Having gained the Konkan territory from the Moghul Emperor as a jagir for Chhatrapati Shahu, the Mahrattas considered it a rightful and legitimate act to recover tribute from the Portuguese also. Actually the Moghul Emperor never had any authority over this territory. But the powerful have always dictated to the weak. Vice-rei Marquez de Alorna said that since Chhatrapati Shahu of Satara and Chhatrapati Sambhaji of Kolhapur had the Mahratta Kingdom divided between them and the Konkan passed to Sambhaji, the Mahrattas expected a tribute from Goa also. But this position was never accepted by the Portuguese, says the Viceroy, and so they did not pay the tribute.1
When Shahu returned from the Moghul Court, he informed the Portuguese that he had gained the territory of Konkan as a jagir from the Emperor of Delhi.2 His first Peshwa, Balaji Vishwanath, brought to Satara the sanads of the sardeshmukhi rights from the Moghul Court in 1719.3In those days Conde de Ericeira was in charge of Portuguese India at Goa. He said that had Chhatrapati Shahu been more circumspect4he would have taken possession of the whole of the Konkan as he conquered Kalyan and Bhimdi.5 But instead of paying attention to increasing his military power he made rapid progress in consumption of alcohol and so was not likely to make use of his great power. Had he the will to do so, the Conde said, he could have raised as big an army as he wanted.
In a contemporary Portuguese report the following description of Kalyan when Shahu took it appears :6 “This town is really a fortress. There are twelve good towers and a deep moat.” Ramchandra Mahadeo Chaskar took possession of Kalyan in 1719. The Portuguese called it Galian. Portuguese records show that Kalyan was the base of operations for the repeated Mahratta raids on the Bassein territory of the Portuguese.7 At least during the earlier raids, the planning and direction was in the hands of this Ramchandrapant8 This is supported also by the Chronicle of Salçette.
A Portuguese report on the conflict between the Mahrattas and the Portuguese in 1737 states :9
After Kalyan was captured by the Mahrattas they stationed a big force there and their general demanded of the General of Bassein the sardeshmukhi dues. But the General replied that the right that the Mahrattas had secured applied only to the Moghul territory and had nothing to do with Portuguese possessions.
Bajirao Ⅰ and the Portuguese came in contact for the first time at the end of 1721 when the English and the Portuguese had encircled Kolaba fort.
The Viceroy informed the King of Portugal by a letler dated 8 January 171810 that Kanhoji Angria was a very powerful and insolent enemy of the Portuguese who was the main cause of their Cheul trade becoming almost extinct. In those days it became impossible for Portuguese trading ships to ply in the northen sea without a permit from Angria and without paying his levy. He used to collect seven lakh rupees a year from the villages on the Bassein territory coast.11 In an account in Portuguese published in Lisbon in 1715, a writer compared Kanhoji to the notorious Barbaroxa.12
The Portuguese attempted to capture Angria dead or alive in November 1720 by secretly sending a large squadron of warships and an army against him. But the plan miscarried and only 13 of the 65 ships heading towards Kolaba reached there in time.13 The Portuguese suffered greatly at the hands of Kanhoji. The English also looked upon him as their inveterate enemy. So the English and the Portuguese joined forces and marched on Kolaba. The Angria tried hard to prevent this combination. On 7 August 1721, he sent a letter to the Portuguese general at Bassein with a faithful servant, Syed Abdul Razak. In this letter he wrote that he had a force of 20,000 soldiers with him and that many more from the armies of his relatives would join him.14 Even Chhatrapati Shahu, like the English and the Portuguese, wanted to curb Kanhoji’s growing power. Chhatrapati Sambhaji of Kolhapur had even tried, with Portuguese aid, to capture Kanhoji’s forts in 1716.
In a manuscript entitled, “An account of the period from the end of the region of Viceroy Vasco Fernandes Cezar till the end of 1738 in India” in the Biblioteca Naçional da Lisboa, it is recorded that, when the Portuguese and the English marched on Kolaba fort, Ramchandrapant, the Governor of Kalyan, and Damaji Krishna, the Governor of Bhimdi, went to Koyna and met the Captain of Sabaho and suggested to him, on behalf of Chhatrapati Shahu, that the Portuguese and Shahu’s forces should join hands to exterminate Kanhoji and share his territory. But the Portuguese did not want a powerful neighbour like Chhatrapati Shahu and did not entertain the proposal.15
Later, Kanhoji became a tributary of Shahu and brought Bajirao Peshwa to his aid. On 30 December 1720, Bajirao stationed 7,000 cavalry at Alibag for the protection of the town.16 On 1 January 1720 Bajirao informed the Portuguese that he was the Prime Minister of Chhatrapati Shahu and that in that capacity he was in Alibag to get Kanhoji Angria to acknowledge the paramountcy of the Chhatrapati to which Kanhoji had agreed. He would, therefore, thereafter help Kanhoji. He also said that, for the protection of Kanhoji, he was ready to make war or peace with the Portuguese, whatever was necessary. If peace was acceptable to them, their friendship would be accepted. Knowing that he would be helpless before the Mahratta forces, the Viceroy agreed to enter into a treaty.
On 3 January talks commenced. The next day Bajirao sent his representative, Mahadaji Krishna, on a Portuguese ship and on 9 January a treaty of friendship between Bajirao Pandit and the Portuguese was concluded at Varsoli.
Vice-Rei Conde de Ericeira wrote in 1720 : “Kanhoji became powerful because of negligence on the part of the Portuguese. In the days of Caitano Melo de Castro (October 1702 to October 1707) the Angria had only eight or ten armed ships and he used to live at Versova which was in Portuguese territory.”17 In 1721, Kanhoji’s fleet consisted of 6 palas with 16 to 18 cannons fitted on them, 30 galvetas and 6,000 sailors.18 The Viceroy further says.
Kanhoji has now become so inflated that he openly brags about easily capturing the Portuguese-owned Cheul and Karanja. But he has eyes on Goa. Thirty years ago he was a poor and humble nonentity. But within ten years, by his many manoeuvres, he has become the owner of Suvarnadurg and 22 forts are under his control. An ex-Governor of the Portuguese who was sailing from Cheul to Bassein in a pala was attacked by Kanhoji on the seas, captured and ignominiously killed. Twenty-six Portuguese made captive by him were taken to Kolaba and beheaded.19 The name of the said Portuguese Governor was Gaspar Aranho de Lencastri.
In 1722, a treaty of friendship between the Portuguese and the Mahrattas was concluded but it did not last long. On 26, November 1723, at 9 a.m. Pilaji Jadhaorao, at the head of 40,000 horsemen, attacked Bassein territory on the pretext that it was part of the Mahratta State20 and marched as far as Gokhirve, near Bassein. By way of retaliation, the Portuguese plundered a number of villages in Mahratta territory. On 6, December 1723, Bajirao sent a letter to the General at Bassein, Luiz de Melo Castro, saying :
If it is your desire that there should be friendly relations between us, release the peasants of Taloja that you have detained and there should be no failure to do so. If you are out to fight, say so frankly so that I can inform my forces accordingly. if you want peace, make it up with Pilaji Jadhao and send a trustworthy person from your side as envoy.21
After receipt of this letter, the Portuguese made peace with Bajirao on 10 January 1724 by the treaty of Varsoli. It was concluded in a village called Kambe. The Mahrattas were represented by Ramchandra pant, Pilaji Jadhav and Dayalji Somavanshi and the Portuguese by Captain Jose Pereira de Vascocelos.22 On Mahratta insistence, a clause was included in the treaty to the effect that till May of that year (1724), the Portuguese would send a competent representative to Satara to confirm the treaty and that, till then, the Mahrattas would not cause any disturbance in Portuguese territory.
The Portuguese understood the inward intent of this clause. The statesmen in Goa conjectured that it was an attempt on the part of Bajirao to collect Sardeshmukhi or some fixed tribute for Bassein from the Portuguese and they therefore decided not to send any envoy to Shahu at Satara.23 That Bajirao was pressing for such an envoy, reinforcing his pressure with presents to the General at Bassein is apparent from the Peshwa’s letter dated 14 November 1724.24
Siddi Yakut Khan swooped on Kolaba with twelve palas, two frigates and a hundred other armed ships in 1724. But Kanhoji bought him off with plenty of money and made peace with him. The same year, however, Kanhoji entered into a pact with Shahu to capture the fort of Rairi from the Siddi and Chhatrapati Shahu sent 500 select cavalry to Angria’s help for this purpose. The Siddi got scent of this and made perfect preparations to defend the fort and the Mahrattas were compelled to abondon the project for some time.25 Ten years later Rairi i.e. Raigad was returned to the Mahrattas by the Siddi.
Among the Portuguese statesmens, Andre Ribeiro Coutinho, the officer at Bassein, counselled the Viceroy at Goa on 5 December 1728, that the Portuguese would not be able to withstand the powerful Mahrattas with their small army. It was advisable, therefore, he said. that the General of Bassein should make a small gift of Rs. 2,500 every year to the Chhatrapati, his Minister or some favourite of the Mahratta king and avoid the damage that the Portuguese had to suffer every year from Mahratta depradations in Daman territory.26 The Portuguese used to pay gavkhandi to the Chauthiya Raja to avoid his plundering in Portuguese territory. He used to collect about 2,000 asurpis from Daman as gavkhandi and the Mahrattas knew it.
Though a treaty was concluded between the Portuguese and the Mahrattas on 10 January 1724, the Portuguese feared that the Mahrattas were intent on invading Bassein territory to recover tribute. This fear was not unfounded. Only six miles from Kalyan, near the fort of Saivan, Ramchandra pant had already encamped but matters did not proceed further.
In May 1728, Pilaji Jadhavrao plundered two Portuguese villages in the vicinity of Daman.27 In retaliation, the General of Bassein attacked Kalyan in August and resorted to arson.28 The Viceroy wrote that, as a result of this assault on Kalyan, Bajirao came down and made a treaty at Bassein, but this treaty is untracable. In 1728, Ramchandra Chaskar died and his brother Krishnaji Mahadeo was appointed Subedar of Kalyan.
In 1729, Kanhoji Angria died.29 That he probably died of wounds is suggested by the fact that, in the Viceroy’s letter dated 14 July 1729 to the General of Bassein, the following reference is found :30
Se o Angria morreo faru toda a dilligencia possivel para mover os animos dos Capitaves das praças para que se sublevem e ajudara, e prometera ajudar aos que tal fizerem; se inao morreo e sarou me avisará com toda a brevidade. [If Angria is dead, his fort captains should rebel and for this purpose you should exert and give the prospective rebels all help or assurance thereof. But if he is not dead and if his wound had healed, you should inform me immediately accordingly.]
No reply to this letter is to be found in the Goa Archives. The date of Kanhoji’s death is also not mentioned in any of the letters there. In a manuscript in the Biblioteca Naçional da Lisboa the date 30 June 1729 (new style) is given as the date of his death31 and Dr. Surendranath Sen has accepted this,32 but it does not corroborate the date given in the Viceroy’s letter dated 14 July 1729 mentioned earlier. Even the Marathi sources mention that Kanhoji died on 14 July 1729.33 A letter of the Goa Governor dated 30 August 1729 mentions that those Portuguese who were the Angraia’s captives were released on the day of his death.34
In May 1730, the Mahrattas invaded Bassein territory.35 Had the Bombay English not sent 700 soldiers to the aid of the Portuguese, Salçette island would have fallen to the Mahrattas.36 On this occasion the Portuguese Viceroy had requested help in men and ammunition from the French Governor at Pondichery also.37 In this war, the Portuguese strategy was to resort to arson in Mahratta territory, capture women and children and baptise them. The Viceroy thought this would deter the enemy and he would come to terms. On 20 March 1731, the Viceroy informed the King of Portugal that he had captured many women and children and had threatened to turn them into Christians because the Mahrattas considered this as most deplorable. But in his letter dated 4 April 1731, he had written to the chief executive of Bassein that the captured women should not be let out and only the canard should be spread that they had been made over to Pae de Christaos, a Catholic religious authority, for being converted. The children were also to be given in charge of that authority but they were not to be baptised until further orders were passed.
The Mahrattas started negotiations for a treaty in July. Bajirao sent his envoy to Goa with a letter requesting the Viceroy to enter into a treaty of friendship. Before that, Pilaji Jadhaorao had taken the Portuguese post of Kambe on 24 May 1731.38 In a letter written to the King of Portugal the Viceroy said :
The enemy has several times asked us for a treaty. The reason for this is not that he is afraid of us. He has other difficulties of his own which do not permit him to descend into the Konkan from the Deccan plateau. The Mahrattas are so powerful that they not only fight the Moghul but have made him restless. So unless God’s grace is on us, the Mahrattas will seriously threaten Bassein. In their negotiations for a treaty they never give up two conditions : one is that we should pay them the same tribute that we have been paying the Chauthiya Raja and Koli Raja, and the other is that we must allow the Hindus in Portuguese territory to build temples.
Bajirao was finally prevailed upon to give up these two conditions and on 10 February 1732, through Robert Coevan, Governor of Bombay, a treaty between the Mahrattas and the Portuguese was signed. While the negotiations for the treaty were in progress, Bajirao himself had encamped at Kalyan.39 What is notworthy is that Robert Coevan has placed on record that, through a trustworthy person, he inspired the Subedar of Kalyan to seek this treaty and that otherwise, the Mahrattas did not care for it. After it was signed, Krishnaji Mahadeo was relieved of the office of Subedar. A Portuguese letter says that Krishnaji Mahadeo was tired of Bajirao and sought employment with the Moghul.40 Krishnaji was considered a friend of the Portuguese in Bassein. According to the Viceroy, Conde de Sandomela, the invasion of Bassein in 1730 was largely the result of the efforts of Ganesh Naik.41
A member of this Naik family (Anzurkar) was arrested by the authorities of the Inquisition in Bassein and despatched to Goa. While there, he embraced Catholism and was given a new name, Inacio de Santo Terej. He knew the Portuguese language. Viceroy Conde de Sandomela has said that he was a very cunning man and, having lived at his (the viceroy’s) house for a long time, he was even capable of forging a letter. Ganesh Naik incurred great favour with the Viceroy and one day fled, returning to north Konkan and getting reconverted to Hinduism. The Viceroy said that he became a great enemy of the Portuguese in later years.42 Some information about Ganesh Naik is available in a letter in the Peshwa Daftar written to the Peshwa43 by Krishnaji Ram from Bombay. There is a letter in the Goa Archives written by Antaji Raghunath Kavle to the Viceroy in 1731 in which he has said that, wherever he might be, he would always be at the service of the Viceroy.44 There is another letter written to the Viceroy by Pilaji Jadhav on 28 September 1731, in which he describes Antaji Raghunath as dishonest.
Although a treaty was concluded between the Portuguese and the Maharattas in 1732, Bajirao did not expect it to last long. He had therefore fixed 13 March 1733 as the date for an assault on Salçette. At the beginning of the rainy season in 1733, Bajirao opened a campaign against the Siddi but was not able to crush him as he had the help of the Bombay English.
