Gulab Singh's Role 1st war

Publication info

  • Raja Gulab Singh’s Role in the First Anglo-Sikh War
  • Author(s): Bawa Satinder Singh
      • Department of History, The Florida State University, Tallahassee.
  • Source: Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1 (1971), pp. 35-59
  • Published by: Cambridge University Press

Article

‘The man whom I have to deal with, Golab Singh, is the greatest rascal in Asia.’ - 1 Sir Henry Hardinge, Governor-General (GG), to his wife Emily, Hardinge Papers (HP), vol. 6, 2 March 1846, MSS in the private papers of Lady Helen Hardinge, Penshurst, Kent, England.

Sikh history has produced few men as controversial as Raja GuIab Singh of Jammu. His conduct, especially in the First Anglo-Sikh War of 1845-46, continues to evoke bitter argument. Whereas the debate at the end of the war pertained to the wisdom of creating the independent state of Kashmir, in more recent years it has centred around Gulab Singh’s part in the conflict, which resulted in the partial dismemberment of the Sikh state. Two major evaluations have been made. A school of Panjab historians condemns the Jammu Raja’s conduct as perfidious and brands him as a traitor.2

  • 2 Such a position is supported by, among others, Jagmohan Mahajan, Circumstances Leading to the Annencation of the Panjab (Allahabad, 1946); Ganda Singh (ed.), Private Correspondence Relating to the Anglo-Sikh Wars (Madras, 1955); Khushwant Singh, Ehe Fall of the Kingdom of the SikAs (Calcutta, 1962).

This conclusion is disputed by pro-Dogra historians who, while acknowledging his reluctance to become involved in the war imply that he played an effective political role on behalf of the Sikhs which prevented the complete annexation of their state in 1846.3

  • 3 The strongest proponent of such a belief is K. M. Panikkar, Gulab Singh (London, t930)+ Others who express similar views include P. N. K. Bamsai, Histoy of Kashmir (Delhi, 1962); Gwasha Lal Kaul, Kashmir Through te Ages (Srinagar, 1960); Salig Ram Koul The Biography of Maharaia Gulab Singh (Srinagar) 1923); Mohammad Aslam Khanj 771e Dogra Occupation of Sashmir (Srinagar, 1946); Maulvi Hashmat Ali Khan, Tarikh-e-jammu (Lucknows 1939) in Urdu.

  • 4 Varying opinions on Gulab Singh have also been put forward by writers on the India-Pakistan dispute over Kashmir. However, their treatment of the man, covered in brief introductory surveys, tends to be superficial. The-writers can be divided into two groups. The first is quite partisan and includes Prem Nath Bazaz, The History of Struggle for Freedom in Kaskmir (New Delhi 1954); AZiZ Beg, Cattive Saskmir (Lahore 1957); Sisir Gupta, Saskmir, A Study in Indian-Pakistan Relations (New Delhi, 1966); Balraj Madhok, Saskmir, Centre of Aew Alignments (New Delhi, 1963). Among the second group, portraying a more dispassionate outlook, are Lord Birdwood, India and Pakistan (New York, 1954); Michael Brecher, The Struggle for Kashmir (New York, 1953); Alastair Lamb, Crisis in Kashmir (London, 1966).

Such widely differing assessments,4 often made without sufficient historical data and characterized by political or regional bias, have done little to produce a balanced understanding of this highly controversial affair. This paper tries to reconstruct and re-evaluate the Raja’s role in the war.

Gulab Singh,5 a Hindu Dogra Rajput, was born near Jammu in 1792. He enlisted in the army of Maharaja Ranjit Singh of Panjab in 1809, rose rapidly, and was appointed the Raja ofJammu in 1822. Two of his brothers and a nephew also entered the service of the Sikh darbar (court or government). They also became Rajas and secured unique positions of authority and influence. While his relatives remained at Lahore, the Sikh capital, Gulab Singh devoted himself to the acquisition of territories surrounding Jammu through a combination of force, intrigue and brutality. Though these conquests were carried out on behalf of the Sikh state, in reality much of the region, including Kishtawar, Iskardu, and Ladakh, passed under his personal control.

  • For a comprehensive account of his career see Bawa Satinder Singh, ‘Gulab Singh of Jammu, Ladakh, and Kashmir, 1792-1846’ (unpub. Ph.D. diss., Wisconsin, 1966) .

Ranjit Singh, who died in 1839, was succeeded by several weaklings and the Dogra Rajas attempted to fill the power vacuum. There were indications that they intended to carve up the Sikh state among themselves. Gulab Singh aspired to become independent in the territories already under his jurisdiction and in addition to take possession of the Sikh province of Kashmir. However, the ambitious schemes of this family met with bitter opposition. The rapid breakdown of the tax collecting machinery and the systematic pillaging of the treasury by high officials, including the Dogra Rajas, drove the state to the brink of financial disaster. Still more serious was the rapid increase in the numbers of the khalsa (army), a development paralleled by the collapse of discipline in its ranks. Frustrated by the lack of a strong leader and angered by the irregular payment of wages, the army became restless and anarchic. Even though the government was forced to pay the army more, it continued to plunder the kingdom unchecked. The khalsa also began to interfere, often violently, in governmental affairs. By December 1844 many leaders of the kingdom had met bloody ends, including several Sikh rulers and three of the four Dogra Rajas. Two of Gulab Singh’s sons also lost their lives while visiting Lahore. All the powerful political figures of the Ranjit Singh era were thus removed except the Jammu chief, who kept his distance from Lahore. The nominal control of the government passed to a young widow of Ranjit Singh named Rani Jindan who acted as regent for her son Maharaja Dalip Singh. The Rani’s brother Jawahar Singh was appointed the wazir (minister) ofthe Sikh state in May 1845, but the real power rested with the khalsa and its elected panches (elders) who became its chief spokesmen.

The elimination of his influential kinsmen and the emergence of the khalsa forced Gulab Singh to move with extreme caution. He wanted to break with Lahore, but concluded that this could only be achieved with the aid of the East India Company. The Anglo-Sikh boundaries had been set at the Sutlej; by a treaty in 1809, and throughout the reign of Ranjit Singh the two powers had been friendly Since 1840, however, the Company’s agents at the frontier had conveyed to their superiors the news of the Sikh kingdom’s instability, and a group of high British officials began to advocate the annexation of Panjab.

By early 1845 both Lahore and Jammu were aware of the British mood, but their reactions varied. The khalsa was enraged and while threatening to cross the Sutlej; further increased its strength.6

  • 6 Sita Ram Kohli, basing his estimates on the darbar’s records states that the numerical strength of the khalsa rose from 46037 in 1838 to 65,835 in 1843 and again to 89,821 in 1845. These statistics include the infantry, artillery, and the cavalry but not the levies supplied by the fief-holders. See Kohli, ‘The Organization of the Khalsa Army’ in Teja Singh and Ganda Singh (eds.), Maharaja Ranjit;Singh (Amritsar, 1939), pp. 60-98, with special reference to pp. 70-87.

At the same time Gulab Singh dispatched several confidential offers to the British agents pledging joint action against the Sikhs on the under standing that his sovereignty would be recognized. Acting on the orders of Sir Henry Hardinge, the Governor-General, the agents did not acknowledge his letters. Hardinge nonetheless was so alarmed by the khalsa’s threat that he not only began to reinforce the Sikh frontier7 but in anticipation of a conflict arrived in Panjab during November.

  • 7 Charles Hardinge, Viscount Hardinge (Oxford 1891), p. 77, discloses that the British strength at the Ambala cantonment was increased Cfrom 13n600 men and 48 guns inJanua 1844 to 32n500 men and 68 guns in December, 1845 .

