06 CH5 DURING NANASAHEB’S REGIME

In 1740, Balaji Bajirao alias Nanasaheb Peshwa made a treaty with the Portuguese at Poona but the Bhonsala Savant of Savantvadi did not like it. Jairam Savant was well aware of the worsened condition of the Portuguese. He decided that before any help from Portugal reached Goa, he should attack Bardez and capture it. He was of the view that with Mahratta help he could even capture Salcete and Goa island.1 His councillers said that while formelly one Portuguese soldier was more than a match for ten of the Savant, the position then was that one soldier of the Savant was too much for 100 Portuguese.2

Jairam Savant fitted up a small armada and began to practise piracy on the sea. With the help of some Portuguese renegades he raised a disciplined battalion of his own soldiers. Vithoji Shenvi Dhume of Kumarjuvem and Vithoji Naik Prataprao Sardesai used to keep the Viceroy informed about the activities of the Savant-Bhonsala. Documents in Goa Archives clearly demonstrate that the Portuguese were trying hard to save themselves by working against the Bhonsala-Savant.3

Ghanashyam Narayan Mantri of Satara had given his daughter in marriage to the son of Vithoji Dhume who was a rich merchant. Because of this relationship he had contact with important Mahratta Sardars. Letters written by such influential persons as Chhatrapati Sambhaji, Naroram Mantri, Bhonsala-Savant, Bhaskar Dadaji, Sadashiv Rao alias

Bhausaheb, (the peshwa’s cousin) are available. It was because Dhume informed the Viceroy in advance that Bhonsala-Savant was attacking Aguada, that the Viceroy could resist the attack and the Bhonsala-Savant could not take it.4Jairam Savant wanted to take Aguada before be invaded Bardez but Dhume’s intrigue foiled his project. Jose Francisco de

Azavedo, a renegade Portuguese captain had counselled Savant how to capture Aguada and Goa Island. The Viceroy writes that Savant was induced to fight the Portuguese, because of this.5

On February 21, 1741, Jairam Savant invaded Bardez and captured it in one day, except the forts of Aguada and Reis Magus. Near Aldona, he slaughtered four Companhias of the Portuguese.6Immediately afterwards he was planning to enter Goa island through the creek of Kumarjuvem. For this purpose, he had kept men and boats ready on the other side of Goa island in concealment and collected over 1500 soldiers at Bicholim but in the nick of time, the English armada came near Aguada and the Portuguese could protect Goa island

with its help.7 The Portuguese armed ships had gone far from Goa and the Savant wished to utilise this opportunity for capturing Goa. But their days were not still numbered.

On 18 May 1741, Conde de Sandomele was replaced by Marquez de Louriçal as Viceroy. While leaving Portugal, he brought with him cannons of a new kind, sufficient ammunition and 2000 soldiers. But only 912 reached Goa hale and hearty. The rest of them died during the voyage which lasted about a year.8201 The Viceroy had brought 16 cannons of the new style. Their speciality was that they made 20 reports a minute. To work them 240 men were required but they did the work of 3,000 soliders.9

This cannon was discovered by Frederick Weinholtz and so it was named after him. What is very remarkable is that Tulaji Angria had also manufactured a gun like this. Marcquez de Tavora came to know about this in September 1750. One Portuguese gunner had deserted Goa and accepted a job under Tulaji whom this gunner gave information about these new style guns. On June 13, 1741, the Portuguese invaded Bardez under the command of General Manuel Suvarisvelu and routed the Bhonsala in one day before the onslaught of these new guns and the Savant had to surrender. For the protection of Colvale fortress, the Savant fought very valiantly but he had to surrender that fort also to these new cannons.

Under these circumstances the Savant pleaded with the Peshwa for his help11 but the Portuguese drew his attention to the treaty made in Poona on September 18, 1740 and in accord with it, the Peshwa showed readiness to help the Portuguese against the Savant.12 The following clause appears in the treaty : “There is a treaty between you and the Savant. You should abide by it. If the Savant acts against it, we shall help you. If you act against the treaty, we shall help him.” At last, once again, there was a treaty between the Savant and the Portuguese on 11 September 1741.13 In terms of it, the Savant had to surrender Khorjuve and Panale to the Portuguese. He had also to give up agricultural lands in Mayen and Araba in the vicinity of the fort of Khorjuvem. He had also to return the village of Peerna which he had secured in terms of the treaty of Bicholim. The Portuguese received some more land also.

Two humiliating clauses in the treaty were that Sawant-Bhonsala should pay a tribute of 1,000 asurpis a year to the Portuguese and pay 15,000 asurpis as damages for the harm done to the churches and forts in Bardez. In a word the Savant-Bhonsla lost everything he had earned by the treaty at Bicholim and over and above he had to part with some lands. Portuguese translation of a letter that Dadajirao Bhave wrote to the Secretary of the Government of Goa is there in Goa Archives. It is dated 16 April 1741. Dadajirao says in it that after ships from Portugal arrive the Portuguese will force the Savant to vacate Bardez in four days and enforce their rule.14 His prognostication came true with a vengeance. Even four days were not required. The Portuguese did all that in a single day on the strength of the new guns.

Nagu Savant Bhonsale was transported with joy at the victory of the Portuguese. Writing to the Secretary of the Government of Goa he says : “I am very highly pleased to hear that you have captured Bardez and regained Khorjuvem from the enemy. It is all very fine. We want the Estado (Goa) to flourish.”16 This letter bears no date but it was translated in

Portuguese on 9 July 1741. Sambhaji Angria also felt that a treaty of friendship with the Portuguese would be desirable after the Viceroy Marquez de Lourecál had won this victory over Bhonsala-Savant of Savantvadi. So he wrote a letter to the Viceroy on 12 November 1741 and suggested that if he desired to take back Bassein from the Mahrattas he should be informed accordingly so that he could arrange everything secretly.16

The Viceroy sent a reply to Sambhaji Angria on 2 December, 1741 reciprocating the desire for a treaty and peace on the sea between them.17 In January next, Sambhaji died. In a contemporary Portuguese document the death is mentioned to have taken place on 22 January 1742.18 The Viceroy writes that there were four palas, one galia and fifty galvetas in the Peshwa’s armada.19 In May 1742, Govind Ram Thakur attacked Salcete in Goa. A warning to that effect was received by the Portuguese from Dadajirao Bhave previously. A translation in Portuguese of the letter Dadaji wrote to the Secretary of the Goa is available.20 It was done

on 30 May 1742. He says therein, “Under orders from the Chhatrapati Sambhaji, Govindpant had invited you for talks but you did not respond to it. He is coming down the ghat and the Portuguese should, therefore, take better care of their forts and fortification of the island of Goa. Nagoo Savant also had cautioned the Portuguese to the same effect. He said Govind Thakur would create confusion in Salcete. 21

Govindpant Thakur, a former sardar of the Peshwas, had accepted service at Sambhaji’s court. He came down the ghat in Sanguem on 12 May 1742. After the death of the Peshwa, Sardar Naropant and Sardar Annaji Prabhu had taken Sanguem and Ponda fortresses from the Prince of Saunde on behalf of Sambhaji. Govindpant had 3,000 horsemen and 3,000 footmen and some elephants.23 When Govindpant reached Sanguem, Annaji Prabhu was at Mardangad. Govindpant sent for him, handcuffed him and placed him under arrest till the fort of Sanguem was delivered to him. Seeing that he had a strong army, Annaji Prabhu surrendered Sanguem to him and agreed to deliver Ponda fort also. Annaji Prabhu then stayed in Ponda fort. Govindpant informed the Viceroy from Sanguem that an appropriate person should be sent to him to hold talks with him. Portuguese translation of Govindpant’s letter done on 15-5-1742 is available.24

As Govindpant received no reply from the Portuguese, he proceeded to Salcete and camped there on 16 May 1742 and demanded Rs. 20,000 as the arrears of tribute from the time of Conde de Sandomele. For fourteen days, he stayed in Salcete without any opposition. Then he hastily went to Sanguem.25 Under orders of the Peshwa, Sanguem and Ponda

fortresses were to be given to the Prince of Sanguem.26 Saundekar’s General Kalaphaya had already taken possession of Mardangad. But Sardar Annaji Prabhu drove out the Saunde Prince from there with the help of Bhonsala-Savant and took possession of Sanguem and Mardangad forts from Ponda Panchmahal. When it was known that Annaji Prabhu was under arrest, about 800 of his men and principal officers accepted service under the Portuguese.

On 8 June 1742, Friday, the Portuguese attacked the army of Govindpant at Sanguem and after a fight for three hours took the fortress and demolished it. Govindpant was defeated and he fled up the ghat. The Portuguese army consisted of 600 Europeans, 1500 natives and two new style cannons. The army was under the command of Manuel Soares Velen. He has left a vivid description of the battle in which he says that he beheaded a number of them, the right hands of some were cut off and tied to their necks and they were then let off.27 On 9 June one thousand soliders under the command of Kalappaya of Saunde came to the aid of the Portuguese. They were sent in advance and the Portuguese army followed them to Ponda

on 11 June. Annaji Prabhu was in the fort there. But he had no more than one hundred men and some ammunition. He did not hesitate for long. The next day he opened the gate of the fort and surrendered himself to the Portuguese. He even ordered for the surrender of Supem fort.28

The Portuguese were going to demolish the Ponda fort but Kalappaya insisted that it should be given to him in tact In this way the fort again passed on to the Saunde Prince, (12 June 1742).29 The Portuguese kept Annaji with his two comrades Sabaji and Narayan Prabhu in Aguada. He was there for 28 days. Later he fled away from there.30

Viceroy Marquez de Louricâl died on 12 June 1742. Goa’s administration was then in charge of acting Governors. One of them Don Luiz Caitano de Almeida kept contact with the Captains of Thana and Bassein forts. He had informed the King of Portugal in a letter dated 28 January 1743 that both of them were prepared to hand over the forts to the Portuguese if each of them was given a bribe of one lakh of rupees but he was instructed from Portugal that to do anything like that was fraught with dangerous consequences.31 In September 1744, the new Viceroy Marquez de Castello Novo came to Goa.

