०१ ऋषिप्रश्नः

The Great Sages, having approached Manu, paid their respect to him in due form, and finding him seated with mind calm and collected, addressed him these words—(1).

वेदान्तवेद्यतत्त्वाय
जगत्त्रितयहेतवे ।
प्रध्वस्ताशेषदोषाय
परस्मै ब्रह्मणे नमः ॥ १ ॥

चतुर्भिः पदश्लोकैर् विशिष्टकर्तृत्वम् अनन्यप्रमाणवेद्यपुरुषार्थोपदेशकत्वं चास्य शास्त्रस्य प्रपाद्यते प्रतिष्ठार्थम् । प्रतिष्ठिते हि शास्त्रे कर्तृभिः स्वर्गयशसी प्राप्येते यावत् संसारम् अनपायिनी च भवतः । शास्त्रं च प्रतिष्ठां लभते यदि तत्र केचिद् अध्ययनश्रवणचिन्तनादिषु प्रवर्तन्ते । न च बुद्धिपूर्वव्यवहारिणो ऽध्ययनादिष्व् अनवधृतप्रयोजनाः प्रवर्तितुम् अर्हन्ति । अतः “पुरुषार्थसिद्धाव् उपायपरिज्ञानार्थम् इदं शास्त्रम् आरभ्यते” इत्य् एतत् प्रतिपादनार्थं श्लोकचतुष्टयम् आचार्यः पपाठ ।

• न च वाच्यम्- अन्तरेणैवादितः प्रयोजनवचनं वक्ष्यमाणशास्त्रपौर्वापर्यपर्यालोचनयैवेदं पर्यवस्यामः किं तत्प्रतिपादनार्थेन यत्नेनेति । किं च । उक्तम् अपि प्रयोजनं यावत् परस्तान् नावमृष्टं तावन् न निश्चीयते । न हि सर्वाणि पुरुषवचांस्य् अर्थे निश्चयनिमित्तम् । न चैष नियमः सर्वत्र प्रयोजनपरिज्ञानपूर्विकैव प्रवृत्तिः स्वाध्यायाद्ययने ऽतन्निबन्धनायाः प्रवृत्तेर् दर्शनात् । पौरुषेयेष्व् अपि ग्रन्थेषु नैव सर्वेषु प्रयोजनाभिधानम् आद्रियते । तथा हि । भगवान् पाणिनिर् अन्नुक्त्वैव प्रयोजनम् “अथ शब्दानुशासनम्” इति सूत्रसंदर्भम् आरभते ।

• अत्रोच्यते । आरम्भे ऽनवधृतप्रयोजना नैव प्रथमतो ग्रन्थम् उपाददीरन् । अनुपादानाच् च कुतः शास्त्रं कार्त्स्न्येन पर्यालोचयेयुः । किं च पौर्वापर्यपर्यालोचनया यो ऽर्थो बुद्धिगोचरताम् आवहति स एव त्व् आदितः संक्षेपेणोच्यमानः सुग्रहो भवति । तद् उक्तम्-

• इष्टं हि विदुषां लोके समासव्यासधारणम् । इति ।

• यत् तु “उक्तम् अपि न निश्चीयते पौरुषेयेभ्यो वाक्येभ्यो ऽर्थनिश्चयाभावात् । एवम् एवायं पुरुषो वेदेति प्रत्ययो न त्व् एवमर्थः” इति । नात्र विवदामहे निश्चयो ऽस्ति नास्तीति । ग्रन्थगौरवप्रसङ्गात् । अर्थसंशये ऽपि प्रवृत्तिसिद्धौ नियतविषयसंशयोत्पत्तिर् नान्तरेण प्रयोजनवचनम् । अनुक्ते हि किम् इदं धर्मशास्त्रम् अर्थशास्त्रं काकदन्तपरीक्षादिलक्षणरूपं वेत्य् अपि संशयः स्यात् । अभिहिते तु प्रयोजने “अयं तावद् एवम् आह नः ऽश्रेयसः पन्थानं दर्शयामि; इति । न च मे प्रवृत्तस्य काचित् क्षतिर् अस्ति । भवतु, पर्यालोचयामि” इति प्रवृत्तिसिद्धिः ।

• या तु स्वाध्यायाध्ययने प्रवृत्तिः साचार्यप्रयुक्तस्य, न स्वाधिकारप्रतिपत्त्या । न हि तदानीं बालत्वात् स्वाधिकारं प्रतिपत्तुम् उत्सहते । परप्रयुक्त्यैव च प्रवृत्तिसिद्धिः । नाधिकारप्रतिपादनेनापि चावेद्यते । अतस् तत्र प्रवृत्तस्य प्रयोजनम् अर्थावबोधो ऽतश् च प्रवृत्तिः । इह तु,

• यो ऽनधीत्य द्विजो वेदम् अन्यत्र कुरुते श्रमम् । (म्ध् २.१६८)

इति गृहीतवेदस्याध्ययनाधिकारः । तदानीं चाभ्युत्पन्नबुद्धित्वात् प्रयोजनम् अन्विच्छति । भगवतः पुनः पाणिनेर् अतिसंक्षिप्तानि सूत्राणि । नैवार्थान्तराभिधानपरत्वाशङ्का । तत्र आकुमारं च यशः पाणिनेः प्रख्यातम् इति सुप्रसिद्धप्रयोजनत्वाद् अनुपन्यासः । अयं तु विततो ग्रन्थो ऽनेकार्थवादबहुलः सर्वपुरुषार्थोपयोगी । तत्र सुखावबोधार्थे प्रयोजनाभिधाने न किंचित् परिहीणम् ।

• द्वये च प्रतिपत्तारो न्यायप्रतिसरणाः प्रसिद्धिप्रतिसरणाश् च । तत्र “मनुर् वै यत् किंचावदत् तद् भेषजम्” इति (म्स् २.१.५) ।

• ऋचो यजूंषि सामानि मन्त्रा आर्थर्वणाश् च ये ।

• सप्तर्षिभिस् तु यत् प्रोक्तं तत् सर्वं मनुर् अब्रवीत् ॥

इत्याद्यर्थवादेतिहासपुराणादिभ्यः प्रख्यातप्रभावो लोके तत्प्रसिद्ध्यैव वा निरूपितमूलपातेन प्रजापतिनैतत् प्रणीतम् इत्य् एतावतैव श्रोत्रियाः प्रवर्तन्त इति । तान् प्रति कर्तृविशेषसंबन्धो ऽपि प्रवृत्त्यङ्गम् । अत एव च प्रश्नप्रतिवचनभङ्ग्या प्रयोजनोपन्यासः । महर्षयः प्रष्टारः प्रजापतिर् वक्ता, धर्मलक्षणश् चार्थो न लोकावगम्यः शास्त्रैकगोचरो ऽयम् । यत्र महर्षयो ऽपि संशेरत इत्य् एवंपर आदेशो ऽपि । स तैः पृष्ट इति नाहं पृष्ट इति । तथात्मनो ब्रह्मणो ऽकृत्रिमप्रतिमत्वं चेत्य् एवमादिः । तद्व्युत्पादनार्थो युक्तः शास्त्रारम्भ इति श्लोकचतुष्टयस्य तात्पर्यम् ।

• यथा चानेन पुरुषार्थोपदेशपरता शास्त्रस्योच्यते तथा पदार्थयोजनात् प्रतिपादयिष्यामः ।

• तत्र मनुम् अभिगम्य महर्षय इदं वचनम् अब्रुवन्- “धर्मान् नो वक्तुम् अर्हसि” (म्ध् १.२) इति । स पृष्टः प्रत्युवाच- “श्रूयताम्” इति (म्ध् १.४) । एवं प्रश्नप्रतिवचने एकार्थप्रतिपादके तात्पर्येण भवतः । अतो धर्मा अत्र प्रतिपाद्यन्त इत्य् उक्तं भवति । धर्मशब्दश् च लोके श्रेयःसाधने प्रत्यक्षादिभिर् लौकिकैः प्रमाणैः शब्दाद् इतरैर् अविहिते प्रयुज्यते । अतः स श्रूयताम् इति संबन्धे विशिष्टपुरुषार्थसाधनत्वम् उक्तं भवति ।

• मनुर् नाम कश्चित् पुरुषविशेषो ऽनेकवेदशाखाध्ययनविज्ञानानुष्ठानसंपन्नः स्मृतिपरंपराप्रसिद्धः । तम् अभिगम्य आभिमुख्येन तत्समीपं गत्वा, व्यापारान्तरत्यागेन न यदृच्छया संगम्य । अनेन चाभिगमनप्रयत्नेन पृच्छ्यमानवस्तुगौरवं वक्तुश् च प्रामाण्यं ख्याप्यते । न ह्य् अकुशलः प्रतिवचने यत्नेन पृच्छ्यन्ते आगत्य ।

