आगमे विश्वासटिप्पन्यः

Echwand Hall.

LECTURES

ON THE

NYAYA PHILOSOPHY,

EMBRACING THE TEXT

OF THE

TARKA SANCRAHA.

Jemes Robert Ballantine.

·000–

PRINTED FOR THE USE OF THE BENARES COLLEGE,

Bg Order of Government, N. W. P.

-0000

ALLAHABAD:

PRINTED AT THE PRESBYTERIAN MISSION, PRESS.

Rev. Jos. Warren, Supt.

IndL FIS

Ind h 323ort2- B 7,58/8.

Harvard College Library,

Git of

FITZEDWARD HALL,

July 17, 1899,

PREFACE.

THESE lectures were delivered to the senior class of pupils

in the English Department of the Benares College, with the

vicw of introducing them to the philosophical terminology

current among their learned fellow-countrymen the pandits.

The easiest, if not the only, way to obtain a thorough ac- quaintance with the force of the terms belonging to a philo-

sophical system, is to study the system itself. The circum-

stances under which the lectures were delivered will account

for their familiar tone, and for the introduction of various

remarks which would have been superfluous if the work had

been addressed to the Icarned of Europe.

Benares College,

J. R. B.No Paus.coord for it.

placed. The orig. not derived from fifet, a leisure,

Both word have the same shyany howwr

Exfilaisend in the comanent by an easily,

or-all.

Crutial

semur, Genericaluers ultimate, final, stable, undifferent table

X that is, the connection between substamen & quality, be

` “Co-inherunder.

indissoluble connection.

Collocatin

Visli..

Constitutiva Cermatia?

LECTURES

ON THE

NYAYA PHILOSOPHY.

THE compendium of the Nyáya system of philosophy, entitled the Tarka-Sangraha, which we propose here to translate and comment upon, has the following exordium :–

निधाय हृदि विश्वेशं विधाय गुरुवन्दनं ।

arenai yoârua fauå nådde: 1

World

“Having treasured in my heart the Lord of the Universe, and having saluted (my) preceptor, (this) Compendium of the Dialectical Philosophy is made by me)for the purpose of plea- santly instructing those who are unacquainted (with the sub- ject.”

The author then proceeds to enumerate the categories or most general heads under one or other of which every name current in the world is capable of being classed. These in accordance with the system of Kanáda, followed by the au- thor of the Tarka-sangraha, are enumerated as follows:—

द्रव्यगुणक सामान्यविशेषसमवायाभावात पदार्थः ।

“Substance (dravya), Quality (guna), Action (karmma), Community of properties (sámánya), Difference (visesha), In- timate Relation (samaváya), and Non-existence (abháva), are the seven categories (padártha).”

। सङ्ग

{that is

to say, having

[[2]]

LECTURES ON THE

The word Category is derived from a Greek word corres- ponding to the Latin predicamentum, and signifying “what can be said or predicated” respecting the several things in- cluded under the term. For example, the Weight, Ductility, and Malleability of gold are qualities. We predicate or as- sert that Ductility comes under the category or predicament of quality—and so of the others. And again we say that gold comes under the category of substance. But we cannot, cor- rectly speaking, predicate any thing of Quality itself, except that it is one of the most general or comprehensive of Names. From its etymology it would seem that the word padártha is equivalent to padasya artha, “the meaning of a word”—and the meaning of every common term must be comprised un- der one or other of the Categories that constitute a correct division of Names.

Different schools of philosophy have adopted different sets of categories. Those of Aristotle were “substance, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, condition, possession, action, and passion.” Those of Zoroaster were the principles of “sensa- tion, intelligence, judgment, conscience, and life.” Those of Locke were “extension, solidity, mobility, perceptivity, moti- vity, existence, duration, and number.”

Our text book now proceeds to enumerate the sub-divisions of the Categories:-

तच द्रव्याणि ष्टथिव्यप्तेजो वाय्वाकाशकालदिगाममनांसि नवैव ।

“There (in the enumeration of Categories) what are meant by substances are these nine-earth (prithiví), water (að), light (tejas), air (váyu), ether (úkásá1), time (kála), space (dig), soul (átman), and mind (manas).”

Modern Chemistry has resolved water into two gases, one of which is a constituent also of the compound air that we breathe. Earth is a very vague term, on which we shall have to remark further on. Philosophers are still divided in opi-

An “Substance depend the 6 categories that follow it.

нормал

On “Quality” defend “Community of properties,”

Intimate Relation”, and “ten- Existimen,

On “Action” defend the lame.

On “Community of properties dependi

“Kitimate Relatio = and “Non-Existence. “In “Difference” defund the same.

An Intimate Relation= defends “non-existence. Qin “Am-Existence may defend

defined “An.

Existence.

Subhart

from substance the categories by which it is quitified, and atous semain.

imponderable, invisible, in- in fact, imperceptible to

Abona are prehensible,

the Teusco.

“*

the debilialume, abode, of Zuality, ten the samainy

Exclusive of jelly the diamond.

*” fekace. ? direction.

I face the sure to col of directions

Collgeries.

I dimension 2 severally

priority of foot. better in Sharifying time only. Not so, whine of the future.

shit treacle both?

bolt of time space

have their quality S. in that quality in

siveness,

Vienation J

itself which a substance forms.

drops

Sometimes in Lans

Evertine

Jesychical fort. It

“Corfinial Effort” FET alwest

because, they consang

water, boin

que choi lver For the sam rearm !!

X another thing, or itself.

motime,

locomotion

means the latter.

she the first four actines the subject, centrically, retains its place? No? In the let to the subject may

not be the object;

in this fifth the sub-doby.

Aza Ed Hal ?NYAYA PHILOSOPHY.

nion as to whether light is an imponderable substance or the effect of undulation. The term Ether seems to be frequently employed in a sense scarcely differing from that of space in three dimensions. The specific quality assigned to it in the Nyáya system will be considered further on. Time and Space are here classed as substances, because the word substance is em- ployed to signify that to which qualities can be attributed. The reason for viewing soul and mind as different substances will appear in the sequel.

The Qualities are next enumerated :—

रूपरसगन्धस्पर्श सङ्ख्यापरिमाणष्टथक्कुसंयोग विभागपरत्वा

परत्वगुरुत्वद्रवत्व स्नेहशब्दबुद्धि सुखदुःखेच्छाद्वेषप्रयत्नधर्म

‘धर्मसंस्काराश्चतुर्विंशति गुष्णाः ।

(polbability-alust) tangibility

tangible prototy

prion &

Sartanding

“Colour (rúpa), savour (rasa), odour (gandha), feel (sparsa), ’number (sankhyá), ‘quantity (parimána), ˇindividuality (pri- thaktwa), conjunction (sanyoga), disjunction (vibhága), “dis- ……, tance” (paratwa), proximity (aparatwa), gravity (gurutwa), fluidity (dravatwa), viscidity (sneld), sound (sabda), intelli gence (buddhi), pleasure (sukha), pain (dukha), desire (ichchhú) aversion (dwesha), volition (prayatna), virtue (dharma), vice (adharma), and faculty (sanskára), are the twenty four quali-

independent ties.”

ith properly upchatire

serpchenhire a facully

(pom

kinez).

daverit

These will be severally considered in the sequel. The va- rieties of action are next enumerated :—

प

उत्क्षेपण।त्रक्षेपणाकुञ्चनप्रसारणगमनानि पञ्चैव कर्माणि ।

་

depression.

“Casting upward (utkshepana), casting downward (apakshe- / pana), contraction (ákunchana), dilatation (prasárana), and

bypaulich going on (gamana), are the five actions.”

The last of these, viz. gamana, or “motion in general,” in- cludes all the varieties of motion not previously enumerated,

LECTURES ON THE

and might very well include also these four results of the exertion of force.

परमपरश्चेति द्विविधं सामान्यम् ।

Community (sámánya) is of two kinds, the highest (para), and the lower (apara).”

These correspond to genus and species, as will be shown further on.

faraçugnar fanGTEESMIT LE I

ultimat

“But Particularities (or differences) abiding in eternal sub- stances (such as mind, soul, time, place, and the atoms of which the Nyaya philosophers consider earth, water, &c., to be composed) are endless.” înfiniti

BRETZEÊH VE I

Cs.infurance

“But Intimate relation (on aggregation) is of only one kind.”

Wel

ttucrado

Such is the relation between a jar and the clay of which it is formed-the relation between a body and the matter of which it is made up.

Spicegfår: momia: veshjendt sammenTÄT SÄT व्याभावश्चेति ।

“Non-existence (abháva) is of four kinds, antecedent non- existence (prágabháva), (or the state of a thing before it be- gan to be), cessation (pradhwansábháva), absolute non-exist- ence (atyantábháva), and mutual non-existence or difference (anyonyábháva).”

Having thus subdivided the categories, the writer of our

in the former of products.

I also called dhwanen

privation ?

unstirnal

NYẨYA PHILOSOPHY.

[[5]]

text book proceeds to consider each of the subdivisions in dc- tail.

viant factar fefaur famı sfaren fal

नित्या परमाणुरूपा । श्रनित्या कार्यरूपा ॥

the dested fraturn

“Earth is distinguished by the quality of smell. It is of two kinds-eternal, and transient. It is eternal in the form of atoms; transient in the form of aggregates or products.”

In order to come to a right understanding with the suppor- ters of the view here laid down, it is necessary in the first place to enquire whether the first proposition is intended as a defi- nition or as a dogma. If as a definition of the sense in which the Nyáya philosopher intends to employ the term “earth,” then it must be conceded that, as the propounder of any the- ory has a right to define his terms as he pleases, provided he keeps strictly to his definition throughout the argument, and does not attempt to apply, in any different sense of the term, the conclusions thus obtained, the Nyaya philosopher is, on this understanding, fully entitled to call every thing earth that smells, and nothing earth that does not smell. The question then remaining will be, whether the division of ob- jects into odorous and inodorous is of any service in rendering our acquired knowledge more distinct, or in facilitating the acquirement of fresh knowledge. Let us see how the case stands. Ammoniacal gas, composed of the two simple and inodorous gases Hydrogen and Nitrogen, is powerfully odorous. Will it facilitate or obstruct our acquaintance with the cha- racter and the relations of this substance, if we separate it from the class of airs, and associate it with stones and gems or flowers? History must answer this question-the history of the progress of chemical discovery under the elemental the- ory and that of inductive analysis.

If, on the other hand, the proposition that “Earth is distin- guished by the quality of smell” is intended not as a defini-6

LECTURES ON THE

tion of the sense in which the term earth is to be employed throughout the argument, but as an assertion that there ac- tually is one real and distinct principle which is the constitu- ent equally of every thing that is odorous, then the philoso- phy of modern Europe demurs to the proposition. It is not self-evidently true. If it be true, therefore, it must be shown to be so by the adduction of evidence, or of sufficient autho- rity. What evidence can be adduced in support of the propo- sition, we may learn further on. What constitutes suitable authority will also form a question for enquiry in the sequel.

The transitoriness of earth in the form of aggregates sig- nifies the want of permanence in the forms, such as jars, &c., which it may assume. The jar, when crushed to powder, is no longer a jar, but the earth of which it is composed, still remains.

The existence of eternal atoms has been a favourite specu- lation in several schools of philosophy. Among the Grecks, Epicurus is one of the most celebrated of the supporters of the atomic theory. The doctrine has been revived by some modern chemists, not as an ascertained fact, but as a hypo- thesis which furnishes terms very convenient in enunciating the chemical laws of Definite Proportions.

Our text-book proceeds to subdivide the products of earth as follows

irke.

सा पुनस्त्रिविधा शरीरेन्द्रियविषयभेदात् । शरीरमादा- दौनामिन्द्रियं गन्धग्राहकं प्राणं नासाग्रवर्त्ति विषयो मृत्पा- घाणादिः ।

promet

“It (earth in the form of aggregates) again is of three kinds, through the division of organized body (sartra), organ of sense (indriya), and inorganic mass (vishaya). Earthy or- ganic body is that of such as us mortals; the earthy organ of

1 it like

borz, organy

sense, timass.

The senses

are

regarded

06-1

bing of

The same nature with that constituent

the External world while they severally

There are

distinct Kinley

take ergiques. muses, & there, bese notes of firstn

минь

qua

lities, & furnisher substrate for which für Elements are postiolated.

The

NYÁYA PHILOSOPHY.

Offerte der

sense is smell (ghrána), the recipient of odour, residing in the

forepart of the nose; earthy anorganic mass is clay, stone, and the like.”

ང་

including annnd, & the like.

To say that an organ of sense is earthy, or watcry, or etheri- al, would seem to indicate some confusion of thought as to the boundary line between mind and matter. But the Nyáya philosophers have perhaps been led to adopt this fanciful view of the senses rather by their excessive fondness for system, which was gratified by the simple means thus afforded of stow- ing away cach of the senses in an ostensibly appropriate place. This point can be more satisfactorily enquired into when we have heard the account given of the other senses.

