is therefore the individual experience of each man (IÊNGREHK :). But the question again arises what kind of individual experience is pleasurable and what is painful. Hence more elaborate definitions of ge and gie are given, like those in N. B. सुख, says N. B., is इतरेच्छानधीनेच्छाविषय, that is, pleasure is desired for its own sake and not for the purpose of satisfy- ing the desire of some other thing; or in other words plea- sure is the ultimate aim of all our acts and is not a means to some other end. Similarly pain is the object of

SBOT. LXXIV.

Notes.

[[367]]

aversion in itself, and not because it causes the aversion for any other thing.

r and, desire and aversion, are respectively de-

fined as wishing and irritation. '

Desire and aver- sion.

or effort is not the actual act, but rather the readi- ness of the mind coupled with an attempt towards performing that act, as when a dying person makes an effort to speak,

Effort.

but cannot do so owing to a failure of his powers.

or as it is sometimes called is therefore best rendered by effort, or volition.

Merit and Deme- rit.

[[7]]

पाप

(merit) and aur ( demerit ) are the two varieties of eTM ( Destiny), and imply two posi- tive things popularly known as gur and respectively. Merit is that which is produced from acts enjoined by Śruti, while demerit is produced from the doing of prohibited acts. For example, the Vedic text ज्योतिष्टोमेन स्वर्गकामो यजेत is a विधि, and there- fore the performance of a mag sacrifice would produce merit; while नं कलखं भक्षयेत् being a निषेध the eating of कलअ fruit would produce demerit.

SECT. LXXIII and LXXIV. SALON: आत्मगुणाः The eight qualities, cognition etc. are special attributes of soul only.

Cognition, desire and effort are of two kinds: eternal and non-eternal; eternal belong to God, non-eternal to human soul.

The eight qualities from af to auf are the special characteristics of soul only, i. e. they are subjective as opposed to other qualities which have objective or external existence. They are also co-related to one another as cause and effect, and are mentioned in that order. Each of these in fact is the effect of the immediately preceding and the cause of the next following. Cognition is of course the foundation of all internal experiences. Of these E and 7:

सुख दुःख

[[368]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

[ SEOT. LXXIV.

are the ultimate objects to be desired or avoided. The notions of pleasure and pain respectively produce correspond- ing desire (7) or aversion () for their means. This desire or aversion gives rise to an effort (sr) directed towards obtaining or avoiding those means. Good and bad efforts produce merit and demerit respectively; while these last produce a are on the mind, which are becomes when ripened the cause of a succession of births.

faâgns or special qualities are enumerated in the verse quoted on p. 86 supra. Out of these eight i. e. the six, intellect, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion and effort, and Adrishta or fate including both merit and demerit are the special qualities of Soul only. The significance of HT, only, is that these qualities reside in Soul alone and no- where else, while the other special qualities are found in other substances. A faqe is defined by T. D. in the next section as a quality that resides in one substance, only at a time and not in two or more substances conjointly, such as number etc. See p. 87., supra.

SECT. LXXV. Áær:

Faculty or Impulse is of three kinds: Velocity, Mental im- pression and Elasticity.

Faculty

or Faculty is almost undefinable, as may be guess- ed from the truism given by T. D. The reason of it seems to be that its three varieties are so incongruous and different in nature that no general definition can be equally applic- able to all. The wonder rather is how these irreconcilable things came to be classed under one head. S. C. gives a definition which is only a little better: सामान्यगुणात्मविशेष- गुणोभयवृत्तिराणत्वव्याप्यजातिमान्, that which has a जाति ( संस्का- a) which is next below guana and which resides in both the general qualities and the special qualities of Soul.’ The qualities are sharply divided into two classes, general and special, but re is the only quality which is common to both, since two of its varieties, Velocity and Elasticity go under general qualities, while the third called at or

SECT. LXXIX. Į

Notes.

[[369]]

mental impression is the special quality of Soul. Another and perhaps a still better definition of dear is given by Türkika-Raksha :-qardia: graecanfiger TE । ET માતા ની ET ज्जातीयस्य कारणम् । स्वयं यस्तविजातीयः संस्कारः भवेत् ॥ gangenfry: der: o edr via” “A property which pro- duces an effect from a cause of the same kind, although it is itself dissimilar.” This means that whenever a quality or action in a thing is repeated or produces effects exactly similar to itself by some interual force and without exterual agency, the internal force is called Gere.

Faculty is of three kinds.

The three varieties of te area (Velocity), waar (Mental impression) und ferfaturque (Elas- ticity). The first is said to reside in the five corporeal (f) substances only, namely, earth, water, light, air and mind; and the reason is obvious, for there can be no velocity or motion unless the thing has a limited dimension. wraan is simply defined as that impression which is boru of age and becomes the cause of remembrance. ffärerçe or Elasticity is that power or force which brings a thing back to its normal shape or condition whenever it is distorted. Elasticity is found in earthy things such as a mat. The several remarks of T. D. have been already explained in their proper places, and so need not be noticed here. Of these three varieties भावना alone deserves the name of संस्कार, and is generally referred to by that word. The other two are common properties of all material things, and can be termed er only by a very far-fetched analogy. Ballantyne thinks that the similarity of the three varieties of very consists in the thing acting by itself without an impulse from an external agent. The explanation is plausible, though not quite convincing. Er is therefore an impulse inhering in the very thing in which a property reproduces itself. This is at best the only characteristic wherein the three varieties agree.

समवायविशेषाः.

SECT. LXXVI-LXXIX, fammererganaràsiar:. Action consists of motion. That which causes connection with region upwards is Tossing; that which causes connection

Türkika-Rakshá v. 48.

[[47]]

[[370]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

SECT. LXXIX.

with region downwards is Dropping; that which causes con- nection nearer the body is Pulling or Contraction; that which causes connection with distant place is Rushing or Expansion. All else is motion residing only in the four substances Earth

etc. and mind.

These sections treat of the remaining categories, except the last. For an explanation of them, see Notes on Sect. V. to Sect. VIII. pp. 81-99 Supra.

SECT. LXXX. STATE:.

अभाव.