Meanwhile, at Lahore, the army’s oppression had persisted and early in 1845 it marched on Jammu to seek the reputed treasures of Gulab Singh. Failing in their objective, the troops brought the Raja to Lahore as a prisoner where numerous threats were made against his life. His fate hung in the balance for several months, but the Jammu chief succeeded in talking his way to freedom and returned home in August. In September the army murdered Jawahar Singh in the presence of his frenzied sister and the young Maharaja. While deep hostility prevailed in the capital, Raja Lal Singh, a reputed paramour of the Rani, succeeded to the wazarat (ministry). But the khalsa continued to intimidate the government, and its talk of invading the British territories became increasingly belligerent.

In an attempt to resolve this dilemma, the Sikh leaders decided to encourage the army to cross the Sutlej. Whatever the outcome of such an enterprise, the darbar assumed that its own position would be strengthened. If the Sikh army were defeated, the power of the most licentious element in the state would automatically be curbed. On the other hand, if the British were defeated ’the Sikhs joined by the Hindoos of Rajpootana & all the discontented were to over-run India & become a great military power’.8

  • 8 Hardinge to Sir Robert Peel, British Prime Minister, HP, vol. 5, 19 Feb. 1846. According to Gulab Singh’s post-war explanation of Lahore’s objectives, the khalsa was to ‘sweep away’ the frontier stations of Feruzpur and Ludhiana. If triumphant, the darbar expected the Company’s Hindu sepoys and the British-protected Sikh states east of the Sutlej to join hands with the khalsa and believed ’that they would in a month be in possession of Delhi . . .’ The Sikhs also looked to ‘Nepal to be ready in
    case of a first success against [the British]’.

Consequently war was all but declared in the third week of November, though hostilities were not immediately launched. The khalsa was attracted by the opportunity of winning glory and lured by the prospect of accumulating riches, but it became apprehensive of the darbar’s motives and threatened to murder various Sikh leaders. The unpredictable army deemed no one at Lahore worthy of its trust and contemplated ‘sending for Rajah Golab Sing to lead them’.9

  • 9 George Broadfoot, GG’s political agent at Ludhiana, to Frederick Currie, political secretary to GG, 20 Nov. 1845, in the War In India (London, 1846), p. 21.
panjAb 1846
panjAb 1846

In an angry argument on 3 December, Tej Singh, the com mander-in-chief, defiantly confronted the Rani and the darbar. A British informer recorded the encounter:

He [Tej Singh] to-day asked the Ranee and Sirdars, as they were sending him to make war on the English Government, to give him a written order; the Ranee said, ‘Why do you constantly ask for written orders? The army regular and irregular marched by the Maharajah’s order, and now you are going by the same order.’ The Ranee asked what the army was plotting as to her ? Tej Singh said, that this time the army would, undoubtedly, treat her ill; that she had sent them against the English to get them ruined, but that the army had found out this device, and now said that they would ‘comb’ [torture] her, along with Rajah Lal Singh, and imprison the Sirdars, and deliver them to Rajah Golab Singh, who would settle their accounts.10

  • 10 Kishen Chund to Broadfoot, 3 Dec. 1845, quoted in The Times (London), 2 March 1846, p. 2.

Despite their suspicions, Tej Singh and the bulk of the Sikh army stationed near Lahore gradually moved towards the Sujlej. 11

  • 11 Though no official figures are available, W. L. McGregor, The History of the Sikhs (London, 1846), vol. 2, p. 64, estimated the invading force to consist of ’nearly 50,000 infantry, 25,000 cavalry and 200 guns’. It seems that a part of the army remained stationed in such provinces as Kashmir, Peshawar, and Multan.

Even Lal Singh, though displaying little enthusiasm, 12 accompanied the troops.

  • 12 When Bhai Ram Singh, a pro-British courtier, attempted to dissuade Lal Singh, the latter answered: ‘Bhai Sahib, what can I do? If I remain, the soldiery seize me by the throat.’ Peel, quoting from a Lahore letter dated 24 Nov. 1845, in a speech before the House of Commons on 2 March 1846. See Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates, vol. 81, p. 393

The panches, however, remained behind with a few regiments, demanding that the darbar offer the wazarat to Gulab Singh. This was refused and the panches retaliated by communicating to the Raja their willingness to remove Rani Jindan from the regency if he would consent to administer the state during Dalip Singh’s minority.13

Perturbed by this unauthorized overture to Jammu the Rani summoned an urgent meeting of the darbar. In the midst of its deliberations word arrived that Gulab Singh had accepted the khalsa’s invitation. In a state of virtual panic the Rani wrote a friendly note to the Raja cajoling him to desist from his plans:

You are an old faithful and well wisher of the Government. If you come without orders you will commit an offience against the Government. Do not act on the writings of the Khalsa. It is the same army which assailed you. Your brothers and relatives and dependents and sons and nephews sacrificed themselves. If you come to Lahore, you will gain nothing. Rely on this.14

  • 13 Lahore Intelligence (LI), Political Correspondence (PC), 6 Dec. 1845, trans cribed records in the Panjab State Archives (PSA), Patiala.
  • 14 Idem.

But the rumour-ridden Sikh capital had been misled about Gulab Singh’s response. He had in reality scornfully dismissed the offer of the panches by observing that ‘he wished to live for more than six months’.15

On the other side of the Sutlej British officials watched these developments in the Sikh state closely and speculated on Gulab Singh’s part in this crisis. Frederick Currie, political secretary to the Governor General, suspected that the military movements had been instigated by the Jammu Raja to further his own interests:

I cannot but think that this late affair at Lahore is part of Goolab Singh’s game, to induce the Ranee and Sirdars to urge the army to this demonstration, with a view to bringing a solemn remonstrance at least from us; this remonstrance and our impending danger to be used by the troops as a plea for putting those obnoxious to Goolab Singh to death, and thus smoothing his way to power.16

  • 15 William Broadfoot, The Career of Major George Broadfoot (London, 1888), p. 35 I.
  • 16 Ibid., p. 37°

Though Hardinge entertained similar apprehensions,17 his son Charles, who served as his secretary, advanced a somewhat divergent opinion:

The Regent really consented to allow the troops to advance againsthe English to save her own life and lives of her lovers. They [the Sikh forces] will retrieve their steps, murder the heads of the existing Govt. & Golab Singh .. .18

  • 17 GG to the Secret Committee (SC) of the East India Company (EIC), 2 Dec. 1845, in The War In India, pp. 9-IO.

The Jammu chief also surveyed the political scene but, despite reports that he intended to invade Lahore,19 remained aloof in the hills. Nonetheless he strengthened his army20 and again suggested an alignment with the British.

  • 18 Charles Hardinge to his mother Emily, HP, vol. 6, 4 Dec. 1845.
  • 19 LI, PC, I Dec. I 845.

A courier informed Brigadier Wheeler, commander of the troops at Ludhiana, that in the event of war his master ‘wished to cast in his lot with the latter, as his existence depended on their success’.21

  • 20 GG to SC, 4 Dec. 1845, in The War In India, p. 28.
  • 21 Broadfoot, pp. 372-3. The messenger was said to have carried a written communication from the Raja but claimed that as ‘he was about to be searched at the Phillaur Ferry, he dropped the letter into the river [Sutlej] and swam across to save his life’.

This was followed up by an overture to Major George Broadfoot, the Governor-General’s political agent at Ludhiana, which pledged Gulab Singh’s collaboration in these words:

The Rajah wishes to be taken by the hand . . . he wishes to cause disturb ance in the whole Sikh Kingdom and he says he will carry out to the utter most whatever orders may be given by the English Government. . If ordered he has force and will serve with life and property . . . that the jageerdars [Sef-holders] ofthe hills, those of Cashmeer, of Hazara .. . must be considered friends and servants of the English.22

Again there was no answer.