The differences between the Siddi and the Mahrattas ended through mediation by the Portuguese. At the end of the first campaign against the Siddi, Bajirao had informed the Dewan of Rajkot at Chaul on 8 June 1733, that he would attack Janjira of the Siddi. In 1734, the Mahrattas forces again marched against the Siddi. With reference to this second campaign, the Portuguese Viceroy said in his letter to the Captain of Cheul on 5 November 1734 :45
I have received news that the Mahrattas have marched against the Siddi. Bajirao has written to say that Shahu has once again ordered him to attack the Siddi. But he is prepared to make up with him if he agrees to cooperate with him to fight the Angria. Even the English and the Portuguese must co-operate with him as against the Angria…… I think it is because it is not possible for the Mahrattas to capture the Siddi’s Janjira that they desire to take Angria’s forts. Although we benefit by the extermination of the Angria, it will be more harmful to us that the Mahrattas should take all ports on the coast. So, from our point of view it is desirable that the conflict between the Angria and the Mahrattas should be long extended. We must be cautious and not let the Mahrattas take the forts of the Angria. So, to all appearances, you should help Bajirao but take care to see that he does not destroy the Angria. I even suspect, that Bajirao has laid a trap to mislead the English and ourselves to ensure that we don’t help the Siddi and thus ease his task, of conquering the Siddi. In view of this, I warn you that, if the Siddi is cornered, you should give him the help he requires. Similarly, let the Angria know what Bajirao has written to us about him, taking care to ensure that Bajirao does not get scent of this.
The Academy of Sciences, Lisbon, has in its collection a letter written by the Vice-Rei Conde de Sandomele on 19 January 1734 to the King of Portugal in which he says :
At the beginning of the rains, the Mahrattas bought over a high officer of the Siddi’s fleet and, with his help, captured a number of forts. They thus secured even the Siddi’s warships. But they have handed them over to the Angria. So now the Angria has more than twelve palas and about forty galvetas. Angria is one of our neighbours who is a danger to our trade.46
At the end of November 1734, there arose a dispute between the Angria brothers, Sambhaji and Manaji. It seems from the letter the Viceroy wrote to Captain Caitano de Sousa Pereira on 13 December 1734 that his Captain of Cheul had a hand in instigating this fraternal quarrel.47 In fear of Sambhaji, Manaji took shelter with the Portuguese at Cheul. In this dispute, Bajirao who wanted a good port on the coast, sided with Manaji. Referring to this, Conde de Sandomele wrote that, in helping Manaji, Bajirao’s object was to exploit this opportunity for securing some good port of the Angrias and capturing the Kolaba fort itself.48
With the help of Bajirao, Manaji captured the Rajkot at Cheul on 12 June 1732.49 This port had been taken by Sambhaji Angria about a year earlier from Tajuddin Ali Khan, Dewan of Cheul. The Captain of Cheul, Caitano de Sousa Pereira, had plotted for this port to pass from Manaji to this Dewan. With this in view, the Portuguese took in their possession an old mosque which was situated between Cheul and Rajkot while Manaji was at Cheul. Manaji did not like this. He left his Cheul camp and went to Rajkot on 2 January 1735 and attacked the mosque in Portuguese possession. Khandoji Mankar, Shankaraji Keshao and other Sardars of the Peshwa helped Manaji. On behalf of Manaji, Bajirao wrote a letter of complaint to the Secretary of the Viceroy on 20 January 1735, which has been preserved in the Goa Archives. This Marathi letter states that the Viceroy had given Manaji a letter to the General of Bassein instructing him to cede some ground to the Mahrattas which letter was delivered to him. But far from doing so, the Captain of Cheul had launched an operation for the capture of the Rajkot at Cheul. In view of the friendship between the Portuguese and the Mahrattas, Bajirao urged this should be ended at once by the Viceroy’s order. However, he stated, if the Viceroy wanted this strife, the Captain of Cheul was serving well and in that case Bajirao also would act according to necessity. Bajirao concluded by saying that his envoy, Yesaji Rangaji, would negotiate further in this behalf. This50 envoy himself carried this letter of 20 January 1735.
The Portuguese desired that since Rajkot of Cheul was originally Tajuddin Ali Khan’s it should be restored to him. But Bajirao not only objected to this, but also he was not ready to allow its demolition. The Portuguese did not want war with the Peshwa, because they feared his power. In this connection the opinion of the Viceroy Joao de Saldanha de Gama’s opinion is noteworthy. In his letter dated 4 November 1730, he says, “Shahu’s army today is so big that if the Moghuls did not back us it will be difficult to resist it on land.” That Bajirao would invade Bassein was suggested to the Captain of Cheul, Caitan de Sousa Pereira, at the end of April 1735 by Lakshmibai Angria, widow of Kanhoji.50
A few days before the skrimish between the Mahrattas and the Portuguese near the Cheul mosque in January 1735, Bajirao wrote to the General of Bassein, in keeping with the terms of the treaty of 1732, that some space should be given in Bassein to the traders of Kalyan and Bhimdi to construct a store-house godown. Far from doing so, he used the derogatory term Negro in respect of Bajirao.51 In those days, the Portuguese generally referred to the Hindus as “gentios” (uneducated) or negros (blackmen)52 From a letter written by Vassudev Joshi, Subedar of Kalyan on 8th of Ramzan, it is clear how enraged the Mahrattas were against the Portuguese at that time.53 This must have happened a few days before January 22, 1736.54
Siddi Yakutkhan of Janjira wrote to the Viceroy on September 18, 1735 that Chhatrapati Shahu, in consonance with his long cherished desire to conquern the northern territory of the Portuguese, was about to send a big army and many Shenvis, Prabhus and such other Hindus from that area who were in league with him. Valentin de Gouveia, Chief of Stores at Bassein, also wrote in his letter dated 2, November 1734 that it was learnt from very reliable soures that Chhatrapati Shahu was proceeding to Raigad with a big army to have himself coronated. There was rivalry between the widow of Dabhade and Bajirao as to who should exterminate the Siddi. Valentin Gouveia further added that all of them expected to be finished after the Siddi was done away with.55
Taking stock of this situation, the Portuguese agreed to keep Rajkot with Manaji and have the mosque demolished.56 In a letter dated November 14, 1735, the Viceroy has said that Shahu had ordered Manaji to return Rajkot to Tajuddin Alikhan.57 Bajirao did not succeed in his object of keeping the Kolaba fort in his possession, because, the General of Bassein writes that Manaji himself was opposed to it.58 Bajirao only got Rajmachi and Kotia, both of which were hill forts. Bajirao defeated Sambhaji Angria and forced him to give Kolaba fort to Manaji. In April 1736, Siddi Sat attacked Manaji Angria Chimaji Appa, the Peshwa’s younger brother, defeated Siddi Sat at Kamarli, near Alibag. This ended the three-year campaign of the Mahrattas against the Siddi. As Bajirao was pre-occupied with the campaign against the Siddii, the Portuguese had an opportunity of building a castle at Thana. From 24 March 1733, Don Luiz Botelo was the General of Bassein. He quickly constructed the castle at Thana. On September 11, 1736, the Bombay English informed the Viceroy at Goa that Bajirao was making preparations to attack Thana and capture Salçette. The Viceroy informed Don Luiz Botelo about it in a letter dated 24 September 1736.
Lakshmibai Angria sent her Karbhari Bhanji Lakhmanji with a letter dated October 25, 1736 to see the Viceroy in Goa. What intrigue she was carrying on is not clear. She received only an oral reply from Goa.59 She probably informed Goa about Bajirao’s movements in Salçette and Bassein. Six months afterwards, on April 6, 1737, on Saturday at 11 p.m. the Mahrattas captured a water-tower in Thana creek and entered Salçette.60 On April 6 and 7, the Mahratta troops practically occupied the whole island. So the Portuguese had with them only Bandra, Versoa, Karanja or Uran and Bassein Castle. As the Bombay English sent help to the Portuguese at Bandra, it did not pass into Mahratta hands. At the time of the Mahratta invasion of Thana, the General of Bassein, Don Luiz Botelo was in Thana. From there he went to Karanja and thereafter to Bassein.
On April 12, 1737, the news of Mahratta assault on Bassein reached Goa. On the same day, the Viceroy Conde de Sandomele ordered the General of Bassein that he should protect Dharavi with all his might. The importance of Dharavi as bastion of Bassein was as well known to the Mahrattas as to the Portuguese. In a letter No. 27 in part 16 of Peshwa Daftar it is said, “Dharavi is the nose of Bassein.” On April 18, an army under Pedro de Melo was despatched to Bassein. The Viceroy dismissed General Don Luiz Botelo and appointed Antonio Cardim Froice in his place. He left Goa on May 18 and reached Bassein on May 23. Next day he took over from Botelo. A few days before Cardim reached Bassein, the Mahrattas had started building a fort on the Dongri Hill.
On May 26, 1737, Antonio Cardim attacked Dongri and turned out the Mahrattas from there. In his letter of May 28, 1737 he wrote, ‘I came to Bassein on May 23 and on May 26 I drove out the enemy from Dongri. I killed eighty of their men, exploded the fortress and beheaded their Captain.” Antonio Cardim fancied that the Mahrattas would give rest to their troops during the rains. According to the Portuguese, about 25,000 soldiers were engaged in this campaign and it was difficult for them to move from place to place during the rains. But the Mahrattas sent select battalions on Bassein fort from Bahadurpura on June 9, 1737 in the early hours and attacked the fortification between Reis Magus and San Goncalo towers. The Portuguese say that 4000 men led this attack which lasted for half an hour. A number of men were killed. Next day, the Portuguese found three wounded men and 32 ascending frames. The Portuguese Chronicler, Diogo da Costa says that only two dead and five wounded were the casualties from the Portuguese side.61
The Mahrattas led on attack on the Bassein fort for the second time on September, 15, 1737. It was Sunday. About 2000 soldiers sealed the fortification. The assault lasted for an hour and a half but it was repulsed. As the Portuguese have recorded, 2000 Mahrattas were killed and 500 were wounded.62 But from the Shakavali in the Peshwa Daftar No. 359 in part 22 only about 500 were killed and about 500 were wounded. After the battle was over, the Portuguese found at the base of the fortification 64 dead bodies and 44 scaling frames. Baji Bhivrao (Rethrekar) himself was wounded. The Portuguese sardar Pedro de Melo was also wounded. The Portuguese have written that several Mahratta Sardars fell in this battle.
The well-known historical research worker, Yeshwant Narsinha Kelkar has stated that the second attack of the Mahrattas on Bassein took place on July 8, 1737.63 It is true that in the Portuguese manuscript Relacao de Gerra and successao de India which the author has published, this date as of the first attack on Bassein has been mentioned, but Antonio Cardim himself in his letter dated August 29, 173764 says that the enemy led an assault on Bassein Castle at night on June 9 but it proved futile. In his letter dated March 5, 173865 he states that the Mahrattas had twice assaulted the Bassein fort. It is hardly necessary to say that Antonio Cardim’s dates are more trustworthy than those given by chroniclers. Besides, the Goa Archives also support the dates given by Antonio Cardim.66
Diogo de Costa who has written about the Bassein Campaign of the Mahrattas in his Relacao dos guerras de India speaks of only these two attacks of June 9, 1737 and September 15, 1737. A manuscript (1487) in the library of the University at Coimbra contains the same information.
After the Mahrattas were repulsed twice from Bassein Castle, they besieged Mahim, Kelva and Shirgaon fortresses in October. Antonio Cardim states that the Mahrattas would have captured these forts but because he sent timely help to them, the enemy had to evacuate. (December 28, 1737 and January 27, 1738). Cardim had turned out the Mahhrattas from Dongri i.e. Dharavi Hill on May 26, 1737., but on 30 November, 1737, 400 Hashams and 100 horsemen went up the top of the hill (aguada) and till February 1738, they established themselves there and fixed Cannons, thus obstructing the passage of ships in the fort of Bassein.
On 28, February 1738, Cardim once again attacked Dongri and routed the Mahrattas. In this skirmish, the Portuguese made captive 50 soldiers and their captain. The Portuguese found over 500 dead bodies of Mahrattas. Four Portuguese soldiers died and thirty were wounded on this occasion. One of them was a captain of footmen. Of the native soldiers of the Portuguese ten died and 20 were wounded. Cardim wrote that he reconquered the Dharavi fortress only with the help of 200 Portuguese soliders. Nearly were 400 Mahratta horsemen and 1000 footmen who had to witness this rout.68 On 9 March 1738, Chimaji attempted to take back Dongri hill from the Portuguese, but failed. He was very much hurt by this defeat.69 He wrote to Nanasaheb, his nephew, ‘Dharavi’s iron has entered my heart and God knows it. What could be done? Nothing at the moment. ‘Cardim in his letter, dated 5 March, 1738 said, “So far 12000 Mahrattas have died. Being numerous, they do not seem to be worried about it.”
The author has published the letters of Antonio Cardim and Pedro de Melo of December, 5. 1738 in Part Ⅴ of Assentos do Conselho do Estado. These letters reveal how difficult the position of the Portuguese forces, engaged in this Bassein Campaign was. Antonio Cardim was a great general. Being well informed about the military power of the Mahrattas he demanded of the Viceroy that more troops should be sent to Bassein. But he had neither troops nor money to raise them. So Antonio Cardim resigned the Generalship of Bassein Castle.
On October 17, 1738, the Viceroy convened a meeting of his councillors and presented a list of the troops that were there in the vicinity of Bassein at the beginning of September 1738.70 It appears from this document that there were 897 soldiers of whom 521 were Portuguese and 376 native. Subtracting those on the sick list, there were only 755 soldiers. Besides these, 900 soldiers were engaged in the Bassein campaign. Of them 190 were on the Bassein Coast, 411 at Dongri, 77 in Juvem, 144 at Mahim-Kelvem and 78 at Karanja-Uran.
From this authoritative information, it is clear that there were 3000 Mahrattas and under the command of Pilaji Jadhav, there were 7000 soldiers and 700 horsemen ready to go there. Such was the information of the Viceroy.
On 23 and 24 October 1738, troops from Portugal arrived in two ships. Among them were 478 Renoles but 145 of them were ill. So from Goa, it was possible to send only 480, men to Bassein. On November 1738, two frigates, three palas and three galvetas left Goa for Bassein with these troops on board. On April 2, Martial Pedro de Mello was appointed General of Bassein. On December 4, 1738 he went to attack Reis fort in Thana. On December 8, a cannon shot from the fort killed him. The Portuguese in Bassein received aid and supplies from sea from Goa and Daman. In order to stop this, Bajirao despatched in November 1738, 8000 horsemen and 10,000 footmen under the command of Shankarajipant. The Mahratta armies marched towards Daman, captured Khattalvada, Umbargaon, Nargol and Dahanu and carried away standing crops. A Portuguese chronicler says that the Mahrattas even plundered the grain godowns near the fortifications of Daman. After such exploits in the neighbourhood of Daman, the Mahratta armies returned to Agashi and Bhadrapur.71 The Portuguese had kept Pardi in their possession so far but gave it up under orders of their superiors. Captain Domingos de Souza was then there.