Antecedent negation is without a beginning but has an end, and exists before the production of an effect. Destruction has a beginning but no end, and occurs after the production of effect. Absolute negation exists during three times, (past present and future) and has a counter-entity determined by connection (with another), e. y. there is no jar on ground. Reciprocal negation is that whose counter-entity is determined by relation of identity, e. g. a jar is not a piece of cloth.

अभाव or Negation is defined by its very name (भावभिन्न : ) . As the author has already stated its four Negation.

kinds, he now goes on to define each of them. Antecedent negation has an end but no beginning,’ while ‘Consequent negation or destruction has a beginning but no end. The other two negations have neither beginning nor end. Thus the first two form one group of transient negations, the other two a second group of permanent ones. Antecedent and Consequent negations are spoken of with refercuce to art, the one representing the time before production, and the other representing the time after destruction. Thus प्रागभाव, कार्य and ध्वंस may be said to represent in order the three divisions of eternal time, past, present and future, of which the past (T) has no beginning and the future (r) has no end because time itself is eternal. Between these two divisions of eternity lies the rf which is limited both ways, namely, by creation at one end and by destruction at the other. But suppose aSEOT. LXXX. ]

Notes.

[[371]]

rf which has once been destroyed is reproduced; will not then its intermediate have been destroyed in its turn by the reproduction? The Naiyayika answers, no; because the second rf, though produced from the same materials, is distinct from the first. That which was destroyed was destroyed for ever, while the new production is one which never existed before. T. D. mentions three characteristics of rare and each; both reside on the intimate or ma- terial cause of their प्रतियोगि, e. g. घटाभाव resides on मृत्परमाणुः they are respectively the cause and effect of their प्रतियोगि; and they are respectively the reasons why people say of a thing that ‘it will be,’ or that ‘it is destroyed.’

Absolute negation is that which is eternal and has a प्रतियोगि determined by some connection Absolute negation. (with another thing), while reciprocal

negation has a

that is determined by the relation of identity of two things.’ The qualification. कालिक ( भूतभविष्यद्वर्तमानवृत्तिरित्यर्थः V. V. ) distinguishes अत्य- न्ताभाव from प्रागभाव and ध्वंस, while संसर्गाविच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिकत्व distinguishes it from अन्योन्याभाव. The name अत्यन्ताभाव may be explained by the derivation अन्तमवधिमतिक्रान्तो नित्योऽभाव इति व्युत्पत्तिः । अत एवायमात्यन्तिकस्नैकालिक इत्यभिधीयते.

f is the connection by which one thing may reside on another. Thus a resides on its for the gas by संयोगसम्बन्ध, while गन्ध resides in earth by समवायसम्बन्ध, each of which is called f. Now if a jar stands on any spot of ground we say घटवतलम्, by which of course we mean संयोग- सम्बन्धन घटवत्; and hence even in such a case we are free to say that समवायसम्बन्धेन भूतले घटो नास्ति. The jar stands on the spot by संयोगसम्बन्ध, but not by समवाय सम्बन्ध; 50 that although भूतल is घटवत् by संयोग it is घटाभाववत् by समवाय. Here घट is the प्रतियोगि of भूतलनिष्ट घटाभाव, not by संयोग but by समवायः or more briefly the प्रतियोगिता of घट is समवायावच्छिन्न. Similarly although earth possesses odour by समवाय, the गन्ध may be said to be संयोगावच्छिन्नत्वेन प्रतियोगि of पृथिवीनिष्टगन्धात्यन्ताभाव. Whenever therefore an era of a thing is spoken of it

[[372]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

[ SEOT. LXXX.

is always understood that the absolute negation is predicated of the entry by some particular. Hence defined as संसर्गाविचितियोगिताकर

Reciprocal nega- tion distinguished.

arra is

अन्योन्याभाव is distinguishable from अत्यन्तानाव in having to depend on a different kind of a. In the former a thing is प्रतियोगि of an अभाव residing in another by तादात्म्यसम्बन्ध, and not by संयोग Or समवाय as is the onse with अत्यन्ताभाव. simple language, when we speak of absolute negation we deny any connection between the farfar on the one hand and the gun that is the steer on the other; in reci- procal negation we deny only the identity of the two. When we say yad et, we only convey that they.are not identi- cal; but when we say tara, we mean something more; we convey that not only and we are non-identical; but that they are not even connected together. car is the denial of a संसर्ग between two things; अन्योन्याभाव is the denial of their artar. Thus if we say eater: fanat a we deny the identity of the ghost and the post; if we say að farì a we deny the existence of the ghost on the post. The nature of the star is therefore determined by the form of the denial although the idea conveyed may be the same. परे घटत्वं नास्ति and वटा पढो न both moau the same thing; but one is an SAFATHIY, while the other is

॥ अन्योन्याभाव-

lute negation.

S. C. divides अत्यन्ताभाव into two sorts एकपर्यातधर्मावच्छिन्न- प्रतियोगिताकः ’that whose प्रतियोगि is a pro- Divisions of abso- perty residing in one substance as Tear- भाव, ’ and अनेकपर्याहधमविच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकः ’that whose nada is a property jointly residing in many things as farra.’ But this is not the only division possi- ble, for, as T. D. remarks, both अत्यन्ताभाव and अन्योन्याभाव will have as many kinds, as the f and the array of the

तादात्म्य प्रतियोगि will be various, although the प्रतियोगि itself remains the same.

An obscure pas- sage in T. D.

The sentence in T. D., explaining the multiplicity of absolute and reciprocal negations is even as corrected very obscure if not positively incorrect. It reads प्रतियोगितावच्छेदकारोप्य- संसर्ग मे वादेकप्रतियोगिक गोरत्यन्ताभावान्योन्याभावयोर्बहुत्वम्. The sen-

SEOT, LXXX. ]

Notes.