[[371]]

शीतस्पर्शवन्यापः

“Water is distinguished by being cool to the feel.”

In the sequel our text book offers the just observation that levity is not an entity but is only the absence of gravity. Had the same view been taken of cold and heat, water would have escaped being defined, as it is herc, by a characteristic which the Naiyáyika would scarcely recognize if he dipped his finger into a boiling tea kettle.

[[37]]

।

dist

नाच्च द्विविधा नित्या ुनित्याश्च । नित्या परमाणुरूपा / : ! अनित्या, कार्यरूपाः । ताःपुनस्त्रिविधाः शरोरेन्द्रियविषय भेदात् । शरीरं वरुणलेोके । इन्द्रियं रसग्राहकं रसनं जिह्वाग्रवर्त्ति

fagiuafi, faqu: aftagsifę: 1

॥

muslinnol

“And this (water) is of two kinds—eternal and transient :— eternal, in the shape of atoms; transient in the shape of pro- ducts. These products again arc of three sorts, through the division of organized body, organ of sense, and unorganic mass. Watery organized body is to be met with in the realms world of Varuna (or Neptune); the watery organ of sense is taste

[[8]]

LECTURES ON THE

percipis cus

(rasana) the recipient of savour, residing in the forepart of the tongue; unorganic masses of water are rivers, seas, &c.”

zwudaña: 1 alglau faranforaqı fazi qenTY रूपमनित्यं कार्यरूपम् । पुनस्त्रिविधं शरीरेन्द्रियविषयभे- दान्त्। शरीरमादित्यलेोके प्रसिद्धम् । इन्द्रियं रूपग्राहकं ag: gwarcıqafti, faucegfåân àrafçâredt या करजभेदात् । भौमं वर्णादिकं । अविन्धनं दिव्यं विद्युदादि । भुक्रस्य परिणामहनुरौदर्यं । श्राकारजं सुबर्णीदि ।

।

“Light is distinguished by being hot to the feel. It is of two kinds eternal in the form of atoms; transient in the form of products. These products again are of three kinds, through the division of organized body, organ of sense, and unorganic mass. Luminous organized bodics abide in the so- lar realm, as every one knows; the lucid organ of sense is sight (chakshus) the recipient of colour, residing in the fore- part of the black pupil of the eye; unorganic light is of four kinds, according to the division of earthy (bhauma), celestial a (divya), intestinal (audarya), and mineral (ákdrają). Earthy

has water for light is that of fire, &c. Celestial, such as lightning, without it, fuel. Intestinal is the cause of the digestion of what is eaten and drunk. Mineral light is (what is found in mines, as gold

&c.”

The Nyaya regards light and heat as one and the same substance. Modern research has discovered striking analogies not only between light and heat but also between these and electricity and magnetism; but whether they are radically the same or different has not yet been determined by investigation. In the Nyaya the organ of sight is said to be a ray of light proceeding from the pupil of the eye towards the object view- ed. The Bauddhas affirm that the organ of sight is the pupil of the eye itself. Modern optical science pronounces that we see

уto

In which but feel resides, that is light.

1.8. Ecutre. ?

produced in the earth, &c.

い

наверальних

The Staiyayikanı

doubt.

dags that the object must be illeminett.

[[1]]

•

NYẨYA PHILOSOPHY.

[[9]]

by means of rays coming to, not proceeding from, the eye. From the bottom of a deep cave we can see an object outside which reflects the sun’s rays to our eye; but, standing outside, no ray from the eye enables us to discern an opaque object at the bottom of the dark cave. X

[[4]]

The doctrine of intestinal heat seems like an anticipation of of Liebig’s theory of digestion; but, like some other seeming anticipations of scientific discovery, it reverses the order of cause and effect. The animal heat arises from the digestion of the food; the body acting, as Liebig tells us, “as a furnace which we supply with fuel.”

Gold is supposed by the Naiyáyikas not to be earthy like the other metals, because the strongest heat of a furnace is insufficient to calcine it, or turn it into an earthy looking oxide.

In the Mimánsa, gold is reckoned a distinct substance, as it is by European chemists,

[[1]]

रूपरहितस्पर्शवान्वायुः । स द्विविधो नित्योऽनित्यश्च । नित्यः परमाणुरूपेा ऽनित्यः कार्यरूपः । पुनस्त्रिविधः शरीरेन्द्रिय विषयभेदात् । शरीरं वायुलोके । इन्द्रियं स्पर्शग्राहकं त्व : सर्वशरीरवर्भि । विषयो वृक्षादिकम्पनहेतुः ॥

tangible

“Air is colourless, and sensible to the feel. It is of two sorts, eternal and transient :-eternal in the form of atoms- transient in the form of aggregates. These aggregates again are of three kinds through the division of organized body, organ of sense, and unorganic mass. Aerial organized bodies belong to the realm of air (evil spirits, such as the pisáchas); the ae- rial organ, the percipient of touch, is the aerial cuticle (twak), ch pervading the whole body. Inorganic masses of air are such as cause the shaking of trees and the like.”

Air is, by many people, in the present day, regarded as co-

[[10]]

LECTURES ON THE

lourless; but, if the colour of a body be that coloured ray which it reflects, then air should be considered to be blue, for it reflects the blue rays. When we go to a great height, in a balloon or on a mountain, the diminution in the amount of the blue rays refracted, owing to the smallness of the mass of air above us, causes the sky to appear nearly black-black being the absence of all colour.

शरीरान्तः सञ्चारौ वायुः प्राणः सचैको ऽप्युपाधिभेदत्प्राष्या T पानादिसञ्ज्ञां लभते ॥

“Air circulating within the body is vital air ( prána); and this, though single, takes the name of breathing, flatulence, &c., through the distinction of modifying circumstances.”

On this opinion Professor Wilson (p. 104 of his edition of the Sánkhya káriká) remarks, “The vital airs are, in fact, the vital functions of breathing, circulation, and digestion. That these functions, resulting from organization, should be sup- posed to partake of the nature of aerial humours, originates very possibly from some misapprehension of the phænomena of breathing, flatulence, and arterial pulsation.’

शब्दगुणमाकाशं तचैकं विभु नियच्च ।

“Ether is the substratum of the quality of sound. It is one, all-pervading, and eternal.”

This element is inferred in order to account for sound. As sound can be conveyed through solids, liquids, and air—but not through a vacuum, it appears to be an imaginary ele- ment, devised with the view of providing each of the senses with a separate element. As pure air and water are devoid of odour, it seems to have been decided by the Naiyáyikas that odour is the distinctive evidence of earth :-the percep- tion of savour being dependent on the presence of moisture in the mouth, it was decided that the sense of taste must be aqueous in its nature :—the relation between light and vision

рии

71.8. inspiration dexpiration. the difference of it’s accidents

Serrand - Geno life)An interpolation.

NYÁYA PHILOSOPHY.

[[11]]

was obvious :–and the air having been appropriated to the sense of touch, which envelopes the whole body just as the air usually envelopes it, there remained nothing for it, if the uniformity of the system was to be established, but to postu- late a fifth elementary essence to account for hearing; and this received the name of ether. A fifth element, under the name of Quintessence, was imagined by some ancient philoso- phers of Europe, but with a different view from that of the Nyáya system.

The opinion that the senses must resemble in their nature the objects which they were to apprehend is akin to the opini- on long prevalent in Europe that a cause must resemble its effect. It is in some respects the converse of the theory of ideas or sensible forms. In that theory outward bodies were supposed to send refined copies of themselves to the mind through the senses. Here, on the other hand, the mind is viewed as despatching a sense towards its object in a material state resembling that of the object itself. Thus luminous bo- dies are represented as being discerned by means of a ray of light which proceeds from the eye, and which constitutes the sense of sight.

अतीतादिव्यवहारहेतुः कालः सचैको विभुर्निव्यश्च ।

“The cause of the employment of the terms past and the like, is Time (kála.) It is one, all-pervading, and eternal.”

प्राच्यादिव्यवहारहेतुर्दिक् साचै का नित्या विभ्वोच ।

Eastern

“The cause of the employment of the termsaster and the like, is Place for Space (or Direction-dik It is one, eternal, s and all-pervading (or infinite).”

ज्ञानाधिकरणमात्मा । स द्विविधा जीवात्मा परमात्माच ।

तजेश्वरः सर्वद्मः परमात्मा एक एव सुखदुःखादिरहितः । ] जीवात्मा प्रतिशरीरं भिन्नेो विभुर्निव्यच ।

[[12]]

(or substration of the quality)

LECTURES ON TH

“The seat of knowledge is the soul (átman). It is two-fold the living soul, and the Supreme soul. The Supreme Soul (or Spirit), the Lord, the Omniscient, is One only subject to neither pleasure nor pain. Living soul is distributed, one to each human body. It is infinite and eternal.”

The reason assigned for saying that the human soul is infi- nite is this, that whithersoever the body goes, there the soul too is present.

सुखदुःखाद्युपलङ्गिसाधनमिन्द्रियं मनः । तच प्रत्यात्मनिय तत्वादनन्तं परमाणुरूपं नियच्च

ishich

[[185]]

«Mind (manas) is the instrument which effects the appre- hension of pleasure, pain, &c. It is innumerable, through there being one assigned to each soul. It is in the form of an atom, and is eternal.”

The Naiyáyikas argue that the mind is minutely small, as an atom, because if it were infinite, as the Mímánsa maintains, it might be united with every thing at once, and all sensations might be contemporaneous. Various sensations, the Naiyáyikas contend, do not arise at one time to the same soul. “They on- ly seem to do so when passing rapidly, though successively; as a firebrand, whirled with velocity, seems a ring of fire.”—The phenomenon here instanced is accounted for in modern philo- sophy by the statement that the retina retains impressions for a short time after the exciting cause has been removed. Ana- logously the ear apprehends one continuous sound when the succession of sounds is very rapid, as when a slip of wood is successively struck by the teeth of a rapidly revolving wheel.

Having finished his account of substance, our author pro- ceeds to treat of quality.

अथ गुष्णाः ।

devoid of

animal

It is developed, (out of the infinites). by an organized body, tits quality Touch brought out - as

a bill

Kunoleon)

the quality of Louid is bought

the infiinte Eller Ideveloped by a diamon

in the undicatory thing of lights

ཞ༔,

witible light is develsen pun the invitite

Eller by fhin sum, de.

༤༦༤༤/

& the caus

жу

been-

brownish, auburn?NYẨYA PHILOSOPHY,

[[13]]

OF QUALITIES.

चक्षुमीजग्राचो गुणेो रूपं । तथ शुक्कनोलपौतरक्त हरितक fqafqaûquanfari efadisonātefa । m efaat सप्तविधं । अभावरं शुक्तं जले । भाखरं शुक्तच्च तेजसि ।

“Colour is a quality to be apprehended by sight only. It is of seven sorts, white, blue, yellow, red, green, orange, and variegated. It abides in earth, water, and light; all the seven sorts occur in earth. In water it is white without lustre. In light it is white and resplendent.”

Lestas

The researches of sir Isaac Newton have established the fact that colour belongs to light only, and that a ray of white light contains all the primary colours, which can be separated by a prism of glass. An object appears of the colour of the ray which it reflects; and the different power in different bodies to absorb one portion of a white ray and to reflect the colour- ed residue of the ray, gives rise to the variety of colours visi- ble in nature.

रसन्क्यायेो गुणा रसः । सच मधुरामुलवणकटुकषायतिक्त âzın asqu: ufadozein: 1 glvat algu: að अधुर एव ।

“Savour is a quality to be apprehended only by the organ of taste. It is of six sorts, sweet, acid, saline, bitter, astrin- gent, and pungent. It abides in earth and water. In earth it is of all the six sorts. In water it is sweet only.”

It would be more in accordance with the usage of modern language, to say that pure water is devoid of savour, although moisture is indispensable to the perception of the savour resi- ding in other matters. The term sweetness more properly suggests the taste of sugar and the like.

/ म

[[14]]

LECTURES ON THE

माणग्राह्ये गुणो गन्धः । सच द्विविधः सुरभिरसुरभिच

एथिवीमाचष्टभिः ।

“Odour is a quality to be apprehended only by the organ of smell. It is of two sorts, fragrance and stench. abides in earth only.”

On the opinion that odour is peculiar to earth we have al- ready remarked. The division into fragrance and stench is not so much a division of odours as they are in themselves, but rather as they affect individuals agreeably or otherwise. The odour of musk is fragrance to one man, and stench in the nostrils of another.

त्वगिन्द्रियमात्रग्राह्यो गुणः स्पर्शः । सच विविधः शीतोष्णा- नुष्णाशीतभेदान् एथिव्यप्तेजोवायुष्टप्तिः । तत्र शौतो जले ।

५/स्ते उष्णे तेजसि । अनुष्णाशीतः ष्टथिवीवाय्वाः ।

“Feel is a quality to be apprehended only by the (aerial cuticle, or) organ of feeling. It is of three kinds, cold, hot, and temperate (or neither cold nor hot). It abides in earth, water, light, and air. It is cold in water, hot in light, and neither cold nor hot in earth and air.”

