04 CH3 DURING SAMBHAJI’S REIGN AND AFTER

After the death of Shivaji, while Sambhaji was at Panhala, he sent a letter to the Governor of Goa through his envoy, Ramoji Naik Thakur. The tone of the letter was friendly. The envoy reached Goa in May 1680. The Governor sent Sambhaji a friendly reply accompanied by a draft treaty of friendship with Raiji Pandit whom Sambhaji had appointed to maintain peace in the Konkan.

In May 1681, Sambhaji went to Bicholim. While he was there. the Portuguese Governor sent him a letter reminding him how the Portuguese had behaved with him after Shivaji’s death, when all was not well with Sambhaji, and requested him to enter into a permanent treaty of friendship without delay. Consequently, Yesaji Gambhirrao, Sambhaji’s envoy, went to Goa to negotiate such a treaty.

Yesaji Gambhirrao was at the Portuguese court for many days. Agreeing with Portuguese complaints against Moro Dadaji, Subedar of Bicholim, Sambhaji removed him from that post and appointed Jivaji Vinayak in his place. It was because of the pains Gambhirrao took in the matter that the Portuguese achieved their end. This happened about the end of December 1681.

Don Francisco de Tovar Conde de Alvora was the then Portuguese Vice-Rei at Goa.

At the beginning of 1682, Sambhaji took Anjediv (off Karwar) and made preparations to build a fort there. A reference is found to this in a letter to the Viceroy from Dr. Luis Gonçalves Couto, Secretary to the Viceroy, dated 29 April 1682. It is as follows : ‘An interpreter has just informed me that Sambhaji has sent stones and lime to Anjediv and has ordered that no money should be spared to erect a fort. Thefore, it would be undesirable to delay despatch of ships there.”1

Two days earlier, on 27 April, the Viceroy held a meeting of his Councillors and decided that, since sambhaji was making preparations to build a fort on Anjediv island and had already ordered plans and designs for the purpose and was collecting the necessary material, it would be proper to send their own men and material and erect a Portuguese fort there and equip it with six guns. Besides, it was decided that some ships should be stationed

there for the protection of the island.2

Anjediv island in the possession of the Mahrattas was a menace to Goa. Grains used to come to Goa by sea from Karnatak which was considered the granary of Goa.3Just as Chaul was harassed after the Mahrattas had built a fort at ‘Hendrikendri’, Goa would be harassed if Sambhaji kept Anjediv under his control and built a fort there. Taking this into consideration, the Portuguese planned to keep Anjediv exclusively Portuguese. There was another reason for Portuguese intervention : Sambhaji had harboured the Arabs in his state

and had even taken their help with a view to attacking the Siddi of Danda Rajpuri. In this way, Sambhaji-Arab friendship was gradually growing. The Viceroy had information that an Arab held the post of admiral in Sambhaji’s fleet.4 The Arabs were the enemies of the Portuguese, but since the days of Shivaji they had become friends of the Mahrattas.5 The Viceroy

legitimately feared that Sambhaji would hand over Anjediv to the Arabs.6

On 5 May, the Portuguese approached Anjediv island and took possession of it. On 2 July, 1682, Captain Amaro Simois Pereira laid the foundation stone of the castle and within six months the castle was completed. There is a stone inscription to that effect in Portuguese on the island.7 Sambhaji protested against this through his envoy and the Subedar of Ankola.8 But the Portuguese replied that, since the island belonged to the Portuguese, Sambhaji had no authority in the matter. The fact is that, when Vasco da Gama came to India, the Portuguese had taken this island and had built a fort there in 1506. But the next year, they

demolished it and the island become desolate. Occasionally, Portuguese ships replenished their water supply from there. That was their only connection with it during Shivaji’s times.

When Abraham Shipman came in 1662 to take over the island of Bombay from the Portuguese, he stayed on Anjediv with 500 of his men. He died there in 1664. When the English took possession of this island, the Portuguese did not raise any objection, but the Adilshahi officer, Rustamjama of Karwar, arrested Subedar Mohamed Khan for not having

resisted the English occupation.9

Although the Viceroy was not prepared to enter into any talks with Sambhaji in respect of Anjediv, Portuguese-Mahratta relations did not suffer on this account. On the contrary, when the Viceroy learnt from the envoy of the Mahrattas that a son had been born to Sambhaji, he wrote him a congratulatory letter and sent an ornament as a present to the baby prince. The letter is dated 28 July, 1682. This son must have been Shahu. The Viceroy referred to him as Sambhaji’s successor in this letter.

Sambhaji informed the Viceroy that he had started gun-powder factories at Kudal and Bicholim and that he had given orders for the purchase of guns, sulphur, saltpeter etc. from Karnatak and Malabar. All these goods would be brought by sea and he requested that they should not be obstructed by the Portuguese fleet. The Viceroy complied and informed

Sambhaji accordingly in a letter dated 28 July 1682.10 Sambhaji also took into consideration the complaints of the Portuguese and arrested Jivaji Vinayak and reappointed Moro Dadaji in his place.11 Although Sambhaji was thus endeavouring to maintain friendly relations with the Portuguese, the treaty with them to negotiate which Yesaji Gambhirrao was kept as envoy with the Portuguese remained unconcluded. The Viceroy reminded Sambhaji every now and then but the treaty was not made, whatever may be reasons therefore.

In 1682 (August) the Portuguese Viceroy learnt that the Moghul was marching against Sambhaji after much preparation. The Viceroy instructed his officers at Cheul, Bassein and Daman that the Moghul army should be allowed to pass through Portuguese territory without any obstruction. In a letter to the King of Portugal dated 24 January, 1683, the Viceroy had said that the Moghul army had passed through Portuguese territory with permission. He also

mentioned therein that, till then, Moghul behaviour had been good enough but nothing could be said about the future, because the Moghuls were untrustworthy.

On 20 January, 1683, Sheikh Mahomed, Aurangazeb’s envoy, came to Goa. He brought a letter from the Moghul Emperor to the Viceroy which was dated 20 June, 1682. This means that the Viceroy received it six months after it was written. Sheikh Mahomed told the Viceroy that the Emperor wished to declare war on Sambhaji and he hoped the Portuguese would do likewise. He also made the request that the Moghuls should be allowed to purchase grain in Portuguese territory and that Moghul ships going from Surat to Bombay should not be molested by the Portuguese.

While the Viceroy agreed to comply with all the two latter requests of the Moghul Emperor, he expressed his inability to declare war on the Mahrattas because he was on terms of friendship with Sambhaji.

On 17 February, 1683, the Viceroy informed Ramchandra Pandit by a letter of the request made by the Moghul Emperor and suggested that Sambhaji should immediately conclude the much delayed treaty of permanent friendship. Yesaji Gambhirrao was the Mahratta envoy to the Portuguese and the Viceroy presumably informed him about his talks with Sheikh Mahomed, the Moghul envoy.12

The Portuguese allowed the Moghul army to pass through their territory in northern Konkan. In addition, when they learnt that the Mahrattas were building a fort at Parsik to impede the movements of Moghul ships to Kalyan and Bhivandi, the Portuguese took possession of the site and built fort of their own there. This is an index of the Portuguese attitude to the Moghul.13

Sheikh Mahomed, the Moghul envoy, left Goa in April 1683. With him, the Viceroy sent his letter to the Moghul Emperor dated 12 April 1683. This long letter was in Portuguese. It throws light on the Viceroy’s dual and equivocal political activities. He informed Aurangazeb that he had instructed his officers to allow the Moghul army to pass through Portuguese territory even before he received the Emperor’s letter and in spite of Sambhaji’s entreaties to the contrary. He further requested the Emperor that, in exchange of this assistance, the Moghul Emperor should make a present to the Portuguese of all territory from the Konkan that he would take by conquest.14 The Viceroy had some more expectations also.15 The Viceroy felt certain that in the Moghul-Mahratta combat, the Mahrattas would be certainly defeated and he planned to exploit this opportunity for getting South Kokan from the Moghuls. To join the whole of Southern Konkan to Goa was the long-cherished dream of the Portuguese16 and Vice-Rei Conde de Alvora’s policy in the matter was not different.17

As the Portuguese allowed the Moghul army to pass through their territory in December 1682, the Mahrattas plundered and burnt many villages from the north Konkan possessions of the Portuguese. They carried off many a ship and boat belonging to them and made two Portuguese Padres captive. In retaliation, the Portuguese seized some ships of Vengurla merchants that were fully loaded with rice from Karnatak and conveyed them to Goa. The Mahratta envoy at the Portuguese Court was placed under arrest and the Portuguese bombarded Cheul then in Mahratta possession. All these events took place in April and May 1683.

When it was suggested to the Viceroy on 4 May, 1683 that he should congratulate Sambhaji on his victory over the Moghuls at Kalyan, Conde de Alvora said : “Our relations with Sambhaji are now of a different character and there is no longer cause for such congratulation.”18 From this utterance of the Viceroy, it is clear to what extent Mahratta

Portuguese relations had deteriorated. When the Moghul Prince Akbar asked the Viceroy through his envoy why, all of a sudden, the Mahratta envoy Yesaji Gambhirrao was arrested, Conde de Alvora replied that Sambhaji had gone to war against them without any previous warning, had arrested two Portuguese padres who were travelling in good faith through Mahratta territory, and that he also had information that a caravan carrying grain to the Portuguese would be waylaid. For this reason, the Mahratta envoy had been placed under the vigil of sentinels.19 However, a few days later, the Mahratta envoy was released and allowed to leave Goa.

Vice-Rei Conde de Alvora entertained the ambition of making Sambhaji captive. A fair takes place every year on Gokulashtami day at Narve in the month of Shravana. Thousands of people go there on that day for a holy dip in the Panchaganga river nearby. The island of Diwadi is situated on the southern bank of this river and on the northern bank is Narve in

Bhatagram. Diwadi was then in Portuguese territory and Narve in Mahratta territory. The holy place, Narve, is beyond Diwadi.20

On 12 August, 1683, the Viceroy learnt that Sambhaji was going to Narve for a holy dip in the river. An original letter of the Viceroy shows that the Portuguese planned to capture Sambhaji by a sudden attack.21 There is no trace among the Portuguese documenets as to what transpired later.

On 22-23 July, 1683, the Mahrattas launched an assault on the Revdanda fort, but the Portuguese repulsed it. Don Manoel Lobo de Silveira was the general of Bassein at this time and had only one battalion of infantry. He therefore requested Siddi Yakutkhan of Janjira to help him. The Siddi immediately supplied 400 men. So, de Silveria’s battalion and Siddi’s 400 soldiers were taken by sea to Revdanda.22

The Mahrattas maintained the siege of Revdanda. On 16 December, 1683, the Viceroy wrote to the King of Portugal : “The Mahrattas have laid siege to Cheul also and this has lasted for about six months.”23

An account of the conflict between Sambhaji and the Portuguese from 2 January, 1683 to 25 January, 1684 is available in the Biblioteca Nacional de Lisboa, and its English version in the India Office, London. This account has been extensively used by Sir Jadunath Sarkar.24 This account states that on 10 August, 1683, Sambhaji’s 2,000 cavalry and 6,000 infantry laid siege to Cheul. On 18 August, they attempted to storm the fortress but the Portuguese repulsed the attack.25

The date, 10 August, mentioned above is according to the new style. Sir Jadunath’s conclusion, therefore, is that the Mahrattas besieged Cheul on 31 July.26 But this date is not correct as is proved on the strength of the Surat English factor’s letter of 31 July (old style).27 This letter states that “Raje Sambhaji has besieged Cheul with a big army and he is about to take it.” So, this siege must have been laid a few days earlier. The letter of Vice-Rei Conde de Alvora of 16 December, 1683 mentioned earlier also supports this.

The Portuguese records give 22-23 July, 1683 as the date of the siege and this cannot be incorrect. 22 July is a date according to the new style and it becomes 12 July according to old style. Although it is mentioned that 22 July 1683 is the date of the Mahratta attack on Cheul-Revdanda, yet it is the date of only the first attack. If it is agreed that Sambhaji’s army besieged Cheul in June, the siege becomes one of six months’ duration by December 1683. Even the Jedhe Shakavali says that on 10 June (old style) Revdanda was besieged.

