5 EFFECTABILITY CAUSAL AND KARMA

CHAPTER V. THE THEORIES OF EFFECTABILITY CAUSAL AND KARMA.

THE ABHĀSAVĀDA AND THE PHYSICAL PHENOMENA.

The two powers of the Maheśvara, namely, the powers of knowledge and action (jñāna and kriyā sakti) are most prominently mentioned in the Saiva literature. The Pratya bhijña Vimarsinī, for instance, is primarily concerned with the exposition of these two powers in its first two voluminous adhikāras. In the preceding chapter we have dealt with the power of knowledge. In this, therefore, we propose to give a brief idea of the power of action.

The? Ābhāsavādins, like some of the modern thinkers, have conceived the universe as broadly consisting of mind and matter. They attribute the psychological phenomena, as we have shown in a preceding chapter, to the omniscience (jñātrtva sakti) of the All-inclusive Universal Consciousness (Parā samvid) and the physical to another similar universal power, namely, omnipotence (Kartstva sakti). “Kriyāsakti" is an aspect of the latter. We have shown in the third chapter how it is responsible for such manifestations as give rise to the idea of action. Here we shall show how it manifests physical phenomena in general.

This conception of the Kriyā sakti forms the chief point of difference between the different schools of Buddhism and the Abhāsavāda. For, the former, perhaps finding it impossible to explain the variety of experiences referring to the same thing at different times, have confined themselves

I. P. V., II, 134-5.

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solely to the explanation of the knowability of the “knowable”. They are significantly silent about what happens to the object after it ceases to be the object of a perception and why it is that every time we perceive it there is found some difference in it; or rather, what it is that causes the difference in the thing which in its turn brings about a change in percep tion. If, for instance, we take the subjectivists, who hold that each cognition is due to the waking up of a certain vāsanā, we find that they have failed to explain why only a certain vāsanā wakes up at a certain time and no other :

“Na vāsanāprabodhotra vicitro hetutāmiyāt Tasyāpi tatprabodhasya vaicitrye kim nibandhanam”

I. P. V., I, 165. Similarly, if we take the case of the Bāhyārthānumeyavādin, we find that though he accounts for difference in cognition by saying that it is due to difference in the external inferrable object, yet he too is silent as to why there is this change in the object itself.

EFFECTABILITY. The thinkers of the Trika had noticed this weak point in the earlier systems and, therefore, took enough pains in their presentation of the system to explain this side also of the problem of human experience. In addition to the relation of knowability of the contents of the All-inclusive Universal Consciousness to its power of knowledge, they believe in another relation, which for want of a better word we call here the relation of effectability to another aspect of the same Universal Consciousness, namely, the power of action. The relation of knowability in this case consists in these contents being the objects of the operation of the power of knowledge of the Universal Consciousness, which at the time of each cognition manifests some object or objects out of the mass, which lies merged within, as

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separate both from itself and from the individual perceiver. It is momentary. But the relation of effectability is constant, so that even when the object is not being known, that is, not being manifested as apparently separate from the Universal Consciousness to an individual perceiver, it does not altogether lose its separate existence; because it is still the object of operation of the power of action which involves its separate existence no less than does the power of knowledge. Just as the latter (the power of knowledge) is concerned with giving rise to the subjective and objective waves in the sea of the Universal Consciousness and uniting them so as to give rise to the phenomena of knowledge, so the power of action may be said to be concerned with effecting that which is necessary for the rise of the objective wave. To make the point clear let us suppose that each object of the physical universe is like an under-current or sub-current, which at times, because of the influence of the power of knowledge appears as a wave over the surface of the sea of Universal Consciousness and serves as one of the necessary constituents of a phenomenon of knowledge. Therefore, just as the under current is not co-existent with the wave so the physical phenomenon is not (co-existent) with the psychological, which is based upon the former. That power which produces the innumerable currents and keeps them going is the power of action: (Kriyāśakti.)

1……………………“Sāntarviparivartinah Ubhayendriyavedyatvam tasya kasyāpi saktitah”,

Kumbhakārahrdaye antarmanogocaratvāt pūrvam api svasaṁvidekātmatayā vicitratvena viśvasya bhedābhedā tmanā parivartamānasya spandanena sphuratah yat antah karana bahiṣkaraṇavedyatvam ābhāsyate…………….Naca kumbhakāre prānapuryaṣtakabuddhidehaprāye tadetat sthitam tasyāpi jadatvāt tatah samvid eva viśvam ātmani bhāsayati saktivaicitryāt,

I. P. V., II, 141.

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THE PHYSICAL UNIVERSE AND THE ULTIMATE

REALITY On the basis of what we have stated above it would not be wrong to say that the Trika conceives the Ultimate Reality not only as Universal Consciousness but also as Universal Energy. It is the latter, which, because of the Creative Desire (icchāvaśāt) appears in the forms of the innumerable physical phenomena much in the same way as the electric energy, because of the resistance, appears in the form of various lights. The Universal Energy and the Creative Desire, working in the aforesaid manner represent “kriya śakti”. Thus the physical universe, with all its varieties, is a mere manifestation of the Universal Energy and is connected with it exactly in the manner in which light is connected with electric energy. Just as innumerable lights, being mere forms of electricity, do not break up its unity, so the physical phenomena leave the unity of the Universal Energy undisturbed :

“Eṣa cānanta saktitvād ayam ābhāsayatyamūn Bhāvān icchāvaśād eṣā kriya nirmātstāsya sā.”