After the death of Pedro de Mello, the Captain of the Bassein fort, Joao Xavier Pereira Pinto kept on the fight until Martinho de Silveira de Menezes took over as the General of Bassein province on 8, January 1739. He bravely kept on the struggle against the Mahrattas. The next day, the Mahrattas entered Mahim. Under the command of Chimaji Appa, Pilaji Jadhav and Shankarjipant, 8000 horsemen arrived in Bassein town. A day previously, 6000 Hashams of the Mahrattas had come. This army encircled Mahim Fort. There were 14 elephants, several horses and 12 camels in the Mahratta army as stated by the Portuguese Captain of Mahim on January 10, 1739.73
In a statement made by leading persons in Mahim Fort describing the movements of the Mahrattas dated January 20, 1739 is available in Biblioteca Publica de Evora.74 The statement says, “The Mahrattas so furiously bombarded the fortifications through their 30 cannons that several breaches were caused. There are excellent foreign gunmen (Condestaveis) in the Mahratta army and they fling big boulders (morteiros) in the fort through their cannons. They were showering fire on the fort day and night. General Martinno de Silveira de Menezes sent a battalion from Bassein to aid Mahim. But in the face of the Mahratta firing, it took three days for it to enter the fort. This battalion consisted of only 50 Portuguese and 90 native soliders. The ammunition they brought with them was consumed within two days. This fort has been holding out for a year and ten months and it is not possible to hold out longer. During the seige, the Mahrattas lost heavily in men and Shankarajipant’s brother Madojipant and forty-four other leading Mahrattas were killed. Tonight the Mahrattas will explode the fort in a revengeful spirit for certain and therefore the Captain of the fort should open talks of peace, capitulate and save the lives of the people inside.”
The name of the Captain of Mahim was Antonio de Melo Pereira de Sousa. In deference to the statement of the inmates of the Fort, he opened surrender talks with Shankarajipant. Chimaji Appa was not then on the spot. The surrender deed was signed by the Captain and Shankaraji and the Mahrattas took possession of the fort on January 20, 1739. This treaty enjoins that in the name of Bajirao, the Portuguese should be allowed to depart with all their belongings but the minutes of the meeting of the Council of Ministers of the Viceroy held on March 1, 1739 record that all the soliders in Mahim were beheaded and the whole of the battalion that went from Bassein to the succour of Mahim was wholly chopped off by the Mahrattas.75 But in the letter from Martinho de Silveira dated February 18, 1739 it is stated that the enemy had kept all the Portuguese captives at Kalyan.76
After Mahim, the Mahrattas conquered Kelve and Shirgaon, two more Portuguese posts on January 21 and 22, 1739. Chimaji then proceeded with his army to Tarapore and laid siege to the fort. A Portuguese Chronicle says that Chimaji captured it on the seventh day but from a letter written by Chimaji himself, it appears that it was captured on 4 February 1739.77 The Portuguese chroniclers say that the Mahrattas had to sustain heavy damages in the fight for Tarapore. Baji Bhivrao Rethrekar died in action. The Portuguese Captain of Tarapore Luiz Veleso Machado also died while fighting. There were many Portuguese women in the fort who were made captive but Chimaji gave them very decent treatment, according to a Portuguese chronicler.78 (Chimaji Apa os tratou com toda a decencia) Another writer has recorded that Chimaji Appa played the role of a perfect gentelman with the widow of Captain Luis Velezo.79 A story is current that Chimaji respectfully treated the wife of the General of Bassein and it has found place in even poetical compositions. The root of that story could be traced to this Tarapore incident.
Under the command of Haripant, 4000 Hashams and 500 cavalry were despatched from Tarapore to capture Asheri, which fell to the Mahrattas without much effort on February 13 or 14. The Peshwa Shakavali says that Asheri was surrendered because the family of the Captain of Asheri were among the Tarapore Captives. Three days atter, on 17 February, Chimaji went with his army to Bhadrapur which the Portuguese pronounced as Madrapur. Portuguese Chroniclers have said that the Mahratta army consisted of 25000 horsemen, 40000 footmen, 4000 mine-exploders, 5000 camels, 50 elephants and innumerable Pindaris. The Mahrattas formed advance-guards despite the fire the Portuguese were pouring from the towers of the castle. This was executed with such speed and discipline that the Chief Portuguese Engineer, Don Adriano de Gonvil was altogether amazed. A Portuguese chronicler says that the innumerable people’s death from the cannonfire from the castle towers must be described as utter barbarism.80
About this time, orders were given by the Viceroy to the General of Bassein. Martinho de Silveira that he should surrender all the forts in Bassein territory except Daman, Bassein, Diu, Revdanda and Karanja (Uran). Accordingly, Pardi, Bandra, Versova and Dongri were given up for the Mahrattas to capture. On 20 February, they took possession of Versova. The Bombay English with Portuguese collaboration demolished Bandra fortifications on 5 April 1739. On 25 April, the Mahrattas captured Dongri. On 21 March, Manaji Angria had already taken possession of Karanja or Uran island. For the conquest of Uran, Manaji took 2000 men in his armada which comprised forty galvetas according to the description in Relacao de Guerra manuscript in Biblioteca Nacional de Lisboa. It was possible for the Portuguese to maintain the defence of Bassein after surrendering Dongri (Dharavi) but they did not have strength enough to defend Dongri. To the north of Bassein fort, the land side was free, but the Mahrattas had already established their sentinels there. All the three other sides were full of mud and sea water. Whatever was at all possible to be done to help Bassein was only by sea at grave risk.
In a meeting of the Councillors at Goa, one member expressed the opinion that even Bassein and Revdanda should be surrendered out of helplessness.81 In order to cut off all help from Goa to Bassein Salçete in Goa was invaded by Venkatrao Ghorpade under Bajirao’s orders on January 23, 1739. The Mahrattas occupied the whole of salçete except the two forts of Raitur and Mormugao. Dadajirao Bhave Nargundkar was Venkatrao’s colleague. On 5 March the Bhonsala Savant of Savantavadi invaded Bardez and captured it. The Portuguese kept with them only Aguada and Reis Magus. On March 1, 1739 the Mahrattas captured Ponda fort from the Prince of Saunde. This became a direct menace to Goa island.82 Under these circumstances, the Portuguese made a treaty of friendship with the Mahrattas on May 6, 1739 at Rai. One clause in the treaty provided for making over the Bassein Castle to the Mahrattas.
While these events were taking place in Goa, a severe battle was being fought in Bassein. On April 15, 1739, the General of Bassein, Martinho de Silveira, fell a victim to a bullet from the Mahrattas while reconnoitring from the tower, Reme Deos. His place was taken by Caitano de Souza Pereira who kept on the fight. On 17 April 1739 he wrote a letter to the Viceroy in which he has showered panegyrics on the military acumen of the Mahrattas. Another letter of his written on 17 August 1739 is also available which contains a detailed description of the battle of Bassein from April 17 to its fall on May 16. He says there were two lakh men engaged in the siege including soldiers and those behind them. During the last two
days alone over 10000 of them must have lost their lives. In the letter of 17 April, he said that over 50000 soldiers were going to lead an assault on the fortifications of the Castle.83 Inside the Bassein Castle, there were 1200 Hindus. Caitano de Sousa Pereira turned out 1000 of them with the consent of the Viceroy, because it was feared that they might rebel, besides, there was paucity of foodgrains.84
The author came across a copy of the letter that Chimaji Appa had sent to Chhatrapati Shahu, in Goa Archives. The whole of this letter is very important. Appasaheb writes, “The Portuguese fought courageously like true soldiers. For four and a half hours, the Portuguese showered fire on us. The Mahratta soldiers took in all this fire and bore it. It was the limit of forbearance. There was no such resistance before.” Because of the Mahratta assault in this manner, the situation inside the castle deteriorated very much on May 13 and 14. During the course of the day on May 13, the Mahrattas led eleven and on May 14 six severe attacks on San Sebastiao and Reme Deos towers. Between San Sebastiao and Cavaleiro towers, the explosions of mines by the Mahrattas had made a breach. Four thousand Mahrattas attempted to push through it. But the Portuguese fire made it futile. On May 15 and 16, Caitano de Sousa Pereira conferred with his leading subordinates and came to the conclusion that it was impossible to defend the fort longer and on 16th May, the Portuguese flew the white flag, indicating surrender and appeal for peace. Pereira appointed Pedro de Rego Barreto de Gama e Castro to carry on peace talks with Chimaji Appa and a treaty was made on 16 May 1739, between the Mahrattas and the Portuguese. On May 23, the Portuguese left the castle to the accompaniment of band music and Chimaji took possession of it. He had written to Gangaji Naik Anjurkar at the beginning of the campaign of Bassein that the Portuguese were not very affluent people; when starved they would come to terms. It happened exactly like that. They were starved on every front. Supplies from Goa and Daman stopped and they had no alternative left, but to surrender the castle.
In the Bassein battle, the Portuguese lost 500 Portuguese and 350 native soldiers. Besides, quite many of them were beheaded according to the manuscript, sucessos do India in Biblioteca Nacional de Lisboa. Reports of Cardim and Pereira show that 22000 Mahrattas lost their lives in this battle. Chhatrapati Shahu gave the same figure to Gordon. After the battle of Bassein only Diu, Daman and Revdanda remained with the Portuguese. This war went on for 25 months and a half. This Bassein campaign is an excellent illustration of the military strategy of the Mahrattas. The Portuguese have written about the valour of the Mahrattas that they exhibited in this campaign.
Viceroy Marquez de Alorna, in his letter written to the King of Portugal on 27 December 1745 says :86
“A ultima perda da Provincia do Norte nao so diminiun o Dominio e a renda do estado, mas tambem o credito e o respeito que nos tinha os vezinhos de que antes se nao fazia cazo, e nos erao, sumissos rebelarao-se contra nos e converterao-se em inimigos mais perigosos por estazem mais a porta, aproeitarao-se da nossa fraqueza para insultarnos, e intentarem expulsar -nos deste paiz, e ainda agora o Bonsulo nao perde de vista esta idea a nos suscita inimigos ao longe a procura contra nos a sua alianca .”.
The gist of this passage is that being compelled to give up their north Konkan territory, the Portuguese lost in power, prestige and revenue. The Asian people lost the confidence they had in the Portuguese and the respect they had for them. Their neighbours like Savant Bhonsle of Savantavadi and others who were afraid of them were busy making efforts to turn them out of India. People in Portugal were astonished to see that the Mahrattas observed the terms of the treaty loyally and well.87
Sashtichi Bakhar describes how the Portuguese resorted to religious persecution of the Hindus and it conforms to a great extent to what obtains in Portuguese sources. Like the Christianisation of Tiswadi, Salcete and Bardez in Goa, the Christianisation of Bassein was effected on one and the same principle. “Cuins regio, illius religio” is that principle. It means the people of a kingdom have the same religion that its ruler professes. In Goa Archives, there is a manuscript entitled ‘Provisoes a favour da Cristandade”. Its name previously was ‘Livero do Pai de Cristaos”. There are authoritative copies of all laws passed from time to time for the dissemination of Catholism among the people under Portuguese rule.88 They afford a clear idea of how the Portuguese persecuted non-Christians. As a matter of fact such laws were in vogue in Portugal for many years intended for the Jews and the Mussalmans. Later on laws on the same pattern were made for Hindus and Muslims in Goa and Bassein. Probably, people in Bassein had to suffer even more rigorous persecution than people in Goa did. The vatandar in that Province had to submit a report of his efforts for the spread of Christianity among Hindus and Muslims in their respective villages.89
There is a letter in Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo, Lisbon which was written by Anji Naik (Anjurkar?) to the King of Portugal from Bassein on December 18, 1549.90 From that letter and the Chronicle of Salcete and Bassein, the feelings of the Hindus in that territory can be guaged.91 The Inquisition was established in Goa in 1560. It was really meant for Jews and Christians and not for the Hindus. But Pope Gregory ⅩⅢ had promulgated a bull named incipit Antiqua indocrum improbitos and on that authority the Inqisition applied it to Hindus also in some respects.92 There is a manuscript called Repertorio Geral in Biblioteca Nacional de Lisboa in which are recorded the 3800 cases made by the Inquisition in Goa from 1565 to 1615; it is written by Joao Degaldo Figeira.93 Many Hindu names appear in it. It is true that Hindu offenders were not burnt alive.94 They were either whipped or transported. The transportation had often to be served in such distant lands as Mozambique in Africa. In 1774 the Goa Inquisition was abolished when one Babu Shenvai of Uskai (Bardez) was serving transportation sentence along with a number of Christian.95 The Goa Inquisition caught hold of orphans below 14 and baptised them from 1645.96 Even the Viceroy was incapable of acting against the Inquisition.97 It brought under its administration even pregnant Hindu widows. In a letter dated April 19, 1737 addressed to Maiz de Santo Officio, the Viceroy says that one reason why the Hindus in Bassein allied with the Mahrattas was their persecution by the Inquisition.98 The Viceroy has further said that the Captain of Salçette Joao de Souza Ferras had informed him that if the Hindus in Bassein were left free to follow their religious practices as they were in Diu, far from cooperating with the Mahrattas, they would have turned them out of Bassein and therefore the maiz should consider this point well and give him the right counsel.
Of course, the Inquisition authorities were wholly indifferent to the conciliatory gesture of the Viceroy and they refused to alter the traditional practices of the Inquisition. There was one more important reason why the Salcete-Bassein Hindus allied with the Mahrattas. The Portuguese had immensely oppressed the people by levying harshly cesses on the people and at least in the early stages exploited rigorously the labourers while erecting the castle at Thana. Great discontent prevailed in Salçete on this account and they helped the Mahrattas to establish themselves in Salcete.99 In a letter written by Siddi Yakut Khan it is stated that Chhatrapati Shahu aspired for many years to capture Bassein territory.100 Some historians take the view that Bajirao invaded Bassein in order to establish Mahrashtra Dharma. This view is supported by Sashtichi Bakhar and some contemporary Marathi documents. Damaji Gaikwad, Samsher Bahadur writes : The Portuguese persecuted Hindus. Therefore Appa Saheb invaded Bassein territory and captured one or two places. (Peshwa Daftar Part ⅩⅥ, p. 135). Amritrao Shankar Dinkarrao also congratulates Chimaji Appa for having conquered Bassein in the following words : “Since success has been achieved in Bassein, the establishment of Hindu raj will be carried out (by you)." (Peshwa Daftar, Part ⅩⅥ. p. 136). There is a contemporary Marathi chronicle by Balaji Ganesh in Bibliothe Nationale de Paris (Chronique de Shivadji, Ms. 661) in which the following sentence occurs : “In the Bassein campaign twelve to fourteen Hashams died. Appa Saheb exerted his utmost to conquer Firangana and establish the rule of Hindu Dharma.” +++(5)+++
Yet, the Portuguese sources appear to make out that the Bassein campaign had not much to do with religious considerations. There was some cursory discussion about the Portuguese permitting Goa Hindus to observe their religious customs and traditions during peace negotiations between the Portuguese and the Mahrattas.101 The Mahrattas had made suggestions to the Portuguese to the effect that the Inquisition should exercise no authority over the Hindus and the ‘Shendi tax’ should not be imposed upon them. But they were not stressed later and in the treaty that was ultimately signed all clauses regarding religious concessions to the Hindus were dropped. Even the Viceroy has said that the Mahrattas did not show much keenness about Hindu religious matters during several discussions on treaties between the Mahrattas and the Portuguese.102
According to Portuguese sources, the main reason behind the Bassein campaign was expansion of territory and through that to secure ports on the western coast. The oontemporary manuscript (F. G. 1605) Relacao de guerra in Biblioteca Nacional de Lisboa says : “In taking possession of Salcette the object is not only to exploit the fertile lands over there, but also perhaps to resort to piracy from Versova as base of operations. On the strength of the practice of this vocation, the notorious Angria became so rich and powerful.” Viceroy Conde de Sandomele also held the same opinion. In his letter dated 20 November 1738 he ways; “For long I have thought that the object of the enemy in this fight is to secure a port on the coast and became powerful on the seas also.”103
Having this at the back of his mind, Conde de Sandomele intended to write on 27 January, 1739 the following letter to Chhatrapati Shahu. He says, “I believe that you have entered into this battle because you desire to have a port on the coast that will be suitable for commercial and allied interests of your State. If that is so, we shall have no objection to cede to you such a port and fort.”104 Even the English of Bombay did not hold a different opinion as to the objects of the aggression in Bassein and Salcette. The Governor of Bombay in his letter dated September 23, 1737 has written.105 Their apparent chief aim has for a long time been getting a sea port for themselves …… and this view of acquiring a port or settlement of the sea coast must be considered as the principal motive that hath determined the Mahrattas to this invasion, though, perhaps, it may have been hastened by the well-grounded complaints of their Geotoo Brethren under the Portuguese Government who have been made frequent examples of the cruelty of the Inquisition which hath been exercised upon those unhappy subjects with equal severity, ignorance and superstition.” (Bombay to Company, October, 1737, Orme Mss. No. 124).
