कुप्पुस्वामी

A

PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC

A Primer of Indian Logic

ACCORDING TO

ANNAMBHATTA’S TARKASAMGRAHA

BY

MAHAMAHOPADHVAYA \7 IDYAVACASPATI S. KUPPUSWAMI SASTRI, M.A., I.E.S. PROFBSJOR OF SANSKRIT AND COMPARATIVE PHILOLOGY PRESIDENCY COLLEGE

AND

CURATOR, GOVERNMENT ORIENTAL MANUSCRIPTS LIBRARY, MADRAS SECOND EDITION

THE

KUPPUSWAMI SASTRI RESEARCH INSTITUTEMYLAPORE, MADRAS

[[1951]]

Four EDITION 1932

SECOND EDITION 1951

PRINTED AT

THE MADRAS LAW JOURNAL PRFSS

MYLAPORE, MADRAS

PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION

Pdniniyam ca sarvasastropakarakam.

“JLogicand grammar are indispensable aids for ^every branch of knowledge.” –.-^* This little book, called A PRIMER OF IKDIAWLOGIC, is primarily based on Annambhatta’s Tarka samgraha and is designed to serve as an introduction, not only to the btudy of Indian logic as embodied in the Nyaya-Vaisesika literature in Sanskrit, but also to the study of Indian philosophy in its diverse systems. In preparing this book, the oft-quoted Sanskrit dictumgiven above was borne in mind. This book comprises three paits. Part I contains an historical introduction. Part II gives the Sanskrit text of the Tarkasamgrahain the Dcvanfijjari script and in English transliteration. Part III forms the bulk of this work and contains an English rendering of the Sanskrit text accompanied bya critical and comparative exposition of each topic in English. In this exposition, an endeavour is made to combine strict fidelity to the original Sastraic texts in Sanskrit with an intelligible presentation of the techni cal ideas of Indian systems of philosophyin an English garb. In the course of this endeavour, it has becomeunavoidably necessary to coin and bring into voguecertain technical terms, which, at first sight, look some what uncouth.

ft

Nearly two years ago,I undertook to write this book for the benefit of modern University students, more especially B.A. students offering philosophy as their optional subject,in compliance with a suggestion made by my esteemed friend, Prof. P. N. Srinivasa chariar, M.A., Professor of Philosophy in the Pachai yappa’s College, Madras. Messrs. P. Varadachari & Co., Publishers and Book-sellers, 8, Linga Chett) Street, Madras.^SSflfJly undertook to publish this work. Theprinting of partsII and III was finished in January1931 and these two parts were separately made avail

able to students in the beginning of 1931. The com plete work, with partI also and a very useful Sanskrit glossary, is now made available in a complete form;and in this form, it is hoped that it will be received well by all the students and scholars interested in Indian philosophy.

The bulk of the matter in this book is directly based on Sastraic texts in Sanskrit. In the course ofthe preparation of this work, I consulted well-knownEnglish books on Indian philosophy like Prof. Radha krishnan’s ’ Indian Philosophy’, Dr. Keith’s< Atomismand Indian Logic’, and Dr. Handle’s ‘Indian Logic in the Early Schools’. My thanks are due, in particular, to two of my young friends and former pupils to Mr. T. R. Chintamani, M.A., Senior Lecturer in Sans krit, Madras University,for preparing the table ofcontents and the Sanskrit glossary, and to Mr. T.Chandrasekharan, M.A., (Diplomain German), Profes sor of History of Sanskrit Language and Literature, Madras Sanskrit College, and Manager, Journal oftts

Oriental Research, Madras, for reading the proofs.I should also take this opportunity to express my thank fulness to the Madras Law Journal Press, Mylapore,for its very kind and efficient co-operationin seeing this work through the press and to Pandit T. S. Subrahmanya Sastri (Sahitya-$iromani) of the M.L.J.Press* for the alert and willing assistance which herendered at various stages in getting me to do the workin the midst of my multifarious duties.

S. KUPPUSWAM1 SASTRI

5, North Mada Street, Mylapore,

llth March, 1932.

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION

The authorities of the Kuppuswami Sastri Research Institute have great pleasure in bringing out this second edition of the Primer of Indian Logfc byProf. S. Kuppuswami Sastri, and pnMi hint; it onthe occasion of the Seventh Foundation Day celebra tions of the Institute founded in ’the name of the

author.

Dr. A. Sankaran, M.A., PH.D., and Dr. V. Raghavan,M.A., PH.D., were in charge of the work of !iri;i;;i,i^ out this second edition.

The corrections noted by the author in his owncopy of the book preservedin the Institute Library havebeen incorporated here.

Sri K, Venkateswara Sarma, M.A., was of muchassistance in the reading of the proofs and seeing the work through the press.

The thanks of the Institute authorities are specially due to Sri N. Ramaratnam, M.A., B.L., Proprietor, M. L. J. Press, for his continued co-operation in the work of the Institute.

7th Sept. 1951.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

PART I

Pages.

Logic in the West and in India : … iii to v TFife meaning of the term Logic … iii Sanskrit Equivalents of the term Logic Logic a system of Philosophy… iv Tarkasastra contrasted with other

sastras … … iv &v Antecedents and foreshadovvings of the Vaisesika and Nyaya v to ix Intuitionistic and rationalistic tenden

cies … … v & vi ^Origin of the Nyaya system of Philo

sophical thought… … vi & vii Darsanas Astika and Nastika … vii & viii ^Beginnings of the Vaisesika and Nyaya systems… … viii &Jx How the Vai : eika and Nyaya schools emerged and when the doctrines

were redacted into sutras … ix to xxManu and Yajnavalkya: their attitude to Tarkasastra … … ix & x ‘‘Rise of pre-Buddhistic logic and meta

physics… … x & xi Anti-vedic Vaisesika … … xi & xii “‘NySLya-sutras and Vaisc$ika-sutras… xii

Dill

Date of the sutras, Jacobi’s views

criticised

xiii to xv

Tarkasastra pre-supposed by Kautalya. xvi to xviii

Nyaya in Patanjali

xix

The Names Vaisesika and Nyaya; The Nature, Aim and Scope of the two

systems

Syncretism and Synthesis… Pairs of allied systems

xx to xxiii xxiii to’xxv

xxv

After the sutras to Udayana… xxvi to xxxivIs Vatsyayana himself the author of the aphoristic statements in the Bhasya? xxviii &xxix

Uddyotakara and Dharmakirti Vacaspatimisra

. xxx & xxxi. xxxi & xxxii

Jayanta

Bhasarvajna

Udayana and his contribution Sridhara

After Udayana to Annambhatta givaditya’s Saptapadarthi

. xxxii . xxxiii xxxiii&xxxiv

. xxxiv . xxxiv to liii xxxiv& xxxv

Gangesa and his special contribution

(The categoristic method replaced

by the epistemological)… xxxv to xxxviii Vardhamanopadhyaya… … xxxviii Rucidatla … … … xxxviii Raghunatha-siromani, Jagadisa and

Gadadhara … … xxxix &xl Samkaramisra and Visvanatha … xl Annambhatta … … xli & xlii

Concluding remarks and general estimate .. xlii & xliii

ix

PART II

Sanskrit text with English transliteration 1 to 37PART III

Mangala … … 3 Explanation of the term Tarkasamgraha 4 tbe Seven categories… … 4 &5 General Remarks on the Categories… 5 to 8 The Categories of Annambhatta com

pared with those of Gautama … 6 Categories according to the Mimamsakas 6 ,, Samkhyas … 6

Saktias a category… … 7 to 8 Category Dravya, Classified … 8 to 12General Remarks on the Classification … 9 &10Basis of Classification …” … 9 &10Definition and its functions … 10 to 12Category Guna …,.. 13 PaUnjali’s conception of Guna … 13 The Mimamsaka’s conception of Guna … 13 The Samkhya conception of Guna … 13 &14The Vedantin’s conception of Guna … 14 Vista-gunas and Samanya-gunas … 14 &15 Category Karma …… 15 Kanada’s classification of Karma … 15 &16Duration of a Karma …… 16 &17The Vaiyakarana’s view of Karma … 17 Kriya according to the Mimamsakas … 17 &18Categories Samanya, Visesa, and Sama

vaya…,…18 General Remarks on these categories… 18 to 24

Kanada’s conception of Saminya … 24 to 26General Remarks on ViSesas … 26 to 28on Samavaya … 28 &29

Varieties of relationship… … 29 to 30The conception of Jati according to the Vai>akaranas .-30

‘Bhattas … 30 &

tll

Pratftiakaras … 31 &32

,,Bauddbas … 32

M Advaitins … 32 &33Samavaya according to the Prabhakarai , 9 B h a t a s and

j ^ Advaitins … 33 Jatibidhaka according to Udayana . 33 to 36General Discussion on Samanya and

‘Viiesa… … 36 &37

Category Abhava … … 37 Nature and Classification of Abhava … 37 to 45Abhava according to the Bhattas … 45 &46Prabhakaras … 46 &47

Mok$a a variety of Abhava … 48 The Nyaya conception of Sambandha as external relation … … 48 to 52Definition of Prthivl and its classification 52 Definition of Ap …… 52 &53Tejas … … 53 &54

f, Vayu … . 54 &55Akaia … … 55

General remarks on these five substances. 55 &56The Atpmic Theory … … 56 to 58

Nature of Paramflnu, Dvyanuka and Tryanuka …… … 58 to 62Weak points in the Atomic theory … 62 &63Greek influence on the Atomic theory … 63 &64A discussion on Prthivl and Ap … 64 to 67. Tejas … … 67 &68”-! Vayu … … 68 Akasa …… 69

Definition and classification of Kala and Dik … … … 69&70

General remarks on Kala and Dik … 70 to 72Conception of Mahakala … … 72 &73The Vaiyakarana conception of Kala … 73 Bauddha … 73 Advaita,,… 73 Sariikhya… 73 Definition of Atman and its classification, Manas …… 74 &75

General discussion on the nature, etc., of Atman … .-v. … 75 to 78Jivatman and Paramatman … … 78 to 80Atman in the Sariikhya and Yoga sys tems … … … 80 Atman according to the Bhattas and the Prabhakaras … 80 &81

Ramanuja … 81

-> the Bauddhas … 81 theAdvaitins … 81

General discussion regarding Manas … 81 to 83Manas according to the Bhattas … 82

Xll

Manas according to the Advaitins 83 Nyaya Realism … … … 83 &84God in the Nyaya and Vaisesika systems 84 & 85Rupa and its classification … … 86 Rasa … … 86 Gandha … … 86 & 87 Sparsa… … 87 General remarks on these Gunas … 87 to 89Pilupakavada and Pitharapakavada… 89 & 90Sarhkhya and its varieties … … 90 & 91 General remarks on numbers … 91 to 93 Apeksabuddhi … … … 91 to 93 Parimana and its varieties … … 94 Prthaktva … … … 94 Sarhyoga … … … 94 Vibhaga … … … 94 Paratva and Aparatva 94 & 95 General remarks on these qualities… 95 to 100Gurutva … … … 100 Dravatva … … 100 Sneha … … … 100 & 101 General remarks on these qualities… 101 gabda and its kinds … 101 general remarks on the nature of sound 101 to 103Conception of sound accordingto the

Bhattas and the Prabhakaras … 103 The Doctrine of Sphota… … 103 & 104Cognition and its kinds … … 104 Recollection … … 104, Experience and its kinds … … 104 Valid experience… … 104xiii

Erroneous experience … … 104 “Four kinds of valid experience.’ 163 Instruments bf valid experience… 105

General remarks on the nature of Buddhi ‘105 Buddhi according to Samkhyas and Advaitins … … 103

NirvrAalpaka and Savikaloaka ‘Tftana’ … 105 to 107Refutation of the Samkhya, vieW’ o’f Buddhi … … ..’. 107’to 110

Smrti and Anubhava … llfrto 112Varieties of Anubhava 112 & 113Nyaya theory of Truth and Error … 113 to 123Khyativadas (Theories of Error)… 12^ to '

Atmakhyativada……

..

Asatkhyativada … …-. 124’ &’ Akhyativada … … ..

Anyathakhyativada t…

An Examination of the Khyativadas… 127 to 131 The Pragmatism of the Naiyayika… 131 16 134RTya’ya theory of truth and error con

trasted with the views’ of other

schools … …’ 134 to 138A synthetic review of the theories ofr Bbrama (error)…^… 138 &139Instruments of knowledge in Indian’

Philosophy…… …

Arthapatti as a distinct Pramana … 14(J to l46^our kinds of Pramariiss”… 146 Karana … 146 Karana …’ 146 B

XIV

Karya … … … 146 Kinds of Karanas … … 147 Samavayikarana… … 147 Asamavayikarana… … 147 Nimittakarana … … 147 Asadharanakarana … … 147 & J48

General remarks on causality… 148 & J9The meaning of Anyathasiddha … 149 to 154Conception of Karya … … 154 & 155General remarks on Samavayikarana … 155 to 157General remarks on Asamavayikarana … 157 to 159theory of causation … … 159 to 163Pratyaksakarana… … 163 Pratyakajnana and its varieties … 163 Nirvikalpakapratyaksa… … 163 Savikalpakapratyaksa… … 163 & 164General remarks on Pratyaksa … 164 to 164Vaiyakarana view of Nirvikalpakaprat

yaka … … 167 to 169Advaita view of Nirvikalpakapratyaksa 169 to 171 Intuition in Nyaya-Vaiscika system… 171 & 172

Definition of Pratyaksa according to the Bhattas and Prabhakaras … 172 & 173Sannikarsa and its varieties … 173 to 175General remaks on Sannikarsa … 176 to 187Alaukikapratyaksa… … 180 to 185 ^laukikasannikarsa … … 185 to 187CHAPTER II

Definition of the Inftrument of Inference 188 Inferential cognition … 188

XV

Definition of Subsumptive reflection . 188 Co-existence 189

Paksadharmata … 189

Anumana and Anviksa … … 189 Inference includes all knowledge… 189 &. 190<jeral remarks on the terms Paksa,

Sadhya and Hetu or Sadhana … 190 & 191 General remarks on Anumiti … 191 &192Explanation of Paksata … … 192 to 194Paramarsa examined 194 to 197Paramarsa not necessary according to

Mimamsakas and Vedantins … 195 to 197Vyapti and its definition … … 197 &198The history of Vyapti… … 198 to 201Nature of the relation of Vyapti 201 &202Early writers on Vyapti… … 202 & 203Process of inference … …203 to 207The negative phase of Vyapti… 207 *

Bhattas and Vyapti

… … 207 to 209

Prabhakaras and Vyapti… … 209 to 211Adverse criticism of inference by Carva

kas and the Western Empiricist… 211 &212Refutation of this criticism by the Mi

mSmsakas, the Naiyayikas and Bradley…- 212 to 215Two kinds of inference … … 215 Inference for oneself … … 215 & 216Inference for others … … 216 General remarks on the two kinds … 217 Distinction between Svarthanumana and Pararthanumana … … 217 &218

XVI

Benedetto Croce’s view on the above … 218 &21*9 Nyayaprayoga … … 220 The five members of a syllogism… 220 & 221Lingaparamarsa … … 221 General remarks on the above … 221 to 223Vatsyayana on the five members … 223 & 224Professor Randle on the five members … 224 to 226The five-membered syllogism of Nyaya contrasted with the syllogisms of the

Mimamsakas and the Bauddhas … 226 to 229

Nyaya syllogism compared with Aristo

jtelian syllogism… 229 to 231Kinds qiprobans… 231 & 232Profraijsof.the Anvayavyatirekl type… 232 Kevlanvayi type… 232

Kevalavyatireki type… 232

Paksa .- … 233 … 234

… … 234

Probans accordingto the Advaita

.V.edSntins 234 Bhaftas .- 234

Fallacious reasons^… … 235 Straying-reason (Vyabhicarin)… 235 The Common strayer (sddharana)… 235 The Uncommon strayer (asddhcrana)*.. 236

Non-conclusive strayer (anupasamharin) 236 Adverse reason (viruddha)… 236 Opposable reason (satpratipaksa)… 237 Unestablished reason (asiddha)… 237

Asrayasiddha … … 237 Svarupasiddha … … 238 Vyopyatvasiddha … … 238 Stultified reason (badhita}… … 239 General remarks on semblances of reason 240 to 248

Hetvabhasas according to the Vaisesikas 248 & 249-I ^CHAPTER III

Uj^gaua…. … 250 General remarks on Upamana … 251 & 252CHAPTER IV

Valid verbal testimony… … 253 Definition of word … … 253 General remarks on verbal testimony… 253>to 255Charge of Dogmatism against Indian

Philosophy examined … … 254 & 255Padasakti … … 255 Causes of Verbal ,-.,: i … 255 Verbal expectancy… … 255 Congruity… … 256 Proximity… … 256 General remarks on the causes of verbal

cognition… 256 to 259Sabdavrttis … … 259 & 260Classes of sentences … … 260 Erroneous experiences and their kinds … 261 Doubt … … 261 Misapprehension… … 261 Indirect argument … … 261 Two kinds of recollection … … 261

Qualities Pleasure, Pain, Desire, Dis like, Volitional effort, Dharma, and Adharma … … … 262

The Vise$agunas… … 262 Three kinds of tendencies (samsktira)… 263 Activity …… 263 Generality …… 264 Specialities … 264 Inherence … … 264 Antecedent non-existence … 265 Annihilative f,265 Total … … 265 Reciprocal 265 Conclusion … 265 &266Sanskrit Glossary… … 267 to 282

II wr: u

II d4vHiJ4.5 II

A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGICPART I

INTRODUCTION

SECTION I

PRELIMINARY: LOGIC IN THE WEST AND IN INDIA

IrCthe cultural history of Europe, over twenty-two centuries ago, thinking,like speaking, needed an elucidative and regulativeaid and found it in a distinct branch of investigation, which was founded and orga nised in Greece by Aristotle and which came to be designated Logic. It is significant that the name logic is etymologically connected with the Greek word logos, which denotes both ’thought* and ‘word* or ‘discourse*. The significance of this etymological connection can be adequately appreciatedif h is remembered that logic, in its rise and development in the western world, particularly in Greece, was closely connected with rhetoric. Thus the name logic is of a tell-tale character in its application to logicin the West ; and it may be taken to indicate how, almost from its very rise, western logic found, itself in the firm grip of formalism andhow it took more than twenty centuries for the scientific method underlying Aristotle’s Organon to be redeemed, brought into prominence and implementedin the Nqvum Organum of Francis Bacon (1561-1626). The term logic should not be taken to carry with it all these implications of European history when it is usedin the phrase Indian logic. This phrase is usually rendered by the Sanskrit equivalents &nvl%fiki

iv A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART r

ny&yavistara, nysyadarsatoa, tarTtoSastra and pramana-&stra. It is also usual to describe Indian logic by the anglicised phrase Nyaya-Vaisesika system and it is usually described thus in this work. ( All these phrases are significant and appropriate in one way or other, particularly in view of the place which Indian logic occupies in the cultural history of India and of the manner in which it arose and grew not as a meregrammar of thinking, but as an orthodox (astikay system of philosophy with a specialstress on the science of methodical reasoning in both its inductive anddeductive aspects,this science forming its dominantand distinctive part. Indian logic is anviksikl or nyayavistara or nydyladarsatoa in the sense! that it is a philosophical system, of which methodical reasoning or investigation of knowledge got through observation. or perception and trustworthy verbal testimony forms the central theme; it is pre-eminently the science of ratiocination or tarkasdstra; and in contrast with the fadasdstra or ’the science of grammar’ ( Vydkarana) and with the vdkyasdsira or ’the exegetics’ (Mlmdmsa) y it is described as the pramdnasdstra or the epistemo logical science, chiefly concerned with valid knowledge and its sources. That Indian logic is usually described as the Nyaya-Vaisesika system is not because it is the result of the syncretism of the two opposing systems Nyaya realism and Atomistic pluralism ; rathei;it is so described because at a very early stagein the history of Indian logic, the Vaiseika stress on the inductive phase of inference came to be synthesized with its deductive phase in the Nyaya theory of *:\ :,V^ reasoning.SEC. i] INTRODUCTION v

Those who are familiar with Western logic and desirous of studying Indian logic from a historical and com parative point of view will do well to bear in mind the fact that, while one may find striking parallels in the Indian and Western systems of logic, one should not bemisled^ by such parallels and lose sight of the funda mental differences in respect of scope and method,which Indian logic discloses in its rise and development,as compared with Western logic.

SECTION II

ANTECEDENTS AND FORESHADOWINGS OF THE VAISESIKA AND NYAYA

The story of India’s quest for truth and of India’s attempts to lay out suitable ways and approaches to truth is long and varied and it has been reconstructed with a considerable measure of success by several eminent scholars, Indian and alien, from the ancient literary monuments of India, which are mostly in the form of Sanskrit works. In all this quest and these attempts, a careful student of the history of Indian philosophical thought may discern, almost from the very beginning, two tendencies the intwitio’nistic and

the rationalistic, and two chief aims the achievementof Dharma and the realisation of Brahman. If one ofthe Rg-Vedic seers could be said to have boldly intuited the monistic absolute in the well-known verse"ThatOne breathed breathlessly by itself”(Anldav&tamsvadhaya tadekam: Rv. .X.129.2),it would not be

Ti A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART

far-fetched to find the rationalistic exhortation ofanother Rg-Vedic seer in the verse “Meet one another, discuss and understand your minds”(Samgacchadh vam samvadadhvam saw vo mandmsi j&nat’&m : Rv. X.191.2). These two tendencies came to exhibit themselves throughout the Vtdic age,in close association with the two aims mentioned abovt.. Onone side, as a result of the influence of the rationalistic tendency on the ritualistic aspect of the Veda, ritualistic and exegetic doctrines, which, in due time, emerged as Jaimini’s system of Purva-Mimarhsa, were developed. And, on the other side, the combined workings of the intuitionistic and rationalistic tendencies in the direc tion of spiritual insight and knowledge of truth led to the emergence of the Upanisadic philosophy of Atman.This philosophy was marked by a pronounced emphasis on the efficacy and value of intuition, which culminated in Badarayana’s system of Vedanta. The dominantfeature of the philosophy of the Upanisads is its monistic absolutism, which led up, within the Upani-$adic period itself, to rationalistic reactions of different types^ representing collateral and casual phases of Upaniadic thought-V-some of them coming to besystematised later on in the dualism and realism of Kapila’s S&mkhya and the allied discipline of Pata fijali’s Yoga, some others eventually giving rise to the pluralistic rationalism of KanSda’s Vaisesika systemand its complementary Ny&ya of Gautama, and yet others emerging as anti- Vedistic rebels ip the form ofthe Jaina may-be-ism (sy8dvtida),the Bauddha idealism and nihilism (Sunyav&da), and the

SEC. n] INTRODUCTION vii

Carvaka materialism. All these post-Upanisadic sys tems came to be called darsanos (darfondtoS).It should be noted here that the term ‘systemis very inadequate as the English equivalent of the Sanskrit word ‘darsana’. While the former word bringsinto prominence the idea of systematisation,the latter wordbringjHnto relief the fact that the plenary intuition of truth or spirit (tatlvadarsana or dtmadarsana),whicl a gifted saint or seer came to have, lies at the root of every system of Indian philosophy and forms its fruit also. A long-established and widely acceptedtradition classifies these darSanas into dstika and nastika. ) Thehistory of the meaning of these two words throws somelight on the manner in which the ground of classifica tion happened to be shifted under varying circums tances. Panini’s sutra 4.4.60 (asti ndsti distant ntatih) gives the derivation of the words astika, nastika anddaistika: and according to Panini, dstika is ‘one whobelieves in the other world’, n&stika is ‘one who does not believe in the other world’ and daistika is a <pre destinarian or ‘fatalist’. This is the oldest recorded explanation of these words. On the basis of this expla nation, even Jainism, and Buddhism in some of its aspects, could be described as dstika systems. An old popular tradition would take the word dstika in the sense of ‘one who believes in God’. If this should be accepted, Jaimini’s Purva-MimSmsa and Kapila’s Sariikhya, which are usually included in the astika list, ought to be dropped from that list, as they do not recognise Itvara. A post-Buddhistic, but pre-Christian, tradition fixed the meaning of the word dstika as ‘one

Yiii A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PAKT i

who believes in the infallibility and the supremeauthority of the Veda’ and of the word ndstika as ‘one who does not believe in it*. This tradition has

been widely accepted for a long time. According to this, the Samkhya and Yoga, the VaiSesika and Nyaya,the Purva-Mimamsa and Vedanta are described as dstika-darsanas, and the Carvaka, Jaina and Bauddhasystems as nQstika-dartanas. In this context, wheneverthe terms orthodox and heterodox happen to be used as the English equivalents of Qstika and nastika, it should be remembered that they have reference to belief anddisbelief in the authority of the Veda.

Though the first beginnings of the Vaiseika andNyaya systems are misty in certain respects, a careful student is not likely to miss the foreshadowings of the central doctrine of these systemsin the Upanisads. In the well-known three-fold scheme of self-culture lead

ing to self-realisation, as taught in the oft-quoted Upanisadic text"Verily, Maitreyi, the Spirit should be realised, heard, discussed and constantly contem plated upon'9(Atma vft are dratfavyas srotavyo mantavyo nididhyasitavyah Brhad. IV. 5),it is generally accepted that hearing or initial comprehension

(iravana) representsthe inaugural stage, investigation and discussion with the help of reason (manana)represent the central stage and constant contemplation

(nididhy&sana) stands for the culminating stage. Thegrim spiritual teacher of the Katfiopanisad, Death(Yama), pulls up the rationalist of the Upanisadic agewith the warning"Self-realisation cannot be got

SEC. ii ] INTRODUCTION is

through ratiocination or tarka" (NaisQ tarkena matird paneya Katha II. 9). From these foreshadowingsof deliberate attempts to exercise reason, when consi dered together with the fact that philosophical debates such as those that were carried on under the auspices of Ajatasatru and Janaka were very common duringthe Up^anisadic age, the inference is irresistible that, already during the period of the Uoanisads, somelogical doctrines should have not only begun to appear, but also progressed beyond the nebulous stage.

SECTION III

How THE VAISESIKA AND NYAYA SCHOOLS EMERGED AND WHEN THEIR DOCTRINES WERE REDACTED INTO SUTRAS

(liefore the end of the Upanisadic period and prior to the advent of the Buddha, the Vedic scriptures embodying the results of the intuitive insight of the Vedic and Upanisadic seers had asserted their authority so far as to persuade a large section of rationalistic

thinkers to agree to play second fiddle to scriptural authorities. This should have resulted in the develop ment of the pre-Buddhistc Nyaya method in close asso ciation with Vedic exegesis and accounts for the earlier use of the term Nyaya in the sense of ’the principles and the logical method of Mimamsa exegetics/ Thisalso accounts for the fact that, even after the disentan glement of the Nyaya logic from Vedic exegetics, the legislators of ancient India like Manu and Yajnavalkya

x A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART i

emphatically recognised the importance and value oflogical reasoning (tarka)in a correct comprehensionof dharma as taught by the Vedas (Manu XII. 105and 106; Yajnavalkya I. 3). Another section of rationalistic thinkers who did not agree to play second fiddle to scriptural authorities, perhaps developed andexpounded rationalistic doctrines on independent lines, without subjecting themselves to the thraldom of Vedicreligion and philosophy. Some of these doctrines perhaps shaped themselves into the Samkhya thoughtof the pre-Buddhistic stage, with a marked degree of hostility to Vedic ritualism. Some other doctrines ofthis kind gave rise to the pre-Buddhistic logic andand metaphysics of the Vaisesika, with a special leaning in favour of the inductive method of reasoning based on observation and analysis and with a simple rationa listic scheme of two sources of valid knowledge perception and inference (pratyaksa and anumana). It is very likely that the anti-Vedic speculations of thepre-Buddhistic Samkhya and the anti-Vedic logic andepistemology of the pre-Buddhistic Vaisesika paved the way for the development and systematisation ofBuddhism.} It may here be borne in mind that Buddhistic tradition, as preserved in ancient Chinese records, readily recognises the priority of the Samkhyaand the Vaisesika to Buddhism. (SeeUi’s Vaisesika Philosophy, pages 3 and 4. )

[About the fifth century B. C., when the anti-Vedic movements of Buddhism rose and began to spread, the exponents of Vedic philosophy and religion keenly felt the need for showing greater accommodation to

SEC. in] INTRODUCTION xi

rationalistic modes of thought. The rationalistic resources available for Vedic religion and philosophy had to be pooled together and kept fit for defensive andoffensive use, as against the impact from collision with avaidika developments. On the one side, it was foundeasy to disentangle from its Vedistic environment the logical method (Nyaya) of Vedic exegetics; and on the other side, to bring the unfettered methods of reasoning and analysis known to the early Vaisesika under the influence of the attempts for rapprochement made bythe Vaidika thinkers turned out to be an easy taskr chiefly as a result of the disquieting nihilistic excesses of early Buddhism. Thus, the Nydya of the Vedicexegesis and the logic and metaphysics of the early anti-Vedic Vaisesika came to fraternise with each otherand gave rise to two sister-schools of philosophical reasoning the Vaisesika school mainly concerned withinductive observation and analysis, and the Nyatyaschool chiefly concerned with the formulation andelucidation of the principles of ratiocination on thebasis of inductive reasoning. These two schools should have appeared in a fairly definite form, with their characteristic methods of reasoning and metaphysics, bythe middle of the fourth century B. C., though the chief doctrines of these schools came to be systematised andredacted in their basic sutras at a relativelylater date, This statement may receive good support from the following facts, if they could be taken to be conclusively established. Bhadrabahu, a Jaina sage, whose activity as a Jaina logician may be assigned to about 357 B. C,was quite familiar with an old theory of ten-membered

xii A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC

syllogism. The Nyaya logic was known to Katyayanaof the fourth century B. C, as Goldstucker has shownin his work on ‘Pflnini and his Place in Sanskrit Litera

ture*. Badarayana’s Vedanta-sutras (Il-ii11 to 17) definitely presuppose the VaiSesika. The Lalitavistara and Milindapaftha mention the Vaiseika. Even the

Vaie?ika-sutras, which were, in all probability, pro duced later than the middle of the fourth century B. C, do not controvert any of the Buddhistic doctrines, while Buddhistic tradition generallyre cognises the prc-Buddhistic origin of the Vaiscsika. These considerations, which tend to show that the Nyaya and Vaieika schools came into being in a definite form before the middle of the fourth century B. C, cannot be lightly brushed aside.

The doctrines of these two sch>ols were syste tnatised and redacted in the form of the Nyaya-sutras and Vaisesika-sutras. The authorship of the former is ascribed to Gautama, and that of the latter to Kanada. According to the generally accepted Indian tradition, which goes back to the early centuries of the Christian era, Gautama is otherwise known as Aksapadaand Kanada is otherwise known as Uluka and Kasyapa. It will be obvious to those who are familiar with the traditions of ancient India that Aksapada was the personal name and Gautama the gotra name of the author of the Nyaya-sutras, and that Kanfida andUl&ka are the personal names and Kafyafa the gotra name of the author of the Vaieika-sutras, in the same way as Paksilasv&min is the personal name andthe gotra name of the author of the

SEC. in] INTRODUCTION xiii

Nyayabhasya. Though the exact dates of Kanada andGautama are not known, the dales of their sutras canbe fixed within fairlydefinite limits. Jacobi,in his well-known article on the date of the philosophical sutras (Journal of the American Oriental Society XXXI. 1911), endeavours to show that the Nyaya sutrai and the Brahma-sutras were redacted between 200 and 500 A.D., that the Vaiseika-sutras andMimamsa-sutras were redacted at a somewhat earlier date, that the redaction of the Yoga-sulras should beassigned to about 450 A. D., and that the sathkhya sutras were produced at a much later date, later than the fourteenth century. With regard to the Sarfikhya sutras, it is generally acceptedthat they were composedlater than the fourteenth century, though the Tattva samdsa, which may be regarded as the nucleus of the basic sutras of the Sarhkhya system, is perhaps older than Isvarakrna and the Christian era and is certainly older than the Bhagavadajjuka, a farce earlier than the seventh century A. D. (See Journal of Oriental Research, Madras, Vol. II. pages 145 to 147).If the Bhiksu-sutra referred to in IV. iii.110 of Panini’s Asfadhyayl and the Brahma-sutra mentioned in XIII.4

of the Gita could be taken to refer to Badarayana’s Brahmasutras, it would be difficult to accept, without due reservations, Jacobi’s argument in its application to the Vedanta-sutras. The name Patanjali, borne by the

author of the Yoga-sutras, presents some difficulties to Jacobi, as the date of Patanjali, the author of the Mahabhasya, is acceptedto be the middle of the 2nd century B. C But Jacobi would attempt to differentiate

xiv A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART i

the author of the Mahabhasya from the author of the Yoga-sutras, though, as a matter of fact, the ancient tradition identifyingthe two Patafijalis is sound andmaintainable on reasonable grounds. The central point jf Jacobifs argument relates to the internal evidences furnished by the nature of the Buddhist doctrines con troverted in some of these sutras. The Nyaya-sutras, according to Jacobi, refute the nihilistic suntya-vdda of Nagarjuna (3rd century A. D. circa) and do not refute the idealistic vijft&na-v&da of Asanga and Vasubandhu(middle of the 4th century A. D.). But, according to Vatsyayana and VacaspatimiSra, the Nyaya-sutra IV. 2.26 refutes the vijiiQna-vada. It should also be remembered here that the Sftnya-vada and vtjn&na-v&da doctrines were not introduced in the world for the first time by Nagarjuna and Asanga and Vasubandhu andthat, before these Buddhist teachers, these old doctrines had been in existence for a long time. Even if this line of argument adopted by Jacobi should be accepted as satisfactory, it does not touch the VaiSesika- sutras; and if the obverse of this argument were to be applied to these sutras, the logical result would be that they should be held to be pre-Buddhistic, Kautaliya Artha SSstra mentions the types of thought comprising tinvikfikl in the statement : Sdmkhyam yogo lokdya* tarn cety&nvikfilti (Vol. I. page 27, Trivandrum edi

tion). Though the date of the Kautaliya is not yet finally settled, the general trend of well-informed andunprejudiced opinion among Indian and alien Indo logists is in favour of assigningthat great work to 304B. C. In this extract from the Kautaliya, there is noSEC.HI] INTRODUCTION xv

specific mention of Nyaya or Vaise$ika as such. Atten tion is drawn by Ui and Randle to noteworthy cases ofparallelism between the Vaisesika-siitras and Ny&ya sutras, in which it would be more reasonable to say that the former sutras were used in the composition of the latter (See Ui’s ‘VaiseSika philosophy’, Introduction, page 16, note 1 ; and Randle’s ‘Indian Logic in the Early Schools’, Introduction, page 7, note i ). There is evidence to show that the sixth Jaina schism ( J8 A,D.)presupposes the Vaieika redaction (TJi’s ‘VaiSe sika philosophy9, Introduction, page 34), Chiefly, onthese grounds, it is surmised by several scholars that the Vaiseika-sutras should have been redacted in the pre-Christian era, subsequent to 300 B.C.; and that the Nyaya-sutras should have been redacted about the time of Nagarjuna and Deva, between 150 and 250A. D. may be inferred from the fact that the sutras 2.2.17 19 seem to presuppose the refutatory commentsin Nagarj una’s Vigra^avyavartanl on the realistic position regarding the relation between pramana andprameya (Ui’s Vaihsika Philosophy, Introduction pages 84 to 86). Randle concludes that the “VaiSe ika and Nyaya were systematised between 200 B. Cand 200 A. D., the Vaisesika being the earlier of the two1 ‘;and that “the indications, such as they are, point to the beginning of the first century A. D., as the latest date for the systematisation of the Vaieika”. (Randle’s ‘Indian Logic in the EarlySchools9, Introduction, pages 16 and 17.)

These conclusions, based as they are on goodgrounds as far as they go, would appear to require

xvi A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART i

reconsideration on a careful scrutiny of all the evidences available. That the redaction of the Nyaya sutras presupposes that of the Vaisesika-sutras may bereadily admitted. It is not easy to establish that theVaisesika-sutras were redacted subsequent to 300 B. C,on the ground that the name Vaise?ika is not contained in the extract from the Kautaliya quoted above. ‘Thosewho are sufficiently familiar with the use of the wordyoga in its old sense of vaiseslka, as it is found used, for instance, in Vatsyayana’s bhasya on 1.1.29, are not likely to consider it a strained interpretation to take the word yoga, as used in the Kautaliya, in the sense of vaise$iTfa. In fact, according to Vacaspatimisra’s T&tparyatikG and the BhGsyacandra on the bhasyaon 1.1.29, the word yoga may be taken in the somewhat comprehensive sense of Nyaya, including the Vaisesika, the Nyaya being a philosophical school laying special stress upon yoga or yuftti or reasoning (yogo tyuktih pradhanataya vidyate yesdm

BhQsyacandra). Further, in the extract quoted above from the Kautaliya, scholars have generally overlooked one important point, to which sufficient prominence oughtto be given in this connection. In chapter 2, the Vidyasamuddesa section of the Kautaliya, the chief branches of knowledge (vidya), according to Kautalya, are stated at the outset. These are four: anwKsiki (logic and philosophy), trayl (the Vedic religion and philosophy of dhartna andadharma), vartfi (the economic science and philosophy of wealth) aud dandatnlti (the science and philosophy of polity). Then there is a reference to the view of

SEC. in] INTRODUCTION xvii

the Manavas (Manu’s disciples or ancient legislators), according to which anviksikl should be regardedas aspecial part of trayi. This view, it may be noted, is consistent with the spirit of the Vedic and Upaniadicage, when logic (Nyaya) had not yet been disentangled from its applicationsto Vedic religion and philosophy. Ther^ is also a further reference to the materialistic doctrine of the Carvakas (the followers of Brhaspati), that trayi (including anviitsikl)is only a pretension or imposture of one who knows the ways of the world andthat only varta and dandanitl should be reckoned withas the two real vidyas. The followers of Usanas (the teacher of the Asuras) are afterwards referred to as recognising only one vidyd viz., the dandanitl. At the end of this chapter, Kautalya reiterates his views aboutthe four branches of learning and explains their nature and aim. In the concluding para of this chapter, hemakes two important observations. One is to the effect that anviksikl consists of Sarhkhya, Yoga andLokayata. The other is that anviksikl is helpful to the world through its ratiocinative process in the investiga tion of the soundness or unsoundness of the conclu sions and doctrines of the different branches of know

ledge.

Scimkhyam yogo loTt&yatatn cetyanviksikl. Dhtr madharmau trayySm. Arthanarthau v&rtayam. Bal&balecait&s&vn heiubhiranvlksam&na anviksikl lokasyopakti roti; vypsvne abhyudaye ca buddhimavasthapayaiitprajndvtikyflkriy&vaisaradyam ca karoti.

B

xviii A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PARTI

Prodipah sarvavidydnfim updyah sarvakarmantim\ Asraynh sariaihaiM&htim saivadtinvlksiki mat8\ (Pa^es 27 and 28 of Vol. I of the Kautallya, Trivandrum edition.)