Eṣa purānah pramātā amūn bhāvān ābhāsitapūrvān ābhāsamānān ābhāsayati avichinnena prabandhena, katham, icchāyā iśiturabhinnāyā avikalparūpāyā akramāyā vaśena sāmarthyena. Kutrāsya te bhāvāh sthitāh ? āha “ananta Śaktitvāt” iti, viśve hi bhāvāstasyaiva Śaktirūpeṇa svarūpāt matvena sthitāh"

I. P. V., II, 136.

CAUSALITY. The Trika conception of causality is not the same as that of the Satkāryavāda of the Sankhya, which holds that the effect is present in the cause exactly as oil is in a sesame seed, nor as that of the pūrvāparībhāvavāda of the Bauddha, which holds that of the two things, which come in the order of invariable immediate precedence and succession, the former

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is the cause and the latter is the effect. It is different from the Naiyāyika concept which differentiates between the material and the instrumental causes even in reference to the universal creation, as well as from that of a certain school of the Vedānta, which holds that the Brahman, as pure consciousness, without the power of control, is the cause of the universe.

It may be of interest to note in this connection that there is a complete agreement between the Sānkara Vedānta and the Trika in respect of the nature of the ultimate cause of the universe. Both hold it to be not only all-inclusive but also all-controlling. In support of this opinion we quote below some interesting passages from the Pratya bhijña Vimarsins and the Sānkara Bhāṣya on the Vedānta Sūtra for a comparative study :

“Nanvetāvatā vijñānam eva brahmarūpam imām viśva rūpatāvaicitrīm parigrhṇātu kim īśvaratāparikalpanayā ? ityāśankyāha”

“Vastavepi cidekatve na syād ābhāsabhinnayoh Cikīrṣālakṣaṇaikatvaparāmarsam vinā kriyā.

…………Tasmāt vāstavam cidekatvam abhyupagamyāpi tasya kartrtvalakṣaṇā bhinnarūpa samāveśātmikā kriyā nopapadyate parāmarśalaksanam tu svātantryam yadi bhavati tadopapadyate sarvam, parāmarso hi cikīrṣā rūpā icchā tasyām ca sarvam antarbhūtam nirmā tavyam abhedakalpenāste

I. P. V., II, 178-81.

and “Prathamedhyāye sarvajñaḥ sarveśvaro jagata utpatti kāraṇam mrtsuvarnadaya iva ghatarucakādīnām, utpannasya jagato niyantrtvena sthitikāraṇam māyāvīva māyāyāh”

V. S. S. Bh, 345.

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“Brahmāsya jagato nimittakāranam prakrtiśca ityetasya pakṣasyākṣepah smrtinimittah parihstah.” V. S. S. Bh, 354.

Like the Buddhist, the Trika also holds that the ‘apparent’ is momentary. Its conception of causality, how ever, is different, because the process which, according to this system, leads to the phenomenal existence is so. It holds that the Universal Energy under the influence of the Creative Desire appears in the forms of innumerable objects of the universe which, before their external manifestation exist within the Universal Consciousness exactly as our own ideas do within ourselves, when we are about to deliver a very thoughtful speech. The life of each object, with all its innumerable changes, is constituted by a separate current of that Universal Energy which manifests itself in the innumerable successive forms, each of which represents a separate moment of existence in the so called life of that object. These forms come one after another with such quickness or velocity that their succession is not marked. Rather, the impression is that the same object is having continuous existence, as it is in the case of the flame of a lamp or in that of moving figure in a cinema-show.

Creation, according to this system, takes place in two ways. It may be in a regular order of successive manifesta tions according to the universal law, technically called Niyati, which fixes the order of invariable immediate precedence and succession in which the things, which are conceived as related to each other by the relation of cause and effect, ordinarily appear. All the effects ordinarily take place in this way. A seed, for instance, appears as a gigantic tree after the successive manifestations of sprout etc. Or it may be in contravention of this law of Niyati i. e. without any succession of manifestations as also without any ordinarily necessary material, as for instance, when a

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yogin creates a city with all its palatial buildings and beautiful gardens, with all kinds of living beings, by sheer force of his supernatural power. In all manifestations working of the sentient principle is the most important factor. This being so, the Trika naturally holds that the causal relation, as it is ordinarily conceived, is a mere convenient conventional assumption based upon what is apparent and, therefore, cannot refer to reality. The real relation between the manifestor and the manifested is not that of cause and effect in the sense that the former constitutes the material of the latter, as does the Prakrti of all her evolutes, according to the Sankhya ; nor in that the manifestor works upon something that exists independently of it, as the God of the Naiyāyikas does on the independent atoms. The relation is similar to that which exists between the thinking self and the thought; it is a subject-object relation (kartrkarmabhāva sambandha).

The Trika concept of causality offers one explanation for all kinds of creations or manifestations. It is the same energy, it says, which is the cause of the sudden (akramika) and the successive (kramika) as well as the universal and the limited creations or manifestations. It tells us of the most essential common factor in all. It also explains the basis of the popular conception of the material cause of an effect in ordinary creation. Because, ordinarily whatever in variably unconditionally and immediately precedes the existence of & certain thing, is taken to be the material cause of what follows, provided that the qualities, which characterise the one that precedes, characterise also the other that follows.3 A seed, for instance, is taken to be

I. P. V., II, 150-1. 2 T. A. VI, 30. 3 T. A. VI, 10.THEORY OF CAUSALITY

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the cause of a sprout. And according to the Trika conception also of the causality, in the Niyati-controlled creation, the form, which is ordinarily taken to be the material cause of what follows, must precede that which is taken to be its effect, exactly as it must, according to the Satkāryavāda.