In a letter written on 3 November 1744, to the Secretario do Estado, this Viceroy says, ‘The people of Bassein are eager to get out of the jaws of the Mahrattas. I am getting numerous letters from the local people to relieve them from the Mahratta oppression.”32 While two Portuguese frigates (N. S. de Oliveira and N. S. de Penha de Franca) with a caravan of

21 ships were proceeding to the North, the armada of the Angria attacked them. This armada contained nine palas and two galvetas. For six days the Portuguese and the Angria fought,

but at last the Mahrattas retreated according to Pedro Vicente Vidal in a letter dated 24 November 1744.33

In a letter dated February 11, 1745, this Viceroy writes to Portugal : “The Angria of Kolaba has sent an envoy to me. Although he has come here only on a goodwill visit, the reason behind his despatch here is different. He has brought a secret message of his master that if I wish to take back Karanji (Uran) and Bassein from the Mahrattas he is prepared to help me in that venture. His reason is that the proximity of the Peshwa is irksome to him. Had I another 2000 disciplined soldiers, I would have attacked Bassein myself. The people there are waiting for us to go there. I receive letters from every ship that comes here to free the people there from Mahratta shackles. Besides this, I feel certain that Chhatrapati Shahu himself is jealous of the army of the Peshwa Nanasaheb and he will not help the Peshwa

against us.”34

In a letter written on March 8, 1745, the Viceroy wrote to Portugal : “We lost an opportunity this year of regaining the northern territory of Bassein. How much do I regret this! There is very little army there at present. Not only the Christians but also Hindus from Bassein write to me that I should free them from Mahratta bondage. Even some Mahratta sardars have informed me that if we go there with an army, they would turn round, give up the service of the Mahrattas and join us as our employees”. 35

The author came across a letter written by Marquez de Castello Novo to the King of Portugal on 27 December 1745 in the library of the Coimbra University.36 The Viceroy says in this letter that he had maintained contact with the Court of Satara during the whole of the preceding rainy season and therefore felt confident that he would receive no molestation from the Mahrattas. The Viceroy further wrote : “I have come to know that Chhatrapati Shahu is jealous of the strong army of the Peshwa and some members of his court are against the Peshwa Nanasaheb. So if we demanded our northern province of Bassein, they will not mind it. But in view of the customs and manners of these people this important business cannot be put through without spending considerable money. Yet I am incessantly trying but I have no idea how far I shall succeed.”

The opinion of Caitano de Sousa Pereira who became well known in the Bassein campaign is worth bearing in mind in this connection. He has said, “The Mahratta captains of Thana and Bassein say that they are willing to hand over the forts to the Portuguese for a price, but it is all a fraud. They only use it as a device to find out how the Portuguese mind works in this matter. As a matter of fact, military action is the only way of recapturing Bassein.

For that purpose besides 600 Portuguese soldiers, one thousand native soldiers and a good armada are-quire enough.”37

Sardar Ramchandra Malhar had come to Kavale on January 20, 1746 for the festival of Magh 5, He had with him 75 camels, 800 horses and some infantry.38 The Goa Government looked askance at this episode. Ramchandra Malhar was a Mahajan of the Shanta Durga temple and he had spent a good deal of money there. He had also built one extension of the temple (alpendre). Therefore the Goa Government was perplexed as to what suggestions it should make to the Price of Saunde in regard to him. The Goa Government knew that Ramchandra Malhar was an influential person at Shahu’s Court and he might have to batch some plot against the Portuguese on the pretext of paying a visit to his family deity. The Portuguese have recorded a number of ancedotes about Ramchandra Malhar.39 One of them is that Ramchandra Malhar was a resident of Savantvadi. The Savant gave him such a severe thrashing for an insignificant mistake that he left his home, went up the ghat and sought employment under Bajirao Peshwa. He was intelligent, smart and good-natured. He prospered there and earned much wealth. He was not without enemies, who poisoned

Bajirao’s ears against him. Bajirao thought that he might have become rich at the cost of Government and so one day he made a call at his place, all of a sudden, and expressed a desire to have a look at his treasure. Ramchandra was not frightened at all. He handed over the keys of his treasure to Bajirao and took him to the strong room where Ramchandra’s wealth was stored. After inspecting it Bajirao said that he was in need of it for a big campaign. Ramchandra smilingly welcomed the suggestion and said that he would be very pleased to keep it at his disposal. He regarded that wealth as his master’s and so long as the master favoured him, he would never be in want of anything. Bajirao was surprised at his attitude and did not touch it at all. He was satisfied with his loyalty and made over his children to him for

their education Ramchandra served Bajirao and his son Nanasaheb loyally for many years and earned much wealth. He was loyal even to the Savant- Bhonsla and helped him on many occasions to the extent of Rs. one and half lakh.

In April 1746, the Viceroy planned an invasion of Savantvadi and asked the help of the Prince of Saunde for that purpose. Saunde and Savantvadi were inveterate enemies and so the Viceroy received a ready response from Saunde. On May 5, 1746 the Viceroy conquered Alorna, part of Savantvadi.40 The Portuguese opened the solid gates of the fort with the help of Petardos.41 The use of Petardos was made by the Portuguese in 1741 in the war against Savantvadi and since then that Portuguese word has passed in the Marathi language for constant use.42 The Viceroy has written that Subedar Goma Savant of the Alorna fort fought valiantly in this battle. Seeing that the Viceroy was proceeding from Alorna to the fort of Bicholim on May 18, he damaged the fort, burnt Bicholim and fled away. The Portuguese captured Bicholim on the same day and started repairs of the fort and issued a proclamation in Marathi (na lingua do pays) and thereby ordered the Desais and gaokars of that Mahal to resume their work in their respective villages.

For some days past, the Desais of Maneri, Sanquelim and Keri had begun friendly correspondence with the Portuguese. But out of fear of the Bhonsala-Savant, they could not muster up courage to join the Portuguese openly and they wanted to pretend that they went over under duress. Taking note of this, the Portuguese sent their troops on Sanquelim. The men of Sanquelim, Desais and the Portuguese engaged there in a skirmish, but the Portuguese did not damage the fort and the city, under instructions of the Viceroy because they had to secure the sympathy of the Desais who were brave men. The Campaign against the Savant was stopped in the rainy season, but during this period intrigues with the Ranes of Sanquelim and Keri went on.

Some ancestor of the Ranes of Sanquelim had killed a monkey while hunting about 70 years ago. On that account, probably at the instance of Savantvadi, the Ranes were under social ostracism. When Chhatrapati Sambhaji came to Ponda in 1684, there was a move to admit them to the caste again but as the Chhatrapati had to leave hastily on account of the invasion of the Moghuls, the problem of the Ranes was hanging fire. For this reason Satroji

Rane was on inimical terms with the Savant-Bhonsla. The Viceroy assured the Ranes that he would see to it that they were admitted to their caste for social intercourse.44 He gave some more assurences also to Satroji Rane and his colleagues, the Desais. One of them was that religious freedom would be given to Hindus in the territory that the Portuguese would take and they would not demolish the temples of the Hindus.45 There was much discontent among the Desais at this time because the Savant had issued orders to recover a watercess of 40,000 rupees from the Desais. This is also one of the reasons why the Desais and Ranes joined the

Portuguese.

At last on October 21, 1746, the Ranes of Sanquelim, Gavas of Maneri, Raghunath Prabhu of Bicholim, Kushtoba Desai of Advai and others turned their backs on the Savant and succumbed to Portuguese rule. Not only this, but Satroji Rane captured Avado, Morle and Satarem forts of the Savant and handed them over to the Portuguese in token of their loyalty to them.46 On November 10 the Viceroy presented himself with his armada in the bay of Caisov and on November 23, he launched an attack of Terekhol fort and captured it. On this occasion, the Portuguese captured or destroyed most of the Savant’s armada which had in it ten palas fitted with15 to 20 guns, 17 galvetas, three batelos one armed manchua and four parangues. There were several boats also.

On December 3, 1746, the Portuguese captured the fort of Redi. The Savant Bhonsala often charged the Portuguese for having deceitfully captured it from them.48 From a letter written by Jairam Savant Bhonsla and Ramchandra Savant Bhonsala to the Viceroy on July 12, 1748, some more information regarding the conflict between the Bhonsala-Savant and the Portuguese becomes available.49 This letter recounts the principal stages of the battle

and says that the fort of Redi was made over to the Portuguese for some days only as security pending settlement of peace at Redi itself on the condition that the people and ryots of Redi would be left undisturbed, but now it was usurped. From the language of this letter it is apparent that the Portuguese seized the Redi fort by force and fraud.

It became obligatory on the Peshwa to mediate on behalf of the Savant with the Portuguese. He appointed Mahipatrao Chanda as envoy who reached Goa a few days before November 11, 1746. Even after staying in Goa for several days, no hope of a treaty with Bhonsla from the Portuguese was in sight. So the Peshwa sent his cousin Sadashivrao with a large army to Karnatak. In a letter written to Pilajirao Jadhav on December 11, 1746 a reference is made to Sadashivrao’s invasion. This letter says, “The Portuguese have picked up a quarrel with the Bhonsala of Savantvadi who has been in our service for long. He must be helped. So arrangement has been made to send troops there. It was decided to send Sadashivrao there with an army. If the Portuguese pursues the Savant, 2000 should be sent there.51 A description of Sadashivrao’s invasion is available in Goa Archives and it shows how terrified the Portuguese were of that invasion.

The henchmen of the Portuguese were at the Mahratta court as well as in Sadashivrao’s army who kept the Portuguese biographer of Vice-Rei Marquez de Castello Novo informed. He has said that the Viceroy daily received messages about the movements of the Mahrattas and even these sardars who had to participate in the battle also sent cautions to the Portuguese.52 In particular, the prince of Saunde was very anxious for the Portuguese because he always thought that the farther the Peshwa army was from Ponda Panchmahal the better it was for him. The Sarsubedar of Ponda appointed by the prince of Saunde, Kushta Rao says in a letter to the Secretary of the Goa Government written on 27-1-

1751 that the army of Sadashivrao was coming down the ghat but the men of Saunde and the Portuguese closed Digi and Tinai ghats and did not allow it to come down as a result of which the territory of Ponda and Goa remained in peace.53

The letter written by Kushtarao on 14-4-1751 says54 that “the Bhonsala had managed to get Sadashivrao to invade Salcete and be even came as far as Supem. Marquez de Alorna beckoned to us and we did not allow him to come down the ghat. He went back with his 40,000 and Jairam Savant thus looked small. In this way saunde and Goa were saved.” What conciliatory and monetory remedies, Kushta Rao employed to prevent Sadashivrao from coming down on Goa have been dilated upon in a letter that Jeevan Naik Hangal wrote to Kushta Rao dated March 8, 1747. Portuguese translation of this Marathi letter is in Goa Archives.

CONTENTSThis Sardar Hangal met Sadashivrao at Khanapur when Bhausaheb told him that he wanted to invade Goa and for that purpose he wanted to keep in his possession Mardangad; so the prince of Saunde should hand it over to him for one year. Besides he should help with his men to get his men down the ghat. On behalf of the prince of Saunde, he offered a lakh of rupees to Bhausaheb and requested him not to go down the Ghat in that year. This Sardar Hangal also assured Bhausaheb that the Prince of Saunde has observed the agreement with Chhatrapati Shahu made forty years ago of paying Rs. 21,000 a year as tribute and he would observe it in future. He bribed many Mahratta sardars also.