• एकाग्रम् आसीनम् एकाग्रं स्थितम् एकाग्रं सन्तम् । न त्व् अत्र बृस्याद्युपवेशनम् आसनम् अनुपयोगात् । आसनेन स्वस्थवृत्तिता लक्ष्यते । तथाभूतः प्रतिवचनसमर्थो भवति । अभिगम्येति केवल एव मनुः कर्म । प्रश्नक्रियायास् त्व् एकाग्रम् आसीनम् इति विशेषणम् । कुशलप्रश्नानुरूपकथाप्रवृत्त्यादिनैकाग्रम् अविक्षिप्तमनस्कं ज्ञात्वा प्रश्नश्रवणे दत्तावधानम् इदं वचनम् अब्रुवन् ।

• एकाग्रशब्दो रूढ्या निश्चलताम् आह । प्रत्याहारेण परिहृतरागादिदोषसंसर्गस्य विकल्पनिवृत्तौ तत्त्वावबोधचिन्तायां मनसः स्थैर्यम् एकाग्रता । तथाभूत एव च संनिहितरूपशब्दादिविषयावधारणे योग्यो भवति, न सदसद्विकल्पयुक्तः । अथ वा योगतो ऽग्रशब्दो मनसि वर्तते, अर्थग्रहणे चक्षुरादिभ्यो ऽग्रगामित्वात् । प्रथमप्रवृत्तियुक्तः पुरःसरो लोके ऽग्र उच्यते । एकस्मिन् ध्येये ग्राह्ये वाग्रम् अस्येति विग्रहः, व्यधिकरणानाम् अपि बहुव्रीहिर् गमकत्वात् । अत्रापि व्याक्षेपनिवृत्तिर् एवैकाग्रता ।

• प्रतिपूज्य यथान्यायम् । न्यायः शास्त्रविहिता मर्यादा । ताम् अनतिक्रम्य यादृशी सास्त्रेणाभिवादनोपासनादिका गुरोः प्रथमोपसर्पणे पूजा विहिता तथा पूजयित्वा भक्त्यादरौ दर्शयित्वा ।

• महर्षयः । ऋषिर् वेदः, तदध्ययनविज्ञानतदर्थानुष्ठानातिशययोगात् पुरुषे ऽप्य् ऋषिशब्दः । महान्तश् च ते¹ ऋषयश् च । तेषाम् एव गुणानाम् अत्यन्तातिशयेन महान्तो भवन्ति । यथा “युधिष्ठिरः श्रेष्ठतमः कुरूणाम्” इति । अथ वा तपोविशेषात् पूजाख्यातिविशेषाद् वा महान्तः ।

• इदं वचनम् अब्रुवन् । उच्यते ऽनेनेति वचनम् । वक्ष्यमाणं द्वितीयश्लोकप्रश्नवाक्यम् इति, तद् एव प्रत्यासन्नत्वाद् इदम् इति प्रतिनिर्दिशति । येषाम् अपि प्रत्यक्षवस्तुप्रतिनिर्देशक इदंशब्दस् तेषाम् अपि बुद्धिस्थत्वात् प्रश्नस्य प्रत्यक्षता । अथ वोच्यत इति वचनं पृच्छ्यमानं वस्त्व् अब्रुवन्, वाक्यपक्ष इदं वाक्यम् उच्चारितवन्तः । कर्मसाधने तु वचनशब्द इदम् अपृच्छन् । द्विकर्मकश् च तदा ब्रूञ् अकथित्कर्मणा मनुना । तिसृणां क्रियाणां मनुः कर्म ॥ १.१ ॥

अभिगम्य प्रतिपूज्य किं अब्रुवन्न् इत्य् अपेक्षायां द्वितीयः श्लोकः ।

Salutation to the Supreme Brahman! His real character can be known only from the Vedānta texts; He is the cause of the three worlds; and He destroys all evil.

The first four verses describe the fact of the treatise being the work of a highly qualified author, and of its providing instructions bearing upon such ends of man as are not knowable by means of any other source of knowledge; and this is done for the purpose of indicating its importance (and raising it in the estimation of men). When a treatise has secured high position in the estimation of men, its author obtains fame, and also heaven; and both these continue to exist as long as the world exists. A scientific treatise, has its position established only when people engage in studying, in listening to lectures on, and in pondering over, it. Intelligent persons cannot undertake the said study, etc., until they have satisfied themselves as to the purposes served by them. It is for this reason that, the Teacher has composed the four verses with a view to point out that the Treatise is put forth for the purpose of making known the means of accomplishing the ends of man.

It would not be right here to argue as follows:—“Even without the purpose of the Treatise being stated at the very outset, we could easily ascertain what that purpose is, by examining the several parts of the Treatise going to be propounded; what then is the use of making an effort to describe that purpose? Further, even if the purpose is stated at the very outset, one cannot bo sure of it until be has fully examined the subsequent portions of the Treatise; as a matter of fact, all the assertions that a man may make do not always bring conviction. Nor is it necessary that every undertaking must be preceded by the knowledge of purposes served by it; for instance, we find pupils undertaking the study of the Veda, without knowing beforehand the purposes to be served by that study. In the works of human authors also, the practice of stating the purpose is not always followed. For instance, the revered Pāṇini begins hi s Sutras with the words ‘Now follows the teaching of words,’ without having stated the. purpose to be served by his treatise.”

Our answer to the above is as follows:—Unless people have ascertained the purpose served by a particular Treatise, they would not, in the first place, take it up at all; and unless they take it up, how could they examine the whole of it? Then again, that same idea which is got at by the examination of the entire Treatise, becomes more easily comprehended if it has been briefly indicated in the beginning. It is with reference to this that there is the assertion that—‘in ordinary experience, the learned always consider it desirable to carry ideas in their minds briefly as well as in greater detail.’

As regards the argument that—“even when the purpose has been stated there can be no certainty about it, for the simple reason that we do not derive conviction from the words of human beings,—in whose oase the idea that we have is that this man knows the matter as he says, and not that the fact is really as he asserts,”—our answer is that we do not quarrel over the question as to whether the words of human

beings do, or do not, bring about conviction; because discussion over this question would swell the size of our work. But as a matter of fact, even though it is possible for a man to have recourse to a certain course of action, even when he is in doubt as to the exact purpose served by it,—yet until there is some statement as to the purpose served by a particular action, even doubts could not arise in regard to it. In fact, if some statement had not been made in regard to the purpose to be served by the present Treatise, the doubt that would arise in men’s minds would be (not as to whether or not it was going to serve any useful purpose, but) as to whether it is a treatise on Law or on Economics, or an aimless attempt in the nature of an examination of such subjects as the ‘Crow’s teeth’ and the like. On the other hand, when the aim of the work has been stated, the idea arising in our minds is—‘the author of this work asserts that he is going to show us the path leading to our welfare,—there is no harm done by our undertaking the study of the work,—well, let us look into it’; and forthwith we take up the work.

Next as regards the case (cited by the opponent) of pupils taking up Vedic study (without being told of the exact purpose to be accomplished thereby),—the fact of the matter is that the action of the pupil is due to his being urged to it by his Teacher, and not to his recognition of the fact that if behoves him to take up the study (for the accomplishment of any purpose of his own); in fact being quite a child at the time (of beginning Vedic study), it is not possible for him to have any idea as to his being entitled to the study (by virtue of his having an aim that could be served only by that study); and his activity, therefore, is brought about entirely by the direction of another person (his Teacher); who does not bewilder him by pointing out to him that he is entitled to take up the study; and when once the boy has taken up Vedic study (entirely under advice of his Teacher), the motive for further study is provided by the desire to know the meaning of the Vedic texts studied; and thus the study continues to be carried on. [This is the case with the study of the Veda.] As regards the study of the present Treatise (on Law), only such persons are entitled to it as have already studied the Veda, as is clearly indicated by the text—‘the twice-born person who, without having studied the Vedas, devotes his energies to other subjects [becomes a Shudra]’ (Manu, 2.168); and by that time the pupil has his intelligence aroused, and consequently seeks to know wbat purpose is to be served by any further action that he is going to undertake.

As regards the revered Pāṇini, his aphorisms are extremely brief; so that there is no possibility of their having any other meaning (or serving any other purpose) than the one directly expressed by them; and further, the fame of Pāṇini is well known to even the smallest boy; so that the purpose served by his work is too well known to need reiteration. The present treatise (of Manu) on the other hand is on an extensive scale, abounding in several (commendatory and condemnatory) ‘Descriptions,’ and it helps in the accomplishment of all human ends; so that if its aim is stated in easily intelligible words, there is no harm done.