Gulab Singh, however, was not the only Sikh official to approach the British. Determined to destroy the khalsa, Lal Singh and even Tej Singh, upon their arrival at the Sutlej, ‘assured the local British author ities [at Feruzpur] of their secret and efficient goodwill’.23 There is some evidence that Rani Jindan and other members of the darbar were also involved in such activities.24

  • 22 LI, PC, I O Dec. I 845.
  • 23 J. D. Cunningham, A History of the SikAs (London, 1849), p. 304.
  • 24 A hint of such an implication is found in a letter from Lal Singh to Peter Nicholson, assistant agent at Feruzpur, ’to consider him and the bibi sahiba (Jindan) as their friends and cut up the burchas [ruffians, i.e. the khalsa] for them’. Quoted from the Nicholson Diary in Khushwant Singh, A History of the SikAs (Princeton, 1966), vol. 2, p. 48. An indirect reference to messages from the Rani and other leaders was also made by Hardinge in a letter to Hugh Gough, commander-in-chief of EIC’s forces: ‘. . . such is the treachery, low cunning & perverse policy of the Durbar & even of Raja Golab Sing, that no dependence can be placed on the professions which every party is ready to make for its own interested objects & in the present state of the Sikh Army neither the Ranee nor any chief can offer any guarantee for the perform ance of their promise’. See Secret Department (SD), Enclosures to Secret Letters from India (ESLI), vol. 103, letter no. 14, 13 Jan. 1846, MSS in the India Office Library (IOL), London.

Unaware of the dealings of its government the army crossed the Sutlej on 11 December. As planned, Lal Singh and Tej Singh helped pave the way for its defeats at the battles of Mudki on 18 December, and of Firuzshahr on 21 and 22 December.25

  • 25 The extensive testimony regarding the incriminating role of Lal Singh and, to a lesser degree, Tej Singh includes Cunningham, pp. 304-9; McGregor, vol. 2, pp. 80-2; Muhammad Latif, History of the Panjab (London, 1889),pp. 541-3; Hesketh Pearson, the Hero of Delhi (London, 1939), pp. 79-80; G. Carmichael Smyth, A History of the ReigningFamily of Lahore (Calcutta, 1847), pp. 173-84.
    • In retrospect the Jammu chief, too, reflected upon the khalsa’s appearance at Firuzshahr: ‘Teja Singh committed a great blunder; he should never have gone near you [the British], but should have marched at once upon Delhi!’ Quoted in W. W. Humbley, Journal of a Cavalry Officer, including the Sikh Campaign of 1845-46 (London, 1954), p. 104.

But the British successes were not achieved before the Sikh troops, in spite of their leaders, had put up an exceptionally stiff resistance which prevented their total rout.26

  • 26 Among British writers, including eye-witnesses, who commended the khalsa’s performance are Cunningham, pp. 301-10; J. W. Fortescue, A History of the British Army (London, 1927), vol. 12, p. 390; H. Knollys (ed.), Life of General Sir Hope Grant (London, 1894), vol. I, pp. 58-9; McGregor, vol. 2, pp. 46-53, III-28; H. K. Trevaskis, The Land of the Five Rivers (London, 1928), pp. 205-6.

In London The Times characterized the situation by commenting: ‘The Sikh army has been repulsed, but not destroyed; and, although we have won a great battle, we have only begun the war.‘27

  • 27 The Times, 2 March 1846, p. 4; Pearson, p. 80, quotes Hardinge’s stinging observation: ‘Another such victory and we are undone!’

The British failure to win swiftly and decisively shattered any dreams of annexing all Panjab. This turn of affairs was not unwelcome to Gulab Singh, who as a subject of Lahore, howsoever unwilling, would have risked the loss of his territories in the event of a complete Sikh collapse. Taking advantage of the stalemate, Gulab Singh once again contacted the British. Lieutenant Lake, a junior agent, received an offer from Jammu delivered by Bansidhar Ghosh. Favourably impressed, the agent, acting on his own initiative, returned an obscurely worded message designed to arouse and encourage the Raja’s ambitions. Lake reported to his immediate superior, Captain Mills:

[Bansidhar Ghosh] described his master as willing to assist us on the following terms: 1. If we will conlErm to him and his heirs forever the jaghiers which are at present held by himself and the different members of his family. 2. If we would leave him in possession of the territory at present under his rule, contenting ourselves with a tribute of [one-quarter] in every rupee of revenue which he derived from it.

As I am not in possession of the Right Honourable the Governor-General’s views upon this subject I could return no explicit answer. I explained to the messenger the difficulty in which I was placed & told him to inform his master that I would lose no time in laying his views before the proper authorities. In the meantime I gave him a letter . . . the purport of which is as follows:

‘He who wishes to climb to the summit of a lofty mountain, must start at day break. Should he delay, night may close o’er him, ’ere he has gained the desire of his heart. The Treasure which is buried in the depths ofthe mountain will become the prize of that man who is the first to reach its summit.’

In the absence of all instructions, I have made use of this ambiguous language, because I feel that while I may be promoting the interests of the British Government Ihave in no way compromised them. I have directed [Bansidhar Ghosh] to leave here a confidential servant, who will carry to Rajah Goolab Sing, any instructions with which the Right Hon’ble the Governor-General may think proper to honour him.28

  • 28 Lake to Mills, SD, ESLI, vol. 103, letter no. 3, 15 Jan. 1846.

Currie rebuked Lake for his action but nonetheless advised the agent ’to refer the said emissary to me or to Major Lawrence’.29 Despite their refusal to commit themselves to Gulab Singh, the very willingness of British officials to receive his representative marked a signiScant shift in attitude towards Jammu. The policy of ignoring the Raja’s initiatives was apparently being abandoned.

  • 29 Ibid., Currie to Mills, letter no. 24, 17Jan. 1846. Lawrence succeeded Broadfoot who was killed at Firuzshahr.

Ignorant of the Jammu chief’s machinations, the Sikh troops not only continued to anticipate his assumption of the wazarat but expected him to make his appearance at the Sutlej ‘declaring that the moment he arrives, they will fight again’.30 Though pretending to submit to the pressure of the panches,31 the Raja decided to visit the Sikh capital after careful deliberation.

  • 30 Lahore News (LN) of 7 Jan. 1846, reported by the Delhi Gazette (DG) and re printed in Ehe Times, 2March 1846, p. 5.
  • 31 According to J. M. Honigberger, Thirty-Five Years in the East (London, 1852), vol. I, p. 122, Gulab Singh permitted himself to be drawn ‘from Jummoo, his den’, by the panches who had dubbed him the ‘bear’.
  • 32 The Illustrated London ;Mews, 4 April 1846, p. 220; 7Che Times, 25 March 1846, p. 5, however, reported that the Raja came with I 2,000 men.

He determined that only by assuming control of the Lahore government could he pursue policies which would persuade the British to be more receptive to him and his aspirations.

Conscious of the innumerable obstacles that lay ahead of him Gulab Singh embarked upon a policy of calculated duplicity and deliberate vacillation. After a leisurely march the Raja, accompanied by an army of about 20,000 men, approached Lahore on 25 January.32

This move raised high expectations among the Sikhs, but upon his arrival Gulab Singh politely declined to commit his army to the war. Yet he attempted to placate them by promising to supply the Sikh forces with ‘cash, ammunition, and food’.33

  • 33 LN, 26Jan. 1846, DG, Ehe Times, 25 March 1846, p. 5, reported that the Raja ‘has brought immense quantities with him; the number of bullocks with his camp is enormous some say 300,000. He has left orders with his lieutenants in Jamoo and other places to send more as soon as they could be collected.’