[[373]]

tence will be intelligible if we take आरोप्य to mean धर्म or property. It will then mean ’that अत्यन्ताभाव and अन्योन्याभाव, though having one प्रतियोगि, are manifold owing to the varie- ty ( भेदात् ) of the properties (आरोग्य) and connections (संसर्ग ) that are respectively प्रतियोगितावच्छेदक in each case ; that is, the number of अन्यो० depends on the variety of प्रति०-बच्छे ०- धर्म, and that of अत्य० on the variety of प्रति०-बच्छे ० -संसर्ग. Nilakantha interpretes the sentence in the same way. The remark appears to have been copied from a passage in Raghunatha Siromani’s Didhiti, which being more explicit may be profitably compared with it. Raghunatha says एक- प्रतियोगिकयोरप्यत्यन्ताभावान्योन्याभावयोः प्रतियोगितावच्छेदकधर्म-प्रति- योगितावच्छेदकसंसर्ग-भेदाद्वहुत्वम् । तत्र प्रति० - संसर्गभेदादत्यन्ताभावबहु- त्वम् प्रति-धर्मभेदादन्योन्याभावबहुत्वमिति योजना. । * An illustra- tion will make all this clear. The अत्यन्ताभाव of केवल देवदत्त is distinct from that of दण्डविशिष्ट देवदत्त, because the प्रतियोगिता- बच्छेदक in one is केवलदेवदत्तसंसर्ग and in the other दण्डविशिष्ट- देवदत्तसंसर्ग. In अन्योन्याभाव there is no संसर्ग and therefore the तादात्म्य is considered with respect to properties (धर्म) residing ou प्रतियोगि. Thus the अन्योन्याभाव of श्वेत घट is different from that of नील घट, because the प्रतियोगितावच्छेदक is नीलत्व in one and श्वेतत्व in the other case.

In conclusion T.D.notices some of the different views propounded in connection with . The Vaiseshikas recog- nize a fifth अभाव called सामयिकाभाव ’temporary absence’ in such cases as इह भूतले घटो नास्ति. The घटाभाव exists on भूतल So long as e is absent, and vanishes as soon as it is brought there; it is not therefore त्रैकालिक and so differs fromअत्यन्ताभाव. Annambhatta includes it in अत्यन्ताभाव, for as a matter of fact घटाभाव resides permanently on भूतल while its occasional dis- appearance may be explained by its being covered by a whenever the latter is present. A rule is therefore laid down that the अत्यन्त्याभाव of घट though नित्य is manifested only when it is accompanied by either the प्रागभाव or प्रध्वंस of घटसंयोग on भूतल.
A writer named Saunda dopadhyaya introduced a new kind of अभाव called व्यधिकरणधर्मावच्छिन्नाभाव in such examples as पटत्वेन घटो नास्ति, that is, घट does not exist on भूतल in

Bhimacharya : Ngiya Koshu, 2nd ed. p. 45, note 2.

[[374]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

SEOT. LXXI.

the form of q although it may exist there as ; but Annambhatta along with the majority of Nyaya writers con- siders it at the most a case of केवलान्वाये अनुमान and not a simple arre. As a matter of fact this variety of erre is recognized for dialectical purposes only and is of little use in practical life.

Negation not re- cognized by other systematists.

Opposed to the Naiyâyikas were the Prûbhâkara school of Mimâmsakas (followers of Prabhâ- kara or Guru), who refused to recognize अभाव 4s a separate category existing apart from its ar. According to them and generally according to all the Mimâmsakas and Vedan- tins अभाव is only अधिकरणकैवल्यमात्रम् ’ simple substratum and nothing more. T. D. rejects this view on the ground that it is impossible to determine what area corbac is. But if, says the Mimâmsaka, is a separate cate- gory there will be अनवस्था, for as घटाभाव is different from the अभाव of qarara will differ from it, and so the num- ber of eras will be infinite. To remove this objection, the ancient Naiyayihas regarded the second अभाव . e. घटाभावा- was identical with . The moderns however go one step further and regard the second are as distinct from both q and घटाभाव; but the अभाव of that, namely the third अभाव was identified with the first, war, the reason being that an अभाव being a negation can be identical with an अभाव only and never with a wr like . Annambhaṭṭa appears to

भाववस्तु favour the ancient view.

घट,

घट.

SECT. LXXXI. zqdgit:.

As all things are included severally in those enumerated, it is proved that there are only seven categories.

The author concludes his Compendium of Seven Cate- gories by showing that all the other The seven-fold padarthas mentioned by Gotama as well as other writers are included in some one of the seven enumerated at the beginning of this book. Gotama’s first aphorism which is quoted by T. D,

enumeration is ex-

haustive.

SHOT. LXXXI. ]

Notes.

[[375]]

contains a list of sixteen padarthas recognized by the Naiya- yikas proper, namely, ( Proof), яàu ( Object of know- ledge ), संशय ( Doubt ), प्रयोजन ( Motive ), दृष्टान्त ( Instance ), सिद्धान्त ( Conclusion ), अवयव (Premise ), तर्क ( Reductio ad Ab- surdum), निर्णय ( Determination ), वाद ( Disquisition ), जल्प ( Controversy ), वितण्डा ( Cavil ), हेत्वाभास ( Fallacy ), छल (Perversion), (Self-contradiction), and far (Refuta- tion ). T. D. then briefly explains each of these and its sub- divisions. All these are not properly speaking categories but only so many topics that require to be attended to in a dis- putation with an antagonist. Gotama’s 16 topics which are meant for dialectical purposes are therefore in no way ir- reconcilable with the seven Categories of Kanada which are metaphysical. There are however some other things recog- nized as separate padarthas by other systematists, but they also fall under the seven mentioned in this book. For in- stance (Power) and ( Ownership), says T. D., are not independent categories as some have supposed. The power of burning which resides in fire is not different from fire, while the power of ashes to cleanse metals is also not distinct from the washing away of those ashes, after they have purified the metal. a or ownership is only the capability of a thing for being disposed of just as one pleases, and is therefore nothing but a quality of the thing. area ( Resemblance) has also been supposed by some to be a distinct padartha; but Vis- ranâtha answers : साहइयमपि न पदार्थान्तरं किं तु तद्भिन्नत्वे सति तगतभूयोधर्मवत्त्वं । यथा चन्द्रभिन्नत्वे सति चन्द्रगताल्हादकत्वादिमत्त्वं मुखे चन्द्रसादृश्यम् ।

What is an injun-

ction.