Of enquirers (and students) there are two classes,—one following reasoning, and another following tradition. The former of these take up the study of Manu; because they know the importance and greatness of the author and his work from such texts as—‘whatever Manu said is wholesome’ (Kāṭhaka, 11.5), and ‘Manu has said all that has been said in the Ṛgveda, the Yajurveda, the Sāmaveda and the Mantras of the Atharva, as also by the Seven Great Sages.’ And those of the latter class undertake it merely under the influence of the tradition, the source of which they have carefully investigated—that the treatise has been composed by Prajāpati himself. And for the sake of such persons, the mentioning of the name of the Author also is a factor leading to action (towards s tudy).

It is for these reasons that we have here the laying out of the aim of the Treatise, in the form of question and answer: The Great Sages are the questioners, Prajāpati is the expounder, and the subject is Dharma, which being not amenable to the ordinary means of knowledge, can be known only from the Śāstras (Scientific Treatises),—it is so difficult that even the Great Sages have doubts in regard to it. That Prajāpati is the actual expounder is indicated by the words of the text itself, which says—being questioned by them,’ and not ‘I, being questioned by them’; and of himself again Manu speaks (12.123) as being the natural image (representative) of Brahmā. Thus an effort is necessary for the expounding of the Law. Such is the sense of the first four verses.

In what manner the present Treatise is made up of Instructions bearing upon the ends of man we shall show by the interpretation of the words of the text.

Now, in the text we have tho declarations—(l) ‘the Great Sages, having approached Manu, said to him—‘do please expound to us the Duties of Man,’ and (2) ‘being thus questioned by them, He said—‘listen’; and these two—the question and its answer—in their import, are expressive of the one idea that the Treatise expounds the Dharmas; (he word ‘Dharma’ is in common parlance used in the sense of that means of accomplishing one’s good which is not cognisable by any of the ordinary means of knowledge, with the sole exception of ‘word.’ Hence when it is said ‘listen to Dharma,’ what is meant is that what is going to be expounded is conducive to the fulfilment of the higher ends of man.

‘Manu’ is the name of a particular person known, in long-continued tradition, as having studied several Vedic texts, as knowing their meaning and as practising the precepts therein contained;—‘Eating approached’ him, i.e., having gone forward near him, intentionally, giving up all other actions, and not by mere chance, having met with him the special effort made by the Sages to get near Manu shows the importance of the subject-matter of their question, as also the authoritative and trustworthy character of the expounder; a man who is not capable of rightly expounding a subject is never questioned by persons going up to him for that purpose.—‘Whose mind was calm and collected’—‘Seated with mind calm and collected,’—i.e., whose mind was in a tranquil state; and it does not mean ṭhat he was actually seated upon a mat, or some such seat; os there would be no point in stating this; in fact the word ‘seated’ merely connotes calmness; it is only when one’s mind is calm that he is capable of answering questions.—‘Having approached’—has for its object simply ‘Manu’; ‘seated with mind calm and collected’ being an adverbial clause modifying the act of ‘questioning’ (by the sages). The sense of the sentence thus is—‘they said to him the following words, on finding, from the manner in which he engaged into conversation with them in making enquiries about their welfare, that his mind was not preoccupied, but calm and collected, and he was therefore attentive to their questioning.’

The term ‘ekāgra,’ by ordinary usage, connotes what is meant by (he term is steadiness of the mind, it being concentrated upon the contemplation of the knowledge of truth, following upon the cessation of all doubts and illusions of the person in whom the contact of all defects of passion and the like is set aside by inhibition. It is only when one h as his mind in this condition that he is capable of apprehending sound and other objects that lie within reach of his senses; which is not the case when he is in doubt as to the object being a real entity or otherwise.—Or, etymologically the term ‘agra’ denotes the mind, by reason of the fact that in the act of apprehending things it is the Mind that goes before (agragāmi) the Eye and other sense-organs; and in ordinary parlance that which acts first or goes ahead, is called ‘agra’;—so that the compound ‘ekāgra’ is to be expounded as ‘he who has his agra, or Mind, fixed upon one perceptible object’; there being nothing incongruous in a Bahuvrīhi Compound being taken, if its sense demands it, as referring to things that are not co-existent. By this explanation also ‘ekāgra’ connotes absence of distraction.

‘Saving paid their respects in due form’—‘Due form’ stands for the rule prescribed in the scriptures; and they did not transgress any such rule; the scriptures have laid down the rule that on first approaching his Teacher, the pupil should offer his obeisance, attend upon him, and so forth; and it was in this prescribed manner that the sages paid their respects to Manu; which means that they showed due devotion and respect.

The great sages.— The word ‘ṛṣi’ means the Veda; and the word ‘ṛṣi’ is applied also to a person, by virtue of his possessing excellent knowledge of the Veda and all that is prescribed therein and acting up to these. The Ṛṣis, sages, who approached Manu, were great; the said persons become ‘great,’ when the above-mentioned qualities become developed in them to a very high degree; just as Yudhiṣṭhira is called the ‘greatest of the Kurus’ (because he possessed, jn a very high degree, the qualities that distinguished the members of the Kuru-race).—Or the sages may be regarded as ‘great,’ by virtue of their superior austerities, or of the great respect and fame enjoyed by them.

‘They addressed these words’—‘Vacana’ is that by which something is spoken of; this refers to the question formulated in the second verse; these being the nearest ‘words’ are what are referred to by the pronoun ‘these.’ Some people have held that the pronoun ‘this’ always refers to something directly perceived at the time; for these people also the question may bo regarded as ‘perceived,’ on account of its being present in the mind.—Or ‘vacana,’ may mean that which is spoken of; and in that case it would stand for the subject-matter questioned about. If it be taken as referring to the sentence (and, not to the subject-matter), then the meaning would be that ‘they pronounced this sentence.’—If the term ‘vacana’ means that which is spoken of, the sense is that ‘they asked the following question’; and in that case the verb ‘abruvan,’ ‘addressed,’ would have two objects,—‘Manu’ being the indirect object. In fact, Manu is the object of all the three verbs in the sentence (approach, pay respects to and address).—(1).

‘Pratipūjya’—has been taken by Kullūka to mean also after mutual salutations’; and be has taken ‘yathānyāyam’ with ‘abravīt.’ Sarvajñanārāyaṇa takes it to mean ‘pratyekam pūjayitvā’, having honoured them severally’.

Medhātithi (p. 1, 1. 18) curiously ascribes the assertion ‘atha śabdānuśāsanam’ to Pāṇini, not to Patañjali.

P. 2, 1. 4—appears to favour the Prābhākara view in regard to the Śastrārambha (vide Prabhākara-Mīmāṃsa). But on p. 73, 1. 20, the Bhāṭṭa view is also accepted.

P. 2, 1. 12.—‘Whatever Manu said &c.,’—This text occurs in several Saṃhitas in varying forms, where it refers to the secred (sacred?) texts ‘seen’ by Manu. But there is nothing to prevent the deduction being drawn that tins declaration proves the antiquity of the ‘Law of Manu’, though it need not be exactly in the form in which it has been handed down to us by Bhṛgu and his pupils.

P. 2, 1. 13.—‘Manu has said &c.’—“ṛco yajūṃṣi” &c.—The second half of this verse is quoted by Bidder (XIV) as “maharṣibhistu tatproktaṃ smārtaṃ tu manurabravīt”, and translated as ‘the Vedas were proclaimed by the great sages, but the Smārta, or traditional lore, by Manu.’ It is strange that Buhler did not notice that such a statement as this would not add very much to Manu’s claims to exceptional honour. The right reading of the verse is, as we find in the printed texts of Medhātithi, saptarṣibhistu yatproktaṃ tu(?) sarvammanurabravīt,’ ‘the Ṛk verses……… and all that has been declared by the seven sages,—all this has Manu expounded’. This would mean that the work of Manu contains all the teachings that had gone before him.

P. 3, 1. 11.—‘Having paid their respects’, &c.—pratipūjyā yathānyāyam—The commentaries on this expression throw a curious light on their own relative antiquity: Medhātithi explains it simply as—yādṛśī śāstreṇābhivādanopāsanādikā guroḥ prathamopasarpaṇe pūjā vihitā tathā pūjayitvā—and he does not seek to Emphasise and explain the anomaly involved in the teacher being a ‘Kṣatriya’ and the questioners ‘Brāhmaṇas’, and the latter offering pūjā to the former. Kullūka has tried to tone down the anomaly by explaining pratipūjya as pūjitāḥ santaḥ pūjāṃ kṛtvā—‘They offered the pūjā after they had themselves received the pūjā due to themselves;’ and Rāghavānanda goes a step farther and explains as yathānyāyam as “nyāpo’tra kṣatriyeṣu brāhmaṇādīnāṃ na namaskāraḥ kintu vākapūjā |”

P. 3, 1. 13.—‘The word ṛṣi means the Veda’—The word ‘ṛṣi’ is explained by Medhātithi as a synonym for the Veda, and in his Bhāṣya on verse 11 below he actually uses the word in that sense. According to him the term primarily denotes the Veda, and only secondarily the person who possesses special knowledge of the Veda.