The Karbhari of Saunde carried on the talks in the Camp of Bhausaheb Peshwa on March 8, 1747 when he said that he had to recover tribute from Goa and take back the forts of the Bhonsala of Savantvadi which the Portuguese had forcibly taken; for that purpose he wanted Mardangad in his possession for a year. But he was obliged to act according to the orders of Chhatrapati Shahu. So instead of that year he would come next year to Goa, when he would require Mardangad for a year. So the Prince of Saunde should not delay this delivery of the fort as soon as he got instructions to do so from the Chhatrapati. Bhausaheb took half

of the amount of tribute from the Prince of Saunde and decamped from Supem on March 10, 1747.55

Marquez de Castello Novo, in his letter to the King of Portugal, written on 30 December 1747 has said,56 “It was published that the Peshwa’s force of 30,000 horsemen and innumerable footmen was coming down on Goa under the command of Bhausaheb. When I knew that it was to march on Salcete I had closed all the mountain passes and raised impediments in the way by felling trees, so that its course should be obstructed. The very name of the Mahrattas frightens people in Asia and so the people of Supem ran helter-skelter when they knew that Bhausaheb was coming. The men of Saunde and Ranes had kept watch to stop the coming army but they also fled away. Our men also were going to do likewise but I gave strict orders to their superiors to behead them in that event. Some months ago

Nanasaheb had sent Mahipatrao Chanda as envoy to me. I delayed my reply and he kept waiting. He asked me to make a treaty with the Savant. Some time later Bhausaheb asked me to send back Mahipatrao and suggested that the Mahratta army was coming on Goa to compel me to make peace with the Savant. Besides, he also wanted to find out if we had any designs on North Konkan and Bassein. Bhausaheb again wrote to me that Savant was a tributory of the Peshwa and so the forts and territory that I have taken from him should be returned to him and for that I should send to his Camp a respectable Portuguese envoy to

negotiate a suitable treaty. I prayed for time without sending him any reply. At the same time I sent an emissary to Satara and convinced Nanasaheb that we had no designs on Bassein. The Mahrattas knew that I was ready for battle. They also knew that people in Salcete had already fled away and so there was no point in plundering Salcete. After waiting for many

days, Bhausaheb decamped from Supem and went to the border of Karnatak. After I knew where he was going I sent his man to him and gave him a letter, saying that if the Bhonsla wanted a treaty, he should send an envoy to Goa and a draft treaty. If the envoy of Nanasaheb is present at that time, he would be a welcome.”

From this Portuguese report it becomes apparent that for two reasons, Bhausaheb did not invade Goa. One was that he had not with him big cannons and other means necessary for capturing forts in Goa and it was not easy to get the diet in Konkan that their animals required.57 Rudrappa Halvi, General of the Kittur Sardesai, wrote a congratulatory letter to the Viceroy on October 8, 1747, because of the Portuguese victory over Savant which is in Goa Archives. He says that when Bhausaheb met him he told him that his army would be harassed after going down the ghat and therefore he changed his plan. Pedro Vicente Vidal, the Portuguese General writes in a letter to Viceroy Marquez de Alorna :59 “I believe that the enemy will not come down the ghat. If he does so, he will have to repent, because he will not get even a seer of rice for his army or grass for his horses. We have burnt all the hay in the theatre of war and collected all possible foodgrains.” The fact of the matter was that the Peshwa had no suitable opportunity to engage in a battle with the Portuguese. Besides the Mahrattas also knew that once a battle began, it would linger on like the campaign in Bassein. Nanasaheb has written in a letter dated March 5, 1747, to Ramchandra Baba : “The Portuguese are dishonest and must be uprooted but it is not possible just now. Although the Peshwa could not help Savant with an army, he was given monetary help from time to time.

The Portuguese Viceroy writes on January 28, 1749 to the King of Portugal : “Nana fears Nizam. I know that while sending money and refusing military help to Savant, Nana pleaded that he had to keep an army ready to resist the Nizam. That is why probably last year and this year, he did not pester us with an invasion.” Besides Nana always had the suspicion that the Portuguese would try to reconquer Bassein. On December 7, 1746, Nanasaheb wrote to Ramchandra Baba :62 “The Portuguese and the French have combined. The French have taken two English forts in Arcot territory, Madras and Pondicherry. The French are coming with 20 ships to Goa. All Europeans are alike. They are unpredictable. Pilaji Jadhaorao has been sent to Konkan as a precautionery measure. Bombay is named, but where they will land is not known. We have taken precautionary steps to guard our posts. What happens later will be communicated to you. This year, the Portuguese seem to be stiff. Why worry as long as Gods’ grace is there.”

As a matter of fact there was no united action between the French and the Portuguese. After the French had taken Madras from the English, they thought that the French would invade Bombay also and if such a calamity overtook the English, they wanted the assistance of the Peshwa and so they had spread the remour that the French and

Portuguese had joined hands. The Viceroy has said that by giving such information the English led the Peshwa to believe that the Franco-Portuguese would take Bombay and with French help, the Portuguese would re-capture Bassein. Believing in all this, Nanasaheb sent 25,000 cavalry to Salcete.63

In a letter written to Joao de Sousa Ferraz on February 13, 1747, the Viceroy has said,64 “The Angria this year is perpetrating atrocities on the whole coast with his nine palas and sixty galvetas and if the concerned European nations did not act in time, they would have to face the consequent calamities. While we were at Redi, the Angria attacked the Manglore port, resorted to arson at Panale and captured a number of Dutch ships that were laden with spices and copper. I have presently received a letter from the agent of the Manglore factory in which he says that three English trading ships had anchored in Telicherry port. They had come from Bengal. They lifted all the cargo and stored it near the fort and had made preparations to meet the possible attack of the Angria at night in his own ports and elsewhere. He has now become so isolent that none can face him as far as Kanyakumari. You should speak to the Governor of Bombay confidentially in this matter and if he is prepared to move forward, we shall make our plans in this rainy season so that by summar all preparations would be made.” Tulaji Angria invaded Manglore on December 8, 1746. He was there for 26 hours.65

In September 1748, a Portuguese armada came to Goa with troops. Only 752 soldiers came. But their captains and military equipment was excellent. The Portuguese naval movements were made only in November and December every year. So the Viceroy decided to press into service this assistance by attacking the Bhonsla and invaded the for of Nevti on December 2, 1748. On this occasion, a Muslim Captain in the Portuguese service showed great valour and hoisted the Portuguese flag on the fort.66 Panegyries have been showered on this Muslim hero by Portuguese writers. The well-informed author of Epanaphora Indica has described him as second Certorio. This Muslim warrior was formerly in the service of Sambhaji Angre, Haripant Phadke, Saundekar, Savantvadkar etc.

While the Viceroy was in the Nevti port he learnt that the Bhonsala was building ships in Karli river and for their protection he had erected cannons on the banks of the river. When Ismailkhan knew about this he went to Karli river with the permission of the Viceroy and burnt away all the ships of the Bhonsala. The Subedar of Malvan had sent an emissary to the Viceroy while he was at Nevti on a goodwill visit. When the Portuguese armada was in front of Malvan fort, the Subedar returned three galvettas of the Portuguese that he had captured. After taking possession of Nevti, the Viceroy went to Vengurla with his armada, where there was a Dutch fort. The Bhonsla had repaired and expanded it. Before the Viceroy reached

Vengurla, the Bhonsala dismantled part of it and left it. The Viceroy was in a hurry to return to Goa. So he caused some damage to the port and left for Goa.

Congratulating the Viceroy on his victory over the Bhonsala-Savant, the Minister of Saunde prince, Krishna Rao wrote to the Viceroy on December 22, 1748 in superlative terms. He said they were praying for the safety and success and return of the Viceroy all the while and their happiness was boundless at his safe return to Goa.67 Although the Bhonsala was meeting with reverses continually in the war with the Portuguese, he did not give up Courage and he did not surrender to the enemy, but kept on the fight. He had many enemies. The Prince of Saunde always helped the Portuguese against him. Nagoo Savant also rejoiced in the success of the Portuguese and the defeat of the Savant. As he was the sardar of Chhatrapati Sambhaji at least he ought to have a soft corner for the Bhonsla, but even he sided with the Portuguese to destroy the Bhonsla in 1748.68 With this end in view the Chhatrapati of Kolhapur had even sent his envoy to Goa at the end of 1747.69 Even at the court of Chhatrapati Shahu, the Viceroy was carrying on intrigues against the Bhonsla through his henchmen.70 Tulaji Angria regarded him as his enemy and asked for Portuguese help to destroy him. In the face of such odds against him, only Peshwa Nanasaheb was his stand by. But in those days so many important problems were before the Peshwa that he was unable to send any big army to his aid but his moral and monetary support to the Bhonsla was always there.

The Portuguese destroyed the armada of the Bhonsla. He tried to build it anew in Karli river but failed. The Bhonsla was exhausted under the severe pressure of the Portuguese. In spite of all this he captured Tulaji Angria’s Mudagad in February 1748.71 Jairam Savant Bhonsala and Ramchandra Savant Bhonsala state in a letter written to the Viceroy on April 5, 174872 that “Penatrating as far as Anjanvel-Govalkot, we captured Mudagad which the Angria had built newly. After returning we received honours and monetary help from the Chhatrapati. More help has also been promissed.” Later in 1749, the Bhonsla captured Angria’s fort of Masure.73 Conde de Castello Novo has written that Tulaji Angria had taken this fort from the Bhonsala. He bought over some men in the fort and attacked it suddenly. The people inside fought for five days but had to surrender for want of water. Tulaji went to their help with troops

but it had already been surrendered and Tulaji had to return.

At the end of March, Tulaji sought Portuguese help in order to recapture the fort from the Bhonsala74 and sent Subedar Rudraji Dhulap as his envoy to negotiate terms. Dhulap had talks with the Portuguese and returned to Vijaydurg. Hope was given to him, but the Portuguese did not want to help the Angria against the Bhonsla. After the rainy season, Tulaji led an assault on Manglore with six palas and 50 galvetas and plundered the town. He even plundered the Portuguese factory there and they got an excuse for refusing help to the

Angria. The Bhonsala tried hard to induce the Ranes of Sanquelim and other Desais to join him again and forsake the Portuguese. He even was prepared to admit Satroji Rane to social intercourse.