Naturally, according to new style, the siege was laid on 20 June and on 22-23 July an assault

on the fort was launched with a view to capturing it. Such a conclusion is logical and legitimate.28

The manuscript in Biblioteca Nacional da Lisboa mentioned earlier was prepared in Goa and its author must have been some Franciscan padre. Even then, it would be hazardous to say that all that he has recorded is correct. The Viceroy planned to attack Ponda in order to compel the Mahrattas to lift the siege of Cheul. Accordingly, the Viceroy camped with his army29 at Agaçaim on 27 October. One thousand two hundred and six Portuguese soldiers and 2,500 native Christian soldiers from Salçette accompanied him.30 That the Viceroy had taken six cannons with him is the information found in Relaçao Verdadeira, but in another contemporary report it is stated that there were 3,200 soldiers, 25 horsemen. and four cannons.31 On 28 October, the Viceroy landed with this army at Durbate, an important port in Sambhaji’s Ponda Mahal. Dulba Nayak,32 the Desai of Ponda had secretly gone over to the Portuguese. He joined the Viceroy at Durbate with 70 soldiers. The Viceroy’s army reached Ponda on 7 November. On their way, they had a skirmish with 300 Mahratta soldiers.33 The Mahrattas put up a stout resistance but the bombardment broke open the inner defences of the fort. It was raining heavily at the time. The Viceroy did not expect the strong resistance that was put up by the Mahrattas.

As the Portuguese army was preparing to lead the last assault on the fort on 29 November, Sambhaji came to Ponda post haste from Rajapur and, within sight of the Portuguese, he sent 600 of his horsemen to the fort, protected by 800 others. Under such circumstances, the Viceroy thought that the Mahrattas would attack him from the rear and obstruct his line of retreat and so he lifted the siege and decided to return to Goa. The morale of the Portuguese army was affected and many, of them began to run away to Durbate port.34 In the Ponda battle, Yesaji Kank showed the greatest prowess. A vatan document of 1685 mentions this as also Sambhaji’s attack on the retreating Portuguese.35

On 10 November 1683, the Viceroy lifted the siege and retreated with his army to Durbate. The Mahrattas completely routed the Portuguese by attacking them from a hill near the creak. Yesaji Kank suffered a number of injuries and died as a result in this battle.36 Many Portuguese and Goan Christians (Canaris) fought bravely and died here. In the report referred to earlier it is said that the Mahratta army consisted of 800 cavalry and 2,000 foot. The Viceroy was seriously wounded and twice narrowly escaped death. In this battle, most of the Portuguese soldiers were killed and the dead and wounded among the Goan Christians were more than 200.

On 12 November, at about 8 a.m. the Portuguese army returned to Goa. Vice-Rei Conde de Alvora was much distressed and remained for four days in the Jesuit monastery in

Old Goa by the side of the church of Bom Jesus. He did not see anybody during this period. In a letter to his king dated 16 December, 1683, he says : “I went to Ponda from Durbate and for nine days fought a great battle. The rains greatly obstructed our movements and Sambhaji got time to come to the help of the Ponda garrison. He gained control of the battlefield on the strength of his cavalry. We unanimously decided to retreat as there was no prospect of help. I retreated slowly while fighting went on. That required two days for covering two miles. I brought with me all the equipment and cannons.”37

A contemporary Portuguese report says that Vice-Rei Conde de Alvora retreated very skilfully. There is a manuscript, “Breve resumo dos Successos do Estado Portuguez na India nos anos de 1682 e 1683”, in the Biblioteca Nacional da Lisboa, which states the following as the reasons for Conde de Alvora’s attack on Ponda.38(1) to compel the Mahrattas to lift the siege of Cheul; (2) to gain the whole of Southern Konkan from Banda to Mirjan in order to facilitate the protection of Portuguese Goa i.e. the island of Goa, and Salçette and Bardez; (3) to bring the people of the Konkan under Portuguese rule which, the MS. states is what they desire as they were believed to be unhappy under what the MS. describes as Sambhaji’s oppressive rule; (4) to gain control of the considerable revenues of the Konkan; and (5) to take possession of the Konkan before the Moghul Emperor did.

Giving these as the reasons, the writer of the said manuscript says that what the Viceroy did was quite right but fortune did not favour him and, when he needed help from Portugal most, it did not arrive. In this way, a good opportunity for the King of Portugal to annex a new kingdom was lost. The writer of this report knew the policy of the Viceroy very well. Contemporary official correspondence confirms his view of the reasons for the conflict.39 The correspondence between Dr. Luis Gonsalves de Couto and Vice-Rei Conde de Alvora in Biblioteca da Ajuda, Lisboa also throws good light on this affair.40

Manucci says that the Viceroy attacked Ponda because he learnt that Sambhaji had stored much wealth in Ponda fort. This Italian traveller also writes that the spies of Sambhaji had spread this canard in order to mislead Conde de Alvora.41 But no Portuguese document supports this statement of Manucci.42 On the contrary the reasons of Conde de Alvora’s attack on Ponda are quite explicitly stated in the report referred to above.

Most of the Konkan Desais maintained friendly relations with the Portuguese during the Sambhaji-Portuguese conflicts in the Konkan. It has already been related that Dulba Desai of Ponda joined the Portuguese at Durbate in the midst of the battle. Keshav Desai of Pernem had been a protege of the Portuguese in Bardez from October 1680.43 The Desai of Bicholim had been living in Old Goa since the middle of 1683. Before that he lived in Panvel with his family. The Ranas of Sanquelim lived in Kumbharjua from 1682 onwards, Satroji Rane

the vatandar of Revode, Nanode and Pirna was captured by the Mahrattas while he was fighting Sambhaji on behalf of the Portuguese.44

There is mention in the letter of Dr. Luis Gonçalves de Couto dated 23 September, 1683 that Keshav Prabhu had informed the Viceroy that all the Desais, from Kudal to Ankola, would join the Portuguese in a war against Sambhaji because they were smarting under his oppression. Keshav Prabhu laid down only one condition, viz. that after Portuguese rule was established in Konkan, they should not demolish Hindu temples. Keshav Prabhu had not only supplied information about all Desais in the Konkan but also about all forts in the Konkan in Sambhaji’s possession, from Rajapur to Ankola.

The letter containing all this information is available in the Biblioteca da Ajuda, Lisbon.

Like Keshav Prabhu, the Desais of Bicholim and Sanquelim were ready to ally with the Portuguese in a war against Sambhaji as is mentioned in another letter of Dr. Luis Gonçalves Couto. The date of this letter is 19 September, 1683. The Khem Savant of Kudal was also favourable to the Portuguese. That the Portuguese had induced him to join them against

Sambhaji is clear from the letter of Dr. Couto dated 29 September, 1683.45 The Portuguese Vice-Rei’s ambition was to conquer all Southern Kokan by enlisting the help of all these and other Desais from the Konkan. Before the Viceroy marched on Ponda, these Desai negotiations had been completed and the writer of Breve Resumo dos successos was well informed about them. This writer also said that the 700 horsemen who attacked the Portuguese were in the employ of Prince Akbar and that this Prince later said that he did not participate in the battle and that his maternal uncle had taken this cavalry unit to Ponda.46

Prince Akbar was then probably living at Bicholim.47 The namajga that he built there still stands. Ishwardas says that the residences of Sambhaji and Akbar were in Bicholim.48 The Italian traveller Manucci was in Goa even before Sheikh Mahomed, Aurangzeb’s envoy, reached there. As he knew Persian and the customs and manners of the Moghul Court he was of great service to the Portuguese. The Viceroy had praised him for his services.49 Even so Manucci was not aware of all that was going on between the Moghuls and the Mahrattas. Consequently, not all that he has said in his Storia do Mogor about the battles of Ponda can be regarded as correct.50

The Viceroy himself has explained why the Portuguese met with failure in this battle. The heavy rains interfered with the movements of the army and Sambhaji gained time which worked in his favour. But contemporary documents show that there was a breach in the defence works of the fort as a result of bombardment by the Portuguese.51 This is confirmed by Kavi Kalash, Sambhaji’s Minister, in a gift deed made in favour of the Mujavars of Pir

Abdulla Khan in the fort.52 The deed says : “The Portuguese besiged the fort and greatly damaged it.” In a letter written to Siddi Yakutkhan, dated 13 November, 1683, Vice-Rei Conde de Alvora informed him that Sambhaji was aware that the fort would not be able to stand the Portuguese bombardment and he was therefore demolishing it.53

The Karwar English wrote to their Surat Council on 6 December 1683, that Sambhaji had pulled down the Ponda fort and had built another nearby,54 named Mardangad. The Italian traveller, Gemelli Careri, who visited Goa in 1695, wrote : “Twelve years ago, Conde de Alvora attacked Ponda Fort and soon effected a great breach in its walls. [y fit en pen de temps une grande breche.]. So Sambhaji demolished the Ponda fort and used its stones and other material for building another called Mardangad.”55

Pierre Joseph D’Orleans, a French Jesuit padre, writes in his book, Histoire de Sevaji et du son Successeur, nouneaux Conquerans dans les Indes, published in Paris in 1688, that when Sambhaji reached Ponda, the fort was in a dilapidated condition owing to Portuguese bombardment (deja demiruinee). He had obtained his information from Goa.

Sambhaji did not lift the siege of Cheul-Revedanda on account of the Portuguese attack on Ponda. On the contrary, it continued under the command of the Peshwa. In addition, the Mahrattas conquered some Portuguese territory from Bassein and Daman to the north of Goa.56 The Viceroy’s expectation that Sambhaji would quit Ponda and proceed to Panhala without taking any action against the Portuguese was totally belied.57

On 24 November, 1683,58 at eight o’clock at night, when the tide was low, some of Sambhaji’s men went to the island of Juvem and captured the fort there. The Portuguese had named this island as San Estevam. This island is beyond Dhavaji, a village in Tiswadi, and at ebb-tide, it is not difficult to ford the creek and reach Goa. The Portuguese called this fort the Passo Seco. To protect it, the Portuguese had built a fort on the island and, on the Dhavaji side, a watch tower manned by armed sentinels. On one side of the island were Bhatagram

and Ponda, Sambhaji’s possessions, and on the other, beyond the Mandovi river, was the fortification of Cidade de Goa.59 The tide was then rising. The padres armed themselves and ran to the fortification of the city and the Viceroy camped near Dhavaji from where the enemy was expected. He stayed there overnight.60 The next day, on 25 November, at 6 a.m., the Viceroy, accompanied by by 400 soldiers, marched in the direction of Juvem island where Sambhaji’s troops were awaiting him. A battle followed. Taking fright at the Mahratta horse, many Portuguese soldiers abandoned the Viceroy, came down the hill and ran to the bank of the river to save themselves. The Viceroy had a very narrow escape,61 but he was wounded. The tide in the river rose at this hour.

After the Mahrattas captured San Estevam, the Portuguese broke the bunds of the rice fields on the outskirts of Goa town. This inundated the fields with river water, thus in effect, increasing the width of the river. Many Portuguese were drowned in this flood water while trying to swim away to safety. It is believed that Sambhaji intended to attack Goa on this occasion but was prevented from doing so by the rising tide. In a record entitled, “Brief Story of Khando Ballal”62 it is said, ‘‘Goa was almost captured on that day, but the sea came to its rescue.” Very probably the reference is to this occasion. When the tide was rising Sambhaji’s own horse was being swept away, but Khando Ballal saved him without caring in the least for his own life.63

Till 12 noon on 16 November, 1683, the Mahratta army remained on the island. Then, all of a sudden, the army hastilly withdrew, leaving their guns and other equipment behind. Why they did this is enigmatic. The Portuguese had kept their fleet in readiness at Aguada, Reis Magos, Cabo and Mormugao under the protection of the respective forts. Portuguese ships were guarding Goa island round the clock and San Estevam was likely to be besieged by Portuguese fleet. The Viceroy had said as much.64

In 1570, when Adilshah had attacked Goa with a large army, he had captured this island. The Portuguese fleet had at that time surrounded the island and destroyed the occupying force. Since then, the Portuguese called it the “island of the dead”, ilha dos mortos.65 The Mahrattas probably feared that they would be similarly surrounded by the Portuguese fleet whose movements they were watching and therefore hastily withdrew. No

Marathi document speaks of the capture of this island by Sambhaji. Jedhe Shakavali speaks of “Kumbharjuve having been taken from the Portuguese in the month of Margashirsha”. But no Portuguese document mentions this event.

