काशीनाथः

TRANSLATION.

‘Having placed in my heart the Lord of the world, [having meditated on God], and having saluted my preceptor, I com- pose this Compendium of Logical results for the pleasant com- prehension of the uninstructed.’

  1. ‘There are seven Categories;-Substance, Quality, Ac- tion, Genus, Difference, Co-inherence and Non-existence.’

  2. Amongst those (categories), Substances [the abodes of Qualities] are nine;-Earth, Water, Light, Air, Ether, Time, Place, Soul and Mind.'

  3. ‘There are twenty-four Qualities;-Colour, Savour, Odour, Tangibility, Number, Dimension, Severalty, Conjunction, Dis- junction, Priority, Posteriority, Weight, Fluidity, Viscidity, Sound, Understanding, Pleasure, Pain, Desire, Aversion, Effort, Merit, Demerit and Faculty.’

  4. There are five Actions;-Throwing upwards, Throwing downwards, Contraction, Expansion and Going.'

  5. ‘Genus [a common nature] is of two kinds;-Higher and Lower.’

  6. Differences, which reside in eternal substances, are end- less.'

  7. ‘Co-inherence is one only.’

  8. ‘Non-existence is of four kinds;-Antecedent non-exis- tence, Destruction, Absolute non-existence and Mutual non- existence.’

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  1. That is Earth, in which there is the quality Odour. It is of two kinds;-Eternal and Non-eternal. In its atomic cha- racter it is Eternal; and when some product arises out of those atoms, then that is called Non-eternal. This [earth in the character of a product] is of three kinds, through the differences of body, organ of sense and mass. The body is that of us men. The organ is the apprehender of odour, called the Smell, which resides in the fore-part of the nose. And the masses [what have parts] are ‘clods, stones, &c.’

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  1. That is Water, which appears cold on touching it. And it is of two kinds;-Eternal and Non-eternal. In the form of atoms, it is Eternal; and when a product is produced by those atoms, then that is called Non-eternal. This [water in the form of products] is of three kinds, through the differ- ences of body, organ of sense and mass. The body exists in the world of Varuna. The sense is the percipient of savour, which is called the Taste, and which resides in the fore-part of the ton- gue. The masses are rivers, seas, &c.'

That is Light, the sensation by touch of which is warm. This is of two kinds;-Eternal and Non-eternal. It is Eternal in the form of atoms, and in the form of products it is Non- eternal. This [light in the form of a product] is of three kinds, through the differences of body, organ of sense and mass. That the body exists in the Solar realm, is well-known. The sense,, the percipient of colour, which is called the Sight, resides in the fore-part of the pupil of the eye. Masses are of four kinds, through these differences;-Produced in earth, Produced in the sky, Produced in the stomach, and Produced in mines. Pro- duced in earth, it is fire, &c. Produced in the sky, it is light- ning &c., the fuel of which is water. Produced in the stomach, it is the cause of the digestion of things eaten. Produced in mines, it is gold &c.'

  1. That is Air, which has not colour, and has tangibility. It is of two kinds;-Eternal and Non-eternal. In the form of atoms it is Eternal; and in the form of products it is Non- eternal. This [air in the form of products] is of three kinds, through the differences of body, organ of sense and mass. The body is in the ærial world. The sense is the Touch, the ap- prehender of tangibility, existing throughout the whole body. The mass is that which is the cause of the shaking of trees &c.'

  2. Air circulating within the body is called Prána. Although it is but one, yet, from the difference of its accidents, it is called by Breath, Flatulence, &c. [Breath, Flatulence, Cerebral pulsation, General pulsation and Digestion ].'

  3. “That is Ether, in which there resides the quality of sound. It is one, all-pervading and eternal.'

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  1. That is Time, which is the cause of the employment of

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Past’ &c. [Past, Present, and Future.] It is one, all-pervading

and eternal.'

That is Space, which is the cause of the employment of ‘East’ &c. [East, West, North and South.] It is one, all- pervading and eternal.’

  1. That is Soul, which is the substratum of knowledge [that in which knowledge resides.] It is of two kinds;–the Animal soul and the Supreme soul. The Supreme soul is God, the Omniscient. He is One only and devoid of joy or sorrow. The Animal soul is distributed to each body. It is all-pervad- ing and eternal.'
  1. That is Mind, whose sense is the cause of the perception of pleasure, pain, &c. It is innumerable, for it remains with each Soul. It is in the form of an atom and is eternal.'