From a letter written by Yesaji Raghunath to Bajirao, it is clear that the Mahrattas desired to exercise power over the sea as they did on the land. Yesaji says, “Your glory spreads every day in all directions. But do you not aspire to own an area in Konkan and spread your glory in lower Konkan and the sea as it has spread up the ghauts?”106 The Portuguese statesman Bispu de Alicarnaco has written in 1712 that after capturing Bassein the Mahrattas have immediately started building warships at Arnala (Ⅰlhas de Vacas) and they have their big armada there.107 A Portuguese chronicle mentions that the Mahrattas used to say on the strength of the sanad of Sardeshmukhi that the Moghul Emperor had given to Shahu in 1719 that the Mahrattas had the presogative of extending their authority in the Portuguese territory in Konkan.108
A detailed description of the prowess of the Mahrattas in the Bassein campaign is to be found in Vasaichi Mohim by Y. N. Kelkar who made quite a generous use of the author’s two Portuguese books on this topic. But it will be proper to sum up in brief the information that became available to the author after Kelkar’s book was published.
First of all it must be noted that when Bajirao invaded Goa, it was not his intention to conquer that territory for all time. This conclusion is inescapable after the perusal of several Marathi chronicles.109 Bajirao was compelled to attack Goa in order to stop supplies of men and materials to Bassein by sea.110 According to the treaty of Warna, Goa territory fell in the orbit of the Chhatrapati of Kolhapur and so the Chhatrapati of Satara did not consider it right to meddle with Goa.111 Besides, Bajirao may have thought that the Portuguese would offer stiff resistance in Goa.
There is a letter in Goa Archives sent by Annajipant, envoy of the Prince of Saunde to the Secretary of the Viceroy, Dr. Luis Affonso Dantas on October 6, 1737 in which it is said,
“I hear from up the ghauts that Bajirao is going to invade this territory. Savant Bhonsla is being instructed to be ready for this event in all respects. You may have learnt it from him or otherwise. Letters have also gone to the Prince of Saunde, though what they contain is not known. But what is he going to do by coming to this side? These things have happened before. Twenty five thousand soldiers came from Bijapur. Shivaji and Sambhaji also tried their hands. What the effect of all this was is well known. So Bajirao will go the same way. There is a rumour that the Moghul is marching on him. God will save Goa and defeat the enemy.’’
It is remarkable that these are the thoughts of a Hindu statesman who was a neighbour of Goa.
In a letter of Sardar Ramkrishna Chimnaji of Shahu’s Court, it is said,
“Some people think that Goa is a more difficult place than Bassein. It is no use sending armies there, because the Portuguese will not pay. That is why no forces were sent on Goa. Bassein keeps strong, because help from Goa reaches there frequently. Forces were to be kept in Savant Bhonsla’s territory and in Karnatak to exercise pressure. When Vyankatrao went and took over Salcete and Bardez, the Chhatrapati and others were surprised. They were encouraged to see that it was easier to take Goa than Bassein.”
A contemporary Portuguese report says that when Bajirao invaded Goa and conquered some territory, Chhatrapati Sambhaji of Kolhapur was much incensed.113
It is well known that many Hindus from Bassein allied with the Mahrattas during the Bassein Campaign. Portuguese sources mention that some Hindus in Goa also allied with the Mahrattas when Vyankatrao invaded Goa. But their names are not known.114
Goan Hindus were orginally with the Portuguese, but when they saw that the Mahrattas were the winning party they went over to them according to a charge made by the Chief of the Inquisition.115 But he was unable to produce any evidence in support of the charge. On the contrary many a respectable Hindu, at least to all appearances, helped the Portuguese to the last. Some of them were : Vyankati Kamat, Upya Kamat, Babulya Shenai Sukhtankar, Baburao Desai of Narve, Santu Shenai Dangi, Vithoji Shenay Dhume, Bhagvan Kamat Vagh etc.116
One source that alleges that Goan Hindus had gone over to the Mahrattas during the invasion of Goa is a manuscript No. 4180 in Biblioteca Nacional da Lisboa. This was written by a learned Portuguese who was in Goa in 1744. It is said therein that a certain Hindu brought the Mahrattas in Goa in the battle of 1739 and he was sentenced to death. The name of this Hindu is not given in the manuscript and the author did not find it even after a vigorous search in Goa Archives Another source is a Portuguese report on the Mahratta invasion of Goa which undoubtedly is a very valuable, authentic source. Its title is Relacao sumaria dos Successos de Goa com e guerra do Maratta. When Bhonsala of Savantvadi invaded Bardez, many people went over to him according to this report, but their names are not given.
The well-known Goan learned Padre. Sebastiao Rego gave a sermon in Goa in 1745 in which he said that Hindus in Goa assured Mahrattas that the Portuguese were unable to resist them and helped them to enter Bardez and Salcette. On top of this, people were then saying that the Hindus had conspired with the Mahrattas for making over Goa city to them. But even this writer depends only on rumour for support. From this sermon, the Padre’s prejudice against the Hindus is only laid bare.
As a matter of fact the Christians in Goa and especially the Padres like Sebastiao Rego, were very jealous of the Hindus.+++(5)+++ They believed that the Hindus of Goa, by and large, favoured the Mahrattas. They were also jealous of the wealth of the Hindu traders. Their expectation was that trade and commerce in Goa should be predominently in Christian hands.117 These Padres held the view that the State of Goa rightfully belonged to the Christians and Hindus should not have even the right to live there.118 There was a Portuguese writer in Goa in 1725 who held that the decline of Goa began when the Hindus began to enjoy religious concessions in Goa.119
These Padres’ hatred for Hindus reached a saturation point when they saw that in the war of 1739, the Mahrattas were winning one success after another over the Portuguese. The Chief of the Inquisition even brought a resoultion in the meeting of the State Concil held on 11 March 1739 that the wealth of all Hindus in Goa be consficated and they be turned out of Goa.120 The inquisition had made a similar attempt before, though it was unsuccessful.121 Rumours were spread in those days that the Hindus were secretly in league with the Mahrattas.122 The Viceroy had kept under detention several leading Hindus in Mormugao fort on 10, March 1739 on the ground that they were likely to be persecuted and tortured by the Padres.123
One such canard brought one rich Hindu trader in serious trouble. Phondu Kamat lived at Paneli near Goa. A canard spread in the town that 400 armed soliders of the enemy were concealed in his mansion. This was on 8 March 1739. Taking advantage of this, many padres and their Christian followers raided Kamat’s mansion and plundered whatever they could lay their hands on. Viceroy Conde de Sandomele himself went there on horseback and in order to pacify the people, he placed under arrest Phondu Kamat and his brother-in-law Vithoji Naik Prataprao Sardesai. On inquiry, it was found that the charge against him was baseless.124 In place of 400 armed Mahrattas, only half a dozen of Vithoji Naik Sardesai’s soldiers were found. On the day this padre-led raid on Kamat’s house took place, some Christians also plundered many Hindu shops.125
Some rioters insulted even Conde de Sandomele on this occasion and they did not hesitate to allege that he was in the pay of Hindus. Really speaking, even the Viceroy’s outlook on matters relating to Hindus and their religion was unsympathetic and harsh. The Portuguese were wholly uncosious of the principle of toleration in those days. An illustration would be in point in this connection. In 1735, A Hindu recluse came down the ghaut to bathe in the holy waters of Narve, but lost his way and came to Goa. The Portuguese arrested him and with the consent of Conde de Sandomele forcibly converted him to Christianity in the Bom Jesus Church at Goa.126 Illustrations of this kind can be multiplied with reference to Conde de Sandomele. Whatever that may be, it is clear from the case of Phondu Kamat, that he was against injustice being done.
On 23 January 1739, the Mahratta army under the command of Sardar Vyankatrao Ghorpade descended on Salcete through Dighi Ghat.127 He was accompanied by Dadajirao Bhave Nargundkar, Jiwaji Shinde and others. Vyankatrao was the brother-in-law of Bajirao and Chimaji. Dadajirao was the nephew of Ramrao Bhave. Ramrao had carried away a loot of over five lakh asurpis from Salcete in Goa on 25 April 1717.128 On this account he had earned a bad name in Goa. On behalf of Bajirao (Shahu) Vyankatrao Ghorpade and on behalf of
Chhatrapati Sambhaji of Kolhapur, Dadajirao Bhave were the leading men in this invasion of Goa.129
The Viceroy had come to know about a month previously from Captain Inchbird of the Bombay English and Narsingrao, Captain of Mardangad that Vyankatrao Ghorpade would march on Goa. Besides, a Sardar of the Court of the Bhonsla of Savantvadi had informed the Viceroy that Bajirao had got the Bhonsla of Savantvadi and Sambhaji Angria to join him in this invasion of Goa.130 But the Portuguese had neither the men not the money required for resisting this aggression. This is apparent from the statement that the Viceroy had made in the meeting of his Councillors on 17 October 1738.131 Viceroy Marquez de Lourical wrote on 20 September, 1741 that in the days of Conde de Sandomele there were only 1,156 paid soldiers.132
A Portuguese report of those days says that the Mahratta army comprised 4,000 cavalry, 6,000 infantry and two thousand Pindaris.133 The biography of Shahu by Malhar Ramrao Chitnis says “Vyankatrao Narayan with 10,000 Hashams and equipment was sent.”134 Another Portuguese report says that there were 3,000 horsemen, 6,000 footmen and 2,000 unarmed Pindaris. In his letter to the Viceroy written in the beginning of February 1739, Nagu Savant Bhonsla says that the army consited of from 5,000 to 6,000 horsemen and 2,000 footmen.135 Yet another contemporary report has it that there were 2,000 horsemen and 4000 footmen.136 This figure is more trustworthy, because the same has been given by Conde de Sandomele.137 A letter written by the Sardar of Ponda, Narsingrao on 23 January 1739 at 6 p.m. to the Viceroy is available in Goa Archives which says that he was informing the movements of the army to the Portuguese Government from the moment it camped at Khanapur. There was no worth while resistance to the Mahratta army. It took Margao on January 25 and camped near the town.138
Tuku Naik, a captain of native soldiers in the fort of Cuncolim joined with his battalion the Mahratta army as soon as he learnt that the Mahrattas had captured the fort of Margao.139 The people in Ponda and specially the villagers of Marcaim gave every kind of help to Vyankatrao’s army. The brave Kharvis of Durbate assured Vyankatrao that they would help him to enter the island of Goa with alacrity. Not only this, but they captured an armed ship of the Portuguese (galia) in the early hours of 4 February in the Rasai river and made it over to the Mahratlas.140
Because of the co-operation of the people of Ponda, Vyankatrao captured Mardangad without firing a single shot. Govind Ram Thakur, Dewan of Vyankatrao, marched on Ponda at the head of 500 horsemen when Narsingrao, Captain of the fort himself, opened the gates of the Fort and surrendered himself and the fort to the Mahrattas. Immediately, the
Mahrattas captured the fort of Usgaon. All this happened on 1 March 1739.141 A few days later, Vyankatrao took Sangem and Supem without any opposition and kept his army there.
The Portuguese were frightened out of their wits when they learnt that Ponda was captured by the Mahrattas. Ponda was next door to Goa and they feared that the Mahrattas would attack Goa town any moment. The canard spread in Goa that Vyankatrao had announced at Margao that after entering Goa he would ride in a palanquin to be carried over the shoulders of four Inquisitors which terrified them and he would set free all their prisoners according to a contemporary Portuguese report.142 The Mahrattas captured Salçete, but the Portuguese did not surrender the two forts of Raitur and Mormugao. At this time there was some intrigue going on between the Bhonsla of Savantvadi and the Portuguese.
On February 16, 1739, the Mahrattas besieged Raitur fort. On the same day, the Viceroy had thanked the Bhonsla of Savantvadi for having refused to co-operate. Ramchandra Savant and Jairam Savant were ruling at Savantvadi whose Karbhari was Deoba Vishram Sabnis, whom the Portuguese described as the Demosthenis of the Bhonsla. Deoba’s brother Minoo Shenvi was a trader at Divadi in Portuguese territory. He was a son in-law of Santoppa Naik, who was a wealthy merchant of Goa. On this account, Minoo Shenvi and Deoba Vishram came in contact with the Portuguese Viceroy. At the begining of March, the Bhonsla informed the Viceroy that Bajirao was pressing him to invade Bardez. So if the Portuguese desired peace with him, they should return Khorjuve and Panale to him. Also the tribute of one thousandt asurpis that he was paying to the Portuguese should be remitted. Besides, the expenditure that he had incurred for two months to protect Bardez from Bajirao’s army should be given to him by the Portuguese. These conditions were not acceptable to the Portuguese and on 5 March 1739 the Bhonsla invaded Bardez and captured it in deference to the wishes of the Peshwa.
The sons of Vishram Sabnis had informed Minoo Shenvi, in advance that this invasion was expected and they had given even the precise timing and Minoo Shenvi duly kept the Portuguese posted with it.143 One Portuguese account says that even after the Portuguese had this information, it was not possible for them to protect Bardez, because a number of people of Bardez had already gone over to the Savantvadi camp and so those Goan soldiers who were in the neighbourhood of Kamurli made way for the Mahrattas to enter Bardez. The Portuguese decided only to guard Aguada and Reis Magus and give up the rest of Bardez. It is no wonder that there was great commotion in Goa because Bardez and Salcete had passed on to the Mahrattas and Ponda was already in their hands except the Raitur, Marmugao, Aguada and Reis Magus forts.