This story is given in Epanaphora Indica. It is also stated in it that Bhonsla’s Karbhari Deoba Shenvi succeeded in this effort because Hari Gavas, Desai of Maneri and Raghunath Prabhu, Desai of Sanquelim were moved and Satroji Rane himself informed the Portuguese that he would have to break with the Portuguese under the orders of the Peshwa. From a letter which Bhaskarrao Bhave had written to the Portuguese on May 11, 1748, it appears that the Bhonsla was secretly influencing in various ways the Ranes and Desais. He has insisted that no one should come to know that he was an informant of the Portuguese and averred

that he regarded the Portuguese as the greatest of all powers, pointing out that the Bhonsla, the Ranes and the Desais were plotting to hand over Goa to the Peshwa. He has said that muros 77 i.e. fortifications of Bardez and passos78 in the river were in their hands, but should be watched. Mardangad was to be handed over to the Peshwa so that the Portuguese should camp there and suggesting this he concludes with humility that whatever was of benefit should be considered and the rest left out of account.79 This Bhaskarrao was in the Peshwa’s army and in that capacity he used to get several clues of policy. He faithfully but secretly let them out to the Portuguese. There are several letters of his in Goa Archives.

The Bhonsla was very sullen over the Portuguese usurpation of Redi fort and he tried many remedies to regain it. In July 1747 he tried to win over Captain Raghuji Naik who was a Portuguese protege and even the time of handing over the fort to the Bhonsla was fixed. But Rama Kamat, a local merchant went to Goa and informed the Viceroy about it. Pokya Naik, a subordinate of Raghooji. also gave similar information to Goa. An inquiry into Raghuji’s conduct was held, his guilt established and he was hanged.80 Pokya Naik and Rama Kamat were rewarded by money grants.81 In August 1747 again, the Bhonsla made one more effort to regain Redi. He managed to sell dried fish which was treated with poisoned salt to the soldiers in the fort. They used it and fell ill. The Bhonsla led an assault in this situation but had to retreat under Portuguese fire.82

The Chhatrapati of Satara planned in 1748 to appoint Apaji Angria in place of Tulaji Angria in Vijadurga and in order that the Portuguese should co-operate with him in this plan he sent Dom Antonio Jose Henriques who was at the Satara Court to talk to the Viceroy about it. When Tulaji came to know about it, he arranged to have Apaji murdered some days before May 14, 1748.83 A contemporary Portuguese historian has written that Kanhoji Angria had two married wives. He had a number of mistresses also. He had two sons by his first wife, Sekhoji and Sambhaji. The second wife also had two sons and one of them was Apaji.

In March 1749, Chhatrapati Sambhaji of Kolhapur went to Sindhudurg when he informed the Portuguese through Tukoji Shyamji and Maloji Malad that he wished to act as mediator between the Bhonsala and the Portuguese, but the Portuguese were not prepared for it, because the stand of the Kolhapur Chhatrapati was that all the fortresses of the Bhonsala that the Portuguese had captured should be returned to him and they should close

the strife.84 Next year in April the Chhatrapati sent an envoy to the Viceroy Marquez de Alorna and suggested that the Portuguese should fly the Chhatrapati’s flag on those forts, but the Portuguese replied that they could fly only the flag of the King of Portugal on all the forts they had captured from the Bhonsla.85

In 1749, the Portuguese learnt that it was being resolved in Poona that the contract of recovering the revenue of the territory of Bhonsla was being entrusted to the Peshwa’s Sardar, Malhar Ramchandra. The Portuguese did not want this. So they instructed Dom Antonio Jose Henriques who was at Shahu’s Court to impress on Shahu’s mind that by such a measure the Peshwa’s power would increase and the Chhatrapati’s power would diminish.86 In a letter written to the Peshwa in December 1748, Ramchandra Malhar said that people from Bicholim, Sanquelim and Belgaum wished ardently that the Peshwa’s flag should fly in these areas.87

The reign of Viceroy Marquez do Castello Novo ended on September 27, 1750. After he had taken the Bhonsla’s Halorna fort, the King had conferred on him the title Marquez of Alorna. Marquez de Tavora was appointed in his place. The instructions that Marquez the Alorna left for his guidance are well-known. In his reign, many important events in Mahratta history happened.

In 1751 March, the Portuguese sentenced to death a spy who was sent by Shankarajipant from Bassein to Goa. Great efforts were made to induce him to embrace Christianity in order to be kept alive but he preferred death to conversion.88 On March 25, 1751, Captain Ismail Khan of the Portuguese captured three armed manchuas of Hiroji Naik who was in the service of the Bhonsla.89

There is a manuscript entitled Journal de L’armee conduite par M. Bussy in Bibliotheque Nationale de Paris in which there is mention of some Goan Christians (Canaries) having been sent from Goa to meet Bussy at the beginning of 1752. The purpose of this step can be gathered from Bussy et l’lnde Francaise by Alfred Martineu. He writes that Dupleix had suggested to the Portuguese Viceroy that the Portuguese should help Bussy and Salabat Jung and in exchange regain Bassein. The author has published in part Ⅵ of Portuguese e Maratas the documents available in Goa Archives from which it is obvious that in this league against the Peshwa Nanasaheb Bussy, Salabatjung, Tarabai of Kolhapur and Tulaji Angria

had combined.90 The biographer of Marquez de Tavora has said that Tarabai had joined this conspiracy against the Peshwa because he gave her very unsympathetic treatment.91 Marquez de Tavora had informed Bussy and Salabat Jung in a letter dated November 30, 1751 that he was prepared to join them. The Goa Christians mentioned before must have gone to Bussy’s camp with this letter.

On January 10, 1752, the Viceroy writes to the King of Portugal that “a serious conflict having arisen between the Peshwa and Tarabai, she has gathered in her camp Salabat Jung and all Maratha Sardars of her caste and so the Peshwa’s end seems to have come near.” In a letter written two days after this, the Viceroy says, “I have written to Tarabai and her reply also has come. She had asked for some ammunition. I sent her a present and said for sending the ammunition she wanted there would have to be a treaty and if such a treaty is made, not only ammunition but military assistance could be given. She has not replied to this letter but our correspondence continues.”

In a letter to Tulaji Angria on February 8, 1752, the Viceroy said that if he gave a little military help, he would start with his armada to get back Bassein ad Salcette. But soon afterwards, the Peshwa stole a march over Tarabai, Bussy and Salabat Jung. In a leter written on February 3, 1753 to Portugal, the Viceroy says, “Just as last year, Salabat Jung successfully fought against Nana, Salabat Jung should have done this year. Had he done so and had we been able to ally with him, I would have easily regained Bassein. But due to unforseen political developments, I had to set aside the idea of taking Bassein and carry on the campaign of capturing the territory of Saunde prince as far as Ankola and for this the help from Portugal is needed.”

The policy of Marquez de Tavora was that the Portuguese should extend their state boundary in South Konkan by capturing the territory between the river of Aronde and the river of Sadashivgad. He was of the opinion that if the three mountain passes of Dighi, Ram and Hanuman were in Portuguese possession, it would never be difficult to protect Goa from

Mahratta depredations. In a battle with the prince of Saunde, Marquez de Tavora conquered Sadashivgad and Kurmagad and the fort of Korve in November 1752.92 In January next year, his army entered and pillaged a number of villages. But he did not touch the Shiva temple on Chandreshwar Hill, because he feared that if he demolished this important temple, Hindus would not fail to demolish churches.93

In a manuscript entitled Annal Indico Historico in Biblioteca Publica de Evora, the following information is available : “Letters have come from Vijayadurga which indicate that on January 3, 1753 two armed ships of the Dutch, Nans and Chalupa were going from the South to Surat. Each ship was equipped with 60 caanons and ample stocks of ammunition. The

main ship was named Winnemum and its captain was one Filipe. The other was named Viced and its captain was Simon Root. The name of the Chalupa was Lamence. Angria’s armada was in sound condition at Vijayadurg, which contained three big palas and nine small ones. There were 3,000 sailor-soldiers on these 12 ships. On January 4, these ships set sails. Three of these big and three small ships attacked the main ship of the Dutch. The Dutch replied by their guns and hand-grenades but by the explosion of its ammunition stock it was wholly consumed. This caused breakage of the three ships of the Angria, one of which was big and the other two small. The Dutch themselves destroyed their second ship. The Angria captured only their chalupa. Seventyfive men on board that ship were taken to Vijaydurg. The Dutch had to bear a loss of 400 lakhs of rupees. Three hundred of Angria’s men died and 400 were wounded, most of whom will not survive. The Angria took his six palas to Vijayadurg which have been greatly damaged by the Dutch bombardment and are being hastily repaired. So the Angria has left with him for piracy one big pala, six small palas and 125 other small craft. On account of this unfortunate Dutch event, the battle that our armed ship Mizecordeia fought with Angre’s ten palas and elven galvetas in Calicut port in 1752 is considered very significant.”

On September 20, 1754, Conde de Alva replaced Marquez de Tavora as Viceroy. Tavora also has left instructions for the guidance of his successor on November 7, 1754 in which he has given the names of some spies who supplied him with political news. Among them is one Joao Gomes de Almada. It was through him that the Portuguese spies in Bombay

were paid. This Almada also sent money to Joao Galvao’s family at Bassein. The Mahrattas had put to death Joao Galvao for spying. For this reason, under orders of the King of Portugal, the Portuguese had taken responsibility for looking after his family. This Joao Galvao is mentioned in Peshwa Daftar.94

The other spy mentioned by Tavora is Don Antonio Jose Eirices. He stayed as a physician to the Chhatrapati Shahu and was ingratiated in his favour. He came in contact there with many respectable men and was much esteemed by Shahu. He often sent important news despatches to Alorna and Tavora. He was a Portuguese from Bassein, hailed from a high family and was gay by temperament.

There was one Hindu also who supplied news to Goa from the Mahratta camp. His name was Goraksha Shenvi. He hailed from Thorle Juve in Goa. Later he took up service with the Portuguese. The Portuguese envoy at the Mahratta Court, Vithal Goraksha Valavalikar was the son of this spy. One more Hindu spy mentioned by Tavora was one Mulshi Shenvi who lived at Kittur up the Ghat. There was a captain of spies appointed in Salcete by the Portuguese. He was designated Capitao de espiao and under him all Portuguese spies worked.

Several of the opinions of Marquez de Tavora on the Mahrattas are noteworthy. About the Mahratta army, he has said, “The army of the Mahrattas is disorgainised (desordenada) and so even 7000 or 8000 disciplined soldiers are enough to fight a lakh of them.”