With Gulab Singh at Lahore the panches renewed their demand for a new wazir, but Rani Jindan adamantly refused. Their squabble was intensified by the Raja’s announcement that the wazarat was acceptable to him only if it included an unconditional mandate to run the state. The panches supported his stand and promised that if he

. . . agreed to exert himself in the cause of the Khalsa and would go out against the English, the whole Khalsa would accompany him. If on the contrary the Rajah disapproved of war, let him go and make peace what ever the Rajah might order would be approved by the Khalsa.34

  • 34 LI, PC, 29 Jan. I 846.

Unmoved by such obsequiousness, Gulab Singh instead undertook to exploit the army’s obsession for him. He aimed to baffle the khalsa by administering to it simultaneous dosages of despair and hope. He accused the Sikhs of cowardice at Mudki and Firuzshahr, charging that ‘when the time came, [they] fled, eight men out of ten . . .‘35

  • 35 The Illustrated London News, 4 April x846, p. 220.

And ridiculing the khalsa’s war cry that it would sit on the Mughal throne of Delhi, he mockingly observed that it was ’too small to accommodate the Sikh forces which numbered almost one hundred thousand’.36 On the other hand, he dangled before the khalsa the prospect that he would take up arms against the British. The Raja reportedly . . . declared his determination to conquer the enemy or die in the attempt

. . . [adding] that as soon as the whole of his men were collected, many being still in the rear, he would march to Ferozpore.37

  • 36 Kirpa Ram, Gulab Nama (n.d.), p. 425, Persian MSS in PSA, wrote that the khalsa used the Urdu slogan ‘Delhi takht per bethegi aap guru ki fauj [Your guru’s army will sit on Delhi’s throne].’
  • 37 The Illustrated London News, 4 April 1846, p. 220. According to the Tarikh Nama (n.d.), p. 589, Persian MSS in PSA, Gulab Singh told the panches he would move upon receipt of the Rani’s written orders.

Though this encouraged the khalsa, the Rani put little faith in Gulab Singh’s pledge and entertained grave misgivings as to his motives. She suspected that the Raja was, in fact, fomenting a conspiracy ’to depose her and the infant Maharaja Dhuleep Singh, and throw them into prison’.38 To forestall such an eventuality she plotted to have the Raja murdered, but the attempt failed.39

  • 38 History of the Campaign on the Sutlej and the War in the Punjaub (Londonn 1846) p. 36.
  • 39 Ibid., p. 37; LN, Xg jan. 1846 DG, The Times, I Aprli 1846> p. 6.

Amidst this confusion Gulab Singh continued his intrigues to deepen the darbar-khalsa hostility. The news of yet another defeat at Aliwal on 28 January strengthened his position. With emotions running high among the Sikhs the Raja made an appearance at the darbar on 29 January, his first since arriving at Lahore. Feigning an attitude of goodwill and loyalty the Raja announced that ‘he was the humble servant of the Government’,40 but when asked to participate in the war he prevaricated. Nevertheless, on the following day he professed to the Rani his intention to fight the British but refused to act in association with the khalsa. The Delha Gazette recorded this latest about-face:

Rajah Gholab Singh represented that he was fully prepared to undertake any duty which the Ranee might assign to him. The Ranee said that he had better take what money was left in the treasury, and as much ammunition as might still be required, and proceed to join the camp. The Rajah replied that he had brought men, money, and ammunition with him, and was ready to place the whole at the disposition of the Sirkar [Government], but he did not wish at the present moment to join the Sikh troops, being anxious to lead his troops on some service separate from theirs. He was, he said, determined to fight the British, but he did not in doing so wish to be mixed up with the Sikhs, who would run away instead of fighting.41

  • 40 LI, PC, Xg jan. 1846.
  • 41 LN, 30Jan. 1846 DG, The Times, I April 1846, p. 6.

This promise also remained unfulfilled as the Raja whiled away his time censuring the khalsa rather than preparing for war. He condemned it for advancing against a strong power like the British.42 But when the panches protested that the Sikh troops had acted only under orders from the darbar, Gulab Singh, in yet another tergiversation, made the accusation that ’the object of the officers of the state in sending them across was to destroy them’.43

  • 42 LI, PC, 30 J an. I 846.
  • 43 Ibid., 3 I Jan. I 846.

Despite the double-dealing of the Raja the panches refused to lose faith in him. On the morning of 31 January they issued a warning that if Gulab Singh was not elevated to the wazarat by the end of the day the Rani, the Maharaja, and other high officials would be put to death. The terror-stricken Rani convened a hasty session of the darbar to which the Jammu Raja and the panches were also invited. In the stormy conference that followed the panches poured forth their wrath on the Rani, censuring her for leading the kingdom down the path to destruction.

Joining in the attack Gulab Singh reproached the Sikh leaders for embezzling crores44 of rupees. Launching a particularly vituperative assault on Lal Singh, the Raja blamed the absent wazir for the out break of the war ‘as his object was to destroy the Sikh army, and [demanded] that he ought now to be imprisoned and punished . ..‘45

The Rani, unable to resist the mounting pressure, brought the altercation to an end by yielding to the panches’ demand. At his installation that very evening, Gulab Singh proclaimed his intention of launching guerilla warfare in the British territories beyond the Sutlej;. Choosing pillage over actual combat, he

. . . expressed his determination of dividing the cavalry into two bodies of about 5,ooo men each, and sending them across the river at Loodianah, not to fight, but to plunder and cause destruction amongst the villages and towns, as far as they could penetrate, avoiding the regular British troops wherever they could. Should they meet with any, they were to pretend to fight, and then give way and take some other route, plundering as they went.46

When news of Gulab Singh’s pronouncement reached the Sikh troops in the nearby camps they rejoiced by firing guns late into the night.47 Such exultation proved transitory as the Raja displayed no desire to implement the grand scheme he had suggested. Instead, on being installed as Minister, [he] immediately put himself in communication with [the British], proffering every assistance in his power for the furtherance of any ends in regard to the State of Lahore which [they] might have in view.48

  • 44 One crore equals IO,OOO,OOO.
  • 45 LI, PC, 31 Jan. 1846.
  • 46 LN, 31 Jan. 1846, DG, The Times, I April 1846, p. 6.
  • 47 Idem.
  • 48 GG to SC. Further Papers respecting the Late Hostilities on the North-Western Frontier of India; and the Conclusion of Treaties with the Maharajah Dhuleet Sing, of Lahore, and Maharajah Golab Sing of jtummoo (FPNWF), 19 Feb. 1846 (ESouse of Commons, 1846), p. 67.

Expecting a favourable response to this message, the Raja stiffened his attitude toward the Sikhs. Renewing his criticism of the war, he scorned the darbar suggestions to participate in it.49 Similarly he ignored the panches, but an attempt to silence them through bribery failed as they ‘refused the money, and said they would not go without the Rajah’.50

  • 49 Panjab Intelligence (PI), I Feb. 1846, SD, ESLI, vol. 103, enc. no. 6, IOL.
  • 50LN, I Feb. 1846, DG, Thwe Times, IApril 1846, p. 6.

Undaunted, Gulab Singh strove to undermine the khalsa’s morale by vilifying its performance on the battlefield. Exercising the prerogative of his high office he publicly censured the troops ‘for their cowardice, and [told] them they were totally unfit for duty’.51

In spite of this latest humiliation the army, almost pitifully, clung to the belief that the Raja alone could galvanize its spirit and lead it to success. But when Gulab Singh was approached once more by the panches, he spoke of the inevitability of defeat and advised that the Sikhs sue for peace. Offering to mediate the Raja demanded authority to the extent that the Sikhs ‘would agree to stand by any treaty he made even if by that treaty the city of Lahorewas offered as a peshkush [gift] to the English .. .‘52

Contemptuously he suggested that those who disagreed with him could ‘fight to their hearts’ content’.53 Thoroughly confused the panches acquiesced, but on subsequent reflection they denounced Gulab Singh’s unwillingness to join the Sikhs in the war.54 The troops once again demanded his presence at the Sutlej,55 but the Raja declined, remarking pungently that ’the Khalsa wanted him to be in the same plight as they were.‘56

In spite of his failure to win over the army to his point of view, Gulab Singh succeeded in convincing the darbar of the advisability of seeking a treaty with the British.57 Without divulging the nature of his dealings, the Raja by 6 February felt bold enough to announce ’that he had sent an embassy to the English’.58 The darbar supported the action and approved further contact by declaring that ’the fault [for the war] lay with the Khalsa, not the English’.59 But the army’s recalcitrance made any negotiations meaningless and the prospect of another battle seemed imminent.