The feeling here described is that of temperature only; and it is perhaps of that only that the organ gives us information without the cooperation of our muscular frame, which, by creating or offering resistance, conduces to the sensation of hardness, roughness, and the like.

नित्य रूपादिचतुष्टयं एथिव्यां पाकजमनित्यश्च । श्रन्यचापाकजम- निव्यश्च । निम्बगतं नित्यं । अनित्यगतमनित्यम् ।

“These four qualities, colour, &c., are either artificially produced in earth, and then they are transient; or else they are not so produced, in which case they are either transient

Zampsbility

touch

Негеди

the distinctio

temperat

Adreshire -118. in light swater.

producir mig by the peory of hist

quoturation

by anot

pecution

Sewer, Ave. Phil.

Two therefore twas accvend

vol.1.1.69. Cf. 64-62–66.

;

تم

arlie

may mean that & Huysmal 2 drops of vu 2 my tile thy sum into I, which they are. bus lible to do. Thus every case of fork

Busse way

ecase; - but if the whole dhuiness wire to run into my, there world while be that ! that mity will always be fand if anyting

་་༤།).

Conception

of Bulk f

Small, a great

NYÁYA PHILOSOPHY.

[[15]]

or eternal-eternal in what is eternal (as atoms are), or tran- sient in what is transient (as productions are).”

त्व

एकादिव्यवहारासाधारणहेतुरव्या ।

“The special cause of the employment of the terms one, &c., is Number.”

न्वा

सा नत्रद्रव्यष्टभिः । एकादिपरार्द्धपर्यन्ता । एकत्वनित्यमनित्यश्च नियमतन्नित्यमनित्यगतमनित्यम् ।

नित्यमेव ।

दिवादिकन्तु सर्वचा

“It (number) is common to all the nine substances. Be- ginning from one, it extends to the utmost limit of numera- tion (parárddha). Unity is either eternal or transient; eter- nal as regards things eternal, and transient as regards things transient. But duality, &c. are everywhere transient.”

The word here rendered “the utmost limit of numeration,” is “a lakh of lakhs of karors. " The transientness of uneter- nal unity, when simply rendered, amounts to this, that a piece of wood ceases to be one when you break it in two. The as- sertion of the universal transientness of duality, &c. is either X intended to conciliate the Vedántists, who deny duality alto- gether; or else it is a reflection of the mystical doctrine which these philosophers propound.

मानव्यवहारासाधारणं कारणं परिमाणं नवद्रव्यष्टभि ।

तच्च चतुर्विधं श्रणु महद् दीर्घं हुखश्चेति ।

“The special cause of the use (or perception) of measure, is Quantity. It is common to all the nine substances, and it is fourfold, small, Jarge, long, and short.”

पृथग्व्यवहारासाधारणं कारणं पृथक्कं सर्वद्रव्यष्टति : //

“The special cause of the employment of the term several

f16

LECTURES ON THE

or separate, is Individuality, a quality common to all sub- stances.’

संयुक्रव्यवहारासाधारण हेतुः संयोगः सर्वद्रव्यष्टभिः ।

“The special cause of the employment of such a term as ’the state of being connected,’ is Conjunction. It is incident to all substances.”

संयोगनाशको गुणेो विभागः सर्वद्रव्यष्टभिः ।

“The quality which annihilates conjunction is Disjunction. It is incident to all substances.”

Disjunction therefore, it is to be remarked, occurs only when conjunction has preceded.

परापरव्यवहारासाधारणकारणे परत्वापरत्वे । एथिव्यादि चतुष्टयमनेrष्टतिनी ते द्विविधे दिलते कालकृतेच । दूरस्थे दिकृतम्परत्वं समीपस्थे दिकृतमपरत्वम् । ज्येष्ट कालशतम् परत्वं कनिष्ठे कालक्कृतमपरत्वम् ।

“Distance and Proximity are the two special causes of the employment of the terms far and near, ancient and recent. Abiding in the four substances, earth, &c., and in the mind, they are twofold, with reference to place and to time, In re- gard to what is situated far off there is distance with refer- ence to place. In regard to what is situated near, there is proximity with reference to place. In what is old, there is distance with reference to time. In what is young, there is proximity with reference to time,”

Reckoning either backwards or forwards from the point, in space or time, occupied or supposed by the speaker, that one of two things which is nearest he calls apara, and that which is further off he calls para.

श्राद्यपतनासमवायिकारणं गुरुत्वं पृथिवीजलहनि ।

in severally

(Hing8 01) enquired

The special cause Cancerption of things as joind the 1227

They

I kind, made up of Spacetrade.

use of sime.

this cheer

десидела

[Distana & Proximiz

relation]

determined by

the

non-intimati

NYÁYA PHILOSOPHY.

[[17]]

“The cause (other than the body itself) of (a body’s) be- ginning to fall is Gravity, which resides in earth and wa- ter.”

Gravity is here spoken of as being confined to earth and water. If Gotama or Aristotle had been permitted to wit- ness the experiments of Torricelli and Pascal, they would have changed their opinions respecting the supposed absence of gravity in the atmosphere. One cannot help thinking sometimes with what indignation these great original thinkers and enquirers would now look upon their wilfully blinded adherents, who, instead of following out the course of enqui- ry which their teacher had indicated, sat down to dream, through centuries, over what one single man’s labours had amassed. An intelligent schoolboy of the present day, with his modicum of the experience of past centuries, is a being who would have been welcomed as a messenger from heaven by Plato, Kanáda, and all the other enquiring spirits of anti- quity. Gold was the heaviest substance known to the an- cients; who were not acquainted with Platinum; yet, accord- ing to the Nyaya view that gold is solidified light, it ought to have no gravity. This difficulty is met by saying that some earth is combined with light in the process of solidification; but the puzzle remains, how, with only a portion of gravita- ting matter, gold should be heavier than every other substance with which the Naiyáyikas were acquainted.

A noticeable decision of the Naiyáyikas was this, that le- vity is not a distinct quality, but the negation of gravity. Light and heavy are, in truth, relative terms. Stone is light in comparison with iron, but heavy in comparison with wood. The lightness here consists not in the absolute negation of gravity, but in the absence of so much as would have made the two equally heavy.

श्राद्यस्यन्दनासमवायिकारणं द्रवत्वं एथिव्यप्तेजोष्टनि । ति

[[18]]

expression) Jur. Colebrook’s

LECTURES ON THE

fari aifafgaffung । aifatgai nà । Afafadi

efaðandi:

efaat qarşı afıdâınsa’ çardı

Fluidity is the cause, other than the fluid itself, of com- mencing to trickle. It affects earth, light, and water. It is of two sorts, natural and adscititious. It is natural (or essen- tial) in water. It is adscititious (or caused by something else) in earth and light. In earthy substance, such as butter, &c., fluidity is produced by the application of fire.”

人

Modern discovery tends to establish the opinion that what Kanáda regarded as the adscititious cause of fluidity is in reality the indispensable cause of it. In the opinion of the Naiyúyi- kas “fluidity essentially exists in hail and ice; but is obstruct- ed by an impediment arising from an unseen virtue which renders the water solid."-This unseen virtue is no other than the abstraction of heat, which also solidifies molten lead after it has been removed from the fire. The three states of solid, liquid, and aeriform, most probably belong equally to every substance-or, at least to every uncompounded substance; for heat separates many compounds. Every one who has studied the works of modern chemists will admit the probability of this view.

The rendering of light fluid by means of fire, alluded to in the text, has reference to the notion that gold is solidified light.

quifefqushnazgoju: âtı semtaefn: 1 चूर्णादिपिण्डीभाव हेतुर्गुणः जलमात्रवृत्तिः

“Viscidity (or clamminess) is the quality which causes minute particles to take the shape of a heap. It abides in water alone.”

人

Hence the Naiyáyikas hold that oil, &c. are viscid only in consequence of their containing water. Oil contains the ele- ments of water, but mercury does not-yet the particles ofतेजसित सुवर्णादौ ।

for intimate

(or orze, er flow)

1.2. Established by its own.

maliva

shi

Gymnation

And in light, such as

gold, em- (by fire).

(whill acenory to the etyaga, refers to

Property. the adright plants, the monit or

the person to when hail is more

love to their wake

furmía d

have bem

would have beni)

nature

detri

bu,

produced by the instimmentality (1.2. in the form of fyllables)

The kumwlage which is produced why by its on antexedence,

they call Remembrancein

NYÁYA PHILOSOPHY.

[[19]]

mercury collect into heaps just as those of oil or water do. The phenomenon, in each of these cases, falls under what is termed, in modern science, the attraction of cohesion.

/ त्त

श्रोत्रग्राह्य गुणःशब्द आकाशमात्रवृतिः । स द्विविधः ध्वन्या- त्मको वर्णात्मकश्चेति । धून्यात्मको भेर्यादा । वर्ण । त्मकः संस्कृ- तभाषादिरूपः ।

residing only in the “Sound is a quality of ether, to be apprehended by the fe hearing (srotra). It is of two sorts, inarticulate and articu- late. Inarticulate sound is that of kettle drums, &c. Arti - culate is in the form of the Sanskrit and other languages.”

only

On the question of the medium of sound we have already offered some remarks.

सर्वव्यवहारहेतुर्बुद्धिशीनं ।

सा द्विविधा स्मृतिरनुभवश्च ।

“The quality which is the cause of every employment of any term whatsoever, is intellect or knowledge (buddhi). It is of two sorts, remembrance and notion.”

संस्कारमात्रजन्य ं ज्ञानं स्मृतिः । तद्भिनं ज्ञानमनुभवः । सद्विविधो यथार्थे ऽयथार्थ च ।

Knowledge (or a state of consciousness) produced only by the mental faculty (the sanskára, termed bhávaná) is Memory (smriti)._Knowledge other than that, is notion, (anubhava). This is of two kinds, right and wrong. '

"”

The nature of memory will be considered when we come to

Ceraiderali

the the subject of faculty. qualities self- resendung. तद्वति तत्प्रकारकानुभवेो यथार्थः यथा सम्यरजते इदं रजत-

मिति ज्ञानम् । सैव प्रमेत्युच्यते । तदभाववति तत्प्रकार को

on frica f

the Arnoldn

the self-reproduction

[[20]]

LECTURES ON THE

saran serenes: 1 aen yanfaę zanfarenfe man i

“In respect to a thing possessing a certain nature, a notion entertained implying that same nature is a right notion. For instance in the case of silver, the notion that this is silver’ is a right one. It is also termed pramá, that is to say, some- thing incontrovertible. Wrong notion is that which implies a nature which does not belong to the thing respecting which the notion is entertained. For example in the case of mo- ther o’pearl, the notion ’this is silver’ is a wrong one.”

यथार्थानुभवच्चतुर्विधः प्रत्यच्चानुमित्युपमितिशाब्दभेदात् । तत्करणमपि चतुर्विधं प्रत्यक्षानुमानापमानशब्दभेदात् ।

“Right notion is fourfold, according to the division of per- ceptions, inferences, comparisons, and authoritative state- ments. Of these the special cause is also fourfold, viz., per- ception, inference, comparison, and verbal authority or testi- mony.”

2 comidity

Jt.རྟ་ཝ'.

Seraphin-

The merit of the Sanskrit philosophical nomenclature is observable in this passage, where we find the process of in- ference and the process of comparison cach distinguished by 3 name different from that which denotes the result of the l in

process, yet etymologically related to it. The term for Per-S eeption labours under the same defect as the English word the act and the result being denoted by the same ambiguous term. In our translation we have employed the plural in speaking of results, the not being of course always spoken of in the singular. Comparison and verbal authority are includ- ed, and properly in our opinion, by the followers of the Sán- khya philosophy under right affirmation. When a man, to take the familiar illustration instanced by the Naiyáyikas, is told that a gayál (bos gavaeus) is like a cow, and so recog- nises the gayál, when he meets with it, by its resemblance to

Commensurate with its object

formed

accuratate in the unasure of

its original.

with

Cornmensurate

its object_

conclusions for similarity/cube,

assertions understand

& sense, induction,

Knowlege fo

Efficient causes,

a likueis

recopition of similarit

instrument in the production of

#it)

A cause which (is so in so far out

so in so far as it ) has operation, is called. Karana

“That which can exist (in some given character) Even in the

absenc

the product, be micr

Constantly

soulf

to That which invariably precndes some pendectiffith

and is not otherwise constituted

Erates the result in question 18. is not

cause) _ is the

by anything else constituted a

NYẨYA PHILOSOPHY,

[[21]]

a cow, his knowledge is based on the affirmation of the per- son who stated the resemblance to him. In a strict classifi- cation, founded on a complete analysis, affirmation would not appear as an ultimate ground of knowledge or belief, for it is itself indebted to inference for all its efficacy. We believe testimony only where we have inferred that it is trustworthy. Every one is not aware of having made an inference in such a case, because it is not every one that is capable of noting and analysing the operations of his own mind, even were it to occur to him to attempt it. A young Arab believes the Ku- rán on the testimony of his father, because he has observed during his own infancy that his father is a much better in- formed person than himself, and he has always found it safer to take his father’s word on any point than to decide in opposition to it on the strength of his own experience. He therefore infers that his father’s word is to be trusted in regard to the Kurán also, and he infers that what he finds written in it is true, because this follows of course from the belief that his father had given a true account of the matter. Now, if, forgetting or not perceiving the real foundation of his belief, the young Arab grows up under the habitual im- pression that the Kurán is in itself an authority standing in need of no process of inference, from matters extrinsic or intrinsic, for its establishment, then he must needs remain a Musalman to the end of his days, though no one but a Musal- mán will think that his notion is a right one.