About the intention of Nanasaheb to dislodge Tulaji Angria and to take over Vijaydurg, Marquez de Tavora says : “We had in our army a Muslim soldier, originally a native of Bicholim. After the capture of Bassein by the Mahrattas he served a number of princes and lastly got a job with the French. He was appointed as Jamadar. Later when the French and Salabat Jung made common cause, this man came to prominence by his valour. He called himself Nawab Mazzafar Khan or Muzzafar Jung. He left the French and joined Nanasaheb Peshwa and won his favour. At the beginning of this rainy season he informed me that Nanasaheb has appointed him Chief of the navy (General de armada) and entrusted to him the business of destroying Tulaji Angria and capturing Vijayadurg. So the Viceroy should help him with his counsel and armada. I have told Muzaffar Khan that this is the best time to attack Tulaji, because with the same intention the Dutch are coming with a big armada. As I gave him no hope about military help, he wrote to me again after three months and even induced Nanasaheb to write to me. 95 These two letters were so written that they took it for granted that I was going to help him. Muzaffar Khan asked for 1500 guns and 25 khandis of ammunition. I made the messenger who brought these letters wait for several days and told him that unless ships from Portugal arrived and I had my King’s orders, I could do nothing. After these ships arrived I informed Nanasaheb and Muzaffar Khan that my reign is over and a new Viceroy is coming to take my place. I believe Nanasaheb has postponed the campaign against Tulaji, since no news about happenings in Vijayadurg has come so far.”

The enmity between Tulaji Angria and the Peshwa was widely known. That is why he showed sympathy with Peshwa’s enemies. When the Peshwa marched on Karnatak, Tulaji made overtures to the Nawab of Savnur. Correspondence on this topic is in Goa Archives. It contains a letter from Muzaffarkhan. He says in it that Tulaji was ready to fight with the Peshwa with great alactrity. Muzzaffarkhan has informed the Portuguese that he had received a letter from Tarabai who had written to Murarrao and intended to write to the Viceroy also. Muzzaffarkhan asked in the same letter 1500 guns, ammunition worth Rs. 1,000 and other material to be sent to Savnur. Goa sold ammunition and guns to Savnur and in February 1756, sent Captain Antonio Gonçalves, a guner also to Savnur.96

The Peshwa wanted the help of Portuguese armada against Tulaji Angria in accordance with the treaty of Poona in 1740 between them but since he had no hope of getting such help, he took the help of the English. Tulaji agreed to give the Portuguese two lakhs of rupees and got their military help. The treaty on this subject was made in Goa on November 5, 1755 between the Portuguese Viceroy Conde de Alva and Kanopant and

Ramjirao Rane on behalf of Tulaji. According to this treaty the Portuguese army was to be stationed at Vijayadurga for the protection of that fort only. But Tulaji sent one Portuguese battalion to Kharepatan to fight the Peshwa’s army. On December 11, the two armies met and a severe battle was fought. The Peshwa and the English had already protested to the Viceroy for the Portuguese having helped Tulaji. When a crisis developed at Kharepatan, the Portuguese army returned to Goa without loss of time.

On February 12, 1756 most of Tulaji’s armada was consumed to ashes. It was agreed between the Peshwa and the English at Suvarnadurg on March 19, 1755 that the captured ships of Tulaji should be distributed between the English and the Peshwa fifty fifty. That might have been done this time also but the Peshwa had probably no idea that the armada would be totally destroyed. The English bombarded the fort on February 12. The English have recorded and G. S. Sardesai has also said it that one cannon ball from Watson’s armada fell on the ships of the Angria and all his ships were burnt down.98 But the Viceroy in his letter to the King of Portugal dated January 22, 1757, says that Tulaji Angria himself set fire to his armada and destroyed it.99 No supporting documents to the Viceroy’s statement are found.

Col. John Biddulph has written that this armada contained three palas equipped with 20 cannons, nine palas having 12 to 16 guns and 13 galvetas having six to ten guns, besides some smaller ships.100 On February 13, the English took possession of Vijayadurg and had to hand it over to the Peshwa in October. Khandoji Mankar was the chief of the Peshwa army to

whom Tulaji surrendered himself. Tulaji was kept in prison till he died. Raghoji, a son of Tulaji, escaped from jail and joined Haidar Ah’s armada in 1771.

Some people hold the view that because Nanasaheb destroyed Tulaji’s armada, it led to a menace to Mahratta power. But the then Viceroy held the opposite view. Bajirao himself had formulated the policy of subordinating the Angria to him. He had planned to take English and Portuguese help for that end in view.101 It will be no exaggeration to say that what Bajirao

had planned, his son brought into execution. Tulaji was an enemy of the Peshwas and did not even care for Chhatrapati Shahu. Not only that but he had no scruples in making common cause with whosoever was the enemy of the Peshwa, whether, they were Mussalmans or the Portuguese.

In May 1749, Sardar Rudraji Dhulap went to Goa and delivered Tulaji’s message to the Viceroy. It was to the effect that whoever was a Maratha was against him and so he did not want to seek their friendship. He therefore sought permanent friendship and alliance with the Portuguese.102 Next year Tulaji sent Ismailji Nakhava to Goa with the object of getting Goa’s help against Bhonsla-Savant, saying that he was the common enemy of the Portuguese and the Angria and therefore they should unite and finish him. In their unity lay God’s graceful

CONTENTShand and then he did not care for others.103 The Viceroy has said that Tulaji was a rustic, a cruel man who did not care for a pledged word and given to drinking.104 He further writes that when his mother told him that the Portuguese army should be employed only for the protection of Vijayadurg fort, he gave her such severe thrashing that she was on the point of death.

Tulaji’s armada was destroyed, but the Peshwa founded a new armada in its place. He did not remove Rudraji Dhulap, the Subedar in Tulaji’s armada but appointed him at Vijayadurg in charge of the new armada. Writing about this on January 31, 1763, the Viceroy has said : “The proximity of the Mahrattas at Vijayadurg has proved to be detrimental to the interests of this State and particularly its trade. Rudraji Dhulap, the former Chief of Tulaji’s armada went to Poona two years ago and secured the monopoly of piracy on this coast. If his course of activities continues as at present, I think another Angria will soon arise.” Viceroy Conde de Alva was cut to the quick to see that owing to Anglo-Mahratta opposition, the Portuguese army which had gone to help Tulaji had to return. There was some criticism of the Viceroy in Goa and in Portugal in this connection, because this help given to Tulaji was in contravention of the Mahratta-Portuguese treaty made in Goa in 1740. Besides the Portuguese in Goa were not in a position to stand before a powerful opponent like the Peshwa. The Portuguese learnt some lessons to their cost from the Maharatta invasions.

The Portuguese had clearly read the policy of the Peshwas in their conflict with the Bhonsla. From the days of Bajirao it was the desire of the Peshwas to keep Ponda fortress in their hands as a counter against the Portuguese. The same view is confirmed by a letter in Peshwa Daftar, Part 24, page 154.106 As a matter of fact the Peshwas had to put up with large expenditure for the protection of this fort.107 Yet they always wanted to keep it in their possession. In 1750, they had asked it for a year from the prince of Saunde108 and the Portuguese knew why that demand was made on Saunde. In 1756, the prince of Saunde made an agreement to mortgage the fort with the Peshwa against Rs. 5,50,000.109 As soon as the Viceroy knew about this, he marched on Ponda on June 1, 1756 to take possession of it, but before he reached there, the Peshwa’s army had already captured it.110

As the Peshwa had already taken possession of Mardangad, the Viceroy Conde de Alva returned the same day to Goa and on June 22, he made special preparation, crossed the Durbate creek and marched on Mardangad. He had taken with him the new style two cannons and petardos to break the gate of the fort. He had camped near the temple of Kapileshwari. They were getting ready for the assault from there. On June 28, they started bombarding the fort. It was raining cats and dogs and all ammunition became wet. Yesaji Ram Joshi Huprikar was the Captain of the fort.

Four hundred Mahrattas, with a sword and a shield, came out of the fort and attacked the enemy with vigour. The Portuguese were completely routed. The Viceroy himself and 14 other notable Portuguese were killed in action. But the Captain of the fort sent the dead body of the Viceroy to Goa with due honour. Yesaji Ram wrote to the Secretary of the Government

of Goa144 that it was surprising that the Viceroy behaved with such rashness when he and the Peshwa were in constant correspondence. However, effort was made to trace his dead body and send it with due respect. Many others were lying dead or wounded and they should be looked after. This letter bears no date but it was translated in Portuguese on July 1, 1756.

Dulbaji Naik Prataprao Sardessai of Ponda wrote to the Secretary of the Government of Goa on June 30, 1756 that “such excesses would not have been committed had it been known that, it was the Viceroy himself. The soldiers did it unknowingly”.115 Viceroy Conde de Alva was killed by his own soliders is the contention of historians like Tomas Rebeiro, Balcemao and others. But it is not supported by contemporary documentary evidence.116 As a matter of fact these Portuguese writers never had an opportunity to study papers and sources that go against their stand and which the author has seen.

One well-known Portuguese writer, while writing about the assault on Mardangad by Conde de Alva has said : “Many of them were drowned dead. Many fled away half-naked. All the material remained on the battlefield. Those who could manage to run away took shelter in the Kapileshwari temple at Kavle. Had they not fled away, they would have died there. Three

days after the Viceroy’s body was searched. It was so hopelessly decomposed that it was difficult to recognise it as his body.”

The Captain of Mardangad wrote to the Peshwa that the Portuguese came unexpectedly, the people were frightened but due to the glory of the Peshwa, the Portuguese were completely discomfited. The Viceroy himself fell and his body and ten cannons, big and small, were captured. Arms captured are numerous. The Portuguese were never so utterly defeated before. 118 There is a letter in part 24 of Peshwa Daftar of Jilkad 2. It is said therein that 1500 Portuguese came and attacked the bazar and were about to attack the fort when

the garrison of the fort attacked them and killed five to seven hundred Portuguese. The Chief of the Portuguese, the Viceroy, had come but he was also killed. (P. 246).

An acting Governor was appointed in Goa after Conde de Alva’s death. The Karbhari of the Bhonsla of Savantvadi, Pandurang Vishram sent a letter of condolence to Goa on the death of the Viceroy and the defeat of the Portuguese at Ponda but ended it with the encouraging words that the Portuguese were powerful and so there was no danger.119 This letter does not bear any date but it was translated in Portuguese on September 14, 1756.