It is evident here that Ka-ttaliya elucidates the twotneanings of the term twltsikl. One is the general rsense, philosophical enquiry or philosophy. In this

tsense, it is used in the first sentence of the above ex tract. As already pointed out, the word yogah in this sentence refers to the VaiSe$tka logic;c r even if it be taken in the special sense of the yoga discipline of Patafi jali’s system, the word lok&yata does not refer to the materialism of the Carvakas, but very probably it refers to the logic of the Vaisejika and Nya\a in its secular ised form and as disentangled from its Vedic associa tions. It shonlJ be noted here that the view of the Carvaka materialist is separately mentioned in a pre vious part of the same chapter and Kautalya rejects it and is not prepared to bring the Can aka doctrine underany recognised vidyd or branch of learning. VatsyS yana, in the concluding part of his bhasya on l.l-l, amplifies the second sense of the word tinvlksiki, i.e. Mogic which investigates by means of rationalistic methods’ (hetubhiranviksawans) and gives Kaujalya’s Terse quoted above, with its last quarter modified as

vidyoddefe Pfakirtitd”. It is quite clear from this amended quarter of the verse, as given by Vatsyayanaf that he is quoting from the ^ idyasamuddeSa section ofthe Kautallya. It is hardly necessary to point out that a careful consideration of the above extract from the

SBC. m] INTRODUCTION xix

Kautallya in comparison with its striking parallel in Vats>ayana’s bhasya on 1.1.1 would make it very diffi cult to believe that Qnvlksikl, in the sense of ‘system oflogic’, was not presupposed by the Arthas&stra ofKautalya. Further, a careful consideration of the ex. tract from Nagarjuna’s Vigrahavyfaartanl, which \3\ gives in pages 84 and 85 of his introduction to th* ‘Va’sesitia philosophy’, in comparison with its parallel in the Nyaya-suiras 2.2.17 19, would tend to show that Nagarjuna is presupposing these sutras and refuting the view embodied in them, rather than support Ui’s inference in the reverse direct ior. Patanjali,at the endof his t.’tdfya on Panini’s 3.2.123, remarks “Otherthinkers hold that there is nothing known as the present time” (Apara dhandsti rartamdnah kdla tti) and gives five verses in support of this view. Thisportion of the Mahabhaya closes with the remark

Another thinker holds that there is such a thing as the present time, and it is not perceived in the sameway as the Sun’s motion is not perceived" (Apara dha

asti variamanah kdlah] and supports this view withone verse. Between this portion of the Mahabhasyaand the Nyaya-sutras 2.1.40 44, there is a striking parallelism, which none can miss. A careful consider ation of these two texts would lead to the impression that Patanjali is here using not only the ideas in the Nyaya-sutras referred to, but also the phraseology in those sutras, in his characteristically graphic narrationof of a discourse between two imaginary dialogists. All these considerations may reasonably lead to the conclusion that the Vaiesika-sutras and the Nyaya-

xx A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART i

sutras were redacted between the middle of the fourth century and second century B. C., perhaps towards the end of the fourth century B. C., the Vaisesika-sutras being earlier than the Nyaya-sutras.

SECTION IV

THE NAMES VAISESIKA AND NYAYA; THE NATURE,AIM AND SCOPE OF THE TWO SYSTEMS

It is generally accepted that the names Vaisesika darsana and Nyaya-dartana are based upon the terms viSesa and nya$a. It is not possible now to ascertain exactly what these two terms signified to the early exponents of these two systems, who were responsible for devising and introducing these two names. Accor ding to an old tradition recorded by the Chinese Bud dhists Ci-tsan (549-623 A.D.) and Kwhei-ci (632- 682 A. D.), Kanada’s work came to be called the Vai Sesika-sastra, since it excelled works of the other systems, more especially the Sarhkhya and it was diffe rentiated from them, the term vaisesika being taken in the sense of ‘superiorto* or ‘distinct from’. (See Ui’s Vaisesika Philosophy pp, 3 to 7). Indian tradition is in favour of connecting the name Vaisesika with the doctrine of specialities (visesah}, visesa being regarded as the distinctive category of the Vaisesika scheme of categories. The Vaisesika-sutra 1.1.4 which practi cally represents the beginning of Kanada’s sutras, lays special emphasis, not upon any of the categories, but upon ’the comprehension of truth through similarities and dissimilarities’ (sadhai myavaidharmyabhyam

SEC. iv] INTRODUCTION xxi

tattvajnanam) upon the striking out of the one in the many- and this amounts to an unmistakable stress on’the analytic or inductive method of philosophical reasoning’. Gautama’s Nydya-darsana took its namefrom nyaya, which means ’the synthetic or deductive method of syllogistic demonstration*. Gautama’ssystem ’lays particular stress on the synthetic methodof syllogistic reasoning. One of the earlier mea nings of the term nyaya is ’exegetic principle ormaxim’; and after logical reasoning had beenreleased from Vedic exegesis, the term nydyadeveloped the specialised sense of syllogistic reasoning. The appropriateness of using the term toyaya,in this specialised sense, as the name of Gautama’s system lies not only in the historical connection between the Nyayaand MImamsa systems; but it lies also in the fact that the term nyaya means illustration or example and that example (udaharana)is the most important of the five members constituting Gautama’s syllogistic expression. Thus it may be seen that the names vaisesikaandnydya may be connected with the two aspects of sound reaso ning the analytic or inductive aspect which mountsup from particulars (visesa)to the general or universal (sdmdnya) and the synthetic or deductive aspect whichmoves on from the universal (sdmanya) to the parti culars (vise$a). In these logical notions, it would be in keeping with the history of Indian philosophical thought to recognise the basis of the names, vaifefika’ and nyaya, rather than in the ontological doctrines of atomism and pluralistic realism. This would account better for the way in which the interrelation of the

A PRIAJER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART i

Vaiesika and the Njaya came to be conceived of as two sister systemsin spite of their differences on themetaphysical side.

The Vaisesika and the Nyaya, in their early andlater phases, are not restricted in their scope and aimto logic in a narrow sense. Like other Indian systems, these two form sell -contained philosophical disciplines of a complex character, with a distinctive central themecorrelated to thtir special goal. The final cessation ofall miseries (apavarga)is the goal of the Vaisesika and the Nyaya. The VaistSfika stresses the analytical side of rea oning and furnishes the metaphysical back ground and the inductive basis of the Njaya system. With the VaiSesika material, suitably modified in minordetails, the Nyaya builds up a complete system of

pistemology and logic, combined to some extent withpsychology, ethics, ontology and religion. Such a mixed composition of Indian philosophical systems is due not to any lack of appreciation of differences of value in different things, but rather to the cultural outlook of India, which is dominated by an intense desire to synthesise all the departments of knowledgein a scheme ot progressive realisation of life’s endsculminating in final emancipation (mukti) conceived of as the sunitnmn bonum. Methodical reasoning, involving a critical investigation of knowledge got through perceptual experience and verbal testimony, i.e., anvikfd, with the help of the five-membered schemeOf syllogistic expression (nydya or pQ%c&vayavavakyti)> forms the distinctive contribution of the Njaya to phi

SEC. v] INTRODUCTION xxiit

lo&ophical thou< ht. Since its first redaction, the Nyayasystem has permanently secured for itself a position ofimportance in the Hindu scheme of Vedic religion ardphilosophy, chiefly by the ancillary role which it hasassumed in its n laiion to the Veda; and if the Vaisesika also is given a place among- the dstika systems,it is duemainly to its fraterrity with ih N\aya. Gokulanatha,, a Naiyayika of the 16 h Century A.D, suggests in his philosophical drama, called Amrlodaya, that Anviksiklis the amaz nian oonimander-in-thief of ,>/i-theempress ruling over the empire of kr.owledge ardemancipation. This poetic rcpresei tation would bevery helpful in appreciating the exact position of the Nyaya-vaisesika system in the scheme of astila schools of philosophy.

SECTION V

SYNCRETISM AND SYNTHESIS

It has now become usual among modern scholars, when speaking about the historical dtvelopmtnt of tl eVais f ka and N^aya systems, to refer to tlie tendencyto syncretism in these two scho<.K In chapter II, part I of “Inliwi Logic a<id Atomism”, Dr. Keith dwells upon what he describes as “the syncretism of the schools” and the “syncretist school”. Syncretism, in its strict sense, means the tendency to reconcile andblend two oppooini; and irreconcilable systems, byminimising differences. In this sense, it would be

xxiv A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART i

correct to speak about syncretism in the Vaisesika andNyaya only with reference to their condition beforetheir redaction into sutras, and even then, with duereservations. It may be said that, in the pre- Buddhi stic age, rationalistic thinking came to have a schis matic split which resulted in two opposing types of rationalistic thought, one linking itself with Vedictradition and the other antagonising it. As already pointed out at page xi-suj>ra, a rapprochement waseffected between these two types of thought; and as aresult of this, the Vaisesika and Nyaya arose in the form of two sister schools. The tendency which led to the first redaction of these two schools in a fraternal relation may be appropriatelydescribed as syncretism. Since their definite emergence as two distinct and allied systems about the fourth century B. C. to this day, the Vaises; ka and Nyaya have been treated as sister schools, fundamentally agreeing with each other in respect of important metaphysical and logical doctrines and persistently showing some comparatively minordifferences; and in this condition, they were never regarded as opposing schools and it would not be quite accurate to speak of syncretism in them, in the strict sense of the term. In the somewhat larger sense, however, of synthesis, one may well speak of syncretism in these two sister schools from and after their first redaction. In the history of the Nyaya Vaisesika system,the Vaisesika and Nyaya schools were never regarded as rival schools. Nor were their differences ever forgotten: and till recently, separate Nyaya and Vaisesika treatises continued to be written.SEC.V] INTRODUCTION xxv

In fact, even as late as in the seventeenth century A. D., separate handbooks dealing with the Vaisesika doctrines, like Gangadharasuri’s Kanadasiddhanta candrikd (Trivandrum Sanskrit Series No. XXV),were written. It should be remembered here that Aksipjada-Gautama,effected the momentous synthesis between the inductive (Vaisesika) and deductive (i^jydya) types of rationalistic thinking, in his doctrine of five-membered syllogistic expression (nydyaprayoga)hinging upon the example (udaharana) as the central member. The Nyaya ontologyis built upon the atomictheory and pluralistic realism of the Vaiseska. TheNyaya epistemology, with its fourfold scheme ofpramdnas is distinctly pro-Vcdic; and in this respect,it shows a sharp contrast with the Vaisesika scheme ofpramdnas which consists of perception and inference and which betraysar.ti-Vedic leanings. Such points of contrast have only led to Vaisesik-i gradually losing its hold and influence. Indian philosophical tradition recognises three important pairs of allied systems (samanatantrani) viz., the Samkhya and Yoga, the Vaisesika and Nyaya, and the Mnndmsd and Vedanta.Vatsyayana, in his bhasya on the Nyaya- sutra (1.1.22), speaks of the Vaisesika and the JMydya assanianatantra. It is noteworthy that, while the Sdmkhya and Yoga,<ind the Mimdmsd and Vedanla grew as two pairs ofallied systems, the Vaisesika and Nydya came to bemore closely knit together and grew as twin systems, chiefly as a result of the complete synthesis which the Nyaya effected in its logical method.

SECTION VI

AFTER THE SUTRAS TO UDAYANA

The extant early works, forming the bas’c source books of the Vaisesika system, are Kanada’s sutras and Prasastapa<la’s Padarthadharwasamgraho, better known under the name of Prasastapadabhasya. Accord to Udayanacarya’s Kirunatall, as interpreted byPadmanabhamiSra in his Kiran&valibhaskora (BenaresSmskrit Series, Ktraufa’all, page 5), Prasastapatla’s Paddrthadharmasomgraha is a comprehensive epiu meof the Vais ska system which presupposesan extensive V.-iiSesikn-hlK’s. ;i. known as Ravana-bhasya and attri buted to an ancient philosopl er called Ravana. Atpage 2/8 of the manuscriptof the commentary called the Prakatarthaviuarana on gimkaru’s Brahmasutia bha$ya% pre>erved in the Government Oriental Marus cripts Library, Madras, Ravana’s bhSsyaon the Vai’e sika-sutras is cited. (See p. 491 of Pt. of the edition of this work in the Madras University Sanskrit Series). Prakatarthavivarana * earlier than 13th century A. D.An interesting confirmation of the tradition aboutRavonn-bhasyd is contained in the vislambha to the fifth Act of the Anatgharaghava (Nirnayasagaraedition, page 161 ). There is evidence to show that this drama must be earlier than the Litter part of the ninth century A. D. In this connection, attention is invited to my paper on the Ravwa-bhosya,which appears in volume III of the Journalof Oriental Reseaicn, Madras, pages1 to 5. In this paper, it is indicated that it may not be unreasonable to conjecture

SEC. vi] INTRODUCTION xxvii

that the Ravana-bhdsya was perhaps dominated byatheistic and pro-Buddhistic proclivities, such as werequite in keeping with the text of the Vaistsika-sutras and with the spirit of the tradition characterising the Vaisesikas as ardhai ainasi kas (semi-nihilists), whilethe yirork of Prasastapada gave a theistic turn to the Vaisesika system and presented its doctrines in an anti Buddhistic dstika setting. There is conclusive proofto show that Prasastapada should be earlier than LJddyotakara, the author of tbe NyCiyavartika, whoflourished in the latter part of the sixth or the begin ning of the seventh century A. D. Professor Ui, in his introduction to the ‘Vaiscsika Philosophy’, draws atten tion to the evidences showing that Prasastapada should be earlier than P,iramartha and Dharmauala. 1 houghKeith emphatically asserts in his ‘Indian Logic andAtomism9that Prasastapada’s indebtedness to Dignagais undoubted, it must be said that Prasastajada’s debt to Dignaga has not yet been proved. If, on the other hand, Prasastapada could be taken to be presupposedby Vatsyayana on the ground relied upon by Mr. Bodasin his introduction to the Tar’.asuh^jial^a (BombaySamkrit series, No. LV.), Dignaga, who presupposesVatsyayana, must be later than Prasastapada. Thetwo most authoritative commentaries on Prasasta pada’s Bhasya are Sridhara’s Kandnli and Uda>ana~carya’s Kiranavall Sridhara’s date is givui as 991 A. D. in his Kandall and Udayana^ date is given as 984 A. D. in one of his works Laksandvali. Sri dhara’s reputation is restricted to his Vaiseika work ;

xxviii A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART i

but Udayana holds a far higher placein Indian philo sophy and he is held in high esteem as the Nyayacaryapar excellence.

The extant basic works of Nyaya are Gautama’sNyaya- sutras, the Nyaya-bhasya by Vatsyayana, other wise known as Pakilasvamin, and the Nyaya-vartikaby Uddyotakara.In the Nyaya-vartika and other works, there is sufficient evidence to show conclusively that Dignaga, th$ famous Buddhistic logician, adverse ly criticised the Nyaya-bhasya. Vasubandhu, the famous teacher of Dignaga, criticised Nyaya-sutrasand the Nyaya-bhasya does not reply to Vasubandhu’scriticisms. From these facts, it would be reasonable to conclude that the Nyaya-bhaya is earlier than aboutthe middle of the fourth century A. D., which is the date for Vasubandhu. Vatsyayana suggests alternative interpretations to some of the sutras, as, for instance, in his Bliasya on 1.1.5. This may lead to the inference that Vatsyayana wrote his Bhasya, long after the Sutrakara, perhaps at a time when the meaning of someof the sutras had already become a matter for specu lation. There has been some controversy among scho lars as to whether there was any commentary on the Nyya-sutras before Vatsyayana, and whether the aphoristic statements, which the Bhasyakara introduces in the course of his exposition, are really quotations from some earlier commentary on the sutras. Professor Windisch and several others are inclined to think that such aphoristic statements are citations from an earlier commentary. Professor Handle discusses this question in his recent work “Indian Logic in the Early Schools”

SEC. vi] INTRODUCTION xxix

(pages 19 to 24) and concludes that these aphoristic statements are not citations from any author but should be viewed as forming"the heritage of the schcol and as carrying an authority onlyless than that of the

sutras themselves’’. Indian tradition, however, is wholly against any speculation of this kind in regardto to the aphoristic statements in the Bhasya above re ferred to. In Sastra literature, more especiallyin old works like the Bhasyas on the various systems,it is a common stylistic device to put forward a main thesis or argument in the form of a terse aphoristic statement and amplify it in an expositorynote. Several old Bhayakaras have adopted this device and hundreds of instances can be given from the Mahabhasyaot Patan jali and Sankara’s Bhasyas on the Brhadaranyakopani

ad and the Brahma-sutras. In fact, the aphoristic statements which Vatsyayana makes at the beginningof his expository sections form integral parts of Vatsya yana’s own composition; and it would be as absurd to ascribe such statements to any author different fromVatsyayana, as it would be to ascribe the aphoristic statement, “Since there is no difference from cattle andother lower animals” in Sankara’s Bhasya on the Brahma-sutras (pavQdiI>hiscavise$at-.l.l)to someauthor different from the BhasyakSra, who amplified that statement in the following expository paragraphbeginning with the words “yatha hi paSvadayah”.Students of Indian logic will do well to remember that Vatsyayana is the earliest known writer who drewpointed attention to the reason why Gautama’s JNyayacame to be regardedas the science of epistemology

xxx A PRIMER OF TND AN LOGIC [PART i

and logic (Pramanasastra, Anviksikior Nyaya-sastra). It is worth remembering, in this connection, that Vatsyayana indicates in the very first sentence of his Bhasyahow valid thinking (/rawd) and fruitful doing (arthakriya) serve as each other’s axle in each other’s

wheelings and how they constitute real living with all its complexity in the pluralistic universe of the Nja ya-Vaisesika realism. It is also worth noting that it is Vatsyayana who first explained how the entire epi^temo logical scheme of Pramanas could be synthesised in a valid syllogistic expression, (vide pages 30 to 42 of his Bhasya on 1.1.1, Chaukhamba edition) and how, for this reason, logic proper justly came to exercise a pro found influence over the whole realm of philosophical thought in India.

About the end of the sixth century A.D., or in the former half of the seventh century, Uddyotak<ira wrote his Nyaya-v&rtika, the earliest extant commentary onthe Nyaya-bhasya. Some scholars like Dr. Keith maintain that UJdyotakara was a contemporary of the Buddhistic logician Dharmakirii. Hiuen-t^ang (629- 645 A. D.) does not speak of Dharmakirti, while I-tsing (671-695 A. D.) refers to him. The reference in the Nyaya-vartika to a Vada-vidhi (page 117, line 21, Chaukhamba, edition)is the only argument relied uponfor showing that Uddyotakara is not earlier than Dhar makirti. Tnis argument assumes that Dharmakirti is the author of the Vada-vidhi. Sufficient evidence has not been adduced in support of the view that the Vada vidhi is one of Dharmakirti’s works. Chinese tradition definitely lends support to the identification of the

SEC. vi] INTRODUCTION xxxi

Vada-vidhi with one of Vasubandhu’s works. Further, in the Vartika on 1.1.4, Dignaga’s definition of percep tion is criticised; and it is generally accepted by Brah manical and Buddhistic authorities alike that Dharma kirti was responsible for the introduction of the addi tional word abhranta in that definition, chiefly with a view to meeting the objections raised by Uddyotakara against it. These considerations tend to show that it would be reasonable to assign Uddyotakara to the end of the sixth or the beginning of the seventh century A. D. and to assign Dharmaklrti to about the third quarter of the seventh century A. D. Uddyotakara’s great service to Nyaya consists in his successful en deavour to lift it up from the slough into which it wasthrown by Dignaga’s confutation of Vatsyayana’s Bhasya. After Uddyotakara, the philosophical contest between the anti-Vedic and pro-Vedic sides of the Nyaya thought was keenly carried on by great Buddhistic logicianslike Dharmaklrti, Dharmottaraarid Ratnakirti and eminent Brahmanical logicians like VacaspatimJsra, Jayantabhatta, Bhasarvajna andUdayana. Vacaspati has himself given 841 A. D. as the date of the composition of his index to Gautama’ssutras, called Nydya-suci-nibandha. Vacaspati is famous for his polymathic learning and dispassionate philosophical outlook. He is the author of many im portant and authoritative treatises, mainly in the nature of expository and critical commentaries, on almost all the systems of Indian philosophy. His Brahmatattva samlksd on Mandanamisra’s Brahmasiddhi andBh&mati on Sankara’s Brahmasutra-bhaya represent

xxxii A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PARTI

the Advaita system; his Sdmkhya-tattvakaumudi andYoga-bhGfya-vati&radl represent the Samkhya-Yogasystem; and his Ny&ya-stici-nibandha and Nyaya v&rtiktht&tparya-fika represent the Nyaya system* There is evidence to show that Bh&matl should have been his latest work. In his Nydya-vartika-tatparya fikft, he renders intelligible the difficult portions of the Nyaya-vartika and incidentally discusses several obs cure portions of the Nyaya-bha?ya and the Nyaya sutras, in accordance with the Nyaya tradition banded down to him by his Nyaya teacher Trilocana. Forthe monumental contribution which he made to Nyayain his T&tparya-fikfi, he came to be known as the Tatparyacarya in Nyaya literature. He justly claims, in his Tatparya-fika> special credit for having re deemed from oblivion Uddyotakara’s work, which came to be regarded very old and nearly forgotten in the ninth century A. D. Jayantabhatta, who presup poses Vacaspati in his work and refers to Ananda vardhana’s Dhvany&loka (Vide page 48 lines 21 to 25, Ny’ayamaiijari, Benares), should be taken to be later than the middle of the ninth century A.D. ; and with the help of the particulars furnished by Jayanta’s son, Abhinanda, in the Kadambarikath&sara, Jayanta may be assigned to the third quarter of the ninth cen tury A. D. Jayanta’s chief contribution to Nyaya is his Ny&yamanjart. This work is of the nature of an elaborate vjtti (expository gloss) on select sutras of Gautama. Jayanta himself says that the Nyayo-man~/on was so well appreciated by his contemporaries that he came to be recognisedas the Vrtti-kara of Nyaya.

SEC. vi] INTRODUCTION xxxiii

Bhasarvajna, who flourished perhaps about the begin ning of the tenth century A.D., is the author of an im portant Nyaya work called Nyaya-sdra; and the dis tinctive feature of this work is its epistemology whichdeviates in certain respects from established Nyayatradition, as for instance, in discarding upamdna as adistinct Pramana and in recognising six hetv&bh&sasincluding anadhyavasita. Udyanacarya is the greatest Naiyayika of the tenth century A.D. At the end ofone of his works, Laksanavali, he has given 984 A.D.as the date of its composition. Besides his erudite commentaries on Prasastapada’s Bhaya and Vacas pati’s Tatparya-tlk& Kirandvali and Tatparya-pari sitddhi, he wrote three important Nyaya works the Prabodhasiddhi, otherwise called Ny&yaparisista, the Atma-tattva-vivtka, otherwise called Bauddha dhikkQra and the Nyaya-kusum&njati. The first ofthese three works contains an elucidative and illustra tive exposition of the subtleties of /<Ut (futile respon dence) and nigrahasthana (vulnerable points)in ac cordance with the dialectics of early Nyaya. TheAtma-tattva-viveka is a brilliant exposition of the Nyaya metaphysics with particular reference to the Nyaya conception of the self (jlva) and contains aforcible refutation of the Buddhistic doctrines ofmomentariness (ksana-bhanga) and voidness (sunyt a). The Kttsumanjali is Udayana’s masterpiece. It is devoted to a refutation of the anti-theistic theories maintained by the Vedistic, Samkhya, nihilistic andnaturalistic schools of his age and to the amplification and vindication of the Nyaya theism, chiefly on theC

xxxiv A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART i

basis of the creationistic view of causation. Udayana’sthcistic argument consists of two main parts: one part arguing towards values, design and causation in the sense of creation and the other part arguing to Godfrom values, design and creation. His monumentalcontribution to Indian theism has secured for him the high rank of Nyaydc&rya. From the references given on page 21 of the Sanskrit introduction to the Kaudall(Vizianagaram Sanskrit Series),it may be safely con cluded that Udayana was a contemporary of Sridhara.

SECTION VII

AFTER UDAYANA TO ANNAMBIIATTA

Sivadityamisra’s Safrtapadarthl is a short and sim ple manual setting forth the essentials of the Vaiseikasystem chiefly in accordance with Prasastapada’s Bhasya. It also makes use of the Nyaya material in Bhasarvajna’s Nydya-sara, to some extent. Sivaditya’s text giving his scheme of six fallacious types of probans with anadhyavasita corresponding to asadhti rana (uncommon probans) as a distinct type, is practi cally a reproduction of the corresponding text of Bhasarvajna. (Compare page 23, Saptapadarthl Viztanagaram Sanskrit Series, with page 25 in the Nyayasfira Poona Oriental Book Agency). Acareful comparisonof Sivaditya’s Saptapadarthl with Udayana’s Kiranavall would lead one to believe that the Saptapadarthl utilised the material in the Kiranavall. For instance, the definition of dark ness on page 71 of Saptapadarthl appears to presupposeSEC. vii] INTRODUCTION

Udayana’s remarks about darkness on pages111 and112 of the Kiranavall (Bibliotheca Indica) ; the defini tion of /a/I* on page 70 of the Saptapadarthl appearsto presuppose Udayana’s enumeration of jdtib&dhdkas onpage 161 of the Kiranavall and the definition of laksana (definition) found on page 192 of the Kiran&valt is reproduced on page 35 of the Saptapadarthl. Sriharsa, the autlior of the Khandatiakhandakhddya, andGangesa, the author of the l^attvacintamani, undoubt edly refer to Sivaditya. (Videintroduction to the Saptapadarthl page 2.) On these grounds,it wouldnot be unreasonable to assign the Saptapadarthlto the eleventh century A. D. (circa). The importance of the Saptapadarthl lies in the fact that later writers like Annambhatta used it as their model for their primers of Nyaya, as may be unmistakably made out from the close correspondence between several portions in the Saptapadarihl and primers like the Tarka

sanigraha.

The greatest Nyaya work, which was written after Udayana, is the Tattvacintdwaniby GangeSopadhyaya.In this monumental work, Gangesa utilised all the con structive, expositary, critical and polemical material in the earlier works on Nyaya and Vaiseika and gave the final shape and turn to the logic and metaphysics of Nyaya. In treating the various topics of Nyaya, the earlier writers usually adopted the categoristic method, which was inaugurated by Gautama. This method as expounded by Vatsyayana, consists in enumeration andclassification (uddeta and vibhaga), definition (laksana} t careful investigation and discussion (fiariksti). Varada-

xxxvi A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART r

raja’s Tarkikaraksa (1100 A. D. circa) is the latest im portant work on Nyaya, which adopts the old catego ristic method in accordance with the Nyaya-sutras andBhaya. It was Gangesa who replaced this old methodby what may be described as the epistemological methodor the fyramana method, which definitely shifted the emphasis from the categoristic treatment of the topics (padarthah} of Nyaya to the epistemological treat ment of the four means of valid cognition (praManam)recognised by the Naiyayikas. Thus, the Nyaya-sastrawhich had remained hitherto a mere pad&rtha-sastray for all practical purposes, was turned into a full-fledged pramana-fastrain Gangesa’s Tattvacintamani; and in this partly lies the epoch-making character of this monumental work on Nyaya. That the Tattvacintamaniserves as the basic work on which the whole literature of what is commonly known as toavya-nyaya (modernN>aya) rests is also another reason for regarding it as an epoch-making work. The Tattvaciniamani, or the Mani as it is popularly known, consists of four maindivisions represented by the four chapters (khanda) onperception ($ratyak$a), inference (anumana}, assimi lation in the sense of analogising (upam&na), andverbal testimony (sabda). In the course of an elabo rate elucidation and discussion of the nature and ob jective reach and content of these four Pramanas, the relevant topics of the Nyaya-Vaisesika system are con sidered in the Mani in comparison with the kindred topics of other philosophical systems. The languageof Gangesa’s Mani is also of an epoch-making type. Such of the modern students of Nyaya literature as are

SEC. vn] INTRODUCTION xxxvii

not equipped with the required control over the termi nology of navya-riyaya are apt to indulgein the ill conceived criticism that the language of the Mani andthe connected works is spoiled by a huge over-growth of inflated and hair-splitting logic-chopping. The key to navya-nyaya is its terminology. Those who havecontrolled this terminology are sure to find in the Maniand allied works a discipline of unique subtlety andvalue. The history of philosophical thought showsthat lack of precision in expression seriously hampersits progress. In Indian thought, this defect was sought to be remedied by Naiyayikas like Gangesopadhyayathrough several thought-measuring devices, whichchiefly consisted of formulas in Sanskrit constructed with the aid of terms like avacchedaka (the delimiter),. avacchedya (the delimited), nirapaka (co-forming), nirupya (co-formed), anuyogin (containing correlate) and pratiyogin (the other correlate or counter-corre late). All the Indian dialecticians, who wrote after Gangesopadhyaya, were influenced by the thought measuring formulas used by Gangesa. By using sucfr formulas, it was possible for later dialectics in Indian philosophical literature to achieve a remarkable degreeof quantitative precision in measuring iht* extent (temporal and spatial), content and intent (purpose and potency) of cognition (jnana).

Gan gesa quotes Sriharsa (the Khandanakard)and refutes his view (page 233 of the Mani anu mdna, Bibliotheca Indica). There is sufficient evidence in favour of assigning Sriharsa to 1136 A. D. circa. Pakadharamisra, otherwise known as Jayadeva, wrote

xxxviii , A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART*

a commentary called Aloka on the Mani. This Jaya deva is believed to be identical with Jayadeva, the author of the Prasatonaraghava. A verse from this drama (kadali kadall etc., I. 37) is quoted in the Sahityadarpana, as pointed out by Mr. P. V. Kane in his introduction to the latter work. Thus Paksadhara misra, alias Jayadeva, must have been considerably earlier than the Sahityadarpana (1300 A. D. circa). These facts will show that it would not be reasonable to assign Gangesa to any date much earlier than 1200A. D. and that he may be assignedto the former half of the thirteenth century A.D.

Vardhamanopadhyaya, the only son of Gangesaaccording to tradition, was also a reputed Naiyayika ofthis period. He wrote several learned and illuminating works, generally known as Prakasa, in the form of commentaries on Udayana’s treatises, Gangesa’s Maniand Vallabhacarya’s Nyayalilavatl. Jayadeva’s pupil, Rucidatta, was a logician of considerable repute andwas the author of a well-known commentary called Makaranda on Vardhamana’s P

rakasa.

t

The end of the fifteenth century, as also the six teenth and seventeenth centuries, may well be described as marking tfie heyday of Nyaya dialectics in Nuddea{Navadvlpa, Bengal). Vasudeva Sarvabhauma wasthe greatest Naiyayika who flourished about the end ofthe 15th and the earlier part of the 16th century. Hehad the unique privilege and glory of having taught Nyaya to four of the greatest personalities of the 16th century: v%z, Caitanya, the greatest Vaisnava teacher

SEC. vii] INTRODUCTION xxxix

and reformer of Bengal in the 16th centujry; natha, otherwise known as Tarkika-siromani (th$crest jewel of all logicians); Raghunandana, a fstfitous Bengal lawyer ; and Krsnananda, a reputed tantrika, who was a great authority on the different forms andcharms of the Sakta cult. Raghunatha (Tarkika-siro mani) was admittedly the greatest logician of the six teenth century. He wrote several treatises on Nyaya,mostly in the form of commentaries and the greatest and the most famous of the works is the Didhiti, an expository and critical commentary on Gangesa’s Mani.Mathuranatha was the most famous of Raghunatha siromani’s pupils and wrote authoritative commentarieson the Mani and the Didhiti. Jagadisa and Gadadharawere the greatest exponents of navya-nydya as re presented by the Mani and the Didhiti, and flourished in the earlier part of the seventeeth century. Jagadisa is famous as the author of the commentary on the Didhiti, popularly known as J&gadlsl, the Sabdasakti prakdsika an independent treatise on the speculative Semantics of Nyaya, a short manual called the Tarka mrla and a commentary called the Bhdsya-sukti onthe Bhasya of Prasastapada. Gadadhara is famous as the author of the commentary, popularly known as the Gddddhari, on the Didhiii, the commentary called the Mulagddddhan on portions of the Mani, commentarieson Udayana’s Atmatattvavivcka, and fifty-two dialectic tracts and treatises such as the Vyufyattivada andand Saktivada (dialectic treatises on the speculative Semantics of Nyaya). The more important works ofJagadis.a and Gadadhara are still studied carefully by

XL A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PARTr

those students who seek to specialisein navya-nydyaand they are regarded as constituting an indispensable discipline of high value to every scholar who wishes to be recognised as a sound sdstrin. The dialectic litera ture of later Nyaya is a vast banyan tree, which had its roots struck deep and its huge trunk fully developedin Mithila in the Tattvacintumani, had its immensebranches and foliage stretched out and ramified in the Didhiti in Nuddea, and bore fruit in the rich fruitage of Jdgadlsl and Gadddhari, which formed the colossal monument of Indian dialectics in the seventeenth century. If Tvajjlmnfiiha is regarded as the crest-jewel (siromani) of logical dialecticians, Gadadhara may well be characterised as the prince of Nuddea dialecticians, who wears the diadem inlaid with this brilliant crest

jewel.

In the latter pa;rt of the seventeenth century,the NyHya scholars interested themselves chieflyin the interpretation of the earlier and later works on Nyayaand in the production of introductory hand-books.Three of such scholars may be mentioned here Sam kara-misra, Visvanatha-paficanana and Annambhatta,Samkara-misra wrote a commentary on the Jdgadlsi anda comprehensive commentary called the IJpaskdra oi> Kanada’s sutras. Visvanatha-paficanana wrote a com mentary on the Nyaya-sutras in 1634; and he is famous as the author of the popular hand-book of the Nyaya-Vaisesika system, called the Bhasdpariccheda or Karikftvall, which consists of 168 easy verses. TheKdrikdvall is accompanied by the author’s own com mentary called the Nyayasiddhantamuktavali. Accord-

SEC. vn] INTRODUCTION

ing to the traditional methods of study, the MuktQvaliis widely studied by students of Nyaya, immediatelyafter finishing the study of Annambhatta’s Tarkasatii graha and Dlpika.

Annambhatta was an Andhra scholar whoflourished in the latter part of the seventeenth century. He was a versatile scholar and a reputed polymath. He wrote several learned works on almost all the im portant branches of Sastraic lc;i ruing. In this connec tion, attention may be invited to some of Annam bhatta’s known works. In the sphere of Purva mimarhsa and Vedanta, he is known as the author of the massive commentary called the Ranakojjlvam on Bhatta Somesvara’s Nyaya-sudha, otherwise known as Ranaka, and of a commentary on the Brahma-sutras. In Vyakarana, he is famous as the author of an easy commentary on Panini’s Astadhydyi and of an exten sive commentary called Uddyoiatoa on Kaiyata’s Pradlpa. In the sphere of the Nyaya-Vaisesikasystem, he wrote a learned commentary called Sid dhanjana on Jayadeva’s Manyaloka, as also the mostpopular handbook of Indian logic called the Tarka samgraha and its expository and supplementary gloss called the Dipika. The name Tarkasamgraha is inter preted by Annambhatta himself as a compendiouselucidation of the nature of substance, qualities andsuch other ontological categories of the Vaisesika sys tem, which are accepted by Nyaya. These two works

the Tarkasamgraha and the Dlpika fulfil the object mentioned in the concluding verse of the Tarka

ii fh n

ii afefaf: n

A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC PART II

TEXT

3. (a)

(e)

(0PRATYAKSA-PARICCHEDAH

1. Nidhdya hrdi visvesam vidhdya guruvanda nam{ Bdlandm sukhabodhdya kriyatc tartiasamgrahah\

2. Dravya-guna-karina-sdm8nya-visesa-sainav&y&-bhavah sapta padarthah.

3. (a) Tatra dravyani prthivyap-tejo-v&yvak&sa k&fa-dih-atma-manamsi navaiva.

( b) RupQ-rasa-gandha-sparsa-sankhya-parim&na prthaktvc^samyoga-vibhaga-paratva-aparatva- gurutva dravatva - sneha - Sabda - tuddhi - sukha-duhkha -icch& -

dvesa-prayatna-dharmddharma-samsihdrdhcaturvim^atir gunah.

(c) Utksepana- avak^epana- &Kuncana-pras&- rana-gaw>andni pafica karmdni.

(d) Param, aparam ceti f’vividham s&m&nyam. (e) Nityadravyavrttayo vitesastu anantd cva. (f) Samavayastu eka eva.

A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC (g)

4. <ra

i fon TOrsTT i

i

n^urrs*

PRATYAKSA-PARICCHEDAH 5

(g) Abhdvah caturvUhah, frdgabhdvah, pra dhvamsdbhdvaht atyantdbhdvah, anyonydbhdvasca iti.

4. Tatra gandhavatl prthivl. Sd dvividhd, nity&, anityd’ca. Nityd paramanurupa. Anitya karyarupa. Punah frividha, Sctfii’a-indriya-visaya-bhed&t.Saflfarit asmadddindm. Indriyam gandhagrahaUam ghrdnam,tacca nds&gravarti. Visayo mrtpdfanddih.

5. Sitasparsavatyah dpah. Tah dvividhah, toitydh, anitydsca. Nitydh faramdnurftpdh. Anitydh k&rya rupdh. Punah trividhdh, sarira-indriya-visQya-bhed&t. Sariram varunalofo. Indriyam rasagrdhakam rasanamjihvagravarti. Visayah sarit-samudradih.

6. U$nasparsavat tejah. Tacca dvividhatn, nityam anitypm ca. Nityam paramdnarupam. Anityamkdryprupam. Punah trividham, iarira-indriya-vlsaya Vhed&t. Sariram ddityaloke prasiddhatn. Indriyamrupagrdhakam caksuh krsnat&rdgravarti. Vifayah caturvidhah, bhauma - divya-udarya- dkaraja-bhedat. Bhaumam vahny&diEam. Abindhanam dfvytmvidyudddi. Bhuktasya parin&nahelurudaryam. Akara jam suvarn&di.

A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC 7. 5<rcf!?r

n

s.

is.

PRATYAKSA-PARICCHEDAH 7

7. Ruparahitah sporfavdn vdyuh. Sa dvividhah, nityah, anityasca. Nityah parantanurafah. Anityah tidryarupah. Punah trividhah, sarjra-indriya-visay- Shedat. Sariram vayuloke. Indriyam sparfagrahakwhtvak sarvasarlravarti. Visayo vrksadikampanahetuh.Sartr&ntah-sancan v&yuh pranah. Sa ca eko’pi ufadhi bheddt prdnapdnddi-samjndm labhate.

8. $afdagunakam dkdsam. Tacca ekam, vibhu, nityam ca.

9. Atltddivyavahdrahetuh Jtdlah. Sa ca eKo, vibhuh, nityasca.

10. Pfacyddivyavaharahetuh dik. Sd ca ekd, vibhvl, nityd, ca.

11. Jndnddhikaranam dtmd. Sa dvividhah% jlvdtmd param&tm& ceti. Tatra Uvarah paramdimdeka eva. Jlvastu pratisaflram bfo’nno, vibhtth, nityafca.

12. SuKhtidyupalabdhisddhanain Indriyam manah.Tacca pratydtmaniyatatvdt anantam, paratnanurupat*, kityam ca.

13. Caksurmdtragrdhyo guno rUpam. Tacca

suWa-nila-plta-rakta-harita-kapifa-citrat/heddt sapta vidham. Prthivl-jala-tejovrtti. Tatra prthivydin sapfavidham. Abhdsvarasuklam jale. Bhdsvarafuklam

tejasi.

8 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC 14. wroiift fir w i s ^

16. ^ttoiirsrRT^ gr: *rih i

I ^wr: fa I

H

i

H

20. W^cmm WR^ I

PRATYAKSA-PARICCHEDAH 9

14. Rasanagrahyo guno rasah. Sa ca madhura amla - lavana-katu - kasaya- tiktabliedat sadvidhah.Prthivi-jalavrttih. Tatra prthivyam sadvidhah. fale madhura eva.

15.* Ghr&nagrahyp guno gandhah. Sa dvtvidhah, surabhih* asurabhisca. Prthivlmatravrttih.

16. Tvagindriyamatragrahyo gunah sparfah. Saca trividhah, slta usna-anusnasltaShedat. Prthivyap tejo-vayuvrttih. Tatra sltah jale. Usnah tejasi. prthivlvayvoh.

17. R&padicatustayam prthivyam paftajam am tyam ca. Anyatra apakajam nilyam anityam ca. Nityagatam nityam. Anityagaiam anityam.

IS. Ekatv&divyavaharahetuh sankhyp. Sa nava dravyavrttih, elaatvGdi-pardrdhafaryanta. Ekatvamnitya^ atoityam ca. Nityagatam nityam, Anityagatawanityam. Dvitvddikam tu sarvatra anityameva.