व्यापारवदसाधारणं कारणं करणं ।

“An efficient cause, not common to other effects, is called a special cause.”

अनन्यथासिद्धकार्य नियतपूर्ववृत्ति कारण ।

“That which invariably precedes an effect that cannot else be, is a cause.”

कार्य प्रागभावप्रतियोगि ।

[[22]]

annulo

LECTURES ON THE

inthi.. coru.len fear 7 of

seah. 45.

atc

“That of which, there was antecedent non-existence is an

effect.”

This coincides with Mill’s proposition (Logic, V. 1. p. 395), that “It is an universal truth that every fact, which has a beginning, has a cause.”

कारणं त्रिविधं समत्राय्यसमवायिनिमित्तभेदात् । यसमवेतं कार्यमुत्पद्यते तत्रायि कारणं यथा तन्तवः परस्य पटव स्वगतरूपादेः । कार्येण कारणेन वा सहैकस्मिन्नर्थे समवेतत्वे सति कारणमसमवाथि कारणं यथा तन्तु संयोगः परस्य तन्तु- रूपं पटरूपस्य । तदुभयभिनं कारणं निमित्तकारणं यथा तुरीवेमादिकं पटस्य । तदेतत्रिविधकारणमध्ये यदसाधारणं कारणं तदेव करणम् ।

“Cause is of three kinds according to the distinction of intimate, non-intimate, and instrumental. That from which an intimately relative effect arises in an intimate cause, as threads are of cloth, and the cloth itself of its own colour, &c. Where this intimate relation exists, that cause which is as- sociated in one and the same object with such effect or cause, is non-intimate. Thus the conjunction of the threads is the non-intimate cause of the cloth, and the colour of the threads that of the colour of the cloth. The cause which is distinct from both of these is the instrumental cause, as the weaver’s brush, the loom, &c. are of cloth. Among these three kinds of causes, that only which is not a universally concurrent cause or condition (of all effects, as God, time, place, &c. are) is called the instrumental canse.'

[[33]]

Let us compare this view of causes with the view taken by the followers of Aristotle. In the opinion of these specula- tors four things were entitled to the name of cause; and

inconsistent

orverse

contrastant counter entity or

reefual

ст

what

gelap 3

ANYÁYA PHILOSOPHY.-

[[23]]

causes.

these were severally termed the material, the efficient, the formal, and the final. That out of which any thing is made, as the marble out of which a statue is made, they termed its material cause. This corresponds to the samaváyi-kárana, or intimate cause, of the text. It is the ground of the possibility of a thing’s coming into existence. The efficient cause was that in which resides the moving power requisite in order to ren- der the possible existence actual; as the sculptor. According to the Nyáya, the sculptor would be classed along with his chissels as onc among the several nimitta-kárana or efficient The designation of karana, or instrumental cause, would belong to the chissel. The final cause of a thing, ac- cording to the Aristotelian view, is that very thing in its com- pleteness; as the statue when madc. In modern language the final cause is synonymous with the purpose to which any object is supposed to contribute; thus the promotion of vege- tion may be regarded as the final cause of rain. This corres- ponds, to what the Naiyáyikas term prayojana, motive or pur- pose. The formal cause is that which must supervene to the matter, in order to give the thing its precise individual exis- tence as that thing and no other; as the shape which the sculptor communicates to the marble. This corresponds to the asamaváyi-kárana, or non-intimate cause, of the text, in- asmuch as it is concerned about the relative distribution of the particles of which the aggregate is made up. The word “form” is employed in a peculiar sense by Bacon to denote that in virtue of which a given quality resides in a given “The [Baconian] form,

thing; as transparency in glass. then, (vide Preliminary Dissert. Enc. Brit. p. 459), differs in nothing from the cause; only we apply the word cause where it is an event or change that is the effect. When the effect or result is a permanent quality, we speak of the form or es- sence.”

In modern philosophy the employment of the word causc

[[24]]

LECTURES ON THE

has been much simplified. We now speak of the marble as the material of the statue, not as its material cause. Again, in modern philosophy, the same view of form is taken as that taken by the Sankhyas, who say “Cloth is not different from the threads of which it is woven, for it is made up of them;” which, (vide Wilson’s Sánkhya káriká, p. 38), is tantamount to Dr. Brown’s declaration “that the form of a body is only another name for the relative position of the parts that constitute it; and that the forms of a body are nothing but the body itself.” The term “final cause” is still current, but in the altered sense that we have already stated. The arguments for the existence of a Deity, drawn from the observation of nature, have reference to final causes. Harvey was led to the discovery of the circulation of the blood by en- quiring into the final cause of, or purpose to be subserved by, the valves in the blood vessels.

The scientific employment of the word cause in modern philosophy is founded on the familiar truth, (as stated by Mill, Logic, V. 1. p. 397), “that invariability of succession is found by observation to obtain between every fact in nature and some other fact which has preceded it.” Of two facts so related, that which precedes is termed the cause of the other. To prevent misconception, it is frequently termed the phy- sical cause; the word physical serving to signify that we are speaking merely of the invariable relation of succession ob- served in nature between the two facts, and not of any effi- ciency in the antecedent for the production of the consequent. That efficiency we cannot well conceive to consist in any thing else than the fact, that the relations observed in nature are such as the Author of Nature has thought fit to establish among his works. The efficiency of a cause consists in its being God’s will that it should be efficient. This, in our opi- nion, is what is conveyed by the Musalmán expression mu- sabbib-ul-asbáb, usually rendered “The causer of causes ;” but

but

цим

་་A.ཙ{

Staz

that the relative position of

parts the body,

fin.

lait

some thiting.

NYÁYA PHILOSOPHY.

[[25]]

which, to our mind, rather expresses, “Who maketh causes to be efficiently such,” or “Who bestoweth on something that, in virtue of which it becomes a cause.'

Let us see how the chain of cause and effect, in regard to the production of cloth, looks when we resolve the variously named causes of the Nyáya into the language of invariable antecedence and succession. In such a sequence we do not enumerate the matter of the cloth, because, as the matter is the ground of the possible existence of the thing, the existence of the cloth about which we are speaking implies the existence of the matter. When we speak of an effect, we speak of an event, not of a substance; and the event of which we have to trace the chain of antecedents is the appearance of a certain amount of matter in the form of cloth. The event which in- variably precedes, and is invariably followed by, the appear- ance of cloth, is the suitable conjunction of threads. This, then, is the cause why cloth has made its appearance. That conjunction itself was immediately preceded by the operation of the loom upon the threads properly disposed. This opera- tion, which always precedes the conjunction, and which, in regard to threads suitably disposed, is invariably followed by it, is the cause of the conjunction. The operation of the loom was consequent on the muscular exertions of the weaver, which invariably precede each movement of the loom. Again, the exertions of the weaver were consequent upon his desire to possess cloth, and this desire itself was consequent upon other considerations, which we need not at present enquire further into. Thus we find that the different kinds of causes enumerated by Aristotle and the Naiyáyikas may be resolved into similar sequences, differing only in regard to the distance of each link in the chain from the ultimate effect dependent upon it.

तत्र प्रत्यक्षज्ञानकरणं प्रत्यक्षं । इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षजन्य’ ज्ञानं प्रत्यक्षं । तत् द्विविधं निर्विकल्पकं सविकल्पकञ्च । तत्र निष्णु-

D26

LECTURES ON THE

कारकं ज्ञानं निर्विकल्पकं । यथा इदं किञ्चित् । सप्रकारकं ज्ञानं सविकल्पकं । यथा ङित्यो ऽयं । ब्राह्मणो ऽयं । श्यामो ऽयमिति ।

The Kunalidge [called]

esaas ayana of ferasz “The cause of perception is sensation; knowledge pro- duced by the confunetion of an organ of sense and its object, is sensation. It is of two kinds, where it does not admit-of- an alternative, and where it does. The knowledge which does not admit of an alternative is that which involves no specification, as in the simple cognition that ’this is some- thing that exists.’ The knowledge which admits of an al- ternative is that which includes a specification, as ‘This is Dittha’, ‘This is a bráhman,’ ’this is black.””

!…!

The opinion here expressed, that sensation is produced by the conjunction of the object and the sense, is borne out of modern enquiry, which tends to go still further, and to regard with approval what Sir W. Hamilton terms the shrewd ob- servation of Democritus, that “all the senses are only modi- fications of touch.” [Reid’s collected works, p. 104].

प्रत्यच्चज्ञानहेतुरिन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षः षड्विधः संयोगसंयुक्तसम-

वायसंयुक्तसमवेतसमवायममवायसमवेतसमवायविशेषणविशे- व्यभावाईति । चक्षुषा घटमत्यचजनने संयोगः सन्निकर्षः । घटरूपपत्यच्चजनने संयुक्तसमवायः सन्निकर्षः चक्षुः संयुक्त घटे रूपस्य समवायात् । रूपत्वमामान्यप्रत्यचे संयुक्तसमवे- ‘तसमवायः सन्निकर्षः चतुःसंयुक्त घटे रूपं समवेतं तत्र रूप- त्वस्य समवायात्। श्रोत्रेण शब्दसाक्षात्कारे समवायः सन्निकर्षः कर्णविवरष्टत्त्याकाशस्य श्रोत्रत्वात् शब्दस्याकाशगुणत्वात् गुणगुणिनेोश्च समवायात् । शब्दत्वसाक्षात्कारे समवेतसम- वायःसनिकर्षः श्रच समवेतेशब्दे शब्द त्वस्य समवायात् । श्रभाव- प्रत्यचे विशेषणविशेष्यभावःसन्निकर्षःघटाभावबहू नलमित्यच

hay regard to

Asime

memditioned tconditioned

“Secmily, if they [-terms-] are the Prisccables. termine they must not be Legical Individuals”. What is out ob simpatial feels of sensation inward or outward, worked out o cations. I distinguished from all other objets of sensation by the occupying a ontain space at a certain time, which then it is inconceivable that of the dimme tiette.

Komen

чему

other thing

Shirild

occupy

“Buch either Armino Lazied, staners, that is, for soficura certain classes of things subject to and enote the the by some

cam quality in qualitis.

constituted

Un accurate Edgarological sewn of the wind Radioiden is plaively that which has us quotities which we kans of- gund nihil habet dividuim but is an

to me any by its accutying

Band By a

object of secration t

a certain there at a certain time. We then sware, however, it would be absend talk an individual wear cy lunge, by wi kiwow that a harve, we know some of its layer in individual Emizikalkan Thing

thing is a qualities, I therefore it is no to us. Noth the mine than that it is a

can be individual f of which we “formning

gou do mots.

Thoberley’s Lecting on Sagres butt.

NYAYA PHILOSOPHY.

चक्षुःसंयुक्ते भूतले घटाभावस्य विशेषणत्वात् । एवं सन्निकर्ष- षट्टुजन्यं ज्ञानं प्रत्यक्षं । तत्करणं इन्द्रियं तस्मादिन्द्रियं प्रत्यक्ष- प्रमाणमिति सिद्धम् ।

contact

॥ इति प्रत्यक्ष खण्डः ॥

[[27]]

“The relative proximity of a sense and its object, which is the cause of perception, is of six kinds, (1.) conjunction, (2.) intimate union with that which is in conjunction, (8.) intimate union with what is intimately united with that which is in conjunction, (4.) intimate union, (5.) intimate union with that which is intimately united, and (6.) the connection which arises from the relation between that which qualifies and the thing qualified. For example, when a jar is perceived by the eye, there is (between the sense and the object) the proximity of conjunction. In the perception of the colour of the jar, there is the proximity of intimate union with that which is in con- junction, because the colour is intimately united with the jar, which is in conjunction with the sense of vision. In the perception of the fact that colour generally is present, there is the proximity of intimate union with what is intimately united with that which is in conjunction, because the generic property of being coloured is inherent in the particular colour which is intimately united with the jar which is in conjunc- tion with the sense of vision. In the perception of sound by the organ of hearing, there is the proximity of intimate union, because the organ of hearing consists of the ether which resides in the cavity of the ear, and sound is a quality of ether, and there is intimate union between a quality and that of which it is the quality. In the perception of the nature of sound (in a given sound of which we are cognizant) the proximity is that of intimate union with what is intimately united, because the nature of sound is inherent in sound which is intimately united with the organ of hearing. In the perception of nonexistence, the proximity is dependent on the relation between a distinctive quality and that which

[[28]]

LECTURES ON THE

is so distinguished, because when the ground is (perceived to be) possessed of the nonexistence of a jar, the nonexistence of a jar distinguishes the ground which is in conjunction with the organ of vision.”