  • 51 Ibid., LN, 2 Feb. 1846.
  • 52 LI, PC, 2 Feb. 1846.
  • 53 Idem.
  • 54 PI, 4, 6, and 8 Feb. 1846, SD, ESLI, vol. IO3, enc. no. 6.
  • 55 Ibid., 7 Feb. 1846.
  • 56 Ibid., 8 Feb. 1846.
  • 57 1bid., I, 4, and 5 Feb. 1846.
  • 58 Ibid., 6 Feb. 1846.
  • 59 Ibid., 8 Feb. 1846.
  • 60 GG to SC, FPNWF, 19 Feb., p. 67.

Though realizing that the khalsa was beyond the control of any one man,60 the British were gratified by Gulab Singh’s manoeuvres. This new turn of events made them increasingly optimistic that the war would soon end. In fact, Hardinge was so encouraged that he drew up a rough blueprint of post-war territorial arrangements less than three days after Gulab Singh succeeded to the wazarat. This plan, which included the creation of an independent kingdom under the Jammu Raja, was referred to by Hardinge in a letter to Sir Robert Peel, the British Prime Minister:

A nephew came from Golab S. a day ago and a note this morning. I have desired Major Lawrence to let his native secretary answer it . . . I anticipate Golab S. will probably come here. The general operations will not be suspended. The chief difficulty will consist in controlling the Sikh army. Golab S. and the Rajpoot tribes should be made independent. Our frontier line may be improved by some annexations towards the hills exclusive of the Lahore territory confiscated on this side and steps may be taken to come to a settlement before the hot weather sets in . . .

I write in great haste having just received Golab Singh’s note an hour ago. If the S. [Sikh] nation and the army cling together and defend their footsteps our means and the advanced season render it impossible to carry the war to a successful termination this spring-if the Sirdars and the Ranee submit to our terms the termination is possible. I must incur the risk or avoid it according to the progress of any negotiations with Golab Singh.61

  • 61 Hardinge to Peel, HP, vol. 5, 3 Feb. 1846. In a similar vein GG wrote to SC, FPNWF, 3 Feb. 1846, p. 54, that it ‘may be politic and proper in the course of discussions which may arise, to weaken the territorial power of the Government of Lahore,- rendering the Rajpoots of the Hills independent of the Sikhs, and by other means involving a loss of a portion of their territory .. .’

As directed by the Governor-General, Lawrence acknowledged the Raja’s letters by informing him that the British ‘appreciated his wisdom in not taking up arms . . . and that his interests would be taken into consideration.62

  • 62J. J. M. Innes, Sir Henry Lawrence (Oxford, 1898), p. 208.

Strengthened by the British commitment and convinced of the army’s resolute opposition to a peaceful settlement, Gulab Singh let the Sikhs drift toward another armed clash. In his determination to bring about the final defeat of the khalsa he took a series of steps calculated to hinder its efforts and lower its morale. There was a sudden irregularity in the dispatch of food supplies to the Sutlej.63 Requests for additional war materials were refused. One such application by Runjore Singh Majithia, a prominent Sikh chief, was turned down with the jibe that he already had abandoned too much while fleeing from the sites of earlier defeats.64

  • 63 According to William Edwardes, Reminiscences of a Bengal Civilian (London, 1853), p. 104, a soldiers’ deputation complained to the Rani of a shortage of food at the front. When told that Gulab Singh had sent sufficient supplies, the soldiers retorted: ‘No he has not, we know the old fox; he has not sent breakfast for a bird.’ 64 PI, 5 Feb. 1846, SD, ESLI, vol. 103, enc. no. 6.

A complaint brought by Tej Singh against a group of his assistants was dismissed by the Jammu Raja who encouraged insubordination by observing that ’they were wise officers who thus refuse to obey orders, and set a good example to the troops’.65

Finally, he re moved all Sikh soldiers from Lahore and replaced them with his own. ‘His object evidently’, Currie was informed, ‘is to bring about the extermination of the Sikh troops . . .‘66 While the khalsa was thus being crippled, Gulab Singh ordered the captured British troops to be well treated. Elephants were frequently dispatched to conduct the prisoners to Lahore where the Raja honoured them by granting audiences and bestowing gifts.67 The collective effect of such measures created a mood of panic and desperation among the Sikh soldiers. Some of them expressed their readiness to accept any settlement with the British so long as it did not involve a reduction in their salaries. Others were so dismayed by Gulab Singh’s conduct that they wanted Lal Singh reinstated as the wazir.68

  • 65 LN, 8 Feb. 1846, DG, The Times, I April 1846, p. 6.
  • 66 Mackeson to Currie, 10 Feb. 1846, SD, ESLI, vol. 103, letter no. 23. 67 Honigberger, vol. I, p. 122; LN, 7 Feb. 1846, DG, Ehe Times, I April 1846, p. 6; PI, g Feb. 1846, SD, ESLI, vol. 103, ene. no. 6.
  • 68 LN, 8 Feb. 1846, DG, Ehe Times, I April 1846, p. 6.

But Lal Singh and Tej Singh were no more sympathetic toward the khalsa’s cause than the Raja himself. Once again at the battle of Sobraon on 10 February they led their forces astray and abandoned them,69 thus effecting a decisive Sikh defeat. The khalsa suffered thousands of casualties70 and the survivors were forced to retreat, leaving behind the dead ‘as food for the jackal, the dog, and the vulture’.71 When news of the catastrophe reached Lahore, the panches reproached Gulab Singh for his failure to participate in the war. The Raja promptly placed the blame on the khalsa by charging it with having ‘commenced to fight before his arrival . . .‘72

  • 69 Several British writers refer to the cowardly conduct of the Sikh generals at Sobraon. Cunningham, p. 327, wrote: ‘The traitor, Tej Singh, indeed, instead of leading fresh men to sustain the failing strength of troops on his right, fled on the first assault, and, either accidentally, or by design, sank a boat in the middle of the bridge of communication.’ Calling him ‘a base traitor’, Humbley, p. 179, charged that Tej Singh ‘deserted his post; he fled at the first brush . . .’ He also notes that Lal Singh ’lay with his cavalry higher up the river in a careless, unmilitary position, conscious of being closely watched by the English’. Trevaskis, p. 205, condemned the Sikh and British generals alike and commented that the war ‘may be described as one between lions led by asses . . .’
  • 70 Cunningham, p. 328(n) puts the number of dead and wounded between 5,ooo and 8,ooo, but Humbley, p. I 80, believes it was between 12,000 and 15,ooo.
  • 71 MeGregors vol. 2, p. 177*
  • 72 PI, 12 Feb. 1846 SD, ESLI, vol. 103, ene. no. 6 also reported Gulab Singh’s boast ’that had he gone, he would have died like the other Sirdars, & not have run away like the Khalsa’.