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  1. That quality, which is apprehended only by the sense of Sight, is called Colour. And it is of seven kinds, through the differences of White, Blue, Yellow, Red, Green, Brown and Variegated, residing in earth, water and light. In earth, colour of all the seven kinds resides; in water, white colour not lustrous resides, and in light, lustrous white colour resides.'

  2. That quality which is known through the sense of Taste, is called Savour. And it is of six kinds, through the differences of Sweet, Sour, Saline, Bitter, Astringent and Pun- gent, residing in earth and water. In earth, there is savour of the six kinds; and in water, there is only the sweet savour.'

The quality which is apprehended by the sense of Smell, is called Odour. And it is of two kinds;-Fragrance and Stench, residing in earth alone.'

  1. That quality which is perceived only by the organ of Touch, is called Tangibility. And it is of three kinds, through the differences of Cold, Warm and Temperate. This quality resides in earth, water, light and air. Coldness resides in water; Warmth in light, and Temperateness in earth and air.'

  2. The four of which colour is the first [Colour, Savour, Odour and Tangibility] may be produced in Earth [in earthy things] by maturation [a special conjunction of Heat), and they are then Transient. In others [in Water, Light and Air] Colour &c. are not produced by maturation. They are then[4]

Eternal or Transient. When they reside in eternal things, they are Eternal; and when they reside in things not eternal, they are said to be Transient.'

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That quality, which is the peculiar cause of the con- ception of Unity &c., is called Number. This resides in the nine substances. Reckoning from Unity, it is as far as a Parardha [100,000,000,000,000,000]. Unity is both Eternal and Non-eternal. In an eternal thing, it is Eternal; and in a non-eternal thing, it is Non-eternal. But Duality &c., is every- where Non-eternal.'

  1. ‘The peculiar cause of the conception of Bulk, is called Measure. It resides in the nine substances. And it is of four kinds; Small, Great, Long and Short.’

  2. ‘The peculiar cause of the conception of distinct things is called Severalty. It resides in all the substances.’

‘The peculiar cause of the conception of conjoined things is called Conjunction. It resides in all the substances.’ 28. ‘That quality which annihilates Conjunction, is called Disjunction. It resides in all the substances.’

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  1. The peculiar cause of the conception of things Far and Near, is called Remoteness and Proximity. These reside in the four substances beginning with earth, [earth, water, light, air] and mind. They are of two kinds;-Made by Space and Made by Time. Remoteness made by Space is in that thing which remains in a distant place; and Proximity made by Space is in that thing which remains in a place near. In the person who is elder, there is Remoteness made by Time; and in the person who is younger there is Proximity made by

Time.’

  1. The quality which is the non-intimate cause of in- cipient falling, is called Weight. It resides in earth and in water'

  2. ‘The quality which is the non-intimate cause of inci- pient trickling, is called Fluidity. It affects earth, water and light. It is of two kinds;-Natural [established by its own nature], and Adscititious [produced by some cause]. Natural fluidity resides in water; and Adscititious fluidity resides in earth and light. In earthy substances, such as butter &c., flui-

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dity is produced by the conjunction of fire. In light, ( it is pro- duced) in gold &c.’

  1. The quality which is the cause why particles &c. be- come a heap, is called Viscidity. It resides in water alone.'

  2. The quality which is apprehended by the organ of hear- ing, is called Sound. It resides only in the ether. It is of two kinds;-Inarticulate and Articulate. In-articulate sound is produced by the instrumentality of a drum &c.; Articulate sound is that, which is in the shape of the Sanskrit or any other language.'

  3. ‘Knowledge, which is the cause of every conception (that can be put in words) is called Understanding. It is of two kinds;-Remembrance and Notion. The knowledge which is produced only by its own antecedence, is called Remembrance; and knowledge which is different from that, is called Notion. It is of two kinds;-Right and Wrong. Of whatever description anything is, when our idea of that thing is of that same descrip- tion, it is called a Right notion; as, in the case of silver, the idea of its being silver. This is called Prama [commensurate with its object.] The supposing a thing to be as the thing is not, is called a Wrong notion; as, in the case of a shell, the notion of its being silver. This is called Apramá.”