19. Mdnavyavahdrakaranam parim&nam, Nava dravyavrtti. Taccaturvidham, anu, mahat, dirgham, hrasvam ceti.

20. Prthagvyavaharak&ranam prthaktvam. Sarva dravyavrtti.

10 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC

21. ^j^reirct: s^w i

22. tfPRHTO 3"Jfr ww \ qfawifo n

, Rff^

27. i^fin gn 5^5, wnmnPi ,e^f[^^: qa^^^^ I^ I fft^W: ^rllWlf^^ II

PRATYAKSA-PARICCHEDAH 1 1

21. Samyufaavyavahdrahetuh samyogah. Sarva dravy&vrttih.

22. Samyogan&sako guno vibhdgah. SarvOrdravylavrttih.

23.- Pardparavyavahdrdsddhdranakdrane ftaratvd paratve. Prthivyadicatustaya^anovrttinl. Te dvividhe, dikkrte kalakrte co. Dtirasthe dikkrtath paratvani. SaMipasthv dikkrtam aparatvam. Jyesthe kalakrtani paratvam. Kanisthe k&lakrtam aparatvam.

24. Adyapatanasamavayikaranam gurutvam*prthivijalavrtti.

25. Adyasyandanasamavayikaranani dravatvam,prthivyaptejovrtti. Taddvividham, samsiddhikani, naimittiftam ca. Sdmsiddhikam jale. Naiwittikamprthivltejasoh. Prthivydm ghrtdddvagnisamyogajamdravatvam. Tejasi suvarnddau.

26. Curnadipindibhdvahetuh gunah srtehah, jalamatravrttih.

27. Srotragrdhyo gunah sabdah, dk&amdtravrttih. Sa dvividhah, dhvanydtmakah varndtmaKafca. Tatradhvany&tmakah bheryddau. Varndtmakah samskrt*-bhdsadirnpah.

12 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC 28. (a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

II

(e)

(f)

(g)

29. (a) areiwr *m wii n (b) vtffrMlfoft ^Rl^ II

(c) *K& jR^wR^^iPir n

(e)

nPRATYAKA-PARJCCHEDAH 13

28. (a) Sarvavyavah&rahetuh jn&nam bUddMh.Sddvividhd, smrtih, anubhavasca.

(b) Samskdramdtrajanyani jndnam smrtih. (c) TadbHinnam jndnam anubhtivah. Sadvividhah, yotharthah, ayafh&rthasca.

(d) Tadvati tatprakarakah anuthavah yothaf thah. Saiva pramd ityucyate.

(e) Tadabhavavati tatprak&rakah anuthavahayatharthah.

(f) Yatharthdnulhavah caturvidhah, prat yakfa-anumfti-updmiti-f&bdabhed&t.

(g) Tatkaranam apt coturvidham, pratyaksa anumdna-upani&na-saldathzdat.

29. (a) Asfidh&ranam kdranam Jiaranam. (b) Kdryaniyatapurvavrtti kdranam.

(c) Kfiryam pr&gabhavapratiyogi.

(d) Kdranam trividham, sawavdyi-asamavdyi toimittabheddt.>

(e) Yatsamavetam ktiryam utpadyate tat samavdyi-karanam ; yathd tantavah patasya ; pafa&asvagatarupddefr.

14 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC wr 85

(g)

ii

30. (a)

(b)

,ftffasr*

(c) 3*

(d)

(e)

PRATYAKSA-PARICCHEDAH 15

(f) Karyena karvnena va saha eRasmin arthe samavetam sat karanam asamavdyikdranam; yathatantusaihyogah patasya, tanturupam patarupasya.

(g) Tadufyhayabhinnam Kfiranam nimittakara nam ; yatha turivem&dikam pvfasya.

(h) Tadetattrividhakdranamadhye yadasfidha ranam karanam tadeva karanam.

30. (a) Tatra pratyaksafnonakaranam pratyak saw.

(b) Indriydrthasannikarsajanyamjnanam prat yaksam. Tat dvividham, nirvikalpakam savikal pakam ceti.

(c) Tatra nispraJAdrakam jndnam nirvikol pakam.

(d) Saprakdrakam jnanam savikalpakam. Yatha ‘Ditthah ayaW, ‘Brahmavah ayam’, ‘syamahayam’, ‘Pacakah ayam’ iti.

(e) PratyaJssajndnahetuh indriydrthasanni karsah sadvidhah samyogah, samyuktasamavdyah,samyukiasamavetasamavdyah, sawavdyah, samaveta~samavdyah, visesanaviiesyabhavasca iti.

16 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC

PRATYAKSA-PARICCHEDAH 17

Caksusa ghatapratyaksajanane samyogah san nikarsah. Ghatariifyapra tyaksajanane sathyfuktasaina vdyah sannikarsah, sariiyukte ghatc riipasya samavdyat.

Rtipaii’asanianyapratyakse satiiyuktasamaveta samavayah sannikarsah, caksussamyukte ghate rupam,tatra rilpatvasya sawavayat.

Srotrcna sabdasaksatkdrc samavayah sannikarsah, karnauivaravartyakdsasya srotratvat, sabdasya akasa gunatvat, gunaguninosca samavaydi. Sabdatvasdk satkare samavetasamavdyah sannikarsah, srotra samavete sabde sabdalvasya samavdyat.

Abhdvapratyaksc ,-, : V.v, /-./. .:v,;.; ;. a7//.’?: a/, sanni karsah ‘ghatabhavavat bhutalain ityatra caksuhsam yuktc bhiitalc ghatabhavasya visesanatvdt.

Evam sannikarsasatkajanyam jndnam pratyaksam, tatkaranam indriyam. Tasmad indriyam pratyaksapra indnam iti siddhatn.

Iti pratyakfaparicchedah.

18 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC

si. (a)

(b)

(c)

'

(d)

II

(e) rww fmfiw T^rt m n 32. (a) 3T3TR ftft^, l4 T^W ^II

(b) ^1^

i 33[: H 41. (a) inl ^R ( C ' II 42. i 43. (a) (b) (c) (d) *ftt CT: IIGUNA 33- (b) Vdkydrthajnanam s&bdajnanam.Tai karanamsabdah. Iti sabdaparicchedah. Evam yatharihanubhavo nirupitah. 41. (a) Ayatharlhdniibhavah trividhah, sam saya-zriparyaya-larkabhedat. (b) Ekasmin dharmini viruddhananadharma-.:;"'; . ".T' ;.7">. . samsayah yatha sihanurvapiimso i'd iti. (c) Mithydjnanam viparyayah yathd suktaw'idam rajatam'Jti. (d) Vydpyarofyena vydpakaro'fah tarkah yathd 'yadi vah'nih na sytt tarhi dhumo'pi na sydt' iti. 42. Smriirapi dvividhd, yathdrthd ayathdrthaca. Pramdjanyd yfathdrthd. Apramdjanyd ayathdrthd. 43. (a) Sarvesam anu'kulatayd vedarityamsukhatn. (b) Pratikulalayd vedanlyam duhkham. (c) Icchdkdmah. (d) Krodlio dvesah. c .34 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC (c) ft: 44. 45. GUXA, KARMA, SAMANYA 35 (e) Krtih prayatnah. (f ) Vihitakarmajanyah dhartnah. (g) Nisiddhakarmajanyastu adliannah. (h) Buddhyddayah astan dtmamatravisesa gunah. Buddhi-iccha-prayatn&h nitydli anitydsca. Nitydh Isvarasya. Anityah Jivasya. (i) Saniskdrali trividhah regah, b/ifirand, sthitasthdpakasca iti. Vegah prthivyddicatustayawanovrttih. Anubhavajanyd smrtihetuh bhavand dtmawdtra*vrttih. Anyathdkrtasya punah tddarasthydpadakah sthita sthdpakah katadiprthivlmdtravrttih. Iti gundh. 44. Calandtmakani karma. Urdhvadesasamyoga hetuh utksepanam. Adhodesasaniyogahetuh avakse panatyi- Sanrasya sannikrstasamyogahetuh dkuficanam. Viprakrstasamyogahctuh prasdrartam. Anyat sarvamgamanavi. 45. Nityam ekam anckilnnyalain sdmanyamDravya-guna-karmarrfti. Param satfd. Aparamdravyatvddi. 36 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC 46. 47. , gqgfltfh II 48. (a) II (b) (c) ' (d) 49. so. VISESA, ABHAVA 37 46. Nityadravyavrttayah vyavartakah visesah. 47. Nityasambandhah sawav&yah, ayutasiddha vrttiti. Yayoh dvayoh madhye ekamavinasyadavas tham, apardsritam evavatisthate /aw ayutatiddhau yathd avayavavaypvinau, gunaguninau, kriyjakriyd* vantau, jutivyakti, visesanityadravye ca iti. 48. (a) Anadih sdntah prdgabhavah, utpatteh purvam kdryasya. (b) Sddih anantah pradhvamsaht utpattya nantaram kdryasya. ( c ) Traikalikasamsargdz'acchinnapratiyogitakah atyantabhdvah yathd 'tohutale ghatah ndsti' iti. (d) Tdddtmyasainbandhdi>acchmnapratiyogita kah anyonyabhavah yathd 'ghatah Pato no? iti. 49. Sarves&m ftadarthanftm yathtyatham uktes vantarbhavdt saptaiva paddrlhdh iti siddham. 50. Kanddanyayamatayoh balavyutpattisiddhaye Annambhattena vidusd racitastarkasamgrahah\\ ITI TARKASAMGRAHAH SAMAPTAH II wr: II II Cf^fa?* II A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC PART III TRANSLATION AND EXPOSITION CHAPTER I PERCEPTION [[1]] T In my heart, I devoutly cherish the Lord of the universe; my teacher, I respectfully greet; and I proceed to write this Primer of Indian Logic, called Tarka-Samgraha, with a view to beginners gaining knowledge easily. Following the time-honoured practice of orthodox: Sanskrit writers, Annambhatta begins his Primer witlir an appropriate mangold, which consists, here, in paying devout homage to his God and to his teacher. Theexpression Visvesa the Lord of the universe is sug gestive of the central argument of the Nyaya theism the creationistic argument. The four preambularyfactors, constituting what is known as anubandha*catustaya, are also indicated in the second line of the introductory verse. They are subject-matter (vifayaj,. the chief aim (prayojana),relation (sambandha) and; the persons for whom the work is specially designed1 (adhikarin). Such preambulary details are usually incorporated in modern books in a separate prefaceprefixed to the work in question, while they are briefly set forth in the opening verses in sastra treatises in? Sanskrit. The elements of the Nyaya-VaiSesika system 4 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART in in its syncretist form constitute the subject-matter ofthis Primer and its aim is to enable beginners to understand them easily.It follows from this that this Primer is intended for the beginners. Pratifadya pratipadaka-bhava the relation of treated and treatise is generally stated to form thesambandha in almostall sastra works. This would be useless information, when understood literally.It would acquire special significance if it should be interpreted as holding out an assurance, that the author can be trusted to treat well in his treatise, the subjectin hand. The name Tarka-samgraha is interpreted byAnnambhatta himself as a compendious elucidation of the nature of substance, qualities and such other onto logical categories of the Vaisesika system, that are accepted by Nyaya. The term tarka is thus taken bythe author in a somewhat unusual sense. The usual meanings, however, of the word tarka are logic, reason ing, reductio ad absurdum and discussion. Putting all these ideas together, it would be easy to see how the title Tarka-samgraha may be taken to be equivalent to A Primer of the Nyaya-Vaisesika system in its syn cretist form*. [[2]] T Substance, quality, ac tivity, generality, particularity, inherence and non-existence are the seven categories (pad&rth&h) 9 A paddrtha is literally a nameable or denotable thing or a fhing which corresponds to a word. Kanada,CH. i] PERCEPTION 5 in his Vaisesika-sutras, givesthe name artha to sub stance (dravya), quality (guna)and activity (karma).Prasastapada, the author of the Vaisesika-bhayacalled Padartha-dharma-saihgraha enumerates the first six paddrthas out of the seven mentioned above. LaterVaisesikas add non-existence (abhdra)to Prasasta pada' s list of six paddrthas. Gautama, the author ofthe Nyaya Sutras, Vatsyayana, the author of Nyaya bhiisya and later Naiyayikas: ov'opiNr all these seven paddrthas. What is a paddrtha or category as understood in the above text 2. T.? A paddrtha is usually defined as a knowable thing (jneya)or as a validly cognisable thing (pravicya),or as a nameable or denotable thing (abhidheya). The Nyaya-Vaisesika system maintainsthat its scheme of seven padarthas represents a satis factory classification of all the knowable or nameablethings. The first six are called bhdva-faddrthas orexistent entities and are thus contrasted, in a markedway, with abhava, which amounts to non-existence. Though Kanada speaks of abhava, he does not include it in his list of arthas for the reason that he under stands by artha an entityin which existence or satta, in the Vaisesika sense, inheres. Prasastapada does not mention abkava in his scheme of six padfirthas, since this scheme confines itself to bhavas. But a complete scheme of all the knowable or validly cognisable or nameable things must not omit abhava for it is main tained in the Nyaya-Vaisesika system that we knowabhava, know it correctly and the negative terms in language denote it. 6 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART in It would be useful to compare in this connection the above scheme of seven paddrthas with Gautama'sscheme of sixteen pad&rthas and with the correspond ing schemes adopted in certain other systems of Indian philosophy. In the first Sutra of the Nyaya-darsana, 'Gautama enumerates sixteen paddrthas means oi valid 'knowledge (pramana), objects of valid krtowledge i(prameya), doubt (samsaya), purpose (prayoj ana) , instances (drstdnta), established conclusions (sid dhanta), members of syllogism (avayava),reduciio adstrat who would recogniseten pad&rthas in all the six bhdvas of the later Vaisesikas, poten tiality (sakti), inability (a-sakti), genericdifferentia (sdmdnya-visesa) and non-existence (abhdva). ExceptGautama's list of sixteen padarthas, all these schemes of categories attempt, with a large measure of success, at a sound metaphysical classification of all nameableor knowable things; and none of these Indian schemes can justly be said to exhibit the logical defects that wenotice in similar schemes of categories known to Western logic such as the somewhat arbitrary schemeof ten categories or predicates given by Aristotle, andthe schemes of four or three or seven categories put forward by the Stoics, Descartes, Spinoza, Locke* Mill and other philosophers. In most of the syncretist works dealing with the tenets of the Nyaya-Vaisesika system, the argumentsadvanced by the Bhattas as well as the Prabhakaras to establish the existence of potentiality (sakti) asa distinct entity (quality or category) and the view upheld by the latter school of MImamsakas that similarity (sddrsya) should be given a distinct placein the list of categories are refuted. Counter-agents (pratibandhaka) counteract the operation of causes and causes turn out to be un availing. The counteraction that we experience in such 8 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART ra cases cannot be explained otherwise than as consisting in the destruction of the causal efficacy or sakti of the causes. Thus according to Mimarhsakas, the existence of sakti as a distinct category must necessarily be re cognised. The Naiyayikas argue that counteraction consists merely in the presence of counter-agents,the total non-existence of which is one of the ^elements constituting the full compliment of the causal apparatus (sSmagrl) . Thus they disprove the necessity for re cognising sakti as a distinct category. Similarity, ac cording to Prabhakaras, does not consist merelyin the possession of parts or qualities or features of the samekind as the Naiyayikas urge; but it is revealed inex perience as a distinct category. The Naiyayikas contend that a careful analysis of experience would show that similarity consists merely in the possession of parts orqualities or features of the same kind. 3 (a) T Of them (the seven cate gories), the Substances are only nine vis.: earth, water, light, air, ether, time, space, soul and mind. The word 'only*in this text is intended to exclude'darkness', which according to Mimarhsakas, is a dis tinct substance. The Mimarhsakas argue that on the strength of the experience which associates blue colour and movement with darkness, it should be regarded as a substance; and it cannot be any of the nine substances mentioned above. So, it should be given a distinct OH. i] PERCEPTION 9 place as the tenth substance in the list of substances. The Naiyayikas point out that the experience whichassociates colour and movement with darkness is erro neous. For, a substance having colour can be seen only in the presence of light; and darkness, which is seen in the absence of light, cannot be a substance havingcolour. In fact, darkness, according to Naiyayikas, is nothing but the total absence of such light as is effec tual in normal perception. In the text under consideration, substances are divided into nine classes. This may be taken to be a definition of substances from the point of view of ex tension. But the Nyaya method of exposition, according to Vatsyayana (Nyaya-Bhfisxn 1-2-3, Avatarika) recognises that expository scheme to be perfect whichconsists of uddcsa (enumeration accompanied byvibhaga or division), laksana (definition) and pariksa (investigation). Thus a mere enumeration or division of substances will not do and they should be defined. A substance is usually defined as that which possesses the jati (generic attribute)called dravyatva (sub stance-ness) ;or as that in which a quality (guna)or activity (kriya) inheres; or that which is fit to be treated as the inherent cause (samavtiyi-karana)of some effect. Of these alternatives, the second and third, based on quality and activity, are not applicable to substances in the first moments of their creation ; for, according to the Naiyayika theory of causation^ every cause should necessarily precede its effect, andqualities and activities, which are the effects of sub- 10 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART in stances, require at least one moment before they could come into being. If the function of definition should be to provide a valid reason (hetu)for inferring differ ence from others and if inference should be of some thing which is not already comprisedin the connota tion of the minor term (paksa),substance-ness (dra vyatva), which is connoted by the term dravya, wouldnot form a satisfactorydefinition. In such circum stances, by using quality or activity and without directly using dravyatva, a substance is defined as a thing possessing a jdti (generic attribute), which is not satta (existence) and is co-existent with a quality or activity. This kind of ingenious device, which is com monly adopted by the Naiyayikas,is known as jdti ghaMa-laksana. In this connection, it would be of advantageto elucidate briefly the Naiyayika's view of definitions and their functions. A definition in Nyaya is not merely an explication of the connotation of a term; but it is a proposition specifyingthe differentia or the differentiating feature of the species or the thing defined. A laksana is a specific feature or asddhararia dharm a. The term asadhdrana means that which is free from the three faults of a definition vis: over applicability ( ativyapti) , partial inapplicability (avyapti) and total inapplicability (asambhava). Adefinition, that is too wide and that consists of anattribute which is presentin things soughtto be defined as well as those not intended to be defined, has the defect of atwy&pt'i; while a definition which does not CH. i] PERCEPTION II apply to some of the thingsdefined has the defect of cvydpti' and one which is wholly inapplicableto any of the things defined has the defect of asambhava. Sucha specific feature (asadharanadharma)is reciprocally co-extensive with the adjunct that delimits the scope of laksyald (being sought to be defined);in other words, wherever that feature is, laksyatavacchedakaor the delimiting adjunct of laksyata is, and wherever the latter is, the former is. In the case of a cow or an ox(gauh), for instance, gotva or bovineness is the laks yatavacthedaka, when all the quadrupedsof the bovine species, and none else, are sought to be defined. In this case, brown colour or uncloven hoof would be too narrow to constitute a definition, the former, which is applicable only to some of the laksyas, being vitiated bythe fault of avyapti (partial inapplicability), and the latter, which is applicable to none of them, beingvitia ted by asambhava (total inapplicability), while havinghorns would be too wide and therefore vitiated by the fault of ativtyapti. It will be seen, from this, that the Nyaya view of the function of a definition is primarily, differentiation, and incidentally, designation also, while the latter is the only conceivable function in certain cases. "Vyavrttir vyavaharo vd laksanasya prayo janam" is an oft-quoted dictum in Nyaya literature. Vydvrttior differentiation consists in the inference of difference from the other things. Smell in the case ofearth or rationalityin the case of a man forms a differentiating laksana and serves as a valid reason leading to the inference of difference from not-earth in the former case, and from not-man in the latter. What 12 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART in helps in differentiation also helpsin specific designation. All vy&vartakalaksanas are thus vyavaharikalaksanasalso. In certain cases like nameability (abhidhe yatva), all things (paddrtha)are intended to be covered by the definition ; but no differentiation is possible, as nothing can be said to be other than a thing (padartha) ; and in such cases the only function of laksanq is desig. nation (vyavahara). It would be interesting to observe here that lak sanas or definitions are as important on the positive side in the pluralistic realism of the N}aya-Vaiscs'kasystem, as they are on the negative side in the monistic phenomenalism of the Advaita Vcdanta. In the formersystem, laksaiias are helpful in arriving at, and main taining the reality of, several self-contained andmutually exclusive units, which, according to the Advaitic monist are but fragmentary appearances of the one absolute; while, in the latter system, laksanas are but so many unsustainable stunts demonstratingthe futility of the ayikasuse any one of these five factors, from the origin of kriyd down to its cessation, as the delimiting condition (upddhi) of a ksana, which is regarded as the smallest unit of time. The Nyaya-Vaisesika conception of kriyd stands in sharp contrast with the Vaiyakarana view of this category. According to the Vaiyakaranas a kriyd is what is usually denoted by a verbal root (dhdtu) andit is ordinarily a process consisting of many activities (vydpdrah") arising in succession. In its fully accom plished state (siddhdvasthd),a kriyd is denoted by a substantive like pdka; and when it is being done or in its sddhydvasthd, it is denoted by the radical element in a finite or infinitival verb. It would be worthy of notice here that the'Naiya yikas and the Bhatta-mimarhsakas maintain that a kriyd is perceptible and may be visualised under cer- 18 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART m tain conditions ; whereas, the Prabhakaras hold that it falls beyond the scope of the senses and it comes to be iknown only through inference from fur thejcontact preceded by disjunction (vibhayapurvaka-samyoya).It should also be remembered that Indian philosophers, like Sankara, draw pointed attention to the funda mental difference between a 'kriyd and a jndna, which consists in the former being such as directly falls with in the scope of the will (purnsatantra) and the latter never coming within the scope of the will but having its nature determined byits object (rastutantra). 3 (d) T Generality is of two kinds the more comprehensive and the less comprehensive. 3 (c) T Particularities, on the other hand, abide in eternal sub stances and are innumerable. 3 (f) T Whereas, inherence is merely one. In common speech, stinidnya means a common fea ture; but, in the technical language of Nyaya, it is equivalent to j&ti and is understood to stand for ageneric feature which inheres in all the individuals constituting a class and is eternal. The individual units (vyakti) of a class may come and go, but the generic attribute common to the whole class exists for ever. CH. i] PERCEPTION 19 Humanity, or more literally man-ness (manusyatva) , which is common to all mankind, is eternal and it existed before the origin of man and will continue to exist even after the annihilation of all mankind. A jdti, in this technical sense, is connected with a vyakti through the intimate relation known as samavdya orinherence. An attribute may be common to several individuals and connected with them either through the direct relation of svartipa-sambandha, the related object itself being looked upon as relation, or through someindirect relation (parampard-sainbandha) ;such anattribute is called upddhi and should not be confoundedwith a yd /i. Mfirtati'a, for instance, is not a ;d/i; andit amounts to "being the seat of all activity" (kriy&sra yatva). It is sometimes called sakhandopadM a feature which admits of being defined and stands in need of the help of a definitive expression for its defi nite comprehension; and in this sense, a sakhaydopadhiis said to be nirvacaniya. A jdti like pot-ness (yhatatva) is anirvacanlya does not stand in need of the help of a definitive expression for its comprehension. The Naiya yikas recognise certain generic attributes called akhandopadhis, which are not jdtis but similar to themin all respects except that the relation of the former to their abodes is self-link (svarupa-sambandha) the related thing itself constituting its own relation andthat it is not inherence (samavdya) as in the case ofjdti. Visaya is object ;visayat& is object-ness*, visayata iva is being object-ness and is an akhandopddhi. Prati yogin is correlative; pratiyogitd is correlativeness; pratiyogitdtva is being correlativeness and is an 20 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART in akhandop&dhi. Under which of the seven categories should an akhandopadhi be brought? In reply to this question, a Naiyayika would say that it could be brought under saniunya, if that term should be under stood to mean all generic attributes jatis and akhantfopddhis. Or, if the term sdmanya should be restricted to a jati, an akhandopadhi could not be brought under any of the seven categories. It should be remembered in this connection that these two kinds of generic attributes (j&ti and akhandopadhi) are the only things that are presentedin thought, by them selves, without the help or mediation of their attributes (svartipatobhdtoa-ioyytih) ;and that thought grasps Jther things only under the aspect of, or only through the mediation of, a qualifying attribute (kincitprakara- 'Quraskarenaiva bh&nayogyah). In Nyajja terminology, a distinction is sometimes made between akhanda amtinya and sakhanda-sainanya, the former being a j&ti directly connected with a vyakti and the latter being a generic attribute which is reducible to a jati connected with a vyakti through some indirect relation (fiaramparCisatnbandha). For instance, kriyatva (mo tion-ness) is an akhanda-sawanya-, while uigr/afra is a sakhanda-s&manya, as it is equivalent to kriy&sra yatva (possessing an activity), which is a generic attribute common to all the tnurtas earth, water, fire, air and mind, and may be said to consist in the jati kriy&tva being present through the indirect relation svasamavfiyi-soniavdyitva (being the intimate substra tum of its own intimate substratum). CH. i] PERCEPTION 21 How do the Naiyayikas show that it is necessary; to recognise sdtndnyta or jdti as a distinct category?Our experience, in several cases where it relates to diverse objects, exhibits a certain degreeofuniformity^. When we see a human being or a beast, our experience howsoever it may differ in other respects, invariably takes the. form 'this is a man' (ayam manusyah) or 'this is a beast* (ayam mryah). The uniformity that wethus observe in our experience cannot be accounted for otherwise than through the assumption of a generic feature common to all mankind or all the beasts. This generic feature is called manusyatra (humanity) in the case of human beings and nirgatva (beasthood)in the case of beasts. Parsimony in thought is relied upon bythe Naiyayikas as a criterion of soundness, when it does not clash with any other criterion which is stronger or more reliable. The principle of economyor the law of parsimony or the Idghava-nydya deter mines the nature of many a h)pothesisin Nyfiya andother systems of Indian thought. According to this principle, a generic feature like manusyatva or mryatvashould be taken to be eternal, one, and connected with men or beasts through the intimate and eternal relation called samavaya (inherence).In one word, it should be taken to be a jdti in the technical sense, in the in terest of Idghava, so long as there is nothing preventing the hypothesis of jdti being put forward in the case under consideration. Thus, through perceptual ex perience, one might arrive at a jdti, in order to accountfor uniformity in such experience. There are several cases in which perceptual experience of a whole class 22 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART m is impossible or it happens to be restricted to a few andnot accessible to all. For instance, in the case ofsubstances (dravya), only three of them earth, waterand fire are perceptible to the external senses, some of their varieties being imperceptible. Though atvian (spirit or soul) is perceptible to the inner sense called wanas (mind), its existence as a dravya cannot be taken for granted at the stage at which the jati drQzyatzfa (substancencss)is yet to be established. In such circumstances, the Nai)fiyikas maintain the neces sity for rcn-jjiii -in.; a jati by means of infeicnce (anmn&na) aided by the principle of parsimony(laghava). By way of illustration, their argument to establish dravyaiva may be set forth here. Only a substance can be samarayikarana (intimate cause or inherent cause). Human thought,in respect of causa lity (karanata) as in other respects, shows a habitual preference for compactness and unity. The conception of karanata could serve some useful purpose in life, only when it takes a definite and comprehensive form;and it cannot take a form which is at once definite and comprehensive, so longas it is not specifically delimited in its scope by a comprehensive and definite adjunct. In other words, a suitable delimiting adjunct of kara nata ( (karanatavacchcdaka),besides a similardelimiting adjunct of karyata or cffcctness (karyatavacchedaka)should be thought of in the case of every comprehen sive and definite statement of causal relation (Surya k5rana-bh&ra). The need for such a statement being taken for granted in the case of the samav&yi-kdranatdbelonging to substances as a class, it follows that this CH.I] PERCEPTION 23 kdranatd is definitely determined in its scope by a deli miting adjunct which is common to all the substances. Such a delimiting adjunct in the case of samavdyi kCirana (samavtiyi-karanataracchedaka')is called drav yati'a. Economy in thought, in the absence of anyoutweighing