NECESSITY FOR SUCH A SUPPOSITION From what has been stated above it follows that the causal relation is in reality nothing but the subject-object relation. (“Kartr karmatva tattvaiva kārya kāramatā tatah”

T. A., Comm. 24). It is the Universal Energy, which, being moulded by the Creative Desire, appears in the multifarious forms of the objective universe, just as the clay does in the forms of a jar, a dish and a cup and so on, as the potter’s will moulds it. Let it not, however, be forgotten that the Universal Energy and the Creative Desire are non different from the Universal Consciousness. They can, at the most, be spoken of as the different aspects of the same Ultimate Reality.

Action is of two kinds. The one relates to an object and the other is confined within the agent. In the former case a conscious relation of the agent with the object, to which his action relates, is necessary. A potter, for instance, must have conscious relation with what he intends to produce. Both the theories of causality, namely, the Satkāryavāda of the Sankhya and the Asatkāryavāda of the Nyāya and others, therefore, cannot stand. For, how can the insentient, which is devoid of the capacity of placing itself in a conscious relation with that object, to which its productive activity relates, produce an effect? The two, the seed and the sprout, are separate from each other, and, being insentient, are self-confined, i. e. there is no conscious relation similar to that which exists between the potter and the

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jar, that is to be created, so that if such things be supposed to be related to each other as cause and effect, there is no reason why any two things should not be supposed to be so related ?1 Moreover, if the essential nature of the effect before it comes into being is non-existence, as the Nyāya holds, it can never become existent in any way, for nature does not change ; but, if it be existence, as the Sankhya maintains, what is then to be effected by the cause. It cannot be said that the cause effects manifestation; for, the same question can be raised with regard to the manifestation also i. e. does the manifestation exist before manifestation or not? If it does, the activity to bring it about ceases to have any meaning. But, if it does not, how can it then be brought about ? For, according to the Satkāryavāda, nothing that does not already exist can be brought about. The Trika, therefore, puts forth its own theory of causality.

CRITICISM OF THE BUDDHISTIC CONCEPTION

The Buddhistic causal conception also cannot explain the above difficulty. The Bauddha holds that whenever phenomena happen in a series, each particular phenomenon, as soon as it takes place is invariably followed by another; that of the two phenomena the one that invariably unconditionally and immediately precedes the other is called “the cause” and that which follows “the effect”, and that, everything being momentary, the latter is altogether a new production and is in no way materially connected with the former as in the case of the Sārkhya conception of causality, called the Satkāryavāda. The unsoundness of the above view is apparent. For, according to this, there is nothing which can justify one phenomenon being called the cause of another. The invariable precedence cannot be regarded

1 T. A., VI, 23. 3 I. P. V., II, 139.

2 T. A., VI, 25 ; 4 1. P. V., II, 168.

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as sufficient reason, for, in that case any two phenomena, one of which is perceived following the other, the two lunar mansions Krttikā and Rohiṇi, for instance, shall have to be accepted as being connected by causal relation, or, for that matter, we shall have to suppose the pictures of a cinematographic reel, coming invariably one after the other, as connected with one another by causal relation. The Buddhist cannot say that it is not because of a mere incidence of invariable precedence that one phenomenon is called the cause, but because of its capacity to cause ; and that it is not because of mere succession that the other is called the effect, but because of its capacity to be effected. For, such a causality, in order that it may serve its purpose, presupposes conscious relation of the cause, which has the capacity to effect, with the object of its operation. According to the Buddhist hypothesis, however, the object is non-existent at the time of the causal activity. The causal operation, therefore, because of its being dependent upon its object, would not take place. And even if it be supposed to take place, it would lead to no result because of its being objectless :

Atha pūrvatā nāma prayojaka sattākatvam parata ca nāma prayojya sattākatvam tarhi bījasya aukura prayoktrī sattā ankura viśrāntā apkurāntarbhāvamātmanyānayati, ankurābhāve prayoktrtva mātram syāt tadapi na kiñcit anyāpeksatvāt tasya.

I. P. V., II, 168-9.

CRITICISM OF THE SANKHYA. The exaplanation of the causal relation as given by the Sãrikya is no better. It holds that the cause and the effect are connected by the relation of identity (tādātmya). The defect of the theory is obvious; because, if the seed and the

1 T. A., VI, 17.

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sprout be supposed to be identical, then the notion of their duality becomes meaningless. Therefore, either the seed or the sprout only can be said to exist; because, identity and separateness cannot co-exist. Thus, according to the Sārkhya also, the causal activity will remain objectless. Nor can the assumption of evolution of one into multifarious forms improve the position of the Sankhya; because, evolution in itself is an action inasmuch as it consists in the assumption of multifarious successive forms by one at different points of time; therefore, if the ultimate nature (prakrti) be supposed to evolve it ceases to be pure material cause. It becomes an agent? (kartr). Nor can it be said that the idea of authorship (kartrtva) of the ultimate nature is not against the Sāūkhya conception: for, although the Sārkhya admits the prakrti to be an agent, yet such an admission is in conflict with its own theory of insentiency (jadatva) of the ultimate nature. The chief characteristic of an insentient thing is that it is of a certain fixed appea rance and that by itself it cannot manifest itself in any other than the fixed form. A stone, for instance, cannot assume multifarious forms of a man, a tree and a mountain etc and again after some time regain its original form; therefore, if Prakrti be insentient its manifesting itself in diverse forms at the time of creation and again assuming the state of equilibri um of qualities at the time of universal dissolution would be as impossible as the assumption by stone of its original condition as stated above :

“Abhinnarūpasya dharmiṇah satatapravahadbahutara dharmabhedasambheda svātantryalakṣaṇam pariṇamana kriyākartrtvam yaduktam tat pradhānāderna yuktarh jada tvāt, jado hi nāma pariniṣthitasvabhāvah prameyapada patitah.”