C

  1. Right notion is of four kinds, through the divisions of Perceptions, Inferences, Conclusions from similarity and autho- ritative Assertions understood. The efficient [peculiar ] cause of those, also is of four kinds, through the divisions of Percep- tion, Inference, Recognition of similarity and authoritative Assertion.’

  2. ‘Whatever thing, through its operating, is the cause, not common to all effects, of some given effect, that is the in- strumental cause thereof. That which is invariably antecedent to some product, and is not otherwise constituted [is not by any thing else-except the result in question-constituted a cause] is the cause (of that product). That which annuls its own antecedent non-existence is called an Effect.

  3. ‘Cause is of three kinds, through the distinctions of In- timate, Non-intimate and Instrumental. That in which an effect intimately relative to it takes its rise, is an Intimate

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cause; as, threads are of cloth, and the cloth itself of its own colour &c. Where this intimate relation exists, that cause which is associated in one and the same object with such effect or cause, is Non-intimate; as, the conjunction of the threads is the non-intimate cause of the cloth, and the colour of the threads, that of the colour of the cloth. The cause which is distinct from both of these is the Instrumental cause; as, the weaver’s brush, the loom &c. are of cloth. Among these three kinds of causes, that only is called an instrumental cause which is not a universally concurrent cause or condition (of all effects as God, time &c. are).’

  1. ‘The Cause of the knowledge, called sensation is an organ of sense; knowledge produced by the conjuction of an or- gan of sense and its object, is sensation. It is of two kinds;- Where it does not pay regard to an alternative, and Where it does. The knowledge which does not pay regard to an alter- native is that which involves no specification, as in the simple cognition that this is something that exists.’ The knowledge which contemplates an alternative is that which includes a specification, as, ‘This is Dittha,’ ‘This is Brahmana,’ ‘This is black.”

  2. ‘The relative proximity of a sense and its object, which is the cause of perception, is of six kinds;-Conjunction, In- timate union with that which is in conjunction, Intimate union with what is intimately united with that which is in conjunction, Intimate union, Intimate union with that which is intimately united, and the Connection which arises from the relation between that which qualifies and the thing qualified. When a jar is per- ceived by the eye, there is (between the sense and the object) the proximity of Conjunction. In the perception of the colour of the jar, there is the proximity of Intimate union with that which is in conjunction; because the colour is intimately uni- ted with the jar, which is in conjunction with the sense of vision. In the perception of the fact that colour generically is present, there is the proximity of intimate union with what is intimately united with that which is in conjunction; because the generic property of being a colour is intimately united with the particular colour which is intimately united with the jar

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which is in conjunction with the sense of vision. In the percep tion of sound by the organ of hearing there is the proximity of Intimate union; because the organ of hearing consists of the ether which resides in the cavity of the ear, and sound is a quality of ether, and there is Intimate union between a quality and that of which it is the quality. In the perception of the nature of sound, the proximity is that of intimate union with what is intimately united; because the nature of sound is inti- mately united with sound which is intimately united with the organ of hearing. In the perception of non-existence, the pro- ximity is dependent on the relation between a distinctive quality and that which is so distinguished; because when the ground is (perceived to be) possessed of non-existence of a jar, the non-existence of a jar distinguishes the ground which is in conjunction with the organ of vision. Knowledge produced by these six kinds of proximity is Perception. Its instrumental cause is Sense. Thus it is settled that an organ of sense is what gives us the knowledge called sensation.

  1. ‘The instrument (in the production) of an inference is a generalized Fact. An Inference is the knowledge that arises from deduction. Deduction is the ascertaining that the sub- ject possesses that character which is invariably attended [by what we then predicate of it.] For example, the knowledge that, this hill is characterized by smoke, which is always at- tended by fire,’ is a deductive application of a general principle; the knowledge produced from which, viz. that’ the hill is fiery’, is an inference. Invariable attendedness is the fact of being con- stantly accompanied; as,—in the example ‘Wherever there is smoke, there is fire [by which it is invariably attended ]’. By ’the subject’s possessing a character &c.,’ is meant that in a mountain &c. there is present that which is invariably attended.’ 41. ‘A general principle is of two kinds, in so far as it may be useful for One’s self, and for Another. That which is employed for One’s self is the cause of a private conclusion in one’s own mind. For example, having repeatedly and per- sonally observed, in the case of culinary hearths &c., that where there is smoke there is fire, having assumed that the con- comitancy is invariable, having gone near a mountain, and be-