Having thus facilitated the British victory Gulab Singh turned to the task of preparing the Sikhs to suffer the penalties of defeat. In extended conferences he warned the darbar that the very existence of the Sikh kingdom was at stake73 and the frightened Rani implored the Raja to seek a compromise. Gulab Singh, however, accepted this assignment only after the members of the darbar, the army officers, and even the panches had signed ‘a solemn declaration that they would abide by such terms as he might determine on with the British Government’.74 Once again Lahore fell prey to the Raja’s schemes in the two-fold belief that he was genuinely concerned with their predicament and that he alone could save the kingdom from disastrous consequences. The Sikhs, of course, had no inkling that compliance with the British terms agreed to by Gulab Singh would inevitably advance his own aspirations at their expense.

Meanwhile the British forces moved rapidly into Panjab and halted at Kasur where, on 14 February, Hardinge issued a proclamation expressing his readiness to negotiate with the Sikhs. His proposal was promptly accepted and a delegation led by Gulab Singh arrived on the following day. The initial welcome accorded the Lahore emissaries was cold. Accusing the Sikhs of committing aggression Hardinge gravely warned of reprisals ‘which would mark to the whole world that insult could not be offered to the British Government . . .‘75 But the reception of Gulab Singh was markedly different. Addressing him as ‘a welcome ambassador’,76 Hardinge praised his behaviour during the war and referred to this encounter in a communication to the Secret Committee:

I told the Rajah that I recognized the wisdom, prudence, and good feeling evinced by him in having kept himself separate from these unjustifiable hostilities of the Sikhs, and that I was prepared to mark my sense of that conduct in the proceedings which must now be carried through. I stated, in the most marked manner and words, my satisfaction that he who had not participated in the offence, and whose wisdom and good feeling towards the British Government were well known, had been the person chosen by the Durbar as their representative for negotiating the means by which atonement might be made, and the terms on which the Sikh Government might be rescued from impending destruction, by a return to amicable relations between the British Government and the Lahore State.77

  • 73 Ibid., I 2 and I 3 Feb. I 846.
  • 74 GG to SC, FPNWF, 19 Feb. 1846, p. 68.
  • 75 Idem.
  • 76 Hardinge to Emily Hardinge, HP, vol. 6, 17 Feb. 1846.
  • 77 GG to SC, FPNWF, 19 Feb. 1846, pp. 68-9.

Amidst wild rumours circulating round Panjab that Hardinge, Gulab Singh, and others had been slain,78 negotiations proceeded swiftly and ’the terms proposed were privately arranged between the Political Secretary [Currie] and the Raja about X o’clock in the morning [of the 18th]’.79 Under the compelling persuasion of its leader the Sikh delega tion conceded all British demands, including:

  • ( I) the cession of territory between the Sutlej and the Beas;

  • (2) the payment of one and a half crores of rupees in indemnity; and

  • (3) the drastic reduction of the Sikh army.80

  • 78 Mackeson wrote to Currie, SD, ESLI, vol. IO3, letter no. 29, 19 Feb. 1846, that ‘Rumors were afloat at Loodiana, quite undeserving of credit, such as the Governor General & his suite with Rajah Goolab Singh and others having been murdered at an interview with the Ranee at Lahore . . . I am inclined to credit the report of Rajah Goolab Singh’s death.’ According to LN, 18 Beb. 1846, DG, The Times, 20 April 1846, p. 6, ‘a rumor got abroad [at Lahore] that Rajah Gholab Singh and others, who had gone to the British camp had been seized and made prisoners by the British, which greatly alarmed the people’.

  • 79 Hardinge to Peel, HP, vol. 5, 19 Feb. 1846.

Though not immediately revealed to the public, the British authori ties at this time devised a scheme by which they in due course would assist Gulab Singh to acquire Kashmir. Hardinge, who had previously informed Peel of his resolve to make Jammu independent of Lahore, now conveyed to the British Prime Minister his intention to sell Kashmir to the Raja.81 Convinced that the financially bankrupt Sikh government would be unable to pay the stipulated indemnity he obviously planned to ensnare Lahore into surrendering Kashmir and other hill territories in compensation and, in turn, to transfer them to Gulab Singh. The British desire to reward the Jammu chief was quite apparent, but all of Hardinge’s reasons for following such a course were not revealed until later.

At the end of the Kasur negotiations Hardinge prepared to depart for Lahore to help draft a treaty based on the agreement made with the Sikh delegation. But before his departure Gulab Singh summoned the Maharaja to meet the Governor-General and directed him, if necessary, to accotnpany the British entourage to the Sikh capital. Hardinge seemed pleased by the gesture and recorded:

In the course of discussion, the minister [Gulab Singh] asked, if the young Maharaja should now return to the Ranee, at Lahore, or if it was my desire that he should remain at my camp, intimating that it was for me to dispose of the young chief as I pleased, and as I might consider best for His Highness’s interests. I replied that I thought it advisable that His Highness’s camp should accompany mine, and that I should myself conduct him to his capital . . .82

  • 80 GG to SC, 19 Feb. 1846, in Ehe War In India, p. IO2.
  • 81 Hardinge told Peel, HP, vol. 5, 19 Feb. 1846, that in anticipation of independence Gulab Singh ‘wished us to [let him] adopt the subsidiary system & a Resident. This was refused.’

The Raja took precautions to insure a safe passage by ordering the defeated Sikh troops, who had halted about eighteen miles from Lahore, to remain in camp.83 In addition, he replaced Sikh guards with Muslims at all the gates to the capital.+++(5)+++ On 20 February Hardinge marched into Lahore without incident and an official in his party boasted: ‘Thus we took the enemy’s capital without firing a shot.‘84 But he should have given most of the credit for such a smooth entrance to Gulab Singh.

During the writing of the Anglo-Sikh treaty the Jammu chief’s true role in the war began to be revealed. There was an outburst of resentment, and unsuccessful attempts were made on the Raja’s life.85 Rani Jindan dismissed him from the wazarat and reinstated Lal Singh.86 In an angry letter to Henry Lawrence she warned ’that if Kashmir were given to Gulab Singh she would appeal directly to Queen Victoria’.87

  • 82 GG to SC, 19 Feb. I 846, in Ehe War In India, p. I 04.
  • 83 The Illustrated London ;Mews, 4 April 1846, p. 222, reported that these troops numbered ‘from 14,000 to 20,000 horse and foot, with about 35 guns’. 84 Papers of Lt H. L. Pester, p. 14, European MSS in IOL.
  • 85 Papers of R. N. Cust, p. 76, European MSS in IOL. Gustn an assistant to Law rence, claimed to have witnessed an attempt by unknown snipers to kill Gulab Singh on 24 Feb. C. Hardinge, pp. I 38-9, also refers to a conspiracy by Lal Singh to murder the Raja.
  • 86 LN, 21, 22 and 23 Feb. 1846, DG, The Times, go April 1846 p. 6.
  • 87 Kirpa Ram, p. 443

The Rani and Lal Singh attempted to outwit the Jammu Raja by offering his territories to the British in reparation for the indemnity. Gulab Singh, assuming an air of injured innocence, used this as a pretext to make his final break with the Sikhs. And ironically enough Lahore’s manoeuvre led it straight into the Anglo-Dogra trap. The affair was reported in The Times as follows:

. . . the Ranee and Lall Singh, being determined to spite Gholab Singh if they couldn agreed to propose the cession, including Jamoo . . . This appears to have alarmed Gholab Singh exceedingly; and he openly declared that they might manage their affairs as they pleased, he would have no further concern with them. . . He should take his departure, and make his own terms with the British. It is very probable, however, that the alarm and vexation were but a ruse of Gholab Singh’s to get free of Lahore, and to throw himself entirely into the hands of the Governor-General . . . Gholab Singh could pretend to be vexed at the idea of being transferred to the English . . . He, therefore, preserved his appearance of having been affronted, and affairs took the course he desired, and which were probably desired by the Governor General.88