I. P. V., II, 176-7

I. P. V., II, 173. 2. I. P. V., II, 174.

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CRITICISM OF THE VEDĀNTIN’S THEORY. Even the assumption of the principle of pure Cit as the cause of the universe cannot explain the manifest variety. Manifestation is a causal action and as such necessarily pre supposes desire and this in order that it may lead to some definite action, must have an object of its own. This object before creation cannot have existence apart from the desiring self. It has, therefore, necessarily to be supposed to be one with the Self much as the words, that we utter, are one with ourselves at the time when we are preparing ourselves for some utterances. Hence the manifestation of the universe by pure Cit is out of question.

THE TRIKA THEORY OF CAUSALITY. In opposition to the Suddhabrahmavādin, the exponents of the Trika, therefore, hold that the Ultimate Reality is Prakāśavimarśamaya i. e. it is not only all-inclusive but also all-controlling?. It is by virtue of the latter aspect that it manifests the universe, which is ever within itself in the form of universal energy, as apparently separate from itself on the back-ground of itself without losing its oneness, much in the same manner as that in which a mirror manifests what is reflected on it. The most important difference between the two cases is that, while, in the case of an ordinary mirror, reflections are cast by an external object, in that of the mirror of the Universal Consciousness they are caused by its own powers (saktis) which constitute different aspects of its Svātantrya saktis.

Thus, according to the Trika, all that we see is a mere manifestation of the Universal Energy under the control of the Creative Desire. When for instance, a seed develops into

I. P. V., II, 278-9
I. P. V., II, 177. 3. T. A., II, 72.

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a sprout, it is the Universal Unergy underlying the seed soil and water etc. that manifests itself as a sprout; or when a potter, who also is a manifestation of the same energy, makes a jar, it is the Creative Desire that works through him on the Universal Energy, underlying the so called instrumental and material Causes, and, according to the law of Niyati, brings the jar into existence through various stages,

THE TRIKA THEORY OF KARMA. Here it may be asked: if it is the Creative Desire that is working in and through the individual, if all that is accomplished is the work not of the individual but of the Universal Self, how can then any merit or demerit attach to the former ; how can the individual’s experiences, good or bad, be attributed to his previous actions; and how can this concept of Kriyāśakti be reconciled with the acce pted theory of Karma? To this Abhinava replies in the 9th and the 13th Ahnikas of the Tantrāloka. His conclu sion on this point is based on the combined authority of Sambhunātha’ and Somānanda.3

The theory of karma is meant to explain not only the variety of an individual’s associations and experiences and his freedom from them but also the variety that we find in the so called physical universe. Just as individual karma determines individual experiences, so the sum total of all karmas of all the individual selves determines the variety to be found in the physical universe which supplies the necessary stimuli for innumerable experiences. The physical universe is not a capricious creation. It is created with a purpose. Its creation, therefore, is controlled by the necessities of that purpose. It is meant for meeting the innumerable

I. P. V., 11, 146.
T. A., VIII, 69. 3. T. A. VIII, 72.

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shades of countless desires of an unimaginable number of limited selves; the selves which are mere limited manifesta tions of, or mere appearances assumed by, the Universal Consciousness by virtue of its power of obscuration (tirodhāna). To assume such appearances, is, according to the ābhāsavāda, as also, according to the monistic Vedānta, a mere sport of the Supreme.

The limitedness of an individual self consists in the limitation of its powers of knowledge and action. It is called svarūpākhyāti, because it is due to the ignorance of the real nature of the individual self. This limitation necessarily involves another, namely, limitation in desire; for, desire presupposes the knowledge of the desired, and, therefore, cannot refer to what is beyond the reach of knowledge. The latter being limited the former also has necessarily to be so. This limited desire before the creation of the physical universe is objectless; it is a mere eagerness on the part of limited self to use its limited powers. It is the one cause of the future association of the soul with different kinds of bodies suited for its realisation. It is responsible for the limited associations of the limited self. It is the cause of transmigration. It is the root of all actions or Karmas. It does not presuppose a connection with a body, because it is a function of the self and not of the body. If it were not so, a yogin, having once reached the transcendental state i. e. having risen above the limitation of the body, would not be able to resume his connection with the same; because, to break the transcendental state requires a conscious effort which presupposes the rise of desire, so that if the latter were always to presuppose a connection with the body vyuthāna would never take place. This limited desire is called Kārmamala, because it leads to

I. P. V., II, 220.

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action of a limited nature. It is determined by the Lord’s will :

Isvarecchāvaśād asya bhogecchā samprajāyate. Bhogasādhanasamsiddhyai bhogecchorasya mantrarāt Jagadutpādayāmasa māyāmāvisya saktibhih.”

TA., Comm., VI, 56.