Knowledge produced by these six kinds of proximity is perception. Its instrumental cause is sense. Therefore it is clear that sense is the authority for perception.”

“So much for the chapter on Sense.”

The doctrine here laid down respecting the nature of the proximity between the senses and their supposed objects, is a corollary to the doctrine of material and formal causes, which, as we have already shown, has been superseded in modern speculation by the simpler view of invariable se-

quence.

Instead of saying that we perceive the jar immediately, and its colour as inherent in it, modern philosophers hold that the eye takes cognizance of nothing but the colour, which is due to the reflected rays coming to the eye from the object; and from the sensation of a coloured form we infer that there is a jar, just as the sparrows inferred that there was a bunch of grapes in the picture of the Greek artist. Our interpretation of a sign may be right or wrong, but the only sign conveyed to the mind by vision is that of coloured form. Again, we do not now say that the sense of vision takes cog- nizance of the generic quality of colour as residing in any particular colour, for we hold that the term colour, generical- ly, is nothing else than a contrivance of language for the pur- pose partly of economizing words, and, more particularly, of furnishing general propositions, without which we could not

reason.

The hypothesis of ether in the ear has been rendered un- necessary by the observation, that the vibrations of the ear occasioned by a sounding body, are communicated to theThere it is settled that an organe of senise

the knowledy called

is what gives sesation.

(in the production &)

་

The matriment of an inference is generalized fact. An inferences is the knowleicht that crises from deduction. Deduction

that something is

in the ascertaining

entitled to be the subject of an apportions poppipes that character which is invariably. attended [by what we then predicate of it?.

trition Still Toh, 2. p. 41,6.

sur application if an geural principale = special case.

NYAYA PHILOSOPHY.

[[29]]

tympanum or drum of the ear, which communicates with the auditory nerve, an offshoot of the brain beyond which we can trace the phenomenon no further-the way in which the matter of the nerves communicates with the immaterial prin- ciple of conciousness being one of the mysteries which re- main with the Creator.

The subtleties about the proximity between sense and non-existence were necessary, to give completeness to the system, in which non-existence plays an active part.

In saying that “sense is the authority for perception,” the meaning appears to be that, if we incline to doubt the evidence of our senses, no reason can be given why we ought to trust it all reasoning being based on our accepting the deliverances of sense

We now come to the chapter

ON INFERENCE.

अनुमितिकरणमनुमानम् । परामर्शजन्यं ज्ञानमनुमितिः । व्याप्तिविशिष्टपचधर्मताज्ञानं परामर्शः । यथा वह्निव्याप्य- धूमवानयं पर्वत इति ज्ञानं परामर्शः । तज्जन्यं पर्वता वहि- alfafa qız qgfafa: 1 az az yaqnfafcfamie- चर्यनियमो व्याप्तिः ।

mider it.)

Hat Fall

(The Consideration of with a particular case

inductive fou

Ancele

An friction feuerafitairie (in the attain production)

“Reduction is the instrumental cause of an inference. An incifle. fuel. inference is knowledge produced from a logical antecedent This consists in the knowledge of a general principle combin

the colligati

with the knowledge that the case in question is one to which it is applicable. For example, the knowledge that ’this hill is characterised by smoke, which is always attended by fire,’ is a logical antecedent, the knowledge produced from which, viz. that ’the hill is fiery,’ is an inference. The gene~

als J.

[[80]]

LECTURAS ON THE

necessity

Juvenia-

rality (or universality) of a principle consists in the invariable concomitancy of one given thing with some other, as in the instance that wherever there is smoke there is fire.’ By the applicability of the principle to the case in question, is meant, . the fact that there belongs to the hill, or the like, the charac-

ter which is thus invariably accompanied.”

In order that we may be enabled to trace the analogy which, disguised by differences arising from diversity in the point of view, or in the form of expression adopted, must yet necessarily exist between any two processes of reasoning, nei- ther of which is unsound, let us examine severally the terms in the foregoing passage, which we have rendered, as nearly as we could, by equivalents borrowed from the logic of Eu-

rope.

The first formal difference that requires to be noticed is the fact, that whilst the European logic employs a phraseology founded on classification, the Nyáya goes to work with the terms on which the classification is based. The former infers that kings are mortal because kings are men, a class of beings who are mortal. The latter arrives at the same inference by means of the consideration that mortality is inherent in hu- manity and humanity in kings.

The process of inference (anumána) is rightly distinguished by a separate name from the inference or conclusion (anumiti), the knowledge resulting from the process. This knowledge is said to be deduced from parámarsa, which we have rendered “the knowledge of a logical antecedent.” This, though viewed by the Naiyáyikas as the one indivisible antecedent of an inference, contains in reality the two premises which belong to the Aristotelian deductive syllogism. In the antecedent instanced in the text, there are wrapt up in one the major premiss “all things that smoke are fiery,” and the minor premiss, “this hill is smoking.” The reason for preferring to regard these as two inseparable parts of a single statement ap-

.haracter

the subject subject

Invariable attendedness is the fact of being constantly accompanied

as in thi

example ‘Wherever them is smoke

there is fire [ by which it is invariably

the audircts popping

attended]

a character de

mountain or

we mean that wan The like there is present

that [e.g. aoke] which is invariably attended [es. ey fire ].A general frinciple may be regard

Wb s b l

A generated for

NYÁYA PHILOSOPHY.

[[31]]

pears to be this, that it is only when simultaneously present to the mind that the premises suggest the inference.

The term which we have rendered “invariable concomitan- cy” is vyápti—“pervading inherence.” In regard to the import of a proposition which the logic of Europe calls a Universal Affirmative, such as “All men are mortal,” the Naiyáyika would say that there is pervading inherence, (vyápti) of mortality in humanity-and he would state the proposition thus, “where there is humanity, there is morta- lity.” In a universal affirmative the predicate or major term connotes the “pervader” (vyápaka) or invariable concomitant of the characteristic connoted by the subject or minor term, which is “pervaded” (vyápya) by it. The term paksha means the subject or minor term of the conclusion; and paksha-dharmmatá, the word in our text, means the possession of the character which entitles its possessor to be the sub- ject of the conclusion-the condition of a mountain, for in- stance, in so far as the vyápya, or characteristic connoted by the subject of the major premiss, (viz. “smoke”), belongs to the mountain which is thereby entitled to be the subject of the conclusion.

agari fgfaði anà quda, and argfafang: । तथाहि । स्वयमेव भूयो भूयो दर्शनेन यत्र यत्र धूमस्तत्राशि- fefa agızgıdı anfi qåtar qånedla nai aga- चान सन्दिहानः पर्वते धूमं पश्यन् व्याप्तिं स्मरति यत्र धूम- स्तत्राग्निरिति । तदनन्तरं वह्निव्याप्यधूमवान् श्रयं पर्वत इति ज्ञानमुत्पद्यते । अयमेव लिङ्गपरामर्श इत्युच्यते । तस्मात्पता वहिमानिति ज्ञानमनुमितिरुत्पद्यते । तदेतत्खार्थानुमानम् ।

“The process of Inference-is of two kinds, for one’s self, and for another. That which is for one’s self is the cause of

[[32]]

LECTURES ON THE

a private conclusion in one’s own mind. For example, hav- ing repeatedly and personally observed, in the case of culi- nary hearths and the like, that where there is smoke there is fire, having assumed that the concomitancy is invariable, having gone near a mountain, and being doubtful as to whe- ther there is fire in it, having seen smoke on the mountain, a man recollects the invariable concomitancy of fire where there is smoke. Then the knowledge arises that ’this moun- tain is characterised by smoke, which is invariably attended by fire.’ This is called linga-parúmarsa, which means such recognition of a sign as leads to inference. Thence is pro- duced the knowledge that the ‘mountain is fiery,’ which is the conclusion (anumiti). This is the process of inference for one’s self.”

यतु खयं धूमादग्निमनुमाय परम्पति बोधयितुं पञ्चावयव - वाक्यं प्रयुङ्क्ते तत्परार्थानुमानं । यथा पर्वता वह्निमान् । धूम- वत्वात् । यो यो धूमवान् स वह्निमान् यथा महानसः । तथाचायं । तस्मान्तथेति । अनेन प्रतिपादिता शिङ्गात्परो ऽप्यग्निं प्रतिपद्यते ।

“But, after having, to the satisfaction of his own mind, inferred fire from smoke, when one makes use of the five- membered form of exposition for the instruction of another, then is the process one of inference for the sake of another. For example, (1.) The mountain is fiery; (2.) because it smokes; (3.) whatever smokes is fiery, as a culinary hearth; (4.) and this does so; (5.) therefore it is fiery as aforesaid. In consequence of the token here rendered, the other also admits that there is fire. "

clear

प्रतिज्ञाहेतूदाहरणेोपनयनिगमनानि पश्चावयवाः । पर्वता वहिमानिति प्रतिज्ञा । धूमवत्वादिति हेतुः । या यो धूमवानित्युदाहरणम् । तथाचायमित्युपनयः । तस्मान्नथेति निगमनम् ॥

be, linis 2.

inference?

?NYÁYA PHILOSOPHY.

[[33]]

“The five members of this syllogism are severally named: (1.) the proposition, (2.) the reason, (3.) the example, (4.) the application, and (5.) the conclusion. The mountain is fiery’ is the proposition; ‘because of its being smoky is the rea son; ‘whatever is smoky, &c.’ is the example; ‘and so this mountain is’ is the application; therefore the mountain is fiery’ is the conclusion.”

The five-membered argument has been the object some times of undeserved censure, and sometimes of commendation equally undeserved. When it is commended, at the expense of the Aristotelian syllogism, on the allegation (see a quota- tion in Sir G. Haughton’s Prodromus, p. 215) “that it exhibits a more natural mode of reasoning than is compatible with the compressed limits of the syllogism, and that its conclu- sion is as convincing as that of the syllogism,” the commen- dation is based simply on a misconception of the syllogism thus disparaged. On the other hand, when it is censured as “a rude form of the syllogism,” the censure is unfair, because what corresponds to the syllogism is the two-membered ex- pression, which, we have already seen, comprises neither more nor less than the syllogism does; whereas the form now un- der consideration is proposed as the most convenient for communicating our convictions to others. Being a matter of exposition, it is therefore a question of Rhetoric whether the form be or be not the most convenient in which to arrange our propositions, our proofs, and our illustrations. The five-membered expression, so far as its arrangement is concerned, is a summary of Kanáda’s views in regard to Rhetoric, “an offshoot from Logic,” (see Whately’s Elements of Rhetoric, page 6), and to which, after “the ascertainment of the truth by investigation,” belongs “the establishment of it to the satisfaction of another.” Disregarding what is called rhetorical artifice, which, in his system, would have been out of place, as it would have been out of place in Eu- clid’s Elements of Geometry, Kanáda directs his rhetorician to

[[84]]

LECTURES ON THE

commence, as Euclid does, by stating the proposition to be proved. The reason is next to be alleged, and then instances are to be cited in order to show that the reason is sufficient to establish the fact in regard to all cases of a certain given character. The auditor is then to be reminded that there is no dispute that the case in question is of the given character, and the oration winds up with the reintroduction of the ori- ginal proposition in the new character of an established con- clusion, just as Euclid’s argument winds up by reintroducing the triumphant proposition with a flourish of trumpets in the shape of a “Quod erat demonstrandum.”

Thus, rhetorically considered, the five-membered expression is a very suitable framework for a straight-forward argumen- tative speech, making no appeal to the passions, and not he- sitating to table, without exordium, the proposition which it proceeds to establish.

Logically considered, the five-membered expression is a combination of the Inductive with the Deductive syllogism. It aims at laying before an auditor, for his conviction, an ex- position, conjointly, of the two separate processes which are described as having previously led to the conviction of the speaker himself. With this view, the instances which led the speaker to an inductive generalization are directed to be cited, for the satisfaction of the auditor, in the third division of the rhetorical address-from which circumstance it has so hap- pened that those who suppose the intended function of the model oration and of the Aristotelic syllogism to be identical, have come either to regard the oration as an illogical mon- strosity, or else to fancy that it is a great improvement upon the syllogism. The former misconception is that of those who, like Ritter, (“History of Ancient Philosophy,” Vol. 4. p. 365), were familiarly conversant with the logic of the schools. The other misconception was to be looked for in the case of those whose notions of the logic of the schools were derived from Locke and Dugald Stewart.

NYÁYA PHILOSOPHY.