;u:v,'-n!;i^c or difficulty, would neces sarily lea(J to dravyatra (substanceness) being assumed! to be eternal (nitya), one (cka) and connected with all the substances through samardya, i.e., a jCiti in the technical sense. This argument is usually stated in Sanskrit thus: "Dravyanisthd samavdyikdranatd (yin/aw, saih yogam, libhugam vdprati), yatkinciclanugata dharniaracchinnu, kdranatutvat, dandanistha yjiatakdranattirat." Some jdtislike draryati'd (substanceness)are more comprehensive (para)as compared with prthivl tra (earthness) and less comprehensive as compared^ with sattd (existence) ; while yhatatza (potness)is the least comprehensive (apara) of all the jdtis in the series of jdtis sattd, dravyatia, prthivitva, ghafatva. In every series of jdtis,it will be seen that sattd is the most comprehensive jdti and is the generic attribute characterising the one sttmmmn genus recognised in the Nyaya-Vaisesika system, which may be called sat andto which Kanada gives the technical name artha. Everyseries of ;a/y ends with its own antya-jdti, whichcharacterises its infinta species. Thus in the Nyaya Vaisesika system, while there are several antya-jdtis and diverse infimoe species, there is only one higher 24 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART in j&ti, viz., satta and one summum genus. Jdtis, in cluding satta, can inhere only in substances, qualities and activities (dravya, guna and karma) and cannotinhere in any other category. The predication, of satta with reference to the remaining positivecate gories, sdmanya, vifcsa and samavciya, is explained away by the Naiyayikas, on the basis of co-inherence, and not on the basis of inherence. Propositions like 'dravyam sat\ 'guriah san', 'karma sat1convey that satta inheres in a dravya or guna or karma; whereasthe propositions 'sam&nyam sat', 'visesah sanfah', 'samavdyah san9 should be interpreted as referring to the co-inherence of samtinya, visesa and samai'dya with sat id in the same place. In his Sutra, "S&mdnyam visesa iti bttddhyapck sam" (ch. I-ah-2-su 3), Kanada observes that 'genera lity and speciality are dependent upon the nature of the view-point*. Some modern writers on Indian logic, more especially some writers in English, are misled by this Sutra into the belief that Kanada was in favour of a conceptualist view of samdnya and would reduce it to a conceptual factor existing only in thought. Thismisapprehension results from an imperfect knowledgeof Kanada's position. Kanada maintains, partlyin anexplicit way and implicitlyin part, that jdtis are eternal universals, existing outside the sphere of thought in the same sense in which other realities exist ; and that a jdti is looked upon as a generic feature (samdnya) or a specific differentia (z(t&?a), according as it is con ceived of as a unifying or differentiating factor. ForCn.i] PERCEPTION 25 instance, substanceness (dravyatva) is a samanya, whenit is looked upon as a generic feature common to all the substances; but it is a viscsa when it is looked upon as the differentia of substances, by means of which they areilibi':i.. i-'.nl from other things like qualities andactivities. One could clearlysee how solicitous Kanudareally is^to establish the reality of jatis, from the signi ficant way in which he uses the phrase arttya-iisesa to designate the distinct category known as rifesah, so that they may not be confounded with jatis looked uponas differentia. To philosophise, according to the exponents of the Nyaya-Vaisesika system, is to unify, wherever possible, through universals arrived at on the basis of observed similarities or uniformities, and to ramify and differen tiate, wherever fidelity to experience requires it, through differentiating features arrived at from ob served dissimilarities. This process,in the direction of generalisation, has led to several jatis being recog nised, and in the direction of differentiation, has re sulted in the hypothesis that a unique, self-differentia ted and cuTl.tMiiig feature called 'particularity' (viscsa) should be attributed to every everlasting sub stance that could not be otherwise ilisiin^uMu'd fromsimilar everlasting substances. Composite substances like a jar or a cloth, made of component parts, can easily be distinguished from each other by means of the different parts constituting them. Eternal substances, which are alike in respect of guna, Karma and jati, like the eternal atoms of earth, water, fire or air, cannot be 26 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART m distinguished from similar substances of the same class without ascribing to them some unique feature called visesa. In our perceptual experience, one thing is differentiated from another thing through a distin- ., feature. As a matter of fact, in the super :' ' ., . normal perceptual experience (alaukika-pratyaksa) ofseers and Yogins, one atom of earth is distinguished from another atom of earth; in such cases, there mustbe a differentiating feature; no yuna, karma or jdti can be relied upon as a di-tinguNhi:!'.; feature, for in those respects, all atoms of earth are alike; even the super normal perception of a Vogin cannot change the funda mental nature of things (I'astu-srabhara) and cannot see a man as a beast or a horse as an ass; it is the fundamental nature of perception, both normal andsuper-normal, that it distinguishes one object fromanother through a disiiijuujxlsjug feature; and thus, the perception of one atom of earth as distinct fromanother atom of the same kind, super-normal as it happens to be, should be accounted for by ascribing to each atom of earth a unique feature called viscsa. Byfollowing the same line of argument, it would be necessary to ascribe a rises a to each of the atomsconstituting producible substances (janya-drarya). These vixcsas should be taken to be self-discrimi nating (svatoryavartaka) or self-differentiated (svato ry&vrtta). If a visesa were to be differentiated from another vifcsa or from any other object through some distinctive feature other than itself or its own svar&pa, it would lead to an endless CH. i] PERCEPTION 27 assumption of distinctive features and this lire ofthought cannot be sound as it is vitiated by ana vasthd or endless regression. It follows necessarily that each risesa stands isolated and unique; and exhypothesiteven a jaii called risesatva, common to all the risesas, becomes inadmissible for the reason that a visesa wotrld cease to be self-descriminating were it to be associated with a jati, every jati including sattd turning out to be a differentia in cases of contrast with things devoid of that jtiti. AH the Vaisesikas and Naiyayikas agree that each atom should be taken to have a unique visesa inherent in it, that the relation between a visesa and its abodeis inherence (scMKK'aya) and that visesas are eternal. There is, however, some difference of opinionas to whether every eternal substance should be taken to have a visesa. It is necessary that each jiva (indivi dual soul) and each inanas should be assumed to ha' e a unique visesa; for, though, when a jivais in a state of bondage (baddha),he and his mind could be shownto have distinctive features in the form of distinctive experiences and such other Characteristics, yet neither a liberated (mukta) jiva nor his mind could be differ entiated from other liberated fivas and their minds, without ascribing to each of them a unique visesa; andthere can be no difference of opinion about this matteramong the Naiyayikas. With regard to ether (akasa), while some Naiyayikas hold that a visesa should be as cribed to it as the delimiting determinant of its causa lity of sound (Sabda-sdmavdyikaraMat&vacchedaka), 28 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART m others hold this is unnecessary. In the case of spatial direction (dik) and time (Mia},if they are recognised to be distinct substances, they should be taken to have distinctive visesas; but, while the earlier Naiy&yikas recognise dik and kola to be eternal substances, distinct from others, the later Naiyayikas, like RaghundthaSiromani, would bring dik and k&lu under God (Isvara), uncommon attributes like eternal omniscience being quite adequate to distinguish God from the rest with out the help of a visesa of His own. It should be re membered in this connection that, when the term vise$a is taken in its usual sense of differentia, the phrase antya-visc$a is used to describe the unique category known as viscsa, it being said to be antya for the reason that it stands at the end of all differentiating features, or for the reason that it inheres in eternal substances which transcend creation and destruction and are, therefore, denoted by the word anta. When two substances come into contact with each other, their relation is called samyoga; and this relation is not of an intimate character and is separable. Thereis another type of relation which determines determi nate cognitions of objects as associated with certain attributes (visista-pratiti) ; and this relation when it happens to connect two things of which one, as long as it does not become moribund or cease to exist, is always associated with the other two things which are techni cally called ayuta-siddha is known as samavaya.This is an intimate type of relation recognised as sub sisting between component parts and composite wholes CH. i] PERCEPTION 29 (avayaia and arayavin) , qualities and substances (guna and dravya), movements and moving substances (kriya and dravya}, genericattributes and the indivi duals forming a class (jati and vyaTtti), and particula rities and eternal substances (visesaznd nityadravya) . The intimate relation of satnavdya stands in markedcontrast with contact (saihyoga) which is not an in dissoluble relation and is easily lost. With some effort the Naiyayikas distinguish samavdya from another type of relation recognised by them, which is known as svariipa-sambandha or self-relation and which consists in one of the related things being looked upon as com prising a relational phase forming a connecting link. For instance, time-relation (kdlika-sambandha) is time (kdla) itself looked upon as a connecting link between time and things limited in time. Numerous varieties ofsvarapa-sambandha are recognised by the Naiyayikasin all cases where cognition of an object with its adjunct (visista-pratiti), the configuration of which in volves three cognised factors an adjunct (visesana), an object qualified by it (visesya) and their relation, has to be accounted for through some relation andwhere that relation cannot be contact or inherence (samyoga or samavdya). The conception of svarupa sambandha is pressed into service too much by the Naiyayikas and is pushed too far in their view regard ing the relation of tdddtmya (complete identity), whichforms the relation underlying cognitions like this 'a jar exists in itself. It is maintained by the Naiyayikas that, though a relation ordinarily implies difference 30 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART m the relation of identity should be considered an ex ception and cannot be ignored since it is presentedin valid experience. The Nyaya conception of jati may, with advan tage, be compared with the views held by the Vaiya karanas (Grammarians), Bhattas, Prabhakaras, Baud dhas and Advaitins on this subject. The term jati, ac cording to Indian Grammarians, primarily denotes class-attributes in the Nyaya sense; and terms denoting caste, lineage and followers of a Vedic school are also treated as terms denoting a jati for purposes of the application of certain grammatical rules framed with reference to terms denoting jati (jativaci). TheBhatta-mlmamsakas hold that a jati like cowness(yolva), horseness (asvatva}is eternal, omnipresentand perceptible; that, though present everywhere, it is manifested only in and through the individual objects comprising a class and that such objects are called vyaktis chiefly for the reason that they serve to manifest jati', and that their relation to vyaktis is not inherence (samavdya) but relative identity or identity compatible with difference (tadatmya). The relation of tadatmyot according to the Bhattas, is not absolute identity, as the Naiyayikas take it to be ; but it is identityin a relative sense i.e. identity (abheda) compatible withdifference (bheda-sahi$nu). Though difference andidentity are ordinarily opposed to each other, yet they; are taken by the Bhattas to be compatible with eachother, on the ground that it is experience,after all, that determines the compatibility or incompatibility of two ^H.IJ PERCEPTION * l things and that experience warrants the recognition of difference, associated with identity, as forming the rela tion between jdti and vyakti. In the proposition'this h a horse' (ayam asvah),for instance, 'this' refers to a particular vyakti and 'horse1, according to the Bhattas, primarily refers to horseness (osvatva), whichis a jati According to this view, in the judgment em bodied in this proposition, a jdtiis equated with a vyakti. But this equation cannot be absolute as, in that case, the two words 'this* and 'horse* would turn out to be synonyms. Therefore, the Bhattas argue that, on the strengthof what is presentedin cognition, a peculiar relation ;'::,.,in difference-cum-identity (bhcdabhcdau), should be recognised in the case of jdti and vyakti. While Naiyayikas restrict jdtis to the first three categories substances, qualities and acti vities, the Bhattas ascribe the highest or the most com prehensive j&ti called existence (sattd)to those three categories and also to the fourth category, generality (sdmdnya). The Prabhakaras, on the other hand, con tend that a jati or generic attribute can be recognised only in perceptible substances, and any common attri bute which cannot be perceivedalike by the learned andilliterate in vydktis should not be regarded as a jati. It would follow from this that cowness (gcttva) and such other attributes may be regarded as j&tis, while -existence (sattd), substanceness (dravyatva), and such other attributes are not jdtis. According to these philosophers, the relation between a jati and vyakti is inherence (samavdya), as in the Nyaya system, the re- 32 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART in lation of tdd&tmya consistingin difference-cum-identity being discarded as an impossible jumble. The Buddhistic idealists would reduce all jatis to the negative form of 'difference from the rest* (svetara bhcda), cowness (gotva),for instance, being nomore than difference from things other than a cow(yavetarabheda}. They ridicule the Nyaya doctrine of jati in this strain: "Eternal cowness, dogness, assness and such other jatis where do they exist, after all the cows, dogs and asses cease to exist at the time of uni versal dissolution (pralaya) ? Do they exist in God?To say so would be blasphemy. When a dog or an ass or a cow dies, does its jati leave it? It cannot doso, for the reason that only substances can move. When a cow is just born, how does it cometo have cowness ? It cannot be said that cow ness is produced in a new-born calf, for jati is eternal and has no origin. Nor can it be said that a jati loses some of its parts when a ryakti ceases to exist, and acquires additional parts as new vyaktis are produced ; for eternal jatis can have no parts. Indeed, in your doctrine of jati, you have brought a hornet's nest to your ears." The Advaitic monists of the post-Sankara and pre-Sankara stagesin the history of Indian monismcleverly use the Nyaya theory of jati to their profit, byshowing that the highest jati, existence (satta),is the grand generality (mahasaManya}, which represents the only absolute realitycalled Brahman, and that the various vyaktis and smaller jatis like yotva and asratva Cn. i] PERCEPTION 3& are but appearances super-imposed upon the absolutesatta. Inherence (samavaya) is recognised by Prabha karas in cases where two inseparable things (ayuta siddha) are intimately connected with each other; but it is taken to be eternal in cases where both the related objects are eternal, and non-eternal in other cases. It is, the obsession of economy (l&yhava) that has led the Naiyayikas to hold that inherence is eternal and one.. In the place of sawat'aya, the Bhattas and Advaitins recognize the relation of difference-cum-identity (tddat mya). Fiscsas, in the sense in which the Vaisesikas and Nai>ayikas recognize them, are not recognized by;, other Indian philosophers, who find it easy to disprove the necessity for recognizing I'isesas by pointing out that the self-discriminating capacity ascribed to risesas might be attributed, with advantage, to eternal bubstan ces themselves. In order to completely understand the Nyaya doc trine of jatj, it is necessary to pay some attention to the principles which Udayanacarya, one of the greatest exponents of Nyaya in the tenth century, laid down for determining which of the numerous common attributes presented in one's experience should be treated as j&tis and which should not be. These principles are six*: (1) the individuals in question being only one (vyak tyabheda); (2) the individuals in question being the same neither more nor less (tulyatva) ; (3) attributes which exclude each other in some places being found together elsewhere (samkara) ; (4) endless regression 3 34 A PRIMER OF INDIAN" LOGIC [PARTIII (anai'astha) ; (5) giving up the distinctive feature made out ex hypothesi (rupahani} ;and (6)the absence of the necessaryrelation (asambandha).In his Kiranavall, Udayana sums up these six principlesin this verse : ^Vyaktcrabhedastulyatvam samkaro'thanaz'asthitih ; Rupahdnirasambartdho jatibadhakasariiyrahah." Etherness (akasatra} cannot be a jati, for the obvious reason that, according to Naiyayikas, ether is eternal and one and that there is no question of form ing a class consisting of several similar individuals. There can be no distinction between jarness and potness (kalatatva and ghatatva), as the jars or pots, whichform the class in view and to which the generic attri bute in questionis ascribed, happen to be the same. Senseness (indriyaiva}co-exibts with elementness (bhutatva) in the external senses like the visual sense constituted by fire; indriyatva is dissociated fromIthutatva in the mind (manas),which is not a bhuta; fyhfttatva alone exists in a jar, which is made of earth and not a sense; the only possible relations that are warranted by experience, between two attributes re cv/.-.ii-.sl to be jatis, are inclusiveness and mutual exclu siveness; for instance the sphere of dravyatva includes that of ghatatva, while ghatatva and patatva (jarness and clothness) are mutually exclusive; so, neither indri yatva nor bhutatva can be regarded as a jati, on the ground of unwarranted blend (samtiarya). If all the jatis were to be supposed as having a jati common to them there would be endless regression in this way.n. i] PERCEPTION 35 Suppose the jatis we start with are three a, b and c\ if we assume that these three fat is have a jati commonto them called A*, the total number of jatis would becomefour 0, 6, c and #; and having committed ourselves to the position that there should be a jati common to all jatis, the meaning of the word all will increase at every step by ofie more jati being added to the list and weshould go on assuming an endless series of jatis com mon to all jatis, like x, x*-, x%, x*. Thus, on the groundof endless regression (anavastha), a jati called fatitva, common to all jatis t cannot be recognized. To say that visesatva is a jati common to all the visesas would be fatal to the distinctive feature of self-differentiation (svato-vyavartakatva), which is ascribed ex-hypothcsi to visesas. The hypothesis of antya-visesas (ultimate particularities) is put forward for differentiating eternal substances which could not be otherwise differ entiated. If the antya-visesas were to have a jati vtte safra common to them, they would cease to be self-differ entiating ;for in the case of objects having jatis fit to be treated as differentia, it is a well-established habit of thought to rely upon such generic differentia? for pur poses of differentiation and not upon the things them selves that have to be differentiated. Thus visesatva cannot be treated as a jati, since it would jeopardise the distinctive feature of visesas svato-vydvartakatva and thus involve rupahdni. Negation-ness (abhdvatva) is a feature common to all the varieties of non-existence (abhava) ; but this common feature cannot be regardedas a j&ti, for the reason that there is difficulty in recog nizing the relation of inherence (sa/na: -aya) as a link 36 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART in serving to make abhava the substratum of any attribute or the attribute of any substratum. In cases like this, the jdtibadhaka is called asambandha, the required re lation of inherence being impossible. Samanya and visesa may appropriately be described as the two poles of the pluralistic realism of the Nyaya Vaisesika system. Satta, the highest sdmcnya, to which the NaiySyikas rise with a true philosophic in stinct, is not allowed to exhibit itself in its full glory as the all-comprehending absolute reality. Between the two poles of s&manya and visesa, the pluralistic uni verse of Nyaya is sought to be fitted to a threefold scheme of external relations contact (samyoga), self linking relation (svarupa-sambandha) and inherence (samavdya) a scheme which, with the eternal and intimate relation of samavdya, turns out to be the Pro crustean bed of Nyaya thought. The Nyaya doctrines of sdtnonya, visesa and samavdya exhibit fatal weak nesses. If uniformity of experience should necessitate the assumption of sdmGnya and if the principle of parsimony (Idghava)should lead to a sain anya being taken to be eternal, strict consistencyin thought would necessarily result in one absolute all-comprehending reality in the shape of satta being recognized and thus the Advaitic monist would find it easy to demolish the pluralistic realism of Nyaya. If an tya-viscsas should be taken to be self-discriminating to avoid anavasthd, why should not the self-discriminating capacity, ascribed to them, be attributed to such eternal sub stances as could not be otherwise distinguished and thus save the Nyaya thought from the cumbersome CH. i] PERCEPTION 37 doctrine of visesasl The Nyaya philosopher, whotakes samavaya to be eternal and one and yet seeks to avoid inherence of colour (rnpa-samavoya) being ab surdly jumbled together with the inherence of touch (sparsa-sawiavaya)in air, which is a colourless sub stance, is only swallowing a camel but straining at a gnat, when he refuses to accept the relation of relative identity \tdddtmya=bhedabhedan) in the place of in herence on the ground that bheda and abheda are in compatible. 3 (g) T Non-existence is of four kinds: antecedent non existence, annihilative non-exis tence, absolute non-existence and mutual non-existence. In rendering the term abhava, the two terms non existence and negation are commonly used. Of these two, the former term is nearer to the Sanskrit wordabhava; and the latter term is likely to prove some what misleading, as it primarily refers to negative ex pression rather than to the negative category denoted by such expression. In the previous section, it waspointed out that abhdvatva could not be treated as a jdti. Some Nai>ayikas take abhavatva to be an akhando pddhi, while others describe it as consistingin the negation of sattd (existence) through the relation ofinherence (samavaya) as well as its negation throughco-inherence (ckdrtha-samavdya). Abhava is defined as a thing which neither has samavaya nor is samavaya. 38 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART in Things which are yetto be produced are referred to as non-existent prior to their production. Whenthreads are ready and a cloth awaits production, it is said "Here, a cloth will come into being" (atra pato* lha.'isyati). Such expressions conveying the non existence of a product prior to its creation should be relied upon as evidence of antecedent non-existence (pr&gabhara). According to the Naiyayikas, every producible object (knrya) is invariably preceded by its own antecedent non-existence (pra(jabhInl*'a 9 abides in the intimate or inherent cause of what is destroyed and it is presented in experiences, such as 'the jar is annihilated* and 'the annihilation ofthe jar is produced' ('yhato dhrastah', 'yhatadhvariiso j'atah'). Some Naiyayikas of the Nuddea school, like Raglnnulha Siromani, hold that, though it is clearly necessary to recognizedht'aihsa on the strength of cer tain experiences common to all,it cannot be said that prdyabhdva is supported by any such experience andantecedent negation may well be explained as no morethan complete non-existence (atyantabhdva) viewedparticularly in association with the time preceding the creation of the effect in question. The earlier school of Nyaya, however, argues that, if the prior non-exis tence of a cloth (pata-prdyabhava) were not recognized as a special type of non-existence, having no beginningbut coming to an end at the moment at which the cloth comes into being, the absurd result that the same cloth is produced again and again in an endless series ofsuccessive moments (f>atadhdrtif>atti) would follow; and that, if the prior non-existence of a cloth be re cognized as a special type of non-existence formingone of the factors constitutingthe causal apparatus of the cloth, no such absurd result would follow, oneof the causes of the cloth, vis. its own prayabhava, ceasing to exist at the first moment of the creation of 40 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART m the cloth. 'On this spot there is no jar' (atra Vhutale ghato ndsti) expressionslike this, and experien ces corresponding to, and embodied in them, refer to a certain type of non-existence which is not restricted to the past, present or future but has reference to all time. In this respect, this variety of abhava stands out in sharp contrast to the two varieties, already men tioned prdgabhdva and dhvamsa and is called atyanta bhava, absolute non-existence, its presence being en tirely independent of its counter-correlative (prati yogin) being produced or destroyed. Absolute non existence (atyantdbhdva)is eternal and the pluralistic universe of Nyaya is wide enough to accommodate in numerable such atyantabhdvas. The concept of abhava is complex and involves several factors. In order to encompass completely anabhava in thought, one has to think of it in association with five factors viz.> counter-correlative (pratiyoyin), ^correlated substratum (anuyoyin),the determining ad junct of the former which delimits the scope of counter-correlativeness (pratiyogitavacchedakadharmu], the adjunct delimiting the scope of the substratumness (anuyogitd), and the relation which determines the counter-correlativeness of an object (pratiyoyitd- *uaccHedak(asambandIia*). Taking a specific instance of atyantdbhdva^ such as is embodied in the proposition t ordinarily possible. Several later Naiyayika>reject this view and explain cases like 'yhatahpatati'ciui ntisti', by taking the total non-existence of clothness (patati'tityanttibhdz'a)to be referred to. Advancedstudents of Advaita would be able to see how the theory of 'non-existence delimited by an incompatible adjunct' (vyadhikaranadharniavacchinnapratiyogitaka-OH. i] PERCEPTION 45 bhara) turns out to be a treacherous device whichAdvaitins could conveniently use in proving the un reality of the world. There is much divergence among the different school^ of Indian philosophy in this matter. A stu dent of Nyaya should be able to contrast the Nyayaview of abhtira with the views of the Bhattas andPrabhakaras about abhtira. Like the Naiyayikas the Bhattas also hold that ablidra is a distinct category^ The latter maintain that every reality has a positive side consisting of positive attributes, and a negative side represented by non-existence (abhura). Thus abhdra is an attribute of reality a bhuradhanna or rastudharma. According to the Bhattas, abluiva is cognised by a special instrument of cognition, which is called non-cognition (annpalabdhi) and which consists in the non-cognition of an object when all the condi tions necessary for its cognition are present. In the Bhatta scheme of pram anas (instruments of valid cognition), anupalabdtii is given the sixth place andit is known as the sasthapramdna and it is itself some times called abhdva. The term abhara used in the sense of anupalabdhi, should not be confounded with the abhdva which is the object of this pramdna(prcmcya). The Naiyayikas, on the other hand, con sider that abhdva is known through one or the other, as the case may be, of the pramdnas recognized by them. In fact, of the four pramdnas recognized by them viz.: pratyaksa (perception), anumdna (in ference), upamana (comparison) and sabda (verbal 46 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART m testimony) abhdva may come within the scope of the first, second or the fourth, as the case may be. TheNaiyayikas contend that non-cognition, or strictly speaking, effectual non-cognition (yoyyanupalabdhi), serves as a necessary accessory to pratyaksa, in cogni zing abhdva. In the case of a samsaryubhdva, it can be perceived only when its pratiyoyin happens to be perceptible; while in the case of anyonyabhara, it can be perceived only when its annyoyin is perceptible. Forinstance, one would be able to perceivethe non-ex,is tence of a jar on a certain spot, but not the non-exis tence of air in a place; whereas, one could perceive the difference from ether (akasa-bheda)in a jar. TheNaiyayikas further explain that the effectuality ( yoyyalti) of non-cognition (annpalabdhi) when it helps a pramana in ,.,!", abhdva, consists in there being no cognition when all the conditions required for it are present. The Prabhakaras refute the theories that abhavais a distinct category and that annpalabdhi is a distinct pramana. They contend that the basis of negative pro positions is the mere container (kcvalddhikarana). For instance, in the proposition"Here, on this spot, there is no jar", the only thing which, in fact, is re ferred to is the empty floor (kcvala-bhutala).If abh&va should thus be equated with the empty container (l^cvalddliikarana) t it might easily be argued from the opposite camp that this is an evasive trick of the Pra bhakaras which could be easily seen through and that the concept of the 'emptiness of the container* inevi tably presupposes non-existence. The Prfibhakaras, CH. i] PERCEPTION 47 however, meet this difficulty by explaining that the phrase 'empty container* is only a description of the form of the cognition underlying negative statements and that abhara, strictly speaking, is the cognition of the container, and of nothing ehe, in such circum stances as would necessarily lead to the missing object (pratiyoyin) being cognized, were it present. One ofthe greatest Prabhakaras Salikanatha describes abhara thus in the Prakaranapancika:" Abhdva is the cognition of that (container) alone, when the praiiyogin (the thing denied in negative statements) ought to have been perceived were it present" (drsycpratiyoyini yd tadckavisayd buddhih sd tadabhdvoryafadisyatc). This view shows a clear idealistic leaning. The weak spotin this theory is that it fails to account adequately for the specific reference to ptatiyogin in negative propositions, since it would be fatal to the Prabhakara view to connect the cognitions underlying them with anything other than the container and it has to be necessarily said that emptiness is not presented as an adjunct in such cognitions. In order to avoid needless complications and also endless regression in some cases, abhdvdbhdva is equated by the Naiyayikas with the correspondingbhdva (positive entity), on the ground that a denial of the non-existence of a thing amounts to an affirma tion of the corresponding positive entity. Where oneabhdva is said to be present in another abhava, someNaiyayikas equate the contained abhdva with the other abhdva which represents the ,.-:::,ir!iii,; substratum (adhikarana). It would be useful to note here that 48 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART HI difference from a certain object is reciprocally co-ex tensive with the absolute negation of the differentia of that object. Difference from a jar (yhatabhcda) is mutually co-extensive with the absolute non-existence of jarness ((jhatatvatyantabhava). Abhava is one of the realities recognized by the Naiyayikas. In a sense, it might be said that it is the reality of the greatest moment in the pluralistic universe of Nyaya. Final emancipation (inukti or apat'arya)is the highest aim of spiritual life in Nyaya as well as in other systems of Indian philosophy. In Nyaya, nntkti consists in the annihilation of all evils (dnhkhas), the term dithkha in this context comprising everything connected with voluntary activity and leading directly or indirectly to the cycle of death and birth (prctya bhdva) and including in this manner every form of pleasure (snklia). In the language of Nyaya, innkti is Gtyantikadnh'bliadli'i'aiiisa.It would be a mistake to suppose that the Naiyayikas are pessimists. In fact* no system of Indian philosophy can be said to be pessimistic; for pessimism,in a strict sense, affords nohope or solace, but every system of Indian philosophy aims at the attainment of what it believes to be the highest good and expects its adherents to find comfortin the sumnurtn bonum it offers to them. One can easily see why Naiyayikas attach so much importance to abh&va, having due regard to its close relation to the Nyaya conception of wukti. At this stage,it would be useful to consider the Nyaya conception of sainbandha (relation), with f arti- CH. i] PERCEPTION 49 cular reference to the Nyaya theory of difference (anyonydbhava). The Naiyayikas maintain that rela tion always presupposes difference and that difference invariably involves total exclusion of identity. Accord ing to this view of sambandha, it may be said that relation in the Nyaya system is wholly external, and in no case internal. Bearing this in mind, one cannot easily understand the rationale of the way in which the Nyaya realists bring relations under different categories contact (saniyoga) being brought under quality (guna) tinherence (samavdya) representing a distinct category, and self-relation (srarftpa-sambandha) being reducible to the form of one or the other of the seven categories, as the case may be. The Naiyayikas hole! that not only the simples which unite into complexwholes, but the complex wholes also, exist as indepen dent entities and that neither the simples nor the wholes, when they happen to be the rclata of some relation, lose their independence.In Western philosophical literature those relations are said to be external which bring the relata together without unifying them, and internal relations are said to be rooted in the very nature of things and serve to transform and to unify, though in varying degrees. In Indian philosophy, the relation of difference-cum-identity (tddatmya)is essentially an internal relation^ according to the Samkhya, Bhatta and Advaita systems. In these systems, where difference is not wholly incompatible with identity, where causa tion is not new creation, but transformation to some extent, and where all relations may be said to involve difference and identity in some sense and no relation 4 50 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART m can be recognisedin cases of absolute difference, it can be easily seen that no relation is strictly external andnothing which does not unify,in some sense, can be considered a relation. In the Nyaya-Vaiseika system, difference is uncompromising and amounts to a total negation of tadatmya in the sense of complete identity; it is an external reality and not a mere conceptual product; it is presupposed by every relation, and every relation is thus external. It may be asked whether complete identity (atyantdbhcda=tadatmya) ,which is treated as a sambandha by the Naiyayikas in all cases where a thing is equated with itself, is also an external relation. To this question, a Naiyayika would reply that nothing can be said to be rooted in the nature of a thing, in view of the fact that an attribute (dharnia) is wholly different from a qualified thing (dhannin), a composite whole (avayavin} is totally different fromits component parts (avayava), jati is totally different from vyaki, and that in all cases of relation, the relata, as such are different from each other. Even in cases wherecomplete identity (aikya = tadatmya) is recognized to serve as relation, though the relation amounts to a negation of difference (bhcdabhava), yet there would be no inconsistency in recognizing difference between the relata as such; for, where a jar is conceived of as existing in a jar through the relation of identity, whatis denied is the difference between a jar and itself, as determined by jarness (ghatatva), the difference presupposed by the sambandha, in that case, havingreference to the relata as such i.e. as determined byrelatedness (sambandhitra). The opponents of Nyaya CH.I} PERCEPTION 51 realism point out that the conception of relation, whichis based upon uncompromising difference incompatible with identity, is unsustainable, in as much as the fundamental function of every relation is to unify, in however small a measure it may be, and fot the reason that it would be absurd to speak of anyrelation of proximity or distance between entirely different things such as Madras and Monday or Vara nasi and Friday. A Naiyayika would meet this kind of objection by saying that the fundamental function ofrelation is to bring together and not to unify to glue and not to weld or solder or fuse, and that any twothings can be brought together or glued together through a relation. With an unyielding pertinacity, the Nyayarealism clings to the conception of uncompromisingdifference and seeks to represent that all relations mustbe taken to be external. Nevertheless the philosophical integrity of Nyaya thought pullsin the opposite direc tion and inevitably leads to compromises with the phi losophical systems recognising infernal relations; andsuch compromises are to be found in 'samyoga the most prominent type of external relation which is possible only between independent substances (dravya) being regarded as a quality (guna) which, along with the related elements (samyukta) where it inheres, formspairs of inseparables (ayutasiddha) ; in sawiavftya being regarded as an intimate relation and in the somewha t clumsy efforts made to save its externality by makingit eternal and one and by lettingit survive its relata in several cases; and in the very conception of self-rela* 52 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART ID tion (svarupa-sambandha), more especiallyin the con ception of complete identity (abheda)as a variety of self-relation. These compromises are indeed the weakspots in the walls of the realistic fortress of Nyaya,at which the opponentsof Nyaya, like the Bhattas andAdvaitins, find it easy to effect convenient breaches. 4 T Of them, earth is that which has smell. It is of two kinds eternal and non-eternal. Its eternal variety consists of atoms. Its non-eternal variety consists of its products. Again, it is of three kinds the three varieties being the body (sarira), the sense (indriya) and other objects (visaya). The earthen body is the body that belongs to the beings of our class. The earthen sense is the olfactory sense by which one perceives smell; and that sense finds its abode in the tip of the nose. The earthen objects (vifaya1) are clay, stones and such other things. [[5]] T Water is that which has cold touch. It is of two kinds eternal and non-eternal. The OH. i] PERCEPTION 53 eternal variety consists of atoms.The non-eternal variety consists of its products. Again, it is of three kinds the three varieties being the body,the sense and other objects. The body made of water is found in the world of the Water-God. The sense made of water is the gustatory sense by which one perceives taste; and that sense resides in the tip of the tongue. The ob jects made of water are rivers* ocean and such others. [[6]] T Fire is that which has hot touch. It is of two kinds eternal and non-eternal. Its eternal variety consists of atoms. Its non-eternal variety consists of its products. Again, it is of three kinds the three varieties being the body, the sense, and other objects. The body made of fire is in the world of Sun. The sense made of fire is the visual sense by which one perceives colour; and that sense resides in the foremost part of the dark pupil of the eye. The objects $4 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PAKT m made of fire are of four kindsr the four varieties being the light of the earth, that of the sky, that of the stomach and that of the mine. The common fire which people use and its varieties be long to the earth. Lightning and such other varieties, with water as fuel, belong to the sky. The gastric variety is what digests the food. Gold and such other lustrous metals form the variety which is dug out of a mine. [[7]] T The air is that which has touch but no colour. It is of two kinds eternal and non eternal. Its eternal variety con sists of atoms. Its non-eternal variety consists of its products. Again, it is of three kinds -the three varieties being the body, the sense and other objects. The body made of air is found in the world of the Wind- God. The sense made of air is the tactus by which one perceives touch; and that sense is found all over the body. The object made of air is the air that shakes treesOH. i] PERCEPTION 55 and such other things. The air that moves about within the body is the vital air, which, though one in itself, is called differently as prana, aptina, etc., according as its abodes in the body differ. [[8]] T Ether is that which has sound as its quality. That is one, all-pervasive and eternal. In the texts given above, the first five substances are defined and classified. These definitions, with the required amplification, are faultless, according to the requirements of what a Naiyayika would consider a valid definition. In these five definitions, the relation connecting the respective qualities with the respective substances is inherence (samavaya). In order to makethe first four definitions quite accurate so as to cover cases of earth, water, fire and air in the first momentsof their creation (utpatti-ksana),the device of jatigha titalaksana, already referred to on page 10 supra, i& adopted. In the definition of ether (afodsa), the wordquality (guna) is intended to indicate that sound is the only vifesaguna of this substance. In the Nyayasystem, as in the other systems of Indian philosophy,, the five substances earth, water, fire, air and ether are said to be the five elemental beings (bhuta). TheNaiyayikas define a bhuta as a substance having a special quality which may be perceived by one or the 56 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART m other of the external senses (bahirindriyagrahya visesagunavat) ; and the bhutas are contrasted withwhat are called murtas in Nyaya. There are five mftrta substances earth, water, fire, air and mind(manas). A murta is a moving substance (kriya Jraya). In the case of earth, water, fire and air, twovarieties are spoken of the eternal and the non eternal. The eternal variety in each case is said to be represented by atoms (paramanu).This leads to a consideration of the atomic hypothesis of the Nyaya Vaiseika system. This hypothesisis closely connect ed with the Nyaya- Vaisesika theory of causation andit forms the pivotal part of the Nyaya-Vaisesika cosmo gony. Though it had its origin mainly in the specu lative thought of Nyaya metaphysics, it exercised a profound influence over many a doctrine of the plura listic realism of Nyaya and it is in no sense less worthyof consideration than the corresponding atomism which, till recently, swayed scientific thought in the Westernworld, until it came to be replaced by the theory reduc ing every atom to a miniature solar system consisting of numerous small electrons gyrating round a sun in the centre. The course of speculative reasoning whichled the exponents of the Nyaya-Vaisesika system to formulate the atomic hypothesis should receive dueattention here. All visible substances are compositestructures consisting of component parts joined together and are large, i.e. have the size (parimana) called largeness (mahattva). Largeness (mahattva) and CH. i] PERCEPTION 57 smallness (anutva)are the two main varieties of size recognized by the Naiyayikas and they varybetween two extreme limits, the highest and the lowest. The highest limit of mahattva is called paramamahattva and is ascribed to all-pervasive substances (vibhudravya). The lowest limit ofmahattva .belongs to the smallest visible substance say a mote floating in a sunbeam, one of the conditions of visual preception being association with the size, wahat tva, to the minimum degree at least. The highest limit of smallness (anutva) is the smallest conceivable size (anuta'*tatva==pdrimandalya), which is attributed to atoms (paramdnu). Even the smallest visible subs^ tance is a composite structure consisting of componentparts (savayava}, because it is a visible substance {caksusadravya). We know this from our observation of the nature of visible substances like a jar. Weknow also from our observation of the nature of the component parts of visible substances that such parts produce discrete wholes possessing mahattva ( largeness) and are themselves discrete wholes consisting of distinct parts. In other words, from our observation, we arrive at the generalisation whichever forms a part of a large substance (mahadarambhaka)is itself a discrete whole made up of parts (sdvatyava) . So, even the constituent part of the smallest visible substance -say the smallest mote seen floating in a sunbeam is a discrete whole made up of parts (savayava). Anendless assumption of parts would involve the defect of endless regression (atnavastha}, which is generally regarded in Indian philosophy as a fatal objection to 58 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART m the recognition of causal relation or to explanation. It would, therefore, be necessary that the process of divi sion should stop at some point and the point at which it stops is the last conceivable part (avayava). It wouldbe most reasonable to recognizethat as the last con ceivable part, beyond which no kind of argument con strains us to recognize further parts. Beyond the parts constituting the component elements of the smallest visible motes, there is no necessity to recognise further parts, the reason constraining the recognition of parts in the smallest visible substances being that the latter are visible and, likewise, the recognition of parts in the constituents of the smallest visible substances being that those constituents cause a composite whole whichis large (mahadarambhaka), and there being no such compelling reason in the case of the component parts of such constituents, since those parts are neither visible nor members of a large substance. The whole argu ment is usually stated thus in the form of two syllo gisms in Sanskrit : "falasuryamaricistham yat suksmatammn drsyate tat sSvayflvam, cdksusadraryatvat, ghatavat. Tadara yavo'fi savayavah, mahadarambhakaivat, kapalavai." The smallest visible substance forming the minorterm (paksa) in the first of these two syllogismsis called truti or trasarenu and is regarded as a triad orternary product. Its component part forming the minorterm (paksa) of the second syllogism is called anu or dvyanuka, which is a dyad or binary product. Thesmallest conceivable unitx forming a dyad is called ai OH. i] PERCEPTION 59 atom (parani&nu). The component part of a truti is not visible and does not possess even the minimummahattva (largeness) ; and it is, therefore, said to be a minute part (anu). This minute part forms a member (avayava) of the smallest visible substance called truti which has the minimum mahattva; and it is thus maha d&rambhaka and, for that reason, consists of parts. The parts of each component element in a truti mustbe at least two and need not be more than two and they are therefore taken to be two ; and these two parts are the smallest conceivable units which are taken to be the smallest ultimates not admitting of further sub-division and are called atoms (paramanus). It is now apparentwhy each component element of a truti is called a dyad (dvyanukaa. binary product of atoms). For obvious reasons the component elements of a truti itself cannot be less than two; and they are taken to be three in the Nyaya-Vaisesika system. In other words, a truti or trasarenu is made up of three dyads (dvyanuka). Forthis reason, it is also called tryanuka. The reason whythe number of parts in a truti is fixed at three requires explanation. In our experience, we see that the size (parimana) of the parts gives rise invariably to anincreased size of the same kind in the composite wholeand that this increase is only an increase in degree. Our observation is restricted to substances havingmahattva (largeness). This observation leads to the generalisation that, if a size should serve as the non intimate cause (asamavayiktirana)of another size, both of them, the size that causes and the size that is caused, belong to the same variety of size, and the size 60 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART m that is caused represents a higher type of the samevariety, as compared with the size that causes. (Fari mftnanam svasajatiyasvotk'rstaparimanarambha'katva niyamah). A strict application of this rule to anutva would make it clear that, if the anutva (smallness) of atoms (paramanu) or dyads (dvyanuka) were to be taken as the non-intimate cause (asamavdyikdrana) of dyads or triads (tryanuka),the size of the dyads and triads should represent a higher degree of smallness (anutaratva) . This is an obviously absurd result, for the reason that tryanuka must necessarily have the minimum mahattva at least, since it is the smallest visible substance. So, from the scope of the rule set forth above, the sizes of dyads and triads should be taken away; and this is done by assuming that,in the case of dyads and triads, the size of the compositeproduct (avayavin)is caused, not by the size of the component parts but by their number (samkhyd). in such circumstances, unless the number of the componentparts of a dyad differs from that of the componentparts of a triad, the difference between a triad and a dyad in respect of size cannot be accounted for. Thesize of a triad is mahattva; the size of a dyad is anutva ; the number that causes mahattva must be larger than tivo, which is the number causing the anutvaof the dyads. The simplest thing to do here is to assume the next higher integer three as the numberof the component parts of a triad. Those who closely follow the Nyaya-Vaisesika tradition hold that, in the atomic theory, there is clear justification for some res tuction regarding the nature and number of the com. CH.I] PERCEPTION 61 ponent parts in the case of dyads and triads and there is no necessity for recognising any such restriction in the case of composite products (avayavins) beyond the stage of triads. It is maintained that the parts of atriad (tryanuka) are composite structures (savayava), and they cannot be less than three and need not be more than three and therefore must be three in num ber. The constituent elements of the composite pro ducts beyond the stage of triads may be four dyads orfive dyads and so on, or four triads or five triads andso on, according to the varying circumstances in eachcase. It should also be borne in mind that atoms anddyads are never presented in normal perception andthat they are capable of combining with each other. In the atomic theory of the Nyaya-Vaisesika system, it is assumed that the fiat of the omnipotent God, in conjunction with the inevitable vestiges of the worksdone by embodied souls (/*^0/&), causes concretise activities of various kinds in various atoms; and as aresult of such activities, they come into contact with each other and composite products in the shape ofdyads, triads, and so on, arise. Thus creation(srsti) takes place. The Nyaya theory of dissolution involves what would appear to be an unnatural assumption. Disintegration or dissolution (pralaya) begins not from the top, but from the root not in the whole, but in the parts. The fiat of the omnipotent God, again, in the absence of any demand for creation on behalf ofjivas, causes descretive activities of various kinds in atoms, with the result that the contacts (samypgah) 62 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART in by which two atoms are held togetherin dyads are destroyed and all the composite products, beginningfrom dyads, crumble to pieces. The opponentsof the atomic hypothesis of the Nyaya-Vaisesika system draw pointed attention to its weak points. In the first place,it is difficult to deter mine which is the smallest visible substatice. Themotes in the sunbeam are not all of a uniform size. What happens to be the smallest visible substance to the naked eye would not be such to the visual sense aided by a powerful microscope. Even tj the nakedeye, the smallest visible substance would not be the same, as visual power varies in different individuals. In cases where the size of a composite product is the effect of the size of its component parts, each compo nent part is a composite product. Where, however, the size of the composite product is regardedas result ing from the number of its component parts, one mayvery well stop with the members of the smallest visible substance and take these members to be two in number.The arguments of anavastha and layhani,if pushed a bit further, would knock off dyadsand atoms andwould lead to the smallest visible substances themselves being regarded as the indivisible ultimates of composite matter. Further, how can atoms come together? How can contact (samyoga)arise between two atoms?In our experience, contact (sawyoga)is possible ordi narily between two composite substances (s&i'ayava) or, in some cases, between one compositesubstance andanother all-pervasive substance (vibhudravya). Con* CH. i] PERCEPTION 63 tact is by its very nature spatially non-pervasive (avyapyavrtti) ;if it is presentin one part of a thing it is missing in another part of the same thing; and it can never be said to completely pervade its relata. Such being the case, it is hardly conceivable how an indivisible atom can come into contact with another atom. These are the more important defects in the atomic theory and pointed out by anti-creationistic philosophers like the Advaitins, the Samkhyas and the Mlmamsakas. A disingenuous attempt is made by some writer to ascribe the origin of the atomic theory of Kanada and Gautama to Hellenic influence. Luckily and justly, that attempt has failed. In the first place, it has to be remembered that, though KanaJa might have been the earliest complete and systematic exponent of the atomic theory, he cannot be said to be its discoverer and it might have been one of the floating theories of the pre-Kanada period of Indian thought. Further a com parison of Kanada's atomic theory with Greek atomismwould show that the divergences between them are more numerous and striking than similarities. In fact, the only noteworthy similarity between the Indian andGreek theories is that both consider atoms impercepti ble. On the contrary, the Greek conception of atomsrecognizes quantitative differences in them and totally dissociates them from qualities; while, in the Nyaya Vaisesika system, atoms are of uniform size, their size representing the extreme limit of minuteness called parimandalya or paramanuparimana, and they have 64 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART ni qualities, which are non-eternal in the case of colour, taste, smell and touch in the atoms of earth, and eternal in other cases. Another important difference is that the integration of atoms according to the Nyaya theory is the result of the deliberate design of the omnipotent and omniscient God ; while atoms in the Greek theory are wholly subject to chance drifts and ,v..:i::o '..'