Had Sambhaji taken Kumbharjuve, it would certainly have been mentioned in Relaçao Verdadeira, Breve Resumo dos Sccessos, Oriente Conquistado, Letters of Vice-Rei Conde de Alvora, or Manucci’s account. Padre Francisco de Souza was a veritable Portuguese bard, but he has not said a word about the Victory of Kumbharjuve in his Oriente Conquestado. So it appears that the reference by Jedhe Shakavali to Kumbharjuve is really a

reference to Juvem or San Estevam. Since they are so near each other, such a mistake is very likely. In contemporary English sources, there is no mention of Sambhaji having taken Kumbharjuve except in the Karwar English factor’s letter dated 6 December, 1683.66 This letter said that a small island near Kumbharjuve was captured by the Mahrattas but they gave it up because threee-fourths of the island was surrounded by the Portughese fleet. This description applies to Juvem or St. Estevam.

CONTENTSBoth Sambhaji and the Portuguese Viceroy had information that Shah Alam was coming to the aid of the Portuguese with a big army from Aurangabad. Sambhaji decided to make use of his army against the Portuguese before the Moghul army reached South Konkan. The Viceroy has said that Sambhajii attacked the Portuguese because he did not want to keep his army unemployed.67 On 11 December, 1683, Sambhaji’s army attacked Bardez and Salçette. The writer of the report, Breve Resuma Succesos, recorded that, according to the information of the Portuguese Government, about 6,000 cavalry and eight to ten thousand infantry must have entered Bardez and Salçette. It is stated in Relacao Verdadeira that Sambhaji’s army that invaded Salçette consisted of one thousand horsemen and three thousand foot soldiers. Padre Francisco de Souza, a contemporary Portuguese chronicler, says that Sambhaji invaded Goa with 20,000 soldiers, four to five thousand cavalry and ten elephants. According to this account, on entering Bardez and Salçette, the Mahrattas resorted to plunder and arson, demolishing a number of Christian churches and the images therein,68 raping a number of Christian women,69 carrying off a number of men, women and children and presenting many of them to their soldiers. Some were sold in Vengurla harbour to some Arabs or to Dutch factors. The Portuguese protested to Sambhaji about this.70

In his proclamation dated 13 December, 1683, the Viceroy said that the enemy has openly declared that no trace of the Portuguese and Christians would be allowed to remain in Goa.71 The Portuguese successfully defended only Aguada, Reis-Magos and Raitur and Murgao forts against the onslaught of the Mahrattas. All their other forts were captured by the Mahrattas. Sambhaji removed 46 cannons from the forts in Bardez. Bishop Don Gaspar de Liao wrote in 1573 that native Christians fought the enemy like tigers with their Portuguese comrades72 but the Portuguese had a different experience at the time of this invasion by Sambhaji. Goan Christian soldiers were posted at Thivim fort. As soon as they got scent of the enemy, they abandoned their arms and fled. Some of them, according to the Portuguese, took up employment with the Hindu prince of Karnatak.73 In a letter to the King of Portugal on 25 January, 1684, the Viceroy gave an account of Sambhaji’s invasion of Goa and said that the enemy was in Bardez and Salçette for 26 days. He had besieged the fort of Raitur for six days.74

It is no wonder that François Martin, the French factor at Surat, had an adequate idea of how difficult the position of the Portuguese had become in their conflict with Sambhaji because there was correspondence between him and Conde de Alvora. He wrote that the situation in Goa was very difficult; the Viceroy did his best to resist the Mahrattas and prevent them from entering the island on which the city was situated. They were waiting, he wrote, for the Moghul help to arrive and entirely depended on it.75 [“Ⅰls (the Portuguese) etaient tres mal a Goa Le Vice-roi se soutenait autant que ses forces puvaient le lui permettre, empechant les ennemis d’entrer dans Ⅰ’ile au Ia ville de Goa est situee. Tout le recours elait

dans le secours du Mogol que les Portugais attendaient.”] On one occasion, the Mahrattas poisoned the water supply to Goa town at the source, Baigini spring. But the Naikwadi of Ponda, Ramaji Naik, quickly informed the Portuguese about this and averted a disaster,75 and the great danger.76 Curiously enough, Adilshah had also poisoned the water supply in 1570 when he had besieged Goa.77

After having captured Salçette and Bardez, the Mahrattas were exerting to take the island of Goa also. The Viceroy feared that if things went on as they were going, Sambhaji would soon conquer the island of Goa.78 He went to the body of St. Francis Xavier, lying in the Bom Jesus Church in Old Goa, and placed his sceptre in the dead saint’s hand and prayed for his grace to avert the Mahratta menace.79 There was only one hope left for the Viceroy and that was the succour of the Moghul Emperor.

There is in the Goa Archives a letter from the Siddi of Janjira to the Viceroy of Goa dated 12 September, 1735 in which it is said that his predecessor had informed the Moghul that Goa was about to pass into the hands of Sambhaji and that, as a result, there was immediate Moghul help in the form of troops and the Mahrattas had to give up the siege of Goa.80

..When Sambhaji learnt that Shah Alam was approaching, he withdrew to Raigad on 2 January, 1684. Faced with the danger of the Moghul army, Sambhaji planned to make peace with the Portuguese through the mediation of Prince Akbar and appointed Kavi Kalash to carry on negotiations. Padre Francis de Souza has written on 3 January, 1684 that, “the Mahrattas sent four representatives to Dhavaji and prayed for peace. Three days later, the Poruguese envoy, Manuel Saraeve de Albuquerque, crossed the Mandovi to negotiate. The fighting then ceased. The Mahrattas lifted the siege of Raitur and left Bardez. The approach of the Moghul army caused a commotion in the Mahratta ranks. The Commander of Aguada drove the remnants of the enemy from Betim and Caisou and in this way the enemy occupied territory of Goa was liberated.” The information in Oriente Conquistado is supported in at least some respects by contemporary Government documenets.

A letter written by Dr. Luis Gonçalves de Couto to the Viceroy on 31 December, 1683 is in the Biblioteca da Ajuda.81 In that letter he said; “I have written to Manuel Saraeve that he should be prepared to leave next Sunday. He wished to take Nicolav Manucci with him but he said he was not keeping well and so was unable to accompany Manuel. As a matter of fact,

he did not wish to go as interpreter because previously he had acted as envoy. So if a Government interpreter can take his place (Lingua de Estado), I am completing the draft of the treaty and shall come to see you with it in the afternoon.” The Viceroy made the following remark on this letter : “You should order the feitore to purchase the presentation articles. It

would have been better had Manucci gone with Manuel. But it will do if a Government interpreter (Lingua do Estato) also goes. But if someone else is available he should not be sent, because I don’t find him straight.”.

It is probable that the Viceroy did not find the Government interpreter trustworthy because he was a Hindu.82 The list of the presentation articles that the Portuguese envoy was to take with him is available.83 It reads as follows : “Three gold ornaments for the Shahazada (Akbar) if he is present to participate in the talks. Three gold ornaments for Sambhaji Raje.

Two articles for Durgadas, one of them of gold and the other a tea set. Two for Sambhaji’s Secretary, which must be there. If necessary ten pieces of China for others (peças de China).”.

There is no date on this list. But it has been registered immediately after 27 December 1683. If Manuel Saraeve left Goa on the first Sunday after 31 December, 1683, he must have left Goa on 2 January 1684. In that case, the date as given in Oriente Conquistado is wrong and the one given in Relaçao Verdadeira is right.

Manucci ultimately accompanied the Portuguese envoy in deference to the wishes of the Viceroy.84 Mention is made in Dr. Couto’s letter dated 31 December 1683 mentioned earlier that Manucci had once acted as Viceroy’s envoy at Sambhaji’s Court. Manucci himself has also written about it. From this it seems that the date of the arrival of Sambhaji’s representatives for negotiating a treaty between him and the Portuguese was 28 November, 1683 as given in Relaçao Verdadeira. Although Oriente Conquistado says that the Portuguese envoy, Manuel Saraeve de Albuquerque, crosed the rive for negotiating the treaty, the Goa records mention in several places that he went to Ponda for this purpose.85

Jedhe Shakavali recounts that Kavi Kalash, accompanied by Prince Akbar, went to the forest of Bhimgad and made peace with the Portuguese on Magh Shuddai. From this it is clear that on 17 January, 1684, the treaty between the Portuguese and the Mahrattas was concluded. But Breve Resuma dos successos says that Manuel Saraeve de Albuquerque reached Rasai on 13 January, 1684 and from there informed the Viceroy that the clauses of

the treaty had been agreed to but it had not yet been signed because Moghul forces have already come down the ghat and camped in the Konkan. Receipt of this letter is mentioned in the letter of Conde de Alvora dated 14 January 168486.

Shah Alam came down Ramghat on 7 January, 1684 and camped in the Konkan as is obvious from Jedhe Shakavali. It is also mentioned in Relaçao Verdadeira that he reached Bicholim on 15 January, 1684. It has been mentioned in the letter of the Viceroy of the same date that the Moghul army was only six miles away from Bicholim on 13 January.87 On 12

January, 1684, Syed Asadulla wrote to the Viceroy requesting him to send Dulba Naik, Sardesai of Ponda, to the Moghul camp.88 Bicholim is about four miles off Bhimgad and it therefore does not seem probable that Prince Akbar and Kavi Kalash stayed near that fort till 17 January. Besides, Shah Alam’s correspondence with the Viceroy had been going on from

12 January, so they might have thought it risky to camp near Bhimgad.

In the Viceroy’s letter dated 25 January, 1684 it is said that the treaty negotiations were in full swing but not concluded till then. So the Jedhe Shakavali record is not corroborated by Portuguese sources. But Prince Akbar is recorded as having gone to Bhimgad in Breve resuma dos soccessos. Later it is also recorded that the Moghuls besieged Bhimgad. Portuguese Government documents clearly show that some time after 25 January and before 4 February, the treaty between Sambhaji and the Portuguese was finalised.89

There is no Portuguese record to show that the treaty negotiations even took place in Bhimgad forest. On the contrary, it is mentioned everywhere that the treaty was concluded at Ponda. Ponda is far away from Bicholim and it is not surprising that Akbar and Kavi Kalash considered Ponda more safe than Bhimgad. Shah Alam’s troops did not march towards

Ponda till the very end. Even if negotiations for the treaty started in the forest of Bhimgad, they might have been postponed because of the Moghul attack. It seems that they had then not marched as far as Ponda and so the final negotiations must have been conducted in Mardangad fort.90 Many days before the treaty was concluded fighting had stopped and exchange of prisoners had also taken place.

The originals of all treaties and pacts were in the Goa Archives. Most of them are now in Lisbon. Portuguese versions of almost all the treaties made by the Portuguese with Indian rulers are obtainable in the Biblioteca Nacional da Lisboa.91 But, unfortunately, a copy of the treaty concluded with Sambhaji in 1684 is not available there. There is no information about this treaty even in Biker’s Tratados, but there is no doubt that this treaty was concluded and that it bore the seals of Akbar and Sambhaji.92 The Viceroy’s letter to Joao de Sequeira de Faria, General of Bassein, dated 4 February, 1684 speaks of a copy of this treaty being despatched as an enclosure with it.93

The substance of the treaty can be gathered from this letter of 4 February, as follows :94

(1) Sambhaji should return all the territory and forts captured by him, with guns and arms.

(2) There should be a mutual exchange of ships and goods seized since the fighting began.

(3) There should be a mutual exchange of prisoners.

(4) Gavkhandi and Chauthai as was paid to the Chauthiya Raja by the Portuguese in Bassein territory should hereafter be paid to Sambhaji and he in turn should protect that territory.

(5) There should be free trade and travel between the Mahratta and Portuguese territories.

(6) The Portuguese should not afford Moghul ships laden with grain intended for Moghul troops the protection of Portuguese artillery on their forts.95 This clause would naturally not apply where there was no Portuguese artillery.

Some more items were presumably included in the treaty. One clause provided that the Desais who had rebelled against Sambhaji and had sought Portuguese asylum should be granted amnesty.96 One more clause prohibited Sambhaji from constructing any forts on Portuguese borders.97 The Viceroy knew well that Sambhaji agreed to this treaty only under the pressure of the circumstances created by Moghul aggression.98 As a matter of fact, Sambhaji’s Peshwa did not at all approve the treaty negotiated by Akbar and Kavi Kalash on behalf of Sambhaji. The Peshwa secretly hated Kavi Kalash and since it was at his instance that the treaty was made, the Peshwa desired that it should not be observed as has been recorded by a Portuguese nobleman.99 On 12 January, 1684, the Viceroy convened a meeting of his State Council and took the decision to remove the capital from Goa to Marmugao

fortress. The reasons given by the Viceroy for this move eminently show how very miserable the condition of the Portuguese was at this time.100 The Viceroy had no adequate idea of the Mahratta war strategy and their military strength before he met Sambhaji on the battlefield. The envoy of Akbar had told the Viceroy that Sambhaji’s legions were full of cowardly mercenarics101 and be imagined that his few disciplined soldiers would be more than a match for them. In the beginning of September 1683, the Viceroy received the first hints that Sambhaji was planning to march on Goa with a big force. It was his aged and learned secretary, Dr. Couto, who sent him Asia Portuguesa, a historical volume by Manuel Faria de Souza, and recommended to him that he read the description therein of the two sieges that Adilkhan of Bijapur had laid around Goa. The Viceroy returned this volume with thanks with a note to the effect that even if Sambhaji marched on Goa with all his strength he would be able to protect Goa, only Salçette and Bardez being far away, they might be invaded by the Mahrattas before help could reach there.102 Conde de Alvora was a brave and veteran soldier.