The last paragraph of T. D. begins with a curious dis- quisition on the meaning of the Potential form, a guia etc. which is usually em- ployed in Vedic injunctions; but it is ra- ther difficult to see how the topic is relevant in a book on Nyaya, unless of course it is intended to show that the Nyâya system, although differing considerably from the exegetical school of Mimâmsakas, is not really inconsistent with the unquestioned authority of the Vedas and has its own method

S. M. Calc. ed. p. 4.

[[376]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

[ SECT. LXXXI.

of interpreting Vedic texts. ff, according to flotamu, is a faunqarea, a text which enjoins some act upon men. Vedic texts are either ara (Injunction) are (Statement of a fact) or (Repetition), of which far is the principal and the other two only subsidiary to it. Injunction is of two kinds, नियोग ( Command ) such as अग्निहोत्रं जुह ara स्वर्गकामः, or अनुज्ञा ( Permission ) such as ज्योतिष्टोमेन स्वर्ग-

q, the difference between the two being that the first enjoins a ff which entails sin if omitted, while the second prescribes only a which may or may not be performed. Annambhatta’s definition of faft is “a sentence which conveys knowledge that prompts a desire for action which in its turn produces effort.” The second of the above texts for instance prompts a यजमान to perform & ज्योतिष्टोम, and then he makes preparations for the ceremony. But one might ask how can it be the cause of the attainment of heaven to the यजमान since a cause must be फलायोगव्यव-

, immediately preceding the effect,’ while in this case the end of the sacrifice and its , viz. the attainment of heaven (which can take place only after the death of me ra), may be separated by considerable lapse of time? To remove this difficulty and establish a connection between the cause ज्योतिष्टोम and the फल स्वर्ग, a व्यापार is assumed in the interval, called अपूर्व.

The summum bo- numi.

Although the Naiyayika accepts the efficacy of Vedic rites as befits every orthodox systematist, he does not depend upon them exclusive- ly. The attaimnent of heaven by means of the Vedic rites is not according to him the true goal of man. The end and aim of philosophy, says T. D., such as the knowledge of the seven padârthas, is Salvation, which consists in recognizing the self as distinct from body and other material things. This is laid down in the celebrated text, “Oh Maitreyi, the Self should be perceived, heard,

G. S. II, 1, 62.

SECT. LXXXI. ]

Notes.

considered and contemplated upon.”*

[[6]]

[[3]]

Gotama defines

निश्रेयस Or अपवर्ग 3s आत्यन्तिकी दुःखनिवृत्ति ’ eternal cessation of pain,’ while Kanada declares that rer or salvation consists in the separation of the soul from the former body, not fol- lowed by his union with another owing to the absence of .’ According to both, salvation consists not in any kind of positive pleasure as the Mimâmsakas think, but in the complete and eternal cessation of all pain. This can be attained by right knowledge alone, as is distinctly said in the Sruti, तमेव विदित्वातिमृत्युमेति नान्यः पन्था विद्यतेयनाय : कर्म, i. e. the Vedic rite, does not directly lead to salvation as the Mîmâmsakas suppose; but it only prepares the ground for the attainment of knowledge by destroying sins and purifying the soul. When this knowledge is digested by constant contemplation, it ripens and leads to. This process is described in Gotama’s second aphorism, gear- प्रवृत्तिदोषमिथ्याज्ञानानामुत्तरोत्तरापाये तदनन्तरापायादपवर्गः.8

Of the

five things, pain, birth, effort, faults and erroneous know- ledge, the destruction of the subsequent leads to the destruc- tion of the immediately preceding, and so ultimately the salvation follows. The destruction of a causes the removal of various दोषs such as राग, द्वेष etc. When these are removed effort also ceases, for no desire is left to induce प्रवृत्ति. Cessation of प्रवृत्ति necessarily stops जन्ममरणपरम्पराः for var having ceased, no action is done and no age which is the cause of is produced. When the series of births ends, it is necessarily followed by the cessation of pain, for then the soul is for ever freed from the body which is the seat of pain. Finally, complete cessation of pain brings on salvation, which is the ultimate goal of all true philosophy. The proper way to attain salvation is therefore to attack the very beginning, namely, fear which lies at the root of all our misery. This fe

consists in the er-

आमा वा अरे यः श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यो निदिध्यासितव्यों मैत्रेयि। Brih, Ar. Up. IV, 4. 5.

† Viśvandtha: V. S. Vṛilti II, 18.

1 Svetasvatara. Up. VI, 15.

§ G. S. I, 1, 2.

[[48]]

[[378]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

SHOT. LXXXI.

roneous identification of the soul with our body and with material objects. Cognitions such as अहं सुखी, अहं दुःखी are all products of such wrong identification. It is the purpose of true Sastra therefore to destroy this fear by impart- ing . This true knowledge is the correct knowledge

सत्यज्ञान. of the seven categories, for it is only by knowing these ac- curately that one can discriminate them from the eternal and transcendental Soul. To give a right knowledge of the padarthas is therefore the area of this Sâstra. The necessity for inculcating this arises from our com-

mon experience as expressed in the maxim प्रयोजनमनुद्दिश्य न मन्द्रोऽपि प्रवर्तते which is as true in the case of acquision of knowledge as in other walks of life. All systems of Indian philosophy open with an enunciation of garager the four requisites of every Śástra, and or purpose which

is one of them is invariably stated to be the a, the knowledge of reality, leading to salvation. Ancient Hindu philosophers may fight with one another on almost every point, but in one respect they agree among themselves and differ from the votaries of other religions, viz. in holding that it is knowledge of truth and not blind faith in a revela- tion or a Saviour that is the road to salvation. Even the reli- gion of Bhakti which spread through and permeated popular thought in India in later times

times under

under Mahomedan influence was based on the solid principle of a. The doctrine of rerer: is in fact the corner-stone of all the philosophical systems of India.

तत्त्वज्ञान.

Appendix A.

Meaning of Avachchhedaka.