P. 2, l. 23—‘Dharmaśabdaśca—This is a paraphrase of Jaimini’s definition codanālakṣaṇo’rtho dharmaḥ

001 The great sages approached Manu, who was seated with a collected mind, and, having duly worshipped him, spoke as follows:

May Thou, O blessed One, explain to us, in due form and in proper order, the duties of all castes and intermediate castes!—(2).

ऐश्वर्यौदार्ययशोवीर्यादौ भगशब्दः । सो ऽस्यास्तीति, मनुः । तेन संबोधनं भगवन्न् इति । वर्णशब्दश् च तिसृषु ब्राह्मणादिजातिषु वर्तते । सर्वग्रहणं शूद्रावरोधार्थम् । इतरथा महर्षीणां प्रष्टृत्वात् त्रैवर्णिकविषये च प्रश्नः कृतः स्यात् । अन्तरं तन्मध्यम् । द्वयोर् जात्योः संकराद् एकाप्य् अपरिपूर्णा जातिः । अन्तरे प्रभव उत्पत्तिर् येषां ते अन्तरप्रभवाः अनुलोमप्रतिलोमा मूर्धावसिक्ताम्बष्ठक्षत्तृवैदेहिकादयः² । न हि ते मातापित्रोर् अन्यतरयापि जात्या व्यपदेष्टुं युज्यन्ते । यथा रासभाश्वसंयोगतः खरो न रासभो नाश्वो जात्यन्तरम् एव । अतः वर्णग्रहणेनाग्रहणात् पृथग् उपादीयन्ते ।

• ननु अनुलोमा मातृजातीया इष्यन्ते । नेति ब्रूमः । सदृशान् एव तान् आहुर् इति मातृजातिसदृशास् ते न तज्जातीया एव । सो ऽप्य् एषां धर्मो वाचनिको न वस्तुस्वभावसिद्धः । अतः प्रमाणान्तरगोचरत्वाद् धर्मपक्षपतितत्वे शास्त्रोपदेशार्हा एव । प्रतिलोमानाम् अप्य् अहिंसादयो धर्मा वक्ष्यन्ते । यत् तु धर्महीना इति तद्व्रतोपवासादिधर्माभावाभिप्रायेण । सर्वपुरुषोपकारिता चानेन शास्त्रस्य प्रदर्श्यते ।

यथावत् । “अर्हत्य् अर्थे वतिः” येन प्रकारेणानुष्ठानम् अर्हति । इदं नित्यम् इदं काम्यम् इदम् अङ्गम् इदं प्रधानं द्रव्यदेशकालकर्त्रादिनियमश् च प्रकारो ऽर्हतेर् विषयः ।
अनुपूर्वशः** । आनुपूर्वी³ क्रमः । येन क्रमेणानुष्ठेयानि सो ऽप्य् उच्यताम् । “जातकर्मानन्तरं चौडमौञ्जीनिबन्धनेत्यादि” । यथावद् इत्य् अत्र पदार्थविषयं कार्त्स्न्यम् उपात्तम् । क्रमस् तु पदार्थो न भवत्य् अतः पृथग् अनुपूर्वश इत्य् उपात्तम् ।

J : anupūrvaḥ

• धर्मशब्दः कर्तव्याकर्तव्यतयोर् विधिप्रतिषेधयोर् अदृष्टार्थोस् तद्विषयायां च क्रियायां दृष्टप्रयोगः । तस्य तु किम् उभयं पदार्थ उतान्यतरत्र गौण इति नायं विचारः क्रियते । ग्रन्थान्तरे विस्तरेण कृतत्वाद् इहानुपयोगाच् च । सर्वथा तावत् “अष्टकाः कर्तव्याः” “न कलञ्जं भक्षयेत्” इत्यादाव् अष्टकाविषया कर्तव्यता प्रतीयते, कलञ्जभक्षणविषयश् च प्रतिषेधः । तद् अष्टकाख्यं कर्म धर्मस् तद्विषया वा कर्तव्यतेति फले न विशेषः । धर्मरूपोपदेशाच् च यत् तद्विपरीतम् अधर्मो ऽसाव् इत्य् अर्थात् सिध्यति । अतो धर्माधर्माव् उभाव् अपि शास्त्रस्य विषय इत्य् उक्तं भवति । तत्राष्टकाकरणं धर्मो ब्रह्महत्यादिवर्जनं च धर्मः । अष्टकानाम् अकरणम् अधर्मो ब्रह्महत्यायाश् च करणम् अधर्मः । अयं धर्माधर्मयोर् विवेकः ।

• **अर्हसीति **सामर्थ्यलक्षणया योग्यतया प्रवचनाधिकारम् आचार्यस्याहुः । यतस् त्वं समर्थो धर्मान् वक्तुम्, अतो ऽधिकृतः सन्न् अध्येष्यसे ब्रूहीति । यो यत्राधिकृतस् तत् तेन कर्तव्यम् इति सामर्थ्यगम्यं ब्रूहीत्य् अध्येषणापदम् अध्याह्रियते ॥ १.२ ॥

उक्तम् अदृष्टार्थे व्यापारमात्रे धर्मशब्दो वर्तते । तत्र यथाष्टकादौ तस्य प्रयोग एवं चैत्यवन्दनादाव् अपीति । तत्र कतमे धर्मा अत्रोच्यन्त इति संशये धर्मविशेषप्रतिपादनार्थम् उक्तसामर्थ्योपादनार्थं[^४]_ च “त्वम् एक इति” ।_

The second verse describes what the sages said to Manu, after having approached and worshipped him.

The term ‘bhaga,’ ‘blessings,’ is used for superiority, magnanimity, fame, strength and so forth; and ‘bhagavān’ is he who possesses all this; that is (in the present context) Manu; hence it is he who is addressed by the term ‘O blessed one.’

The term ‘caste’ is applied to the three castes, ‘Brāhmaṇa,’ ‘Kṣatriya,’ and ‘Vaiśya’—the term ‘all’ has been added for the purpose of including the ‘Śūdra’; if this was not done, then, the question, emanating from the Great Sages (who represent only the three higher castes), would be restricted to the three castes only.

‘Intermediate’ means middle; from the mixture of two castes there arises another imperfect caste; those that are born out of those imperfect unions are the ‘intermediate castes,’ born in the natural order or the reverse; those known under the names ‘Mūrdhāvasikta,’ ‘Kṣattṛ,’ ‘Vaidehika’ and so forth (Vide, Manu 10.7 et. seq.), these could not be classed under the caste either of the mother or that of the father; just as the Mule born out of the union of the Horse and the Ass is a distinct species, it is neither the ‘horse’ nor the ‘ass’;—on this ground these would not be included under the ‘castes’; hence they have been mentioned separately.

Objection—“But the offspring of ṭhe union of castes mixed in the natural order is regarded as belonging to the caste of the mother.”

It is not so, we reply. From what is said under 10.6 as to these castes being ‘similar,’ it is clear that they are only ‘similar’ to the caste of the mother, and not quite the same as this latter. The functions of these intermediate castes also are such as can be learnt only from scriptures; they cannot be ascertained entirely from their natural inclinations (as in the case of lower animals); and in as much as these functions cannot be ascertained by the help of any other source of knowledge, they fall under the term ‘Dharma,’ ‘duties,’ and as such deserve to be expounded in the scriptures. Of the intermediate castes born of unions in the reverse order, such duties as ‘not harming others’ and so forth are going to be described (by Manu himself under 10.63). When they are spoken of as being ‘without any duties,’ the ‘duties’ meant are such as Observances, Fasts and so forth.

‘Yathāvat,’ ‘in due form.’—The suffix ‘vati’ denotes propriety; the meaning being—‘in the form in which performance would be proper.’ This ‘propriety’ also includes such details as—‘this is compulsory, that is optional,’ ‘this is primary, that is secondary,’ as also rules relating to substance, place, time, agent and so forth.

‘Anupūrvaśaḥ,’ ‘in due order.’—‘Order’ means sequence; the meaning is—‘please explain also the order in which the several duties have to be performed.’ The order meant is such as—after the performance of the ‘Birth-rite,’ come respectively ‘Tonsure,’ ‘Initiation’ and so forth. The phrase ‘in due form’ implies completeness in regard to subject-matter; ‘order’ does not form part of the subject-matter, hence the qualification ‘in due order’ has been added separately.