He had participated in many a battle against Spain. Before he came out to Goa, he had been Governor of Angola.

The Viceroy learnt from personal experience that to protect Goa town against the Mahrattas was an impossibility.103 The Portuguese had a fine navy; Goa town was well fortified and, in several places, there were towers. There was an ammunition factory in the town and at the mouth of the Mandovi there were strong forts at Marmugao, Aguada, Reis

Magos and Cabo. In spite of all this, he thought it expedient and absolutely necessary to remove his capital to Mormugao.

As soon as Shah Alam came down the Ramghat, Sambhaji was compelled to lift the siege of Goa. Ramghat is only 30 miles from Goa. On 12 January, 1684, the Secretary of Shah Alam sent a letter to the Viceroy in which it was said that the Portuguese had bravely withstood Sambhaji’s assault but nevertheless, if the Viceroy had any expectations of the Moghul he should send a messanger to Shah Alam so that he would see what he could do to help them.104 Shah Alam’s troops reached Bicholim on 15 January, 1684, as has been mentioned earlier. His army consisted of 40,000 horsemen, 60,000 foot, 1,900 elephants and

2,000 camels, according to the Relaçao Verdadeira. Manucci has recorded that there were 45,000 horsemen,105 while Oriente Conquistado says that there were 70,000 horsemen and innumerable infantry.106 Khafi Khan mentions that there were only 20,000 horsemen.107

Three days afterwards, on 18 January, 1684, Aurangzeb’s fleet presented itself opposite Aguada fortress at the mouth of the Mandovi. There were 101 ships in it. They had brought provisions for Shah Alam’s forces. The Moghuls burnt the town of Bicholim and razed to the ground the mansions of Akbar and Sambhaji.108 There was no castle at Bicholim at that time.109 According to Ishwardas, a biographer of Aurangzeb, it was a big township and the English, the French, the Dutch and the Portuguese had built palatial houses in it.110 In this town was a beautiful Catholic church built by the Goan Bishop, Don Mateos de Castro.111 Under the Subedar of Bicholim was the territory covered by Bhatagram, Sanquelim (Satari), Pernem, Maneri and Banda except the Kudal area.112 After completely demolishing the town of Bicholim, the Moghul army encamped on the banks of the river near Narve in Bhatagram. A Vatan deed mentions that the Moghuls demolished a temple consecrated to Rama at Pilgaon and defiled and destroyed the idols.113 It is probable that the Moghuls also damaged other temples, including that of Saptakoteshwara in the Bhatagram area. In this campaign, the Moghuls also burnt Kudal and Banda (Savantvadi) and plundered Vengurla.

Shah Alam sent an envoy and a letter to Goa and asked for permission for the ships that had arrived from Surat to pass up the Mandovi to Narve. The Viceroy granted them permission to pass through the Caesuo river instead as he probably thought there was danger

to Goa town if the Moghul fleet passed through the Mandovi.114 The Viceroy had already removed the guns from the fort of Chapora on the bank of Caesuo to some other place.115

The ships that had come from Surat landed some cargo, including foodgrains, in Caesuo port and the rest in the port of Vengurla.116 A biographer of Aurangzeb, Bhimsen Bashampuri, says that these ships supplied grains to Shah Alam’s army twice117 (Nuksha-i Dilkusha). The Moghul envoy, Sheikh Mahomed, once again came to Goa and saw the Viceroy. He came with this Moghul armada.118

The Viceroy sent his envoy, Joao Antonio Portogal, to Shah Alam on 23 January, 1684.119 Two days earlier, Shah Alam’s army had left Bicholim.120 So the Portuguese envoy had to go to Vengurla. The Viceroy had given written instructions to the envoy before he left for the Moghul camp. But this document is not available in the Goa Archives or the Biblioteca da Ajuda. However, information on the pricipal points is available in the Viceroy’s letter to the Moghul Emperor dated 20 March, 1684. The Viceroy informed Shah Alam that he was prepared to continue the war against Sambhaji and requested him not to leave the Konkan before the end of the monsoon. He added, however, that he was in financial difficulties since the Mahrattas had inflicted damage to the extent of ten lakhs of rupees (20 lakh asurpis), and requested that the Moghul should pay this sum to him in compensation and also send him six hundred horses. The envoy also discussed some other minor matters with Shah Alam. Breve resumo do successos mentions that the Viceroy demanded territory from Banda to Mirjan.

There is a scrap of paper in the Viceroy’s hand in the correspondence of Dr. Couto and Conde de Alvora in the Biblioteca da Ajuda in which there is a demand for Konkan and Cheul territory from the Moghul.121 But there is no mention of this in the letter dated 20 March, 1684. From Vengurla, Shah Alam went up the Ramghat and Manucci accompanied him. After the Moghul army had left the Konkan after plundering and despoiling it, Prince Akbar’s two envoys called on the Viceroy in the first week of February 1684. They were Madaji Naik and Rai Kirtisingh. Conde de Alvora sent a letter and a present to Sambhaji with Madaji Naik and requested him to make arrangements to implement the treaty concluded in January. He assured him that he was prepared to abide by the conditions of the treaty. A fortnight later, Conde de Alvora sent Ramkrishna Naik Barve to Kavi Kalash for completing the treaty

arrangements.122

On 13 March, 1684, the Viceroy held a meeting of his Council and stated, citing illustrations, that the terms of the treaty were not being observed by Sambhaji.123 At the end of March, the Portuguese sent their envoy to Raigad. He was Fr. Antonio de Sao Joseph, an Augustine padre. Some Portuguese officers and Ramkrishna Naik Barve, as interpreter,

accompanied him. The present author has published an account of this embassy in an English article in 1936.124

A difference arose between Sambhaji and the Portuguese envoy over two matters not mentioned in the treaty. Sambhaji held that when the former Portuguese envoy, Manuel Saraeve de Albuquerque, had seen him in connection with the treaty he had agreed that the Portuguese would give up Anjediv island and that the Viceroy would sent his envoy to Sambhaji with a present of one lakh hons.

While the Portuguese envoy was at Raigad, the Viceroy received a letter from Prince Akbar and two others from Durgadas and Gangadhar. These letters made the suggestion that Anjediv should be given up and a valuable present should be sent to Sambhaji.125 But the Portuguese refused to act on the suggestion and said that what was not mentioned in the terms of the treaty and was not acceptable. Finally, the Portuguese envoy and Kavi Kalash decided on 6 September that representatives of Sambhaji should go to Goa with Fr. Antonio de Sao Joseph and get a final reply from the Viceroy on these two points and meanwhile maintain the truce.126

Fr. Antonio de Sao Joseph and party left Raigad in October and returned to Goa via Cheul the next month. Sambhaji’s envoys did not accompany them. They reached Ponda at the end of December 1684. Their names were Rangaji Lakshmidhar and Sidhoji Farjand. Rangaji knew Portuguese. Two of his letters to Fr. Antonio are in this language. The letters of Sidhoji Farjand are in Marathi. On 29 December, 1684 their letters reached the Viceroy in Goa. These two envoys were accommodated by the Portuguese Government at the foot of the Monte in Goa town.127 They were informed that ships to Portugal would sail on 20 January, 1685 and that they should meet the Viceroy only after that and not before.128 There was some more exchanges of letters and the envoys were summoned to Goa town. The Mahrattas attacked Bardez on 23 February, 1685 after these envoys had arrived in Goa.129 In retaliation, the Portuguese Viceroy ordered a watch to be kept on them the next day.130 Rangaji Lakshmidhar protested to Fr. Antonio de Sao Joseph against this in his letters dated 11 April and 13 May, 1685131 In his Portuguese letter, Rangaji said, ‘You have brought us here from Rairi. If I had taken you to Rairi like that and if you had been watched as we have been watched, I would have freed you within twenty-four hours and if that had become impossible I would have stood before the Chhatrapati like a recluse with my moustaches shaved off. Neither Sambhaji nor his illustrious father had ever broken a word pledged even to seditious and rebellious persons.”.

Sidhoji Farjand who accompanied Rangaji Lakshmidhar wrote in his Marathi letter to Fr. Antonio de Sao Joseph dated 10 March 1685 that Chhatrapati Sambhaji wanted the

Portuguese to know that he wanted Anjediv island and a valuable present. The Viceroy had been appraised of it in a personal interview. There was nothing more to do. The Viceroy did not agree to either demand, so what was the use of their continuing to stay longer in Goa? They had come to Goa on trust and since there was nothing to do, it was not proper that they should live in Goa in misery.132 The letter sent by the Portuguese envoy, Manuel Saraeve, who went to Ponda to negotiate the treaty sent a letter to Kavi Kalash on 24 April, 1684 which throws a flood of light on this affair.133 In his opinion, controversy arose between the Mahrattas and the Portuguese because of an error made by a translator.

Manuel Saraeve de Albuquerque wrote to Kavi Kalash that be had not said that the Portuguese would give up Anjediv. What he had said was that he felt certain that the Portuguese would leave the island because of sickness and death (due to climate and hardships) and cited the example of the Portuguese and the English having done so before. About the present, he said that during the negotiations for the treaty nobody touches this point. Only Prince Akbar had once said that the Viceroy should send a present to Sambhaji and he in turn would send an elephant or something else to the Viceroy. When Akbar said this, Manuel said that the Viceroy was so magnanimous that he would voluntarily send a present and if he did not do that the envoy would do it on his own. The fact of the matter was that Sambhaji was not very keen about this treaty. The Portuguese had sustained considerable damage as a result of the war and they had no money in reserve.134 The Portuguese had recovered 40,000 asurpis as a mere war impost from Goa Hindus.135 It is no wonder then that the Mahratta envoys got a negative final reply from the Portuguese on these points, to clear which they came all the way to Goa from Raigad.

Several Desais opposed to Sambhaji from Sanquelim, Bicholim, Pernem and Ponda were living in Goa at that time. Khem Savant of Kudal, Desais like Ram Dalvi, Tana Savant and Rudraji Rane and Yesoba Rane of Sanquelim had risen in revolt against Sambhaji and sent their families to Goa to live under Portuguese protection.136 Like these Konkan Desais, the Desais of Karwar also rebelled against Sambhaji, captured Karwar fort which was in the possession of the Mahrattas, and sent their families to Anjediv island.

The Desais of Karwar then made over Karwar fort and the territory around, from Bhatkal to the Avarsa river, to the Jagirdar of Saunde, who sent seven hundred soliders and captured all the territory from Cabo de Rama to Ankola without any opposition. The Moghul army had by this time come down the ghat. Utilising this opportunity, the Saunde prince also took possession of Sambhaji’s fleet which was stationed near Karwar. It consisted of sixty

armed ships (galvetas) ten pals (palas) and two freshly built ships in Karwar river and 300 guns fitted on all these ships. The Karwar Desais counted these guns and made them over to a representative of the Saunde price.137 They also gave him possession of Karwar fort and

seven other forts of theirs : (1) Kholgad (Cabo da Rama), (2) Kurmagad, alias Simpigad, (3) Shiveshwar, (4-5) Kadre and Madhurgad, and (6-7) Ankola and Mahendragad.

Sambhajirao and Vithojirao, Desais of Karwar, probably mistakenly believed that the whole of Sambhaji’s fleet was stationed at Karwar. The Mahratta navy consisted of many more ships at that time. In the letter to Siddi Yakut Khan written by the Portuguese Viceroy on 13 November, 1683, it was mentioned that in the river of Negao, there were 76 galvetas

(warships) belonging to Sambhaji.138.

In February 1685, the Moghul took the fort of Karwar from the Saunde prince.139 Moghul control was established over all the territory that the Saunde prince had received from the Karwar Desais. The Saunde prince became a subordinate of the Moghul and subsequently ruled over this territory in that capacity. The Desais of the South Konkan who had rebelled against Sambhaji and allied with the Portuguese because Sambhaji retained a considerable part of their vatan revenue, as is apparent from their correspondence. The author believes that Sambhaji was compelled to do this on account of the war situation.