The limitation of desire is as beginningless as that of the powers of knowledge and action; and both are due to the All-Controlling Universal Will. Not only this, even the freedom from these limiting conditions and the regaining of godhead are due to the same cause. It cannot be objected that if the Lord be responsible for the variety of limitation in respect of powers of knowledge and action and therefore of desire and other conditions and circumstances, in which we find the living beings, it would naturally follow that He is partial and cruel ; for, some He has placed in very favourable circumstances, but others in the extremely adverse; some He has made so happy that they are envied by all who see them, but others so miserable that their very sight is heart-rending; some He liberates but others He keeps in bondage. The reason is that this is a non-dualistic system and, therefore, the so called differently circumstanced indi. viduals have no being apart from Him. And cruelty is cruelty and so partiality is partiality only if it be done to another. Therefore, according to this system, there being no being having a separate being from the Universal Being, the notion of partiality and cruelty being practised by Him is baseless. 3 Nor can it be questioned why He manifests this apparent diversity. Because to do so is His essential nature and it is absurd to question it. It is as meaningless as asking why fire burns ? 1. T. A., VIII, 74.

T. A., VIII, 82. 3. T. A., VIII, 71.
T. A., VIII, 72.

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KARMA AND CREATION.

In addition to the three functions of the Brahman accepted by Sankarācārya, who interpreted the Brahma Sūtras according to the teachings of the Upaniṣads, namely, creation maintenance and dissolution (srsti, sthiti, samhāra) the Trika, in common with all other āgamic schools, believes in two more, namely, obscuration and grace (tirodhāna and anugraha). It has to be very carefully noted here that only the last two functions are independent of Karma. Only the obscuration and the liberation are brought about by the Lord’s independent force of will. The rest i. e. creation etc. depend upon the main prompting cause, the Kārmamala, 1 the sum total of the limited desires of the limited selves; because, the satisfaction of these is the only purpose of the creation, as we have already pointed out above. In fact, in the Tantrāloka the question is raised as to why the creation etc. also are not attributed to the free will of the Lord, and why the malas are assumed to be the prompting causes? And Abhinava has replied to this as follows:

The Creation is of two kinds, the impure and the pure i. e, with and without limitation. In the latter case śiva himself is the creator and it is the work purely of His independent power of will. But the former is created by Ananta, who requires prompting causes, the malas, to determine his creative activities. (“Nanu yadyevam tat kim ebhih antargaduprāyaih malādibhih, īśvarecchaiva viśvasargādau nirapeksā nimittam astu ityāśankya āha :

Ittham srstisthitidhvamsatraye māyām apekṣate

krtyai malam tathā karma śivecchaiveti susthitam. Iha khalu uktayuktyā viśvatra srstisthitisamhāralakṣaṇam

T. A., VI, 56.

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nijam krtyatrayam kartum īśvarecchaiva pragalbhate, kintu malarh karma māyāñca apekṣya, yat parameśvarah

“Suddhedhvani śivah kartā proktonantosite prabhuh.”

ityuktyā māyiyedhvani anantamukhena srstyādi vidadhyāt, na ca tasya īśvaravat ananyāpekṣameva svātantryamh samasti iti avasyam eva malādyapekṣaṇīyam, anyathā hi katham pratipum vicitrarh srstyādi syāt iti sarvarh sustham”

T. A., VIII, Comm., 76-7.)

In our humble opinion, therefore, in view of what has been stated above, Prof. Radhakrishnan’s statement in the very brief summary of the Pratyabhijñā system in his Indian Philosophy, requires some modification in respect of the prompting causality of Karma in creation. His statement runs as follows:

“The existence of a prompting cause, like karma, or material cause, like praksti, for the creation of the world is not admitted. Nor is Māyā the principle which creates illusory forms. God is absolutely independent, and creates all that exists by the mere force of His will.”

I. Ph. Vol. II 732.

As regards the quotation from the Pratyabhijñā Vimar sinī, given by the learned professor, we may point out that it is connected with the discussion on the theory of perception and is meant to show how the objective wave is suddenly given rise to at the time of perception. And the illustration of yogin refers to the sudden creation (akrami kābhāsa) i. e. creation in violation of the law of Niyati, and is meant to show that this system does not believe in the material cause, like atoms, of the objective universe. ThisTHEORY OF KARMA

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point we have already discussed at some length in the preceding pages, and we think that the Professor means to substantiate by this quotation only that part of his statement which denies a separate material cause and not that which is concerned with the denial of Karma as a prompting cause of the creation. And if so, we fully agree with him on that point.

It may be pointed out here that Sankara agrees with Abhinava that the creation of universe is merely a sport of the Lord, that sportiveness is His nature and is unquestionable and that the grace is solely dependent upon the Lord’s will. To support this statement we may give the following extracts from Thibaut’s translation of the Sānkara Bhāṣya :

“But (Brahman’s creative activity) is mere sport such as we see in common life”

………… We see in every day life that certain doings of princes and other men of high position, who have no unfulfilled desires left, have no reference to any extraneous purpose, but proceed from mere sportfulness, as for instance, their recreations in places of amusement ………… Analogously, the activity of the Lord also may be supposed to be mere sport, proceeding from his own nature without reference to any purpose. For on the ground neither of reason nor of scripture can we construe any purpose of the Lord. Nor can His nature be questioned." (356-7)

“And if we are asked how we come to know that the Lord in creating this world with its various conditions, is not bound by regards, we reply that scripture declares that. Compare, for instance, the two following passages. “For He (the Lord) makes him, whom He wishes to lead up from these worlds, do a good deed.” (359)

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No doubt, this passage speaks of the grace being dependent upon the action of the recipient (Prāṇikarma sāpekṣam eva iśvarasyānugrahītrtvam), but the question is: on what does the action itself depend? Does it not on the Lord’s will? How can then the ultimate dependence of the grace on the Lord’s will be denied ?