The word ‘dharma,’ ‘duty,’ is found to be used in reference to—(1) the injunction of what should be done, (2) the prohibition of what should not be done,—both these bearing upon transcendental purposes,—and also (3) action in accordance with the said Injunctions and Prohibitions. Whether the denotation of the term applies equally to both, or it applies primarily to one only, and to another only secondarily,—this we do not discuss on the present occasion; and we have already discussed this in detail in another work (the Smṛtiviveka), and it has no direct bearing on the present context. In any case, when it is declared that the Aṣṭakās should be performed,’ what is clearly understood is the propriety of performing in relation to the Aṣṭakāt; and when it is declared that ‘the meat of the animal killed by a poisoned arrow should not be eaten,’ what is dearly understood is the impropriety of performing in relation to the eating of the said meat. Whether the action of the Aṣṭakā is regarded as ‘duty,’ or the propriety of performing that act,—it does not make any difference in the ultimate result. And when the form of ‘duty’ has been duly expounded, that is contrary constitutes ‘Adharma’ (sin) follows naturally by implication. Thus what is meant is that ‘Dharma,’ ‘Duty,’ as also ‘Adharma,’ ‘sin,’ both form the subject-matter of the scriptural treatise: the performance of the ‘Aṣṭakā’ is a Duty, as also is the avoidance of Brāhmaṇa-murder’; the non-performance of Aṣṭaka’ is a sin, as also is the performance of Brāhmaṇa-murder’; such is the distinction (between ‘Duty’ and ‘Sin’ as described in the scriptures).

‘Arhasi,’ ‘may you’—indicates ability in the shape of possessing the requisite capacity; and as such expresses the fact of the teacher being a lit and proper person for the expounding the duties; the sense being—‘in as much as you are fully able to expound the Duties, hence you are a fit and proper person for that work,—ns such you are entreated by us to explain to us the said Duties’; it follows by implication that when a man is a fit and proper person for doing a certain act, that act should be done by him. The term of entreaty ‘do please explain to us’ is supplied from without.—(2)

‘O blessed one,’ bhagavan—The title bhagavān means ‘one who possesses Bhaga.’ What ‘bhaga’ stands for is thus described in the Viṣṇupurāṇa quoted by Kullūka—‘Bhaga is the name for the following six—(1) full sovereignty, (2) strength, (3) fame, (4) glory, (5) knowledge and (6) freedom from passion.’

‘Intermediate castes,’ antaraprabhavān—This refers to the ‘mixed castes’ described under Discourse 10.

P. 3, l. 24—For manuḥ J reads manoḥ which would be construed with sambodhanam.

P. 3, l. 25—for jñātiṣu (l. 25) J and Mand. lightly read jātiṣu.

P. 4, l. 3—Those castes being similar &c. sadṛśāneva tānāhu:—This is Manu, 10. 6, where Medhātithi says—te sadṛśā eva jñeyāḥ, natajjātīyāḥ……tatsadṛśagrahaṇāt mātṛta utkṛṣṭāḥ pitṛto nikṛṣṭāḥ—‘They should he regarded as equal to, not of the same caste as, their fathers; what is meant is that they are superior to the mother, but inferior to the father.’

P. 4, l. 14—‘In another work,’ granthāntare—Does this refer to the author’s Smṛtiviveka from which he has quoted in his comments on 2. 6 below?

Medhātithi does not attach much importance to the account of creation here provided. In more than one place he says that the whole of Adhyāya I is ‘mere Arthavāda.’ In his comments on verse 5, for instance, he says that the process described is in some places in accordance with the account found in the Purāṇas, and in others, in accordance with the tenets of the Sāṅkhya system of philosophy; and that no attention need be paid to this, as it has no direct bearing upon Dharma. Again under verse 9, he says that as this subject does not form the real subject-matter of the treatise, no attention need he paid to what the author says on it.

002 ‘Deign, divine one, to declare to us precisely and in due order the sacred laws of each of the (four chief) castes (varna) and of the intermediate ones.

Thou alone, O Lord, art conversant with what ought to be done, which forms the true import of this entire Veda—which is eternal, inconceivable and not directly cognisable.—(3)

“As a matter of fact, Vidhi is something in the form of what should be done, expressed by the injunctive and such other verbal expressions; and this, in all cases, must be directly expressed by actual words; under the circumstances, what do you mean by saying that there are two kinds of injunction,—that the term ‘one should offer’ denotes something to be done, and the procedure of the offering is indicated by implication in the manner described above?”

त्वम् एव एको ऽसहायो ऽद्वितीयः । सर्वस्य विधानस्य कार्यतत्वार्थवित् । विधानं शास्त्रं विधीयन्ते ऽनेन कर्माणीति । तस्य स्वयंभुवो नित्यस्याकृतकस्यापौरुषेयस्य वेदाख्यस्य । सर्वस्य प्रत्यक्षाक्षरस्यानुमेयाक्षरस्य च । “अग्निहोत्रं जुहुयाद् अयं⁴ सहस्रमानव इत्य् एतया⁵ आहवनीयम् उपतिष्ठते” इति प्रत्यक्ष एव वेदो ऽयं होमं विधत्ते । एतयेति च तृतीयया प्रत्यक्षस्यैव मन्त्रस्याहवनीयोपस्थाने विनियोगः । “अष्टकाः कर्तव्याः” इत्य् अत्र तु स्मृत्यानुमीयते वेदः । “बर्हिर् वेदसदनं दामि” इति लिङ्गाद् अनेन बर्हिर् लुनातीति श्रुतेर् अनुमानम् । अयं हि मन्त्रो दर्शपूर्णमासप्रकरणे पठितो बर्हिर् लवनं च तत्राम्नातम् । अनेन मन्त्रेण लुनीयात् इत्य् एतत् तु नास्ति । मन्त्रः पुना रूपाद् बर्हिर्लवनप्रकाशनसमर्थः । प्रकरणात् सामान्यतः सिद्धो दर्शपूर्णमाससंबन्धः । स्वसामर्थ्येन तु बर्हिर्लवने प्रयुज्यते । एष ह्य् अत्र प्रतीतिः । प्रकरणाद् दर्शपूर्णमासाव् अनेन मन्त्रेण कुर्यात् । कथम् इति । यथा शक्नुयाद् इत्य् अनुक्तापि शक्तिः सर्वत्र सहकारिणी । किं च शक्नोति मन्त्रः कर्तुं । बर्हिर्लवनं प्रकाशयितुम् । ततः प्रकरणात् स्वसामर्थ्याच् चानेन मन्त्रेण “बर्हिर् लुनाति” इति बुद्धौ शब्द आगच्छति । सविकल्पकविज्ञानैः पूर्वं शब्दः प्रतीयत इति । स बुद्धिस्थः शब्दो ऽनुमेयो वेद उच्यते । वेदत्वं च तस्य दर्शपूर्णमासवाक्यमन्त्रवाक्याभ्यां श्रुत्यन्तराभ्यां स्वसामर्थ्येनोत्थापितत्वाद् इति कुमारिलपक्षः ।

• अथ वा विधिर् विधानम् अनुष्ठानं प्रयोजनसंपत्तिः । तस्य स्वयंभुवो नित्यस्यानादिपरंपरायातस्य, स्वयंभुवा वेदेन वा प्रतिपाद्यस्य, सर्वस्य श्रूयमाणाक्षरप्रतिपाद्यस्य प्रतिपन्नार्थसामर्थ्यगम्यस्य च । द्विविधो हि वैदिको विधिः । कश्चित् साक्षाच् छब्दप्रतिपाद्य्ः । यथा “सौरं चरुं निर्वपेत् ब्रह्मवर्चसकामः” इति सौर्ये चरौ⁶ ब्रह्मवर्चसकामो ऽधिक्रियते । तस्य चरोर् ब्रह्मवर्चसं साधयत इयम् इतिकर्तव्यता आग्नेयवद् इत्य् अवगम्यते⁷ । उभयत्रापि चेयं प्रतीतिः शब्दावगममूलत्वात्⁸ शब्द एव । उभाव् अपि शब्दाद् अभिधानतः प्रतीयते, तथा अभिधेयप्रतिपत्तितः । विशेषस् तु व्यवधानादिकृतो न शब्दतां विहन्ति । यथा वापीथम् उदकं हस्तेनाभिहतं प्रदेशान्तरम् अभिहन्ति तद् अपि हतसंयोगेनैवाभिहतं भवति न तु साक्षात् । शर्कराणां रेचककर्मण्याद्यप्रयत्नकृता एवोत्प्लुत्योत्प्लुत्य पाताः । तादृशम् एततत् । वैकृते कर्मणि विशिष्टेतिकर्तव्यतासंबन्धः । एवं “विश्वजिता यजेत” इत्य् उत्पत्तिर् नाधिकारशून्यास्तीति स्वर्गकाम इत्य् अधिकारावगतिः प्रतिपन्नार्थसामर्थ्यगम्या । अतो⁹ वैरूप्यं विधानस्य सर्वस्येतिपदं सर्वस्य तात्पर्यम् एवं रूपं, वेदमूलाः स्मृतय इति ज्ञापयितुम् । द्वितीये चैतद् दर्शयिष्यामः ।