[[35]]

Whilst Kanáda in his rhetorical section, gives the frame- work for a set harangue, to be delivered without interruption, Gautama supposes an opponent, and a chairman, or Speaker of the House. In his first aphorism, (see the “Logical Ap- horisms of Gotama,” published in Calcutta, p. 2; Colebrooke’s Essay, p. 265; or Ward’s “View, &c. of the Hindoos,” v. 4, p. 239,) he sketches, by an cnumeration of the sixteen topics following, what may be regarded as “the natural history of a debate.” What is to be admitted as proof (pramána) having been pre-determined, and the subject of discussion (prameya) having been mooted, the impartial chairman, not having yet heard the arguments, is in a state of doubt (sansaya), both as to what is the fact of the matter, and also as to there being any sufficient motive (prayojana) for entertaining the question. The asserter of the proposition explains the importance of the question, which furnishes the motive for entertaining it; and he supports his own opinion on the matter by citing examples (drishtánta) sufficient, he conceives, to make out an establish- ed casc (siddhúnta). An opponent rises, and takes the reason- ing to pieces (avayava), putting it, that is to say, into the form of the five-membered discourse, and trying to show its insufficiency. The first speaker makes a refutation (tarka) of thesc objections, and thus furnishes confirmation (nirnaya) of his own position. The objector, who, being, by hypothesis, in the wrong, is of course obstinate, begs that a fair discus- sion (váda) may be allowed; and he proceeds to offer a wrang- ling rejoinder (jalpa); and, in default of better arguments, he brings forward cavils (vitanda), fallacics (hetwábhása), am- biguous expressions, and such-like disingenuous artifices (chhala). By these unworthy proceedings he lays himself open to the confutation (játi) to which a reasoner is liable who evidently contradicts himself, and, the assembly being no longer disposed to listen to him, he is voted a nuisance, and finds himself in the predicament of being rebuked (nigra- ha-sthána) by the president, who puts him down, and declares that “the Ayes have it.”

[[86]]

LECTURES ON THE

Kanáda’s six categories belong, in the foregoing enumera- tion of topics, to the head of prameya-things, the existence of which is to be proved.

The point, in the course of analysing the reasoning pro- cess, at which the logic of India came to a halt, whilst that of Europe made an important step in advance, was that at which the sagacious mind of Aristotle discerned that whilst the pro- cess of induction, in all save those barren cases where every one of the individuals is included in the enumeration, must fall short of demonstrative certainty, the subsequent process of de- duction could be placed on a basis as stable as that of Mathema- tical science. It would be superfluous here to dwell upon the scientific beauty of Aristotle’s analysis of the reasoning process. Its scientific beauty, and also its practical utility, are well known to the intelligent readers of Whately and DeMorgan ; and are hidden in deepest darkness from those who, on this point, follow Locke and misunderstand Bacon. It is not ex- actly fair to say with Ritter (“History of Philosophy,” Vol. IV. p. 365,) that, two of the five members of Kanáda’s argu- ment “are manifestly superfluous, while, by the introduction of an example in the third, the universality of the conclusion is vitiated :”—for, as we have shown, the citation of the ex- ample is designed, as a matter of rhetorical convenience, to bring to the recollection of the hearer examples, in regard to which all parties are unanimous, and which are such as should constrain him to admit the universality of the principle from which the conclusion follows. The short-coming of the Nai- yáyikas consists in their having failed to perceive that the as- certainment of “pervading inherence” (vyápti), that is to say the process of Induction, and the subsequent process of De- duction are two processes as advantageously susceptible. of entirely separate consideration as the question of accuracy in the statement of an account and the question of accuracy in its summation-the latter being in every case a question ca- pable of demonstrative solution, and therefore convenientlywith an

He have must, then, to enquire what several kinds of

there are.

Signs there

NYÁYA PHILOSOPHY.

[[37]]

disposeable of at the outset, leaving the remainder of the en- quiry, if any further enquiry be found necessary, all the more easy to be disposed of. That the Naiyáyikas failed to per- ceive this, is less strange than that it should have been for- gotten again in Europe, as it so generally was till very re- cently. No one is perhaps more perfectly aware of the real import of the distinction here adverted to than Mr. J. S. Mill; and it is therefore matter of regret that he should have thought proper to write of the syllogism, in his “ Sys- tem of Logic,” in a sort of disparaging tone, which is calcu- lated to perpetuate misconception just in proportion to the great merit of the rest of his work. No doubt, it will have this effect only on his superficial readers; but superficial readers constitute a numerous and influential body, whom it is of great importance not to mislead.

स्वार्थानुमितिपरार्थानुमित्योर्लि’गपरामर्श एव कारण WENT स्विङ्गपरामर्शो ऽनुमानम् ।

“The cause of an inference (anumiti) whether for one’s self

The fontider a fem or for another, is simply such recognition of a sign ka leads to

indriching Beverkligan inference; therefore the pot of inference (anumána, which was previously stated to be the cause of an inference) is just this recognition of a sign.”

enin ours

bral,

The belief of the conclusion necessarily follows the com- bined apprehension of the two propositions involved in the logical datum (parámarsa), and therefore stands to it in the re- lation of an effect to its cause.

लिङ्ग’ त्रिविधं अन्वयव्यतिरेकि केवलाम्बाय केवलव्यतिरेकि- घेति । अन्वयेन व्यतिरेकेणच व्याप्तिमदन्वयव्यतिरेकि यथा षा साध्ये धूमवत्त्वं । यत्र धूमस्तत्राग्निर्यथा महानस इत्यन्वय- anfx:14a afgåifa na qàn sfa aifa au ALIYE

analy

[[38]]

LECTURES ON THE

।

इति व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिः । श्रन्ययमात्रव्याप्तिकं केवलाम्बयि यथा

तू

घो घटोऽभिधेयः प्रमेयत्वात् पटवत्। अत्र प्रमेयत्वाभिधेयत्वव्यति - रेकव्याप्तिर्नास्ति सर्वस्य प्रमेयत्वादभिधेयत्वाच्च । व्यतिरेक- माव्यातिकं केवलव्यतिरेकि ।

केवलव्यतिरेकि । यथा टथिवीरेभ्यो भिद्यते गन्धत्रत्वात् । यदितरेभ्यो न भिद्यते न तङ्गन्धवत् । यथा जलं । न चेयं तथा । तस्मान्नतथेति । अत्र यङ्गन्धवन्तदितरभिन्न- मित्यन्वयो दृष्टान्तो नास्ति एथिवीमाचस्य पञ्चत्वात् ।

TEKALI PLor

attendan

“ A characteristic token (linga) is of three sorts, (1.) that

Many Ine

vusal pa, ay ka în balsçuk iu another which has reference both to association and separatoness (anwaya-vyatireki); (2.) that which has reference to associa- tion only, (kewalánwayi); and (3.) that which has reference to separateness only, (kewalavyatireki). The first is that token which is possessed of pervading inherence (vyápti) both in res- pect of its association (with the thing which it betokens), and its absence (when the thing it betokens is absent ), as, for example, smokiness when fire is to be proved. When it is said, ‘where there is smoke there is fire, as on a culinary hearth,’ Cassil tutorialls Cleanice

we have a universal affirmative. When it is said ‘where fire

Carc

is not, there smoke also is not, as in a great deep lake,’ we

cicvonjable, devague have a universal negative. The second is that token which has no negative instance, as when it is said ’the jar is namea- ble because it is provable, as cloth is,’ there is no instance of nameableness or of provablness being present where the other is absent, because every thing is both provable and nameable. The third is that token in regard to which we can reason only from its invariable absence. For example, (we might argue as follows ) :—

“ (1.) Earth is different from these (other elements) : “(2.) Because it is odorous

" (3.) Nothing that is different from these (other

elements) is odorous-as water, (for example, is not odorous ) :

unconcomitum

содијали

cosmigablumps caguigall

literal?

Whitting furfiNYẨYA PHILOSOPHY.

“(4.) But this (earth) is not inodorous :–

(5.) Therefore it is not like the other elements :-

[[39]]

but if (in the third member of the argument) we had argued (affirmatively) that ‘what possesses odour is different from the other elements, we should have had no example to cite in confirmation, seeing that of earth alone can that property be asserted.”

Into this superfluous subtilty the Naiyáyikas would seem to have been led by their giving so much greater prominence to the Rhetoric than to the Logic of their system. Such an ar- gument as that just quoted goes far to justify the disparaging estimate of Hindú Logic entertained in Europe. Throwing aside the needlessly assumed necessity for the citation of an exam- ple in every argument propounded to another, and waiving all dispute about the truth of the premises, the argument could be easily enough stated with a universal affirmative premiss—thus–

“(1.) Whatever is odorous differs from the other

(inodorous) elements:

’ (2.) Earth is odorous :

“(3.) Therefore Earth differs from the others.”

میں مجمع

सन्दिग्धसाध्यवान्पचः । यथा धूमवत्वे हेतैा पर्वतः । निश्चित साध्यवान् सपचः । यथा तत्रैव महानसः । निश्चितसाध्या- भाववान् विपक्षः । यथा तचैव

महाहूदः

“That whose possession of the property in question is doubtful is called the subject (paksha); as the mountain, when the fact of its smoking is assigned as the reason (for in- ferring the presence of fire). That which certainly possesses the property in question is called an instance on the same side (sapaksha); as the culinary hearth, in the same example. That which is certainly devoid of the property in question is

[[40]]

LECTURES ON THE

called an instance on the opposite side (vipaksha); as the great deep lake, in the same example.”

The sapaksha corresponds to Bacon’s instantiæ convenientes “quæ in eadem natura conveniunt, per materias licet dissi- milimas.” The vipaksha corresponds to the instantiæ " “quæ natura data privantur.”—(Organum, Lib. 2, Aph. XI and XII).

OF FALLACIES.

सव्यभिचारविरुद्धसत्प्रतिपचासिङ्घबाधिताः पञ्चहेत्वाभासाः ।

“The five that merely present the appearance of a reason (hetwábhása), are (1.) that which goes astray, (2) that which would prove the contradictory, (3.) that than which there is a qually stronger argument on the other side, (4.) the inconclusive,

and (5.) the futile.”

aafuarı saaıfag: 1 afafar:aunCOSTEICON- नुपसंहारिभेदात् । तत्र साध्याभाववद्वृत्तिः साधारणो ऽने- कान्तिकः । यथा पर्वता वह्निमान् प्रमेयत्वादिति प्रमेयत्वस्य

भाववति हुदे विद्यमानत्वात् ।

“The alleged reason which goes astray (savyabhichára), is that which may have a conclusion other (than the one want- ed). It is of three kinds-(1.) What would prove too much (sádhárana); (2.) what belongs to none besides the individual (asádhárana); and (3.) the non-exclusive (anupasanhári). The fallacy falls under the first head, when that which is al- leged as the proof may be present whilst that which is to be proved is absent:-as for instance, if one should say, “The mountain is fiery, because the existence of the mountain is capable of proof,’ (the reason assigned would be liable to this

was incompatibe

co-suichen k

it is

( eljut of right kundig) Cognisable

× That is bosey

we mouth lugnize whethin the Ammiana, from which we got one

conclusion, is a

Fond

case of ayaptidhé

His recop wording We ate

در امورا

real

сорніцайга

NYÁYA PHILOSOPHY.,

соджиза

[[41]]

objection) because the capability of having its existence proved belongs (equally) to a lake, which is characterised by the ab- sence of fire.”

The result of this, translated into the language of Eu- ropean logic, is, that in such a case an opponent would deny the major,―viz. that “All that is demonstrable is fiery.” There, therefore, is a question, not of formal logic, but of fact -a question to be determined by inductive investigation. X सर्वसपञ्चविपचव्याष्टनेो ऽसाधारणः । यथा शब्दो नित्यः शब्दत्वादिति शब्दत्वं सर्वेभ्थे । नित्येभ्यो ऽनित्येभ्यश्च व्याटतं शब्दमाचष्टभि ।

[[1]]

de belez

“The pretended reason, which applies neither to similar … instances nor dissimilar ones, is one devoid of community (asá-

dhárana). As, when one says ‘Sound is eternal, for it has the nature of sound.’ Now the nature of sound resides in bel sound alone, and in nothing else, whether eternal or uneter- nal.”

This fallacy consists in what we should call the attempt to prove the proposition by reasserting it. “It is so❞—“why ?”

-“because it is so.”

अन्वयव्यतिरेकदृष्टान्तरहितो ऽनुपसंहारी यथा सर्वमनित्यं स् प्रमेयत्वादिति । अत्र सर्वस्यापि पञ्चत्वात् दृष्टान्तो नास्ति ।

“The pretended argument, which can bring an example neither in support or in opposition, is non-exclusive (anupa- sanhárí). For example-should one say, ‘Every thing is uneternal, because it is capable of proof’—there would be no example to cite, because ’every thing’ (leaving nothing over) is the subject of the conclusion.”