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ing doubtful as to whether there is fire in it, having seen smoke on the mountain, a man recollects, the invariable attendance of fire where there is smoke. Then the knowledge arises that this mountain is characterised by smoke, which is invariably attended by fire’. This is called the Consideration of a sign. Thence is produced the knowledge that ’the moun- tain is fiery,’ which is the Conclusion. This is the process in in- ference for One’s self. But, after having, to the satisfaction of his own mind, inferred fire from smoke, when one makes use of the five-membered form of exposition for the instruction of another, then is the process one of inference for the sake of Another. For example :-

(1) The mountain is fiery;

(2) Because it smokes;

(3) Whatever smokes is fiery, as a culinary hearth; (4) And this is so;

(5) Therefore it is fiery as aforesaid.

In consequence of the token here rendered, the other also ad- mits that there is fire.’

  1. There are five members of this syllogism;—the Pro- position, the Reason, the Example, the Application and the Conclusion. The mountain is fiery’, is the Proposition; ‘Be- cause it smokes,’ is the Reason; Whatever smokes &c.,’ is the Example; ‘And so this mountain is,’ is the Application; “There- fore it is fiery’, is the Conclusion.

  2. ‘The cause of an inference, whether for one’s self or for another, is simply the Consideration of a sign; therefore the anumána [the cause of an inference] is just this Consideration of a sign.’

  3. A sign is of three sorts;-That which may betoken by its

presence or by its absence; That which betokens only by its presence; and That which betokens only by its absence. The first is that token which is possessed of pervading inherence both in respect of its association (with the thing which it betokens) and its absence (when the thing it betokens is absent) as, for example, ‘smokiness’ when ‘fire’ is to be proved. When it is said, ‘where there is smoke there is fire, as on a culinary hearth,’ we have a case of concomitant presence. When it is said, ‘where fire is

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not, there smoke also is not, as in a great deep lake,’ we have a case of concomitant absence. The second is that token which has no negative instance, as when it is said ’the jar is name- able because it is cognizable, as cloth is,’ there is no instance of nameableness or of cognizableness being present where the other is absent, because everything (that we can be conversant about) is both cognizable and nameable. The third is that token in regard to which we can reason only from its invariable absence. For example:-

(1) Earth is different from these (other elements);

(2) Because it is odorous;

(3) Nothing that is not different from these is odorous;-

as water;

(4) But this is not so;

(5) Therefore it is different from the other elements.

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But if [in the third member of the argument] we had argued [affirmatively] that what possesses odour is different from the other elements,’ we should have had no example to cite in confirmation, seeing that of earth alone can, that property be asserted.’

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  1. That whose possession of what is to be established is doubtful is called the Subject; as the mountain, when the fact of its smoking is assigned as the reason (for inferring the pre- sence of fire). That which certainly possesses the property in question is called an instance on the same side; as the culinary hearth, in the same example. That which is certainly devoid of the property in question is called an instance on the opposite side; as the great deep lake, in the same example.’

  2. The five, that merely present the appearance of a reason, are:-That which goes astray; That which would prove the con- tradictory; That where there is an equally strong argument on the other side; the Unreal; and the Futile. The alleged reason which goes astray, is that which has not just the one conclusion. It is of three kinds;—What would prove two much; What be- longs to none besides the individual; and the Non-exclusive .The fallacy falls under the first head, when that which is alleg ed as the proof may be present whilst that which is to be proved is absent;-as for instance, if one should say, “The moun-