• ननु लिङ्गादिप्रतिपाद्यो ऽर्थः कर्तव्यतारूपो विधिः । स च सर्वत्र प्रत्यक्षशब्दप्रतिपाद्य एव । तत्र किम् उच्यते द्विविधो हि वैदिको विधिर् इति । निर्वपेद् इति कर्तव्यतावगम्यते । इतिकर्तव्यतार्थसामर्थ्यगम्या उक्तेन प्रकारेण ।

• नैष दोषः । निर्वपेद् यजेतेति न केवले धात्वर्थविषयत्वे ऽवगते परिपूर्णा कर्तव्यता भवति । यावद् अंशान्तराण्य् अधिकारेतिकर्तव्यताप्रयोगरूपाणि नावगतानि । एतैर् अंशैर् विततरूपो विधिः प्रतीयते । अतो ऽंशरूपाण्य् अपि विधिशब्दाभिलप्यतया न विरुद्धानि ।

• एतद् एवाह । अचिन्त्यस्येति । अप्रत्यक्षस्येत्य् अर्थः । प्रत्यक्षं ह्य् अनुभूयत इत्य् उच्यते, न चिन्त्यते इति, न स्मर्यत इति । अप्रमेयस्य कल्प्यस्य प्रायशः स्मृतिवाक्यमूलस्य । न हि प्रत्यक्षेण प्रमीयते । अतो ऽप्रेमेयस्येत्य् उच्यते । अथ वाप्रमेयस्येयत्तया परिमातुम् अशक्यस्यातिमहत्त्वात् । अनेकशाखाभेदभिन्नो वेदो न शक्यते सर्वैः प्रमातुम् । अत एवाचिन्त्यस्य । यद् अतिबहु तद् दुर्ग्रहत्वाद् अचिन्त्यम् इत्य् उच्यते । यथा च लोके वक्तारो भवन्ति, “अन्येषां का गतिः, चिन्तयितुम् अप्य् एतन् न युज्यते” इति । मनः किल सर्वविषयम् । अयं चातिमहत्त्वात् तस्यापि न विषय इति । पदद्वयेन बाह्यान्तःकरणविषयतया महत्त्वस्य ख्यापनेनाचार्यः प्रोत्साह्यते । त्वयैव केवलेनैवंविधो वेद आगमितो ऽतस् तस्य यः कार्यरूपस् तत्त्वार्थस् तम् वेत्सि जानीषे ।

• कार्यम् अनुष्ठेयम् उच्यते । यत्र पुरुषो ऽनुष्ठातृत्वेन विनियुज्यते- इदं त्वया कर्तव्यम्, इदं त्वया न कर्तव्यम् इत्य्; अग्निहोत्रादि कर्तव्यम् कलञ्जभक्षणादि न कर्तव्यम् । प्रतिषेधो ऽप्य् अनुष्ठानम् एव । यद् ब्राह्मणवधस्याननुष्ठानं तद् एव प्रतिषेधस्यानुष्ठानम् । प्रवृत्तिश् च क्रिया निवृत्तिश् च क्रियेति । न हि परिस्पन्दनमानसाधनसाध्यम् एवानुष्ठानम् उच्यते । किं तर्हि । प्राप्ते तद्रूपे तन्निवृत्तिर् अपि । यथा “हितसेवी चिरायुः” इति । यः प्राप्ते काले भुङ्के ऽप्राप्ते न भुङ्के । अभोजनम् अपि हितम् एव ।

• अथ वा कार्यशब्दः प्रदर्शनार्थो विधेः प्रतिषेधस्य च । एतावद् एव¹⁰ वेदस्य तत्त्वरूपः पारमार्थिको ऽर्थः । यस् त्व्¹¹ इतिवृत्तसंवर्णनरूपः “सो ऽरोदीद् यद् अरोदीत् तद् रुद्रस्य रुद्रत्वम्” (त्स् १.५.१.१; निर् १०.५) इति स न तत्त्वार्थः, विध्यन्तरेणैकवाक्यत्वात् प्रशंसापरत्वेन स्वार्थनिष्ठत्वाभावात् । अस्ति ह्य् अत्र विध्यन्तरम् “तस्माद् बर्हिषि रजतं न देयम्” (त्स् १.५.१.२) इति । “सो ऽरोदीत्” इत्यादीनि “पुरास्य संवत्सराद् गृहे रोदनं भवति” इत्यन्तानि (स् १.५.१.१–२) तद् एकवाक्यतापन्नानि बर्हिषि रजतदाननिन्दया तत् प्रतिषेधं स्तुवन्ति । तद् उक्तं “साध्ये ऽर्थे वेदः प्रमाणं, न सिद्धरूपे” । अर्थवादानां हि सिद्धरूपो ऽर्थः । न हि तदर्थस्य कर्तव्यता प्रतीयते । विध्युपदेशपरत्वं च प्रतीयते । यदि च स्वार्थपरा अपि स्युस् तदा विधिपरत्वं व्याहन्येत । ततश् च प्रतीयमानैकवाक्यता बाध्येत । न च संभवत्य् एकवाक्यत्वे वाक्यभेदो न्याय्यः । न च साध्यस्य सिद्धार्थपरत्वेनैकवाक्यता घटते । तथा हि न किंचिद् वेदेनोपदिश्यते कर्तव्यम् । अतश् चाप्रमाणम् एव वेदः स्यात् । विध्यर्थता चावगम्यमाना लिङादीनां त्यक्ता स्यात् । तस्मात् कार्यरूपो¹² वेदस्य तत्त्वार्थ इति मनुर् भगवान् आह । जैमिनिनाप्य् उक्तं कार्ये ऽर्थे वेदः प्रमाणम् “चोदनालक्षणो ऽर्थो धर्मः” (प्म्स् १.१.२) इति ।

• अतश् च निरवशेषपदार्थपरिज्ञानातिशययोगाद् धर्मप्रवचनसामर्थ्यं सिद्धवद् उपादाय, प्रभो इत्य् आमन्त्रणम् । “हे प्रभो धर्माभिधानशक्त त्वम् अनुब्रूहि धर्मान्” इति । एवम् अनया त्रिश्लोक्या धर्मान् पृष्ट उत्तरेण श्लोकेन प्रतिजज्ञे ॥ १.३ ॥

At this stage the following question arises—“It has been said that the term ‘Duty’ is used in the sense of only that activity which tends to accomplish a transcendental purpose; and such activity may consist in the performing of the Aṣṭakā, as also in bowing to Caityas and such other acts (prescribed in the heterodox scriptures); and what sort of Duties is going to be expounded in the present Treatise?”

In answer to this we have the third verse, which serves the purpose of pointing out what Duties are going to be expounded and also of further indicating the aptitude of Manu already mentioned.

‘Thou alone’—without any one to help you; without a second.

‘Sarvasya vidhānasya kāryatattvārthavit.’—The term ‘Vidhāna,’ meaning that by which acts are enjoined, stands for the scripture;—it is called ‘svayambhu’ in the sense that it is eternal, not a product, not the work of man; and its name is ‘Veda’;—‘entire’ i.e., including the text which is directly found in the Veda, as also that the exact words of which are only inferred; for instance, (a) in the text—‘one should perform the Agnihotra, it pertains to thousand men,—by means of this verse one should worship the Āhavanīya’—we have the Veda directly enjoining what is to be done; the term ‘by means of this,’ ending as it docs with the instrumental case-termination, serving to point out the employment of the mantra-text directly quoted;—(b) while in the case of the injunction ‘the Aṣṭakās should be performed,’ which is found in the Smṛti, we infer, on the strength of this Smṛti, the corresponding Veda text;—similarly, when we read the Mantra-text, ‘I am chopping grass, the seat of the Gods,’ we at once infer, on the basis of the indicative power of the words of that text, the Vedic injunction that ‘the said text is to be employed in the chopping of grass this Mantra is found in that section of the Veda which deals with the Darśa-pūrṇamāsa sacrifice, and the chopping of grass is laid down as to be done in course of that sacrifice; but there is no such direct injunction as that ‘the chopping should be done with such and such a Mantra and the above-mentioned Mantra-text is found to be capable, by its very form, of indicating the chopping of grass; while as regards its being connected in a general way, with the sacrifice, this follows the fact of its occurring in the same ‘context’ as the injunction of that sacrifice; and it is by virtue of its own indicative force that it comes to be employed in the chopping of grass. The idea arising in the mind of the student (on noticing the above facts) is as follows:—‘From the context it follows that the Mantra-text in question should be used in the performance of the pūrṇamāsa sacrifices;—how is this to be done?—well, the natural answer is that it is to be used in the manner in which it is capable of being used; the capacity of a thing, even though not directly mentioned, always help., in determining its use;—what then is the Mantra-text capable of doing?—it is capable of indicating the chopping of grass;—hence from the context, and from the capability of the Mantra itself, it follows that it should be employed in the chopping of grass’;—as soon as this idea has been arrived at, the corresponding words, ‘by this Mantra the chopping of grass should be done,’ present themselves to the mind; because as a matter of fact, every concrete conception is preceded by the corresponding verbal expression. The said verbal expression, thus presenting itself to the mind, is called the ‘inferred Vedic text.’ The Text thus inferred is regarded as ‘Veda,’ by virtue of the fact that it owes its existence to the force of two other Vedic texts—viz., the text laying down the Darśapūrṇamāsa and the Mantra-text referred to above. Such is the opinion of Kumārila.