According to plan the British authorities accepted Gulab Singh’s territories and also forced the Sikhs to cede the entire hill area between the Beas and the Indus, including Kashmir, in complete recompense for the indemnity. This was stipulated by article 4 of the Anglo-Sikh agreement known as the Treaty of Lahore. But the treaty also gave a broad indication that the acquisition of the Jammu Raja’s territories was only temporary by stating (article 12) that he would be made an independent ruler of ‘such territories in the hills as may be made over to [him] by separate agreement between himself and the BritLsh government . .‘89 The peace settlement was signed on g March amidst ceremonies marking the resumption of Anglo-Sikh relations. (bulab Singh, though renounced by the Sikhs and not a signatory to the treaty, was very much in evidence. An eye-witness observed:

The center of attraction was the Rae Saheb [Gulab Singh] in his plain suit of yellow, and his unadorned, but no doubt carefully loaded and capped, pistol stuck in his belt.90

The Lahore transaction was followed by negotiations between the British and the Jammu Raja to settle the terms by which the latter was to become sovereign. During the course of these meetings Hardinge confided to his son:

‘I believe I might have had £50,000 [worth ofl secret presents from the Raja for the services and favours he has received.‘91

Whether this was merely a jocular boast or such an offer was actually made by his protege is conjectural. In any event the two sides reached an agreement by which the Jammu chief regained his terri torial possessions, was ceded Kashmir, Hazara, and Chamba, and recognized as a Maharaja.92 In return he was to pay seventy-Eve lakhs93 of rupees to the British government.94

  • 88 ‘The Treaties of Lahore’ by ‘Our Indian Correspondent’ in 171e Emes, 25 May 1846, p. 8s
  • 89 Cunningham, pp. 401I I.
  • 90J. C. Marshman, Memoirs of Sgr Henry Havelock (London, 1960), pp, 161-2, 9t Hardinge to Walter Hardinge, EIP, vol. 7, I I March 1846.
  • 92 The new state under Gulab Singh was not to include such eastern hill areas as Kulu, Kangra, Nurpur, and Mandi. The British considered the region strategically important and annexed it. Justifying the territorial division GG told SC, 4 March 1846, FPNWF, p. 89: ‘It is highly expedient that the trans-Beas portion of Kooloo and Mundis with the more fertile district and strong position of Noorpoore, and the celebrated Fort Kangra the Key of the Himalayas, in native estimation with its district and dependencies, should be in our possession.’ Further territorial adjustments which did not affect Kashmir were made later.
  • 93 One lakh = 100,000.

When the Anglo-Dogra treaty was signed at Amritsar on 16 March Gulab Singh publically acknowledged his deep debt to Hardinge. He

. . . stood up, and with joined hands, expressed his gratitude to the British viceroy, adding, without, however, any ironical meaning, that he was indeed his ‘Zur-khureed’, or gold-boughten slave!9s

Both during and after the negotiations which resulted in the two treaties, Hardinge attempted to explain the policies he had decided to pursue. Despite serious reservations regarding Gulab Singh he apparently accepted him but with little enthusiasm. In remarkably candid letters to his family he manifested more disdain than admiration for the man. To his sister he described the Jammu Raja as ’the ablest scoundrel in all Asia’,96 and to his wife he wrote:

The man whom I have to deal with, Golab Singh, is the greatest rascal in Asia. Unfortunately it is necessary to improve his condition, because he did not participate in the war against us & his Territories touching ours, we can protect them without inconvenience & give him a slice of the Sikh Territory which balances his strength in some degree against theirs . . .97

In a letter to the Secret Committee the Governor-General explained why he had decided not to extend British rule over the hill-territories. He argued that such a move would result in a clash with the neighbouring powers, the extended frontier would be hard to protect, and the mountainous and largely barren regions would be an economic liability.98 Hardinge also advanced a religious reason for defending the creation of a north-western kingdom under Gulab Singh. With the anti-Muslim stance characteristic of British offlcials since the disastrous war against Afghanistan, he wrote to Peel:

  • 94 Cunningham, pp. 413-15. Article 3 of the agreement states that ‘fifty lacs [were] to be paid, on ratification of this treaty, and twenty-five lacs on or before the ISt of October of the current year, A.D. 1846.’ Despite some doubts the following evidence seems to indicate that, though late Gulab Singh paid this amount in full, Hardinge informed his predecessor that Gulab Singh ‘has paid his first instalment of 50 lacs . . .’ See Ellenborough Papers (EP), vol. 7 12 May 1846, Public Record Office, London. The GG communicated similar information to SC, 3 Sept. 1846, Paters Relating to the Arttcles of Agreementfor Administration of the State of Lahore (House of Gommons, 1847), p. 180. According to Mahajan, p. 48 (n) ’the last instalment was paid as late as 14 March 1850. The final receipt for the purchase of Kashmir signed by the Board of Administration - the original draft of which is exhibited in the Punjab Government Record Office Museum [Lahore]-is dated 30 March 1850.’
  • 95 Cunningham, p. 332 (n)
  • 96 Hardinge to Sarah, HP, box no. I of unlSled letters, 19 Feb. 1846.
  • 97 Hardinge to Emily, HP vol. 6, X March 1846.
  • 98 GG to SC, 4 March 1846, FPNWF, p. 89.

I have done this on the principle that it is our policy to prefer Hindoo governments, or any race in preference to the Mahommedans, on this great entrance into India . . .99

A heated debate, however, followed in the wake of these new arrangements. One of Hardinge’s bitterest critics was Gerleral Charles James Napier, then the Governor of Sind. He had marched to Panjab with an army of 12,000 men but arrived too late to give battle.100 In several letters written to his brother during 1846 he denounced Hardinge’s decisions. The General, who in 1843 had played a major role in the take-over of Sind, believed that he could have effected the complete annexation of Panjab if only the war had been continued. He believed that the

. . . whole country along the Indus up to Dhera Ismael Khan, even higher, would have been in arms to aid us, both banks of the Sutlege in our possession, my army in full march on Lahore, and the Sikh army or its debris driven towards the hills on the eastward, where Goolab Sing would oppose them . . .101

Though the Jammu chief’s aid in overwhelming the Sikhs was thus taken for granted, Napier expressed indignation at his reward. He complained that Gulab Singh was

. . . a hated and hateful villain, of whom Hardinge said to me, ‘HE IS THE
MOST THOROUGH RUFFIAN THAT EVER WAS CREATED, HE IS A VILLAIN FROM A KINGDOM DOWN TO A HALFPENNY. Yet he makes him a king! . . .102

Advocating the British conquest of Kashmir he claimed:

. . . it is almost certain that I could take steamers into the heart of Cashmere, and form magazines at Mazafurabad. We could then, early in the spring, run into Baramula when the job would be done.103

  • 99 Hardinge to Peel, HP, vol. 5, 19 March 1846.
  • 100 C. Hardinge, p. I 3 I .
  • 101 W. Napier, Ehe Life and Opinions of General Sir Charles Jveapier (London, I 857), vol. 3, p. 391. bid., pp. 457-8
  • Ibid., pp. 469-70.
  • 104 The inhabitants of north-western India were not unaware of Napier’s militant attitude. A news item entitled ‘India and China The Overland Mail’ in The Times, 6 March 1846, p. 5 revealed that they had tagged him ‘Sheitan ka bhaee, “the Devil’s brother” ‘.