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tain is fiery, because it is an object of right knowledge,’ [the reason assigned would be liable to this objection] because the being an object that may be rightly known is predicable also of a lake, which is characterised by the absence of fire. That (pretended token) which belongs neither to any similar instance nor to any one dissimilar, is one devoid of community. As, when one says, ‘Sound is eternal, for it has nature of sound.’ Now the nature of sound belongs to sound alone, and to nothing else, whether eternal or uneternal. The pretended argument, which can bring an example neither in support nor in opposition, is Non-exclusive. For example, should one say, ‘Everything is non-eternal because it is cognizable,’ there would be no exam- ple to cite, because ’every thing’ (leaving nothing over) is the subject of the conclusion. A reason proving the reverse, is that which invariably attends the absence of what is to be proved. For example-suppose one should say, ‘sound is eternal because it is created.’ (We should reject his argument at once, because the fact of having been created implies non-eternity-the nega- tion of being eternal). A counter-balanced reason is that along with which there exists another reason, which (equally well) es- tablishes the non-existence of what is to be proved. As if one should argue, ‘Sound is eternal, because, it is audible, as the nature of sound is (by both parties admitted to be),’ (it might be argued, with equal force on the other side, that) sound is non-eternal, because it is a product, as a jar is. An unreal rea- son is threefold-whence there is not established the existence of any such locality as that where the property is alleged to reside; Where the nature alleged does not really reside in the subject; and Where the alleged invariableness of concomitancy is not real. (As an example of) the fallacy of non-existent locality (suppose that one argues), ‘The sky-lotus is fragrant, because the nature of a lotus resides in it, as in the lotuses of the lake’- here the sky-lotus is (alleged as) the locality (of the nature of a lotus,) and in fact it [the sky-lotus] does not exist. As (an example of) an argument where the nature does not really exist in the subject (suppose one were to argue), ‘Sound is a quality, because it is visible’-here (every one would perceive at once, that) visibility does not reside in sound, for sound is recog-

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nised by the hearing (not by vision). A reason, when there is an indispensable condition, is faulty as regards comprehensive- ness. Such an indispensable condition is what always attends property to be established, but does not always attend what is brought forward in proof. Invariable attendance on the pro- perty to be established consists in the not being the counter- entity of the absolute non-existence, which has the same location as that which is to be proved. Non-invariable attend- ance on what is brought forward in proof consists in the being the counter-entity of the non-existence which has what is brought forward in proof. (Suppose it to be argued that), ‘The mountain must smoke, because it is fiery’-in this case the contact of wet fuel is an indispensable condition. For, ‘wherever there is smoke, there is the conjunction of wet fuel’ -so that we have here invariable attendance on what is to be proved. But it is not true that wherever there is fire, there there is conjunction of wet fuel-for there is no conjunc- tion of wet fuel in the case of an (ignited) iron ball-so we have here non-invariable attendance on the proof. As there is thus its invariable attendance on what is to be proved, the con- tact of wet fuel is an indispensable condition for the sufficiency of the reason alleged. As it would require this additional con- dition (in order to prove that smoke must be present), fieriness(in the argument before us) is faulty as regards comprehensiveness. An argument is futile when the reverse of what it seeks to prove is established for certain by another proof. For example (it may be argued that), ‘Fire is cold, because it is a substance. There coldness is to be proved; and its opposite, warmth, is apprehended by the very sense of touch. Hence the argument is futile.’

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  1. ‘Comparison or the recognition of likeness, is the cause of an inference from similarity. Such an inference consists in the knowledge of the relation between a name and the thing so named. Its instrument is the knowledge of a likeness. The recollection of the purport of a statement of resemblance is the operation of that instrument. For example-a person not knowing what is meant by the word ‘gavaya,’ having heard from some inhabitant of the forest that a gavaya is like a cow, goes

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to the forest. Remembering the purport of what he has been told, he sees a body like that of a cow. Then this inference from similarity arises (in his mind), that ’this is what is meant by the word gavaya.”

  1. ‘A word [right assertion] is the speech of one worthy (of confidence). One worthy, is the speaker of the truth. A speech [sentence] is a collection of significant sounds; as, for example, ‘Bring the cow.’ A significant sound is that which is possessed of power (to convey a meaning). The power (of a word) is the appointment, in the shape of God’s will, that such and such an import should be recognizable from such and such a significant sound.’

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  1. The cause of the knowledge of the sense of a sentence is the Inter-dependance, Compatibility and Juxta-position (of the words). Inter-dependance means the inability in a word to indicate the intended sense in the absence of another word Compatibility consists in (a word’s) not rendering futile the sense (of a sentence.) Juxta-position consists in the enuncia- tion of the words without a (long) pause between each.’