\*>\\ of various types. Professor Keith and those who agreewith him are at liberty to think that these divergences, however fundamental they may be, need not be taken to shut out all possibility of Greek influence, it must, however, be remembered that any suspicion of Greekinfluence has to rest almost entirely on the slender basis of temporal proximity or synchronism and that even this flimsy ground is shattered by the evidences in the early philosophical literature of India in favour of the view that atomic theory might have gained currency in India, in some form, perhaps long before the age of Kanada and Gautama. The first three of the five elements (bhiita) earth, water and fire are defined through their characteristic qualities; and the fourth element, air, is defined through the quality of touch in association with the negative adjunct of colourlessness (rfipabhdva). The eternal varieties are represented by the atoms whose nature is described above. In the textual sec tions relating to earth, water, fire and air, the threefold classification, which follows the twofold classification into eternal and non-eternal, divides each of these substances again into body (sarira), sense-organ (indriya) and object (visaya). Sanra (body),inCH.I] PERCEPTION 65 Nyaya, is the field within whose bounds, the soul (atman) has its experiences (bhogdyatanam) ; or it is antydvayavl or a composite whole which never formsthe component part of another composite whole and it serves as the seat of voluntary activity. In the Nyaya Vaisesika system,a body is constituted wholly by earthy water, fire or air; and it is not made up of five elements (pdncabhtiutika) as admitted in the Sdmkhya andVcdanta systems. A body made of earth, for instance, is constituted entirely by earth which forms its material cause (samavayikarana),the remaining elements form*ing merely supportive (upastambhaka), not constitutive (samavtiyi), factors. This is the case also in the bodies made of water, fire and air. The belief that these three varieties of bodies (jalryasarira, taijascu sarira, vdyt avlyasarlra) are ultramundane existences and are found in the worlds of Varuna, Aditya andVdyu is based on Puranic cosmology and does not require any discussion here. A sense-organ (indriya) is defined in Nya>a as the seat of such contact with manas as causes a cognition, there being in it no special quality which shows (udbhutavifrsaguna), except sound (sabda). The Sanskrit definition of a sense organ runs thus : "Sabdctarodbhutavisesagunana srayatve sati jnanakdranamanassamyogasrayatvamindnyatvam." It may be noted here that perceptible qualities like colour, touch, etc., may be present in asubstance either in a condition in which it shows(udbhtitd't'dstha) or in a sub-perceptional condition in which it does not show (anitdb hut avast hd). Colourin the former condition, for instance, is visible and 66 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART m actually visualised when all the circumstances necessary for visual perception are present and it is present in all visible substances; while, colour in a sub-percep tional condition (anudbhutavastha) though not in herently invisible, is never actually visualised. The term visaya in the threefold classification of earth, water, fire and air turns out to be somewhat misleading in the case of some people. Professor Keith, for instance, takes this term to mean 'an object of sense-perception* and accuses Annambhatta of inadvertence for having brought atoms under visaya. It will be seen that there is no inadvertence on the part of Annambhatta thoughsome of his readers may lose sight of certain matters in their bumptious presumption. The term visaya here means object of cognition (jndnavisaya) ; and in the classification of earth, etc,, what is referred to is 'a variety of earth which is neither body (sarlra) norsense-organ (indriya)'. In other words though Sarlra and indriya are also visaya in the sense of object,it is obvious that, in the classification referred to in the text, they are not intended to be denoted by the termvisaya. Intelligent students of philosophy would not find it difficult to appreciate the ontological and episte m )l<)^ica1 significance of this threefold classification. The knowing souls (jivdh) form the fulcra of the pluralistic universe of the Nyaya realist, in whosephilosophical setting all the things would fall mostnaturally into three groups the cognitional groupcomprising various forms of cognition, their instru ments and their field (bhogayalana),the group ofknowing souls, and the objective group comprising CH. i] PERCEPTION 67 cognised objects. The Nyaya realist would thus like to fancy the universe as a bunch of three distinct flowers fastened together by some kind of external relation; while monistic philosophers would feel sorry that the pluralism of Nyaya mistakes an integral three-petalled -flower for a motley cluster. In the textual section dealing with fire (iejas), gold and such other valuable metals are said to comeunder the mine-born (d&araya) variety of fire. Through speculative reasoning, the Naiyayikas seek to maintain that gold is light. The yellow metal that we see and handle has some weight. Yellow colour belongs to earth and weightiness to earth and water. So, the metal which has these two properties yellow colour and weightiness, should be taken to be a variety of earth. However, the yellow and weighty substance that we see and handle and commonly regard as gold cannot all be earth; for, however much you may heat it, it does not completely lose its fluidity (dravatva), and any variety of earth, which preserves its fluidity under heat, does so only when it is associated with a substance which is not earth and has fluidity and is capable of counteracting the effect of heat on fluidity. This may be seen in certain varieties of earth, like ghee, placed in water. Thus the yellow substance referred to, though it is itself a variety of earth, should betaken to preserve its fluidity for the reason that it is associated with some other substance which is not earth and has fluidity and counteracts the destruction of fluidity by heat. The latter substance which coun teracts and which has occasional fluidity (na\mitt\klia.*\;ikiira observes under 11 1 41, "Nadhvavyahgyah kalah, kim tarhi kriydvyangyah". A kriyd, as understood by Vatsyayana in this context, is not a single activity but 74 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART in a series of activities. The conception of a kriya or!karma9 even in its strict sense, is inseparably bound upwith the conception of duration, every kriya lasting for four ksanas (moments)as already explainedin page 16, part in, supra. In this connection, it should be remembered that though there can be no contact between two all-pervasive substances (vibhudravya),there is contact between one such substance andanother substance limited in size;for contact presup poses movement, and in the case of a substance limited in size, movement is possible, though it is not possible in the case of an all-pervasive substance. [[11]] T The substratum in which cognition inheres is the soul (dltnan).It is of two kinds the supreme Soul and the individual soul. Of these tv\o, tlie supreme Soul is one and is the omniscient Lord. The individual soul, on the other hand, is different in association with different organisms or bodies, though it is all-pervasive and eternal. [[12]] T Mind (manas) is the sense by means of which plea sure and such other (perceptible qualities of the soul)are direct-CH.I] PERCEPTION 75 ly apprehended. There are innumerable minds (manamsi),. since they are specifically linked up with each soul and they are atomic and eternal. Atvicui (soul)is the substratum in which know ledge inheres. This definition is quite adequate to indicate that the soul is a substance ( arises; then follows the determinate perception of dvitva; then the two substances having dvitva are cognized; and lastly such a cognition produces the corresponding impres sion (saniskara) in the soul/' While ckatva is com pletely contained in a single container (pratyeka paryapta), dvitva and the higher numbers are partially contained (vyasajyarrtti)in each of the containers and completely contained only in groups of two andso on. The NySya conception of number more especially of two and the higher numbers as qualities inhering in substance may be described by the opponents of the Nyaya-Vaisesika realism and pluralism,as well as by the exponents of the modern school of Nyaya (navya ny&ya), as specimens of the warty overgrowths dis figuring the complexion of Nyaya realism. But shrewdcritics who can probe into the heart of Nyaya may be able to find in it an effective check to monistic thought which seeks to efface completely all the numbers andtheir metaphysical implications holding together the component parts of the social fabric. 94 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART m [[19]] T Size is the special cause of expressions pertainingto measurement. It is found in all the nine substances. It is of four kinds atomic, large, long and short. [[20]] T Separateness is the special cause of expressions such as 'this is separate from that'. It is found in all the substances. [[21]] T Contact is the special cause of expressions such as 'these are in contact with each other/ It is found in all the substances. [[22]] T Disjunction is the quality which destroys contact. It is found in all the substances. [[23]] T Remoteness and proxi mity are the special causes of expressions such as 'this is remote/ 'this is near'. They are found in the four substancesCH. i] PERCEPTION 95 beginning with earth and in Dianas. They are of two kinds, those that are due to time and those due to space. In a remote substance, spatial remoteness is found ; and in a substance lying near, spatial proximity is found. In an older person, temporal remoteness is found; and in a younger person, temporal proxi mity is found. It will be seen that sections 18 to 21 and section 23in the text define number, size, contact, remoteness andproximity as special causes of the respective expressions which refer to them. The term vyavahdra is used in the text and is usually understood in the sense of'expression in words' or 'putting into words' (sabda prayoga). One cannot say 'this is one' (ayamckah)or 'this is large' (ayam mahdn), unless the thing referred to has the attribute connoted by the words'one' (cka) or large (niahat). By elimination, the attribute ekatva or mahattvatzn be shown to be distinct qualities. In the case of the expressions referred to* our experience enables us to establish the relation of causality between them and the qualities connoted bythe expressions used. God, time, space and adrsta (the unseen impressions resulting from good or baddeeds) are believed by the Naiyayikas to be commoncauses of all products; and to exclude these commoncauses (sadharanakarana) ,the phrase asadharana- 96 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART in karana (special causes) is used in the definitions ofnumber, size, contact etc. All these definitions are based on the supposition that the expressions referred to are all correct and should be taken in their popularsense. In the Nyaya-Vaisesika system,the size of the atoms called tyQrimawdalya and the size of all-perva sive substances (vibhu") called paramawahativa are eternal. The cause which produces a size is the corres ponding size of the component parts, as in the case of all the degrees of mahattva above that of a triad andbelow that of an all-pervasive substance; or it is the number (sanikhya)of the component parts, as in the case of the sizes of a triad and a dyad; or it is loose contact (pracaya)of the component parts as in the case of a ball of cotton. The two sizes denoted by the words 'long* and *short' (dirghatva and hrasvatva) may well be brought under mahattva and anutva andneed not be recognised to be distinct varieties of size. The distinct position which separateness (prthak tva) occupies in the list of qualities recognised by the Vaisesikas is dependent chiefly upon the view that the experience embodied in the proposition 'A jar stands out separate from a cloth' (ghatah patat prthak)should be distinguished from the experience embodied in the proposition 'A jar is not a cloth' (ghatah pato na) and that the former should be interpreted as an affirmative proposition referring to the positive entity called prthaktva and the latter as a negative proposition refer ring to the negative category of reciprocal non-existence called anyonyabhava. Though the older Naiyayikas CH. i] PERCEPTION 97 support this view, some of the Naiyayikas like Raghu natha Siromani shrewdly see that this way of differ entiating prthaktva from anyonyabhava would only amount to the recognition of some useless distinction without any real difference and they discard prthaktvaalong with similar useless qualities like remoteness anddistance, which are merely temporal and spatial rela tions involving a larger or smaller number of interven ing contacts (Vide part III p. 14). It would be useful to refer again, in this connec tion, to the remarks at pages 51 and 52 of part III, about the Nyaya conception of contact (samyoga) as aquality and as an external relation possible only between two substances. The N)5,ya theorists wouldnot recognize contact between two all-pervasive sub stances. Contact may arise from activity (kriya) orfrom another contact. The latter variety is to befound in the contact which arises between one's bodytaken as a whole and a book, when the book is held in one's hand; and this variety of s\ii'ii\'oya called samyo gaja-samyoga is an inevitable result of the N}aya viewthat a composite whole (avayavin) is totally different from its component parts. The contact which arises whenone hits with force is called abhiyhata (striking) and it causes sound or some activity resulting in disjunction between the things joined by such contact; and a con tact which does not cause sound or does not cause someactivity of the kind described is called nodana (push ing). In the N>aya system, contact is a typical instance of a non-pervasive object (avyapyavrtti). Certain* 98 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART in things are spatially non-pervasive (daisikavyfipyavrtti) ; for instance, contact with a monkey (kapisamftoga)is spatially non-pervasive in the sense that it may be said to be present and not present in the same tree at the same time, with reference to its top and foot. In a similar way, all the producible things (jdwyapaddrtha) are temporally non-pervasive in the sense that they maybe said to be present and not presentin undivided time (Wahakala) ,with reference to the periods preceding and following their production. Advanced students of Advaita may realise that the conception of avydpya vrttitva developed by the Naiyfiyikas is, indeed, used bythem as their life-belt when they have to save their realism from being drowned in the Advaitic deluge in which everythingother than the absolute Brahmansinks down to the level of mithyd (unreal) and turns out to be relativelyreal in the sense that it co-exists with its own non-existence. The Vaisesika theorists argue that disjunction (vibhtiga) should not be equated with the negation ofcontact in any form; and the older Naiyfiyikas support them. Disjunction cannot be the antecedent negation of contact (samyoga'prdgabhdra) ; for, in cases wherewe have the experience 'these are disunited' (imauvibhaktau}, we do not have the experience 'these will come into contact with each other' (imait samynktaul)havisyo>ia\i). Disjunction cannot be the total negation of contact (samyogdiyantdbhdva) ; for, in that case, one should have the experience 'these two qualities are disunited' (imau gunau vibhaktau), but one never has CH.I] PERCMPTION 99 such experience of vibhaga in the case of qualities. In every case of disjunction, one invariablyrealizes that contact is destroyed; but disjunction itself cannot be identified with loss of contact (samyoganasa}, for the reason that contact is also lost when one of the substan ces in contact with each other happens to be destroy ed and that, in such cases, one does not speak of dis junction (vibhaga}. Loss of contact between twosubstances which continue to exist has to be accounted for. It cannot be the direct result of discretive move ment (kriyd). For, in a case where a particular finger, as a result of its activity, comes into contact with a tree and the hand likewise comes into contact with the sametree as a result of its movement, the linger may be moved away from the tree and thus lose its contact with the tiee; in that case, one speaks of the hand also losing contact with the same tree; the movement of tiie finger may cause the loss of contact between the finger and the tree; and this movement does not belong to the hand and cannot, theiefore, have anything to do with the loss of contact between the hand and the tree. In such instances, the loss of ? a;;, \otja should be attributed to a cause other than movement (karma) and this cause is called vibhaga or disjunction. By a process of elimination, disjunction is brought under the category called guna. This argument set forth by the Vaisesikas to maintain that vibhaga is a distinct quality involves many an assumption which canLot be satisfactorily sustained. The later Naiyayikas realize the weakpoints in this argument and bring vibhaga under loss ofcontact (sathyoganasa). 100 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PARTII? The qualities mentioned above, viz. number,size, separateness, contact, disjunction, remotenessand proximity, and fluidity and viscidity are capable, of being perceived by two of the external senses the sight and the touch. Sections 25 and 26 in the following text deal with fluidity and viscidity. 24 T Weight is the non-inti mate cause of the first downward motion (of a falling substance) It is found in earth and water. [[25]] T Fluidity is the non-inti mate cause of the first flow (of a fluid substance).It is found in earth, water and light.It is of two kinds natuial fluidity and artificial fluidity. Natural fluidityis found in water. Arti ficial fluidityis found in earth and light. In certain varieties of earth like ghee, etc., fluidity of the artificial variety is brought about through contact with fire; and it is also found in gold and such other varieties of light. [[26]] T Viscidity is the quality which causes the lumping up of H. i] PERCEPTION 101 powder etc., i.e. the particles of powder, etc., to adhere to each other. It belongs only to water. The above definitions of gurutva, dravatva andsneha have hardly any scientific value and they are based wholly on speculation resting upon certain popular notions. 'It should be noted that gurutva (weight)* according to Nyaya theorists, is beyond the range of sense-perception (atindriya). The Naiyayikas main tain that, though oil and such other substances appear to have viscidity (sneha), it really belongs to water which forms part of those substances. [[27]] T Sound is a quality which is perceived by the ear. It belongs only to the ether. It is of two kinds viz., noise and alphabetic sound. Noise is found in a drum and alphabetic sounds form languages like Sanskrit. The Nyaya-Vaisesika theorists aya theory of sabdaja sabda or series of successive and exactly similar soundsarising in a continuous chain, beginning with the first sound caused in the portion of ether delimited by the substance that is struck, such as a drum, and ending with the last sound that is caused in the portion of ether representingthe sense of hearing and is actually heard. The Naiyayikas explain the way in which a sound-series is producedin auditory perception, bymeans of two illustrations vis., the illustration of 'little wave and big wave* (vlcitaranganyuya) and the illustration of kadamba buds. These two illustrations suggest two ways of i \;>1, lining how a sound comes to be heard on all sides and in all the ten directions, in cluding the intermediate points and up and down. Alittle circular wave springs up; around it a bigger wavearises; around it a still bigger wave and so on; in this way, a circular wave of sound is caused, around it a bigger sound-wave and so on, until at last a certain sound-wave is produced in such a way that it reaches the senses of hearing which may be fit and ready to hear in all the ten directions. In this explanation, there is only one series consisting of several circular sound waves, each coming into relation with all the ten direc tions. One kadamba filament which first shoots up, causes several kadamba filaments to shoot up simul taneously in all the parts of a kadamba flower; in the CH. i] PERCEPTION 103 same way, the first sound, produced at some point, causes ten sounds to spring up simultaneously in all the ten directions; and they cause ten other sounds to spring up in all the ten directions and so on; and thus the sound in question comes to he heard on all sides. In this explanation, the series of sabdaja-Sabdas consists of several groups of sounds, each group being taken to be a ten. In the illustration of kadamba bud, it should be remembered that each bud-like filament of a kadambQflower is described as a bud in the phrases kadamba mukulanydya and Jtadambakorakanyaya. The expla nation suggested by the second illustration is consider ed unsatisfactory and cumbrous. The Bhattas and Prabhakaras hold that alphabetic or articulate sounds (varnatmakasabda) are eternal. The former maintain that varna is an all-pervasive eternal substance (nityam vibhu dravyam} ; while the latter hold that varna is an eternal quality (n'ityaguna}. The Mimariisakas seek to support their view that varnais eternal by referring to the recognition which we are conscious of in the case of the same varna and whichtakes a form like this: 'This sound g which I nowhear is the same as that g which I heard several times before' (So'yam gakarah). One can easilysee the reason why the Mimarnsakas are particularly solicitous to maintain the theory of the eternity of varnas if oneremembers that the Mimamsa theory of the eternity of the Vedas rests upon 'the eternity of varnas. TheVaiyakaranas hold that the transcendental substratum of varnas called sphota is real and permanent and that .104 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART in varnas themselves are not permanent. The Nyaya Vaisesika system maintains that every varna is causedand the Vedas themselves were produced by God, the recognition of the same varna like 'This g is that* (So'yam gakdrah) being interpreted as referring to the permanent jati called gatva and not to the same#-sound (ga-vyakti). [[28]] T (a)BuddJii and Jndna are the same thing, and stand for cognition which is the cause of all verbal expressions. It is of two kinds recollection and ex perience. (fc) Recollection is the cogni tion which is caused only by reminiscent impression. (c) All cognitions other than recollection come under ex perience. There are two kinds of experiences,real and erro neous. (d) The experience which cognizes an attribute as belong ing to a thing which really has it, is real; and this is known as pTania (valid knowledge). (<>;:, i ihing, it would no longer be possible to recall it again to memory; for, every recollection would, in its turn, cause a reminiscent impression. Thus, according to the older Nyaya theory, every recollection, even whenit relates to the same object,is caused by a different set of reminiscent impressions. Later Naiyyikas and 112 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART m Advaitins, on the other hand, hold that the recollections of the same object are all produced by the same set of reminiscent impressions, which merely acquire enhancedintensity through every recollection. Cognitions whichadmit of being reproduced in memory through reminis cent impressions are classified under three heads by the Vaisesikas and Naiyayikas of the older school: patupratyaya, abhyCisapratyaya and adarapraiyaya. The normal type of cognition which involves the mini mum degree of attention sufficient to ensure reprodu cation in memory is called 'vivid cognition' (patupra tyaya}. By repeatedly revolving a certain idea in one's mind, one comes to have what may be called 'repeti tional cognition' (abhyasapratyaya}. When one's mindgets riveted to a wonderful or extraordinary object, the cognition that arises is known as 'regardful cogni tion' (adarapratyaya}.All the cognitions other than recollection (stnrti) are technically known as anubhava*This technical use of the term unubhava is common in sfistraic literature and it has to be rendered by the English equivalent 'experience'. In its technical sense, as used in Nyaya-Vaisesika literature, it may denote any kind of experience direct or indirect, perceptual (pratyaksika), or inferential (anuw&nika), or verbal (s&bda). In some places, the word anubhava is somewhat loosely used in the sense of direct experience or direct realization. Students of Nyaya should take care to avoid confusion between these two uses of word anubhava. Anubhava is divided in Nyaya literature into real (yathartha) and unreal (ayathartha). The first variety CH.I] PERCEPTION US is also called pram& and the second variety is also called bhrama. The etymology of the term pramd drawsattention to the fact that the experience denoted by that term is sound or valid, as the prefix pro, indicates. Theetymology of the term bhrama draws attention to the fact that the thinker's mind goes astray in every case of erroneous experience. The term yathartha meansexactly corresponding to the object; and the definition of valid experience, that it cognises an attribute as belonging to an object which really has it, is directly based on the meaning of the term yathdrtha; andlikewise, the definition of erroneous experience, that it cognizes an attribute as belonging to an object which,, in fact, does not have it, is based on the meaning of the term ayathartha. To cognize a piece of silver lying before one as a piece of silver (purovartini rajate 'idam rajatam9iti pratltih)is valid experience; and to cognize a shell, or mother of pearl, or nacre as it is called, as a piece of silver (hiktau 'idam rajatam9iti prat) tih) is erroneous experience. In order to understand correctly the definitions ofvalid and erroneous experiences, as given in the text, it is necessary to acquire some knowledge of the termi nology by which the Naiyayikas indicate the content of a cognition, with a measure of quantitative precision which is nor ordinarily achieved through English ex pression. Every determinate experience involves anobjective complex as representing its objective con tent. The objective content of cognition is called visaya (objective) ; the cognitionitself is known asvisayvi (subject) ; and the relation between a cognition 8 114 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART m and its object is known as visayavisayibhdva (subject object-relation). In the Nya>a-Vaisesika system, this is conceived of as an external relation between twodistinct relata which are two realities connected with each other for the time being. The problem of the relation between the subject (visayin=jndna) andobject (visaya) is solved by the Naiyayikas in this way. Objects like a jar or a piece of cloth exist out side the sphere of cognition (jiiana)as realities inde pendent of cognition. Through visayata (objectness), which is a kind of self-linking relation (svarupasam bandha) and is merely a phase of the object cognized, an object comes into relation with cognition, which hasthe correlated counterpart of visayaid known as visayitd (subjectness). Visayitd is also a kind of self-linking relation and is merely a phase of the visayin which cognizes. The Nauayikas hold that, while several realities n ay exi.st independently of cog nition, the latter never exists independently of, and as dissociated from, the objects that arc cu:;ni/id ; and this is regarded by the N)fi\a theorists "s a state of things fatal to idealism. They forget, however, that their realism ultimately rests upon experience and what is relied upon as the only guarantee of the objective rea lity of the external world is the content or form whichis involved in experience, and which idealism or sub jectivism can easily merge in cognition. The Nyava relation of visayavisayibhava involves two correlated parts known as visayaid (objectness) and visayitd (subjectness) and the correlation of these two parts is denoted by the word nirupita. TheCH.I] PERCEPTION 113 objective content of a ^ determinate cognition or judg ment is constituled by three parts, vis., the principal or leading concept called viscsya (substantive), one or more subordinate concepts called visesana or prak&ra (adjunct), and a relation (samsarga^ connecting the visesana and visesya. These three parts form the complex object (z'isaya) of a judgment; the aspect of visayatd which belongs to the viscsyais called viscsyatd (substantiveness) ; that which belongs to the visesanais called viscsanatd (adjunctness) ; and that whichbelongs to samsarya is called .^(uii^arijatC: (relation ness). In ihe judgment 'the cloth is red* (raklah patah), cloth i-> the visesya, red col ur is presented as the visesana, and the relation between the redness andcloth is inherence (samavtiya) and that is presented as the samsarya. The visayatd which belongs to these three things is presentedin three forms, viz., viscsyata, visesanatd or prakarata and samsaryatd. These three aspects of visayatd are correlated to each other and to the visayita (subjectness) which belongs to the cogni tion in which they are presented. The correlation of these factois is expressed in Sanskrit by the symbolic terms nirupaka and ninlpya. The boundary of each of the objective factors is exactly defined bya reference to the delimiting feature which is also presented in the cognition under consideration. In the example referred to, cloth is presented as visesya, not under the aspect of dravyatva (substanceness), but amder the specific aspect of patatva (clothness) ; red colour is presented as vUesana or prakdra, not under the aspect of gunytva.{qqalityness), but Under the specific jaspect of raktatva 116 A PKIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART m (red-colourness) ; and samavayo (inherence)is pre sented as samsarga, not under the aspect of samban dhotva (relationness), but under the specific aspect of samavayatva (inherenceness). The required specifi cations in these cases are made by referring to patatva, raktatvanml samavayatva as the delimiting adjuncts (avacchedaka) respectively of the viscsyata in the cloth, the prakaratain the red-colour and the samsar gatd in inherence. Thus by a clever use of the terms avacchedaka (delimiting), ayacchedya or avacchinna(delimited), and nirupaka or nirupila (correlating or correlated), in the instance taken for illustration,. viz., the judgment 'raktah patah' (the cloth is red), the objective content may be described in the following way, with a considerable measure of quantitative pre cision : "It is a ((/Bullion whose visayita (subject ness) is correlated to the viscsyata (substantiveness) delimited by clothness (patatva), the viscsyata in its turn being correlated to the prakarata (adjunctness) delimited by red-colourness (rakta-rapatva), and the sariisargata (relationness)correlated to the said praka rata and viscsyat& being delimited by inherenceness (samavayatva). The Sanskrit expression whichexactly describes the objective content of the judgment, the cloth is red* (raktah patah), may be set forth thus :"raktatvdvacchinnaprakaratanirupita patatva vacchinnaviSesyataniriipita samavayatvavacchinna samsargatanifupita visayitat&li jndtiam". In this waythe disposition of the component factors of the objec tive content of a cognition is exactly indicated bymeans of the symbolic words avacchedaka and CH. i] PERCEPTION 117 The definitions of ffama and bhrama, as givenin the text, are somewhat defective, since they do not indicate correctly the correlation between the visesyatd andprakdratd. In the definition of pramd, for instance, as given in the text, the substantive having a certain attribute is referred to as viscsya and the particular attribute as prakdra. This amounts to saying that in Pramd, if silverness is presented as prakdra, silver having silverness (rajatatva) in it is also presentedas vtiesya. Though, for all practical purpose?,this looks like a correct definition of pramd, it would break clown when considered in the light of certain group-cogni tions (samiihdlambana), in winch two or more sub stantival factors (visesya)are presented as co-ordinate objects associated witli certain adjuncts. Nacre and silver (sukti and rajata) may both be presentin a cer tain place; a gioup-cognition, which at once mistakes nacre f >r silver and silver for nacre, may arise; it is a sajnuhdlambanabhraina which takes the form. ''These are silver and nacre" (ime rajatasitkti) ; the definition of pramd as given in the text would be applicableto this case of bhrama for the reason that silverness (rajatatva) and nacreness (suktitva) are presented as attributes (prakdra) and the two things, nacre and silver, which really have the two attributes mentioned, are presented as leading concepts (visesya). There is nothing in the definition of pramd, as given in the text, which would exclude such cases of samuhalambana bhrama. To exclude such cases, it is necessary to point out that the adjunctness (prakdratd) of the attribute presented in a valid cognition is correlated with the 118 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART in substantiveness (visesyata) of the thing really having that attribute. In the erroneous group-cognition (sannl halambana) above referred to, the substantiveness of nacre is not rightly correlated with the adjunctness of nacreness but wrongly correlated with the adjunctness of silverness; and similarly the adjunctness of nacreness and the substantiveness of silverness are wrongly correlated with each other. A correct des cription of this erroneous group-cognitionin accord ance with the technical terminology of the Nai^ayikas would facilitate a correct appreciation of these remarks. This samuhalambana may be described thus in Sanskrit: "rajatatvanistha-prakaratdnirupita- sukiinistha- vi sesyata ckd, suktitvanistha-prakarataniriipita-rajatonis thaviscsyatd apara, etddrsavisesy itadva\anirupita-visa yitasdli 'ime suktirajate' iti saniuh&lanibanam." Thus it will be seen that the correct and complete definition of prama or valid cognition is that it is a cognition in which the thingthat is presentedas sub stantive (v sesya) has the attribute which is presented as adjunct (prakara) and the substantiveness (vife syatd) of the former is presented as correlated with the adjunctness (prakdratd)of the latter. For a similar reason, the definition of bhrama, as givenin the text, should be amplified with a view to securing greater precision. A bhrama is an erroneous cognition in which the thing that is presented as substantive (visesya) does not have the attribute presented as adjunct (Prak&ra), though the substantiveness (visesyata) of the former is presented as correlated CH.I] PERCEPTION 119 with the adjunctness (praktiratd) of the latter. Thisdefinition would he applicableto cases of erroneouscognition like 'this is silver* (idam rajatam), wherenacre is mistaken for silver; and it also excludes cases of valid group-cognition (sawuhalambanaprama) like 'these are silver and nacre* (imc rajatasuktl), whereboth silver and nacre are seen as such and not con founded with each other. In this connection, it is desirahle to say a fewwords ahout the way in which the Nyaya theorist solves the problem of knowledge and the connected questions of truth and error. The realism of Nyaya,which recognizes complete difference (bheda) betweenthe object (visaya) and subject (visayin) or betweenthe known object (jncya} and the cognizing knowledge(jnana) lias inevitably to face UK* piobiemof truth anderror and to suggest some solution which may be con sistent with the Nyaya theory. If the jneya should bewholly different f rom jnuna, lu w is the gulf betweenthese two real factors to be bridged over, seeing that they are fundamentally different? How is knowledgepossible at all? Knowledge is a real factor and its object is also a real factor existing independently of knowledge. To a Naiyayika,esse can never be pcrcipi. If it is the nature of knowledge, as the Naiyayikacon tends, to come into relation with a real object existing outside knowledge, what is it that bridges overthe gulf between these two factors? The Nyayatheorist who recognizes a scheme of external relations finds it easy to point out that through the self-linking 120 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART m relation (svarupasambandha) of subject and object (visayavisayibhava} 9 the cogipzid reality (jfieya) andthe cognizing reality (jfiawa) cnn Le brought together. The secret of the N\aya conception of svariipasam Sandha is that relation is but a phase of reality andevery real object involves that phase. From the N>ayapoint of view, it is perfectly inuiii^ihlc that knowledgeis knowledge of a real object external to it and is not simply knowledge of ideas which are only copies of ob jects. It is one of the advantages of the Nyaya concep tion of relation being wholly external that the Naiya yikas can account for cognition without the mediation of ideas as idealists and subjectivists find it necessary to do. So, in Nyaya epistcmology, it may be said that the Naiyayika has no difficulty in solving the problem of knowledge, the term knowledge being understood as cognition of objective reality, while there is real diffi culty in'for the difference between truth anderror, or valid cognition and erroneous cognition, con sistently with the realistic standpoint oi Nyaya meta physics, not to speak of the difficulties involved in the Nyaya theory of external relation. In a valid cognition like 'this is silver' (idam rajat am), where silver is seen correctly as silver, the Naiyayika contends that its objective content exactly corresponds to the external realities represented by the attribute 'silverness', the thing possessing that attribute, vis., silver, and their relation of inherence (samardya). It should be re membered here that according to N>aya epistemology, the objective content of a cognition is not contained in cognition but exists outside it and it is called 'content* CH. i] PERCEPTION 121 only in the sense that the relation of object and subject (visaya and visayin) connects it with jiidna. In a valid cognition, the exact correspondence betweenjnana and jncya, as already explained,consists in the correct correlation of the phases of visayavisayibhdva, viz., adjunctness (prakdratd), substantiveness (vise syatd) ai.id relationness (samsargatd).In an errone ous cognition like 'this is silver' (idatn rajatam), where nacre (su /f mother of pearl)is mistaken for silver, the objective content does not exactly corres pond to the external realities represented by silverness, silver and their relation; and the lack of correspond ence in such cases is due to a wrong correlation of the phases of visayavisayibhava, the a< junctness (prakd ratd) of the real silverness \vhich belongs to the real silver existing elsewhere being erroneously correlated with the substantiveness (visesyat a) which belongs to the nacre presented as idam (this). Thus, a careful analysis of the Nyaya definition of pramd nnd bhramawould make it clear that the Naiyfuikas are prepared to regard truth and error us rmixi.MJng in correspond ence and lack of correspondence with objective reality. The Nyaya theory of bhrama is known as anya th&khydtiv&da or the theory which explains erroneous cognition as misapprehension of one thing as another thing. In the phrase anyathakhyati, the term khydti means 'cognition' and anyathd means 'otherwise than what it is'. When nacre is wrongly seen as silver, the erroneous cognition that arises takes the form 'this is silver' (idam rajatam). Here, 'this' stands for nacre 122 A PRIMER OF INDJAN LOGIC [PART m lying in front of the knower; and it is first seen as a white piece and not as nacre, the distinctive feature of nacre being missed cither through some defect in sight or in the particular situation in which the visual per ception arises. The visual perception of racre as 'this* (idam) arises in the ordinary way, through laukika scwnikarsa or through the normal sense-relation ofcontact between the sense and the object seen. Thereal silverness (rajatatva), which belongs to the real silver existing elsewhere, is presented in this visual perception as the attribute of nacre seen as 'id am9in a general form; neither the real rajata nor the real rajatatva could be said to be connected with the sense of sight through normal sense-relation (laukikasauni karsa) ; and without sannikarsa (sense-relation) being established between the sense-organ concerned and the object to be perctivcd, perception cannot arise. So, the Naiya>ikas hold that the real silver and silverness come to be connected with the sense of sight through anextra-normal t) pe of sense-relation (alaitkikasanni karsa) which is called jnanalaksanapratyasatti (sense relation represented by cognition). The details relating to the different kinds of extra-normal sense-relation causing extra-normal perception will be fully explained under section 30, infra. In the present instance oferroneous cognition, features like white colour andbrightness, wi.ich nacre possesses in common with silver, are noticed; they remind the knower of the real silver and silverness which he might have seen else where; and the recollection (smrti) of the real silver ness (rajatatva) constitutes the exta-normal relation CH. i] PERCEPTION 12$ represented by cognition f jiidnalaksanapratydsatti), which brings silverness within the scope of the visual sense seeing nacre as 'this1(tWaw?)in the ordinary way.Thus, according to the Naiyayika*, the visual mis apprehension of nacre as silver is an extra-normal variety of visual perception (alaukikacdksusa). It may he noted here that the proposition 'One thing is mistaken for another' (anyat anyat lid grhyate), whichbrings out the meaning of the technical phrase anyatha khydti, is interpreted in two ways in Nyaya literature. The earlier Naiyayikas like Vacaspatimisra would take this proposition to mean 'One realityis mistaken for another reality' (sadantaram sadantaratmand grhyate) ; while later Naiyayikas like Garuresopadhyaya wouldtake it to mean, 'A real object which does not have a certain attribute is mistaken in an extra-normal percep tion as having that attribute, which exists elsewhere' (tadubhCivavat vaslu [nival jndyatc). Students of Nyaya epi*>temology cannot adequate ly estimate the phil sophical value of the Nyaya theory of anyathdkhydti without comparing it to some extent with the theories of bhrama (khyativ&da) propounded by the other schools of Indian philosophy. There are five theories of bhrama; viz., the theory of self-appre hension (dtmakhydti), the theory of non-being's appre hension (asatkhydti),the theory of non-apprehension (akhydti), the theory of misapprehension (anyathd khydti), and the theory of indefinable^ apprehension (anirvacanlyakhydti). The Yogacara school of Bud dhism, otherwise known as the Vijfianavada school, explains erroneous cognition as consistingin (he 'self* 124 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART m which is identical with consciousness, externalising itself in the form of objects like silver; all determinatecognitions of objects, according to the Yogacarasubjectivists, are erroneous; this theory otbhramaiscalled atmakhyativada (theory of self-apprehension). The nihilistic school of Buddhists, otherwise known as the Madhyamaka school, explains bhrania as consisting in the cognition of a non-being (asat) ;in the case of the erroneous cognition 'this is silver* which arises wherethere is no silver, the object of the cognitionis a non being (asat) ;on the strength of experience, even non being should be taken to admit of being cognized; this theory of bhrama is known as asatkhydtivada. TheP^abhakara school of Mimarhsakas explains all cases ofbtirama as cases of non-apprehension. They contend that, in the cognition of silver where only nacre is seen, two cognitions arise in fact, one cognition being the perception of nacre in a general way as this (idam) and not as ;; --: the distinctive feature of nacreness, and the other cognition being the recollection of silver previously cognized elsewhere. The recollec tion of silver in this case is not identified by the knoweras recollection, but is cognized by him merely as cogni tion, since the object of recollection viz., silver is thought of merely as stiver, stripped of its association with past time and the particular place where it wasseen. The Prabhakaras describe such recollection by the phrase frramustatattakasmarana or 'recollection of an object robbed of its thai-ness.9In certain other cases of bhrama like 'the conch is yellow' (pitahCH. i] PERCEPTION 125 sankhah), the Prabhakara theorist explains that twoimperfect perceptions arise, one being the visual perception of a conch as such, its real colour being missed, and the other being the visual perception of the yellow colour of the bilious matter which causes jaundice (pittadravyapitima) ,the relation of the yellow colour to the bilious substance beingmissed. Thus in all cases of bhratna, two distinct cognitions either aperception and a recollection or two perceptions arise; their distinction is missed; and the difference betweenobjects comes to be missed for the time being; as a result of such non-discrimination, volitional decision (pravrtti or y&tna) leading to voluntary activity arises;, a voluntary activity with a view to seizing the object of bhrania, such as silver, folows; the knower in such cases,, acting on his knowledge, realises through his experience that his activity has become futile, as he finds only nacre on the particular spot and no silver at all; and ia those cases, in view of the fact that the volitional decision {pravrtti) of the knower concerned leads to a futile activity, the cognitive antecedent of such a futile pravrtti is technically called bhrama. It will be seen that, while the Prabhakaras are prepared to give a place to the term bhrama in their vocabulary, they maintain that all experiences are valid (anubhutih prama)andthat the so-called cases of bhrama are only undiscri minated jumbles of cognitions whose objects also happen to be undiscriminated for the time being (jnanayohvisayayosca vivekagrahat bhramah).In other words,according to the Prabhakaras, to experience is to experience validly and to err in experience is to expert* 126 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART m inf->;iihlin^ one reality with another reality andcomplicates his theory hy trying to bring the absent reality within the range of the sense-or^an concerned through the extra-normal relation (a'aukikasannikarsa) represented by some form of cognition itself (jfiana laksanapratydsatti). The Bhatta realists, while adop ting the theory of onyathukhytiti, find it necessary to accommodate themselves to the asatkhyuti theory, in holding that the samsarga element in the apprehension of nacre as silver and in such other cases is a non-being (asat). The Prabhakara realist sees the danger of compromise with the asatkhyuti on the one side, and onthe other side, sees how the Nyaya theory that onereality is presented as another reality (sadantaramsadantardttnand grhyate) would inevitably reduceitself to a variety of asatkhydti for the obvious reason that one reality never exists (is asat) in the form of another reality. In order to avoid these difficulties the Prabhakara realist adoptsthe extreme theory of akhydti. Though this is the only theory which could be said to be perfectly consistent with realism, it is not adequate to account for the volitional decision (Pravrtti) and the further activity that follows a bhratna. As Vacaspatimisra points out in his Tdtparya tika and Bhawatl, (in the akhydiivdda) one could find as much justificationin non-identification (abhedd gr&ha), for the two cognitionsin cases of bhramaappearing as two cognitiveunits and consequently for the two objects in such cases appearing as different, as in non-discrimination (bheddgr&ha), for the two- CH. i] PERCEPTION 129 cognitions and their two objectsin such cases appearingas one and the same; and as a result, if there should be volitional decision in the direction of activity on the latter ground, there should be volitional decision in the opposite direction of abstention on the former groundand the knovver should hang between pravrlti andnivrtti. These difficulties, the Advaitins endeavour to meet by propounding the theory of anirvacanlyaTehydti and explaining bhrama as experienceof a relatively real object, which is neither absolute being (sat), norabsolute non-being (asat), nor both. According to the Advaitins, when nacre is seen as silver, for instance, what happens is this: over the real substratum (adhisthana) represented by a nacre, or more correctly, nacre-delimited spirit (suktyavacchiiinacoitanya) the beginningless positive mist of nescience (anudibhava riipajnarla) happens to be thrown; when the sense of sight comes into relation with nacre in a general way,the mist is partly dispelled by the cognitive modification of antahkorana which takes the form 'this' (idamd karavrtti) ; the mist of nescience, however, continues to veil the nacreness of what is seen as this (idam) and, reinforced by the prepossessions of the knower'smind and by the similarity between the object seen as 'this' and silver, undergoes transformation, with the result that silver comes into being also with the cogni tion of silver, which is but a cognitive modification of nescience (suktyavacchinnacaitanyadhisthitavidya raja tarapena rajatakuravrttirupena ca parinamate); silver which thus conies into being has relative reality ; it is said to be anirvacaniya in the sense that it does not 9 130 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART in admit of being definitely described as sat (being), or asat (non-being) or both; and it is also said to be prdtibhdsika in the sense that it is coterminous with its presentation in cognition.It will thus be seen that the Advaitin's theory of bhrama regards it as a cognitive complex consisting of two cognitive factors, one of them being a vrtti of antahkarana and the other being a vrtti of avidyd. According to this theory, the object of a bhrama is real in a relative sense and comes into being along with the bhrama and lasts as long as the bhrama lasts; and there is no need for accommodationto asatkhyati or for any complication in the form of extra-normal (alaiikika)sense-relation. That the Advaitins have no particular animus against the advocates of anyathdkhydtivdda is evident from the way in which they are readily willingto accept the explanation of anyathdkhydti in the case of what is known as sopddhikabhrama, where the object of bhramahappens to be within the normal scope of the sense organ, as, for instance in the erroneous perception of a crystal (sphatika)as red-coloured when a japd (Chinarose) is seen to be in its vicinity. Such students ofIndian philosophy as are capable of critically reviewingthe five 'theories' of bhrama (khyativdda) set forth here would not find it difficult to conceive of an appro priate graph by means of which the epistemological inter-relation of these theories may be exhibited andcomprehended. If one could imagine that epistemo logical thought starts with asatkhydti as centre and, in its endeavour to escape from it, swings forcibly betweenthe two diametrical termini of anyathdkhydti and OH. i] PERCEPTION 131 akhyati, it would not be difficult to imagine that such thought inevitably describes a comprehensive epistemo logicai circle in the form of anirvacanlya'khyati, whicheasily accommodates itself to akhydti in respect of the non-discrimination of the two vrttis constituting abhrawa and to anyathdkhycLti by complete surrender in the case of sopddhikabhrama. It would be quite appropriate to consider here the Nya\a view regarding the way in which the validity and invalidity of a cognition, or truth and error, orprdmdnya and aprdmdnya have to be accounted for andascertained. The Naiyayikashold that validity andinvalidity of cognitions are made out through extrinsic considerations and are brought about by extrinsic circumstances. In other words, according to the Naiyayikas, validity and invalidity cannot be said to be intrinsically made out (svalograkya)or intrinsically brought about (svatojanya). Intrinsicality (svatastva) in respect of the knowledge of reality consists in reality being made out by every means by which the cognition having it is ascertained but not ascertained to be invalid. This definition of svatogrdhyatva is expressed thus in the technical language of Nyaya : "(rdmdnyasyajfiaptau svatastvam 'a !.iprl ii,;.'