Thus, when, in accordance with the limitations of powers of knowledge, action and desire, an individual self gets associated with body, senses, vital air and mind and is placed in the requisite circumstances for the realisation of the limited desire, the universal will works through it. In reality, therefore, the individual self is not independent in its action nor does any merit or demerit, consequent upon the so called pious or sinful acts, attach to it ; because, their piety and sinfulness are imaginary and conventional. But among other effects of the universal will, there is this also that under its influence the individual self arrogates the authorship (kartstva) of the actions, so performed, to itself and is perfectly oblivious of the fact of its being simply a tool of the universal will. It is this self-arrogation of the individual which is responsible for the attachment of merit and demerit. On this the idea of the individual piety or sinfulness is based.

One can very pertinently ask here : why is the limited desire of the individual self spoken of as Karma and whether it is not strange to suppose the Lord to be perfectly independent in some of His functions but in others to be entirely dependent upon mala etc.? To the former Abhinava replies that Karma is that which results in some limited experience and so in further obscuration of the real

T. A., VIII, 70. I. P. V., II, 149

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nature of the experiencer. It is a different matter that in the ordinary use the word means something else:

“Karma tallokarudham hi yadbhogam avaram dadat Tirodhatte bhoktộrūpam samjñāyām tu na no bharah.”

T. A., VIII, 161.

The limited desire of the limited individual is, therefore, spoken of as karma because it is the primary cause of all kinds of its associations and experiences, as shown above. And to the latter question he replies that it is unreasonable to assume one and the same thing to be productive of opposite effects. How can a thing, which is the cause of bondage, be the cause of liberation also ? It is to satisfy the demand of reason that the Trika holds the Lord’s grace, independent of any thing that is connected with mala, māyā and karma, to be the only cause of liberation :

“Anusvarūpatāhānau tadgatām hetutām katham Vrajenmāyānapekṣatvam ata evopapādayet.”

T. A., VIII, 77. KARMA DEFINED.

It is necessary here to point out the distinction between the Kārmamala and the Karmasaskāra. The former is the limited desire, as we have just stated, which is responsible for the future limited association of an individual self, after the Mahāpralaya, when the universe is created anew. The latter, the Karmasaṁskāra, is a certain effect that is produced on a limited self; an effect, not that which, being revived, is responsible for the rise of phenomenon of remembrance, but that which is caused by the personal conviction of the potentiality of a particular action to lead to certain experiences at the time of its maturation. Both these, the Kārmamala and the Karmasamskāra, may be spoken of as two aspects

T. A., VI, 85

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of the same thing. In fact, when the distinction of the former from the latter is not intended to be emphasised i. e. when the idea of both of them is intended to be conveyed, the simple word “Karma” is used. Karma in general, there fore, means that unseen factor which is responsible for the difference in the fruition of the same action done by a number of persons. Certain boys join the same school, are placed under the same teacher, are given the same facilities and opportunities, and read the same courses for the same number of hours daily, but the result is not the same in all cases. Why ? Certain children are born to certain parents, their surroundings are the same; the care that the parents bestow on each is the same and there is no difference in their external life. Will the result be the same in all cases ? And if not, why? The Trika, in common with other systems of Indian philosophy, replies that it is due to Karma! in general, as defined above.

CONDITIONS NECESSARY FOR FRUITION OF KARMA.

Karma is like a seed and as such does not fructify soon after it is sown. It requires the fertile soil of self-arrogation? and the manure of similar actions to help its growth; there fore, unless a person arrogates an action to himself it would not fructify. In fact, this is the chief point of distinction between the two kinds of experiencers, the pralayākalas and the vijñānākalas. The former arrogate their action to them selves and, therefore, are affected by the impurity called kārmamala, but the latter do not and so are free from it. It is this very absence of self-arrogation that keeps the persons, who are out of their senses, unaffected by the actions done in that state, as all the scriptures unanimously declare. The

T. A., VI, 98. 2. T. A., VI, 85. 3. T. A., VI, 86.

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self-arrogation is thus the soil without which the seed of Karma cannot grow.

THE ASSOCIATED IDEA AND FRUITION.

The result of an action, however, even when it is associated with the self-arrogation, is not always the same. It is greatly influenced by the associated ideas. When, for instance, a person practises certain austerities and desires that their fruit should go to the other person for whom he performs them, it is the other that gets the fruit and not the per former. This idea is common to most of the religions. It is on this that engaging of the priests for prayer, fasting and other kinds of austerities to effect a certain desired end is based. Leaving the religious questions aside, if we analyse our daily experiences we find that the nature of the effect of an action in the form of a mental state of some kind depends not on the action itself but on the idea with which it is associated. Suppose, for instance, that two new motor cars are driven by two different persons; one is a servant, driving his master to a certain place, and the other is the owner himself. The act of driving is the same; both the cars are equally new; they are of the same maker and have similar accessories; but will the pleasure of driving be the same in both the cases, and if not, why? Is not the difference due to the associated ideas? Is not the littleness of the servant-driver’s joy, as compared to that of the master, in driving a new car, due to the association of the idea of service ? Thus, as in ordinary life so in the sphere of religion and morality, an act by itself is productive of no fruit; its productivity differs with the difference in the associated ideas.