On March 8, 1739, all women and children in Goa and the nuns in the Monic monastery were removed to Mormugao fort. On the Mahrattas entering Salçete, many Christian families went to Goa island with all their valuables. They feared that the Mahrattas would enter Goa also and everybody tried to run to Mormugao. In a letter written to Chimaji Appa, Dadajirao Bhave said : “We are after Goa also. But all have fled away and only desolate houses have remained. We shall act as all of us will decide.”145 Many cattle from Goa had fled to the coast. Vyankatrao wrote to the Captain of Sidhudurg that they should be taken away as loot but Raghoji Thorat did not carry out the suggestion of Vyankatrao, out of a desire to show fraternal sympathy with the Portuguese146
People in Goa recalled the days of the invasion of Sambhaji in 1683, but their hope then was that help from the Moghul would come. No help from Portugal was possible. So the Viceroy requested help from the Pondichery French and the Bombay English.147 On February 27, 1739, a Dutch armada came near Goa. The Viceroy offered to give the Dutch the Cheul fort and asked their help against the Mahrattas but the Dutch declined the offer.148
From January 27, 1739, the Portuguese were eager to enter into a treaty with the Mahrattas. The Viceroy tried for it in various ways before Vyankatrao came to Goa. He tried to establish contact directly with Chhatrapati Shahu, through Naro Ram Mantri but he was convinced that no treaty was possible without Bajirao’s consent149 and so he at last beseeched Vyankatrao for a treaty on 8 March 1739. The whole account of this treaty is very instructive and though Marathi documents do not give much information, the Portuguese records are regular and consistent. This research throws a flood of light on the character of Sardar Dadajirao Bhave Nargundkar and what is surprising is that several Marathi letters of Dadajirao and his son Bhaskarrao support the inferences that can be drawn from the Portuguese papers.150
A number of rich Hindu merchants lived in Goa. Several of them were greatly attached to the Portuguese. Because their connections were with Brazil, Macao, Mozambique and other Portuguese colonies, they earned rich profits. Portuguese records of those days clearly show that well known Hindu business men like Phondu Kamat supplied information regarding the Mahrattas to the Portuguese and offered other help.151 High officials of the Portuguese also maintained cordial relations with them. The Viceroy hatched the project of postponing the battle by trying to bribe some sardars of the Mahrattas through these Hindu merchants. Before that he made arrangements to despatch supplies of food and arms and men to Raitur so that the Captain could maintain his resistance. Sardar Dadajirao was very obliging to the Portuguese in this matter and a bribe of 70,000 asurpis was fixed for him and 12,000 were immediately paid to him as first instalment through Vyankati Kamat, a rich Hindu merchant.
This intrigue was managed through Mahadaji Shenvi, Karbhari of Dadajirao. Mahadaji Shenvi was related to Babulya Shenvi Sukhtankar. The Portuguese used him to win over Dadajirao.
A manuscript in Portuguese, purporting to be a report on the invasion of Goa by Vyankatrao, says that Vyankati Kamat was called to Agshi (Agacim) and sent to the Mahratta camp. After returning from there he said that he made an agreement with Madu Shenvi and Dadajirao that Dadajirao should resort to delaying tactics in regard to assault on Raitur and till the treaty negotiation started he should allow the Portuguese to send help to the fort. For this assistance he should be paid 70,000 asurpis of which 12,000 should be paid forthwith. Of this sum Dadaji should keep 10,000 and 2,000 should be paid to his Karbhari, Madu (Madhavaji) Shenvi. They were compelled to do this under the pressure of a very difficult situation.153
The same report says further : “The garrison of Raitur held out for many days in the hope that a treaty was in the offing. All the same, the threat of an assault was there all the time. One attack was made but it was not forceful. Dadajirao told the Portuguese envoy assuredly that the assault was made without his consent and he raised obstruction in order that it might not be effective. He also gave the assurance that the army under his command would not raise impediments in the way of the Portuguese who were carrying aid to the Raitur garrison. There was paucity of grain in the fort.”154
Portuguese records show that Sardar Dadajirao Bhave had accepted bribes from the Portuguese and established fraternal relations with them. The working of Dadaji’s mind can also be followed on the basis of some of his letters. In a letter written to the Portuguese Viceroy Marquez de Louriçala.155
In a letter written to Chimaji Appa in 1739 Dadaji wrote that the Portuguese were sinners and they must be destroyed.156 The same Dadaji wrote to the Viceroy Marquez de Louriçala that the Portuguese were good for conversation, honest in word and action, true to the word once given. That was the intelligence he received as soon as he came down the ghaut and therefore decided to save Goa. In another letter to the same Viceroy in February 1742 he says that the Viceroy had to pay attention to all directions. Goa was recently saved. He only desired to be more and more serviceable. He had also sent a letter to the Secretary saying that he had saved Goa. Until he was murdered in 1742157 his fraternising with the Portuguese went on as could be verified from correspondence in Goa Archives.
Dadaji’s son Bhaskarrao wrote to Vithoji Shenvi Dhume that his father had cultivated a special kind of friendship with the Portuguese in Goa over all others. The Portuguese were very good-natured, true to their word and their action conformed with it and very brave too. They could not be compared with any others on this earth. His father always impressed this on his mind and he found that out by personal experience.158 This Bhaskarrao, in another letter to the Secretary, tells him that his father had served Goa and gained Goa’s favour. In yet another letter he said his father earned the enmity of others but he fraternised with the Portuguese. He also told Bhaskarrao that he had cultivated the friendship of the Portuguese and they would be helpful to him (Bhaskarrao). The author can multiply extracts on these lines to any length.
At the beginning, Vyankati Kamat went to see Dadajirao on behalf of the Portuguese for the treaty talks. Later Dadaji asked the Viceroy to send some influential Portuguese to continue the talks and so Antonio Carneiro de Alcaçoua and Jose Pedro Emaos were nominated by the Portuguese. On March 11, 1739 these Portuguese Fidalgos, Bhagoon Kamat Vagh, Vyankati Kamat and Upya Kamat with their retinue went to Kelshi on the bank of the Zuari. On reaching Kelshi, Dhondobarao, Govindpant Thakur and Mahadaji Shenvi went to receive the Portuguese envoys. The Mahratta sardars had with them 50 horsemen, one elephant and 150 armed men. A reception was given to them in the residence of the Jesuits. The same evening, the Portuguese returned to Goa.
The next day on March 12, they met Sardar Vyankatrao in his tent at Rai. Two chairs were placed in the tent for the Portuguese envoys. Near them sat Vyankatrao, Dadajirao and Sambhaji Shinde. On a bench nearby Sayaji Gujar and Manaji Paigude had their seats allocated. On the same bench Govindpant Thakur and Mahadaji Shenvi on one side and Venkati Kamat and Upya Kamat were given seats. On either side of the envoys, the interpreters and others from their retinue stood up. In this initial interview, representatives of both sides made short speeches after which the Portuguese envoys appealed for a truce. Vyankatrao agreed to one day’s truce and the Portuguese envoys left.
After three days, a message was sent to the Portuguese envoys by Vyankatrao that a trusted Portuguese representative and an interpreter should see him. Accordingly Bhagoon Kamat Vagh, Joao Lobo, Vyankati Kamat and Babulya Shenvi Sukhtanker called upon Vyankatrao. Govindpant Thakur told them that Bajirao was an enemy of the Portuguese and he had humbled the Moghul by his military power. The Moghul Empire included also Adilshahi and Nizamshahi. The Portuguese had usurped the territory that they had in their possession from Bijapur Adilshahi. Bajirao had already conquered Thana, Bassein as well as Salcete and Bardez. Only Goa had remained to be taken and he could do so without much effort. After saying all this Govindpant Thakur informed the Portuguese representatives that there was no hope for the Portuguese to regain any of the conquered territory and added that if the Portuguese wanted to keep the Goa island with them they should payp the balance of 60 years in gold at the rate of three khandis a year which they had agreed to pay Chhatrapati Sambhaji. Besides they must also allow the Hindus in Goa to build temples. The Inquisition should have no authority over them and the Shendi cess should be abolished.159
In reply, Joao Lobo, the Portuguese representative said that Salcete and Bardez were not usurped but were presented to the Portuguese King by Mealkhan. Govindpant retorted that the Portuguese had deceived Bijapur and in the same way put Bahadurshah to death by unfaithful conduct at Bassein and that is why the place was known after his name as Bahadurpura. Vyankati Kamat said that there was no written documentary proof about the Portuguese having agreed to give three Khandis of gold every year to Sambhaji. Next day, Govindpant Thakur wrote out the conditions of peace and handed over to Bhagoon Vagh, the interpreter. The Portuguese envoy, Alcaçova was amazed to see the Portuguese translation of the conditions but said nothing.
Vagh wrote, “Two Portuguese envoys met Sardar Dadajirao accompanied by Upya Kamat. I do not know what transpired between them. But one day, Dadajirao sent word to the envoys that they should see him.160 A copy of the letter that Viceroy Conde de Sandomele wrote to Dadajirao on March 11, 1739 is in Goa Archives. It says “Although Bajirao wants to take Portuguese territory, Mahadaji Vithal has told us that Dadajirao wants to maintain peace and so I have sent Antonio Carneiro de Alcaçova for discussing terms of the treaty.”161 The other Portuguese envoy Jose Pedro Emaous fell ill but Alcaçova continued the talks. He met Dadaji and carried on discussion with Mahadaji Shenvi. Mahadaji wrote down his conditions and gave the paper to Alcaçova.
The Portuguese envoy sent both the documents of conditions, one from Govindpant Thakur and the other from Mahadaji Shenvi to the Viceroy on March 18, 1739 and consideration was given to them in the meeting of the State Council on March 23, 1739.162 This meeting decided that though the text of the treaty speaks of a treaty between Bajirao and the Viceroy, Bajirao was a servant of Chhatrapati Shahu and so the treaty should be between Shahu and the Viceroy or Bajirao as the authorised agent of Shahu and the Viceroy, because even the treaty of 1722 was made under the authority of Shahu.163 But the Portuguese Viceroy soon learnt the high position and authority of Bajirao.
Shivaji Devji, a close friend of Naroram Mantri reached Goa as from Chhatrapati Shahu on March 27, 1739. He brought letters to the Viceroy and asked the Viceroy to send envoys to Satara. Shivaji Deoji also brought an order from Shahu on Vyankatrao asking him to postpone fighting but the Viceroy knew that it was of no avail. In a manuscript purporting to be an account of Bajirao’s invasion of Goa, it is said, “Everyone knows that Bajirao does not carry out the orders of Shahu and his Sardars Vyankatrao and Dadajirao are so indifferent to Shahu’s name appearing in the treaty document. So they will not attach any importance to the Chhatrapati’s order.”164
Even while knowing what the effect of Shahu’s order would be, the Viceroy respectfully sent Shivaji Deoji to the Mahratta camp in Salçete. The report referred to above says that though Shivaji Deoji was not given the right reception, the Chhatrapati’s letter was useful to a certain extent and the Portuguese envoy was not detained by Vyankatrao till the treaty was signed. Being aware of the true situation, the Portuguese statesmen did not think it fit to run to Shahu for a treaty. So they took much time to send a reply to Shahu with Shivaji Deoji who had come from Satara and wanted to return without delay. In this connection Shivaji Deoji writes to the Secretary to the Viceroy on 6 April, 1739 that it was 25 days since he left Satara and eleven since he reached Goa. He was asked to return post-haste. Even after two meetings nothing seemed to result. He could not stay longer.
If the Chhatrapati had any idea that such would be the state of things, he would not have sent him at all to Goa.
It is obvious from a letter written by Dadajirao on April 14, 1739 that Raitur was about to fall to the Mahrattas.165 The Portuguese also knew that the Mahrattas would easily take it. The Goa Government was anxious to make a treaty before that happened. One of the conditions made by Govindpant Thakur was that Hindus in Portuguese territory should have the same religious freedom that they had in Savantvadi and no shendi cess should be levied on them. Even among the conditions of Mahadaji Shenvi the condition of religious freedom and exemption from the authority of the Inquisition was there. On 2 April, 1739, Mahadaji Shenvi presented fresh conditions on behalf of Vyankatrao and Dadajirao to the Portuguese envoys.166 Even these fresh conditions contained these old conditions regarding religious freedom. But the Portuguese made clear that the Viceroy had no power to meddle with the existing religious practices and so those conditions were beyond discussion.
The shendi cess was imposed on the Hindus by the Portuguese from the beginning of 1705 like the Jijiya imposed by the Moghuls. On 14 August, 1732 it was decided that not only the Hindus, but all non-Christians should pay that levy. The income from this tax was about 7,000 asurpis. It has already been pointed out that the Inquisition not only exercised authority on the Catholics but even the Hindus had to suffer much persecution from it. At last, conceding the Portuguese say on this point, Vyankatrao and Dadajirao concluded a treaty with Portuguese envoys on behalf of Bajirao on 2 May, 1739. This treaty does not mention Chhatrapati Shahu’s name anywhere.
It was agreed that seven lakh rupees should be paid by the Portuguese towards expenses of the Mahratta army camping in Goa. As soon as the treaty was duly signed and impressed, two respectable Portuguese should come with the first instalment of two lakhs to the Mahratta camp, after which the army in Bardez should depart. Until the second instalment of three lakhs, to be paid within a week was actually paid, two Portuguese men should be detained as hostages in the camp. This might be in the form of cash, gold and flannel. The balance of two lakhs should be paid afterwards, but till the payment was made two Portuguese should remain as security with the Mahrattas. The author found this treaty in Goa Archives which he has already published in Portuguese e Maratas as supplement to part Ⅳ.169
Although the Portuguese were to pay Rs. 7 lakhs, it was secretly agreed that Rs. one lakh in addition should be paid to Mahratta sardars. Dadajirao had taken care that it should be an underhand deal.170 So it would be improper to call it state expenditure. While fixing this tribute of Rs. 8 lakhs, the talks that were carried on by the Mahrattas and the Portuguese have been narrat by Bhagoon Kamat. He says, “After the preliminary conversation was over, Vyankati Kamat and Upya Kamat said that the amount of money must be settled. Envoy Alcoçova said that he had accepted a ring of fraternity from Dadajirao; so he should name the figure in view of Goa’s condition. Dadaji mentioned eleven lakhs. Vagh said that it was a little too much. At last Vyankati Kamat, Upya Kamat, Babulya Shenvi and Mahadaji Shenvi went aside, discussed among themselves in a low tone and decided that Rs. 7 lakhs should be given by the Portuguese openly and Rs. one lakh clandestinely. The sum was written in Marathi (Hindavi) language on paper. The interpreter translated all that in Portuguese and envoy Alcaçova said that he would communicate the proceedings to the Viceroy.
On May 2, 1739 another draft treaty was prepared. Its Portuguese version is in Goa Archives and the Marathi version has been published by Krishnaji Purandare from the Purandare daftar. It is also published in Y. N. Kelkar’s Vasaichi Mohim. Two principal conditions in it are : (1) Forty per cent of the revenue from Salcete and Bardez should be given to Bajirao by the Portuguese (2) Khorjuve and Panale should be returned to Bhonsla Savant by the Portuguese. Bhonsla should stop paying to the Portuguese one thousand asurpis according to the pact made through Siva Bhat.