In December 1756, Trimbakrao Vishwanath Pethe was camping at Ponda for medical treatment. A Portuguese physician Cosme Pinto, sent by the Goa Government treated him. In Marathi letters he is called Kosmi Diwadkar. The same by wrong interpretation is mentioned as Conde Pinto Manad in Revival of Maratha Power (p. 16). Trimbakrao was in Ponda for three months. 120 The Goa Government has said that the object of Trimbakrao in staying at Ponda was to straighten matters in Ponda Panchmahal and collect information about the military strength of the Portuguese. After he was quite well he tried suddenly to take Sanquelim from the Portuguese by trying to win over Satroji Rane and other Desais, but he failed.121 In a letter written to Portugal by the Acting Governor on January 28, 1758, he has said that Trimbakrao was bent on taking revenge on the Portuguese according to this information.

When the English and the Peshwa armies combined to take charge of Vijayadurg, Nanasaheb and Bhausaheb had gone on the Karnatak Campaign. After defeating the Nawab of Savnoor, the Peshwa returned to Poona on July 20. The Peshwa informed Goa about his victory in Karnatak by a letter dated May 22, 1756 which was translated into Portuguese on June 16, 1756. Conde de Alva must have received it somewhere in the middle of June. It is at present deposited in Arquivo Historico Ultramarino, Lisbon. The Peshwa writes124 : “Half of Savnur territory has been taken from Abdul Hakim Khan and agreement of eleven Iakhs of rupees as tribute has been made. Some of the tribute has been received in cash and for the rest Volav-Bankapur fort has been mortgaged with us. After finishing business there we came to Tungabhadra. Nawab Salabat Jung had come to his help. He was accompanied by Bussy. The Nawab did not like it. Bussy has been engaged in the service of Salabat Jung but was given leave to go to Tasalipatam. He will join service at the beginning of the rainy season. “Goa was in league with Savanur in a secret way. On May 8, 1756 a letter was went to Savnur by the Viceroy along with 300 muskets and 56 containers of ammunition.125

Antonio Gonçalves, a Portuguese Captain, was kept at Savnur to collect information there under the pretext of a position in the Savnur army.126 Even in 1756, the efforts to induce the Portuguese to join the Tarabai conspiracy against the Peshwa were continued. On January 23, 1757, the Governor of Goa informed Portugal that if the Portuguese joined the Tarabai conspiracy, they would have to take Vijayadurg and hand it over to the Angria. In return, the Portuguese would get one lakh of rupees at the beginning for expenses and after the war, she was willing to give back to us Bassein and other stations taken by the Mahrattas. Besides Kalyan and Bhivandi would also be given to the Portuguese.127 The envoy of the Peshwa, Ganesh Trimbak wrote to Poona about the plans the Portuguese and the Nawab of Savnur were hatching.128 While Nanasaheb was engaged in the Karnatak campaign, the Governor of Goa had informed the Peshwa that the help he had sent to Tulaji Angria was only protective and not for fighting with the English or the Peshwa. But when Tulaji used it for war

at Kharepatan, it was immediately called back.129 The Goa Government’s explanation about Conde de Alva’s assault on Mardangad was that the Portuguese army had entered Ponda Panchmahal of the Saunde Prince and captured considerable part of it. It was also going to take Mardangad but in the meanwhile the Prince of Saunde handed over the fort to the Peshwa and that is why the conflict between the Portuguese and the Mahrattas arose.130

From September 23, 1758, Conde de Ega was the Viceroy of Portuguese India. He wrote to the King of Portugal to say that Nanasaheb had two lakh horsemen, unlimited footmen and an evergrowing armada and the only way open to the Portuguese was to avoid war with him.131 So he said that he had decided to behave with humility with the Peshwa in opposition to the time-honoured Asiatic policy of the Portuguese.132 He came to know in Goa that Peshwa Nanasaheb was coming to Vijayadurg in February 1759. On March 6, the Viceroy

sent Tomas Jose Codmore with a present to wait upon the Peshwa, but as Nanasaheb had already left for Poona, he proceeded to Poona where the Peshwa gave him a hearty welcome and send-off. After Codemore’s return to Goa, two Mahratta envoys came to Goa. One of them was Mahadaji Keshav Phadke. On June 26 the Viceroy met the Peshwa’s envoy with due ceremony. Through the mediation of this envoy, Conde de Ega made a treaty with the Bhonsla of Savantvadi on July 26, 1759. In accordance with it Pernem, Bicholim (Bhatagram) and Sanquelim (Satari) were given to the Bhonsala on the Khoti tenure. Mahadaji Keshao systemetically wrote out the gist of the talks he had with the Viceroy and presented it to him on September 9, 1759. This document is now in Lisbon.133 It throws burid light on the

Peshwa-Portuguese relations of the day. The Viceroy interview took place on June 26, i.e. 30th Savat.134

The following points were laid down serially by Phadke :

(1) Tulaji Angria was a servant of the Peshwa. His ancestors traditionally conducted themselves as such. Tulaji behaved in a wayward manner and you helped him despite our warning in exchange of Rs. 2 lakhs. We pointed out to you the impropriety of your action and you came back without helping him. So that the sum of Rs. 2 lakhs you should, in fairness, return to us.135

(2) Savant’s several places are with you for 12 years, Alorna, Bicholim and Terekhol. They should be given back to him who also is in our employ. The Peshwa will see to it that you and Savant do not come in conflict.

(3) We have taken Jamboli mahal from Saunde. Three villages of this Mahal are with you, Parode, Talavade and Mule. They should be returned to us as parts of Jamboli Mahal.

(4) Krishna Savant is your protege. You should send him away and give shelter to no one like him.

(5) Mardangad is in our possession. All kinds of goods have to be shipped there. You should allow it to pass through Mormugao and Aguada seaways.

(6) You should aid us in war on sea and land.

(7) Our envoy should be at your court and your envoy at our court to promote mutual friendship.

You should accept these terms in the interest of mutual friendly relations.

Mahadaji Keshao Phadke probably left Goa for Poona on September 11, 1759.136 As the Viceroy Conde de Ega held that some of these points needed discussion with the Peshwa, Portuguese envoy Jack Filipe de Landrasey was sent to Poona. He took with him some medicines also to Poona. The medicine box carried the warning on its cover that if taken in excess, death may be caused. Landrasey was well received by the Peshwa. Viceroy Conde de Ega wrote in his letter dated January 29, 1760 : “This envoy was treated very well by Nanasaheb. No one is allowed at the Peshwa’s court with footwear on, but Landrasey and his colleagues were admited to the court with their boots. The Peshwa appointed a team for talks and included Sadashivrao (Bhausaheb) among them. Landrasey made friends with him. Most of the talks pertained to the capture of Janjira of the Siddi on which Nanasaheb and Bhausaheb were very keen. They desire that we should take up the task. They want to take these forts merely as a matter of propriety. They are prepared to compensate us richly for this. I intend to regain our northern territory of Bassein from them through these parleys.”137 Landresey returned to Goa on January, 19, 1760.

On March 20, 1760 the Peshwa made a treaty with the Viceroy at Goa. Mahadaji Keshao Phadke and Vishnu Naik, Sardesai of Ponda represented the Peshwa. A Portuguese version of this treaty is published in Biker’s Tratados volume Ⅶ and the Marathi version is kept unpublished in Lisbon. One of the clauses says that there should be friendship between the Peshwa and the Portuguese and they should ally with each other and the Portuguese should not quarrel with any Europeans without the orders of the King of Portugal. If any other Europeans attack Mahratta posts where the Portuguese are employed, they have to fight them.” Another clause provides that the Portuguese will help the Peshwa to take Janjira

Raipuri and Kansa from the Siddi. It specified that 500 Portuguese soldiers and 100 officers would go to the aid of the Peshwa force for capturing these forts.

According to this treaty. Condi de Ega sent help to the Peshwa to capture Kansa (Padmadurg) and Danda-Rajpuri.138 Ramaji Mahadeo Barwe was the Commander of the Campaign of Danda-Rajpuri. Conde de Ega has written about this Sardar that his fortune favoured him more than his capacity.139 This campaign went on for several months. The Portuguese sent Joao Manuel de Ajambuja with some soldiers at the end of March 1760. Its object was not to engage in any battle but to reconnoitre the battlefied and make preparations for the invasion after the rains.140

The English from Bombay complained to Nanasaheb for having taken Portuguese help against the Siddi and in a letter dated April 15, 1760 gave the warning that if the Portuguese fired a cannonball on Siddi’s fort in aid of the Peshwa, the English would be compelled to go to the aid of the Siddi.141 In a letter sent by Nanasaheb to his envoy in Goa on April 27, 1760 says : “Kansa was to be captured in two days. But the English did not like that the Portuguese had given us help and they sent all material to the fort and our business was spoilt.”142 Nanasaheb wrote to the same effect to the Portuguese on April 26, 1760.143 In September 1760, the Viceroy sent Landrasey to Poona and had discussions again on the

Portuguese aid of land and sea forces being sent on the campaign of capturing Kansa and Danda- Rajpuri.144 After these talks, the Peshwa wrote to Conde de Ega on October 24, 1760 as follows : Landrasey and Vishnu Naik came and agreed to go on the invasion of Kansa and Danda-Rajpuri. So you may proceed to send army, navy and everything to Janjira and see to

it that we take the forts.” This letter and its Portuguese translation done on November 15, 1760 are in Biblioteca Nacional de Lisboa.

Complying with the request of the Peshwa, the Viceroy sent the second aid in the last week of February 1761 under the command of some big ships and 1,700 soliders. The English in Bombay openly helped the Siddi on the pretext that the Peshwa had taken the help of the Portuguese. They took possession of both the forts and flew their flags on them. When the Portuguese armada noticed this while anchoring in front of Danda-Rajpuri and Kansa, the armada returned to Goa. The Portuguese were acting only under pressure from the Peshwa. They got the necessary excuse of the English having taken possession of the forts to become inactive.

Later the great battle of Panipat was fought and the Peshwa had hardly the time to pay attention to this Siddi affair. Besides, Condes de Ega has said that since they had Bassein and Vijayadurga, they did not really need Kansa and Danda-Rajpuri.147 There is a letter written by Sardesai Vishnu Naik to the Secretary of the Goa Government in Biblioteca Nacional de Lisboa in which it is said : “The English have said that they would abide by what the Peshwa would say and gave in writing that the forts were in their possession. The Peshwa will demand their possession when he comes.” 148

Dr. Sardesai has said that the Peshwa army had captured Kansa alias Padmadurg on February 21, 1760.149 His basis for this statement is the letter of Jivaji Nanaji dated February 17, 1760 published in part 24 of the Peshwa daftar. But this letter only says, “Later Kansa is going to be attacked. It will fall in four or eight days.” From this it is obvious that Dr. Sardesai’s statement is baseless.