  2. ‘A collection of words devoid of inter-dependance &c., is no valid sentence-for example ‘cow, horse, man, elephant,. gives no information, the words not looking out for one another. The expression ‘He should irrigate with fire’ is no cause of right knowledge, for there is no compatibility (between fire and irrigation.) The words ‘Bring-the-cow,’ not pronounced close together but with an interval of some three hours between each, are not a cause of correct knowledge, from the absence of (the requisite closeness of) juxta-position.’

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  1. Speech is of two kinds;-Sacred and Profane. The former being uttered by God, is all authoritative: but the latter, only if uttered by one who deserves confidence, is authoritative; any other is not so.”

  2. “The knowledge of the meaning of speech is verbally communicated knowledge; its instrumental cause is language.

  3. Incorrect knowledge is of three sorts, through the divisions of Doubt, Mistake, and (such opinion as is open to) Reductio ad absurdum. The recognition, in one (and the

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same) thing possessing a certain nature, of several heterogene- ous natures as characterising it, is Doubt. For example ‘a post or a man.’ Apprehending falsely is Mistake. For example, in the case of a shell, the idea of silver. Reductio ad absurdum consists in establishing the pervader [here supposed to be de- nied] through the allegation of the pervaded [here supposed to be granted]. For example, ‘If there were not fire [which is denied,] then there would be no smoke [which is admitted.]’

  1. ‘Memory also is of two kinds;-Correct and Incorrect. Correct memory is that which arises from correct knowledge. Incorrect memory is that which arises from incorrect know- ledge.’

  2. ‘What all perceive to be agreeable, is Pleasure.” 56. ‘What appears disagreeable, is Pain.’

  3. ‘Desire means wishing.’

Aversion means disliking.’

  1. ‘Effort means action.’

  2. ‘Merit arises from the performance of what is enjoined.. 61. ‘But Demerit (arises) from the performance of what is forbidden.

  3. ‘The eight qualities-Understanding and the rest [Un- derstanding, Pleasure, Pain, Desire, Aversion, Effect, Merit and Demerit] are distinctive of Soul alone.’

  4. ‘Understanding, Desire and Effort are of two kinds;- Eternal and Transient. Eternal in God, and Transient in mortals.’

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  1. Faculty is of three kinds;-Momentum, Imagination and Elasticity. Momentum resides in the four beginning with Earth, [Earth, Water, Light and Air] and in Mind. Imagina- tion, the cause of memory, and arising from notion, resides only in the Soul. Elasticity is that which restores to his former position what had been altered. It resides in things like mats &c., formed of the earthy element.’

  2. ‘Action consists in motion. Throwing upwards is the cause of conjunction with a higher place. Throwing down- wards is the cause of conjunction with a lower place. Contrac- tion is the cause of conjunction with what is near the body. Expansion is the cause of conjunction with what is distant..[14]

Going is every other variety. Action resides only in the four beginning with Earth [Earth, Water, Light and Air] and in Mind.’

  1. ‘Genus is eternal, one, belonging to more than one, and residing in Substance, Quality and Action. It is of two kinds;- Higher and Lower. The higher Genus (the summum genus) is existence. The lower Genus is such a one as Substantiality [the common nature of what are called Substances].’

  2. Differences residing in eternal substances, are excluders (of each from genus of nature with the others).’

  3. ‘Intimate relation is Co-inherence. It exists in things which cannot exist separately. Two things which cannot exist separately are those of which two, the one exists only as lodged in the other. Such pairs are, parts and what is made up of the parts, qualities and the thing qualified, action and agent> species and individual, and difference and eternal substances.*

  4. ‘Antecedent non-existence is without beginning, and has no end. Such is the non-existence of an effect previously to its production. Destruction has a beginning, and has no end. (Such is the non-existence) of an effect subsequently to its production. Absolute non-existence is that of which the counter-entity is considered independently of the three times [past, present and future]. For example;-(Such is the non- existence in the instance where it is remarked that) there is not a jar on the ground. Mutual non-existence is that of which the counter-entity is considered with reference to the relation of identity. For example;-(Such difference is re- ferred to when it is remarked that) a jar is not a web of cloth.’ 70. ‘Since every thing is properly included under the cate- gories that have been now stated, it is established that there are only seven categories.’

“This Compendium of Logical results was composed by the learned Annam Bhatta, in order to perfect the acquaintance of students with the opinions of Kanada and of the Nydya.