Nothing is more difficult for a beginner than to under- stand the exact sense of the term Avachchhedaka and its varieties which occur so frequently in Nyaya writings. The following Note on the meaning of the word appended to Cowell’s translation of Udayanâchârya’s Kusumâñjali will therefore be found useful:-

“The term Avachchhedaka has at least three meanings, as distinguishing, particularizing, and determining.

a. In the phrase ‘a blue lotus,’ ‘blue’ is the distinguish- ing Avachchhedaka ( i. e. Višeshana) of the lotus;-it dis- tinguishes it from others of different colours.

b. In the sentence the bird sits on the tree on the branch’ ( za urai qefi ), śâkhâyâm particularises the exact spot-this is the ekadesávachchhedaka.

But the third is the usual Naiyayika use of the word i. e. as determining ( niyâmaka ). Wherever we find a re- lation which is not itself included in any one of the seven categories but is common to several, we require something to determine its different varieties; thus if we say that fire is the cause of smoke, or vice versa smoke the effect of fire, we do not mean only this particular case but any fire or smoke; we therefore require, to determine this particular relation of causality, something which shall be always found present with it. This in fire is the cause of smoke’ it will be vahnitea, the species of all fires. This will always be found present wherever the causation of smoke is found, and it is therefore called the dhuma-hâranatâvachchhedaka as dhûmatwa would be the vahnikâryatâvachchedaka. If we have several causes or effects (as e. g. green wood in the case of smoke), each kâranatá or kâryatâ will require its own avachchhedaka. But we could not say that substance’ is the avachchhedaka of ‘quality’ although it does always

[[380]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

accompany it, because quality is a category by itself and common to several. An avachchhedaka is always required for such relations as karanata, karyata, śakyata, jñeyata, pratiyogitâ, etc. Thus gotva is the avachchhedaka of the go-sabda-sakyata as otherwise the word go might be restrict- ed to mean only this particular cow, or extended to include every animal; and in बह्नन्यभावस्य प्रतियोगी बाहः, we have vahni- tva as the avachchhedaka of the pratiyogitâ. This determining notion need not be always a species; thus in art - säærara, cheshțâ is the avachchhedaka of kâranatû, and cheshtâ is included in the category of action. ‘( Cowell: Kusumâñ- jali of Udayanâchârya, p. 26 ).

{

Appendix B.

The following lists of all the known commentaries on Annambhaṭṭa’s Tarka-Sangraha and Tarka-Dipika are com- piled from Aufrehet’s Catalogus Catalogorum, Bhîmâchârya’s Nyaya-kośa, Hall’s Bibliographical Index of Indian Philoso- phical Systems and other sources. Letters in brackets indicate the copies consulted for which see Appendix C.

I Commentaries on तर्कसङ्ग्रह.

१ तर्कसङ्ग्रहदीपिका or तर्कदीपिका by the author of T. S. himself,

printed at various places.

२ न्यायबोधिनी by गोवर्धनमिr, printed by N. S. Press at

Bombay.

३ सिद्धान्तचन्द्रोदय by श्रीकृष्णधूर्जदिदीक्षित, printed at Benares . ४ पदकृत्य by चन्द्रजसिंह, printed by N. S. Press at Bombay. ५ तर्कसङ्ग्रहतत्त्वप्रकाश by नीलकण्ठ ; this is perhaps नीलकण्ठी. ६ निरुक्ति or पट्टाभिरामटिप्पणी by पट्टाभिराम or माधवपदाभिराम,

printed in 1915 at Madras ( W. )

७ तर्कसङ्ग्रहवाक्यार्थनिरुक्ति or निरुक्ति printed in 1915 at Madras

(W.)

८ तर्कसङ्ग्रहचद्रिका by मुकुन्दभट्ट गाडगीळ, printed by N. S. Press

at Bombay.

९ तर्कसङ्ग्रहव्याख्या or वाक्यवृत्तिं by मेरुशास्त्री गोडबोले, printed in

1915 at Madras ( W.)

१० तर्कसङ्ग्रहटीका by अनन्तनारायण.

११ तर्कफक्किका by क्षमाकल्याण.Appendix B.

[[381]]

१२ न्यायार्थलघुबोधिनी by गोवर्धनरङ्गाचार्यः

१३ तर्कसङ्ग्रहटीका by गौरीकान्त.

१४ निरुक्ति by जगन्नाथशास्त्रिन. १५ न्यायबोधिनी by शुक्लरत्ननाथ- १६ त. सं. टीका by रामनाथ-

१७ तर्कसङ्ग्रहतरङ्गिणी by विन्ध्येश्वरीप्रसाद. १८ त. सं. टीका by विश्वनाथ.

१९ तर्कचन्द्रिका or प्रभा by वैद्यनाथ गाडगीळ. २० त. सं. टीका by हनुमान् son of व्यास. २१ त. सं. व्याख्या by मुरारि.

२२ तर्कसङ्ग्रहोपन्यास ; author unknown.

२३ तर्कसङ्ग्रहटीका; author not known.

२४ तर्कसङ्ग्रहशङ्कु;

Ditto.

२५ न्यायचन्द्रिकाः Ditto.

II. Commentaries on तर्कदीपिका,

१ तर्कसङ्ग्रहदीपिका प्रकाश OF नीलकण्ठप्रकाशिका by नीलकण्ठशास्त्रिन author of तत्त्वचिन्तामणिदीधितिटीका. This is again commented on by रामभद्रभट्ट, It is printed at Bombay, Benares and Madras.

२ रामरुद्रीयम् by रामरुद्रभट्ट printed at Madras ( W ).

३ नृसिंहप्रकाशिका or नृसिंहीय by राय नरसिंह printed at Madras ( W ).

४ पट्टाभिरामप्रकाशिका ends abruptly at वायु printed at Madras (W ).

५ भास्करोदया a commentary on नीलकण्ठी by लक्ष्मीनृसिंह, son of नीलकण्ठ, printed by N. S. Press at Bombay. ( R )

६ तर्कफक्किका by क्षमाकल्याण, pupil of जिनलाभसूरि who wrote his commentary on both T. S. and T. D. in 1772 A. D.

७ सूरतकल्पतरु by श्रीनिवास.

८ टीका by गङ्गाधरभट्ट.

९ टीका by जगदीशभट्ट.