A report of the negotiations that the Desais of Sanqualim, Bicholim and Pernem had carried on with the Secretary of the Viceroy, Gonsalves Couto, against Sambhaji, is available.140 They said that they were ready to pay the Portuguese what they were formerly paying to Adilshah in whose time the usage was that two thirds of the revenue went to the Sultan and one-third was kept by the Desais. For exampel, the revenue of Bhatagram mahal was 22,000 hons, of which the Bijapur Sultan got 15,000 hons and the Desai 7,000.141 The

revenue of Satari was 10,000 hons, of which the Desai got 3,000 and the Badshah 7,000.

To the last, no friendly relations were established between Sambhaji and the Viceroy of Goa.

Dr. Luis Gonçalves Couto informed the Viceroy about Sambhaji’s campaign in north Konkan through a letter dispatched at the beginning of May 1684.142 He said, “The enemy has evacuated Cheul, but has greatly harmed the Bassein area. He has taken Kalyan (Galian), Saivan and Manor and recaptured Asheri Fort. He is fighting for Karanja (Uran), Mahim and Tarapur and has taken possession of Bassein town as far as Bhadrapur. Antonio Teiseira de Machado is guarding Belapur and Antonio Camelo is guarding Salçette. The enemy has captured the keeper of Asheri fort. The soliders from there had fled to Tarapur where they were placed under arrest. Padre Antonio Vaz Riscad who has come from Bassein says that many of the people of the Portuguese are under detention among whom are men, women and children. Many of them have been maimed by cutting their hands, feet, noses, ears and they are all panicky. Whereever the enemy went he took possession of churches. He

CONTENTSdemolished the fort and church of Manor.” Viceroy Conde de Alvora wrote to the King of Portugal on 24 January, 1686 to say that, since Sambhaji did not implement the treaty he made with the Portuguese, he (the Viceroy) was obliged to carry on the war. For that purpose, he had allied with many of the Konkan Desais and instigated them to rebel against Sambhaji. Secret talks with them were going on for many months and a pact was made with them on 8 February, 1685. Accordingly, on 12 February, 1685143 they rose and, attacking simultaneously in many areas, collected much plunder.144

The secret pact mentioned above was made by the Viceroy with Khem Savant. Its main clauses are as follows :

(1) Two parts of all the territory conquered from Banda to Ankola to be kept by the Portuguese and one by the Savant.

(2) The Portuguese would help with their fleet, to whoever captured the territory from Kudal to Cheul. For this the Portuguese would get one-third and the conqueror two-thirds of the territory.

(3) The Portuguese would lend such naval vessels to the Savant capable of fighting the enemy. Besides, the Portuguese would equip the ship loaned with men, arms and ammunition and ensure that they keep pace with the Savant’s moves on land.

(4) Besides naval help, the Portuguese would supply ammunition free of charge to the Khem Savant.

(5) Conde de Alvora would request the Moghul to employ the Desais in his service.

(6) After success was achieved, whatever Konkan territory came under Portuguese rule, would have freedom of worship as under Muslim or Mahratta rule.

(7) The Portuguese would not conciliate Sambhaji. The Savant would in no way harm the English, the French or the Dutch factories in Sambhaji’s territory.

(8) Once the war began the Portuguese would give financial help to the Savant as a loan.

Two copies of this pact were made. One was signed by the Viceroy and the other by Ram Salvi Bhonsale and Devu Savant Bhonsle, representatives of Khem Savant. On this

occasion, Mangoji Shenvi Laud and Vithoji Shenvi Karnik were present as interpreters respectively on behalf of the Portuguese and Khem Savant.

Though this pact was made between the Goa Portuguese and Khem Savant of Kudal, the Viceroy must have treated him as the leader of all the Konkan Desais.145 Of all the Konkan Desais, the Khem Savant had the largest army. According to the information of Keshav Prabhu he had in his service 2,000 soldiers in 1684. The rebel Desais inflicted severe damage on Sambhaji and the Viceroy said in his letter dated 24 January, 1686 that, except in Ponda, Sambhaji had no authority anywhere in Goa. The Portuguese regained all the territory in north Konkan that Sambhaji had taken. On 27 August and 12 September, 1685, they captured Jivadan and Kamandurg (Givdana and Camandrugo) from the Mahrattas.146 They reconquered Asheri fort from Sambhaji in October 1687.147 The Mahrattas were prepared to be bribed and hand over this fort to the Portuguese but the Viceroy informed his king that he had conquered it.148

On 11 May, 1686, the Viceroy directed the Captain of Cheul that small ships (embarcaçoes) from Sambhaji’s territory should be given permits to go out to sea at a fee of not more than four annas.149

Dharmaji Nagnath was Sambhaji’s Subedar at Ponda. The Moghul captured it from him with the help of Konkan Desais like Dulba Naik and others at the beginning of 1689.150 Sarbajkhan was appointed Subedar of Mardangad by the Moghul. The Viceroy wrote his first letter to him on 10 January 1689.151

On 13 August, 1688, the Viceroy permitted the Desais who were living in Goa, like Khem Savant, Ram Dalvi and Dulba Naik, to take up service with the Moghul. Accordingly, they left their families in Goa and went to see Bahadur Khan at Belgaum who received them with honour and employed them.152 A reference to their having left Goa is to be found in the Viceroy’s letter dated 27 October, 1688.153

There is a manuscript No. 8538 dated 24 January, 1688 which is a copy of a letter written by the Governor of Goa to the King of Portugal154 in which it is said that “the condition today of the hostilities between Sambhaji and ourselves is the same as it was in the time of Conde de Alvora. Here live the Desais who are enemies of Sambhaji, who encroach on his territory and plunder it. This creates unrest in his territory which is of great advantage to us. I

shall entertain them here as long as I consider their residence useful here.”

In January 1689, Nawab Bahadurkhan made over to Khem Savant the order of the Moghul Emperor conferring on him the Sardeshmukhi of Kudal. The Viceroy congratulated

him on this in a letter dated 14 February, 1689.155 One 3 June, 1690, the Moghul General, Abdul Raza Khan, recommended that the family of Khem Savant living in Bardez should be allowed to go to Kudal and the Portuguese gave the permission.156

After the death of Sambhaji, while Chhatrapati Rajaram was on his way to Jinji in Karnatak, Bahadur Khan wrote to the Portuguese that it was gathered that Rajaram was running away to Karnatak. All routes to the Karnatak should, therefore, be guarded and, if he was found, he should be arrested, or killed.157 The Governor of Goa wrote back to say in his letter dated 12 May, 1689 that he had made complete arrangements to arrest Rajaram if he tried to pass through Goa but added that he did not expecpt him to do so. The Governor further said that on learning that Bahadur Khan had ordered Khem Savant to go to Kudal, he had immediately instructed him to see Bahadur Khan. But since it was then not twelve days since his mother died, he had asked his nephews, Bapu Desai and Mamba Savant, to go ahead with some troops, intending to see Bahadur Khan later.

Khem Savant was then living in Bardez. From there he went to Kudal with the Moghul army in June 1689 and conquered the Banda fort.158 Thus sway of the Moghul over Kudal was established. Sanquelim, Bicholim and Maneri had already come under his sway earlier. It is apparent from a letter of Yesaji Rane of Sanquelim dated 11 April, 1689 that he was guarding Sanqulim and Bicholim forts on behalf of the Moghuls.159

There was quite a new spirit abroad among the people of Maharashtra after the execution of Sambhaji by Aurangzeb and it pervaded even the Desais near Goa. Many of them from Maneri, Sanquelim (Satari), Bicholim (Bhatagram), Ponda (Antruj) and Chandravadi were fired by the belief that the realm of the Chhatrapati was the resting place of the gods and Brahmans and they therefore enlisted in the army of Rajaram against the Moghul.160 But Khem Savant Bhansale and some others remained loyal to the Moghul.

The acting Governor of Goa informed the King of Portugal by a letter161 dated 10 January, 1691 that a number of Desais had abandoned the Moghul and joined Rajaram because they professed the same religion. Besides, the Muslims were notorious for assaulting their women and demolishing their temples. On this occasion, Portuguese policy in regard to the Moghuls and the Mahrattas was equivocal. They played the parties against each other and deceived both. The fact of the matter was that the Portuguese were certain that Mahratta rule would be re-established in the Konkan and they therefore considered it more beneficial that Hindu rulers should be their neighbours than Muslim ones.162

On the excuse that the Portuguese officials had helped the Mahrattas, the Moghul general, Matbarkhan, attacked Bassein territory from Bhimdi in 1692 and resorted to plunder

and devastation. But the Governor of Goa sent an envoy to the Moghul court and secured an order from Aurangzeb that Matbarkhan should end hospilities and pay two lakh rupees as damages to the Portuguese.163

While Rajaram was at Jinji, several Konkan Desais had joined Ramchandrapant Amatya and Santaji Ghorpade in their struggle against the Moghul. From the days of Sambhaji, the Mahrattas had taken an extremely hostile attitude towards the Portuguese and Raoji Shamraj’s battalion entered Bardez a few days before 15 November, 1694 and recovered Rs. 3 per head by force. The Viceroy complained about this and sent an envoy, Ramkrishna Naik Barve, to Raoji Shamraj.164 Earlier in 1694, a Portuguese nobleman, Antonio de Menezes, went to Achre port with three ships and resorted to arson. He demolished a Hindu temple there and burnt seven boats that were lying at anchor in the port.165 The effect of the Moghul-Mahratta conflict was noticed even at Mailapur, a town near Madras.166

Under the Moghul, the influence of Khem Savant Bhonsale, from among the Konkan Desais, gradually increased. In the middle of 1695, he had eight armed ships (galvetas)167 and a number of cargo ships in his possession and he began to function as a pirate. In 1695, Jemilli Careri, the Italian traveller came to India. From his account it seems that Ponda, otherwise called Antruj Mahal, was under Moghul control and Jambauli Panchmahal was administered by the Prince of Saunde.168 Being a tributory of the Moghul, he used to pay him a fixed tribute every year and help in war.169 In 1701, Anjya Shenvi was appointed havaldar at Chandravadi.170 What is curious is that on 14 July, 1696, the Saunde prince acquired the sanad of Ankola, and five other mahals and four fortresses and four castles. Savai Sadashiv Naik of Saunde got the sanad deed on 20 May, 1702 wherein friendship and help were assured to him.171 Another sanad of 16 July, 1705 given to Savai Basavling Raje Sounde acknowledges that he had secured territory from the Moghul covering Supe, Chandravadi, Khejarbali, Hemadbarse, Ashtaghar and Kakoda for a tribute of Rs. 10,000 a year.172 Though Chhatrapati Rajaram awarded the Panchmahal as an inam to Saunde and his successors, this was only on paper because, at that time and for many years afterwards, Mahratta rule was non-existent in that area. The Prince of Saunde had all this on paper only to avoid being molested by the Mahrattas.