T. A., VI, 87.

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DIFFERENT STATES OF KARMA

Karma is associated not with the body but with the limited self, and, therefore, is not destroyed with the destruction of the body. It transmigrates with the soul and determines the soul’s associations with the future body and its circumstances. It waits till it gets circumstances favourable for its growth and then it asserts itself. The state of Karma, when it is about to assert itself, is called the state of its maturity. When once this state is reached, nothing can stop it from running its course. Even self-realisation cannot prevent it from fruition. Even the enlightened souls have to undergo the experiences which follow the maturity of Karma. Even they cannot escape it. It is this maturity of the past karma which is responsible for the difference in the result of the same action done by a number of persons, as in the above stated case of school children. This state of Karma is technically called “Phalonmukhata” As opposed to this, there is the other state in which, the circumstances being extremely unfavou rable for its growth, a karma remains dormant; it is called “Phalānunmukhatā”. The fructifiability of a karma in the latter state can be destroyed by a counter-action such as charity austerity and knowledge. The preventive measures against the fructification of Karma are like inoculations to safeguard a person against the attack of a certain disease. And just as inoculation, though effective, if it be done long before the attack, is yet useless when the attack has come, so charity, austerity and penance can prevent the fruition of a karma, only if they be done long before its maturity or Phalonmukhatā. But they are of no use when it has attained maturity. The mature

T. A. VI, 103. 2. T. A., VI, 102.

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Karma is like a boulder, slipped from the top of a mountain, which knows no obstruction and must have its course till it reaches a table land.

KARMA AND LIBERATION.

The destruction of karma is one of the most essential antecedent conditions of the liberation of soul. But let it be noted here that, according to this system, this is neither the only condition nor is this in itself Mokṣa. Even when the karma is destroyed there remains another impurity, called āṇavamala, associated with the self; and so long as this also is not destroyed there can be no emancipation. In fact, the only difference between the experiencer, known as Vijñānākala and śiva, is, that, while both are equally free from karma, the former has still got the anavamala but the latter is free from that also. This is another point of difference between the Vedānta and the Trika conceptions of Mokṣa. According to the former, liberation means simply liberation from the bondage of karma (Naiṣkarmya), but, according to the latter, it means freedom from both kārma and anava malas. It cannot be objected here that if the āṇavamala is the cause of the association of the soul with karma why does not Vijñānakevala get into the bondage of karma ? Because in the Vijñānākala state the āṇavamala is about to be destroyed and, therefore, loses its causal efficiency”.

HOW IS THE DESTRUCTION EFFECTED ?

We have pointed out above that the individual self is not free in its volition and action. These are the universal powers of will and action which are working in and through the individual. It is thus a mere tool and not a free agent.

T. A., VI, 77. 2. T. A., VI, 79-80

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Under the influence of His will, however, it arrogates to itself the authorship of all that is done through the body with which it has identified itself. But, when through His grace true light dawns upon it, it realises its oneness with the Universal Self. As a necessary consequence of self realization, the identification with the body, together with the effect of self-arrogation of the deeds done in the state of ignorance (Moha) comes to an end. The fruition of the past action, therefore, naturally becomes out of question. This? nullification of the effect of self-arrogation of action which follows the cessation of identity of the self with the body, is technically called karmadāha in the Trika literature :

“Karmaṇaśca iyān dāho yad dehāhambhāvasamskāraguṇi bhāvo nāma iti, sa ca vaiśvātmyam asritāyām samyidi ātmābhimānasya mukhyatvād bhavet ityuktam.”

T. A., Comm., VI, 108.

CRITICISM OF THE RIVAL THEORY OF THE SANKHYA.

According to the Sāūkhya, liberation is nothing but the cessation of the activity of prakrti towards a particular puruṣa. But it may be asked: if puruṣa is never really affected in any way and is simply pure consciousness, (puṣkara palāśavannirlepah kintu cetanah) in itself it must ever be the same; why is it then that prakrti is not active towards the so called liberated ? It cannot be said that the activity of praksti requires the presence of the old habits of experience of Buddhi (karmasamskāra) as a prompting cause, and because all the samskāras of the past actions of the liberated are destroyed, there is, therefore, nothing to prompt prakrti to work for the liberated; for, the opponent then may be asked : “what is it that is responsible for the destruction of

T. A., VI, 106-7. 2. T. A., VI, 108.

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saṇskāras ?” It cannot be experience of the fruit by the doer, because experience in itself is an act and, therefore, rather than destroying the samskāras, would lead to the formation of another. Nor can the knowledge be the cause of destruction, because if the word “knowledge” means something which is to be got by performing the acts of piety, enjoined by the scripture, then it is only a fruit of a certain action and as such cannot rightly be represented to be the cause of destruction of the past karmas. For, if fruition of one action is supposed to destory another action there is no reason why fruition of those actions, by virtue of which one attains heaven, should not destroy those which result in knowledge. Nor can this be said that knowledge does not destroy karma, but simply sterilises it by removing ignorance, which is the most essential condition of its fruition. For, then the opponent may be asked to state what he means by ignorance. Is it a negation of knowledge which precedes the existence of knowledge (prāgabhāva) or that which follows its destruction (dhvarsa), In the for mer case again, is it the negation of all kinds of knowledge or only of some ? The former position is, of course, impossi ble, for, to deny all kinds of knowledge to a limited self is to deny sentiency and selfhood to it. The latter also is no better, because the absence of some kind of knowledge preceding its coming into being will always exist in the cases of both the bound and the liberated; for, according to the Sankhya, the Puruṣa is simply sentient but not omniscient as the real self of the Vedāntin, so that even after liberation it can be spoken of as being without a certain knowledge preceding its existence. Nor can ignorance mean the absence of knowledge consequent upon its destruction, for, such an ignorance there will always be in the case of the liberated.