On 6 May, 1739, Vyankatrao and Dadajirao made an independent in regard to Bassein with treaty Alcaçova and Jose Pedro Emaons. This has been produced in Portuguese e Maratas and by Y. N. Kelkar in Vasaichi Mohim. The manuscript Successos da India no Governo do Conde de Sandomele says that the Portuguese had to pay a penalty of Rs. 50,000 for their fraternising with Dadajirao. In the report made by Bhagoon Kamat Vagh, a Portuguese version of the receipt of Rs. 50,000 that Dadajirao took is available for perusal.
As a matter of fact, it was the Hindu merchants of Goa who were compelled to pay this fine under compulsion for the most part.172 The Portuguese raised with very great difficulty Rs. 2 lakhs towards the first instalment of the tribute for paying to Vyankatrao and Dadajirao. The army in Salcete and Bardez ought to have decamped thereafter. But that did not happen. The Bhonsla-Savant did not approve of the treaty made by Vyankatrao and Dadaji and kept his army in Bardez. Vyankatrao withdrew his army from Salcete on May 21 and the siege of Raitur had already been evacuated.
The Mahratta army for the most part went up the ghauts. Vyankatrao camped at Sanguem with a small army, where he received Chimaji Appa’s letter of having captured Bassein. So Vyankatrao went home. Before leaving Goa, he made arrangements regarding the forts in Sanguem, Ponda and Usgaon. Dadaji was camping in Cuncolim. He tried in person to persuade Bhonsla-Savant to evacuate Bardez in accordance with the treaty of Rai but he failed. So Dadajirao returned the two Portuguese men who were kept as sureties to Alcaçova after meeting him at Pilgaon, near Bicholim. He gave orders for taking some money from Alcaçova and return it to the Portuguese. On July 19, 1739, the Mahrattas handed over Margao fort to the Portuguese. As soon as the Mahrattas left, the Portuguese demolished the fort.173 The Mahrattas did not give up Cuncolim village and fort and Asolnem under orders of Bajirao.
The Viceroy had sent Santu Shenvi Dangi, a Goan disciple of Brahmendra Swami to Satara with Shivaji Deoji who had come as Shahu’s emissary. He realised there that it was not possible to succeed in treaty talks in Satara Court against the wishes of Bajirao.174 So Santu Shenvi went to Poona and met Bajirao. Bajirao said that he was ready to make a treaty and sent a letter to the Viceroy with Santu Shenvi Dangi in which he claimed 40 per cent of the Salcete revenue and Daman and Cheul fortresses.175
Chhatrapati Sambhaji was incensed to see that Bajirao had found a foothold in Goa’s Salçete and Ponda Panchmahal and insisted that Bajirao should give up their possession.176 The author found a number of letters in the Goa Archives in this connection and he has extracted some of them in Portuguese e Maratas, Assentos do Conselho do Estado (Part Ⅴ) and Agentes da Diplomacia Portuguesa na India. In Assentos he has even published a photostat copy of one of them. Sambhaji’s policy can well be understood from these.
In a letter sent at the end of 1739 by Sambhaji to the Viceroy in which he himself has complained that although Bajirao invaded Salçete and Bardez and gave Goa so much trouble, the Viceroy did not write about it to Sambhaji. Although Bajirao had told him (Sambhaji) that he would take good care of Ponda and serve him (Sambhaji), he had no intention of taking his service but to keep it with Goa and in order that Bajirao’s botheration should stop
thereafter, Hindurao Ghorpade was being sent with an army. He (Sambhaji) was determined to keep Goa with the Portuguese as before.177
On November 4, 1739, Sambhaji wrote to Vyankati Kamat and Upya Kamat to the same effect viz. that Hindurao Ghorpade was being sent to Ponda and that Sambhaji was at Maraz for the time being and would soon be going to Goa. He had informed the Viceroy also about it and details were given to Ramchandra Babaji. Hindurao Ghorpade was maternal uncle of the wife of Nagu Savant Bhonsala who was on friendly terms with the Portuguese to such an extent that he had informed the Portuguese that he would fight on their side with the Peshwa during Vyankatrao’s invasion of Salcete178 As from several other Mahratta Sardars, the Portuguese used to receive information about the Mahrattas from Nagu Savant also. In a letter written at the beginning of February 1739 to the Viceroy of Goa, Nagu Savant pledged complete loyalty and friendship to the Portuguese because he said it was traditional. He expressed his condolence for events in Salcete. He pointed out that the intent of the Mahrattas was to capture all Northern territory from the Portuguese. He referred to Hindurao’s arrival in Goa and offered military help to Goa in consort with him. He also said in the letter that about 2000 Mussalman soldiers could be recruited.
Not only the court of Chhatrapati Sambhaji but even some Sardars of Chhatrapati Shahu’s Court like Naroram Mantri, Ramkrishna Chimaji and others were favourably inclined towards the Portuguese. Ramkrishna Chimaji had informed the Portuguese that if they resolutely resisted the Mahrattas, they would have a winning counter at the treaty talks. In a letter he said that the Portuguese should hold out with determination so that people like him would be in a strong position to speak in their favour at Shahu’s court.179 Even Shahu himself felt that Goa should remain with the Portuguese.180
Sambhaji wanted the help of the Portuguese to take Ponda from Bajirao, but the Viceroy considered that to keep Ponda with Sambhaji was as dangerous to Goa as to keep it with Shahu and so he offered the help of only some ammunition to Sambhaji and nothing more according to a Portuguese report.181 It has already been mentioned that Bhonsala
Savant was not prepared to accept the treaty made between Vyankatrao and Dadajirao on the one hand and the Portuguese on the other at Rai.
At the beginning of Vyankatrao’s invasion of Goa, Bhonsala- Savant was on friendly terms with the Portuguese. His Karbhari kept himself in touch with the Portuguese through correspondence. Even in the midst of the battle, he wrote to the Viceroy and those letters are in Goa Archives. Jairam Savant Bhonsala and Ramchandra Savant Bhonsala Sardesai, in a letter to the Viceroy dated April 13, 1739 say that the Portuguese were traditional friends. The Savant took Bardez in order to preserve it for the Portuguese without the help of the
Mahrattas. He did not differentiate between his control and Portuguese control and the Portuguese should understand for certain that Bardez would not be given to the Mahrattas. He then asked for expenses of the army to be paid and assured that Bardez would be kept with him only until Vyankatrao went up the ghauts and then made over to the Portuguese.182
On behalf of the Bhonsala-Savant, Deoba Shenvi Sabnis, Jivaji Shenvi Sabnis, Yesu Shenvi Havaldar and Jivaji Pundalik informed the Viceroy that the aggression of the Peshwa on Portuguese territory was not acceptable to them and they were waiting for the departure of the Mahrattas from there.183 Consideration was given to the points raised by the Bhonsla
Savant in the treaty made at Rai between Vyankatrao and the Portuguese. But Jairam Savant Bhonsala and Ramchandra Savant Bhonsala planned to make an independent treaty with the Portuguese on his own points. Accordingly be mentioned two fresh conditions in the letter he sent to the Viceroy.184 They were : the point of religious freedom for Hindus should be conceded if it is not already there in the treaty made with Vyankatrao and cash for expenditure should be given. The Portuguese accepted neither of the conditions.
On 27, December 1739, Nago Savant Bhonsala appeared all of a sudden in the morning at Narve with 350 horsemen and 1000 footmen.185 It was agreed between the Portuguese and Nagu Savant that they should pay him 20,000 asurpis and he should stay in one of the villages near Bicholim with 4,000 soliders, because the Portuguese intended to give him the gadi of Savantvadi. But it was not possible for Nagu Savant to hold his own against the 4,000 soldiers of Ramchandra Savant and Jairam Savant. In the meanwhile the Portuguese learnt that Naroram Mantri was arriving from Miraj at Kavle to pay his respects to his family deity. He was accompanied by 500 horsemen, 800 footmen, 1000 oxen and some camels to carry their luggage. The Portuguese have recorded that there were three elephants and six palanquins for the family.
Naroram came to Bicholim from Savantvadi. Jairam and Ramchandra Savant accompanied him as far as there. Naroram sent some of his soliders to fight Nagu Savant on their request. Naroram’s and Nagu’s men had a skirmish for a day and a half at Narve. The Portuguese and Naroram intervened and Nagu Savant was allowed to depart with his men. He started for the ghaut on March 7.186 After Naroram reached Kavle, the Viceroy sent Pedro de Geddis de Magaleice on 12 January 1740 with presents to see him.187 Afterwards Vithoji Shenvi Dhume, a Saraswat merchant was appointed in place of Magaleice to carry on treaty talks. Bhagoon Kamat Vagh and Shivaji Desai also were sent with Dhume to Kavle.
Although Naroram was favourably inclined towards the Portuguese he was not prepared to help them against the wishes of Bajirao. In this connection, the Viceroy, in his letter to the King of Portugal on February 9, 1740 says, “Since everybody is aware of the
importance of Bajirao, no project can reach its fruition without the consent of Bajirao, or against his wishes.”188 Naroram went to Bicholim from Kavle. On 3 February, 1740 he learnt there that the Angria had captured two palas and two galias of the Portuguese and decided that the times were against the Portuguese and so it was not advisable for him to use his good offices in their favour and went home.189 After Naroram Mantri left for Satara, the Viceroy sent Vithoji Shenvi Dhume and Bhagoon Kamat Vagh to Bhonsala-Savants (Jairam and Ramchandra) and entered into a treaty with them at Bicholim on 28 February, 1740. The Portuguese did not take into consideration the question of religious freedom for Hindus even on this occasion. In terms of this treaty, Bhonsala-Savant ceded Bardez and Panalem to the Portuguese and the Portuguese gave him Khorjuvem and Peerna.
On 12, March the Portuguese took possession of Bardez. It is needless to say that they had to grease the palms of Naroram Mantri for the help he gave. Naroram even volunteered to work as Agent of the Portuguese at the court of Shahu, but the Viceroy had fully realised that nothing could be of avail to them against Bajirao’s wishes. Viceroy Conde de Sandomele was trying through the Governor of Bombay that the Mahrattas should give up Cuncolim and Assolanem in Salcete. The reply that Bajirao gave in connection with the treaty for that purpose was received in Goa on 30, January 1740. Three out of the twelve points made by Bajirao in his letter to the Governor of Bombay were : (1) The forts of Revdanda and Korlai should be given as agreed before (2) The Portuguese should aid the Mahrattas in the event of a conflict with the Angria (3) Mahrashtradharma should be freely followed by Hindus in Salcete, Bardez and Goa. While negotiations for a treaty with Bajirao were in progress, the Subedar of the Mahrattas at Ponda sent an army under the command of Haripant in Salçete with 500 horsemen and 600 footmen and pluhdered it with a view to recovering 40 per cent of the revenue. In order that there should be no more promiscuous plundering, the leading men in Salcete entered into an agreement with the Mahrattas to pay up 40,000 asurpis in four instalments. This was done without the permission of the Portuguese Government but the Viceroy wrote on 30 March, 1740 that he had to overtook that irregularity, even though Bajirao had agreed that since treaty negotiations were in progress he would not send his army to that side.190 Bajirao died on May 9, 1740, Vaishakh, Shuddha 13, Sunday, Shake 1662.
After the death of Bajirao, a treaty was made between his son Balaji Bajirao alias Nanasaheb and the Portuguese at Poona on 18, September 1740. Don Francisco Baurot de Galenflux on behalf of the Viceroy and Captain Inchbird on behalf of the Governor of Bombay were present on the occasion. Captain Inchbird had carried on talks for a treaty on behalf of the Governor of Bombay in favour of the Portuguese. With reference to that, the Governor of Bombay wrote to the Viceroy at Goa that, “The Mahrattas were so puffed up with pride that while talking to the Captain they spoke in terms of only rooting out the Portuguese from Goa.”191 The Bhonsla-Savant had sent Narba Shenvi Chitnis on his behalf to participate in the
CONTENTStreaty negotiations. This treaty was published by Parasnis in his Taha va Kararmadar on pages 30-32 which contained some minor errors. After making due corrections, the author published it again on the basis of the original in Goa Archives.192
Even in this treaty there is no reference to the religious question of Hindus in Salcete, Bardez and Goa, even when Chimaji Appa and other Mahratta statesmen were well aware of what persecution the Hindus had to suffer at the hands of the Portuguese.193 But the Portuguese were very firm on this point. The Portuguese Viceroy has said, “No one has any right to speak on this point in the territory of the Portuguese in India. This right is enjoyed only by the King of Portugal. Besides, it can scarcely be said that Hindus in Goa, Salcete and Bardez are not happy. Because Portuguese laws apply only to those Hindus who live in their territory. No one compels the Hindus to live in their state. They live there in peace because of the conveniences and concessions they get for their trade, commerce and business.”.
From one letter of the Viceroy, it has to be gathered that the Subject of religious freedom for Hindus did not find place in the treaty because Chimaji Appa and members of the Peshwa Court did not care very much about it.195 Viceroy Conde de Sandomele writes as follows to the Governor of Bombay on 11, May 1740 : “It does not appear likely that the Mahrattas will lay much stress on the point of religious freedom for Hindus in Goa. Last year, Vyankatrao did not include any clause in the treaty he made with us. Even the draft treaty that Bajirao sent with Santu Shenvi Dangi did not contain a word about it. Naroram in his talks with us never mentioned it. Bajirao and Chimaji mentioned it during the treaty negotiations with Bhonsala-Savant but neglected it in the end. Taking into consideration this experience, I do not think the Mahrattas will object to the treaty on this point, when it is of such immense advantage to them otherwise.”196
In terms of this treaty, the Portuguese got a remission of Rs. 5 lakhs. Similarly, the 40 per cent of the revenue which was to be paid to the Mahrattas from Salcete and Bardez according to the last treaty was remitted to the Portuguese. The Viceroy said that what was very important was that as a result of these concessions the Vahivatdars of the Mahrattas were prohibited to enter Bardez and Salcete. Cuncolim and Assolanem were returned to the Portuguese. The Mahrattas got Revdanda and Korlai (Morro) instead. Besides the Mahrattas handed over one pargana below the fortress of Daman for its upkeep to the Portuguese. When the Portuguese envoy said that the income of one pargana should not be enough for the maintenance of Daman, Chimaji Appa retorted, ‘I really wished like Bajirao to turn the Portuguese out of India. But I have not done so only to oblige the English.”197
There is one more important clause in this treaty. It is to the effect that in the event of a conflict with the Angria, the Portuguese should aid the Mahrattas with their armada. It was the policy of Bajirao, Chimaji and Nanasaheb to break the Angria and make him their subordinate. For this they needed the help of the Portuguese. Their policy also was to humble the Portuguese and recover tribute from them and the Angria had realised that for this purpose they wanted to subordinate the Angria to the Mahrattas. Manaji Angria tried hard to prevent the Portuguese from handing over Revdanda and Korlai to the Mahrattas. He had even written to the Viceroy that if the Portuguese kept the forts with them, he would bear the expenditure for their maintenance.198
Through the mediation of Captain Inchbird, the Mahrattas handed over Cuncolim and Assolnem to the Portuguese on 25 November, 1740.199 In exchange, the Portuguese handed over Revdanda, Cheul and Korlai (Morro de Cheul) to the Mahrattas. The island of Uran (Karanja) was already taken by Manaji with the help of local Hindus on March 21, 1739.200 Dr. S. N. Sen has written that the Peshwa took Revdanda (Cheul) and Korlai (Morro) in September 1740 in his possession.201 Riyasatkar Sardesai also has said so.202 But contemporary Portuguese papers show that both the forts were not in the Peshwa’s hands before December 5 or 6 of 1740.203 In the Adhikari Shakavali published in Angre Kalina Ashtagar (p. 17) it is said that the flag of Chimaji Ballal was unfurled on Revdanda and Korlai forts on 19 December, 1740.