!ry.l ;r'i!t j7'ayCi: a/;iTJ*:a grahakasamagrigrdhyatvam." Whenever a person knows that he cognizes and does not know for the moment that he errs, he also knows that he validly cognizes: this is the contention of the advocates ofsvatograhyatva or the theory that validity is intrinsically made out. THUS, if a person could become aware ofthe existence of a cognition in him in a hundred 132 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART UI without becoming aware that that cognition is erroneous and in any one of those cases he becomes aware of the cognition only without becoming aware of its validity, the definition of svcttograhyatva would not hold goodand the view that validity is made out extrinsically (paratggrahya)has inevitably to be accepted. TheNaiyayikas explain their position thus in regard to this question. A determinate cognition like "this is silver" (idam rajatam) is called vyavasaya and it is presented first in the anuvyavasdya (after-cognition or conscious ness of a cognition) which takes a form like this "I cognize this silver" (idam rajatam janami), and in this anuvyavasaya, the validity of the cognition referred to is not presented.If such anuvyavasaya were to in variably take cognizance of the validity of such vyava saya, it would not be possible to account for the doubt which an inexperienced person feels regarding the vali dity of such vyavasaya. So, in such cases, the validity of the vyavasaya "this is silver" should be ascertained through the practical result to which it leads.- If the voluntary decision and activity following such vyava saya should turn out to be fruitful and if the knowershould actually find himself in a position to get the silver which he wanted, such vyavasaya (cognition)is recog nized to be valid. The process of inference through which one's mind may pass in such cases is usually put in this form: "This cognition is valid, because it leads to a fruitful effort; any cognition that leads to a fruit ful effort is valid, as another valid cognition already realized to be such in experience, (idam jndnamprama', saphalapravrttijanakatvat; yadyat saphala- CH. i] PERCEPTION 133 pravrttijanakam tat jnanam prama; yathti praman taram). It should be borne in mind, in this connection, that causing fruitful effort is, according to Nyaya the ground of inferring validity, while validity itself con sists in the cognition in question cognizing a thingas possessing an attribute which it really has. In that the Naiyayikas make the ascertainment of the truth of acognition 'dependent upon its agreement with its expec ted workings or, in other words, with the consequenceswhich are expected to arise from it in the experience ofthe active subject, their view would appear to be closely similar to that of the modern pragmatist. However,they do not lose sight of the fact that pragmatism is only a method of ascertaining truth, that this methoditself presupposes truth whose nature has to be explain ed independently of agreement with practical workingsand that, if the truth presupposed by the pragmaticargument were itself to be ascertained pragmatically, through inference, the fault of regressus ad infinitum would inevitably follow. Having due regard to such difficulties, the KTaiyayikas define truth as consisting in correspondence with reality and thus combine their pragmatic theory with a theory which has much in common with what is known as the correspondence notion of truth in western philosophical literature. TheNyaya definition of validity (pramatva) makes it clear that truth consists in correspondence with reality. TheNayiyayikas also point out that, only in cases where acognition leads to effort in practical experience or it happens to be pravaftaka, it becomes necessary to ascertain the validity of such cognition in order to 134 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART in ensure unfaltering effort (niskampapravrtti) ; and that, on the first occasion of halting effort (sakampapra vrtti), it is not necessary that the cognition leading to such effort should have been definitely made out to be valid and it would do if such cognition should not havebeen definitely ascertained to be invalid. It can be easily seen from this that there is no room for any fear of anavastha (endless regression) or atmdsraya (self dependence) in the pragmatic method of inferring truth as employed by the Naiyayikas.In respect ofthe question how validity and invalidity are brought about, the Nyaya theory is that they are brought about by certain extrinsic circumstances which, for the sake of convenience, are called gunas (good features) anddosas (defects) ;in other words the Nyaya theorists maintain paratastva (extrinsicalit)>)in respect of the utpatti (production)of validity and invalidity of a cognition as well as in respect of their jnapti (know ledge). For instance the validity of a perception is secured by the good feature (guna) consistingin the adequacy of the contact between the sense-organ con cerned and its object; and its invalidity is the result of defects such as distance and some disease affecting the sense-organ. It would be interestingto contrast the ITyaya theory of truth and error with the epistemological theories put forward by other schools of Indian philo sophy about truth and error. The Sarhkhyas maintain that both validity and invalidity are intrinsically madeout in the sense that it is by virtue of the reflection or proximity of the same cit (self-luminious conscious-CH. i] PERCEPTION 135 ness), that the existence of a cognitive vftti and its validity or invalidity are illuminated. PrSbhakaras make no difference between vyavasdya and anuvyava saya and maintain that,in every cognition,the knower, the known object, and knowledge itself, along with its validity, are presented. They advocate the theory of intrinsicality (svatastvapaksa),in so far as validity (pramdtva) is concerned; and there is no question of error (apramatva)in their theory, since they maintain that all experiences are valid (anubhutih pramd). TheBhattas contend that co-nil ion is to be inferred through its effect, called jndtatdor prakatya, whichconsists in what some of them describe as a temporaryluminosity (prakdsa) arisingin known objectsandi referred to in propositionslike 'this is known' (ayamfndtah) ;and that in such inference the cognition whichhas caused fndtatd, and its validity are presented. Thevalidity which is thus intrinsically made out may bestultified by a subsequent sublating cognition ; and thus, in the Bhatta theory, invalidity (apramdtva)is extrin sically made out. The Bhattas are, therefore, to betaken to advocate svatastva in the case of validity andparatastva in the case of invalidity. Murarimisra, whodoes not go the whole hog either as a Prabhakara or as a Bhatta, but who is undoubtedly a A amamsaka, recog nizes, like a Naiyayika, that a cognition (vyavasaya) is cognized by its after-cognition (anuvyavasaia) ,but maintains, unlike a Naiyayika,that the validity ofvyavasaya is also presented in the same anuvyavasdya.It will thus be seen that Murarimisra is an advocate of the theory of the intrinsicality of validity (pram&- 136 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART m tvam svato grhyate). The Bauddhas, on the other hand, hold that all determinate knowledge (savikal- $aka) fin so far as one is conscious of it, is erroneous (aprama) and its apramdtva is intrinsically made out; while, through inference, the validity (pramatva) of indeterminate cognition (nirvikalpaka}is extrinsically made out. The Buddhists thus advocate the theory of extrinsicality (paratastvapaksa)in regard to validity and intrinsicality (svatastvapaksa)in regard to invali dity. According to the Advaitins, the validity of a cognition is intrinsically made out in the sense that the witnessing inner spirit (saksicaitatoya), which illumi nates the valid cognitive vrtti, also illuminates its vali dity (prawatva); and the invalidity (apramdlva)of a cognitive vrtti is inferred extrinsically, through the resultant effort becoming futile. In order to evaluate adequately the different theories of pramatva andapramatva set forth here, it is necessary to note that the Naiyayikas would answer in the affirmative, the question 'Is error possible in realism?1 and wouldexplain the possibility of error by showing how a real substantive (visesya) and a real attribute (prakdra) may be erroneously correlated when they are presented in cognition and thus save realism itself from being ruined by conceding the possibility of error. ThePrabhakara realists think that any concession of the possibility of error (bhrama) would spell the ruin of realism and insist that all experiences are valid (anubhfltih pramd) and that the so-called bhramasinvolve an element of non-discrimination (aviveka). The Bhafta realists adopt the anyathdkhyati of Nyaya CH.I] PERCEPTION 137 with suitable modifications ; and in order to preserve realism effectively, they would make the knowledge of cognition (jndna) dependent upon the knownness (jndtatd) of the object (jneya) and thus provide an effective counterblast to idealism which seeks to mergeall jneya in jndna. The Buddhist idealist rules out truth and considers all determinate knowledge (savikal paka) erroneous. The advocates of the theory of intrinsicality of validity (pramdnyasvatastvavddinah'), more especially the Bhattas and the Advaitins, wouldgenerally emphasise the ideas that, in a valid cognition, the object is not stultified by a subsequent sublating cognition and is not merely re-exhibited through a reminiscent impression, the former of these two fea tures being stressed in particular; and this way of looking at pramdtva would be quitein accord with the view that aprawiatva is made out extrinsically andpramatva intrinsically.It may also be noted, with advantage, that, in the Nyaya theory, anuvyavasaya(the subject-centred after-cognition)is regarded as self-luminous (svaprakasa) in the sense that it reve; Is itself along with the vyavasdya (the object-centred cognition in which the knower and knowledge are not presented) ; and that, in this respect, the Nyaya realist seeks to combine in a way his objectivism with anaspect of subjectivistic thought which is not incom patible with his realism. In this kind of compromise,a danger is lurking, as students of Advaita may easily see, and this danger consists in the manner in whichthe Nyaya view lends itself to ^anuvyavasaya being treated as a fragmentary appearance of the absolute 138 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART in reality represented by the absolute, self-luminous consciousness called cit. An intelligent attempt to review syntheticallyall the theories of bhrama known to Indian philosophy will bring to light the fact that, in some manner or other, a negative element is involved in every one of the five khyativadas (theories explaining the nature of bhrama). In the asatkhyati doctrine, the' negative element is obvious; and in dtmakhydti doctrine, it is obvious in so far as objective externalityis concerned. In the anyathakhyati view, the negative element is to be found in the samsarya part or in the idea that onereality is presented as another reality which it is not or that a real substantive is presented as having a real attribute which it has not; and in the akhydti doctrine, one can easily detect the negative element in the idea of non-discrimination (aviveka). The anirvacaniyakhyatidoctrine appears on the surface to eschew the negative element from the conception of bhiama; but, in fact, the negative element is replaced by relativity whichimplies a negative element and transfers the negative element from the side of object to the side of definite predications (nirvacana) with reference to the object. A careful investigation of the Advaitin's anirvacamya khyati, as compared with the other theories of bhrama^would lead to the mystery of error being unravelled through the disentanglement of negativity, which is the inner core of bhrama. But this would not amount to all the theories of bhrama being reduced to the level ofasatkhy&ti; for, it should be remembered that negativ ity is only the other side of relativity and an aspect of CH. i] PERCEPTION 139 reality. If one might be permitted here to indulge for a while in epigrammatising, one might well saythat yes (sat) and no (asat) are the fulcra of all epistemologyas they are of all metaphysics ; that yes and no are but phases of the same reality; that all appearancesare the offspring of a cross between yes arid no\ that it will be evident through the gemination of yes and no, that yes is no and no is yes; and 'that error (bkrama)is the antechamber of truth (pramd). In subsections (f) and (g) of section 28 of the text, valid experience (pramd) and its instrument are each divided into four kinds. The term pramdna is used in this section in the sense of the efficient special cause or instrument (karana) of valid experience. Theword pramdna is sometimes used in the sense of valid experience (pramd), as for instance in the proposition 'idam rajatam iti jfidnani pramd' (thisis siver this is valid experience). /In the word pramdna, the suffix ana denotes an instrument in the former case; and in the latter case, it denotes bhava (the meaning of the root itself). The Indian materialists, called Carvakas,recognize only one pramdna, viz., perception: the Bauddhas and the Vaisesikas recognize two pramdnas*viz., perception and inference; the Samkhyas recognize three, viz., perception, inference and verbal testimony; the Naiyayikas recognize four, viz., perception, inference, assimilation and verbal testimony; the Prabhakaras recognize five, viz., the above four pra mdnas and presumptive testimony (arthdpatti) ; the Bhattas and Advaitins recognize these five pramdnasand non-cognition (anupalabdhi)as the sixth pram&na; 140 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART n and the Pauranikas recognise these six pramdnas and, in addition, recognize necessary inclusion (sambhava)and traditional hearsay (aitihya)as the seventh andthe eight prawi&na. The leading exponents of Indian philosophy are unanimous in discardingthe last two, sambhava and aitihyajfthe reason is obvious; the former which enables one, for instance, to be sure of fifty when hundred are guaranteed is nothing morethan a plain case of immediate inference; and the latter, which consists in traditional hearsay like 'a spirit dwells in this banyan tree* (ihavate yaksastisthati),is no 'pramdna at all until it is verified, and when verified, it comes under verbal testimony. The argumentsadvanced by Carvakas to reject even anumana and the grounds on which the Vaisesikas and Bauddhas wouldbring upamana (comparison or assimilation) and sabda(verbal testimony) under inference will be considered under appropriate heads in chapters II, III and IV, in/ra. The Naiyayikas would bring presumptive testi mony (arthapat ti} under anumdna (inference), and in some cases, under sabda (verbal testimony). A refer ence to pages 44 to 47 supra would show how the TTaiyayikas and Prabhakaras discard anupalabdhi(non-cognition) as a distinct pramdna and how the former reduce it to the level of a necessary acessory to pratyaksa, in perceiving non-existence (abhava). Fromchapter III it will be seen that the PTyaya view of upamana is different in several respects from the MImamsaka's view of that pramdna. It would be useful to consider here how the chief champions of arthdpatti, the Bhattas and Prabhakaras, CH. i] PERCEPTION 141 maintain that it is a distinct pramdna and should not be brought under anumdna or sabda and on what groundsthe Naiyayikas refuse to recognize it as a distinct prdmana. According to the Bhattas, a knowledge of some fact which is unaccountable otherwise than bypresumptively granting another fact is the instrumentin the case of arthdpatti and the knowledge presump tively arrived at of the explanatory fact is the resultant cognition (upapdd^ajndnam karanam, upapadakajfidnamphalam). For instance, Devadatta is alive and not present in his house; this fact has to be accounted for (upafddya), and cannot be accounted for otherwise than by presumptively granting that he must be present in some place outside his housd[bahissadbhdvakalfape belonging more to the side of imagination than to inference belonging more to the sphere of hypothesis than to the sphere of inferentially established thesis, and it is articulated through propositions like 'I pre sume* and not through propositions like 'I infer*. TheBhattas do not approve of the way in which the Prabhakaras have exalted doubt in this connection to the rank of a pramana. It is also pointed out by the Bhattas that there are certain cases of presumptive knowledge which do not admit of being reduced to inference. For instance, Devadatta is known to be present in the third house from mine ; it is presumedthat he is not presentin any other house \ this presump tive knowledge refuses to be reduced to inference; it would not be a sound argument to say that any place other than the third house from mine is not a placeCH.I] PERCEPTION 145 Devadatta is, on tha ground that such a place happensto be different from the third5 house from mine and onthe analogy of the second house from mine; for with equal force it might be argued that any place other than the three houses which have come within the scope of my observation is the place where Devadatta is pre sent, on the ground that such a placeis different fromthe two houses adjacent to the third house in which heis present and on the analogy of that third house. TheNaiyayikas would, however, explain their attitude in the matter by pointing out that, where one has to rely exclusively on negative concomitance (vyattrekavyapii) one's mind has to pass inevitably through a stage olpositive concomitance (anvayavyapti) before it arrives at the resultant cognition; that presumptive knowledge(kalpatoa) is really the anticipatory forestalling by the imaginative side of one's mind of what its somewhatslower ratiocinative side arrives at through inference; and that such foreshadowings through negative con comitance (vyaiirekavyapti) may well be broughtunder anumana as a distinct variety of it and need not be exalted to the rank of a distinct pram&na. It should be remembered in this connection that the Bhattas* maintain that what the Naiyayikas would treat as in ference based exclusively on negative examples andnegative concomitance {kevalavyatirekyanum&na) is. realty no inference at all and demands a distinct place as pramana, since it lacks the essential feature ofinference vie., direct subsumption to positive con.. comitance. The Bhattas realize the danger that this 10 146 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART in way of merging vyatirekin in artttdpatti may lead to the entire province of anumana being swallowed up by the latter; and this fear they remove, by drawing attention to the fact that the inference of fire in a mountain from Smoke, for instance, through the concomitance of fire and smoke in all observed cases, may be reduced to arthapatti, and that the universal concomitance of all smokes and all fires, including the few observed and*nany unobserved cases, is a clear case of inference -which cannot be accounted for by any pramana other 4han anumana. The Bhattas speak of two kinds of vrthdpatti, srut&rth&palti and drstarth&patti, according as the upapadya (the fact requiring explanation) is made out through perception or through verbal testimony. In section 28 of the text, four kinds of pramanasare referred toby Annambhatta. A pratnanais a karanaof a valid cognition (prama). The concept of karanahas to be elucidated. The author proceeds to define karana in section 29 (a) and this leads on to a detailed Consideration of the Nyaya view of causation. 29 T (a) Karana (efficient or instrumental cause) is a special cause. (b) The invariable antece dent of an effect is its cause. (c) -An effect is the coun ter-correlative of its antecedent non-existence. CH. i] PERCEPTION 147 (a theory, that it is created for the first time and that it never existed before. Consistently with the creationistic view of causation (arambhavada\ Annam bhatta defines an effect as the counter-correlative of antecedent non-existence. In this connection students are advised to consider again the remarks about pragabh&vain pages 37 to 40, part III, supra. Positive product (bhavakarya) has three kinds of causes; the first being of the nature of component parts or of the nature of the substratum in which the effectuated quality or activity inheres and called 'inherent cause' (samav&yikarana) ; the second being of the nature of the Conjunction of parts producing the whole or of the nature of theCH. i] PERCEPTION 155- quality or activity inhering in the component parts or a substratum and producing a corresponding quality in the whole or disjunction in the same substratum, andcalled non-inherent cause (asamav&yikdrana) ;and the third being of the nature of agent and such other causes, not falling under either of the first two heads, and being called occasioning cause (toinrittaltararia).It would be a mistake to suppose that all the nimittas are less important than the other two varieties. For, karla or the intelligent agent, in whose absence the other causes become ineffectual, is technically a nimitta, but is, in a sense, the most important of all the varieties of causes. That is a samavayikarano, in which the effect inheres as it comes into being. The component parts (avayavah), like threads, thus form the inherent cause of a composite substance (avayavin}, like a cloth; andlikewise a substance, of the quality or activity which is produced in it. To secure precision and avoid confu sion, the delimiting adjuncts of effectness (kdryatd) and causeness (karanata') karyaiavacchedakadharmaand kfiranatavacchedakadharma should be specified in defining the relation of cause and effect in every case, as also the relations which determine the co-existence of the antecedent and the consequent in question kdryatuvacchedakasambandha and karanatavacchedaka sambandha. Causality involves invariable co-existence between an antecedent and a consequent; their co-existence (sam&nddhikaranya) is their presence in the same place; when they are present in the same place they should each be connected with the common sub- 156 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART m stratum through a relation ; the relation which connects the antecedent with the common substratum (samdna dhikarana) is known as the determinating relation ofcauseness (karanatavacchedakasambyndha); and the relation which connects the consequent with the samesubstratum is called the determining relation of effect ness (karyatavacchedattasambandha). The exponentsof the Nyaya-Vaisesika doctrine of causation contendthat, by a careful observation of the invariable con comitance between an antecedent and a consequent, as determined by particular delimiting adjuncts and rela tions, as also of the invariable concomitance betweenthe negations of such antecedent and consequent of anvayasahacdra and vyatireTtasahacdrathe, causal re lation in every case can be accurately defined so as to obviate every conceivable hitch. In the case of a samavayikurana, like threads in relation to a cloth (tant avaJi patasya), the simplest and the most accurate way in which the causal relation may be defined is this: 'the causeness delimited by thrcadness and by the rela tion of identity (tantulvdvacchinnd tadqtmyasam bandhdvacchinnd ca kdranata) is correlated to the cffcchu'ss delimited by clothness and by the relation of inherence (patatvavacchinnasaniavayasQinbandhavac chinnakaryatanirupita). It will be seen here that, in every case of samavayikarana, the simplest way of defining the cainal relation (karyakaranatyiava) wouldbe by referring to the cause itself as the common subs tratum (samanadhikarana) in which the antecedent andthe consequent under reference co-eaist. In Nyayadefinitions pf cau&ality, the common substratum kept CH. i] PERCEPTION 157 in view is generally suppressed; and the student ofNyaya has to find it out first before trying to interpret such definitions. It should be noted here that the Nyaya conception of samavayikorana, while it includes what the Vcdantins call the upadanakarana (material cause), is not exactly parallel to it ; because, upadana(material cause)is the substance which enters into the make-up of its product and this is true, in the Ny&yatheory, only in the case of the component parts andtheir composite product, and not in the case of a sub stance and the quality or activity arising in it, the cause and effect in the latter case representing fundamentally different categories.It should also be observed here that the phraseinherent cause, samavayikdrana, is somewhat misleading, in that it may lead one to suppose wrongly that it is the cause that inheres in the effect but the fact is thr.t the phrase here means 'a cause which is capable of producing an effect that inheres in it*. It may appear at first view that the phrase 'intimate cause* is a better equivalent ; but it turns out to be more misleading when the correspond ing phrase non- intimate cause comes to be used as the equivalent of asamavdyikarana, as may be seen presently from the next para. The phrase cu/imar Jv/foJrii>:a means a cause which, under no circumstance whatever, could be treated as a samavayikarana (inherent cause). Substances only can be treated as samav&yik&rana and they can never be treated as asamav&yikfirana. Qualities and activities only can be treated as asamavayjk&rana. 158 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART in While the two kinds of causes inherent cause (samavdyi) and non-inherent cause (asamavdyi)are absolutely exclusive of each other, the third kind viz., .occasioning cause (nimittakdrana)includes causal factors which, while being the nimitta of certain effects anay well ba the inherent or non-inherent causes of certain other effects, as the case may be. The phrase non-inherent cause used as the equivalent of asama vdyikdrana should not be taken to mean that the cause referred to does not inhere in any substratum, since every non-inherent cause, on the contrary, inheres somewhere; but this phrase should be understood to stand for, like its Sanskrit equivalent, a cause which, under no circumstance whatever, could be treated as inherent cause. In defining the causality of a non-in herent cause, the inherent cause of the effect in ques tion should be kept in view as the common substratum(samdnddhikarana),inherence (samavaya) should be referred to as the relation determining the presence of the effect in questionin the common substratum (kdryatdvacchcdakasambandha), and either inherence or co-inherence (samavdya or ekartha-sanuwaya)should be referred to as the relation determining the presence of the cause in question in the common subs tratum (kdranatdvacchedakasantbandha). The con junction of threads (tantusarhyoga) is the non-in herent cause of cloth; and in that case, the commonsubstratum is thread; the relation connecting cloth with such substratum is inherence; and likewise, the relation connecting the conjunction of threads with such substratum is inherence; this is one type ofnon-in- OH. i] PERCEPTION 159 4ierent cause. Another type of non-inherent cause is to (visesagunah) of soul (atman) should not be treated as non-inherent cause in the case of any effect, thoughthe general definition of such cause holds good in the -case of knowledge in relation to desire, of desire in relation to voluntary decision or effort (yatna) and in such other cases. The chief reason why the special qualities of soul should not be treated as non-inherent cause in the case of any,effect is that, in all such cases, it would be simpler to treat the contact between the soul .and the mind (dtmamanassamyoga) as non-inherent cause and in the case of any effect, more than one non inherentcause need not be recognized. In view of this, in the general definition of non-inherent cause given in the text, it is necessary to introduce the qualification that such cause is different from the special qualities of soul { &tmavise$agunabhinnam ). The atomic hypothesis of the Nyaya-Vaieikasystem and the creationistic view of oausation main tained in that system are closely bound up with each other. The Nyaya-Vaisesika theory of causation is known as aratnbhavddd (creationism) as distinguished from the parindtnavdda (evolutionistic view of causa* 160 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART in tion) of the Samkbyas. In the Nyaya-Vaisesikasystem, 'to come into being' means 'to spring up at acertain point of time and not to have existed before'; for this reason, the Nyaya theory of causation is known as asatkdryavdda. The expression asatkdrya vdda, according to Naiyayikas, means 'the view that every effect is invariably preceded by its antecedent non-existence' and it should not be understood to imply that an effect arises out of nothing. On the contrary, according to the Nyaya theory, a positive product(bhdvakdrya) is invariably preceded by a causal machinery, the full complement of which includes several positive antecedents and two negative antece dents,^., the antecedent negation of the effect in ques tion (kdryaprdgabhdva) and the absence of counter acting causes (fratibandhakdblidva}. The Naiyayikasare anxious to repudiate the suggestion that their theory of asatkdryavdda implies that an effect mayarise out of nothing; and they point out that antece dent negation (prdgabhdva) would be inconceivable without thinking of a suitable anuyogin (correlated substratum ) and pratiyogin ( counter-correlative ) , and that in the case of prdgabhdva, as in the case of annihilattve negation (dhvamsa), while the effect itself represents the latter, the inherent cause (sawav&yikdrana) represents the former. Invariable concomitance between an antecedent and a consequent(nfyataptirvavartitva) and absence of such circum stances as would justify the idea that the antecedent in question is not indispensable (ananyathdsiddhatva) these are the two essential elements in the Nyaya con- CH. i] PERCEPTION 161 cept of causality. The former, according to theNaiyayikas, is generally made out through a know ledge of the invariable sequence between two positive factors (anvayasahacara) and of the invariable con comitance between the negations of those two factors (vyatirekasahacdra). The formula for anvayasaha~cdra is usually stated thus: "Whenever C precedes, Efollows"; and that for vyatircksahacara thus; "Whenever C does not precede, E does not follow/* The latter formula is intended to serve as a corrective to the former and effectively eliminates the mistakewhich may arise through an exclusive adoption of the former formula and which consists in mere co-exist*- ence or sequence being taken for causality. There arecertain cases where it is not possible to make out negative concomitance (vyatirckasahacara); for ins tance, where a cause, like God, is ex hypothesi present everywhere and the invariable antecedent of every conceivable effect, the negative formula of vyatireka cannot possibly apply. In such cases, the affirmative formula of anvaya alone is available and dependedupon. In all other cases, the Naiyayikas insist that causality should be determined through an application of both the formulas of anvaya and vyatireka. Wherethese two formulas are applied to instances falling1 within the range of direct observation (fratya'ksa) andas a result causalityis made out,it is said to be madeout through praiyaksa. Students of Western logic, who are familiar with the experimental methods formulated by Mill for determining causal relations, may be able to 162 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART in (find in the combination of the Nyftya formulas ofG#vaya and vyatireka a parallel to what is known as the /*jfil method af agreement and difference. The Naiya ylfcas are keenly alive of the difficulties in determining causality, which are brought about by cases of plurality of causes and intermixture of effects. They contend that, strictly speaking, there can be no plurality ofcauses or intermixture of effects. If fire appears to be the effect of straw (trna), or tinder-sticks (arvni), orlens (wow), the fact is that the same effect is not pro duced from these three causes and the effect in each case has different properties. Such differences in effects may be apparent in certain cases and may be subtle andiiave to be noted with care in others. In a similar way, Che effects of different causes may be mixed up; and in such cases, these effects should be carefully distinguish ed. The Naiyayikas are never tired of remindingthemselves and others of the need for carefully observ ing and making out the relation of invariable concomit ance between particular classes of antecedents and^consequents, as also between their negations. Thisaaeed is embodied in Udayana's dictum "Concerning4ie truth about the affirmative and the negative con comitance, one should he particularly careful" (tattve fyRtntwatQ bhavyam wvayavyatire&ayoli).It is con tended by the JTaiyayikas that our experience of several things as existing only during a particular period of time and never existing before that time in other words, as being kadacitka in their nature cannot be satisfactorily explained except by assuming causal rela tion between such things and certain antecedents. The CH. i] PERCEPTION causa) factors also-r-gpme pf them at least should themselves be occasional (kaddcitka) and contingent, for the reason that, otherwise, the prior non-existence of the effects in question cannot be accounted for. This would mean that a beginningless chain of causes and effects should be admitted ; and the Naiyayikas donot hesitate to say that the stream of causes and effects is beginningless (karyakaranapravaho'nadih), for the simple reason that the starting point,if any, of the causal stream lies far beyond human ken. 30 T (a) Of those prainanas, perceptive instrument (prat yaksa)is the means of percep tion. (&) Perception is the cogni tion which is produced through sense-organ coming into relation with an object.It is of two kinds: indeterminate anddeter minate. (c) Indeterminate percep tion is a cognition which docs not involve any attribute or adjunct (prakfra). (d) Determinate perception is cognition which involves an attribute or adjunct. It is em bodied in propositions like "This is E>itthtf\ Tbtf ii a 164 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PARTin Brahmana", "This is black9', "This is a cook". The definition of perceptive instrument (prat ya&sapram&na) is based on Gautama's sutra 1. 1. 4, which runs thus : indriy&rthasannikarsotpannam jnanam avyapadesyam avydbhicari vyavasayatma kam pratyaksam". This s&tra may be rendered thus: "Perception is cognition which arises through sense-organ coming into relation with object, and which is non-verbal, unerring and of the nature of ^dubious knowledge". The Sutrakara is evidently defining valid perception (pratyaksapramd)in order to definitely indicate the nature of the instrument of valid perception (pratyaksapramana). According to the earlier interpretation of this sutra, as given in Vatsya yana's bhafya, the adjunct 'unerring' (avyabhicari) excludes erroneous perception; and the adjunct 'indubi ous1 (vyavasQyatwaka) excludes doubt. The adjunct 'non-verbal' (ovyapadesyd)in the sutra is understood in various ways by different scholiasts. Some of the old scholiasts take this adjunct to mean 'not coming within the scope of expressions referring to objects' (sabda karmatdm dpannam na bhavati yat) ; and in this sense, it differentiates perceptionas described by the expres sions referring to objects from perception as it arises, the former having become objectified as prameya andthus ceased to belong to the subjective sphere of pra mana (valid cognition). Some other Naiyayikas of anearly school would take the adjunct 'non-verbal' (avyapdefya) in the sense of 'not being caused by wordCH. i] PERCEPTION 165 in association with sense-organ* (anubhayafaorfabdaksobhayajabhinna) ; and, in this sense,it should be understood as excluding cases where the meaning of a word is made out through the perceptual observation of the way in which an object is referred to by that word, or in other words, cases where a word is first made out to be significative of a certain objectthat is actually being perceived by a sense-organ. In such cases, they hold that the cognition in question should be brought under verbal cognition (sfibda} and not under perception. Another set of early Naiyayikas f (like Jayantabhatta) would take avyapadesya in the sense of asabda (non-verbal) and would explain its purpose as consisting in saving determinate perception (savikalpaka?) from being merged in verbal cognition (sdbda) on the ground that the cognitive process involved in such perception invariably results throughthe operation of a sense-organ in association with the recollection of a scheme of words with which the knower happens to be familiar. Vacaspatimisra andseveral others who follow him 'would take the wordavyapade&ya (non-verbal) and vyfivasay&tmaka (definite and determinate) as referring to the two kinds of perception viz., indeterminate (nirvikalpaka) anddeterminate (savikalpaka). They maintain that the former adjunct (avyapadesya) refutes the view of the grammatical philosophers who refuse to recognize nirvikalpaka and hold that knowledge is impossible except though some language and no objectis cognized by itself and without being associated with the wordsignifying it (Mi so'sti pratyayo loke yatra iabdo na 1<6& A PRIMER OF ItffclAtf LOGIC [PxfcT m The latter adjunct (vy&vasaydtmaka) , they further maintain, refutes the Buddhist doctrine that indeterminate perception (r.irvikdpaka)is the only genuine type of valid perception and that all determinate cognitions (savikalpaka) are illusive. The last expla nation given by Vacaspatimisra and his followers is generally accepted by later Naiyayikas and Gautama'ssfttra dealing with perception (I. 1.4) is believed 10 presuppose both the types of perception determinate (savikalpaka) and indeterminate (nirvikalpaka). What exactly is the nature of indeterminate pecep tiofc and how does it differ from determinate peception? The answer suggested by Annambhatta's definitions of nirvihalpaka and savikalpaka, which follow Gangesa'sview, may be explainedin this way. In the first place, it should be remembered that the Nyaya distinction of erroneous cognition (bhrawa) and valid cognition (pramft), which is intended to apply onlyto cognitions leading to some activity (pravartaka), holds good only in the case of determinate cognitions and cannot haveany reference to indeterminate cognitions. The relation of object and subject (visayavisayibhQva) involved in a determinate cognition is a definite complex consisting of three correlated phases adjunctness (prakaratti)* substantiveness (viSesyata) and relationness (samsar g&t&). In an indeterminate cognition, on the other b&ftd, there is the relation of object and subject; andwhile a thing, its attribute such as a generic feature (//*) and their relation are presentedin it, they arenot presented in a specific manner in their respective forms as a qualified substantive (viscfya), as a qualify- CH. i] PERCEPTION ing attribute (vifesantf) a!nd as a relation of a definite type (samsarga). Such indeterminate cognitionshanre only to be inferentially arrived at through determinate cognitions, on the basis of the observed causal relation between a cognition of a certain attribute (vifef^n^jnana) and a complex cognition of a thing as havingthat attribute (viSistajtitina). On this ground,the determinate cognition of a jar, for instance, one cannot possijly have without previously having an indeterminate cognition in which the substance in question,its generic attribute and even their relation are presented in a vague and undifferentiated form. Indeterminate cognitions are therefore said to be alindriya (beyondthe scope of any sense), while determinate cognitions are generally perceived by mental perception (m&nasa*pratyaksa) and presented in anuvyavas&ya. It mayalso be noted that a nirvikalpaka can never be directly expressed in a proposition and that every proposition* according to Naiyayikas, embodies and conveys a deter minate cognition (samsargavagahijndnaor The grammatical philosophers (fabdikas)as already stated, refuse to recognize nirvikqdpoka. Allthe otlier philosophers recognize the distinction betweennirvlkalpaka and savikabpakain one form or other. Inthe first place, the Buddhists hold that the nirvikalpako is the only form of valid perception and it cognizes the absolute, unrelated, momentary existence called svalak sana (the mere thinu-in-it$elf); while the determinatecognitions (savikalpvka) arc illusive in that theyinvolve wholly fictitious fabrications (vikalp* of 168 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART m fialpana), which usually take the forms of a namei(n&ma), a generic attribute, (/dtf), a quality (guya), an activity (kriya) and a substance (dravya). TheAdvaitins hold that indeterminate cognition (nirvikal fiaka) may arise from propositionslike 'This is that Devadatta' (so'yam devadattah) and 'That thou art1 (tat tvam asi); and that the absolute existence alone (sanmatram), which is identical with Brahman, is pre sented in indeterminate cognitions (nirvikalpaka). TheMimamsaka view of nfrvikalpakais that it is an indeterminate perception which consists in the direct and simple awareness of an individual object (vyakti) and its generic attribute (j&ti) which arises immediate ly after the sense-organ comes into relation with them;and that it misses the definite feature of the jati as being common to several individuals belonging to a particular class and the specific character of the vyakt \ as being different from others i.e., the element of anuvrtti in the former case and of vyavrtti in the latter case. This is closely similar to the old Vaiseika viewof nirvikalpaka. Prasastapada describes indeterminate perception as simple awareness (tilocanamatra) andKumarila, in his description of it, uses the same expres sion and compares it to the unverbalised dumb experi ence of a child or a dumb person. Indeterminate perception is only to be inferred like any other cognition, in the view of Bhattas; while it is presented in itself along with the knower and the known object, as in the case of other cognitions, according to the Prabhakaras.The Vedantins of the Visisjadvaita school adopt the Prabhakara view of indeterminate perception and main- CH. i] PERCEPTION 169 tain that every cognition, however simple it may be, involves a substantive, an attribute and their relation; that both sdm&nya (generic attribute) and vie$a (the individual vyakti)are presented in nirvikalpaka alongwith difference in the form of the individual object (vyaktisvarupa); and that, at the stage of nirvikalpafca, the knower does not realize that the generic attribute pre sented in his knowledge is common to all the individuals belonging to the same class and that these individuals are different from the individuals belonging to a different class, and he is not, therefore, in a positionto articulate his indeterminate perception through verbal expression. The Advaitic view of nirvikalpaka that the abso lute existent (SattaBrahman) is the only thing whichis presented in it and that the highest form of truth realisation which leads to final emancipation is a nirtn kalpaka is an inevitable development of the doctrine of nirvikalpaka as adopted by the exponents of the Nyaya-Vaisesika system. The Nyaya-Vaiseika realists have shown how a permanent reality, and not a momen tary isolated 'this' (svalaksana or thing-in-itself) as in the case of the Buddhist theory of nirvikalpaka, may be presented in indeterminate perception; and it has thus become easy for the Advaitins to push the Nyaya theory of nirvikalpaka to its logical conclusion and to maintainthat the true nirvikalpaka is one in which Brahman, the only absolute and permanent reality,is presented. This 5s, indeed, one of the several instances in whichthe Advaitic Monist effectively uses a weapon made in 170 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PAUT iu the Nyaya forge against its maker himself to annihilate his pluralistic universe. Jayantabhatta, an authorita tive exponent of Nyaya, observes in a significant manner that the only way in which one may get out of the mess which various Indian theorists have made of the content of nirvikalpaka would be by adopting the view that the same reality that is presented in savifcal paka is presented in the nirvikalpaka, the only difference between them being that the former is invariably boundup with a linguistic scheme or verbal image while the latter is not and cannot be specifically articulated through any verbal expression. The sub-joined extracts from the Nyayamanj.iri (Viz. S. S. page 99)deserve a careful consideration in this connection: "Tasmad ya cva vastvatma savikalpasya gocarah ; Sa eva nirvikalpasya Sabdollckhavivarjitah. Kimatmako'saviti ccd yad yada pratibhasatc\ Vastupramitayascaiva prastavya na tit vadinah. Kvacijjatih kvociddravyam kvacitkarma kvacid gunah , Yadevasavikalpena tadev&nena grhyate. Iha tabdaMisandhanwnatramabhyadhikam param"The Nyaya-Vaiseika definition of pratyaksto (sense-perception) generally imibts that sense-data forra its essential feature and that it is invariablythe result of a special type of relation called s&ttnikarsa between a sense and an object. This definition takes into account only perceptual experiences which are pfo duted from certain causes and does not hold good in the case of the eternal omniscience whidi is also called CH, 1} PERCEPTION 171 and which is ascribed to God. Strictly speak ing, the etymology of the word fraiyaksa would sup port its application only to perceptual experiences arising from the senses. However, usage has extendedthe term to all cognitions which are characterised byimmediacy. God's omniscience has the highest degree of immediacy conceivable. So, in order to cover nitya pratyafesa, also, perception is defined as a cognition which does not arise through the instrumentality of another cognition ; (jnanakaranakam jnanam prat yaksam). It should be remembered that, though a determinate perception arises from an indeterminate perception, the latter does not operate as karana (efficient instrument). It would be desirable to consider here whether per ception, in the sense in which it is used in the Nyaya*Vaiesika system, may correctly be called intuition. Without misapprehension, the term intuition may be used with reference to perception (pratyaksa), only in the sense that it possesses a comparatively greater degree of immediacy, as compared with non-perceptual cogni tions. If intuition should be taken to exclude absolutely mediacy of any kind whatever, the praiyaksa of the Nyaya system, which arises through a special kind ofrelation between an object and a sense-organ, cannotbe callel intuition. In the strict sense of the termintuition, it may be proper to use it only withreference to what is sometimes called pratibkd or the innate Capacity of the mind to immediatelyperceive certain things ; and it may also be appropriate to describe the Advaitic realisation of the one absolute 172 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART m reality as intuition, in view of the fact that it results from the intuitive faculty of mind to perceive reality -coming to have a full, free and efficient play after the required preliminary discipline of studying and under standing (fravana),reflective thinking (manana) andconstant meditation (nididhyasana).In fact, in the Nyaya system, all knowledge is mediate in a sense, except the eternal knowledge ascribed to God, evenindeterminate perception depending upon the mediationof a special kind of relation between sense-organ andobject ( indriyarthasannikarsa ). The Bha^ta MImamsakas adopt, for all practical purposes, the Nyaya definition of perception andwould, like Naiyayikas, lay special stress on indri ysrthasannifcarsa. The Prabhakaras, on the other hand, define perceptionas 'direct awareness* (sdksat pratltih)', and according to them, even recollection* inference and such other cognitions, usually considered non-perceptual in their character, are really perceptual on the subjective side, in so far as they themselves andthe knower are concerned (svSmie jnatramse ca), though they are non-perceptual on the objective side, in so far as their objects are concerned (visayatnse). The Advaitic theoryof perception rightly points out that the Nyaya view gives undue prominence to indri ytirthasannikarsa and belittles the importance of the element of immediacy which ought to be treated as the essential element in pratyaksa. The Advaitins seek to remedy this defect by treating sense-relation as anantecedent necessary only for certain kinds of percep- CH. i] PERCEPTION tion and by insisting that immediacy consistingin subject-object-unity is the essential feature of all per ceptual forms of experience, and not sense-relation. Consistently with usage in language,ihe Advaitins dis tinguish the pratyaksatva (perceptuality) of a cogni tion from the pratyaksatva (perceivedness) of anobject. They describe cognition (jfiana) as pratyaksa(perceptual experience), when it comes to be unified for the time being with its object,in the sense that consciousness as conditioned by cognition (pramana caitanya or vrttyavacchinnacaitanya} becomes equatedwith consciousness as conditioned by object (visaya caitanya). In a similar way, they describe an object (visaya) as pratyaksa (perceived), when the knower(pramdtrcaitanya) becomes equatedwith object or consciousness as conditioned by object (visayacaitanya)* It maybe noticed here that the idea that immediacy in the sense of subject-object-unity forms the essential element in pratyaksa has turned out to be wholly foreign to Nyaya realism, mainly because the relational schemeon which the realistic edifice of Nyaya is erected con sists entirely of external relations, and because the object-subject-relation (risaymisayibhtlru),in parti cular, is conceived of as being entirely external in its character, chiefly with a view to keeping the dangerousidealist always at a safe distance. 