At this time the Government of Portugal thought that the Viceroy should live amicably and in peace with Savantvadi and Saunde and should not think of extending Portuguese territory. 150 He should not even accept the Bassein territory even if it could be had by negotiation. Only he should try to see that the Peshwa gives over Ponda to Saunde. The Viceroy was also informed that he should take care to see that the Armada of the Bhonsla did not grow, by a letter dated March 26, 1761. The suggestion was also made that he should not co-operate with the Peshwa to capture Kansa and Danda-Rajpuri.

The Bhonsla was making efforts with the King of Portugal to get back his forts and Mahals. There is a letter on this topic written by the Savant-Bhonsla to the King of Portugal on January 22, 1760 whose Marathi and Portuguese versions, the author had the opportunity of perusing in Lisbon in Arquivo Historico Ultramarino. This letter humbly begs of the King that Pernem, Sanquelim and Bicholim with forts and Terekhol with its fort be given back to him. Acting on the order of the King of Portugal, Vice-Rei Conde de Ega entered into a treaty with the Bhonsala-Savant on December 24, 1761 and gave back to him Pernem, Bicholim and Sanquelim. In this way the Portuguese made one more attempt to make friends with Savantvadi, but unsuccessfully.

NOTES

• (1) Pissurlencar, PM. Ⅴ, p. 67.

• (2) Pissurlencar, Assentos, Ⅴ, p. 643.

• (3) Epanaphora Indica, Parte Ⅱ, p. 11, 12.

• (4) Pissurlencar, ADP, p. 180.

• (5) Pissurlencar, PM. Ⅴ, p. 67.

• (6) Epanaphora Indica, Parte Ⅱ, p. 8.

• (7) Pissurlencar, PM. Ⅴ. p. 64.

• (8) Pissurlencar, Assentos Ⅴ. p. 637.

• (9) Jose Freire Monteiro, Noticia da Viagem que fez segunda vez as Estado da India O lllustrissimo e Excellentisso Sr. Marquez de Lourical, p. 3; Teixeira de Aragao, Descripcao das moedas, Vol. Ⅲ, p. 297n.

• (10) Letter of Marquez de Tavora dated January, 1, 1751. (Goa Archives : CO 39 fl.).

• (11) Pissurlencar, PMV, p. 77, 78.

• (12) Ibid, p. 77.

• (13) J. Biker, Tratados, Ⅵ, p. 220.

• (14) Goa Archives : Translations of Marathi letters in Portuguese No. 545.

• (15) Goa Archives : Marathi letters etc.

• (16) Goa Archives : MR 111 B, fls. 939 : “… Se VEX” pertender empreza de Bacaim me pode avizar por sua carta sobre que terey firto as dilligencias necessarias de minha parte occultamente…”

• (17) Goa Archives : Ibid, p. 940-941.

• (18) Goa Archives : MR 111 B, fl. 953 There is an account about the death of Sambhaji Angria in Arquivo Historico Ultramarino, Lisboa in which it is said that in December 1741 Sambhaji captured a French ship which had left the Goa bay. Two Portuguese Padres were on board the ship. Both of them were arrested so they were present at the death of Sambhaji. His eldest wife, three junior wives and six mistresses burnt themselves with his dead body.” (Arquivo das Colonias, Lisboa, 1917).

• (19) Viceroy’s letter dated February 12, 1742 (Goa Archives : MR 111 B, fls. 953-954) : “O Marata tem ja huma armada de quatro pallas, huma galia, e cinco. centa galvetas.”

• (20) Goa Archives : Portuguese translations of Marathi letters, No. 334.

• (21) Ibid, No. 333.

• (22) Goa Archives, Pissurlencar, PM, Ⅴ. p. 79-80 Portuguese translations of Marathi letters No. 532.

• (23) In a Portuguese letter it is said that there were 2,000 horsemen and some footmen.

• (24) Goa Archives : Portuguese translation of Marathi letters.

• (25) Relacao das victorias alcancadas na India contra o inimigo Marata sendo Vice-Rey daquelle estado… D. Luis Carlos Ignacio Xavier de Menezes, 1743, p. 8. In this rare book it is said that on May 10, 1742, the Mahrattas attacked Salcete and recovered the arrears of taxes and took possession of Sanguem and Ponda forts.

• (26) The following information is found in the letter of Subedar Krishnarao Gurkar, Saunde’s Subedar of Ponda : “Sonaji Tambat came with letters to Naropant from Chhatrapati Shahu, Chhatrapati Sambhaji and Nanasaheb Peshwa asking for handing over of Mardangad from Annaji Prabhu who said that he must get a letter from Saunde and further said that he had orders to hand it over to General Kalappa. So for two months matters were delayed. Naropant died in the meanwhile. Ismailkhan was told that Mardangad should be given to Kalappa as per order of Saunde. (This letter in Marathi was translated in Portuguese on 6, April 1751).

• (27) Manuel Soares Velho’s letter dated 2, July 1742 (BNL. Ms. 465).

• (28) Relacao e verdadeiras noticias das ultimas accoens militares ordenadas pelo … Dr. Luis de Menezes, Marquez de Lourical, 1747.

• (29) Relacao das vitorias alcancadas na India contra o inimigo Marata, p. 13. Chhatrapati Sambhaji of Kolhapur did not like that Saunde took possession of Ponda Panchmahal with the help of the Portuguese. In a letter written to the Bhonsla the Chhatrapati says, “When vatandars like you were in our employ, it is not proper that Kannadas should keep places in our State.” (Gujir, History of the Karvir Chhatrapati House, Part Ⅱ, p. 110).

• (30) Goa Daftar : CO 30, fls. 44v.

• (31) Goa Daftar : MR, 114, fls. 48.

• (32) Goa Daftar : MR, 117, fl. 11.

• (33) BPE, Cartas da Asia as Conde de Unhao, De Pedro Vicente Vidal, Bombaim 24, November 1744 (cod CXX/2-2 fl. 220).

• (34) AHU, Ms. 448, Cons. Ultramarino fls. 7v.-8 : Os povos da Provincia do Norte estao suspirando, que nos o livremos do jugo que padecem … Eu pendindome que os livre daquella vexacao…”.

• (35) AHV. Ms. 448, Cons. Ultr. fls. 72v.; 91-91v.

• (36) BUC. Ms. 148, fls. 28.

• (37) Pissurlencar, PM, Ⅵ, p. 5.

• (38) Goa Archives : Translations of Marathi papers No. 464, 2382.

• (39) BNL. Caixa 13, No. 3, Sucessos da India desde Janeiro de 1749, ate Janeiro de 1750, fls. 46v. (40) BNL. Ms. 419, relacao.

• (41) Pissurlencar Assentos Ⅴ, p. 658 (Viceroy’s letter dated 2, November 1746).

• (42) ‘Lagartos’ and ‘Petardos’ are the two Portuguese words that occur in the text of the treaty between Savantvadi and Goa made on 11, September 1741. One Portuguese account says, the Portuguese used Petardos for the first time in the battle with the Bhonsla who had no idea at all about it. It was never used before on this side. People regard it as some kind of

magic. (Relacao da Conquista das pracas de Alorna, e Bicholim, Avaro e Morley e Satarem pello lllustrissimo e Excellentisso Marquez de Castello Novo Vice-Rey e Capitao General da India).

• (43) Epanaphora, Ⅱ, p. 51. Although the wording in local language (malingua do Pays) appears in this volume it is with reference to Marathi. All declarations of the Portuguese in new conquistas were translated in Marathi from Portuguese.
• (44) In these days Marathas and Maratha Vanis were socially one. There were inter-dinners and inter-marriages were in vogue : (In old Portuguese writings the Marathas Vanis were referred to as Chadde Vanis. As many respectable families of the Vaishya Samaj stayed in Portuguese territories of Bardez and Goa, Bhagoon Kamat Vagh suggested to the Viceroy that with their help, Satroji Rane should be admitted to a common caste dinner. Some important documents connected with this subject are in Goa Archives and the author has mentioned them in Assentos do Conselho do estado Part Ⅴ pages 661-662. Also see in Bharatmitra for January 1941, Pissurlencar’s article, Satroji Ranyacha Panktipawana Vidhi and another article entitled A Proposito de alguns vocabulos Luso-Indianos in Boletim do Instituto Vasco da Gama. A contemporary account of this affair is found in Epanaphora Indica Part Ⅱ (p. 64) published in 1747 and Annual Indico Historico, Part Ill published in 1754. In a book called Promtuario das Difficicoes Indicas written by a well-informed Goan padre and published in Lisbon in 1713, there is a clear and unequivocal reference to the fact of inter-dinners and inter-marriages between Marathas and Maratha Vanis.]
• (45) Epanaphora Parte Ⅱ p. 60. The agreement whereby the Portuguese gave assurances to Ranes and Desais of Sanquelim and Bicholim is registered in Livro das cartas e ordens as No. 35. The agreement is dated October 26, 1746. Since it is against law to grant religious liberty to Hindus in a Portuguese State, the Viceroy consulted the Christian Religious head when he said that Ranes and Desais were not conquered; they only sought the shelter of the Portuguese Government. (Que estes Dessais vinham voluntariamente render a sua obediencia ao Estado; e assim nam tinha este sobre elles o direito de conquista.”— Epanaphora Indica, Parte Ⅱ, p. 60.

• Epanaphora, Ⅱ, p. 62.

• (46) Pissurlencar, Assentos Ⅴ, 662, 663.

• (47) Epanaphora, Parte Ⅲ p. 27.

• (48) Following information is found in a letter written by the Sar Subedar of Ponda, appointed by the Prince of Saunde in 1751 to the Goa Government : the Portuguese and Saunde marched against Bhonsla and asked him to deliver the fort of Redi to them and hoist the Portuguese flag on it. It was promised to be returned, later Ramchandra Savant came to demand its return when the Saunde prince told him that he could only take it but for its return, the permission of Portugal would be necessary. We achieved an object diplomatically. Marquez de Alorna did not return Redi and Marquez de Tavora would also did not return it. (Goa Archives : Marathi Documents).

• (49) Goa Archives : Marathi Documents.

• (50) Portuguese : armas reais means nyal insiguia.

• (51) Aitihasik Patravyavahar p. 41.

• (52) Jose Freire Monteiro; Epanaphora Indica, Part Ⅳ page 4 : “ … cada dia repetiam os avizos por outras vias diferents, e ate alguns dos regulos, que eram, obrigados a seguir o exercito inemigo, nos exhortavam a prevencam.” The gist of this is : We were receiving messages from various sources. Some of those who were under obligation to march with the enemy army also gave us cautions.

• (53) Goa Archives : Marathi Documents, No. 2340. CONTENTS(54) Goa Archives : Marathi Documents No. 2416.

• (55) Goa Archives : Portuguese translations of Marathi letters No. 540 Epanaphora Indica, Parte Ⅵ. It is said that on March 21, the forces under Sadashiv Rao departed after leaving the fort of Supem.