१० तत्त्वार्थदीपिका by बालवेङ्कटगुरु.

Appendix C.

The present edition of the Tarka-Sangraha and its two com- mentaries is based on the following copies. Of these fourteen twelve are printed or lithographed editions, and the rest were Mss. Out of these, twelve give the text of Sangraha, eleven of the Dipika and eight of the Nyaya-Bodhini. In some cases the same copy gives both the original and either of the two commentaries, while the one marked contains all the three. These have been marked as one. The following conspectus will give an idea of the varied character of the editions and Mss. consulted :-

Tarka-Sangraha.

A—Tarka-Sangraha with Dipikâ ( 3rd ed. ), carefully edited by the late Mr. K. P. Parab and printed at the Nirnaya- sagara Press, Bombay.

B-The text of Sangraha alone, printed in Ballantyne’s

Lectures on Nyaya Philosophy ( Allahabad 1849 ).

C-A lithograph edition of Sangraha, Dipikâ and Nyaya- Bodhini, with different paging for each and belonging to the Jeypur library. It is very carelessly printed. A portion of the Sangraha from the 28th to the 31st section inclusive, as well as the concluding paragraph of the Dipika and the portion of Nyaya-Bodhini after

quare missing. However it generally gives correct readings and proved useful in disputed places. It was obtained from the late Pundit Durga-Prasad of Jeypur.

D-An oblong edition of Sangrahu with the commentary Siddhanta-Chadrodaya by Srikrishna Dhurjati Dikshita printed at Benares in 1881. It is carefully edited and proved a useful guide, chiefly owing to the com- mentary which is copious though not always accurate.

Appendix C.

[[383]]

E-An oblong edition of Sangraha with the commentary Vâkya-Vritti of Meru Sastri printed at Poona in 1873. Its value consists entirely in the commentary. F-An annotated edition of Sangraha and Dipika by Mr. K. C. Mehendale B. A. This although professing to be based on two or three Mss. does not materially differ from the Nirnaya Sagar edition. A second edition of this has been published in 1908 with the addition of a new Sanskrit commentary by Pandit Bhavanishankar Shastri.

G-A Ms. containing the Sangraha and the Dipikâ obtained from the library of Baroda Sanskrit Paṭhasâlâ. It gives important variants in several places, especially in the Dipika, which are not to be found in other copies. It closely agrees with J, and seems to have been copied either from it or from some common origi- nal. It bears no date.

H-Ms. containing Sangraha only obtained from Ratnagiri.

It was copied at Benares in Samvat 1820. It varies pret- ty often from the usual text, but the readings are not generally happy.

J-A Ms. of Sangraha and Dipika belonging to Dr. H.

Jacobi of Bonn, Germany. It is undoubtedly the oldest and also the best authority. It is very clearly written and contains many marginal corrections in at least two hands. The Sangraha and the Dipika are paged differently and have different colophons. The colophon at the end of the Dipika is inserted in our edition (p. 67 supra); while that of the Sangraha runs thus:-gra श्रीतर्कसङ्ग्रहाभिधानो ग्रन्थः समाप्तिमगमत् । साम्बशिवो जयतु । श्रीरस्तु । संवत् १७७० वर्षे कार्तिकशुरूषष्ट्यां बुधे लिखितोऽयं ग्रन्थः । शुभमस्तु ॥ It arrived after the work of collation of the 1st edition was completed, but just in time to allow its varietas lectionis being incorporated in the footnotes. Fortunately except in one or two instances no alterations were needed, as the

[[384]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

readings already selected were found to agree with those in J. In several cases many doubtful readings and conjec- tural emendations of mine were unexpectedly confirmed by this Ms., a fact which is perhaps the best proof of the correctness of the readings adopted. My hearty thanks are due to Dr. Jacobi for lending his copy for use, and also to Mr. B. G. Tilak of Poona who pro- cured it for me.

K-This is an old closely written Ms. containing the San- graha and the Nyâya-Bodhini, and obtained from Miraj. It possesses great value and has been mainly relied upon for the text of the Nyaya-Bodhini.

Tarka-Dipiká.

Besides A, C, F, G, and J already described, three print- ed and two Ms. copies of the Dipika were available, namely:–

L-An old and badly written Ms. of Dipika obtained from the library of the late Bâlasastri Agâse of Ratnagiri. It seeme to have been copied at Benares in Samvat 1790 by one Vis’vanâtha Joshi, son of Gopal. It is written in several hands and is often incorrect.

M-A fine and very carefully written Ms. of Dipikâ obtain- ed from Barhanpur. It often differed from other copies, and although its variants had sometimes to be rejected it was useful for comparison.

N-An oblong edition of Dipika with the well-known com- mentary of Nilakantha, printed at Benares in 1875. It contains several additions which were not found in any other copy and which had therefore to be rejected. Nilakantha’s commentary however proved a valuable aid in judging the correctness of a reading, in as much as it generally gives the best reading and sometimes “notices other variants.

Appendix C.

-385

P:-An oblong edtion of Dipikâ only, printed at Jagadis’- vara Press, Bombay. It generally agrees with A and was not of much use.

Q:An edition of Sangraha, Nilakantha’s Prakasa and a commentary thereon named Bhaskarodayá by Nila- kantha’s son Lakshmi-nṛisinha, edited by Pandit Mu- kunda Jha and printed by Nirnayasagar Press, Bombay.

Nyâya-Bodhini.

Besides C and K already described, four printed and two Ms. copies of Nydya-Bodhini were consulted, viz:- R-A Ms. of Nyaya-Bodhint only, written carelessly and often incorrectly. It was kindly lent by the late Mr. N. B. Godbole, B. A. of the Poona Training College. It was copied on the 13th of Ashâḍha, Vadya, Samvat 1907, and generally agreed with C.

$:-A lithograph edition of Nyâya-Bodhini printed at Benaras in 1875. The editor seems to have made no attempt at collation. It contains many sentences and even long passages extending to a page or more which are not found in any of the other Mss. consulted by me. These additions appear to be interpolations, con- sisting of explanatory paraphrases of the original short sentences, which are sometimes retained and sometimes omitted.