30 (*) T The sense- relation (san nikarsa) which causes a percep tual cognition is of six kinds - viz., contact, inherence in what 174 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART tn has come into contact, inherence in what is inherent in a thing which has come in to contact, inherence, inherence in an in herent thing and adjunct-sub stantive relation. When a jar is perceived by the sense of sight, the sense relation is 'contact'. When the colour of a jaris seen, the sense relation is 'inherence in a thing which has come into contact', the jar, in that case, having come into contact with the visual sense and colour being connected with the jar through the relation of inherence. When colourness (rtipatva)in the colour of a jar is seen, the sense-relation is 'inherence in what is inherent in a thing which has come into contact'; for, in that case, the jar has come into contact with the visual sense, the colour of the jar inheres in it and colour ness inheres in colour. When sound is perceived by the sense of hearing, 'inherence' is the sense-relation; for, the ether bound within the auricular orifice is the auditory sense,. t] PERCEPTION 175 sound is a quality of ether, and the relation between a quality and its substratum is inherence. When soundness (sabdatvd) is perceived by the auditory sense, the sense-relation is 'inherence in a thing which inheres'; for, soundness inheres in sound which inheres in the auditory sense. In the perception of non existence, the adjunct-substan tive-relation is the sense-relation ; for in the case jf the visual per ception which takes the form "The seat of the non-existence of jar is floor", the 'non-exis tence of jar' is an adjunct to the floor with which the visual sense has come into contact. Thus the cognition which arises from one or the other of these six sense-relations is per ception ; and sense-organ is its efficient instrument (Tarawa), Therefore, the senses constitute the efficient instrt^nent of per ceptual experience (pratyakfa* pram&na). [THUS ENDS THE CHAPTER ON PERCEPTION]* 176 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC In the foregoing portion of the text, the schemeof sannikarsa adopted by the Naiyayikas is set forth. The term sannikarsa is used in a technical sense; it is not a mere relation, nor is it exactly contact, for the word 'contact' is generally taken to be equivalent to samyoga. It would be correct to describe sannikarsa as a special type sense-relation which determines and constitutes the extent of the perceptive reach or range of the sense-organs. In Nyaya literature, the term sannikarsa is generally used in this technical sense. The scheme of sannikarsa set forth above relates to normal perception (laukikapralyaksa) and com prises normal sense-relations (laukikasannikarsa}. The Nyaya-Vaisesika theory rcpii'dintf the nature and constitution of the sense-organs (indriya) is already set forth on pages 65, 66 and 68 supra. According to the Naiyayikas, the visual sense (fafow/i), constituted as it is by light, travels to the spot where the visible objects happen to be and visualize them and it is there fore said to be prapyakarin; the remaining senses are said be aprftyyakarin,in the sense that they do not leave their place but, remaining where they are, they perceive the objects which come within their reach. Some early exponents of the Nyaya-Vaisesika system, like Jayantabhajta and Srldhara, hold that all the senses are pr&pyak&rins> in the sense that they function with reference to objects within their reach, it being immaterial whether a sense reaches an object or an object reaches a sense. Samavdya (inherence)is CH.I] PERCEPTION 177 recognized as a distinct type of sannikarsa in order to account for the auditory perception of sound. TheNyaya theory of the perception of sound (fabdaprrt* yaksa) is already set forth and explained on pages 101 to 104 supra. The Nyaya view regarding the percep tion of non-existence is that, through the help of effectual non-cognition (^iiyytihHpalaltilii), a sense organ perceives the non-existence of an object which is perceptible to it. As a rule, a sense-organ which perceives an object can also perceive its j&ti (generic attribute) and its abhava (non-existence). The Nyayaview regarding this matter is usually expressed in this Sanskrit dictum "Yenendriyena yd vyaktih grhy^ie% tannistha jatih tadabhavasca tenendriyenaiva grhyate". It is necessary, in this connection again,to refer to pages 45 and 46 su'fira. The relation of v\$e$ana visefyabhava, which is recognized as the sannikarfa connecting non-existence with a bense-organ, is, in fact, an indirect relation iiuvliin^ one or the other of the other sannikarsas. For instance, in the visual percep tion of the non-existence of jar (ghat&bh&va) as adjunct of the empty floor (bhutala),the visual sense comes into contact (samyoga)with the empty floor with which the non-existence of jar is connected as adjunct ; so, the complete chain of sannikarsa, in this case, is not mere vise$anata, but caksussamyuktavife- $anata (being adjunct to a thing with which the visual sense has come into contact). In the case of iriner perception through the inner >ense (antarindriya)called manas,it is necessary to 178 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART m recognize three distinct sense-relations; viz., samyoga,samyuktasamavaya and samyuktasamavetasamavdya, in order to account respectively lor ihe mental perception (mdnasapratyaksa)of the soul (atman),of the cogni tion in it and of cognitionness (jnauatra).In connec tion with the auditory perception of sound (fabda) and soundness (fabdatva),it is necessary to iccognize two distinct sense-relations : viz., samavaya and sawa vetaswnav&ya. The sense relation of visesanavisesya bhava is necessary to account for the perception of non-existence. Would it be necessary to use the first three sense-relations (samyoga etc.)in accounting for external perception through the external senses other than the auditory sense? No substance which does not possess at least the minimum degree of mahattva(largeness) can be perceived by an external sense; and in the case of every external perception of substance or quality other than sound, association with mahattva is a necessary condition. So, in all cases of external perception, except auditory perception, one has to take into account only composite substances (avayavin), from a triad (iryanuka) upward.It would appear that, in such cases, the first two sense-relations may be dispensed with, and the third samyuktasamavetasama v&ya would be quite adequate to account for any per ception. For instance, the visual perception of a triad of earth (prlhivitryanuka) or its colour (rtipa) or its colourness (rfcpatva) can easily the accounted for by taking sathyuktasamavetasamovGya as the sense-rela tion;this chain should be understood in the first case (tryanuka) as consisting of contact between the visual CH.I] PERCEPTION 17$ sense and the atoms, the inherence of dyads in those atoms and the inherence of the triad in those dyads J the first link in this chain in the second case (r&pa) is contact between dyads and the visual sense; and m the third case (rupatza) ,the first link in this chain is contact between the triad and the visual sense. To the above question, the Nyaya theorists replythat the first three sense-relations are indispensable and explain thei^ necessity in this way. Take, for instance, visual percep* tion ; the conditions of visual perception such as udbh&* tar&pa (perceptible colour) and mahattva (largeness) should be regarded as the co-existing determinants (avacchedaka) of contact with the visual sense (indriya samyoga) ; it would not do if they are associated in somemanner with^ffie object visualized; otherwise, the earth* ness (prihivltva)in the atoms of earth and the blueness (nllatva) in the blue colour \\ -i , :: to an atom of earth should be visualized, the former (prthivltva) being asso^ ciated with largeness (mahattva) in a jar and the latter (riilatva) being associated in some manner with large* ness through the blue colour of a jar; or otherwise, as a result of indirect association with mahattva andudbhfttarftpa in a jar, the jati called sattft should bevisualized in air (vdyu) as well as its touch (sparSa); in order to avoid these absurdities, mahattva and stui other conditions in the case of visual perception should be referred to as avacchedaka (co-existing determinantof contact with the visual sense (caksttssamyoga),in all cases of visual perception ;In these circumstaftcel^ it becomes necessary to leave entirely out of account: contact between the visual sense and atoms or djads; WO A PRIMER OR INDIAN LOGIC [PAIT id thus, samyoga, samyuktasamavaya and samyuktasama fttastmav&ya are shown to be indispensable iti account ing for external perception of a substance (dravya), LU Duality (guna) and the generic attribute (; it woiiid be possible to account for fragrance bting brought within the scope of the visual perception of sandal, the requiredsense-relation being fotmi in the cognition of fragranceness (saufabhatva) the generic feature Of fragrance. But the presentation of &aura~ bhatva in the visual perception of sandal cannot be accounted for by means of s&m&nyalatisan since saufabhatva is a fati and is therefore presented in cognition as adjunct by itstlf (svarupatah) and not as delimited by any attribute. In this case, it becomesunavoidably necessary to recognize jnGnalatsanasaHni k&rsa as distinct from samdnyal&ksana. Further, wherea person mistakes nacre for silver in visual perception and has the anuvyavasayaf l see silver*, silvernessCH. ij PERCEPTION IHS (tajatttva) is presented in the inner consciousness of visual perception through jfi&nalaksana, and not through sam&nyalafcsana; for, in the latter case, the generic attribute, whose cognition is proposed to be treated as sannifearsa, should be present in the subs tantive (vifesya) actually perceived, and in the present instance^ silverness is not present in the nacre which is seen. On these grounds, the Naiyayikas maintain that jnanalaksana should be taken to form a distinct type of super-normal sannikarsa. They also hold, on the strength of the evidence furnished by the Yogaf&stra, that the super-normal capacity, which the mind(manas) acquires througli the yogic practice, constitutes the third variety of alaukikasannikarsa described as yogajadharmalaksana. This variety of super-normal sense-relation enables any sense to reach any object. The Nyaya theory of alaukikasannikafsa seeks to account for certain cognitions which really stand' on the border line between ordinary perceptual cognitions and non-perceptual cognitions and wouldappear to be more akin to the former than to the latter. The Mimamsakas and the Advaitins are not in favourof this theory and refuse to recognize any special type of pratyaksa known as alaukikapratyakf&. These oppo nents of the Nyaya theory argue thus. Universal judgments relating to smokes and fires in general terms are the result of the synthesis which a thinker's mindis capable of making; this synthesis is sometimes effect ed through a negative process and sometimes through a positive process; in the case of a negative synthesis,, particular individuals only are observed and brought 186: A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PxiT ill into relation with each other as determined by certain generic features, the individualities of the individuals being entirely ignored for the moment; such a negative synthesis may well be brought under normal perceptual process (laukikapratayksa).In positive synthesis, a generalisation of all the conceivable individuals, with out ignoring their individualities, is definitely contem plated and is effectuated by the thinker's mind passing from particulars to universals; the mental process in volved in such a positive synthesis is essentially one of inference. In cases like the visual perception of sandal as fragrant (surabhi candanam), one may see easily a jumble of visual perception of sandal and recollection of fragrance through association of ideas. Even in the case of yogic perception, what happens, in fact, is that the normal reach of the mind comes to be immenselyextended by yogic powers through the great potentiali ties of the mind becoming actualised in experience; andall instances of yogic perception may be accounted for, without the help of the theory of super-normal sense relation, either as ntanasapratyaksa (inner perception) or as vivid recollection of the past, or as vivid imagi nation of future possibilities. Mtmarhsa theorists dis card the doctrine of yogic perception altogether. However, it should be observed here that the Nyaya theory of alaukikapralyak$a (super- normal per ception) rests on reasons which should not be lightly brushed aside and which are worthy of very careful consideration. In the first place, it may be noted that, in every case which a Naiyayika would bring under the CH. i] PERCEPTION 187 super-normal variety of perception, the mediacy whichis characteristic of non-perceptual cognitions is entirely missing and the immediacy- which is characteristic ofperceptual cognitions is invariably felt to be present. In cases of external perception, where cognition of a or cognition of some other kind is treated as rsd) the mind is entirely subordinated to a sense and if certain impressions derived from previous ex perience get mixed up with perceptual elements, such impressions come to be divested, for the time being, of their non-perceptual character and invested with a sense-bound, perceptual garb. The inner consciousness (anuyyavasaya) of disciplined minds, which takes a form like this "I sec a fragrant sandal" (surabhi can danam pasydmi), is certainly an evidence which the KTaiyayikas feel bound to respect and rely upon, in this connection. CHAPTER II INFERENCE [[31]] (a) Anum&na (Inference) is the efficient instrument (karana)of inferential cogni tion. (&) Inferential cognitionis a cognition which arises fromsubsutnptive reflection (par&-marfa). (c) Paramarsa (subsump* tive reflection)is a cognition which cognizes the presence ofthe invariably concomitant factor denoted by the middle term (probans)in the thing denoted by the minor term. Forinstance, the cognition, "This mountain has smoke which is invariably concomitant with fire" is a subsumptive reflection; and the cognition resulting from it and taking the form"mountain has fire" is inferential cognition. CH. uj INFERENCE (d) "Wtewer there is smoke there is fire" 'This type of invariable concomitance is vyapti (co-extension). (e) Subject- adjunctness (paksadharmata) consists in the invariable concomitant (vyfyya) being presentin things like a mountain (denoted by pak$a or the minor term). S\4num&natas its etymologicalsense indicates is afte**p*oof. It is after-proofin the sense that it uses the knowledge derived from perception (pratyaksa)or verbal testimony (agama) and helps the mind to marchon further and add to its knowledge/) As Vitsyayanaputs it, it is equivalent to anvfllsu; and the Nyayasystem is called anviksiki, for the reason that its immediate and chief aim is to elucidate the nature ofanumana or anviksd as a pramana. (PratyaksQga masritam anum&nam; sd anvlk$a; taya pravwrtata ityanviTzsikl ny&yavidya nyQyasQstram. ) Seeing that verbal testimony is not recognizedas a distinct pfatn&na by the Bauddhas and the Vaiseikas, the Nyaya writers prefer to consider sabda at the end and rightly proceed to consider anum&na immediately after pratyakfd* fIt would be interestingto note here how the Njayfirealist deals with the criticism that all knowledge mayy in a sense, be brought under inference and that evenperceptual experience may be brought under inference* It may well be contended that, in the visual experience 190 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART m of a composite structure like a horse, only certain parts of the animal come into relation with the sense of sight and several parts do not, in fact, come into relation with the sense; and that in such cases, the experience of the whole, of which we become conscious, must betaken as inferencer^Gautamahimself refers to this contention in II ]K-31 and indicates how this difficulty inay be met by using the N) aya theory that the com posite whole (avayavin) is entirely different from its parts (avayavah). /The Nyaya theorists claim that their conception of paTts and whole as entirelydifferent entities has as its chief advantage the preservation of the province of pratyaksa from being wholly swallowedup in the province of anumana.j In the case of every pram&na, the karana (special or efficient instrument), the vydpdra (intermediatecause) and the/>/*a/a (final result) should be carefully distinguished. In the case of anumana (instrument ofinferential experience) the knowledge of co-extension (vy&ptijnana} is karana; substimptive reflection (paramarfa) is vyapara; and inferential experience(anumiti) is phala. Students of Nyaya, before they proceed to study the Chapter on anum&na, should start with a clear con ception of the meanings of the technical terms paksdf sadhya and hetu or sddhana. They are usually rendeF ecTrespecilvely by theTEnglish equivalents minor term, major term and middle term. But it should be remem bered here that these English terms have primaryreference to certain terms constituting syllogistic CH. n] INFERENCE 191 expression; whereas, in Sanskrit Nyava, the termdenoting paksa corresponds to the minor term, the term. pakfa itselFstandlng for'the subs'uritTve with reference to which something has to be inferred or inferentially predicated; the term denoting sadhya corresponds to the major term, the term sadhya itself standTngTorTlie thing that is sought to be inferred or inferentially pre dicated with reference to paksa; and the term denoting hetu or sddhana corresponds^Jo the middle term, the term Jietu'or jflrf/wfia'ltseTf standin^ToFflieTe^son orground which is invariably concomitant with whatissought to be inferred and whose ^"fenowlcHgcTeadsJo inference. Thus, one may see in the Indian terminology itselfevidence of a fundamental difference in the wayin which the topic of inference is treated in Indian logic as compared with the way in which European tradition deals with that topic such difference consistingin greater stress being laid on the material aspects ofinference by the exponents of the Nyaya-Vaisetkasystem and undue stress being laid by European tradi tion on the formal side of syllogistic expression. Annambhatta defines anumili as a cognition pro duced by subsumptive reflection (parfimarfa). This definition, as it is, may be applied even to a perceptual experience following a doubt and arising from a sub sumptive reflection. With reference to a man standing at a distance, a doubt may arise in twilight, as to whether he is a man or a post. As one approaches the object, the cognition "This object has hands and such other features as are found invariablyassociated with 192 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [flu? m humanity'1(purufatvavytipyakaradimGn ayam) arises; and immediately follows the perceptual experience "This is a man" (ayam purtt$ah). Such cases of sam$ayottarapratyak$a (perceptual decision following a doubt) and arising from the reflective perception of certain particulars (vise$aparamarsa) are not instances of anwniti and have to be excluded by the adjunct 'in Association with the pakfattf (pak$atQsahakrta) so that foe complete definition of anumiti will be this nAtiumitiJiS a cognition which is produced by subsump tive reflection in association with subjectness What is paksatG (subjectness)? The earlier school of Nyaya understood subjectness as consisting in 'doubt regarding the presence of probandum' (sddhyasandeha) or, in other words, understood a paksa to be the substantive with reference to which onedoubts whether one may correctly predicate something or not. This view of pak$ata ignores the fact that s&dhyasandeha (doubt regarding prodandum) is not a necessary condition of inference and that a person whohas actually seen clouds on the sky may also infer their presence from their peal of thunder. The later Naiyayikas seek to remove this defect in the earlier definition of paksata and suggest a modified definition which may be stated thus: "Pakfatd, (subjectness) amounts to the absence of such indubious knowledge ofthe probandum as is associated with the absence of adesire to establish the probandum" (sifddhayiftiviraha pakfata). In experience, it is CH. 11] INFERENCE found that indubious knowledge of the frobandum(sadhyasiddhi) prevents inference unless there is apositive desire to arrive at the same result throughinference. Sadhyasiddhi is thus a counteracting agent preventing animiti (anumjtipratibatodhaka) andsi$ddhayi$d neutralises the influence of the counter* acting agent and is therefore uttejaka. Pak$ata thus reduces itself to non-existence of such counteracting agent as is associated with the absence of the neutralising agent (MttejakdbhdvaviSistam yat prati bandhakam tadabhavah}. When the Naiyayikas include pal^ata in the causal equipment necessary foi anumiti, they do not assume anything unusual, but are simply applying to the specific effect, anumiti, the general principle that uttejakabhavavitistapratl* bandha'kdbhdva is one of the things making up the causal complement of an effect. It must be remem*bered that universal sadhyasiddhi in every conceivable instance of fiaksa prevents the inference of the sanre sddhya in some of the paksasas also in all paksas i whereas partial sadhyasiddhi in some tfaksas prevents only the inference of the same sddhya in some pakfas. Universal s&dhyasiddhi is technically"described as paksafavacchedakavacchedena sadhyasiddhi and may be embodied in a proposition like this"All S is P '\ Inference of the same sddhya in all paksas is likewise described as paksatavacchedakavacchedetoa anumiti and embodied in a proposistion like this<* All S is P ". " Some S is P" a proposition of this type embodies partial sddhyasiddhi, which is technically described as fralteQtavacchedakas&mtinadhikaranyena sddhyasiddhi. 13 194 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART m An inference which may be embodied in a propo sition like "Some S is P" is prevented by anys&dhyasiddhi, universal or partial, while the inference in the form "All S is P" is prevented only by uni versal sddhyasiddhi. It should also be remembered that, when the conditions necessaryfor having the perception of a certain object are present along with those neces sary for inferringthe same object, only the perception of that object arises and not its inference; but in cases where the conditions necessary for perceiving an object are present along with those required for inferring another object, inference would arise and not perception. The Naiyayikas insist that, in every case of infe rence, quick or slow, inference for oneself or inference for others, subsumptive reflection (jMamgri^^jL^nindispensable anTeeed^nt"^lnct^"sTiould, therefore, be treated as cause of anumiti. cognition which arises from a combination of the knowledge ofInvariable concomitancet '(vya'pfijnana^ and that of the presence of the reason (hetu)in the suEject CJ>ttfcja) technically known as paksadharmatd jft&na.^In the stock example of inference "The hill hasTire; because it has smoke", the pardmarsa takes the form "The hill has smoke, which is invariably con comitant with fire" (vahnivydpyadh&mavdn parvatah) ; ^nd it is contended by the Naiyayikas that, in the absence of such a pardmarfa, anumiti does not arise. This cognitive complex called pardtnarfa is also knownas lingapardmarsa or trtiyalingaparamarfa (thethird cognition of the reason). The cognition 6f the presenceCH. n] INFERENCE 195 of the lingo, (reason)in the subject (paksa) may be said to be the first lingapardmarfa; the cognition of the in variable relation between linga and sddhya is the second lirigaparamarsa; and the complex cognition which arises from these two cognitions is the third lingapardmarSa. The MImamsakas and the Vedantins who follow them hold that the complex cognition called pardmarSais not indispensable for anumiti, though it mayactually arise just before anumiti in many cases. In our experience, we are conscious of having anumiti directly after becoming aware of the presence of the hetu (reason) in the paksa (subject) and rememberingvydpti (invariable concomitance) and without anyintervening pardmarsa. In such cases, the Naiyayikas also cannot help recognizing causal relation (kdrya kdranabhdva) between anumiti on the one side and the two .,": referred toon the other side (vydpti jndna and paksadharmatdjnana} ;and in cases wherepardmarsa intervenes, they should recognize another causal relation (kdryafcaranabhdva) between pardmariaand anumiti. Thus the MImamsakas argue and maintain that, in order to avoid this difficulty,it would be neces sary to treat anumiti as the effect of vydptijndna andpak$adharmatdjndna and to exclude pardmarSa fromthe causal complement of anumiti. The Naiyayikas, however, point out that it would be much simpler to connect every case of anumiti with pardmarsa as its cause and to assume that, even in cases where anumitiappears to arise directly from vydptijndna and pa%fa~dharmat&jndna, there is an intervening pardmarSathough one may not be conscious of it on account of the 196 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART in quick passage of the mind from the stage of paksa dharmatdjfidna to the stage of inference. The con troversy between the Mimarhsakas and Naiyayikas, as to whether anumiii should be taken as the effect of the two cognitions vydptijndna and pak$adharmatdjfidna or as the effect of the complex cognition called para marfa, appears to hinge on the principle of parsimony(Idghava) and turns out to be a consideration of the greater or smaller degree of cumbersomeness which onemight notice in the MImamsaka's or the JTaiyayika's way of defining the causal relation between anumiti and its cause. However, a careful estimation of the arguments advanced by the Mimarhsakas and the Naiyayikas would reveal the significance of the insis tence in Nyaya on pardmarsa being treated as indis pensable. If subsumption to a generalisation be the essential element in inference, it is obvious that infe rence of fire in a hill cannot arise from the perception of smoke in it, until the particular smoke in the hill is subsumed under the generalisation involving vydpti between smoke and fire; and the Naiyayikas insist that subsumption is the essential feature of inference and insist therefore that every anumiti should betaken to be preceded by pardmarta, which is but a subsumptive reflection subsuming the smoke in the hill under the pre-established vyapii. The Bhatta Mimarhsakas, onthe other hand, hold that it is the subsultive, rather than the subsumptive, passage of the mind from the observed relation of particulars to a certain unobserved particular, that characterises the inferential process of thought; and this view accounts for their attitude CH. n] INFERENCE 197 towards partimarSa. From the following exposition of vyapti, the difference between the views of the Mimamsakas and the Naiyayikas would become further clarified. What .is vytipt4? Annambhatta's definition of vyaptijisLthat it consJtjJjxJj}Ji4/tf (reason or probans) being co-existent with the sadhya (probandumor the ining to be "Tn ferentiall} "Vstablislied ) ,which is per vasive of the hetu (hetuvydpaka). To be pervasive ^^af^aJ^ml^Q context of anumiti, means 'never being the counter-correlative (ptatiyogin)of a negation (abhdva) which is co-existent with hetu.9 In an infe rence, where smoke is the hetu and fire is the sadhyato say that there is ^3^'Lj[.invariable Concomitance)between smoke and fire impliesthe followingtli'ingS, according to this definition. Firstly,it implies that fire and smoke co-exisXJnthe particular form and throughthe particular relation, with reference to which they are intended to be treated as hetu and sadhya respectively, the particular form of hetuandsddhya being technically called hetutavacchedakadharma and sadhyatdvacche dakadharma and the particular relations intended to determine the co-existence of hetu and sadhya being technically known as hetuidvacchedakasambandha andsddhyatdvacchedakasambandha. Secondly, it implies that, with reference to the same hetut&vacchedaka dharma, sddhyatdvacchedakadharma, hetutdvaccheda kasambandha and sddhyatdvcchedakasambandha, fire is never the counter-correlative (pratiypgin) of anynegation which co-exists with smoke. Where fire in a hill is inferred from smoke, fire is sadhya, fifeness 198 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART in (vahnitva) is said to be s&dhyat&vcchedakadharma in the sense that fire is proposed to be treated as sddhya in its general and universal form as fire, andnot in any other form such as that of a substance (dravya) ; smokeness (dhumatva) is said to be hetuta vacchedakadharma in the sense that smoke is proposed to be treated as hctu in its general and universal formas smoke, and not in anyother form; and conjunction or contact (samyoya) is said to be sadhyatavacchcdaka sambandha, as also hetutaracchcdakasambandtoa, in the sense that fire and smoke, in their respective form as sfidhya and hetu, are proposed to be treated as connect ed with paksa (subject), through the relation of con tact, and not through any other relation such as inherence (samavaya)or self-linking relation (svarupa). In later Nyaya literature, based on Gangesopa dhyaya's Tattvacint&mani, two types of definitions of vy&pti are distinguished, one type beingcalled siddhanta laksana and the other type beingcalled purvapaksa iaksana or purvapaksavyapti. The definition explained in the preceding para representsthe former type and is briefly set forth in this Sanskrit formula: Hetuvya pakasSdhyasanianQdhikaranyam vyaptih. This defini tion, when fully amplified, comes to include the hetutavacchedakadharma, sadhyatavacchedakadharnta9 hetutdvacchedakasambandha and sadhyat&vacchedaka sambatodha. It is affirmative in its main form, the latter half being affirmative, though the adjuncthetuvyQpaka reduces itself to the negative form hetu sam&n8dhikarandtyantabhavdpratiyogin ( which is CH. 11] INFERENCE 199 never the counter-correlative of any negation co-exist ing with the reason). The other type of definition of vyapti is known aspnri'apaksalaksana in the sense that it is provisional and prima facie satisfactory. It is generally putin anegative ^form. A typical instance of pftrvapahsavydptiis this: Co-extension (vyapti) consists in non-exis tence of the probans in every place where the probandum(sadhya) does not exist (sadhyabhavavadavrttitvam).This definition also, when fully amplified, comes to in clude the hetntavacchedakadharma^adhyatavacchedalta dharma, hctutavacchcdakasambandha and sadhyata vacchcdakasambandha. This prima facie definition ofvyapti is negative in its main part and is a direct amplification of the conception of avinabhava. Thecontrast between the tv/o phrases avinabhava andsdhacaryaniyama should be clearly understood. Theformer phrase is more commonly used in earlier N> aya literature and the latter in later literature. Vin&means 'without'; a-bhava means non-existence; anda-vina-bhava means non-existence (of the probans or helu) without or in the absence (of the probandum or sadhya). This is the basis of purvapaksavyapti whichis generally negative in its form. The other phrase sdhacaryaniyama which is used by Annambhatta is equivalent to niyatasahacarya, \\ hich means invariable co-existence. This forms the basis of what is referred to above as siddhantavy&pti. The prima facie defini tion of vydpti set forth above is defective. It does not hold good incases where the sadhya happens to he a 200 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART in thing whose non-existence anywhere is inconceivable (kevalanvayl) ,like abhideyatva (namableness) ; nordoes it apply to the hetu in syllogisms like: "A quality (guna) has existence (satta), because it has a generic attribute (jaii)".It will be seen that non-existence of the probans in a place where the probandum does not e&ist can be conceived of only when its existence in such a place through the specific relation in view (helutavacchedakasambandha) is conceivable and that, in the latter instance referred to, the presence of the ptobans, jati, through the relation of inherence, whichis the specific relation in view, in a place like sdmanya-jwhere the probandum (satta)is not present, is incon ceivable. In order to get over difficulties of this kind, thesiddhantalaksana or conclusive definition of vyapti is put forward. The term vyapti literally means pervasion and lays stress on the universal character of the relation Tceptin view. The phrase 'universal connection' ""brings' out exactly the meaning of the term vyapti. In"" early "Nyaya literature, Ihe term avindbhava is frequently used as the equivalent of vytipti. It should be observed that this term, avinGbhSva, brings into prominence the invariable character of the relation kept in view. Thetwo ^concepts, universality and invariableness, implj ^Scfi other; but they are not identical. A careful xlraination of early Nyaya literature would show that, from Kanada and Gautama downward, all the leading exponents of the Nyaya- VaiSesika system were quite familiar with the ideas of universality and invariable- CH. n] INFERENCE 201- ness as forming the essential elements in the conception of vyspti. Vatsyayana, who preceded Dignaga, defini tely makes use of the conception of avinabh&va in his Bhasya on the sutras 2-2-1, 2-2-2 and 2-2-61. Thevery conception of vyabhicGra as a fallacy (hctvabhtisa) presupposes the invariableness of the relation called avinabhdva or vyapti. Patanjali, in his Mahabhaya (on 3 2 124), shows a definite knowledge of the universal character of the relation called vytipti. In the face of these facts,it would be unreasonable to hold, as Professor Keith does, that the doctrine of indissoluble or invariable relation (avindbhava) is Dignaga's special contribution to Indian logic and that Prasastapada and others borrowed this idea fromDignaga and developed it. In this connection, atten tion is invited to the article on "The evolution ofvydpti'' contributed by one of my former pupils, Mr.A. S. Krishna Rao, M.A., in partI Volume I, (1927)of the Journal of Oriental Research, Madras. What is the exact nature of the relation of vy&pti, or avinabhdva? How is it arrived at? Is it arrived at through perceptual experience? Or does it represent itself the result of an inferential .process? If vydpti in its universal form is the basis of inferential reasoning* does it not already contain in itself the result of the inferential process and does it not render inference wholly superfluous? Questions like these were raised and answered both by Naiyayikas and Mimarfisakas of the early and later schools. It would be of great value to students of Indian logic to pay some attention to 202 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART in these questions. Vatsyayana remarks in his Bhasya on1-1-37, that the parallelism between the probans as found in the paksa and the probans as found in the example (udaharana), on which the probative character of the probans rests,is very subtle and diihcult to explain and can be well understood only by men of great learning. (Tadidam heiudaharanayoh ^sadhar myam paramasak$Mam duhkhabodhain panditarupa vedaniyamiti). The Bhasypk&ra sa>s this, not because he was quite innocent of the nature of the invariable or universal relation called avlnabhara or vyafpti, as Professor Keith and some others may fancy, but because, perhaps, he was keenlyalive to the difficulty in satisfactorily answering the questions raised at the beginning of this para and to the snares and pitfalls in the way of generalisation. Uddyotakara, Vacaspatimisra, Jayanta and someother early writers on Ny&ya describe vy&pti as an un conditioned or necessary relation which is not broughtabout by any adventitious circumstance anaupadhikahsambandhah. For instance, that smoke is pervaded byfire, i.e., that dhunia is vahnivyCipya*\$ a necessary and un conditioned relation and does not depend upon any adven titious circumstance; whereas, the relation of vyapti embodied in the proposition 'Wherever there is fire, there is smoke' is not a necessary and unconditioned relation and depends upon the association of fire withthe adventitious contact of wet fuel with fire (Urdren dhanasamyoga). Such adventitious circumstances are called upddhayah. An upadhi is an adventitious factor which is invariabiy concomitant with the p CH. n] INFERENCE 203 (s&dhyavydpaka) and not so with the probaw(sadhanavyapaka).It is called u'p&dhi becabse asUdayana explains, its invariable concomitance with the probandum comes to be erroneously associated with the probans, just in the same way as the redness of a japQ (China rose) is erroneously associated with a crystal (sphatika-) in its vicinity. To define vyapti as anau pddhikasambandha is significantin several ways. In the first place, it shows that the earlier schools of Indian logic, which adopted this definition, do not defi nitely insist upon any conscious process of generalisa tion or universalisation preceding inference. Secondly, according to the early schools, it should be made out that the connection between the probans (hetu) andprobandum (sddhya)is necessary. Thirdly,in order to satisfy oneself that the connection in question in volves necessity, one should know that it is not due to association with any adventitious circumstance, i.e., that it is w&bhavika and not aupddhika. Further, this definition clearly lays greater stress on the element of necessity in the relation between the hetu and sddhyathan on the element of invariableness. It should, how ever, be remembered, in this connection, that Gautamawho recognised vyabhicdra or absence of invariableness as a fallacy, and Vatsyayana and Prasastapada whodefinitely referred in their works to the concept of avindbhdva as an essential element in anum&na, werefully alive to the importance of the idea of invariable ness in vyapti. What is the form in which the relation of vy&pti comes to be known and leads to inference? How does 204 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART in it come to be known ? According to Annambhatta, whofollows GangeSopadhyaya in this as in several other matters, the cognition of vyapti (vy&ptijfi&na) atise&in the form of a universal generalisation which is usually embodied in the proposition "Wherever there is smokethere is fire" (yatrayatra dhumah tatra vahnih),or in the proposition "Whatever has smoke, has fire" (yo yo dhumavan so'gniman) ;in a statement of vyapti, the vy&pya (pervaded)should be first referred to and the vydpaba should be the principal predicate; aijcj the cognition of vyapti arises usually from the observation ofTfie co-existence of smoke and fire in one or moreinstances, in the absence of any knowledge of a place where the hetu is present and the sddhya is not present' Annambhatta criticises the view that the relation of in variable concomitance is known through bhuyodarsanaor repeated observation. As Nllakantha points out, the Sanskrit phrase bhtiyo'darsana is ambiguous. It may refer to the frequent repetition of the same obser vation or to observation of several instances of the stidhya and hctu or to observation of the co-existence of the sddhya and hetu in several places. In any ofthese senses, though the observation of the co-existence of hetu and sddhya may be repeated a thousand times, vy&pti cannot be made out, if, even in a single instance, the hetu is known to be present in the absence of the stidhya. So, following the Manikara, Annambhattapoints out that a knowledge of the co-existence of the hetu and sSdhya in association with the absence of a knowledge of the presence of the hetu where the s&dhyais not present (vyabhicdrajnanavirahasahakrtam svha-CH. n] INFERENCE 205 c&rajnanam) causes vyaptijnana. Knowledge of vya bhicftfa may arise in the form of a doubt or one maybe sure of the presence of this defect. In the latter case, unless it is shown that such knowledge is erro neous, one cannot make out the relation of vyapti. In the former case, any doubt, of vyabhicara, which is otherwise technically known as aprayojakalvasankd andwhich is usually expressedin the form ''Let there be the AIerielSHfr>of greater v^tu^tb^i the element of necessity, in ensuring HT safe passage of inferential thought from theTEn5wn __ , -""**--" ' ** ' ------- . W ^ ^^ ^ ^^ tSthe^ unknown, though .these two elements mvari atJfeness and necessity implyeach other. The'elwrTent oflriecessity looms large only at the"slafF at which the 206 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART in element of invariableness happens to be challenged andcomes to be maintained by a suitable tarfta. fin several instances the universal relation of vyapti is feir"to be arrived at as perceptual experience (pratyaksa) through some sense-organ. Perceptual ex perience persupposes some sannikarsa (sense-relation) between the sense concerned and the objects comingwithin the scope of the experience in question. Y/hen, for instance, one comes to have visual perception of the relation of invariable concomitance between all smokesand all fires, it is through the super-normal sense-rela tion (alaukika-sannikarsa)called samdnyalakfana praty&satli that all the smokes and.jfires are broughtwithin the reach of the visual sense.) The nature of this super-normal sense-relation is explained in pages 180 to 184 of Chapter I, supra. Thus, according to later Naiyayikas,the knowledge of vyapti arises in several cases as super-normal perception through the super-normal sense-relation of seme-bound generality (s&manyalaksanasannikarsa). Jayantabhatta discus ses the nature of vyaptijiiana in pages 121 to 123 of his Nyayamafijari (Viz. S. S.) and arrives at the conclusion that it arises through the inner sense, manas,as mental perception (manasapratypTtfa), when co-ex istence is observed and no hitch in such co-existence is seen. Evidently, Jayantabhatta is inclined to think that manas, though it cannot directly reach external objects (bahirasvatantram manah) under ordinarycircumstances, is resourceful enough to reach all the smokes and fires, both observed and unobserved, in the CH. n] INFERENCE 207 absence of definite obstacles in the way. Jayanta, how ever, does not account for the mind's resourcefulness in this direction and seems to be inclined to attribute it to its nature and not to the aid of any super-normal sense-relation known as samanyalaksanasannikarfa. The nature of this sannikarsa has been explained in detail on pages 180 to 184, in Chapter I, supra. Buddhist logicians like Dignaga and Dharmakirti lay particular stress on the negative phase of vytipti viz., non-existence of the probans in the absence of the probandum (avindbhdvd). They hold that every case of avindbhava involves a necessary and indissoluble connection between the hetu andthe sddhya and that this connection is based uponidentity (tdddtmya) or causality (tadutpatti). TheNaiyayikas rightlycriticise this view as ignoring such cases of invariable concomitance as do not rest uponidentity or causality cases like a blind man's inference of colour (rupa) from taste (rasa). The Mimarhsakas of the Bhatta school maintain that vyapti, in the form of a universal generalisation, is not a necessary condition of inference. Fire is observ ed to be co-existent with smoke in two or three places; and smoke is never seen to be present in a place wherefire is not present When one comes to have this experience repeatedly within the sphere of one's obser vation, one finds oneself in a position to make outinvariable connection between smoke and fire in the form in which they happen to be seen in the particular instances which have come within the scope of one's 208 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART in observation. When one later on happens to see smokein the same form in an unobserved place as in a place already observed, or even when one happens to see smoke again in the same form in an observed place asalready observed there, one's mind comes to have a knowledge of the presence of fire in that place wheresmoke is seen for the moment. The knowledge of fiie which thus arises cannot be regarded as perceptual experience as fire is not for the moment within the range of any of the senses; nor can it be regarded as reproduction in memory of a past experience, since the knowledge of fire which thus arises is felt to be experi ence having reference to the existence of fire in the present time. Thus, according to the Bhattas, the pro position 'Wherever there is smoke, there is fire' repre sents ordinarily a icstricted form of synthesis which has reference only to tlie observed particulars and is quite adequate as a condition of inference; and anybody who is equipped with the knowledge embodied in this proposition would be able to infer the existence of fire on seeing smoke in any place, provided there is no suspicion of vyabhicdra (presence of hetu in the absence of sddhya). At the same time it must be remembered that Bhattas do not deny that, not infre* quently, in the course of inferential reasoning, one mayarrive at a universal generalisation of the type recogniz ed by the Naiyayikas, which has reference to the invariable concomitance between all cases of hetu and s&dhya, including observed and unobserved instances in the present, past and future. The Bhattas, however, insist that such universal generalisations themselves are Cn.n] INFERENCE 209 cases of inference. Parthasarathimisra, one of themost reliable exponents of Rumania's views, explains the inferential process through which such universal generalizations are arrived at. In this connection, areference to Parthasarathi's Nyayaratnamala (Chow-,khamba edition pages 69 and 70) would show howunobserved places, which have smoke, may be inferred, to have fire, from the fact that smoke is predicated it* those places, on the basis of observed cases. In the face of this, it would not be correct to suppose, as Professor Handle does in foot-note (1)to page 282of his work "Indian Logic in the Early Schools ", that "there is nowhere in Indian Logic the notion that Induction or generalization is an inferential process". The Prabhakaras hold that vydpti is the invariable relation between hetu and sadhya, which, when it is made out, happens to be free from temporal and spatial limitations and thus comes to assume the form of a universal generalization. In the hearth, for instance contact between smoke and fire is made out as the relation connecting the two substances smoke and fire. In the cognition of such relation, the two relata are the two principal concepts. The relation on the one sid^ and time and space (kala and deia) on the other are presented in that cognition only as adjuncts subsidiary to the two relata. While two subsidiaries agree to subordinate themselves to a common principal, onesubsidiary does not ordinarily tolerate its subordina tion to the other subsidiary. This is as true in thesphere of thought as in the external world. Thus theknowledge of the relation between smoke and fire that JWQ A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [P**T marises from the observation of their co-existence in particular instances takes a universal form, unhamper ed by the temporal and spatial limitations of the parti* cular place and time actually coming within the scope of observation. With the help of such a universal generalization, when a person infers fire in a mountainon seeing smoke there, he is, in fact, cognizing again ifrhat has already been cognized and forms part of the content of the generalization at which he arrived as a result of his observation. Such inference is valid ex perience (prama), though it cognizes something already cognized. According to the Prabhakaras/ all cogni tions other than recollection are valid (prama) and it is not necessary that a prama should cognize something fiot already cognized. Thus, the Prabhakaras maintain that inferential experience is re-experience and does fiot involve the passage of the mind from the known to the unknown, as is commonly supposed to be the case; but it involves merely the passage of the mind from a known object to something that is already known to be invariably connected with it. In the Prabhakarascheme of inference, even a single observation (sakrd dartana) is enough for having a knowledge of vy&pti and repeated observation (bh&yodarfana) is, however, useful in showing that the relation observed betweenhit* and s&dhya is not brought about by any adventi tious circumstance (upddhi). /Fjiffthe foregoing account it will be seen that all tWfleading schools of Indian philosophy are agreed ki A general way that generalization CH.n] INFERENCE 211 sents the ground-work of inference. The Naiyiyikasand the Prabhakaras take this generalization to be of auniversal type and to have reference to all the conceiv able particulars unobserved as well as observed. TheBhattas look upon this generalization as a synthesis confined to the observed particulars, which is arrived at by sinking all incompatible differences. For instance, according to the former, the generalization, "Whereverthere is smoke there is fire" has reference to every conceivable case of smoke and fire; while, according to the latter, this generalization represents a S)nthesisof all the observed cases and sinks such incompatible differences as are due merely to spatial and temporal limitations.