• (56) Goa Archives : MR 120, fls. 43-46.

• (57) Viceroy’s letter dated December 30, 1747 (Pissurlencar, P. M. Ⅵ p. 14-15); Epanaphora, Ⅵ prefacio, BNL. Sucessos da India.

• (58) Goa Archives : Marathi Documents No. 2041.

• (59) Epanaphora, parte Ⅵ, A quem ler.

• (60) Historical Correspondence, p. 74. Epanaphora, Ⅳ, p. 30-31.]”

• (61) Goa Archives : MR 121 A, fls. 225-238; Pissurlencar, PM Ⅵ p. 17.

• (62) Viceroy’s letter dated 27, December 1747. (Assentos Ⅴ, p. 665); State Councils Memorandum of May 14, 1747. (Assentos Ⅴ, p. 598); Historical Correspondence, p. 40 * Epanaphora, Ⅳ, p. 2.

• (63) Assentos Ⅴ, p. 665; Epanaphora Ⅳ, p. 3, 4.

• (64) Goa Archives : RV 11, fls. 65v-66; RI. 14, fls. 6.

• (65) A. Galleti, the Dutch in Malabar, Madras, 1191, p. 17.

• (66) Epanaphora, Ⅴ, p. 73.

• (67) Goa Archives : Marathi Documents No. 2908.

• (68) Viceroy’s letter to Chhatrapati Sambhaji dated March 28, 1749 (Assentos Ⅴ, p. 683-684).

• (69) Epanaphora, Ⅴ, p. 29, 30.

• (70) Epanaphora, Ⅲ, p. 1; Assentos Ⅴ, p. 681n.

• (71) P. K. Gode, Studies in the history of Angrias, in the New Indian Antiquasy.

• (72) Goa Archives : Marathi Documents.

• (73) Peshwa Daftar, part 28, p. 200. “Bhagwantrao and Savant have taken Mudagad. They will proceed to Masure. (74) Viceroy’s letter dated January 23, 1750 (Assentos Ⅴ, p. 685).

• (75) Epanaphora, Ⅵ, p. 63-65.

• (76) Epanaphora Ⅵ, p. 11; Ⅴ, p. 37; Assentos Ⅴ, p. 671.

• (77) Portuguese word musos means wall.

• (78) Portuguese word passos means footway in a creek.

• (79) Goa Archives : Marathi Documents.

• (80) Epanaphora, Ⅳ, p. 97-99.

• (81) Goa Archives : CO 35 (Marquez de Alorna’s letter dated July 22, 1774).

• (82) Epanaphora Ⅳ, p. 100.

• (83) Epanaphora Ⅴ, p. 31. Goa Archives : RV 12, fls. 147-148; RI. 14, fl. 51.

• (84) Goa Archives.

• (85) Goa Archives : RV. 13 fl. 12v.

• (86) Goa Archives : RV 12 fls. 219v . : “VM. deve por toda a oposicao possivel persuadindo ao dito Xau e aos seus Ministros o perigo que corre fazerse Nana tao poderozo”.

• (87) Peshwa Daftar : Part 26, No. 23.

• (88) Annal Indico-Lusitano, p. 88.

• (89) Ibid, p. 13 * VG. Hatalnar, Relations between the French and the Marattas, Ch. Ⅺ.

• (90) Goa Governor’s letter dated January 23, 1757 (Goa Archives : MR 129 fl. 422).]

• (91) Annal Indico Lusitano, p. 15. * Letter of Marquez de Tavora dated March 26, 1757. (AHV. India, Papeis avulsos, maco No. 1).

• (92) Felix Feliciano da Fonseca, Relacao dos felicissimos sucessos obrados na India Oriental em o Vice-Reinado Marquez de Tavora, Lisboa. 1753.

• (93) Annal Indico-Historico, p. 89.

• (94) Peshwa Daftar, part 34, p. 50-52 “After ascertaining that they were spies from Goa Galbav of Bassein and Duma Koli of Agashi were produced and they admitted their quilt. There was one padre who was went to Bombay and Galbav and Duma were beheaded. Galbao is the same as Galvao.

• (95) Goa Archives : Portuguese translations of Marathi letters No. 2031. The letter written by Peshwa Nanasaheb to Conde de Alva bears 17 safar i.e. December 17, 1754 as the date. Portuguese translation of this letter was done on January 18, 1755.

• (96) Goa Archives : RI. 15, fls. 181v.

• (97) Biker, Tratados Ⅶ, p. 36. This treaty has a clause which says that the Viceroy has given help of 500 men but they should remain in Redy fort and protect it. This is a step to prevent the Peshwa from making war on Angria.

• (98) Sardesai, Balajirao, p. 178; Dr. S. N. Sen, Military system, p. 230.]

• (99) “A Armada que antes da perda referida reduzio a cinzas o sobretudo Angria” (Goa Archives : MR 129, fl. 283).

• (100) Colonel John Biddulph, the Pirates of Malabar p. 246 Biddulph has described gallivats as : Galleywats, or gallivats, were large rowing boats with two masts of forty to seventy tons and carrying four to eight guns.” (p. 92).

• (101) Pissurlencar, PM. Ⅴ, p. 84.

• (102) AHV.

• (103) Goa Archives : Marathi documents.

• (104) Goa Archives : MR 128 A, fl. 626.

• (105) Goa Archives : MR 135 fl. 549 : “…… e se continuar (Rudraji Dulopo) neste corso me parece que brevemente teremos outro Angria nesta costa).

• (106) Shridhar Abaji’s letter to Peshwa dated 24, February 1756 : “After the Angria is exterminated, Mardangad should be taken from the prince of Saunde by negotiation so that Portuguese posts could be taken over, if that is the desire of the Peshwa.”

• (107) Pissurlencar, ADP p. 261.

• (108) Goa Archives : MR. 123B.

• (109) Peshwa Daftar Part 28, 140 “Army was sent to Saunde. Tribute from there came to Rs. 8 lakhs. Some of it in cash and some on sureties. For arrears Mardangad was mortgaged to the Peshwa whose flag is flying there.”

• (110) Khare’s History of Ichalkaranji State.

• (111) Goa Archives : Marathi documents No. 248.

• (112) Joseph Rogers, Relacao dos sucessos … do … Don Luiz Mascarenhas, 1757, p. 10.

• (113) Goa Archives : Portuguese translations of Marathi letters No. 853.

• (114) Goa Archives : Marathi Documents.

• (115) Pissurlencar, O Enigma da Morte do Vice-Rei.

• (116) Ibid, p. 12. There is a manuscript in the India office. Library, London by Stevens, an Englishman in which he has given a description of the assault on Mardangad by the Portuguese. He was then in Goa : “On the 28th ultimo, the Portuguese opened a bomb battery before Ponda and threw two or three shells into the port … and at last the enemy sally’d out to the member of 80 or 100 on which the Portuguese threw down their arms and ran as fast as they could; many officers and soldiers were killed in the retreat, amongst which was the Viceroy … They retreated so precipitately that no one could give an account of the Viceroy; but two days after, they got liberty to examine the dead, where they wound him and brought him to their place to bury.” (Orme Ms. 32, p. 93-96). That Conde de Alva was killed by the Mahrattas is clearly stated in contemporary Marathi sources. Contemporary Portuguese sources also confirm this. (Joseph Roger Relacao dos Sucessos … do … Conde de Alva, Lisboa, 1757 and Jose da Silva Machado, Relacao dos sucessos da India, escrita em Goa a 31 de Janeiro de 1759. Bispo de Halicarnasso’s Systema Marcial Asiatico, a manuscript of 1772.

• (117) Memorias de Fr. Joao de S. Joseph Queiroz, Bispo do Graopara. Com uma extensa introducao e notas illustrativos por Camillo Castello-Branco (Porto, 1668), p. 167n.

• (118) Peshwa Daftar, part 16 No. 95, p. 75.

• (119) Goa Archives : Marathi Documents.

• (120) Pissurlencar, ADP, p. 254-262.

• (121) Ibid, p. 258-259.

• (122) Goa Archives : MR 130A.

• (123) Biker, Tratados, Ⅶ p. 50.

• (124) AHV. Livro de pazes No. 3, fl. 76.

• (125) Goa Archives : Papeis avulsos.

• (126) Goa Archives : Rl 15, fls. 181v.

• (127) Goa Archives : MR 129, fl. 422.

• (128) Peshwa Daftar : Part 24, p. 22.

• (129) Biker, Tratados Ⅶ, p. 43-44.

• (130) Biker, Tratados Ⅶ, p. 144.

• (131) Viceroy’s letter to the King of Portugal dated December 13, 1760 (Tratados Ⅶ, p. 266).

• (132) Viceroy’s letter dated 30, January 1760 : “esta resolucao, alheia interamento do costume da Nacao Portuguesa na Asia. A extremidade em que me via me estava persuadido que se fazia preciso ceder de algum modo da antiga altivez…” (AHV. Ms. 446).

• (133) AHV. Livro de pazes No. 3.

• (134) Iftdai. lbdatai : Beginning.

• (135) The Peshwa wrote to lsmailkhan on the 9th of Rabilakhar it was said that Rs. 2,40,000 which was really due to the Peshwa was not sent till then and it was improper. Ismailkhan was requested to ask the Governor to send the sum immediately.

• (136) Biker, Tratados Ⅶ, p. 47.

• (137) Viceroy’s letter dated 29, Janary 1760 (AHV., Ms. 446, fls. 97-101).

• (138) Peshwa Daftar, part 24, p. 267.

• (139) Biker, Tratados Ⅶ, p. 240 : “Ramajipant Borvo he o cabo maratha, que se acha comandando as suas tropas, este, tendo subido aquelle Iugar mais por fortuna que por merecimentos”.

• (140) Biker, Tratados Ⅶ, p. 182.

• (141) Ibid, p. 195.

• (142) Ibid, p. 196.

• (143) Goa Archives : Marathi documents.

• (144) Biker Ⅶ, p. 144.

• (145) lbid, p. 231.

• (146) lbid, p. 247.

• (147) Viceroy’s letter dated January 12, 1762. C. Soares, (Documentos comprovativos do Bosquejo das Possessoes Portuguezas no Oriente, t. Ⅲ, p. 119.

• (148) Biker Ⅶ, p. 245.

• (149) Sardesai, Marathi Riyasat-Peshwa Balajirao, p. 124 (1953).

  • In 1781-82 the Peshwa made an agreement with the French to get assistance from them to capture Rajpuri fort from the Siddi. (Khare collection of historical documents, part 14, p. 7629).

• (150) Bisker, Ⅶ, p. 272-281.