Or, the term ‘vidhāna’ may be taken as equivalent to ‘vidki’, meaning actual operation, the accomplishment of purpose; this is called ‘svayambhu’ in the sense that it is eternal, i.e., handed down by beginningless tradition,—or that it is prescribed in the eternal Veda;—‘entire’—i.e., what is prescribed in the directly available verbal texts, and what is only implied by the force of what is directly expressed by the words of the texts. The Vedic injunction is of two kinds:—(a) There is one kind of injunction which is directly expressed by the words; e.g., ‘desirous of Brahmic glory, one should offer the Saurya-Caru’; here what is expressed is that one who desires Brahmic glory is the ñt and proper person to offer the Saurya-Caru; and when one proceeds to secure Brahmic glory by means of the said offering, he learns that the procedure of the offering is analogous to the Āgneya offering (which is the archetype of all Caru-offerings). In both these cases the idea got at, being derived from the words of the texts, is regarded as ‘derived directly from words;’ though the former is derived directly from the words and the latter from what is ‘expressed by the worlds,’ yet, this difference, due to the removal of the latter by one step, does not deprive it of the character of ‘being derived from words.’ For instance, when the water in the pool is struck by the hand, and it in its turn strikes against some other place; and yet this latter place is regarded as being struck by the hand, though not directly; similarly when pieces of rubber are thrown down, they rise and fall, and all the subsequent acts of rising and falling are the indirect effects of ’the first downward impulse imparted to them. Exactly analogous is the case of the injunctions in question: Every ectypal sacrifice is related to a particular form of procedure (borrowed from its archetype). Similarly when we meet with the injunction ‘one should perform the Viśvajit sacrifice,’ we argue that no injunction is possible except in reference to a fit and proper person capable of (and having a motive for) performing it, and hence come to the conclusion that the person so capable is one who desires Heaven; this idea being thus implied by the force of what is directly expressed by the words of the text. It is in view of this two-fold character of injunctions (and enjoined acts) that we have the term ‘entire.’ In fact the purpose of adding the epithet ‘entire’ is to indicate that Smṛtis have their source in the Veda. This we shall explain under Discourse II.

An objection is raised:—

“As a matter of fact, Vidhi is something in the form of what should be done, expressed by the injunctive and such other verbal expressions; and this, in all cases, must be directly expressed by actual words; under the circumstances, what do you mean by saying that there are two kinds of injunction,—that the term ‘one should offer’ denotes something to be done, and the procedure of the offering is indicated by implication in the manner described above?”

There is no force in this objection. As a matter of fact, in the case of the injunctive words ‘nirvapet,’ ‘should offer,’ ‘yajeta,’ ‘should sacrifice’ and the like, even though what is expressed by the verbal root itself may be comprehended, the full conception of what is to he done is not obtained until we have comprehended the other factors,—such as the character of the person fit for the performance, the procedure to be adopted, and the actual details of the act to be performed; it is only as equipped with all these factors that the Injunction becomes comprehended in its complete form. In view of this fact, there is nothing incongruous in regarding the said factors also as denoted by the Injunctive word.

This is what the text means by the epithet ‘achintya,’ ‘inconceivable’—which means ‘not directly perceptible.’ What is directly perceived is said to be ‘apprehended,’ and not ‘conceived,’ or ‘remembred’ [so that if the Veda were something directly perceived, the epithet ‘inconceivable’ would have no force; things like the Veda can only be conceived of, and the Veda isnot even that].

‘Not directly cognisable;’—i.e., that which has got to be assumed or inferred, as forming the source of several assertions made in the Smṛti;as a matter of fact, such Vedic texts are not perceived, hence it is called ‘not directly cognisable.’—Or ‘not directly cognisable’ may he taken in the sense of incapable of having its extent exactly defined, by reason of its being very extensive; the Veda being divided into several rescensions, cannot be exactly defined by all persons; and on this account also it may be called ‘inconceivable;’ even in ordinary parlance, people are found to say—‘what to say of others; this cannot be even conceived of.’ The mind can conceive of all things; but the Veda is so extensive that it cannot be conceived of even by the mind. Thus the two epithets (‘inconceivable’ and ‘not directly cognisable’) serve to indicate that the Veda is beyond the reach of the internal as well as the external organs of perception; i.e., it is very extensive; and this mention of the extensiveness of the Veda serves as an inducement to the Teacher; the meaning being—‘it is you alone who have learnt the Veda which is so extensive, hence you alone are conversant with what ought to be done, which forms the true import of the said Veda.’

The term ‘Kārya,’ ‘what ought to be done,’ stands for the act to be performed; in reference to which the man is prompted to be the performer, (in such terms as)—‘this should be done by you,’ ‘this should not be done by you,’ ‘the Agnihotra should be performed’ ‘the eating of the flesh of an animal killed by a poisoned arrow should not be done.’ Avoidance also is a kind of ‘acting;’ e.g., the ‘non-doing of Brāhmaṇa-murder’ constitutes the ‘performance’ or ‘acting’ of the avoidance (of Brāhmaṇa-murder). Activity is ‘acting;’ so is also ‘desisting from activity;’ and the name ‘acting’ is not restricted to only that which is accomplished by means of instruments and agents set in motion; in fact, when such ‘acting’ is possible, if one desists from it, this desisting also is ‘acting.’ For instance, when it is asserted that ‘the man who takes wholesome food lives long,’ what is meant is that the man who takes his food at the proper time, and who does not eat at the improper time; as desisting from eating is also ‘wholesome.’

Or, the word ‘Kārya’ may be taken as indicating the Injunction and the Prohibition; as these alone form the essence of the Veda; the other parts of it, which are merely descriptive of certain happenings,—such passages for instance as ‘he wept, and because he wept, he became known as Rudra,’—are not true; they are not meant to be taken in their literal sense, they are meant to be construed along with an injunctive passage and serving the purpose of commending what has been laid down in that injunctive passage. For instance, the descriptive passage just quoted—beginning with ‘he wept’ and, ending with ‘there is weeping in his house within a year’—is to be construed with the injunctive passage—‘Therefore silver should not be placed on the grass;’ and being deprecatory of the placing of silver, it serves the purpose of commending the prohibition of that placing of silver. This is what is meant by the dictum—‘the Veda is an authoritative source of knowledge in regard to what has to be accomplished, and not what is already accomplished and what is mentioned in the Arthavāda or Descriptive Passages is what is already accomplished; and what is already accomplished cannot be cognised as something to be done; what however is cognised is that the description is supplementary to some injunction; if then it were taken to be true in its own literal sense, it could not be supplementary to any injunction; and this would militate against the syntactical connection between the two passages—descriptive and injunctive; and so long as two passages can be taken as syntactically connected and constituting a single compound sentence, it is not right to take them as two distinct sentences. [The reverse process of taking the injunction as supplementary to the description would not be right; for] as a matter of fact, what is yet to be accomplished could not be subservient to what is already accomplished; specially because, if this were so (and the in junction itself were not literally true), then the Veda would contain no injunction of anything at all; and it would thereby cease to be an authoritative source of knowledge. This would involve the further incongruity, that we would have to deny the well-recognised fact of the injunctive and other words denoting injunction. It is with a view to all this that the revered Manu has declared ‘something to be done’ as the ‘essence’ of the Veda. Jaimini also in the Pūrvamīmānsā-Sūtra (1.1.2)—‘Duty is that desirable tiling which is prescribed by the Vedic injunction’—has distinctly declared that the Veda is an authoritative source of knowledge in regard to what is to be done.

The term of address ‘Lord’ has been used on the understanding that the personage addressed is well-known to be possessed of the capacity to expound duty,—such capacity being due to his being endowed with a high degree of knowledge of all things. The meaning thus is—‘O Lord, may you, who are fully able to expound Duty, explain the Duties to us.’

Being thus questioned by means of the first three verses, he promised, in the following verse, what he was asked to do. (3)

‘Vidhānasya svayambhuvaḥ’—Buhler has translated this phrase to mean ‘the ordinance of the self-existent’,—evidently taking ‘Svayambhuvaḥ’ as standing for God. This, however, is incompatible with the interpretation of all the commentators, according to whom ‘Svayambhuvaḥ’ is in apposition to ’Vidhānasya’,—the phrase meaning the ‘self-existent ordinance’, ‘the Eternal Law’ (the Veda). Burnell is more to the point when he renders it as ‘self-existent system.’ Medhātithi (p. 5) has suggested another explanation—‘activity handed down by immemorial tradition.’