When the Portuguese went to Cuncolim to take possession of the Cuncolim fort from its Captain Ramaji Pandit, the army of Chhatrapati Sambhaji of Kolhapur had besieged Mardangad. Naro Chimaji was the Subedar of this fort appointed by Bajirao. A translation in Portuguese of a letter as well as the original written on 27 November, 1740 by Naro Chimnaji is available. He writes therein that the army of the enemy i.e. Sambhaji of Kolhapur had come but on learning that Bajirao had come to Kittur with 10,000 army, it fled away. He then asked for the arms and luggage in Cuncolim and armada at Assolnem should be properly preserved for taking away when convenient. He has also asked for the receipt of Cuncolim fort having been handed over. From the tone of this letter it would appear that the Subedar of Ponda was on friendly terms with the Portuguese. But the Portuguese really desired that it should pass on to the Prince of Saunde, because the Peshwa as neighbour was considered dangerous by the Portuguese.
It would be appropriate to say a word about Vyankati Kamat. This Hindu merchant took much trouble for a treaty on behalf of the Portuguese. Even then the Viceroy detained him in Mormugao fort and ordered him to pay Rs. 10,000 within ten days for the war fund and he was informed that he would be held guilty of sedition and treated accordingly if he did not pay up.204
NOTES
-
- F. N. Xavier, Instrucçao do Marquez de Alorna, 1903, p. 29; Dr. S. N. Sen, Studies in Mahratta History, p. 207. 2) Pissurlencar, Assentos Ⅴ, p. 237.
-
- Dr. A. G. Pawar, “Some Documents bearing on Imperial Moghul Grants to Raja Shahu”, in Proceedings of the Indian Historical Records Commission, 17th Session, pp. 204-15.
-
- BNL, MS. 1455 F. G., “Instrucçao que deixaou o Conde da Ericeira”.
-
- “se o dito Raja tivesse mais espirito seria senhor de to-das ellas”.
-
- BNL, MS. 465 F. G., “Noticias da India”, fl. 135 v.
-
- Pissurlencar, PM, Ⅳ; Maratas em Barçaim; A Campanha Luso-Marata de Baçaim; Bajirao and the Portuguese” (Sahyadri, 1940, No. 5).
-
- Goa Archives : MR 90, fl. 76 : “Ramchondra Panta, por quem se fulminam todas estas maquinas…”. 9) BNL. MS. 1605 F. G. “Rellaçao da guerra”.
-
- Goa Archives : MR 83, fl. 62.
-
- AHU, India, Avulsos, Caixa 18, Viceroy’s letter to the King of Portugal dated 22 January 1721.
-
- “Justamente o podemos comparar com o celebre Barbaroxa, que em outros tempos se fez tao temido em Europa nas costas do mar mediterraneo”. (Relaçam dos sucessos e gloriozas acçoes militares obradas no Estado da India, ordenadas e derigidas pelo Vice-Rei Vasco Fernandes Cezar de Menezes em o anno passado de 1713, p. 19).
-
- AHU. India, avulsos, caixa, 18. Viceroy’s letter dated 22 January 1721. Goa Archives : RJ 11, fl. 82; Pissurlencar, Assentos Ⅴ, p. 334.
-
- BNL. MS. 465, “Noticias da India desde o fim do governo do Vice-Rei Vasco Fernandes Cezar……”.
-
- Ibid, p. 98 : “estes (Portugueses) para mais certamente conseguirem a runia do Angria, se ligass com sau-Raja, porque este Principe certamente dezejava que o Angria fosse conquistado, ainda que era seu vassaleo e da sua religao…” (BNL. MS. 465 F. G. “Noticias da India”, fl. 98).
-
- BNL. MS. 8548, F. G., fl. 284 BACL, MS. 258. (in this manuscript the figure given is 25,000).
-
- BNL. MS. 1455, F. G., Instrucçao que deixou o Conde da Ericeira Dom Luiz de Menezes, Vice-Rey e Capito-Geral da India a Fraicsico Joze Sampayo e Castro (22 October 1720).
-
- Pissurlencar, Assentos Ⅴ, pp. 334-5.
-
- Ibid : “ha menos de trinta anos se conheco no Norte este mesmo inimigo sendo vil e pobre e exercitando o ministerio de criado e servidor de outro gentio…” There is a Marathi bakhar in the Biblioteque Nationale de Paris called Chronique de Sivadgi which provides similar, information; “Kanhoji Angre was a servant of Sidoji Gujar at Suvarnadurga. When Sidoji Gujar went to Chandi with Rajaram Saheb, Kanoji captured Suvarnadurga and Vijayadurg by force. Rajaram conferred on him the title Sarkhel.” (BNP. Fond Indian, MS. 661). This bakhar has obviously been wrongly named by the keepers of the library.
-
- Goa Archives : MR 89 B, fl. 417; Pissurlencar, A Campnha Luso-Marata de Baçaim, pp. 8, 16.
-
- Goa Archives : Marathi Documents. Pissurlencar, “Bajirao and the Portuguese in Sahyadri, May 1940. Goa Archives : Marathi Documents. Pissurlencar, “Bajirao and the Portuguese in Sahyadri, May 1940.
-
- Pissurlencar, Maratas em Baçaim, pp 12, 14.
-
- ibid., pp. 18, 20.
-
- Pissurlencar, “Bajirao and the Portuguese”, Sahyadri, May 1940.
-
- BNL. MS. 465 F. G., “Noticias da India”.
-
- Pissurlencar, Maratas em Baçaim, p. 20.
-
- lbid., p. 22.
-
- Pissurlencar, A Campanha Luso-Marata de Baçaim, pp. 8, 26.
-
- S. N. Joshi, Angre Shakavali, p. 21.
-
- Goa Archives. “Livro de Baçaim”, No. 5, fl. 52v.
-
- BNL. MS. 465, “Notiçias da India desde o fim do governo do Vice-Rey Vasco Fernandes Cesar de Menezes, fl. 142. 32) Dr. S. N. Sen, Military System of the Marathas.
-
- Angre Shakavali, p. 21.
-
- Goa Archives : “Livro de Baçaim”, 5, fl. 5.
-
- Pissurlencar, Maratas em Baçaim, pp. 22-7.
-
- Ibid., p. 44.
-
- Edmond Gaudart, Catalogue des Manuscrits des Anciennes Archives de I’lnde Française, 1922. 38) Goa Archives : “Baçaim: 5”, fl. 128; Pantambekar, Uttar Konkan, p. 60.
-
- Pissurlencar, Maratas em Baçaim, p. 39.
-
- Goa Archives : RV 9, fl. 52 : “Para Custangi Rao Mahadeo assistente na Provincia Chassa do dominio del-Rei Magor, havendo sido antes governador de Galiana do qual governo sahio desgostozo de seu cunhado Baji Rao, e passou para o servico do Mogor”.
-
- Pissurlencar, A Campanha Luso-Marata de Baçaim, p. 9.
-
- Goa Archives : “Livro de Baçaim”, 5, fl. 131. Viceroy’s letter dated 29 August 1731.
-
- Peshwa Daftar, Part Ⅳ, 33, p. 107.
-
- Goa Archives : Marathi Documents, No. 2649.
-
- Pissurlencar, Maratas em Baçaim, p. 49.
-
- BACL. MS. “Livros do governo do Vice-Rey da India, Conde de Sandomel”, Vol. Ⅱ, fl. 156.
-
- Goa Archives : Livro d correspondencia de Chaul”, 2, fl. 21 v (Viceroy’s letter to Captain Caitan de Sousa Pereira). Pissurlencar, A Campanha Luso-Marata, p. 27; Maratas em Baçaim, p. 51.
-
- Pissurlencar, Maratas em Baçaim (Viceroy’s letter to King of Portugal dated 25 January 1735).
-
- Goa Archives : MR 102 B, fls. 634v-635v. (Don Luiz Batelos’s letter dated 15 July 1732) : “o Angria no principio do mez passado atacou a caza forte do Divao de Chaul, e com effeito a tomou a doze do dito mez.”
-
- Yesaji Rangaji, Bajirao’s envoy, went to Goa with the letter from Bajirao dated 20 January 1735. The Viceroy bade him farewell on 18 March 1735 (Goa Archives : CO. 19, fl. 144v).
-
- Goa Archives : “Livro de Chaul”, 1, fl. 31 v. Pissurlencar, Maratas em Baçaim, p. 54 n.
-
- Pissurlencar, P. M. Ⅳ, p. 15; A Campanha Luso-Marata, p. 27.
-
- C. R. Boxer, Race Relations in the Portuguese Colonial Empire, Chapter Ⅱ, Assentos, Ⅳ, p. 578; v. p. 17. 54) Peshwa, Daftar, Part 16, p. 12.
-
- Pissurlencar, A Campanha Luso-Marata de Baçaim, p. 33.
-
- Goa Archives : MR 103 B, fl. 812.
-
- Pissurlencar, Maratas em Baçaim, p. 56.
-
- Ibid, p. 57.
-
- Ibid, p. 56.
-
- Goa Archives : RV 9, fl. 9.
-
- Pissurlencar, PM, Ⅳ Maratas em Baçaim; A Campanha Luso-Marata de Bacaim; Assentos Ⅴ. Don Luiz Botelo himself informed the fort keeper at Diu in his letter dated April 19, 1737 that the Mahrattas entered Salçette at 11 p.m. (O Oriente Portuguez, 1905, p. 221).
-
- Diogo da Costa, Relaçam das guerras da India, Lisboa, 1741.
-
- Pissurlencar, Maratas em Baçaim, p. 63; Assentos Ⅴ, p. 448.
-
- Y. N. Kelkar, Vasaichi Mohim, p. 47.
-
- Pissurlencar, PM, Ⅳ, p. 33 n. Maratas em Baçaim p. 62, 63.
-
- AHV. India, avulsos, Maco 7 : “O qual (inimigo marata) dando dous assaltos e esta Praca…” (Cardim Froices letter dated March 5, 1738).
-
- Pissurlencar, Maratas em Bacaim, p. 62, 63; Assentos, Ⅴ, page 448.
-
- BVC, MS. 1487, Rellacam dos sucessos da India vinda neste anno de 1740 e capitullacoes que se fizerao com a cidade de Goa.
-
- Antonio Cardim’s letter dated March 5, 1738; Peshwa Daftar part 22 Shakavali.
-
- Peshwa Daftar, part 34, p. 92.
-
- Pissurlencar, Assentos, Ⅴ, p. 463.
-
- Pissurlencar, PM. Ⅳ, p. 61.
-
- Ibid, page 68.
-
- Pissurlencar, Maratas em Baçaim, p. 65.
-
- BPE, Cod CⅨ/1-38 fls. 236-248.
-
- Pissurlencar, Assentos, Ⅴ, 485-486.
-
- O Oriente Portuguez, Vol. Ⅲ, p. 455.
-
- Brahmendracharitra by Parasnis, 49; Pissurlencar, P.M. Ⅳ, p. 66n. Maratas em Baçaim, p. 65n. Y. N. Kelkar, Vasaichi Mohim, p. 165.
-
- Pissurlencar. PM. Ⅳ, p. 66.
-
- Ibid.
-
- Pissurlencar, Maratas em Baçaim p. 66 : “… a que antes se deve chamar barbaridade…”
-
- Pissurlencar, Assentos Ⅴ, p. 496.
-
- Ibid, p. 153.
-
- The two letters dated April 17, 1739 and August 17, 1739 written by Caitano de Sousa Pereira are published in the fourth part of the periodical O Oriente Portuguez.
-
- Letter dated April 17, 1739 by Caitano de Sousa Pereira (O Oriente Portuguez Vol. Ⅳ, p; 30) Viceroy’s letter dated 22 March 1739 to General of Bassein (O Oriente Portuguez Ⅳ, p. 27).
-
- Rajwade, Marathyachya ltihasachi Sadhane, Part Ⅵ, p. 229.
-
- BVC. MS. 148, Conta que mandou o Marquez de Alorna, ft. 28.
-
- Bharat ltihasa Samshodhak Mandal, Viceroy’s letter in Portuguese dated 3 April 1746 to Balaji Bajirao; Pissurlencar, PM, Ⅵ, p. 9.
-
- Pissurlencar, Roteiro, p. 62-95.
-
- Goa Archives : Livro de Certidoes, No. 4 (1672-1694).
-
- Pe Dr. Silva Rego, Documentacao Ⅳ, p. 450. 461. Anju Naik says : “E despoys que vyerao os frades a estas terras de Bacaym, como chegarao logo mandarao dyrribar os pagodes e as mysquitas dos mouros… foi este num grande escandalo pera elles … e lhes nao deyxam fazer nenhum modo das suas festas”. The meaning is that after the padres came to Bassein, they demolished temples of Hindus and mosques of Mussalmans. They deemed it a great calamity. The padres do not allow them to observe their holy days in any way.
-
- Some Catholic historians say that there was no compulsory proselytisation in Goa or Bassein but contemporary documents can be cited to the contrary. Cunha Rivara, Padre Silva Rego, Padre Wicki and other Catholic historians have published quite many documents. The author has also written much about this. In 1561, Catholics of different schools gathered together in the
Viceroy’s residence and expressed the view that compulsory proselytisation was not irreligious. (Rego, Documentacao Ⅷ, p. 301-302. Wicki Documentacao Ⅴ. P. 67).
-
- Pissurlencar, Assentos, Vol. Ⅳ, p. 291; Vol. Ⅴ, p. 402, 530, 543; Dr. Antonio Baiao, A Inquisicao de Goa; Vol. Ⅰ. 94) BNL. MS. 203.
-
- Dellon, Narracao da Inquisicao de Goa, p. 116 (Portuguese translation); Petition of the Hindu people of Goa, Salcete and Bardez (Goa Archives, MR 93 B, fl. 821-822). Pissurlencar, ADP, p. 63-66. It is stated in Sashtichi Bakhar that Rupaji Bhalerao and others were put in oil-clothes and burnt but they must have been sentenced to transportation (G. G. Naik, Sashtichi Bakhar p. 24).
-
- Goa Archives : MR 152 A, fls. 154 v.
-
- Pissurlencar, Assentos Ⅴ. p. 543.
-
- Pissurlencar, ADP p. 64, 65.
-
- Goa Archives : CO20, fl. 213. Pissurlencar, A Companha Luso Marata p. 7, 8. A Portuguese officer in his evidence given on December 19, 1729 says : “Nao sei o regimento, que a Inquisicao tem para conhecer de culpas de homens que nunca farao Catholicos, e vejo sim que pella extecsiva quantidade de prezos desta qualidade esta despouvada toda a Provincia do Norte” (Goa Archives MR 98 fl. 7). The purport of this is : I do not know by what law the Inquisition obtains authority to inquire into the offences of those who were never Catholics. The whole of northern territory has become desolate because of the prisoners the Inquisition keeps.