साध्याभावव्याप्यो हेतुर्विरुद्धः । यथा शब्दो नित्यः कृतकत्वा- fefa । amadfe faaetendanfaða anna I

t42

LECTURES ON THE

“A reason proving the reverse (viruddha), is that which invariably attends the absence of what is to be proved. For example-suppose one should say, ‘sound is eternal because it is created.’ (We should reject his argument at once) be- cause the fact of having been created implies non-eternity-

the negation of being eternal.”)

In this case, as before, the major is denied, viz.–that “ eve- ry thing created is eternal.” Whether sound be created or uncreated is a disputed point among Indian philosophers-the grammarians, of course, taking the side in the dispute which tends most to exalt the subject-matter of their own science. Mr. Babbage assigns to sound an eternity of a different kind from that contemplated by the Hindú sages, for he argues, that the undulations, on which sound depends, being once pro- duced can never be absolutely annihilated; though, through excessive diffusion, the force becomes so diminished that our dull organs are not affected by it. Were it not, for this, we might still hear the echoes of Cicero’ eloquence haunting the Roman forum.

साध्याभावसाधकं हेत्वन्तरं यस्य स सत्प्रतिपचः । यथा शब्दो

faz: ziaurala værafęfa i vâı sfaw: mndeną कार्यत्वात् घटवदिति ।

“A counterbalanced reason (satpratipaksha) is that along with which there exists another reason, which establishes the non-existence of what is to be proved. As if one should argue, ‘Sound is eternal, because it is audible, as the nature of sound is (by both parties admitted to be),’ (it might be argued, with equal force on the other side, that) ‘Sound is non-eternal, be- cause it is a product, as a jar is.’ ”

Wherever there appears to be an equiponderance of argu- ments, the case is one for further enquiry. As for the ex- ample in the the text, a Buddhist would dispose of it by deny-

Cephored,

cer que

learn by experie

“Again, sunctioned there is an

of the existenc

facit asom. Je

tim

realitics, Aude as the tourd refere-

Dutt: Newman, f. 20, (unter” Faulting Definition)..

nature allyed does not mally sexide in the salgset

NYAYA PHILOSOPHY.

[[43]]

ing that any thing exists in reality corresponding to the term sabdatwa, “the abstract nature of sound.” Granting that there were such a thing, and that it were eternal as here assumed, there is a fallacy of equivocation in the attribution to it of the terms “audibleness,” and “eternity.”

The term sabdatwa is audible, like other words, only in the sense of what is called in the Logic of the schools its supposi- tio materialis (the anukarana of the Sanskrit Grammarians) -in so far as it is a pronounceable collection of vowels and consonants; but it is held to be eternal in quite a different sense-in the sense of its being an abstract entity-in which sense it is no more audible than is the abstract nature of a jar, or any other kindred pseudo-Platonic Universal.

«fagfafau://surfag: aoufağı arear- सितश्चेति । he arreality bana

“The fallacy of inconclusivness is threefold—(1.) where there is not established the existence of any such locality as that where the property is alleged to reside (ásrayásiddha ;) (2.) where the inconclusiveness is apparent from the form of

Hi allyer the expression (swarúpúsiddha); and (3.) whière invariableness of concomitancy is not established (vyápyatwásiddha).”

श्राश्रयासिद्धो यथा गगनारविन्दं सुरभि । अरविन्दत्वात् । सरोजारविन्दवत् । अत्र गगनारविन्दमाश्रयः सच नास्त्येव ।

(As an example of) the fallacy of non-existent locality, (suppose that one argues), ‘The sky-lotus is fragrant, because the nature of a lotus resides in it, as in the lotuses of the lake’-here the sky-lotus is (alleged as) the locality (of the nature of a lotus), and in fact it (the sky-lotus) does not exist.”

Mr. Mill, (Logic, vol. 1, p. 200), treating of the nature of

[[44]]

LECTURES ON THE

Definition, has the following remarks, which noticeably il- lustrate the case in hand.

He says:-

“Let this, for instance, be our definition; A dragon is serpent breathing flame. This proposition, considered only as a definition, is indisputably correct. A dragon is a serpent breathing flame: the word means that. The tacit assump- tion, indeed, (if there were any such understood assertion,) of the existence of an object with properties corresponding to the definition, would, in the present instance, be false. Out of this definition we may carve the premises of the following syllogism :-

“A dragon is a thing which breathes flame.

But a dragon is a serpent;

From which the conclusion is

Therefore some serpent or serpents breathe flame :”— “An unexceptionable syllogism, in the first mode of the third figure, in which both premises are true, and yet the conclusion false; which every logician knows to be an absur- dity. The conclusion being false, and the syllogism correct, the premises. cannot be true. But the premises, considered as parts of a definition, are true: there is no possibility of controverting them. Therefore, the premises considered as parts of a definition cannot be the real ones. The real pre- mises must be:

“A dragon is a really existing thing which breathes flame :—

“A dragon is a really existing serpent:

“Which implied premises being false, the falsity of the conclusion presents no absurdity.”

स्वरूपासिद्धेो यथा शब्दो गुणश्चाक्षुषत्वात् । अत्र चाक्षुषलं शब्दे नास्ति शब्दस्य श्रावणत्वात् ।where the nature does not really exist in

The subject

that in which the mature is predicated of this

Subject

NYÁYA PHILOSOPHY.

[[45]]

“As (an example of) an argument evidently inconclusive, (suppose one were to argue), ‘Sound is a quality, because it is visible’—here (every one would perceive at once, that) visi- bility does not reside in sound, for sound is recognised by the hearing (not by vision).”

This is the case of notorious falsehood in the minor pre- miss,

fra gaireanfag:1 avanqzâ efa gru- नाव्यापक उपाधिः ।

“A reason, when there is an indispensable condition, is faulty as regards comprehensiveness. Such an indispensable condition (upádhi) is what always attends the property to be established, but does not always attend what is brought forward in proof.”

What follows is intended to elucidate the terms of this de- finition.

साध्यसमानाधिकर णात्यन्ताभावाप्रतियोगित्वं साध्यव्यापक- त्वं । साधनवविष्ठात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वं साधनाव्याप-

कत्वम् ।

“Invariable attendance on the property to be established (sádhya-vyápakatwa) consists in the not being the counter- «.

part (apratiyogitwa) of the absolute non-existence (atyantá- bháva) attendant on (samánádhikarana) that which is to be proved. Non-invariable attendance on what is brought for- ward in proof (sádhanávyápakatwa) consists in the being the counterpart (pratiyogitwa) of the non-existence which resides in the proof.”

The Naiyáyikas glory in this bewildering style of elucida- tion. In the present instance the question was this-“in what consists such invariable attendance as that of wet fuel on

[[46]]

LECTURES ON THE

smoke ?” In order that the answer might be sufficiently adorned with obscurity, the term Non-existence, the great ally in the mystification of language, is called into council; and it is determined that, so far as concerns the production of smoke, there is the non-existence of every thing that is not required for its production. For example, jars are not indis- pensable, nor elephants, nor astronomical calculations, nor an indefinite number of other things, the non-existence of all of which is compatible with the production of smoke. The counterpart (pratiyogi) of the non-existence of any thing be- ing the thing itself, and the counterparts of all the non-exis- tences compatible with the production of smoke being all those things that are not indispensable for its production, it follows that the characteristic of the indispensable is its being something different from all these-or, as our author express- es it, its not being the counterpart of any of these non- existences. Such, in the case of smoke, is the part performed by wet fuel, which is not the counterpart of the non-existence of jars, &c, but is the counterpart of the non-existence of it- self-a non-existence which is not compatible with the pro- duction of smoke.

The second definition is the converse of this.

न.

पर्वतो धूमवान् वह्निमत्वादित्यच श्रन्यसंयोग उपाधिः । तथाहि यत्र धूमस्तत्रार्द्रेन्धनसंयोग इति साध्यव्यापकता । यत्र वह्निस्तत्रार्द्रेन्धनसंयोगो नास्ति श्रयोगोलके आर्द्रेन्धन- संयोगाभावादिति साधनाव्यापकता । एवं साध्यव्यापकत्वे सति साधनाव्यापकत्वादार्द्रेन्धनसंयोग उपाधिः । सेोपाधि- कत्वाद्वमित्वं व्याप्यत्वामिदम् ।

।

" ( Suppose it to be argued that ), ‘The mountain must smoke, because it is fiery’-in this case the contact of wet fuel is an indispensable condition. For wherever there is smoke, there

NYÁYA PHILOSOPHY.

“

[[47]]

there is the conjunction of wet fuel’-so that we have here invariable attendance on what is to be proved (sádhyavyápa- katá). But it is not true that wherever there is fire, there there is conjunction of wet fuel’-for there is no conjunction of wet fuel in the case of an (ignited) iron ball-so we have here non-invariable attendance on the proof (sádhanávyápa- katá). As there is thus its invariable attendance on what is to be proved, the contact of wet fuel is an indispensable con- dition for the sufficiency of the reason alleged. As it would require this additional condition (in order to prove that smoke must be present), fieriness (in the argument before us) is faul- ty as regards comprehensiveness.’

An argument proposed in the form “The mountain is fie ry-therefore it must smoke,” is called an Enthymeme-be- cause, only one of the premises being expressed, the other is regarded as remaining in the mind (en thymo) of the reason- er. In the case of a fallacy propounded as an Enthymeme [see Whately’s Logic, Book 3, § 1.] it is impossible to tell whether the fallacy is in the form or in the matter. For example, the suppressed premiss in the present case may be either “Some things when ignited are smoky,” or “All things where ignited are smoky.” On the former alterna- tive, the fallacy is the formal one of undistributed middle; on the other alternative, the major premiss is false, as proved in the text by the instance of the ignited iron ball. The Nyaya, which takes no notice of formal fallacies, assumes that the suppressed premiss is in the form in which, if its truth were conceded, it would really establish the point in question : for example-

“Whatever is ignited smokes; “The hill is ignited;

“Therefore it smokes.”

The instance of the ignited iron ball enables us merely to deny the Major premiss of this syllogism. It is not unfre-T

[[48]]

LECTURES ON THE

quently useful, however, to know not merely that something is wrong, but to know how far it is wrong-or what amount of correction would make it right. With this view the case may be regarded as falling under the head of the procedure a dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter,” that is to say “from an assertion with a qualifying condition, to the same assertion without the qualification.” Thus, if we con- cede to the Naiyáyika his theory of smoke, we may say with him that “Whatever is ignited-provided there is the con- junction of wet fuel-smokes”-from which, however, we cannot go on to infer that the hill, being simply ignited, smokes. There the reason (fieriness) is “secundum quid” (sopádhika) in the major premiss, and the fallacy consists in the dropping of the “quid” (upádhi) in the minor.

DEY AIUTHIY: KATUTAĉu fafqa: a anfan: 1 GET वहिरनुष्णो द्रव्यत्वादिति । अत्रानुष्णत्वं साध्यं तदभाव उष्णत्व स्पर्शन प्रत्यक्षेण गृह्यते इति बाधितत्वं ॥

॥ व्याख्यानमनुमानम् ॥

“An argument is futile (bádhita) when the reverse of what it seeks to prove is established for certain by another proof. For example (it may be argued that), ‘Fire is cold, because it is a substance’. There coldness is to be proved; and its opposite, warmth, is apprehended by the very sense of touch. Hence the argument is futile.

“Thus has Inference been expounded.”

Our text-book now proceeds to treat of

COMPARISON.

उपमितिकरणमुपमानम् । सञ्ज्ञासञ्ज्ञिसम्बन्धज्ञानमुप मितिः ।

[[29]]

तत्करणं साहखेज्ञानम् । श्रतिदेशवाक्यार्थसारणमवान्तर-

Xi.e. valin

[wocally andpunt at all)

one when conditioned

Ghind, lignolly is regards

the foses of Expression,

a. Hak & camany сампир

beequent to 2x

Едеса в

Its instrument is the kunoledy of a likmess

NYÁYA PHILOSOPHY.

[[49]]

व्यापारः । तथाहि गवयशब्दवाच्यमजानन् कुतश्विदारण्यक पुरुषाङ्गोसदृशो गवय इति श्रुत्वा वनं गतो वाक्यार्थं सारन गोसदृशपिष्डं पश्यति तदनन्तरं श्रसै। गवयशब्दवाच्यइत्यु- # पमितिरुत्पद्यते । व्याख्यातमुपमानम् ॥

[[114]]

[[141414]]

“Comparison (upamána) is the cause of an inference from similarity (upamiti ). Such an inference consists in the know- ledge of the relation between a name and the thing so named. The recollection of the purport of a statement of resemblance

I. dhrak is a step involved in the process. For example-a person not knowing what is meant by the word gavaya (Bos gavaeus), having heard from some inhabitant of the forest that a gavaya is like a cow, goes to the forest. Remembering the purport of what he has been told, he sees a body like that of a cow. Then this inference from similarity arises (in his mind), that ’this is what is meant by the word gavaya.””

“Thus has comparison becn expounded.’