At the beginning of August, 1696, Khem Savant conquered the fort of Kudal. Rajaram’s army had also captured this fort in between.173 After this, Khem Savant besieged the fort of Vegurla then in Moghul possession.174 He called himself a sardar of the Moghul but did not recognise the authority of the Moghul Subedar of Ponda. In 1698, Khem Savant took Sanquelim and Bicholim forts and besieged the fort of Ponda.175 He would have captured it also but for the timely help given by the Portuguese to the Moghul Subedar of Ponda.176

In the same year, Khem Savant conquered the mahal of Pernem. The Moghul had, in 1691, given this mahal as a jhagir to Nawab Bahadur Khan.177 The Portuguese Viceroy believed that this gift was a reward for the help the Nawab had given to the Moghul.178

In February 1701, Khem Savant took Pargad and thus got possession of Maneri Mahal. Hari Gavas was then the Desai of Maneri. In this way Khem Savant became Sardesai of the five mahals of Kudal, Pernem, Bicholim (Bhatagram), Sanquelim (Satari) and Maneri.179

In a letter dated 24 December, 1702, the Viceroy wrote to Portugal that though the Khem Savant was in the service of the Moghul, he often acted against his interests. Though, as against the Mahrattas, he had often helped the Moghul for his own benefit he had also often sided with elements hostile to the Moghul power. For the present, the Viceroy wrote, he is neutral.180 In 1696 the Khem Savant openly renounced Moghul suzerainty and even struck his own coinage in rupees in his own mint.181

The Portuguese Captain of Cheul wrote in a letter dated 22 February, 1701 :

Twenty thousand Mahrattas under the command of Ramchandrapant attacked the territory of Siddi Yakutkhan of Janjira and plundered it. They were going to do likewise in Korlai but the Captain of Korlai bombarded them and they hastily retreated. The Mahrattas were in the Siddi’s territory for a month. After their return, the Siddi fleet besieged the Angria fort of Kolaba and carried off fifty warships (galvetas). He sent an army to encircle the fort by land also. He asked for ships to carry his army beyond the creek and I supplied them.182

In October 1702, Rajaram’s army captured Ponda Mahal and besieged Mardangad.183 On this occasion the Prince of Saunde helped the Moghul with his army and the Portuguese with ammunition.184 The Viceroy of Goa, Caitano de Melo Castro, in his letter of 6 January, 1703 said that the Mahrattas had taken Ponda but the fort was still in Moghul hands but, for want of food supplies, they would soon have to surrender it.185 In this difficult situation, the Moghul asked for the help of Khem Savant Bhonsala186 and the Portuguese encouraged him to give it.187 Accordingly, this Kudalkar Desai marched with his army on Mardangad and captured it but did not hand it over to the Moghul.188

At the beginning of June 1705, the Khem Savant surrendered Mardangad189 to the Moghul. In July he and the Portuguese joined in a battle and the Portuguese raized the Sardesai’s forts of Amone and Valvoi to the ground.190 In the battle for Amona, a Brazilian woman in male costume, Dona Maria Ursula de Abreu de Alencastre, fought bravely. In December, the Viceroy took Bicholim fort from Khem Savant and completely demolished it.191

He resorted to arson in Bicholim and six miles around. He said, with some flourish, that he had not left even one building in Bicholim standing.192 He held that he had to humble the Khem Savant to ensure that he would not become another Shivaji.193

In 1706, the Moghul entered into a pact with the Prince of Saunde whereby Ponda Mahal (Antruj) was given to him and he was to pay the Moghul an annual tribute of Rs. 80,000.194 The Portuguese Viceroy exerted his influence in this behalf because he did not want any strong ruler as Goa’s neighbour and for this reason he considered the prince of Saunde a good neighbour.195

At this time, Mirza Nijmutidin was the Moghul Foujdar at Ponda. After Aurangzeb’s death, for a bribe, he planned to hand over Ponda to Khem Savant. But the Portuguese helped the Saunde prince in time with troops and torpedoed his plan.196 Khem Savant had entered Ponda and taken possession of Mardangad but the Prince of Saunde, with Portuguese help, drove him out. Before returning it in May 1707, Khem Savant damaged the fort.197 In this way, Saundekar’s control over Ponda as a tributary of the Moghul was established. In contemporary Portuguese papers it is said the Moghul gave Ponda Mahal to the Prince of Saunde by khoti or permanent khoti (Arrendamento or arrendamento perpetuo) but in the firman (order) itself the word jagir must have been used.

The Prince of Saunde appointed Ramayya Nausu as sarsubedar of Ponda.198 On 16 July, 1705, as has been mentioned earlier, the prince also made a pact with the Mahrattas for the inam of the Panchmahals. In the battle with the Khem Savant, the Portuguese took possession of the Khorjuve and Panale islands and built forts on them.199

After his release from the Moghul Court, Chhatrapati Shahu returned to Satara and, at the beginning of August 1708, he sent his envoy, Balaji Mahadeo, to Goa from Rangna. He wrote to the Portuguese Viceroy that he had received the Konkan territory as a jagir from the Moghul Emperor and so, to take possession of it, his army would descend the ghat. This, Balaji Mahadeo said, was necessary as, for some years, the Khem Savant had been in possession of this territory. Similarly, the Prince of Saunde was in possession of Ponda. Actually, Khem Savant was only a Desai of Kudal and Saundekar was prince of only Saunde.

How they were concerned with other territories, the envoy argued. Shahu also demanded the return of Khorjuve and Panale.200

The Viceroy of Goa informed his King about the strife between Shahu and Tarabai in his letter dated 10 December, 1708, saying that both of them demand a treaty with the Portuguese. He remarked that Shahu was likely to get the upper hand because he had a large

army and Tarabai’s supporters were going over to him. He would, be wrote, shape his conduct according as the circumstances demanded.201

The strife between Tarabai and Shahu ended with the recognition of the division of the Mahratta State between Kolhapur and Satara. Khem Savant declared his loyalty to Tarabai and secured Kudal, Banda, Bicholim, Pernem, Maneri and Sanquelim by way of vatan in 1708.202 The Prince of Saunde agreed to pay Shahu Rs. 25,000 a year for Ponda and Panchmahal.203

The Portuguese Viceroy, Conde de Ericeira, left the following for the guidance of his successor in 1720 :

Shahu has secured from the Moghul Emperor, as his favour, the tenth part of the total income from all Konkan. In north Konkan Shahu’s general is Ramachandrapant. We must take care that the people in Portuguese territory do not secretly give the tenth of the revenue to Shahu. All these princes are very ambitious. Had they not quarreled among themselves, we would have been required to keep constantly armed and alert.

There is also mention in these instructions of 1720 about Ponda that the Saunde prince used to pay Rs. 80,000 a year to the Moghul. There is also a record of the Moghul having presented Ponda fortress and the adjoining villages to the Portuguese. In his letter dated 12 January, 1716, the Viceroy referred to a copy of the firman (order) of the Emperor in this behalf that he had received.204 But the Viceroy did not make use of it, because he did not aspire for any expansion of the state, and since Ponda was in possession of the Prince of Saunde, he did not fear any aggression.205

In this connection, the Viceroy in his letter dated 6 January, 1719 to the King of Portugual writes :

The Prince of Saunde is a tradesman and not a fighter like his people. So we consider him a good neighbour. If you are intent on any expansion of the state by taking the fort of Ponda and the adjoining villages, I shall await orders to that effect and take possession of the territory. If we do so, the Moghul Emperor will not regret it, because he himself has given the firman. The Prince of Saunde will also not oppose it. General Hassan Ali Khan is demanding Rs. 80,000 for this firman. If we take Ponda, we need not pay him this sum.206

There is a record also that even in 1719, the Viceroy had made efforts to persuate the Moghul that Ponda Panchmahal should remain with the Prince of Saunde.207

NOTES

• 1. BA : Cartas da India, fl. 59 (MS 51-Ⅸ-1).
• 2. Pissurlencar, PM, Ⅱ, pp. 8-10.
• 3. Padre Fernao de Queiroz Historia da vida do Veneravel Irmao Pedro de Basto, 1689, p. 279 : “aquele reyno he a nossa despensa.”
• 4. Dr. Luis Gonçalves Couto’s letter to the Viceroy dated 29 August, 1683 (BA : 51-Ⅸ-1, Cartas da India, fl. 271).
• 5. A letter from Captain Josef de melo Castro dated 23 February, 1679 is available in which he writes : “ … tive huma carta de Sevagy e a sustancia della, he que, no seu rio, nao façca mal aos Arabios, porque sao hospedes, e elle lhes haode favorecer. A carta ainda coutem mais e maiores roncas …” (Goa Archives : Papeis avulsos). The purport of this is : “I received Shivaji’s letter. The gist of what he says is that we should not molest the Arabs in the river. They are his guests and he is going to support them … … There are more threats also in the letter.”.
• 6. Assentos Ⅳ, p. 389.
• 7. The stone carving in Anjediv. (Teixeira de Aragao, Descripçao das moedas, Vol. Ⅲ, p. 261; Francisco Raymundo de Moraes Pereira, Annal Indico-Lusitano, Lisboa, 1753, p. 24). The Mahratta history scholar, Bendre, mentions in his Marathi biography of Sambhaji (p. 287), that on 5 May, 1682, the foundation of the fortification of Anjediv was laid ceremoniously, but this is incorrect.
• 8. Pissurlencar, PM, Ⅱ, p. 10.
• 9. Collection of letters etc. of Shivaji’s times, Part Ⅰ, p. 239.
• 10. Pissurlencar, PM, Ⅱ, p. 11.
• 11. Ibid., p. 12.
• 12. Ibid., p. 19.
• 13. Ibid., p. 22.
• 14. Ibid.
• 15. BA : Cartas da India, fl. 224, Dr. Luis Gonçalves Couto’s letter dated 15 April, 1683.
• 16. Pissurlencar, Tentativas dos Portugueses para a occupaçao Concao.
• 17. BNL : Breve resumo do sucessos do Estado Portuguez na India nos annos de 1682, 1683, MS. fl. 34. 18) BA : Cartas da India, MS. fl. 228.
• 19. Ibid., p. 236.
• 20. History of the Saptakoteshwar Devasthan by Jayvant V. S. Sardesai.
• 21. BA : Cartas da India, MS. fl. 261.
• 22. Pissurlencar, Antigualhas, pp. 71-2; Assentos Ⅳ, p. 156.

In a letter, a contemporary Portuguese officer stated that the first attack by the Mahrattas on the fort of Revdanda was launched on 23 July, 1682, at night. They simultaneously attacked the fortification of Revdanda town and Korlai fortress. “… (ate que na noute de 23 de Julho de 1682, cometendo o inimigo a escalla a dita fortaleza com grosso poder, e ao mesmo tempo os muros daquella cidade, e a fortaleza do Morro foi rebatido ……”—Goa Archives : Livro de consultas, No. 2, fl. 94 V, Petition of Francisco de Costa.) The Portuguese used to call the Korlai fort Morro Cheul. The scholar Bcndre refers to it as Morro fort (Sambhaji, p. 295).