It seems that most of Napier’s bellicosity during this period was meant mainly for fraternal consumption. Hardinge, though conscious of Napier’s imperialistic views,104 was not aware of the extent of his resentment. In fact, Charles Hardinge wrote that Napier ‘quite concurred with the Governor-General that annexation at that time was impossible’.105 The younger Hardinge nonetheless knew of the General’s opposition to all native chieftains including Gulab Singh, and delivered a rejoinder to Napier and the others who demanded the total acquisition of the Sikh state:

Those, too, who cavil against Lord Hardinge’s non-annexation policy, and who think) as Sir C Napier did, that vno Indian prince should exist’, must put to themselves this question: could the Governor-General) with the military means at his disposal, have achieved such a conquest after Sobraon ? There was at that time a deficit in the Indian treasury. The hot season was setting in, while four general actions had palpably weakened the strength of our European regiments.lo6

Another critic of Hardinges policies was his predecessor, Lord Ellen borough. Irritated by the creation of the new mountain state, he wrote to Hardinge that

. . . there have been times when the treaties with Gholab Singh as the minister of the Lahore Govt. and the detaching from the Lahore dominions avery extensive territory for the purpose of placing it under the independent authority of that minister, thus rewarding a traitor, would have been measures a little too oriental in principle . . .107

Indignant at this criticism Hardinge countered by tracing the perennial differences between the Jammu chief and Lahore, and praising the personal risks that the Raja had taken to help secure British objectives. The Governor-General vigorously justified the grant of Kashmir to Gulab Singh and asked Ellenborough if the British were ’to treat the only man who had not lifted his arm against us with indifference . . .‘108

The recognition extended to Gulab Singh was also defended by Henry Lawrence, who participated in both the war and the negotia tions. While conceding the faults of the New Maharaja) he deemed him better-tharl most other Indian chiefs:

We admit that he is a bad man; we fear, however, that there are few princes who are much better; few who, with his provocation have not committed equal atrocities . . . He has many virtues that few of them possess * viz. courage, energy, and personal purity; his disposition is cruel, but not more than that of hundreds who have not his excuse for such conduct.109

  • l05 C. Hardingef p. 131; Charles also wrote about the ‘impolity and the difficulties of annexation’ to Walter, IIP, vol. 7, 4 March 1846: ‘Peshawar 300 miles in advance of the Sutlege with 4 deep rivers intersecting it-and the military occupation of Kashmeer touching Chinese Territory with our troops extending down to Mooltan would by no means improve our frontier line.’
  • 106 C. Hardinge, pp. 132-3
  • 107 Ellenborough toHardinge, EP, vol. 7, 22 April 1846.
  • 108 Hardinge to Ellenborough, EP, vol. 7, 7 June 1846.
  • 109 B. Edwardes and H. Merivale, Life of SirHeny Lawrence (London, 1877), vol. 2, p. 61.- .

In addition, Lawrence considered him to be admirably suited for his new role and asserted: ‘If any native of India has the ability and the means of establishing a strong and beneficial government in the North ern Hills, Gulab Singh is the man.‘11e

The reaction in London to the British victory and the treaties was one of jubilation. Hardinge was praised as a statesman and as a soldier. Peel informed him that there was ‘universal approval and admiration of your policy from first to last . . .‘111 The Board of Directors conveyed its ‘most cordial admiration, thanks and gratitude’.112 Commendatory speeches were delivered in Parliament and the Queen honoured Hardinge by making him a Viscount. The press added its approbation, and The Times called the treaty with the Jammu chief the ‘most striking feature in these arrangements’.113 In the belief that the British would benefit by the agreement with Gu]ab Singh, The Times emphasized:

As an enemy his power of attack, with the divided forces of an irregular army, would have proved intolerably injurious; as a friend we may hope to find in him a steady adherent of that qualified British ascendency to which he owes his rise.114

The polemic over the Treaty of Amritsar was resumed after the complete annexation ofthe Panjab in 1849, and continued throughout most of the second half of the nineteenth cerltury. Its advocates, however, prevailed and Kashmir remained under the control of Gulab Singh and his successors until the British withdrawal from India.

The more recent debate over Gulab Singh’s role should be examined in the light of other alternatives available to him. Bowing to the pressure of the khalsa he could have taken immediate control of the Lahore government, and attempted to guide the Sikhs to victory. But the Raja concluded that the consequences of such a course would be suicidal to him. In the event of a victory the suddenly reinvigorated Sikhs, who generally abhorred the Raja’s special status in their kingdom, might then turn upon him. On the other hand, if the Sikhs lost, Gulab Sirlgh stood the risk of British retribution. It is also doubtful whether the Jammu chief had the ability to lead the Sikh army through the length and breadth of India and drive the British into the sea. Though credited with a chain of conquests in the hills, his overall experience as a soldier was too narrow to permit an undertaking of this magnitude.

  • oJ. L. Morrison, Lawrence ofLucknow (London, 1934), p. 158.
  • G. Hardinge, p. 143
  • 112 H. Willock, J. Hogg, and W. Astell of the Board of Directors, EIG, to GG, Board’s Drafts of Secret Despatches to India, vol. 19, 4 April 1846, MSS in IOL. 113 lhe 7Cimes, 5 May 1846, p. 4.
  • 114 Ibid., 21 May 1846,p. 4.

Furthermore, despite the extraordinary fighting capacity of the khalsa it is unlikely that this chronically insubordinate and insatiably avaricious body could have carried out the task of uniting a country which had suffered from deep political divisions since the beginning of the eighteenth century.

Another course open to the Raja was to seclude himself at Jammu and let the two antagonists settle their differences on the battlefield. But there were hazards also in treading such a path. His territories could be negotiated away in case of a sudden Anglo-Sikh settlement. And his indifference could invite the wrath of the unpredictable khalsa which, if it survived the war, might decide to destroy him both politically and physically.

There was a third alternative. The Raja could have become instrumental in stirring up revolts in various parts of the kingdom and thus added to Lahore’s problems. In return, however, he expected an Anglo Dogra alliance, but the British lack of response discouraged him from making such a bold move.

Finally, on assuming the wazarat Gulab Singh could have reinforced the khalsa and assisted in denying the British a decisive victory at Sobraon. If the fighting had been prolonged indefinitely the British, who were beginning to experience financial and physical fatigue, might have been inclined to negotiate a peace settlement more honourable to the Sikhs.

Undoubtedly the Machiavellian Jammu Raja gave serious consideration to such alternatives before pursuing the calculated course that he did. He was convinced that his interests would best be served by producing a decisive Sikh defeat in collusion with the British. When such an opportunity presented itself in the latter stages of the war the Raja turned it to his advantage.

Gulab Singh’s conduct during the war and the negotiations is decidedly not above reproach. He can be indicted for making overtures from Jammu to a foreign power at war with-the Sikhs. There is also no doubt that the Raja’s transactions during his brief though fateful tenure of the wazarat were full of chicanery, deception, and treachery. To attain his own ends he confounded, frustrated, and duped Lahore, and secretly reached an understanding with the British detrimental to the very government he headed. He again betrayed the Sikhs at the Kasur parleys. He negotiated the surrender of the territory between the Sutlej and the Beas and was the chief reason for the extinction of Sikh rule in the vast mountain region between the Beas and the Indus. If the Sikh state escaped complete obliteration it was not due to the exertions of Gulab Singh but, as evidence indicates, because the British had neither the will nor the means to accomplish that end in 1846.

However, in spite of all the incriminating testimony, the Jammu chief cannot be held entirely responsible for the Sikh defeats. He was not involved in the first three battles, and can only partially be blamed for the carnage at Sobraon. The larger responsibility for the overall debacle must rest with Lal Singh and Tej Singh who deliberately deserted the battlefield and betrayed their own troops by surreptitiously contacting British officials. If Gulab Singh is to be called a traitor, a similar charge must be levelled at these two leaders. Such an accusation can also be made against Rani Jindan, who in all probability knew and approved of Lal Singh’s inculpatory link with the enemy, and might have made overtures of her own. The dangerously naive darbar is equally guilty for conspiring to send the khalsa to its destruction while overlooking the fact that such a result would inevitably endanger the very security of the Sikh state. Gulab Singh was merely one among many villains, though he alone possessed the foresight to set a viable goal and the genius to attain it.