Our text-book now proceeds to treat of

है

Amnesian ?

form?

TESTIMONY.

श्राप्तवाक्यं शब्दः । श्राप्तस्तु यथार्थवक्ता । वाक्यं पदसमूहः । यथा गामानयेति । शक्तं पदं । श्रस्मात्पदादयमर्थे बोड्डव्य इति ईश्वरेछा सङ्केतः शक्तिः ।

“A word (or right assertion) is the speech of one worthy ( of confidence ). One worthy, is a speaker of the truth. A speech (or sentence) is a collection of significant sounds; as, for example, Bring the cow. ’ A significant sound (pada) is that which is possessed of power (to conyey a meaning). Such power consists in its being the will of God, or in a con-

[[2]]

に

Quinials

tual Aada%

[[1]]

/ब

[[50]]

LECTURES ON THE

vention’s being made, That ‘Such and such a meaning is to be understood from such and such a word:””

waian ânımı afafae arandznaèg:1

“The cause of a sentence’s being significant, (is the pre- sence of) mutual correspondence, compatibility, and juxtapo-

sition (of the words).” “Expecting

These three requisites are explained as follows :—

पदस्य पदान्तरव्यतिरेकप्रयुक्ताम्वयाननुभावकत्वमाकाङ्क्षा । अर्थ माधो योग्यता । पदानामविलम्बेनेाच्चारणं सन्निधिः ।

∙ex/ectancy

“Mutual correspondence (ákánkshá) means the reverse of a disposition to indicate any other than the intended con- nexion of one word with another. Compatibility (yogyatá) consists in (a word’s) not rendering futile the sense (of the sentence). Juxtaposition (sannidhi) consists in the enun- ciation of the words without a (long) pause between each.”

Examples of deficiency in each of these respects here fol- low:-

matwıfęcferi araqanmu ayn ârca:ggâm ❤- स्तौति न प्रमाणमाकाञ्च्चाविरहात् ।

Esherlary

“A collection of words devoid of mutual correspondence, &c. is no valid sentence-for example cow, horse, man, ele- phant,’ gives no information, the words

to another.”

one

having no reference not looking out for

The word ákánkshá literally means “desiring, or looking for.” In the sentence “Devadatto gráman gachchhati,” “Devadatta goes to the village”-the first word is in the no- minative case, a form which, as it belongs to an agent, looks?

application

vin upprop wate,

this species of the ] [will of God is appoint.

Jeower [ to convey

[da pound to a sense of its

recognised as ? See p. 52

auch sense)…

interdependener ? congruity? proping writin propint

thu

They in textependence of (tive or sune) words consisto non- Existence (in any one or more of them), -produced by thin “(innallistate, another word. (or words); - of the condition of being, the

the apprehension of the (hoposed) connection (betower the signification of the words covered). “fer - the mutual necessity of the mutual I

sbound?

Mentud regard mem

presence. the inability

in a word to indicate the intender & Sense in the absina of another word=

Excfunctrung (1.S.,

dina

wond’s interdelen-

on another) means the incapacity -

of snaking

us aware

да

a complete f Emsistant sense - this incapacity bing the absence of another

oceasi und

wond [which, when it comes

Expected, will complete the sense).

“dence (of the spricker’s meaning)

Evide

vativ-rational.

NYÁYA PHILOSOPHY.

[[51]]

for another word denoting action. The word denoting action, the third in the sentence, looks for some object of the action. This it finds in the second word, which, being in the objectivo case, was looking out for the verb. Each word in such a sen- tence finds every other kind of word which it requires. This, however, is not sufficient to ensure a sentence’s being fault- less, as our textbook goes on to show.

अमिना सिच्चेदिति न प्रमाणं येोग्यताविरहात् ।

cause

diglet

The expression ‘He should irrigate with fire’ is no valida sentence, for there is no compatibility (between fire and irri- Kunol. gation).”

[[22]]

महरे हरे असहाचारितानि गामानयेत्यादिपदानि न प्रमाणं सान्निध्याभावत् ।

nai

……

“The words ‘Bring-the-cow-not pronounced close to gether but with an interval of some, three hours between each, constitute no valid sentence, from the absence of (the requisite closeness of juxtaposition.”

वाक्यं द्विविधं वैदिकं लौकिकश्च । वैदिकमीश्वरोक्तत्वात्यर्क- मेव प्रमाणं । लौकिकन्तु श्राप्तोक्तम्प्रमाणं श्रन्यदममाणम् ।

Sar Hinds’ Speech is of two kinds, sacred (vaidika), and temporal or profane (laukika). The former, being uttered by God, is all authoritative: but the latter, only if uttered by one who de-

“ally, serves confidence, is authoritative; otherwise it is not so.”

Who “deserves confidence,” is a question which our text- book does not enter upon.

वाक्यार्थज्ञानं शाब्दज्ञानं तत्करणं शब्दः । इति यथार्थानु- भवो निरूपितः ।

Sift

[[52]]

LECTURES ON THE

“The knowledge of the meaning of speech is verbal know- ledge; its instrumental cause is language.

“Thus has been explained what constitutes correct know- Ledge.”

अयथार्थानुभवस्त्रिविधः संशयविपर्ययतर्कभेदात् ।

“Incorrect knowledge is of three sorts, according to the division of doubt, mistake, and (such opinion as is open to) reductio ad absurdum.” \

fancy - forlar,

एकस्मिन्धर्मिणि विरुङ्घनानाधर्मवैशिष्ट्यावगाहिज्ञान संशयः । यथा स्थाणुवा पुरुषो वेति ।

(and the same)

“The recognition, in one thing possessing a certain nature, of several heterogeneous natures as characterising it, is doubt (sansaya). For example ‘a post, or a man

The object is supposed to be seen from a distance, or when there is little light; and, whilst we have not made up our mind that it is not a post, or that it is not a man, we continue

That fucantheli

to associate both natures with it, and this constitutes doubt.

मिथ्याज्ञानं विपर्ययः ।

यथा शुक्ताविदं रजतमिति ।

" Apprehending falsely is mistake (viparyaya). For exam- ple, in the case of mother o’ pearl, the idea that this is silver.”

व्यायारोपेण व्यापकारोपस्तर्कः । यथा यदि वह्निर्न स्था afê yâr sfa a enfèfa i

“Reductio ad absurdum (tarka) consists in establishing the pervader (here supposed to be denied) through the allega. tion of the pervaded (here supposed to be granted). For example, “If there were not fire (which you deny), then there would not be smoke (which you admit there is).’”

& a species of pramá

Su p. 20.

right nation.

Er sor

(iis. q.)

Recognition relating to the connection of several

contrary

matures in one & the same te.

Error

by the admission of the pervaded (side) the (vestral) admission of the pervading (fire) is (whoit is shown by

a reason when he whing with Unreductio ad alidurdun

Coville procip of confictation)perceivabe.. by ale as

NYẨYA PHILOSOPHY.

[[53]]

On the three kinds of wrong notion it may be remarked, that the first, or doubt, ceases when one of the conflicting natures excludes the rest; the result, however, may still be a wrong notion of the second kind, or a mistake; for our doubt ceases when we become sure that a given object is a man, though in reality it be a post. Mistake ceases, when, by more careful examination or by other means, an apprehension of the real nature of the thing displaces the erroneous appre- hension. The third kind of error is that where no further examination is required, the want of logical perspicacity being all that prevents the individual from perceiving that the opinion which he entertains is inconsistent with admitted

Peter Sovelty yon eskich he himself admitt.

qfnefq fgar aardraardig ।

अप्रमाजन्या ऽयथार्थी ।

ममाजन्या यथार्थी ।

“Memory also is of two kinds, correct and incorrect. Correct memory is that which arises from correct knowledge. Incorrect memory is that which arises from incorrect know- ledge.”

Our text book, of which a considerable space has been occupied with the quality of Intellect, now goes on to the remaining qualities, pleasure, pain, &c.

सर्वेषामनुकूलवेदनीयं सुखम् । प्रतिकूलवेदनीयं दुःखम् ।

“What all perceive to be agreeable, is pleasure (sukha); what appears disagreeable, is pain (dukha).”

इच्छा कामः । क्रोधो द्वेषः । कृतिः प्रयत्नः ।

“Desire (ichchhá) means wishing. Aversion (dwesha) means disliking. Effort (prayatna) means action.”

[[५]]

[[54]]

LECTURES ON THE

विहितकर्मजन्येो धर्मः । निषिद्धकर्मजन्यस्त्वधर्मः ।

“Virtue, or merit, (dharma) arises from the performance of what is enjoined : but vice, or demerit (adharma) from the performance of what is forbidden.”

बुधादयो ऽष्टावान्ममात्रविशेषगुणाः ।

“The eight dualities, beginning with Intellect, are dise tinctive of Soul alone.”

बुद्धौकाप्रयत्ना द्विविधा नित्या अनित्याच्च । नित्या ईश्वरस्य । प्रनित्या जीवस्य ।

“ Intellect, desire, and effort, are of two kinds, eternal and transient ; eternal in God, transient in mortals.”

itarfafar वेगेr भावना स्थितिस्थापकश्चेति । वेगः एथिव्यादिचतुष्टयमनोवृतिः । अनुभवजन्या तिहेतुभावना आत्ममात्रष्टभिः । अन्यथाकृतस्य पुनस्तादवस्थापादक स्थितिस्थापकः कटादिष्टथिवौष्टत्तिः । इति गुणाः ।

A quality self-rapandrelie

Faculty (sanskára) is of three kinds, momentum, imagi nation, and elasticity. Momentum (vega ) resides in the four beginning with Earth, and in Mind. Imagination (bhá- vana), the cause of memory and arising from notion, resides phet only in the Soul. Elasticity (sthitisthápaka) is that which restores to its former position what had been altered. It resides in mats and the like formed of the earthy element.

" So much for the Qualities. "

It may seem strange to class together things in which any common ground of classification is so little apparent as in the qualities of momentum, imagination, and elasticity. We offer the following conjectural explanation-that for the pro-

kty?

Imaginati

(bha’aNYÁYA PHILOSOPHY.

[[55]]

duction of such an effect, or the establishment of such a product, as a jar, two causes at least must co-operate; viz. the maker and the material:-for the clay may be said to make the jar, as reasonably as the potter can be said to make it. So again, in order that there may be Perception, both the Mind and an external Object must co-operate. But equally in the case of the Mind’s exerting the faculty of Memory; of a bent bow’s righting itself on the removal of the strain; and of a body’s continuing its course after dis- junction from that which originated the motion, an agent is recognized as operating by itself. Looking at the etymology of the word sanskára—(sam “with,” and kri “do”)-one might imagine the word to be better fitted to express what is done, by the mind, &c. in co-operation with something clse, than what is done without such co-operation: but occa- sionally, in a compound verb, the separate force of the con- stituent elements is nearly as little obvious as the character

་

of the acid or the alkali in a neutral salt. que lit akkus of the acid or the alkali se, declin to be that of so

Most of the commentators on the Nyaya appear to have overlooked the necessity for defining the connotation of the term sanskára. We have been able to meet with only one attempt to define it-the explanation being to this effect, that a sanskára, acting as a cause, reproduces itself as an effect.

We now come to the category of

ACTION.

चनात्मकं कर्म ।

“Action consists in motion.”

जर्हृदेशसंयोगहेतुरुत्क्षेपणं । श्रवेादेशसंयोगहेतुरपद्येषणं । शरौरस्य सनिष्कृष्टसंयोगहेतुराकुञ्चनं । विप्रकृष्टसंयोगहेतुः

[[56]]

LECTURES ON THE

प्रसारणं । अन्यत्सर्व ं गमनं । पृथिव्यादिचतुष्टयमनामाच

हभि ।

“Casting upward (utkshepana) is the cause of conjunction with a higher place. Casting downward (apakshepaṇa) is the cause of contact with a lower place. Contraction (ákuncha- na) is the cause of conjunction with what is near the body. Dilatation (prasárana) is the cause of conjunction with what is distant. Going (gamana) is the name of every other va- riety. Action resides only in the four beginning with Earth, and in Mind.”

We now come to the category of

COMMUNITY.

नित्यमेकमनेकानुगतं सामान्यं द्रव्यगुणकर्मनि । तद् द्वि- विधं परापरभेदात् । परं सत्ता । अपरं जातिर्द्रव्यत्वादिः ।

“Community (sámánya) is eternal, one, belonging to more than one, residing in Substance, Quality, and Action. It is of two kinds, higher and lower. The highest degree of com- munity (or the summum genus) is existence. The lower-de- gree is that of species (játi), such as is Substantiality (the common nature of what are called Substances).”

Of two classes, the one of which includes the other, the more extensive is called para with respect to the other, just as is the case in our employment of the terms genus and spe-

cies.

Next we have the Category of

[[6138]]

DIFFERENCE.

faraçagnar aqviant factor: 1

ветив

lover

The lower series to its foron depres

is such

one as

Ultimate Eiffe

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