• 23. Goa Archives : MR No. 48, fl. 181; Pissurlencar, PM, Ⅱ, p. 29 n.
• 24. Sir Jadunath Sarkar, Auranzib, Ⅳ, pp. 317-35.
• 25. Pissurlencar, PM, Ⅱ, p. 29.
• 26. Sharma, Maratha History Re-Examined, p. 332.
• 27. B. S. Bendre, Chhatrapati Sambhaji Maharaj, p. 293.
• 28. Riyasatkar Sardesai says that Sambhaji laid siege to Cheul in the summer of 1683. He has given 20 June 1683 as being in accord with the Jedhe Shakavali (Marathi Riyasat, 1935, p. 46). But on p. 47, he also writes that the Cheul fortification was attacked on 8 August, 1683. He has not given any proof for this statement.
• 29. The Portuguese called Agacim, San Lourenço.
• 30. In Shivaji’s times, the Portuguese called Goan Christians Canares (Pissurlencar’s article in Mandavi for July 1964). Bendre interprets Canare as Kanadi, which is wrong (Sambhaji, p. 300).
• 31. BNL: Caixa 201, No. 4. Breve resumo dos successos do Estado Portuguez na India, nos annos de 1682, 1683, MS.
• 32. In the original Portuguese the mention is as Durbanaique. This Ponde Desai’s name was Dulba Naik (Pissurlencar, PM, Ⅱ, p. 35). Bendre writes Dharmaji for Dulba which is wrong.
• 33. Viceroy’s letter to Siddi Yakut Khan dated 13 November 1683 (Pissurlencar, PM, Ⅱ, p. 41). Orleans has written that Sambhaji lifted the siege of Cheul and he went towards Ponda, but this is wrong. (Bendre, Sambhaji, p. 307). Riyasatcar Sardesai also has given similar incorrect information (Sambhaji, p. 52). Bendre has said that Sambhaji went to Ponda from Rajapur, basing this statement on a letter dated 31 October, 1683 from the Bombay English (Sambhaji, p. 300) but his object, viz. taking the fort from Adilshah has been wrongly stated and the date seems to be wrong. It is well known that Shivaji had already taken the fort in 1675. In 1683, Sambhaji’s Subedar at Ponda was Dharmaji Nagnath (Pissurlencar, PM Ⅱ, p. 4n); Dharmaji Nagnath’s letters have been published in “Gomantakachya Itihasachi Sadhane” in ltihasa Sangraha. In the incription at Adkolan, Ponda Mahal, of 1688, the name of Dharmaji Nagnath is found as the chief officer of the Subha (Pissurlencar, Inscriçoes Pre-Portuguesas de Goa, p. 71, Bharat Itihasa Samshodhak Mandal, Annual Report, Shake 1835). Dharmaji Nagnath was a contemporary of Dulba Naik, Sardesai of Ponda.
• 34. Durbate is a village in Ponda Mahal. It was not a province a Bendre writes (Sambhaji, p. 301). 35) Shivacharitra Sahitya, Khanda 2, No. 397, p. 399.
• 36. Rajwade Marathyanchya Itihasachi Sadhane, 15A 365.
• 37. Pissurlencar, PM. Ⅱ. pp. 33-4.
• 38. BNL : MS. Caixa 201, No. 4
• 39. Pissurlencar, Tentativas dos Portugueses para a occupaçao do Concao, Bendre (Sambhaji, p. 308) writes that the Viceroy of Goa led an assault on Ponda at the instance of the Moghuls. But there is no evidence to support this statement.
• 40. BA, (Ms. 51-Ⅸ- 1), Cartas da India.
• 41. Manucci. storia do Mogor, Ⅱ, pp. 262-3.
• 42. BNL, Breve resumo dos sucessos da India, MS.; Relaçao verdadeira, MS.; BA, Cartas da India, MS.; Padre Francisco de Souza, Oriente Conquistado; Pissurlencar, PM, Ⅱ; Prince Acbar and the Portuguese; Assentos, etc.
• 43. Goa Archives : Papeis diversos.
• 44. BNL: MS. 8529, fl. 156. Satroji Rane’s letter to the King of Portugal dated 10 January, 1710.
• 45. BA : Cartas da India. In Conde de Alvora’s letter dated 12 April, 1683, there is information to the effect that he had allowed the Subedar of Sambhaji and the Desais to keep their families in the city of Goa (Goa Archives : RV No. 2, fl. 30; Pissurlencar, PM, Ⅱ p. 23).
• 46. BNL. MS. It is written in Breve resumo dos sucessos that Akbar now denies having taken part in the battle and that not he but his maternal uncle went to Ponda with horsemen. The Moghul brought the battle to our doors and his son’s cavalry attacked us at Ponda. Agroa (Akbar) se excusa com dizer que nao entreveira nisto mas o fosse elle o seu tio, irmao da Mae que foi com esta cavallaria. O Mogor nos meteu a guerra em casa e a cavallaria do filho nos acometeu em ponda..
• 47. Pissurlencar, “Prince Akbar and the Portuguese,” in Indian Historical Records Commission Proceedings, Vol. Ⅹ, 1928; PM, Ⅱ, p. 16n. Padre Leonardo Paes, Promptuario das Diffiniçoes Indicas, p. 17 J. Sarkar, Aurangzib, Ⅳ, p. 340. In a letter dated 20 October, 1638, Sheikh Mahomed, Aurangzeb’s envoy, informed the Viceroy that Prince Akbar had purchased two ships in Goa and that he intended to leave Indian shores on a voyage. He requested that the Viceroy should see that he was not hindered. (BA; Ms. Cartas da India, fl. 312). As a matter of fact, a ship was purchased for Prince Akbar for Rs. 10,000 in August 1683 from a Portuguese gentleman, Manoel Teixeira Franco, and another Rs. 2,000 were spent on repairs. Two smaller ships were also purchased by him at Vengurla. These were to accompany him with his servants and luggage. Akbar planned first to go to Bandra at the end of September and thence to proceed to Iran by sea. He later changed his plans. (BA s MS. Cartas da India; Pissurlencar, Prince Akbar and The Portuguese). The Portuguese believing that Akbar would succeed Aurangzeb, behaved humbly with him. The Goa Government kept in touch with him even after he went to Iran. (Goa Archives : RV No. 3, fl. 33). Padre Leonardo Paes has recorded that, while Akbar was living in Bicholim, he had such a rich emerald necklace that, when he put it round his neck over his white coat, it assumed a green colour. (Promptuario, p. 17).
• 48. J. Sarkar, Aurangzib, Ⅳ, p. 340.
• 49. Pissurlencar. PM, Ⅱ. pp. 60, 16; Prince Akbar and the Portuguese.
• 50. Ibid Bendre (Sambhaji, p. 308) says, Portuguese writer has not mentioned Manucci even once in his account of a whole year. ‘Though Relaçao Verdadeira has not mentioned Manucci, other contemporary Portuguese writings do mention his achievements. (Pissurlencar, PM, Ⅱ; Prince Akbar and the Portuguese. BA. MS. Cartas da India).
• 51. Pissurlencar, PM, Ⅱ, pp. 37, 41.
• 52. Ibid., Supplement (Pissurlencar collection).
• 53. Ibid., p. 41. CONTENTS54) “Some few days since the Rajah razed Pundah Castle and has built a Gurr neare the place in the roome of it; the reason is that his father was engaged for several months in taking it and could not damage it even so much as the Portugueze did in a few days…” (The Factors at Karwar to the Council at Surat, dated 28 November 1683. F. R. Surat, Vol. 109, in I. Hyd. Archaeolog. Soc., 1919-20, p. 31).
• 55. Gemelli Careri, Voyages du Tour du Monde, Paris 1727, pp. 159-60; Pissurlencar, Antigualhas, p. 72. 56) Sarkar, Aurangzib, Ⅳ, p. 331.
• 57. Viceroy’s letter to Siddi Yakutkhan dated 13 November 1683 (Pissurlencar, PM, Ⅱ, p. 43).
• 58. Manucci writes that Sambhaji took Juvem on 25 November 1683 (Storia do Mogor, Vol. Ⅱ, pp. 272-5) but this date is incorrect as contemporary Portuguese sources show (See Relaçao verdadeira; Breve resmo dos successos; and Oriente Conquistado). Riyasatkar Sardesai (Sambhaji, p. 53) gives 24 November 1683 as the date, but he has overlooked the fact that it is new-style date. The English date should be 14 November, 1683. Bendre (Sambhaji, p. 309) calls Juvem, i.e. St. Estevam, Kumbharjuve but these two are separate islands. Sardesai says Sambhaji took both but does not give any authority (Sambhaji, p. 53). ‘Eslov’ is not a correct name. It should be Estevam (Portuguese) or Stephens (English).
• 59. Manucci and the writer of “Relaçao verdadeira” says “at 10 o’clock at night” but “Breve resumo dos sucessos”, “Oriente Conquistado”, two contemporary Portuguese sources say “at eight o’clock” and at 10 the alarmsignal bell was rung.
• 60. Bendre (Sambhaji, p. 309) calls Dhavji as Dongi (Dongium) but there is no such place in Goa. The original Portuguese mentions ‘Daugim’ quite clearly (Pissurlencar, PM, Ⅱ, p. 43). The English translation in the India office library, London, also gives ‘Dangim’ (The Journal of the Hyderabad Arch, Society, 1919-20, p. 16); only instead of ‘u’ there is ‘n’ Bendre’s reading is wrong.
• 61. Goa Archives : MR 161E, fl. 1197 : “… O Conde Vice-Rey que esteve em perigo de ser prezo, se lhe nao acodia com um cavalo, em que se salvou, D. Rodrigo da Costa, certamente acontecia a maior desgraca … …” The purport of this is : The Viceroy was about to be captured. Had not Rodrigo da Costa rushed to his rescue with a horse, a major calamity would have occured.
• 62. Miscellaneous Historical writing by Parasnis, Part Ⅱ.
• 63. Vad and Parasnis, “Sanads and Letters’’, p. 128.
• 64. The Vice-Rei’s letter to the King of Portugal dated 16 December 1683 (Goa Archives : MR 48, fl. 180).
• 65. In a map of Goa island (1615-1622) drawn by Manuel Godinho de Eredia this ‘island of the dead’ (ilha dos mortos) has been shown in place of Juvem, St. Estevam. The reason why it was so called is given in Desengano de Perdidos by Dr. Gaspar de Leao published in Goa in 1573. There is much similarity between Ali Adilshah’s invasion of 1570 and Sambhaji’s invasion of 1683 so far as the military strategy of the assaults on Ponda are concerned. (Antonio Castilho, Commentario do Cerco de Goa e Cheul, Lisboa 1573; Antonio Pinto Pereira, Historia da India no tempo em que a governou o visorey Dom Luis de Ataide, Coimbra, 1616, Vol. Ⅱ). Sixty thousand foot, thirty-five thousand horse, two thousand elephants and artillery constituted the Adilshahi forces in the 1570 invasion, according to the Portuguese, (BNL, MS. 8570, Annaes, fls. 132-3 v) In the sixteenth century, the Portuguese army in Goa never exceeded 4,000 men. At the time of the battle additional soliders had been recruited locally. As the Portuguese had a strong navy, they could protect their possessions near the coast. Albuquerque (Cartes. Ⅰ, p. 40), Don Joao de Castro (Cartas, p. 24), Bishop Don Gaspar de Liao (Desengano, p. 34) and others have written that 3,000 Portuguese soldiers would be enough to protect their possessions.
• 66. Pissurlencar, PM, Ⅱ, p. 47 n.
• 67. Pissurlencar, Assentos, Ⅳ, p. 410 (… Sambage que por uao ter a gente ociosa nos investio). 68) For example, the churches in Juvem, Thivim and Colvale (Pissurlencar, PM, Ⅱ, p. 46; Assentos Ⅳ, p. 429). 69) Pissurlencar, PM, Ⅱ, p. 49.
• 70. Pissurlencar, Antigualhas, p. 79.
• 71. Pissurlencar, Assentos Ⅳ, p. 572.
• 72. “… alem de serem estes (Christaos de terra) de sua natureza em nossa companhia pellejam como tigres”… (D. Gaspar Leao, Desengano de Perdidos, p. 34).
• 73. Goa Archives : MR 54, fl. 55; Pissurlencar, Assentos Ⅳ. p. 413.
• 74. Pissurlencar, PM, Ⅱ. pp. 51-2., Bendre (Sambhaji, p. 316) has made use of the English translation of the account of Sambhaji’s attacks on Bardez and Salçette from Relaçao Verdadeira, available in the India Office, London. But many names are incorrect. For instance he uses Marmugao for both Margao (p. 315) and Murgao (p. 316) and there are more instances of incorrect pronunciation.
• 75. A. Martineau, Memoires de Francois Martin, Vol. Ⅱ, p. 340 (Paris, 1932).
• 76. Goa Archives : Petition of Ramoji Naikvadi. Ramoji related in his petition how he helped the Portuguese at the time of the seige even while he was in the service of Sambhaji (Boletim do Governo da India, 1684, p. 91).