‘Aprameyasya’—Though other commentatoss are satisfied with rendering this epithet as meaning ‘unfathomable,’ Medhātithi imparts to it a special significance by explaining it as ‘not directly knowable, but to be inferred, as the foundation of the Smṛti.’

‘Kāryatattvārtha’—‘the purport and nature of the soul’ (Kullū.)—‘the true purport’ (Medhātithi, Govinda and Nandana)

It is noteworthy that Medhātithi has supplied, under verse 11 below, a totally different explanation of this verse.

003 ‘For thou, O Lord, alone knowest the purport, (i.e.) the rites, and the knowledge of the soul, (taught) in this whole ordinance of the Self-existent (Svayambhu), which is unknowable and unfathomable.’

Being thus questioned by the high-souled Great Sages, he, possessed op illimitable vigour, received them with reverence, and with proper courtesy answered them—‘listen.’—(4)

स मनुर् अमितौजास् तैर् महर्षिभिर् महात्मभिः पृष्टस् तथा तान् प्रत्युवाच । श्रूयताम् इति । तथा तेन प्रागुक्तेन प्रकारेण । पृच्छ्यमानवस्तु प्रश्नविधिश् च प्रकारवचने तथाशब्दे ऽन्तर्भूतः । तेनायम् अर्थस् तथा पृष्टस् तान् धर्मान् पृष्टः प्रत्युवाच । अथ वा तथेति प्रकारमात्रम् आचष्टे । पृष्ट इति पूर्वश्लोकात् पृच्छ्यमानविशेषो बुद्धौ विपरिवर्तत एव । तेन यत् पृष्टस् तत् प्रत्युवाच श्रूयताम् इति प्रश्नप्रतिवचनयोर् एककर्मता सिद्धा भवति । तदा च तथाशब्दः श्लोकपूरणार्थः । आद्ये तु व्याख्याने तथाशब्दोपात्तैव प्रश्नप्रतिवचनयोर् एककर्मता । सम्यक्शब्दः प्रतिवचनविशेषणम् । सम्यक् प्रत्युवाच । प्रसन्नेन मनसा न क्रोधादियोगेन । अमितौजा अक्षीणवाग्विभवः- अमितम् अनन्तम् ओजो वीर्यम् अभिधानसामर्थ्यम् अस्येति । महात्मतया महर्षीणां धर्मप्रष्ट्रत्वं महर्षित्वं चाविरुद्धम् इत्य् आह- महर्षीन् इति । “परार्थकारी सततं महात्मा” इत्य् उच्यते । तेन यद्य् अपि स्वयं विदांसो ऽधिगतयाथातथ्याः, अन्यथा महर्षित्वानुपपत्तेः, तथापि पराथम् अपृच्छन् । मनुः प्रख्याततरप्रमाणभावः । एतेन यद् उच्यते तल् लोकेनाद्रियते । प्रत्ययतो ऽयं समुपास्यते ऽतः शास्त्रावतारार्थम् उपाध्यायीकुर्मः । अस्माभिश् च पृच्छ्यमानः प्रमाणतरीकरिष्यते जनेनेति । अत एव्आर्च्य तान् सर्वान् इत्य् अर्चनम् अविरुद्धम् । अन्यथा शिष्यस्योपाध्यायात् कीदृश्य् अर्चेति । अर्चयतेर् आङ्पूर्वस्य ल्यबन्तस्य रूपम् आर्च्येति । पाठान्त्रम् “अर्चयित्वा तान्” इति ।

• अत्र यद् उच्यते । यदि मनुनायं ग्रन्थः कृतः परापदेशो न युक्तः “स तैः पृष्टः प्रत्युवाच” इति । “अहं पृष्टः प्रत्यब्रवम्” इति न्याय्यम् । अथान्यतर एव ग्रन्थस्य कर्ता मानवव्यपदेशः कथम् इति ।

• तद् अचोद्यं । प्रायेण ग्रन्थकाराः स्वमतं परापदेशेन ब्रुवते- “अत्राह,” “अत्र परिहरन्ति” इति नैवम् “अहं तैः पृष्टः” इति । यो यः पूर्वतरः स स प्रमाणतरो लोकेनाभ्युपगम्यते¹³- “तत् प्रमाणं बादरायणस्य” इति । अथ वा भृगुप्रोक्ता संहितेयं । मानवी तु स्मृतिरूपनिबद्धेति मानवव्यपदेशः । प्रत्युवाच तान् महर्षीन् । किं तत् । यद् अहं पृष्टस् तत् श्रूयताम् इति ॥ १.४ ॥

‘He’—Manu—‘possessed of illimitable being thus questioned by the high-souled Great Sages, answered them—“Listen.”’

‘Thus’—in the aforesaid manner; the word ‘thus’ which denotes method, includes the matter as well as the manner of the question; hence ‘thus questioned’ means ‘thus questioned, i.e., questioned about Duties—he answered.’

Or, the word ‘thus’ may be taken as denoting manner only. As a matter of fact, however the word ‘questioned’ already brings to the mind the details (matter as well as manner) of what has been questioned about; hence the meaning is—‘what he was questioned about, that he answered thus the question and the answer come to have the same objective.

Under this explanation the word ‘thus’ become super fluous, and only serves the purpose of filling the gap in the metre. Under the former explanation however, the word ‘thus’ itself serves the purpose of showing that the ‘questioning’ and the ‘answering’ have both the same objective.

The word ‘Samyak,’ ‘with proper courtesy,’qualifies the answering: ‘he answered with proper courtesy’—i.e., gladly, not with anger or any other form of displeasure.

‘Possessed of inimitable vigour’—with undiminished power of speech; he whose vigour,’ power, capacity of exposition, is ‘illimitable,’ infinite.

The epithet ‘high-souled,’ serves to show that there is no incompatibility in the persons being ‘Great Sages,’ and at the same time ‘questioners’ (as if they themselves did not know what they were asking about); hence it is said ‘he answered the Great Sages.’ It is the philanthropic person that is called ‘high-souled,’ hence the meaning is that though they themselves knew all about Duties,—otherwise they would not be ‘Great Sages,’—yet they questioned Manu for the benefit of other people; the idea in their minds being as follows—‘Manu is a Sage whose authoritative character is better known,—what he says is always respected by people,—he is always approached with trust and confidence,—hence for the expounding of the treatise, we shall make him our Teacher’,—and when he is questioned by us, he will be regarded by the people as still more trustworthy.’

It is this explanation that justifies the statement in the text regarding Manu having ‘received them with reverence.’ If it were not as we have explained, what would be the meaning of the ‘reverence’ shown by the Teacher to the Pupil? The word of the text which means ‘having received with reverence’ must be explained as a participle formed of the root ‘arc’ (to worship) with the prefix ‘ā’ and the participial affix ‘lyap’ [as without the prefix, the form would be ‘arcayitvā’]. Another reading (which removes the difficulty) is ‘tān.’

In connection with the present verse, the following question has been raised—“If the whole of this Treatise has been composed by Manu himself, it is not right to attribute it to another person, as is done in the statement—‘being questioned by them, he answered’; the proper form would have been—‘being questioned by them, I answered.’ If, on the other hand, someone else is the author of the Treatise, then why should it be called ‘Mānava’ (of Manu)?”

There is no force in this objection. In the first place, it is a well known fact that in most cases the authors of Treatises state their own views as if emanating from other persons,—making use of such expressions as—‘in this connection they say’ or ‘they meet this argument thus,’ and so forth; and the form ‘being questioned by them I answered’ would not be in keeping with such usage; the reason underlying this fact is that the older the person the more authoritative he is regarded to be by the people; it is for this reason that we find Jaimini (1.1.5) stating his own view as emanating from ‘Bādarāyaṇa.’

Or (another explanation is that) the Treatise is a compilation made and related by Bhṛgu; and since the original Smṛti [which is, in the present Treatise related by Bhṛgu] was compiled (from teachings received directly from Prajāpati) by Manu,—it is styled ‘Manava’ (of Manu).

He answered the great sages;—what was the answer?—‘Listen to what I have been questioned about.’ (4).

The injunctions and prohibitions in the Institute are the work of Prajāpati himself;—He taught them to Manu, who composed the ‘ordinance’, and taught it to the sages, among whom was Bhṛgu, who was commissioned to relate it to the sages; and the ‘ordinance’ in its present form is what was related by Bhṛgu to the sages at a later time —Vide [Bhāṣya on 1.1] and l.56.

004 He, whose power is measureless, being thus asked by the high-minded great sages, duly honoured them, and answered, ‘Listen!’