T:-This appears to be a reprint, and a very incorrect one

too, of the last preceding, printed at Benares in 1881. U:-An editon of Sangraha and Nyâya-Bodhini with an- notations called Padakṛitya printed by Nirnaya-Sagar Press, Bombay.

V:A Ms. of Nyâya-Bodhint kindly lent by Pandit Bad- rinatha Śâstrin of Baroda. It generally agrees with Ế, R and C, and was useful for ascertaining the correct reading whenever the other copies differed hopelessly. It sometimes gives its own variants. It ends at emater and bears no date.

[[49]]

[[388]]

Tarka-Sangrahu.

W-An edition of Sangraha and nine Commentaries edited

and published by Pandit Chandrasekhara Sastrigal of Mylapore, published in 1915 at Madras.

X, Y and Z:-These three Mss. were kindly lent to me by Pandit Bâlâcharya Gajendragadkar of Satara to whom I am highly obliged for the loan. One of these X containing the Sangraha bears the date Sake 1720. The other two Y and Z contain the text of the Dipika. They mostly agree with G and Jand are chiefly valuable for having been corrected under the superintendence of the late learned Anantâcharya Gajendragadkar.

Most of the Mss. and editions of Sangraha and Dipika mentioned above belong to Northern India or the Deccan. As Annambhatta was a resident of Carnatic, Mss. from that quarter would have proved very valuable guides, but W. which is an elaborate edition of Sangraha and Com- mentaries by a learned Pandit of South India has largely supplied the desideratum. The copies already consulted belong to different ages and distant provinces, and hence the text of Annambhaṭṭa’s two works may for all practical purposes be taken as settled. It is to be regretted that the same cannot be said of the Nyaya-Bodhini. Only a few copies of this work were available, and they varied among themselves so much and some times so hopelessly, that it was often impossible to ascertain the correct reading. Sentences and even whole passages are read differently in different Mss. and the work of collation was most difficult in several places. The defects can be cured only when more trustworthy Mss. are available.

Abhava 2,6,75,99-103,370

Adharma- 5,59,367

Adhikâri– 70

Index.

[ References herein are to pagos. ]

Âpta- 50 Apta-vakya- 50

Aristotle- Intro. IX.

Arthapatti- 55,355

Artha- 30

Adrishṭa- 209

Asadharana- 44,302

Âkânkshâ- 52,346

Âkaraja- 8

Akasa- 3,11,126,133 Akañchana- 5,60

Ambiguous middle- 329 Âmla- 15

Anaikantika- 44,302 Andhakara- 4 Anu- 18

Anubhava-21, 180 Anubandha- 70

Anumâna- 34,37,233

Anumiti- 34,238

Anupalabdhi- 32,228 Anupasaṁhâri- 44,362 Anuvyavasâya- 22 Anvaya-vyâpti- 40 Anvaya-vyatireki- 40 Anyathasiddha- 26,192 Anyathakhyâti- 56

Anyonyabhava- 6,62,372 Ap- 3,7,110,

Apâna- 9

Aparatva- 5,19,167

Âpastamba- Intro, xxxiv.

Apavarga- 64.

Apurva- 66

Apramá- 359

Asamavayi- 26,27,70 Asambhava- 11,81 Asiddha- 44,46,308 Âśrayâsiddha- 46

Atideśa- 50

Ativyapti 11,81 Atman- 3,12,134-137 Atomic theory- 120 Atyantâbhâva- 6,62 Audarya- 8

Audulomi- Intro. XXIV.

Avâchî- 12

Avakshepaṇa- 5,60 Avayava- 64

Avyâpti- 11,81 Ayathartha- 56 Ayutasiddha- 61

Badari- Intro. XXIV.

Badarâyaṇa- Intro. xxIII. Bâd hita- 44,48,318 Bharata-54

Bhâva- 76

Bhavana- 22,50

Bhoga- 7

Bhrama- 57

Buddhi- 5,20,59,173

[[388]]

Tarka-Sangraha.

Categories- 73-5

Causality 198

Causes- 206

Chakshu- 8

Chaitanya- Intro. LIII.

Chalana- 60

Chhala- 64

Chitra- 14

Cognition- 173-176

Colour- 151-154

Creation- 118

Destruction- 119

Dharma- 5,58,367

Dharmakirti- Intro.XLII,XLIV.

Dharmottara- Intro. XLIII

Dhvani-21

Dik- 3,12,132,133

Dinnaga- Intro. XLII,XLIV.

Dirgha- 18

Doubt- 360

Dravatva- 5,20,168

Dravya- 2,76

Drishta- 257

Drishtânta- 64

Duḥkha- 5,58,366 Dushta-hetu- 44 Dvesha- 5,58,64,367 Dvitva- 18,161 Dvyaṇuka- 9

Effect- 196

Ekatva- 18

Fallacia accidentis- 328 Fallacies- 322

Gadadhara- Intro. LIII.

Gamana-80

Gandha- 5,16,155

Gangesa- Intro. LI.

Gavaya- 49

Ghrâna- 6 Go-49

God-137-142

Gold-112

Gotama- Intro. XVII, XX.

Guna- 2,5,81-87

Guru- 63

Guratva- 5,20,168

Haribhadra Suri- Intro, XI.

Harita- 14

Hetu- 38,39,295

Hetvåbhasa- 44,64,296

Hrasvatva- 18

Ichchha- 5,58,59,367

Illicit process of major- 326

Indriya- 6,7 Îévara- 12

Jahadajahallakshaṇa- 51

Jahallakshaṇa- 51

Jaimini- 69

Jalpa- 64

Jâti- 64

Jayadeva Intro. LII.

Jiva 13,142-144

Jivatman- 12

Jñana- 21,67

Kadambari 1,71

Kala-3,11,129

Kâma- 58

Index.

Mind- 145-150

Mithya-jñana- 56

Moha- 64

Moksha- 67

Karaṇa- 25,29,60,186-189,

Kanada- Intro. XVII,XX.

Mridutva- 5

Kapisa- 14

Mûrtatva-11

[[210]]

Nigamâna- 38

Nigraha-sthana- 64

Karaṇa- 25,192

Karma- 2,5,67,87-89

Kârya- 26

Kasakritsna- Intro. xxiv.