• 77. Diago do Couto, Decada Ⅷ, p. 391.
• 78. Pissurlencar, Assentos Ⅳ, pp. 422-3.
• 79. Padre Francisco de Souza, O Oriente Conquistado, p. 400-2 (Bombay 1881).
• 80. Goa Archives : Siddi Abdul Rehman’s letter to the Vice-roy in Portuguese (Papeis avulsos).
• 81. BA : Cartas da India.
• 82. The name of this Government interpreter in Goa was Vithoji Shenvi Bhende.
• 83. Goa Archives : Livro de registo do dos alvaras. Cartas. etc. de diferentes feitorias 1682-1684 (MS. 2316). 84) Dr. Luis Gonsalves de Couto’s letter dated 31 December 1683 (BA : Cartas da India).
• 85. Pissurlencar. PM. Ⅱ. p. 54; Assentos Ⅳ, p. 430; “A Portuguese Embassy to Raigad in 1684”, p. Ⅱ (Proceedings of the All India Modern History Congress, Poona, 1936).
• 86. BA : Cartas da India, fl. 347.
• 87. Ibid., p. 343.
• 88. Ibid., p. 341.
• 89. Pissurlencar, PM, Ⅱ, pp. 56-7.
• 90. BNL : MS. Breve resumo dos successos “…ficavao as pazes adjustadas mas nao assinadas por ter decido do Gate o exercito mogor e tambem se diz por causa certa que por esta mesma causa se lhe mandou instruçao a ir devager nestes consertos…” The substance of this is that the treaty was agreed upon but not signed. It is asserted with certainty that, because the Moghul army had come down the Ramghat, the Portuguese envoys were advised that they should delay the conclusion of the treaty.
• 91. BNL : MS. A 6-43. Tratados depazes antigos e modernos, de que se acharam documentos na Secretaria do estado da India.
• 92. Portuguese envoy manuel Saraeve de Albuquerque’s letter dated 24 April 1684 to Kavi Kalash (Pissurlencar, Antigualhas, p. 91). “…o que esta assinado com os sellos de Sambagi Raze e do Principe Sultao Acbar…”
• 93. Pissurlencar, PM, Ⅱ, p. 57.
• 94. Goa Archives : CPA No. 68.
• 95. Mantimento in Portuguese means foodgrains etc., not ammunition.
• 96. Goa Archives : RV No. 3, fl. 56, Viceroy’s letter to Narahari Pandit dated 26 March 1684.
• 97. BNL, Breve resumo dos sucessos; Pissurlencar, PM, Ⅱ, p. 57.
• 98. Pissurlencar, PM. Ⅱ, p. 53.
• 99. Goa Archives : Joseph de Melo de Castro’s letter dated 19 June 1684. (Pissurlencar, Antigualhas, p. 94; Portuguese Embassy to Raigad in 1684. p. 4).
• 100. Pissurlencar, Assentos Ⅳ, pp. 417-26.
• 101. BA s Cartas da India. fl. 269. Dr. Luis Gonçalves Carto’s letter dated 27 August 1683 and the Viceroy’s remarks of the same date.
• 102. BA : Cartas da India, fl. 274.
• 103. Pissurlencar, Assentos Ⅳ, pp. 422-3.
• 104. BA : Cartas da India, fl. 341; Couto’s letter dated 12 January 1684.
• 105. Manucci, Storia Ⅱ, p. 272.
• 106. Pe. Francisco de Souza, Oriente Conquistado, Vol. Ⅰ, p. 402.
• 107. Khafi Khan, Ⅱ. p. 291.
• 108. J. Sarkar, Aurangzib, Ⅳ, pp. 340, 349.
• 109. BA : Cartas da India, an account of the Konkan Desais.
• 110. J. Sarkar, Aurangzib, Ⅳ, p. 304n.
• 111. The Travels of Abbe Carre, Vol. Ⅰ, p. 202.
• 112. BA : Cartas da India, an account of the Konkan Desais.
• 113. Pissurlencar; Goa Archives; Bharatmitra, Vol. 22. No. 3, March 1950.
• 114. Manucci, Storia, Ⅱ, p. 275.
• 115. Pissurlencar, PM, Ⅱ. p. 59. Viceroy’s letter to the King of Portugal dated 25 January 1684.
• 116. Viceroy’s letter to the Moghul Emperor dated 20 March 1684 (Pissurlencar, PM, Ⅱ, p. 62).
• 117. J. Sarkar, Aurangzeb, Ⅳ, p. 351.
• 118. Pissurlencar, PM, Ⅱ, p. 60.
• 119. BA : Cartas da India, fl. 361.
• 120. Ibid., fl. 365.
• 121. Ibid., fl. 559.
• 122. Pissurlencar, PM, Ⅱ, p. 65.
• 123. Pissurlencar, Assentos, Ⅳ, p. 428.
• 124. “A Portuguese Embassy to Raigad in 1684” (All-India Modern History Congress Proceedings, 1936). 125) BA : Cartas da India, fl. 398.
• 126. Pissurlencar, Antigualhas, pp. 96-7.
• 127. BA : Cartas da India, fl. 499. Goa Archives : Sidhoji Farjand’s Marathi letter.
• 128. BA : Cartas da India, fl. 499. Dr. Luis Gonçalves, letter dated 29 December 1684; Sidhoji Farjand’s letter. 129) BA : Cartas da India, fl. 537. Viceroy’s letter dated 24 February 1685.
• 130. Ibid.
• 131. Pissurlencar, Antigualhas, pp. 98-102.
• 132. Goa Archives : Collection of Marathi papers. Pissurlencar, A Portuguese Embassy to Raigad. 133) Pissurlencar, Antigualhas, pp. 91-3.
• 134. Assentos Ⅳ, p. 431 : “a extrema necessidade em que se acheva o Estado de Dinheiro para suprir as despezas…” (Government was hardpressed for money for expenditure.)
• 135. Goa Archives : MR, 53, fls. 69-70.
• 136. BA : Cartas da India, fl. 535, Letter to Viceroy from Luis Gonçalves Couto dated 18 February 1685.
• 137. BNL : MS. 4179 F. G. A contemporary translation in Portuguese of the letter written in Marathi by Sambhajirao and Vithojirao Karwarkar Desai to the Viceroy. The present author was unable to lay his hands on the original.
• 138. Pissurlencar, PM, Ⅱ, p. 41.
• 139. J. Sarkar, Aurangzib, Ⅳ, p. 358.
• 140. BA : Cartas da India, Pissurlencar, Tentativas dos Portuguese para a occupaçao do Concao.
• 141. The Goan Bishop Don Mateos de Castro of Bicholim said in his letter dated 22 December, 1653 : “Raula Sinay, qui in singulos annos vigenti quartruor mille xerafinorum redditus colligit”. (Desai Raval Shenvi annually takes twelve thousand rupees. i.e. 24,000 arurpis.) ASG : MS. Goa 40, fls. 384-5 : Epistola exprobratoria ejusden episcopi chrysopolitani…).
• 142. BA : Cartas da India, fl. 412.
• 143. Riyasatkar Sardesai (Sambhaji, p. 57) has given the date as it is without taking into consideration that it is in the new style. Dr. Bragança Pereira read ‘dez do proximo mez’ in place of ‘doze do proprio mez’ and made a grievous error (APO, t Ⅰ. Vol Ⅲ, p. 1, p.).
• 144. Goa Archive : MR, fl. 207-49v.
• 145. BA : Cartas da India, fl. 301. Dr. Luis Gonçalves Couto’s letter to the Viceroy dated 29 September 1683. 146) AHU : India, avulsos, Caixa 33. Letter dated 13 November 1686.
• 147. Pissurlencar, Antigualhas, p. 105; A Liga dos Portuguese com o Bounsulo Contra Sambagi (Oriente Portugues, Ⅱ, serie No. 2).
• 148. AHU : India, avulsos, Caixa No. 34 : “fez este sucesso mais gloriozo fao o nao custar a serra o dinheiro que se nos pedia para a entregarem…” (Viceroy’s letter to King of Portugal dated 24 January 1688).
• 149. Goa Archive : Livro de Dio. No. 1.
• 150. Goa Archive : RV No. 4, fl. 69v. (Don Rodrigo de Costa’s letter to Dulba Naik dated 31 January 1689). Pissurlencar PM, Ⅱ, p. 4.
• 151. Goa Archives : RV No. 4, fl. 69.
• 152. Goa Archive : MR 53, fl. 329. Pissurlencar, PM, Ⅱ, p. 66n.
• 153. Goa Archives : MR 53, fl. 328.
• 154. BNL, MS. 8538, Livro de Cartas que escreveo a S.M.o. Sr. D. Rodrigo da Costa. Governador da India, fl. 5v. 155) Goa Archives : CO 5, Ⅱ, 71.
• 156. Pissurlencar, PM, Ⅲ, p. 1; “Rajaram and the Portuguese” (Proceedings, Indian Historical Records Commission). 157) Ibid.
• 158. Goa Archives : RV No. 4, fls. 76-7.
• 159. Goa Archives : RV No. 4, fl. 74.
• 160. Pissurlencar, PM, Ⅲ, p. 3, supplement (Pissurlencar collection).
• 161. Idem. p. 4 : O que mais os incitou a isso foi por ser da sua casta da gentilidade, e nao poderem tolerar as insolencias com que os mouros forçavam as mulheres gentias e profanavam os seus pagodes.” (Goa Archives : MR, 55B, fls. 424-5).
• 162. Pissurlencar, PM, Ⅲ, p. 5; Arquivo das Colonias, 1917, Vol Ⅰ, p. 135.
• 163. Pissurlencar, Maratas em Baçaim, p. 10. Goa Archives : RV No. 4, fl. 119.
• 164. Pissurlencar, PM, Ⅲ, p. 9.
• 165. Goa Archives : MR 58, fl. 269. A Portuguese ‘Achava’ () refers to this incident.
• 166. Goa Archives : MR 55 B, fl. 430 (Letter of acting Governor of Goa dated 22 January 1691).
• 167. Pissurlencar, Assentos, Ⅳ, pp. 496-7.
• 168. Dr. S. N. Sen, Indian Traveles of Thevenot and Careri pp. 208-12.
• 169. Careri writes : “Lord of some villages among the mountains, but tributory and subject to the Great Moghul, being obliged to serve him in his wars.” (p. 212).
• 170. Goa Archives : RV No. 5, fls. 44v, 47v.
• 171. Shivacharitra Sahitya, Part Ⅲ, pp. 87-8.
• 172. Ibid., pp. 89-90.
• 173. Goa Archives : RV No. 6, fl. 41v.
• 174. Pissurlencar, Assentos Ⅴ, p. 12.
• 175. Goa Archives : MR 62, fl. 203. Vice-Rei Camara Coutinho says in his letter dated 19 January, 1701; “passado alguns meses despois da minha chegada se levantouqhema Saunto contra o Mogor … este levantado se fez senhor de Bicholim e Sanquelim. que era do Mogor…”. The substance of this is : “After I came here. Khem Savant became hostile to the Moghul… This rebel took possession of Bicholim and Sanquelim” (Goa Archives : MR 64, fl. 249). This Viceroy (Antonio Luiz Gonçalves da Camara Coutinho) reached Goa on 14 September, 1698. From this it seems that the Khem Savant Bhonsla conquered Sanquelim (Satari) and Bicholim (Bhatagram) by the end of 1698.
• 176. Goa Archives : RV No. 5, fls. 6v, 20.
• 177. Goa Archives : RV No. 5, fl. 94 v. (Goa’s letter to Bahadur Khan dated 16 June 1691. Pissurlencar, PM, Ⅱ, p. 68. 178) Goa Archives : MR 64, fl. 55.
• 179. Goa Archives : RV No. 5. fl. 47.
• 180. Goa Archives : MR 66. fl. 74.
• 181. Goa Archives : RV No. 6, fl. 43.
• 182. Pissurlencar, Assentos Ⅴ, p. 624.
• 183. Goa Archives : MR 66, fl. 275.
• 184. Goa Archives : RV No. 5, fls. 70, 76.
• 185. Goa Archives : MR 66, fl. 275.
• 186. Goa Archives : RV No. 5, fl. 75v.
• 187. Goa Archives : RV No. 5, fl. 66v.
• 188. Goa Archives : RV No. 5, fl. 97v.
• 189. Ibid.
• 190. Goa Archives : RV No. 5, fl. 98v.
• 191. Goa Archives : RV No. 5, fl. 107.
• 192. Goa Archives : MR 70, fl. 15.
• 193. Goa Archives : MR 70, fl. 15; MR 69, fl. 42. The Vice-Rei Caitano de Melo Castro, in his letter to the King of Portugal, dated 5 January 1706 said : “… se nao seguisse ter quebrado o orgulho deste levantado, que dessimulado podia vir a ser outro segundo Sivagi…” (MR. 70, fl. 15).
• 194. Goa Archives : RV 5, fl. 114 v.; MR 69, fl. 108; RI 11, fl. 46v. BNL. MS. 465 F. G. Noticias da India desde o fim do governo do Vice-rei Vasco Fernandes Cesar athe o fim do anno de 1738 (fl. 112). BNL : MS. 1455 F. G. Intruçoes do Vice-rei Conde da Ericeira ao seu sucessor (22 October 1720).
• 195. BNL, MS. 1455, Instruçoes que deixou o Conde da Ericeira (22 October 1720) : “… o rey de Sunda he mais mercador que guerreyro, e por essa razao bom para vezinho…” (Gist : “Since the Saunde prince is more of a tradesman than a warrior we prefer him as our neighbour.”.
• 196. Goa Archives : RI No. 9. fl. 42v; RV No. 6, fl. 116v (Viceroy’s letter dated 27 May 1706). Pissurlencar, Assentos Ⅴ, p. 213; ADP, p. 544.
• 197. Goa Archives : RV 5, fl. 117v; RJ 9, fl. 42v.
• 198. Goa Archives : RV 7, fl. 11v.
• 199. Goa Archives : MR 72, fl. 419.
• 200. Pissurlencar, Assentos Ⅴ. pp. 236-41.
• 201. Goa Archives : MR 72, fl. 7.
• 202. Sabnis, Pant Amatya Barda Daftar, Part Ⅰ, p. 138. Goa Archives : MR 73, fl. 35.
• 203. Goa Archives : Marathi Correspondence.
• 204. Goa Archives : RV 8, fl. 28v. (Letter to Moghul Ali Hassan) : MR 81, fl. 226 (Viceroy’s letter to king of Portugal dated 17 January 1716).
• 205. Goa Archives : MR 82, fl. 133.
• 206. Goa Archives : MR. 84A, fl. 60. Pissurlencar, Assentos Ⅴ, pp. 295-8.
• 207. Goa Archives : RV 8. fl. 87 (Viceroy’s letter dated 9 September 1719 to Nawab Bahadur Dil Khan).