-
- BNL. Successos da India no Governo no Conde de Sandomele, fls. 3-5. Pissurlencar, PM. Ⅳ, p. 15. Goa Archives : Bacaim, Livro 6, fl. 76, 91.
-
- Pissurlencar, A Companha Luso-Marata, p. 27.
-
- Pissurlencar, A Companha Luso-Marata, 16-20, Assentos Ⅴ p. 535, 536, 543.
-
- Pissurlencar, A Companha Luso-Marata p. 18.
-
- Ibid, p. 19.
-
- Goa Archives : RV 9, fl. 96v, Pissurlencar, Companha Luso-Marata, p. 19.
-
- Dr. A. G. Pawar, English Records on the conquest of Salcette by the Mahrattas in 1737 in Bombay University Journal, July, 1942.
-
- Peshwa Daftar, part 33, p. 142.
-
- BNL. Ms. 308. Bispo de Halicarnasso, Systema Marcial Asiatico, fl. 80v.
-
- Pissurlencar, PM, Ⅳ p. 4, 82.
-
- BNP. Ms. 661, Chronique de Sivadji, Roi des Mahrattas. The name of the chronicle is a misnomer but it says, “In order to restrict the activities from Goa, Vyankatrao Ghorpade was sent with a force of 1000”.
-
- Pissurlencar, Assentos, Ⅴ, p. 454 : “O intento de vir o inimigo a estas terras de Salcette e Bardes he com o fim de nos fazer diversao para que se nao mande socorro para a Norte.” This means that the object of the enemy in invading Salcette and Bardez
is that because of this aggression we should not be in a position to send help to Bassein. Nagu Savant Bhonsala informed the Viceroy to the same effect in his letter dated February 7, 1739—Goa Archives : Portuguese translations of Marathi letters.
-
- BNL Ms. 660 F. G. Relacao Sumaria do successos de Goa com a guerra de Marata, fls 99v.
-
- ) Pissurlencar, Mahratta Invasions on Goa—Sardesai Memorial Volume.
-
- BNL. Ms. 560 F. G. Relacao Sumaria dos successos de Goa. fls. 99v.
-
- BNL. Ms. 4180, Arbitrio para no Estado da India haver dinheiro para sua Conservacao (Assentos Ⅴ. p. 528). Padre Sebastias Rego (Sermao de Santa Cruz dos Milagres, Lisboa 1759) : “…… Os gentios facilitaram as inimigo Marata a entrada de Salcette. Indo-o buscar nao terras do Sunda, e segurandelhe, que podia invadir a provincia sem temor de resistencia. Os gentios introduziram o inimigo Bonsulo no mesmo tempo na provincia de Bardez, e estavam confederados para lhe entregarem esta Cidade (Goa) como publicamente se fallou.” (p. 330 2nd Ed).
-
- Pissurlencar, Assentos, Ⅴ, p. 528.
-
- Pissurlencar, ADP. Introduction.
-
- Unsuccessful attempts were even made in order to keep the trade in Goa chiefly in Christian hands by legislation.
-
- In 1745, Padre Sebastiao Rego has said, : “Nao necessitando pois Goa dos gentios, estes sao os que mais necessitam de Goa… O que tudo e tao certo, que se S. Magestade or denasse, que aquelles que nao professassem a lei de Christo nao morassem nos seus dominios, em breve tempo todo este gentilismo se reduziria as gremio da igreja… O que se praticou ja em Hespanha e Portugal com os mouros e judeus e em outras partes do christianismo, onde se nao permitte domicilio firme aos infieis. “(Lisboa 1759)”. The gist of this is that Goa does not need Hindus. It is the Hindus who need Goa. As a matter of fact had the King of Portugal promulgated an order that those who were not Christians should not live in this state, all Hindus would have embraced Christianity in a short while. It was so done in the case of Mussalmans and Jews in Spain, Portuugal and other Christian States. No non-Christian is allowed to live there permanently.) The Chief of the San Tomas Catholic Monastery informed Government on 10 January 1728, that : “O meu parecer … era uzar S. Mag … mandando que todos os gentios moradores nas terras deste seu Estado, ou se convertao a fe de Christo, ou sayam das ditas terras.” (Goa Archives : MR 94. fl. 121) The meaning of this is : I am of the view that Government should declare that those Hindus who live in this state should either embrace Christianity or depart from here.)
-
- BPP. Ms. 818, Estado do Estado da India, fl. 1.
-
- Pisssurlencar, Assentos Ⅴ, p. 530.
-
- Ibid., BA. Ms. 51-Ⅸ-4, Livro 2° do registo da correspondencia do governo de Antonio Goncalves da Comarca Cartinho. Pissurlencar Assentos Ⅴ, p. 530.
-
- Pissurlencar, PM. Ⅳ, p. 98; BNL. Relacao sumaria dos successos de Goa com e guerra do marata. 124) Goa Archives : Co 24, fl. 166.
-
- BNL. Ms. Relacao Sumaria; Goa Archives Co. 25, fl. 168v. Pissurlencar Assentos, Ⅴ p. 531; PM, Ⅳ, p. 97-98. 126) BNL. Ms. Relacam sumaria dos sucessos de Goa.
-
- Goa Archives : Co 19, fis 198, 200. (Viceroy’s leter dated 5-9-1735 to Jesuit official Padre Joao Marqis). The conversion of this recluse was a topic of enormous public discussion. The account of the conversion of this recluse was published with illustrations in Lisboa in 1737. (Bernanrdo Fernandes Gayo, Feliz Noticia da conversam de him joque que na caza professa do bom Jesus de Goa rebeco o Santo Bantismo em 8 de Setembro de 1735. Lisboa 1737).
-
- The Mahratta army came down the Digi ghaut and entered SaIcete via Sangem. Kusman and Palavde, Hanuman Ghaut, Ram Ghaut and the Digi Ghaut were the mountain passes used by armies for descending in South Konkan.
-
- Pissurlencar, Assentos Ⅴ, p. 308n.
-
- BNL. Ms. Relacam Sumaria.
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- Pissurlencar, Assentos Ⅴ, p. 472.
-
- Ibid., p. 463-470.
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- Pissurlencar, Assentos Ⅴ, p. 580n.
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- BNL. Ms. 1605, Relacao da guerra que o inimigo Marata fez……
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- Biography of Shahu Maharaj by Chitnis, 1924, p. 98.
-
- Goa Archives; Portuguese translation of Marathi documents.
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- BNL. Ms. 929, Successos da India no governo do Conde de Sandomil.
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- BNL. Ms. 660, Relacao sumaria dos successos de Goa.
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- Goa Archives : MR 108, fls. 132 (Viceroy’s letter 1-2-1739).
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- BNL. Ms. Relacao Sumaria dos successos de Goa.
-
- Ibid.,
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- Pissurlencar, Assentos Ⅴ, p. 513.
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- BNL. Ms. Relacao sumaria, fls. 68v. : “Entendeo-se que os Inquizidores se achavao muito intimidados de terem ouvido que vencatta Rao dizia em Salcete que havia de andar no seu palanquim sobre quatro Inquizidores.”.
-
- Epanaphora Indica, Parte Ⅴ, p. 37; Pissurlencar, Assentos Ⅴ, p. 671.
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- BNL. Ms. Relacao sumaria dos sucessos de Goa : “Os filhos de Vissaramo mostraram fidelidade ao Estado, porque com certeza, por carta escripta a seu irmao Minu, avizaram ao Secretario das partes por onde o assauto se dispunha, e tambem o tempo para elle detriminado, de que tudo foi logo o General avizado…” *Pissurlencar, Roteiro do Arquivos, Introduction.
-
- Peshwa Daftar : Part 16, p. 115.
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- Goa Archives : Marathi papers No.152 2070.
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- Pissurlencar : Assentos, Ⅴ, p. 447.
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- Pissurlencar : P. M. Ⅳ, p. 88.
-
- BNL. Ms. Relacao sumaria dos successos de Goa; Pissurlencar, PM, Ⅳ, p. 84.
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- Pissurlencar, Mahratta Invasion of Goa, p. 25, 26.
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- BNL. Ms. Relacao sumaria dos sucessos de Goa : “… porque Fondu Camotim. alem deser muito imtereceado na conservacao dos Portuguezes, e no grande comercio, que a sua casa, por sy e por seus avos, tivera sempre nas naos do Reino, constavalhe a elle (secretario) o summo affecto e cuidado com que, despois de principiada a guerra, concorria muitas vezes em sua casa a communicar lhe quais quer noticias que tivesse e a dar-lhe, com grande zello os arbitrios, que tinha por convenientes para e deffensa e para a seguranca, e que por elle mesmo e por sey cunhado o Dessai Vitogi Naique tinha mandado muitas espias confidentes seus, cujas noticias foram sempre as mais certas…”
-
- Ibid : “Corn principio de feiras a dinheiro.”
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- BNL. Ms. Relacao sumaria dos successos de Goa, fls 34v. “ … foi veneati chamado a S. Lourenco, e despedido para o exercito, do qual volou dizendo que tinha adjustado com os ditos Madu Sinay e Dada Rau, favorecer este aos Portugueses, dilatando as operacoes e assaltos contra Rachol, e facilitando a introducao dos socorro ate se entrar em ajusto de faz; e que por pricipio do premio de setenta mil xerafins, que lhe tinha prometodo para esta confederacao, se lhe dessem logo doze mil, dez para elle e deus para o dito seu Divao, Madu Sinay O aperto das cousas fez parecer conveniente este partido…
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- “… A esperanca da negociaco da paz alentou muitos dias os defensores de Rachol sem embargo de que os inimigos continuayam sempre as suas obras, eo ameasso dos assaltos chegando a dar lhe segundo com pouco vigor e Dadagi Rao afirmava aos Ministros conferentes que fora sem seu beneplacito e que elle impedira a ser mais vigorozo, e prometeo tambem que e gente do seu partido nao faria opposicao, a qual estava ja falta de mantimentos…” (BNL. Ms Relacao sumaria dos sucessos de Goa).
-
- Goa Archives : Marathi documents.
-
- Peshwa Daftar, Part 16, p. 115.
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- In a letter written by Keshaopant to the Secretary to Goa Government in connection with Dadajirao’s murder it is said “The wife of Ramrao was killed by deceipt and it was planned that his brother Yogirao and son Bhaskarrao were also to be killed, but they escaped.” (Goa Archives : Marathi documents). This letter is without date but its Portuguese translation was made on April 4, 1743 (Goa Archives : Translations of Marathi letters) Sardessai’s Dynasties of Historical Families.
-
- Pissurlencar, ADP., p. 226n.
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- BPA. Portuguese report of Bhagoon Kamat Vagh.
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- Ibid.,
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- Goa Archives. RV (1737-1740), fls. Ⅲv-112 : sem embargo do empenho com que se acha o felicissimo e ilustre Rao Pardano contra as terras Portuguesas … quer VM. pelo que lhe tem significado o dito Madagi Vitala que haja sucego……
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- Pissurlencar, Assentos Ⅴ, p. 335-337.
-
- Pissurlencar, Bajirao and Portuguese, (Sahyadri, May 1940).
-
- BNL. Ms. Relacao sumaria dos succssos de Goa : “ … e nao seriao attendidas as ditas ordens, principalmente sendo ja constante a dezobediencia de Bagi Rao a Xau Raja, e o pouco cazo que faziam os ditos Cabos do nome do dito Xau, nao qerendo que fosse nomeado em papel algum da dita negociacao.
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- Portuguese translation of Dadajirao’s letter is in Goa Archives wherein it is said : … Quanto a materia de Goa esta parese acabar ou para se deffirir; as fachin as de Rachol estao ja adiantadas athe a borda da cava que so resta para se dar asalto e CONTENTSconseguida esta dilligencia terey sobido o Gatte …” The meaning is : Goa business is about to end. Assault on Rachol has reached as far as the ditch. Only assault now remins. This finished, I shall proceed up the Ghauts.”
-
- Pissurlencar, Assentos Ⅴ, p. 542-545.
-
- Ibid, p. 545.
-
- Ibid, p. 536.
-
- Portugueses e Maratas, Part Ⅳ Kelkar’s Vasaichi Mohim contains this, but it became necessary to publish it again as it contained an error.
-
- Pissurlencar, Assentos Ⅴ, p. 535.
-
- Pissurlencar PM, Ⅳ, p. 130.
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- BNL. Ms Relacao sumaria dos sucessos de Goa says while the Hindu merchants were being taken to Mormugao fort on March 10, their eyes were closed by a bandage in the gate and they were told that they would not be allowed to go home unless they paid seven lakh asurpis as war tribute. They were also threatened that if they did not pay this sum stones would be placed on their heads.
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- BNL. Ms. Relacao Sumaria dos sucessos de Goa.
-
- Ibid : “Dava Santu Sinai por motivo de passar a Punem a experiencia de que na Corte de Xau nao se podia concluir ajuste algum sem o beneplacito de Bagi Rao.”.
-
- BNL. Relacao sumaria dos sucessos de Goa.
-
- Ibid, “Sambagi Raja escandalizou-se de que Bagi Rao se Intrometesse a conquistar terras da sua jurisdicao, a que lhes pagavam tribute….” There are many letters in Goa Archives which support this information in Portuguese. For instance Rangaji Narajan’s letter dated 9-11-1739 (Marathi letters No. 522. Pissurlencar, PM. Ⅴ, p. 45).
-
- Goa Archives : Marathi documents. Pissurlencar ADP. p. 179n. 210, Assentos Ⅴ, p. 633.
-
- Goa Archives : Marathi documents.
-
- Ibid.,
-
- Pissurlencar, ADP. p. 214.
-
- BNL. Ms. Relacao sumaria dos succssos de Goa.
-
- Goa Archives : Marathi documents.
-
- Goa Archives : Papeis Avuslos.
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- Pissurlencar, PM, Ⅳ, Appendix.
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- BNL Sucessos da India no governo do Conde de Sandomil says that Nagoba Savant came to Narve on December 23, 1739. 187) Pissurlencar, PM, Ⅴ. P. 21n.
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- Goa Archives : Co 26, fls. 146.
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- Pissrlencar, PM. Ⅴ. 18n. “… a grande attencao que todos tem a Bagi Rau, muito difficulta qualquer conclusao que nao seja a seu gosto a com o sey beneplacto…”
-
- BNL. Ms. Relacao sumaria dos sucessos de Goa. The Viceroy’s letter dated February 2, 1740 says that that the Angria had captured two palas and two gatias (BACL, Ms. 511, fls. 94 v).
-
- Goa Archives : MR. 113, fl. 37 Viceroy’s letter to Governor of Bombay dated 30-3-1740.
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- BACL. Ms. Correspondencia do Vice-Rei Conde de Sandomele, Vol. Ⅷ, fls. 74 : “A soberba dos maratas chagou a tais extremos que, em discusso das conferencias tidas com o dito capitao, nao falacam em menos que penetrar dentro de Goa com rezolucao de estirpar a raiz…”.
-
- Pissurlencar, Goa Daftar (Bharatmitra Vol. Ⅰ, No. 3, 1935).
-
- Dr. V. G. Dighe, Peshwa Bajirao Ⅰ and Mahratta Expansion, p. 215.