Kathinatva- 5

Katuka- 15

Kevalânvayi- 40,257,287

Kevala-vyatireki- 40,257,

[[287]]

Kiraṇâvali-1,’ 71

Krishnananda- Intro. LIII.

Kriti- 58

Krodha- 58

Niia- 14

Nimitta– 26,27,209

Nirnaya- 64

Nirvikalpaka- 29,215

Nishprakaraka- 29

Nisreyasa- 64

Nyâya- 268, Intro. xvI.

Odour- 155

Kumarila- Intro. XLIII.

Padartha- 2,73

Páka- 17

Laghutva- 5

Paksha- 43,293

Lakshana- 51,44.

Lavana- 15

Laukika- 53

Pakshata- 34,240

Pakshadharmatâ- 34,242

Pañchávayava- 264

Linga- 37,284

Linga-paramarša– 37,39,281

Paramann- 9,121

Paramann-vada- 121

Paramatman- 12

Madhavacharya- Intro. XI.

Madhura- 15

Mahanasa- 43

Mahat- 18

Manas- 3,13,14,145

Mandana- Intro, XLIII.

Mangala- 1,69

Max- Müller- Intro. IX, LIX.

Paramarsa- 34,234

Parårdha- 18

Parartha- 37,252

Paratva- 5,19,167 Paratastva- 55

Parimana- 18

Phala- 64

Pilupaka-17

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[[390]]

Pita- 4

Pitharapaka- 17,157 Plato- Intro. LVIII.

Prácht- 12

Pradhvamsa- 6,62 Pragabhava- 6,6% Pralaya- 10,121 Pramaṇa-64, 184 Prâmânya- 55,357

Prameya- 64

Prâṇa- 9,115 Prasarana- 5,60

Tarka-Sangraha.

Prasastapada- Intro. XXXI,

XXXIX.

Pratichi-12

Pratijñā- 38,39 ·

Pratiyogi- 197

Pratyabhijña- 22,177

Pratyaksha- 29,30,183,211 Pratyâsatti- 214

Prayatna- 5,58,59,367

Prayojana- 64,70

Prithivi- 3,6,103

Pretyabhava- 64

Paritat- 13, 148

Parvavat- 264

Raghunatha- Intro. LIII.

Raghunandana- Intra LIII.

Rága- 64

Rajata- 56

Bakta- 14

Rasa-5,15,155

Basana- 8

Reduction-273 Rudhi- 51,343

Rapa- 5, 151 Rapadi- 16

Śubda- 5,21,170,331 Sâbda-jõâna- 51, 352 Sadharana-44 Sakti- 3,50,65,338 Sâmânya- 2,5,68,89-93 Samavâya- 2,6,61,98-99

Samavayi- 26,27,28 Sâmayikâbhava- 63°

Samsaya- 56,64 Samskara- 5,59,368

Samyoga- 5,15,18,31,98,164 Sankaracharya- Intro. XLI,

XLIV.

Sankara-miśra-Intro. XXI. Sâňgati- 70

Sañjñà and Sañjñi– 49,50 Sankhya 5,18,159

Sankhya- Intro. xx.

Sannidhi- 52,346

Sannikarsha- 31,221

Sapaksha- 43,223 Saprakaraka- 29 Sartra- 6,13,105

Satpratipaksha-44,48,84,206 Savikalpa- 29,215 Savour- 155

Savyabhichára- 44,301 Seshavat- 264. Šukla- 14

Siddhanta- 64

Sixth Contact- 225.

Śivaditya- Intro. XLVII,LI.

Sleep- 148

Smriti- 21,57,176,364 Sneha- 5,20,169

Sopadhika- 46Sound- 170

Sparsa- 5,16,155

Sridhara- Intro XXXIX.

XLVI.

Sthanu- 56

Sthitisthapaka- 59

Subandhu- Intro. XLII.

Substance- 77-80

Sukha- 5,57,366

Sukti- 50,04 Sushumnâ- 149

Suvarṇa- 8

Svartha- 37,252 Svarupasiddha- 46:

Svatastva- 55

Svatya- 65

Syandana- 20

Tamas- 3,4

Tarka-56,64,71,261,363

Tâtparya- 51

Tejas- 3,8,111

Tikta- 15

Touch- 155 Tryaṇuka- 9

Tvach- 9

Indea.

Upamâna- 49,332

Upamiti- 49

Upanaya- 38,39 Utkshepana- 5,60

Vachaspati- Intro. XLII.

Vâda- 64

Vahni- 8

Vaidika- 53

Vallabhacharya- Intro. IL.

Vardhamâna- Intro. LII.

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Vaiseshika guna or Visesha

guņa- 11, 59,60

Vais’eshikas- Intro, XVI.

Vasudeva- Intro. LII.

Vakya- 50,53,350

Varna- 21,54

Vatsyayana- Intro. XXVIII,

XLI.

Vayn- 3,9,114-117

Veda- 54

Vega- 59

Vibhaga- 5,19,166

Vibhutva- 128

Vidhi- 65

Vidyut- 8

Vipaksha- 44,293

Viparyaya-56,361

Viruddha- 44,45,306

Überweg- Intro. IX.

Udaharana- 38,39,276

Udayanacharya- 71, Intro.

Visesha- 2,0,01,03

XLVIII.

Udbhata-7

Udichf-12

Viseshana-viseshyabhava-

31,32,33,225

Vishaya- 6,70,109

Undistributed middle- 327, । Vitaṇḍâ- 64

[[330]]

Upâdâna- 13,209

Upadhi- 46,47,315

Vritti- 52

Vyabhichara-jñâna- 38

Vyañjana- 51,346

[[392]]

Vyapâravat- 25,29

Vyapti- 34,245-252,259 Vyâpyatvasiddha-46 Vyatireka- 40

Vyavahâra- 22

Vyávartaka- 61

Tarka-Sangraha.

Yoga- 51 Yogarúḍhi- 51 Yogyata- 52,346

Zeller- Intro. XII,XIX.

Zeno- Intro. LVIII.