^) At a very early stage in the history of Indian logic, the Carvaka materialist, who recognizes only onepramana viz., pratyoksa. throws out against inference* the challenge that vyapti cannot he relied upon as the basis of anumana. The Carvaka's contention is that, if vyapti were to be restricted to the known or observed particulars, it would be impossible to have any infer ence regarding unknown or unobserved particulars for the simple reason that the latter are wholly different from the former ; and that, if vyapti were to be looked upon as a universal generalization having reference to all the conceivable particulars, unobserved as well as observed, all that has to be known is already knownand nothing remains to be known through inference* This objection is embodied in an old verse which is quoted by several old philosophical writers like SiHJtaniiba and Jayanta aod which rurts 212 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART in "Anum&bhangapanke'smin nimagna v&didantinah. Vi&fe'nugam&bh&vah s&mdnye siddhas&dhyata.'* (Vide Prakaranapancika Benares edn. Page 71), The Carvakas contend that Indian logicians are hope lessly caught between the two horns of the dilemmaindicated they hopelessly sink down in this slough in which anumdna is lost. Students of western philoso phical literature are here likely to be reminded of the Empiricist's objection that any inference of a particular fact from a general principle already known and taken to be valid would amount to arguing in a circle. Theymay think in this connection of objections similar to what is put forward by Mill when he says "that noreasoning from generals to particulars can, as such, prove anything; since from a general principle, wecannot infer any particulars but those which the prin ciple itself assumes as known." To this kind of objection, the logic of the Bhattaschool, as may be evident from their view set forth above, gives the answer that inference is really fromparticulars to particulars and that, in cases where it appears to be from a universal to particulars, the real cause of such appearanceis to be found either in the fact that vydpti, constitutingthe basis of inference, assumes a general form, since such differences as areimmaterial, or incompatible, are left out for the timebeing; or it is to be found in the fact that a universal generalization interposes itself, though it does so as anintermediate inference. In this connection, a reference to Br^idley's Principles of Logic (pages 323 to 326) would CH.U] INFERENCE 213 be of great value. One may easily see that Bradley's criticism of Mill's view holds good as against the Bhattaview also, in a considerable measure. The Bhatfalogic, where it insists upon a very close similarity between the frobans in the paksa and the vy&pya in the sapaksa (example), reduces inference to reasoning from resemblance. But where it insists upon diffe rences being left out, the reasoning turns out to be onefrom identity. Is it not then palpable, cue may ask in Bradley *s language, that, when the differences are disre garded, the residue is a universal? The strong pointin the Bhatta view is that it shows how inference mayreally involve an advance in knowledge in two direc tions: where one infeis unknown particulars fromknown and where one inferentially arrives at a universal generalization from the observation of parti cular instances. As already explained, the Prabhakaras get over the difficulty under consideration by saying that every ex perience (ai ubhava) though it may not involve any newelement or any advance in knowledge, is valid (prantd). All that is required to show that anumana is a pramtinais that inferential cognition (anumiti) resulting from it is an experience (antt&hava) ,and not mere recollection (smrti). The Prabhakaras do not consider it necessary to go beyond maintaining that anumiti, though it hap pens to be a re-experience (gjhltagrahl anubhavah), is a valid experience.It should, however, be rememberedthat, according to them, vy&$ti assumes the form of auniversal generalization; and this is not because every 214 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [Pate in conceivable particularis brought within the scope of a supernormal observation, as the Naiyayikas contend, but because the elements of time and space do not enter into the scheme of relation represented by vy&pti, for the reason already indicated. y^**" \The Naiyayikas, who are the generally accredited exponents of the doctrines of Indian logic, maintain that inference is not_frqmj^rticularsto .ajQ^culars but it is from 'universal to .p.articujys. They hold that s^a^ universal generalization which does not represent a mere summation of the observed instances. It has reference to the invariable concomitance between alt conceivable cases of hetu and sddhya. Such a generalization, though it involves a big leap from the f eW obltTve3""aiK;s (o in'tfun^erable^iFnobserved cases, is rendered possible through the super-tlermal sense: rela tto^cS^d^sanianyalaksanasanniharsa^ Leaving out tfie technical concept oYaTauftikasdnmkarsa, one might well say that such a big inductive leap is rendered possible by the immense resourcefulness of a disciplined mind in the direction of synthesis. /The Nyaya theory of inference effectively exorcises tEe~ghost of pelitio principii, by drawing attention to the fact that infe rence helps one to see and understand more. One maybe equipped \\ith the universal generalization "Wherever there is smoke there is fire" and yet may be quite unaware of the presence of fire in a particular mountain ; nd on seeing smoke in that mountain, the presence of fire may be inferred there. ifl SUfih inference leads to a distinct addition to knowledge andOn. n] INFERENCE 21S helps oneto see more. The Naiyayikas also pointout tbST^after acquiring definite knowledge of a certain thing in a certain place through observation or by someother means, the same thing may be inferred in the same place; and in such cases, inference helps one to understand more by enhancing the degree of clarity orcertitude in the knowledge already got. 32 T ^(a) Inference is of two Sands: inference for oneself and inference for others. , Inference for oneself causes one's own inferential experience. For instance, a person may make out the rela tion of invariable concomitance between smoke and fire and arrive at the universal generali zation "Wherever there is smoke there is fire" from his re peated observation in the hearth and .such other places and then approach a mountain. He may have doubt as to the presence of fire in that mountain. On seeing smoke there, he remembers the generalization "Wherever there is soke there is fire." Then, he comes to have the cognition 216 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART m"This mountain has smoke which is pervaded by (or invariably concomitant with)fire." It is this cognition that is called linga pardmarsa (the subsumptive reflection of the probans). From this cognition arises the inferen tial cognition "The mountain has fire". This is what is called (c)1 nfetence for ~oik&%3 i s th^syllogistic expression which Consists of five members and which a person employs after inferring for himself fire from ^moke, with a view to enabling another person to have likewise the same kind of infe rential cognition. E.g." The mountain has fire; because it has smoke; whichever has smoke has fire, as a hearth; the mountain is such (has smoke which is invariably concomitant with fire) ; and therefore, it is such (has fire).1' From this five-membered syllo gism, the other person to whom it is addressed comes to know the probans (smoke)and infers fire from it. OH. H] INFERENCE 217 Professor Keith and some others believe that the above distinction of inference into inference for onself (svartha) and inference for others (parartha) wasfirst introduced by Dignaga and borrowed from himby Prasastapada. (Vide Professor Keith's' IndianLogic and Atomism', pages 106 to 108). A careful consideration, however, of what Vatsyayana says in his Bhasya and Gautama in his Sutras would clearly showthat the distinction in question should be held to be at least as old as the Sutrakara himself. Vatsyayana,where he speaks of anuwana as distinct from nydya prayoga, presupposes evidentlythe distinction of svariha and parartha. Gautama's description of the five members of a complete syllogistic expression wouldbe unintelligible, should it be assumed that he was not familiar with the substance of the distinction in ques tion, though the terms parartha and svartha are not found used in his Sutras. The distinction of anuwana into svartha andparartha is not only as old as the Nyayadarsana itself, but it is also one of the most vital topics in the KTyaya system. It is a natural result of one of the dis tinctive features of Indian logic and it enables intelli gent critics to appreciate duly the pivotal idea on whichIndian logic turns both in its scope and its development. It should be remembered here that Indian logic never allowed itself to be restricted in its scope and (fevelop ment to the exclusively formal side of ratiocination, but always kept in view as its constant, knowledge or, more accurately, knowledge of truth (tattvajfitina) in 218 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART inrelation to what is conceived of as the summum In this connection, it would be very interestinjfto consider what Benedetto Croce, one of the greatest contributors to contemporary philosophical thought, has chosen to observe concerning Indian logic, parti cularly the distinction of si'&rthanutnana and parar thanum&na recognised in Indian logic. Attention is invited to the subjoined extract from pages 583 to 585of Benedetto Croce's 'Logic as the Science of PureConcept' rendered into English by Douglas Ainslie. " This error, which appeared very earlyin ourwestern world, has spread during the centuries and yet dominates many minds; so true is this that 'logic'is usually understood to mean 'illogic' or 'formalist logic', We say our western world, because if Greece created and passed on the doctrine of logical forms, which wasa mixture of thoughts materialised in words and of words become rigidin thoughts, another logicis knownwhich, as it seems, developed outside the influence of Greek thought and remained immune from the forma list error. This is Indian logic, which is notably anti verbalist ...... Indian logic studies the naturalistic syllogism in itself,as internal thought, distinguishing it from the syllogism for others, that is to say, fromthe more or less usual, but always extrinsic and acci dental forms of communication and dispute. It hasnot even a suspicion of the extravagant idea (whichstill vitiates our treatises) of a truth which is merelysyllogistic and formalist and which may be false in fact. It takes no account of the judgment, or rather it considers what is called judgment, add what is really OH. ii} INFERENCE 219 the proposition, as a verbal clothing of knowledge;it does not mak^ the verbal distinction of subject, copula and predicate; it does not admit classes of cate gorical and hypothetical, of affirmative and negative judgments. All these are extraneous to logic, whoseobject is the constant, "knowledge considered in itself." Students of philosophical literature in the westmay find it easy to appreciate,in the light of the aboveextractfthe significance of the distinction which Indian logic recognizes between 'inference for oneself(svartha) and 'inference for others' (parartha). Thisdistinction is not merely one of a formal kind. It is rooted firmly on the fundamental doctrine of Indian logic that syllogistic reasoning should be viewed, not apart from the inductive process of thinking, but mere ly as a continuation and methodical application of it. In Indian logic, deduction and induction do not repre sent two mutually exclusive types of inference but they should always be looked upon as inseparably connected parts of a complete process of thinking called inference (anuinana) ; and the chief function of annmSna, as a means of valid cognition, is to enable one to realize how certain facts are inseparably and necessarily con nected with each other in accordance with a generalprinciple. This view of inference influenced the1 development of Indian logic for good and saved it fromfalling into the grip of formalism which, till very recently, dominated logicin the west. One of the chkf advantages which have accrued to Indian logic from this view is that it never makes the extravagant 220 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART n claim that formal validity may be viewed apartfrom, and independently of, material validityiy A complete syllogistic expression is called nyaya prayoga by Vatsyayana ami all the Naiyayikas whofollowed him. It is a synthesisin expression (mah8-v&kya) built upj>yfive parts_ or tiKi)iber& (avayavah),eachjo^fjwhich embQji^ forminjjja/necessary part of a complete ratiounaijxc ।n rt-.v, expressSiin word's in order 10 aya doctrine of five-membereH syllo gism is at least as old as Gautama and accepted byVatsyayana and Prasastapada, and almost all the later Naiyayikas and Vaisesikas. These five members are described in the following section of the text. T 33 (a) The five members of a syllogism are: (1) the thesis set down (pratijnd), (2)the reason (hetu) t (3) the exempli fication (udaharana), (4)the subsumptive COPKlSIion naya) and (5) conclusion J^^S)Je-9f "The mountain has *tire" this is the thesis. "For it has smoke" this is the reason. "Whichever has smoke has fire, as a hearth" this is the exem plification. "And so is this" this is the subsumptive correla- CH. n] INFERENCE 221 tion. "Therefore it is such" this is the conclusion. (6)In the case of inferen tial cognition for oneself as well as that for others,it is the sub sumptive reflection of the reason (lingaparamaria) that serves as the efficient and special cause (karana). So, HngapardmarSa in this sense is the instrument of inferential cognition (anumana). Annambhatta's illustrative description of the five members of a syllogismset forth above, read together with the remarks in the dipika, throws adequate light on the function of each of the members. A typical pratifnd is in the form of a proposition consisting of a subject (paksa), which is already known specifically to bot,h the parties in a discussion, and a predicate which, in a specific form, is proposed to be established in the subject; in other words, it is in the form of a definite thesis to be maintained. Its chief purpose is to bring about a definite knowledge of the fakfa as such or what is proposed to be proved as having the pro&andum(sadkya). The person to whom the pratijnd is addressed would naturally desire to know first the reason why the paksa is said to have the sddhya; andto satisfy this desire, the linga or the reason whichserves to establish the sddhya in the paksa is indicated ordinarily by a term in the ablative case in Sanskrit* It would be possible to satisfy oneself that the reason A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART n (linga) adduced is capable of proving the sddhya, only after ascertaining that the former is invariably con comitant with the latter; and the needed knowledge ofthe invariable connection between the probans and the probandum (vyaptijfiatia*) t on which the probative capacity of the yrobans depends,is derived from the statement of the example, which is usually in a formlike this: "Whichever has smoke has fire, as a hearth." The probatos which is made out to be invari ably concomitant with the Probandum (sddhyavyapya) should be specifically known to be presentin the paksa; without such a knowledge, the subsumptive process ofthought on which the conclusion rests would not be complete; and such a knowledge results from the member called subsumptive correlation (upanaya). The final statement of the conclusion called nigamana is not a purposeless reiteration of the thesis, as proved. The purpose of the nigam ana is to indicate that the probans is not vitiated by the presence ra/i/fl, apadeta, nidarfaita, anusandhana and pratyamnaya as the respective equi valents of the Nyaya terms pratijna, hetu, udaharana,upanaya and nigamana. Vatsyayana, the author of the Nyayabhasya, in his Bhasya on the first Sutra, equates nyaya with anvlksa, and explains it as amounting to a critical investigation of facts by means of instruments of valid cognition (PramSnairarthapartksanam nydyah). When such in vestigation is carried on in a methodical way so as to convince another person of a fact, it is expressed in the form of five-membered syllogistic expression which is described as nyayapratfpga or pancavayavavakya.Vatsyayana further explains, in his Bhasya on 1-1-1 and 39, how all the four Pramanas accepted by the Naiyayikas meet in the five-membered syllogism andtend to demonstrate a fact in a conclusive manner. TheBhasyakara points out that the statement of the thesis {pratijfta) may be taken to stand for valid verbal testimony (fabda),the reason (hetu) for the instru ment of inference (anum&na), the example (uddharana) lor the instrument of perception (pratyakfa) and the ti ve correlation (upanaya) for analogy (upa- 224 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART ra mdnd). According to him, one should find in the conclu sion (nigamana) the culminating stage of demonstrativeexpression for the reason that it is nigamana that showshow all the four pramanas have collaborated to maintain conclusively the fact in question; and on this ground, nigamana is described as the acme of logical demonstration (paramo nyayah).In order to appreciate fully the significance of 1 he Bhyakara's account ofny&yaprayoga as represented by the five-memberedsyllogistic expression described above, it should be remembered that the Naiyayikas, from Gautama down ward, look upon logic both as a science and art, that the function of logic, according to them, comprises both discovery and proof, induction and deduction, and lays adequate stress on the material and formal aspects of reasoning; and that logical debate, even in its apparent ly non-logical forms of jalpa (successful advocacy) and vitanda (destructive objection),is never allowed to stand completely divorced from the aim of nyaya, v\z.> conclusive determination of truth (tattvadhyavasaya). Remembering these facts, one may easily see that the structure of the five-membered syllogism is designed to meet in an adequate manner the requirements of logical demonstration, which seeks to convince another person by drawing his attention specifically to fact and by enabling his mind to pass through successive stages of thoughtwhich conclusively establish that fact. Professor Handle is inclined to believe that Vatsyayana thinks of the five-membered syllogism "as more than inference or the expression in words of inference" and that "the five-membered formula was influenced by its historicalCH. 11] INFERENCE 225 origin in a nyaya which was methodological rather thanlogical and its structure must be regarded as in part vestigial, rather than determined by the requirementsof logical analysis." (Vide pages 165 to 167 of Pro fessor Randle's book 'Indian Logic in the EarlySchools'). The learned Professor's estimate of the five-membered syllogism of Nyaya and his interpreta tion of Vatsyayana's remarks in this connection canhardly be said to have given due weight to the fact that Indian logic, particularlyin its early stages as exhibited in the Sutras of Gautama and the Bhasya of V'atsya yana and in the connected early literature, never allowedvalid anumana (inference) to be divorced from other Pramanas, at any rate from the more important ofthem, viz., perceptual instrument (pratyaksa) andcredible verbal testimony (sabda), and that syllogistic formalism abstracted from induction is an aberration unthinkable to the Naiyayikas. A careful consideration of these facts would show that the structure of the five membered formula need not be regarded as in part vestigial. On the contrary, the considerations indicated above would show that this formula is based on anefficient and self-contained type of verbal apparatus which logical methodology has evolved for the purpose of demonstration. Professor Randle further observes that "either hetu or upanaya, and either pratijnd ornigamana are superfluous and this superfluity is inheri ted from the time when the Nyaya was a method of debate and not yet a syllogism : and in the case of the Nyaya school, the convention of five members mayhave been fixed by a desire to equate the four 'premises' 226 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART in yviih the four Pramaijas." If syllogistic expression, Uks any other exj ression, directly or indirectly presup poses a hearer to whom it is addressed, if ny&ya$rayogaor syllogistic expression finds a place only in inference for others (\par&rthawimana) 9 and if the process of ^reasoning in inference for oneself (svarthanum&na)is not syllogising, a strictly logical debate, as recognised by Gautama and his followers, must involve a self-con tained syllogistic expression as its main part. Th$ a,im of such a self-contained syllogism is to enable th$ hearer, first to specifically think of what has to be demonstrated, secondly to learn what the reason is, thirdly to understand how the universal and invariable relation which forms the basis of inference is arrived at through observation, -fourthly how the reason actually relied upon is identical with what is known to be invariably concomitant with the probandum, andfifthly to realize that the probandum is conclusively proved by a probans which is not vitiated by a counter probans or by a stultifying proof. As already indicated, these five requirements can be fully met by the five members of a syllogism, viz., J>ratijfi&, helu, udaharana*Wpanaya and nigamana, It wll be seei> from this that the five-membered syllogism of Gautanaa, far fromfqmprising any superfluous member, is the only com*plete form of syllogistic expression which would enable a hearer's mind to pass in a methodical way througheach of the five stages of demonstrative reasoning, as indicated above. The Nyaya theory of five-membered syllogism mayhere be compared with the theory of three members CH. n] INFERENCE 387 (avayav&h) put forward by the Mimariisakas and th Buddhist theory of two members. The Mimamsaka$maintain that either pratijna, hetu and ud&haraiia, or udaharana, upanayck and nigamana will do; for, the conclusion should be specifically stated and a knowledge of the general relation between the probans and the probandttm and of the presence of the probansin the pafcsa (vyaptiand pafcsadharmata)is necessary, andthese requirements are fully met by the three membersabove-mentioned. The Buddhists hold that syllogistic expression is only an aid to reasoning and that it wouldbe unreasonable to assume that any hearer endowedwith the minimum capacity for reasoning would require more than the members conveying the needed informa tion about vydpti and paksadharmata, and that the tWQmembers necessary for that purpose, viz., the example and the subsumptive correlation (udaharana and npa naya) would be quite adequate to form a sjllogism. It may also be noted here that the three-membered syl logism of the Mimamsakas, represented by the latter alternative, viz., udaharana, upanaya and nigamana, may be regarded as a close parallel to the Aristotelian syllogism of the Barbara mood. The Naiyayikas wouldcriticise the three-membered syllogism of the MSniarii sakas and the two-membered syllogism of the Bauddhasas incomplete and truncated, for the former, when it consists of pratijna, hetu and udaharana omits to makeprovision for equating the probaws in the paksa with' the vyapya and for obviating any possible suspicion ofa counter-probans or a stultifying proof (satpratipaKi satva or badka) ; while, in the form which consists of 228 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART in ud&harana, upanaya and nigamana, it startles the hearer by a generalization without adequately preparing him; and the latter adopted by the Bauddhas combines all these defects. It may be noticed that all the schools of Indian logic the Nyaya, Mimamsa, Bauddha and the other schools agree in regard to the importance and value of the example (uddharana) as a member[of syllogistic expression. Ordinarily, udaharaya is in a form like this "Whichever has smoke, has fire, as the hearth." Its aim, according to the Naiyayikas, is to show howthe generalization on which deduction rests is arrived at. Consistently with this aim, the former part refers to the universal connection between the probans and the probawdum and the latter partrefers to a typical ins tance in which the co-existence between the hetu and s&dhya may be observed. Nyaya tradition, which must have influenced Gautama's mind when, in his Sutra 1-1-5, he proceeds to give an account of the different classes of anumana after referring to it as tahpurvakam (presupposing or resting upon pratyaksa), should have also left its stamp, in the shape of specific instance, on the pivotal part of the five-membered syllogism, vis., uddharaya. Some writers on Indian logic, who lose sight of the distinctive features of the Nyaya doctrine of syllogism, regard the udaharana as a useless and clumsy excrescence. Some others would historically account for the present form of the ud&harana by treat Ing it as result of the portion expressing the generaliza tion (vy&pii) coming to be combined at a later stage in the history of Nyaya with the latter portion referring CH.II] INFERENCE 229 to a specific instance, the original form of uddh^ranabeing merely like this :as a hearth (yathatnahfr basah). It may, however, be pointed out here that if Gautama's Sutra defining uddharana (1-1-36)is correctly interpreted, it cannot be held to convey any thing other than this: that udaharanais a typicalins tance (drstdnta) which, on the strength of the invari able connection observed in it between the probafts andthe probandum, enables one's mind to pass in the patosa from a similar case of the probans to a similar case ofprobandum. If it is true that, from the days of Gau tama, the inductive basis of deductive reasoning hasbeen treated by the Naiyayikas as an integral part of acomplete syllogism, it must be accepted that the wdfl harana as known to Gautama and his followers com prises both the parts, viz., the part representing vydpti and the part referring to a typical instance, and neither the former nor the latter of these two parts can be held to be a later addition. The logic of Nyaya seeks to combine discovery and proof; the Nyaya syllogismis such a harmonious blend of induction and deduction as ensures the safe progress of thinking on right lines ; and if, sometimes, the syllogism of Nyaya is abused in Indian philosophical speculation, it is certainly due to the fact that the basis of syllogistic reasoning in such cases turns out to be a superficial or unsound induction and not to any defect in the scientific method of reason* ing formulated by the Naiyayikas. Students of western logic, when they comparethe Nyaya syllogism with Aristotelian syllogism, are not likely to miss the striking contrast between 280 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC theifi. This contrast consists in the Nyaya systemlt tecognizing anything really corresponding to thfe syllogistic figures and moods known to westernlogic. Ordinarily, the generalization on which thetypical Nyaya syllogism rests is a universal affirma tive proposition, the proposition corresponding to the minor premise is usually stated in the form of Aandthe conclusion is also usually in A, So, it may be said that the typical Nyaya syllogism is of the Barbara type* In this Connection, a student of Nyaya, familiar withthe distinction made in Nyaya literature betweenp&Ttsat&vwchedakasamanadhikaranyenanumiti andpaksat&vaccheddkavacchedenanumiti may feel that there is some reason to find in the former case a con clusion in I and to connect such conclusions in I with a minor premise in I; thus, in such cases, he may feel inclined to find instances of the mood represented by Datii. In the same way, one may be inclined to find an instance of the mood Camestres in a syllogism like this -"Whichever has negation of fire has negation of smoke. No tank has fire. No tank, therefore, has smoke". But a careful consideration of the Nyayatheory of syllogism in the light of the NySya viewregarding the interpretation of propositions would makeit clear that, strictly speaking, it would not be correct to find in any Nyaya syllogism, a parallel to anywestern figure or mood. CJtlfi Nygyg conception of a typical syllogism is that it depends chiefly upon a pro poaitiojn embodying vyapli. Vyapti is ftn invariable or univtrpal generalization in the sense that it consists in unfailing connection between a probans and CH.H] INFERENCE Hi looked upon as attributes predicated of certain subjects rather than as things having such attributes. The Nyayaview is generally in favour of adopting the 'intensive orconnotatio'tfal method of interpreting propositions andmostly avoids the extensive or detootational method^When a proposition like "All S is P" has to be inter preted by a Naiyayika, he would first think of the uff versal and invariable connection between the essential attribute connoted by S and that connoted by P andwould not so readily think of all the individuals denotedby S and P. It would also be remembered in this connection that there is no fundamental difference between a vyafiti of two positive factors and that of two negative factors. In fact, the proposition "Wher ever there is no fire, there is no smoke" is for all practical purposes taken by the Naiyayikas to be equiva lent to "Wherever there is negation of fire, there is negation of smoke". A Naiyayika would have as little hesitation in saying "Negation of fire is" (vahnya bhavo'sti) as in saying "Fire is*' (vahnirasti), abhdvaor non-existence being as much a real category as a bhftva ot positive entity. In these circumstances, onemay easily see how Indian Nyaya did not attach muchimportance in syllogistic reasoning to the artificial dis tinctions of A, I, E and O propositions, though the Sanskrit language was quite capable of expressing suchdistinctions, and how the formalistic formulas ofdifferent figures and moods cahie to be almost com pletely eschewfed in Indian logic. 34 T (tt) Probans ( ftw#a=literal ly, matk) is of three kinds 232 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PAETIH concomitant in affirmation and negation (anvayavyatireki), con comitant in affirmation alone (kevalOnvayi) and concomitant in negation alone (kevalavyati reki). (&) The anvayavyatireki type of probans is that which has affirmative concomitance (anvayavyapti) and negative concomitance (vyatirekavyapti) with the probandum; as smoke when fire is the 'probandum. "Where there is smoke, there is fire, as in a hearth" this is affirmative concomitance. "Where there is no fire, there is no smoke, as in a tank" this is negative concomitance. (c) The kevalanvayi pro bans has affirmative concomit ance alone ; as "Jar is namable, because it is knowable, like a cloth". In this instance, nega tive concomitance is impossible between knowability (jprame yatva) and vamaUlity (abhidhe yatva) ; for all things are know* able and namable. Cn.n] INFERENCE 233 (d) The kevalavyatireki proteins has negative concomit ance alone ; as in the syllogism "Earth is different from the rest (not-earth),for it has smell; whichever is not different from the rest (not- earth) has no smell, as water; this (earth)is not so i.e., it does not have absence of smell or gandha bhava, with which the absence of difference from not-earth (prthivitarabhedabhava) is in variably concomitant (vy&pya) ; therefore, it is not so i.e., it is not devoid of difference from non-earth". In cases like this, there is no example in which the affirmative concomitance "Whichever has smell, has difference from non-earth" may be made out; for all varieties of earth come under the paksa (subject). 35 T (a) Paksa (subject)is that in which the presence of the probandum is not known for certain and is yet to be proved ; as a mountain, when Smoke is relied upon as the probans. 234 /A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC F^AIT til (b) Sdpak$Q^*isa similar instance, in which the proban dum is known for certain ; as a hearth, in the same case of inference. (a) Vipaksa is a counter example in which the non-exis tence of the probandum is known for certain; as a tank, in the same case of inference. In section 34 of the text given above Annambhattaexplains the three types of probans recognized bythe Naiyayikas viz., the affirmative-negative probans(anvayavyatireJsi),the exclusively affirmative (kevalan vayi) and the exclusively negative (kevalavyatireki). The Advaita-Vedantins insist that there is only one typeq$ why Naiyayikas wouldbring cases of arthdpatti uncfef' the kevalavyatireki type of reasoning. 36 T (a) Fallacious reasons (het vdbhasdh literally, semblances of reason)are of five kinds: viz., the reason that strays away (savygbhicdrg), the adverse rea son (viruddha), the opposable reason (satpratipaksa), the un established reason (asiddha), and the stultified reason (bddhita). (b) The straying" reason (savyabhicara)is otherwise known as anaikantika (literally^ not unfailing in its association with the probandum).It is of three kinds: viz., common (sa dharana), uncommon (asddha rand) and non-conclusive (anupa samharin ). The common strayer (sd dhardna) is that variety of stray ing reason which is present in a place where the frobandum (s&dhya)is not present; ast in the argument "The mountain has fire, because it is knowable" In this argument "knowability is 236 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART m found in a tank where fire is not present. The uncommon strayer (asadharana)is that reason which is present only in the sub ject (paksa) and not presentin any similar example (sapaksa) or counter-example (vipaksa) ; as sound-ness (sabdatva),in the argument ''Sound is eternal, because it is sound", sabdatzv (sound-ness) being present only in sound, and nowhere else, eter nal or non-eternal. The non-conchisive strayer (anupasamharin) is that reason which has no affirmative or negative example (anvayadr st&ntaor vyatirekadrstanta) ; as knowableness (prameyatva)in the argument "All things are non-eternal, because they are knowable". Here, no example is available since all things are treated as paksa. (c) The adverse reason (viruddha)is one which is in variably concomitant with the non-existence of the probandum; as producibility (krtakatva),in the argument "Sound is eter- OH. H] INFERENCE 237 nal, because it is produced". Here producibilityis invariably concomitant with non-eternality, which amounts to the non-ex istence of eternality. (rf) The opposablc reason (satpratipaksa)is one which admits of beingcounter-balanced by another reason that proves the non-existence of the pro bandum; as audibility in the argument "Sound is eternal, because it is audible, like sound ness (sabdatva*)'*. The counter reason in this case is produci bility (karyatva)in the counter argument "Sound is non-eter nal, because it is producible". ( vulnerable points, while the latter, other than defective reasons, do not invalidate an argument. CHAPTER III ASSIMILATION OR ANALOGY (uipamana) 37 T Assimilation (upamana) is the instrument of assimilative cognition. Assimilative cogni tion (upamiti) consists in the knowledge of the relation bet ween a name and the object de noted by it. Knowledge of simi larity is the efficient instrument (karana} of such cognition. This may be illustrated thus : A person happens to be ignorant of the exact meaning of the word gavaya (a particularani mal of the bovine species). From a forester, he learns that a gavaya is similar to a coze;; he goes to a forest, sees the animal called gavaya, which is similar to a cow and recollects the in formation conveyed bythe as similative proposition (atidefa vakya). Then the assimilative cognition, "This is the animal (of the bovine species) denoted by the word gavaya'9 arises. Thus ends the chapter on upamana. CH. m] ASSIMILATION OR ANALOGY 251 The NyJya conception of upam&na as a distinct instrument of valid cognition restricts its scope to as certainment of the primary denotative or significative power of a word (saktigraha). The chief object ofthe Naiyayikas in so restrictingits scopeis to save it from being swallowed up in inference (anumana).It should be carefully noted here that, according to the MImamsakas, the cognition embodied in the proposition "The animal called gavaya is similar to a cow" is the efficient instrument (karaya) and the cognition<4 Mycow is similar to this animal called gavaya'9is the resultant upamiti (assimilative cognition); whereas,according to the KTaiyayikas the resultant upamiti is in the form of the knowledge of the primary significative power of the word gavaya (gavayapadasaktigraha).It could be easily seen that the relation between the karana (efficient instrument) and the phala (result), according to the MImamsakas, is exactly similar to the relation between the two propositions "A is similar to B" and "B is similar to A". The Vaisesikas andBauddhas could easily show how the latter, viz. 9 "B is similar to A" may be taken to be inferred from the former, viz., "A is similar to B". The Naiyayikascleverly escape from this danger by narrowing the scope of upamana as indicated above. One might,however, remark that the Nyaya conception of upam&nais singuhrly unpractical and unfruitful. V&tsy&y ana'fremarks on upamtina, under l-i-6 and II-i-44 to 48, throw some light on the practical value of this pramana. ,252 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART ra The BJt&fyak&ra points out bow it would be of great practical value to know exactly what is denoted by cer tain technical names of medicinal herbs, as used in the Ayurveda literature. It should be remembered here that the Indian view of a pram&na is that it is an effi cient instrument of valid knowledge, which possesses such unchallenged certitude as is usually associated with validity or as is not nullified by subsequent experience; or according to some Indian thinkers, it is an efficient instrument of valid knowledge, which possesses such practical utility and effectiveness as is usually associa ted with validity. In this way, it would not be difficult to appreciate the reasons why the Nai>ayikas regard upamfina as a distinct pram&na. CHAPTER IV VALID VERBAL TESTIMONY. Sentence orproposition (sabdha) 38 T (a)Valid verbal testimony is a propositionset forth by a trustworthy person (&pta). One who habitually speaks only truth is a trustworthy person (#/>/a) r A sentence or proposition is a group of words like "Bring acow" (gdntdttaya). (b) A word is that which has significative potency (Sakti). "From th'.s word, this concept should be known" God's will to this effect (Uvarasamketah) is cabled fakti (significative po-. tency). The VaiSesikas would bring valid verbal testimony also under inference. The Naiyayikas however, con tend that, in cases where valid knowledge is derived from valid verbal testimony (e viewed as its central concept from the stand-point ofMimariisa legalism. The Nyaya system recognizes only two main types of significative force (fabdavrtti) viz., abhidhd (the primary significative force) and lak$an& (the secondarysignificative force). It refuses to accept the third type of significative force called vyanjana or suggestion, which is recognized by the Alamkarikas as a distinct type of sabdavrtti, and bringsit under inference. According to the Nyaya system, the primary significa tive force (abhidhd) includes two phases, which corres pond to connotation and denotation, and relate to j&ti (generality) as the connoted attribute, and to vyakti(the individual thing) as the denoted object qualified 260 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC by such attribute. In other words, the Naiyayikas generally maintain that the primary sense of & word is ordinarily an individual qualified by a generic attribute (jWtvUiftovyakti). Students of modern philosophy will find it easy to see that, according to the Nyayasystem, the concepts conveyed by separate words are apparent simples* but really petrified judgments. AHthe names, including proper names, are connotative, according to Nyaya.40-T (a) There are two classes of sentences : those that belong to the Veda and those that belong to secular speech. Those that belong to the Veda are all statements of God and therefore authoritative. Of those that belong to secular speech, such as produced by trustworthy persons are authoritative and others are not authoritative. (6) Verbal cognition (Mb* dajnfaa) is the knowledge of the meaning of a sentence. Its efficient instrument (fearana) is sentence (iabda). Here ends the chapter on Verbal Testimony. Thus valid experience (yathtrthfaubhwa) has been explained, . pratiyogitatva: the state of being correlativeness. pratyaka: perception; perceptive instrument pradhvmsabhava : annihilative non-existence. prama : valid knowledge. pramana: means of valid knowledge; valid knowledge.pramatva : validity. prameya: object of valid knowledge; cognizable thing. prameyatva: knowability. prayatna: volition, prayojana : purpose ; aim. pralaya: dissolution; universal dissolution. pravrtti: volitional decision. prasarana: expansion. pragabhava : antecedent non-existence. pratyaksika; perceptual. pramanya: truth; validity. pretyabhava : cycle of death and birth. phala: result. phallbhutajnana: resultant cognition. baddha: bound. badhakapratiti: sublating cognition. badhita : stultified reason. buddhi : cognition. bhavakarya : positive product. bhavana: reminiscent impression. bhavapadartha : existent entities. bhasvara; brilliant. bhitti: wall. bhuta : elemental being. SANSKRIT GLOSSARY 277 bhutatva : elementness. bhuyodarsana : repeated observation. bheda: difference. bhedasahisnu : compatible with difference. bhauma: that of the earth. mani: lens. madhura: sweet. inanas: mind. manana: reflective thinking. manusyatva: humanity. mahat : large. mahattva: largeness. mahakala: undivided time. mahasamanya: grand generality ;the summum genus. mana: measurement. manasapratyaksa : mental perception. mithya: unreal. mithyajnana: false cognition. mukti : final emancipation. murta: moving substance; limited in size. mrgatva : bcasthood. mrt: clay. yatna: volitional effort. yathartha: real. yogyata: congruity. yogyanupalabdhi: effectual non-cognition. rakta: red. rajas: passion. rasa: taste. rasana: sense of taste; gustatory sense. rupa: colour. 278 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [?ART m rupatva: colourness. lakana: definition. lavana: salt. laghava: principle of parsimony or economy. linga: probans; mark; reason. lingaparamarsa : subsumptive reflection of the probans. loka: world. Varuna: Water-God. varna: alphabet. vahni: fire. vakyarthabodha : verbal judgment. vada: argument for truth. vayu: air, vayuloka : world of Wind-God. vikalpa : fictitious fabrication. vijnana: consciousness. vitaruja: destructive argument or objection. vidyut: lightning. vidheya: predicate. vipaka: counter-example. viparitakhyati : contrary experience. viparyaya : misapprehension. vibhaga: division; disjunction. vibhagaja: caused by disjunction. vibhudravya: all-pervasive substance. viruddba : adverse probans or re; son. visi।apratiti: determinate cognition. visesa : particularity. viSesaguna : specific quality. vis^sana: adjunct. visesyata ; substantiveness. SANSKRIT GLOSSARY 279 visaya; object; subject-matter. viayata: objectness. visayatatva : the state of being objectness. visayita: subjectness. vrksa: tree. vrtti: activity; modification, vega: speed, veman: loom, vyakti : individual unit, vyanjana: suggestion, vyatirekadrstanta : negative example, vyatirekavyapti : negative concomitance; negative gene ralization. vyatirekasahacara : concomitance of negation, vyavasaya : cognition in which an object is presented and not the subject, vyapara : activity ; intermediate cause, vyapti: co-extension; invariable concomitance, vyapyatvasiddha: unestablished in respect of its con comitance. vyapyavrtti: pervasive, vyavartaka: differentiating feature, vyavrtti : differentiation, vyasajyavrtti : partially contained, sakti: significative potency or power; potentiality, sabda: proposition; verbal testimony; sound, sabdaja: caused by sound, sabdatanmatra: subtle sound, sabdavrtti: significativeforce, sarira: body; form, sabda : verbal ; verbal experience. 280 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART in Sabdajnana: verbal cognition. s&bdabodha : verbal cognition. Ita: cold. sitasparsa: cold touch. Sukti: nacre. Sukla: white. syama: black. sravana: understanding. gruti: Revealed Texts. sakatnpapravrtti ; halting effort. sakrddarsana : single observation. sat : being. satta: existence. sattva: goodness. satpratipaksa : opposable reason. sapaksa: similar instance. samavaya: inherence. samavayin : constitutive. samavayik3rana : constitutive or inherent or intimate cause, samudra: ocean. samuhalambana : group cognition, samkhya: number, sarhdigdha: doubtful probans. sannikarsa: sense-relation, sannidhi: proximity, sambandha: relation, sarhyoga: conjunction, sarhyogaja : caused by contact, sarhsaya: doubt, samsarga; relation. SANSKRIT GLOSSARY 281 samsargata:: relationness. samskara: tendency or impression; reminiscent impression, sarit : river. Sarvajna: Omniscient, savikalpaka : determinate, savyabhicara : straying reason, santa: having an end. sadrsya: similarity, sadhana : middle term ; probans. sadharana: general; common strayer. sadhya: probandum; major term, samagri: the whole causal apparatus, samayikabhava : temporary non-existence, samanya: generality, samanyavisesa : generic differentia, samkarya: unwarranted blend, samsiddhika: natural, siddhanta: established conclusion, sukha: pleasure, surabhi: fragrant, suvarna : gold, srsti: creation, sthitasthapaka : elasticity, sneha: viscidity. sparSa: touch, sphatika: crystal. sphota: the eternal substratum of significativcncs?. smrti: recollection, smarana: recollection, svatastya: intrinsicality. 282 A PRIMER OF 1NDIJLN W&IC [ PART .in svatograhya: intrinsically made out* svafojanya : intrinsically brought about, svatovyavartaka : self-discriminating, svatovyavrtta : self-differentiated, svarupasambandha : self-relation; self-linking* svarupasiddha: unestablished in respect of itself. svarthanumana : inference for oneself, svetarabheda: difference from the rest, harita: green. hetu: probans; reason; valid reason;middle Ufm. hetvabhasa : fallacious reason ; semblance of defective probans. hrasva: short. 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