T. A., VIII, 9.

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But if the opponent were to say that ignorance means not the absence of all knowledge, but simply wrong knowledge, then also it has to be made clear whether its causal relation to the fruition of an action depends upon its presence at the time of performance of the action or at that of the fructi fication. In the latter case, the accepted theory of each creation after dissolution being according to the individual karmas falls to the ground; for, association of a puruṣa with a body is a sort of fruition of certain karmas, but how can the karmas fructify unless there be ignorance and how can there be ignorance unless there be the association of self with a body; because ignorance, according to the Sankhya, is a quality of buddhi, an evolute of prakrti, and as such it is non-existent at the time of dissolution. In the former case there is no reason why all karmas should not fructify in the case of the ignorant and the enlighter.ed alike, because the ignorance was present in both the cases at the time of per formance. Nor can it be said that ignorance is co-existent with sentiencyl and because sentiency lasts even through dissolution, ignorance also, therefore, is naturally present; for, in that case it will not be possible to deny the presence of ignorance even in the case of the enlightened ; because the enlightened are no less sentient than the unenlightened and therefore, it would be hard to explain why the karma of of the latter does not fructify.

SANKHYA CONCEPTION OF IGNORANCE.

The evolution of Prakrti has got a twofold purpose to serve, namely, (I) to supply the necessary stimuli for the varying experiences which the puruṣas have helplessly to suffer or to enjoy, according to their individual karmas, and (II) ultimately to effect their salvation. The former is called

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bhoga and is due to the identification of the self with Buddhi. The latter is called apavarga and consists in the knowledge of difference between the self and the Buddhi and consequent cessation of the activity of the nature (pradhāna) with reference to a particular self. Bhoga depends upon the arrogation by puruṣa of the work of buddhi to itself. Buddhi, according to the Sāökhya, is like a mirror, capable of receiving reflection from both the sides. Its capacity to receive reflection of the external object, however, depends upon its receiving light from puruṣa. Thus Buddhi, though insentient in itself, appears to be sentient because of the reflected light. And puruṣa too, though in reality indifferent to all the works of prakrti, yet, because of the co-evality of the reflection of the external objects on buddhi with the reflection of its own light, arrogates to itself the agency of assuming the form of the external object, which, in fact, belongs to buddhi. Apavarga similarly depends upon the distinctive knowledge that buddhi is of changing nature and that puruṣa is unchangeable and something different from Buddhi.

The beginningless ignorance of difference between the self and the prakrti is the prompting cause of the evolution of the latter for bhoga. After the rise of the knowledge of distinction, therefore, there remains nothing to prompt it to further action. Hence its evolutive activity towards that particular puruṣa, on whom the knowledge has dawned, automatically comes to an end.

REFUTATION OF THE SANKHYA THEORY.

From what has been stated it is clear that, according to the Sānkhya, release is nothing but cessation of the evolutive activity of prakrti consequent upon the disappearance of the prompting cause, the ignorance of distinction between

T. A., VIII, 21-2.

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puruṣa and buddhi. But the defect of the Sānkhya theory is obvious. The Sānkhya is silent on the question of the relation of this ignorance. It cannot satisfactorily answer the query : “To whom does the ignorance belong ?” For, it cannot be attributed to puruṣa, because that would make freedom from it impossible. Purusa, according to the Sārkhya, does not change. The loss of an attribute certainly means a change in the possessor; therefore, if it be said that ignorance belongs to purusa who loses it at the time of libera tion, the Sankhya theory of unchangeability of the purusa would fall to the ground. But if it be said that it belongs to prakrti, then puruṣa being ever free from it, the notion that evolutive activity of prakrti is for the liberation of puruṣa becomes absurd. Further, the Sājkhya cannot satisfactorily answer another question : if the ignorance lasts only so long as the knowledge of distinction between puruṣa and buddhi does not arise, when does this knowledge arise ? It cannot be said that it arises when all the effects of praksti have been seen, because they are limitless and, therefore, it is impossible to see all of them. Nor can a general knowledge of the nature of praksti’s evolute be represented to be the cause of liberation, for, that being possible even from seeing one evolute there is no reason why any puruṣa should be in bondage.

DUALISTIC SAIVA THEORY OF IGNORANCE.

According to the dualist school of Saivaism, the recog nised exponent of which is Khetapāla, ignorance is some thing like a cover which hides the perfection of self in respect of the powers of knowledge and action. It is one, but possesses innumerable varieties of concealing power. It hides the perfection of each soul by a separate variety of its power. This, according to the dualist Saivas, accounts

T. A., Comm., VIII, 36.

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for the difference in knowledge or ignorance of one soul from that of another. This also explains why at the liberation or destruction of ignorance of one soul, all do not get liberated or enlightened. It is not a creation of māyā, for, if it be so, there would be no reason why māyā should not create it for the liberated also. It is not a mere negation or not-being of knowledge, but a positive entity, because it has the causal efficiency of hiding the perfection of the powers of knowledge and action of the Self. It is beginningless in itself and so is its association with the souls. It is insentient and is the cause of association of karma and māyā with the self. When the concealing power of this ignorance is nullified by divine grace (saktipāta) in the case of a certain soul, it (soul) shines forth in its true glory. This removal of the veil of ignorance, this recovery of the hidden powers, this freedom from all kinds of limitations, is called mokṣa, in the dualistic śaiva literature.

REFUTATION OF THE DUALIST THEORY.

But what is the cause of the maturity (pāka) or destruc tion of this ignorance? It cannot be action (karma), because it is accepted to be the cause of the variety of pleasant or unpleasant experiences which a person enjoys or suffers. It is, therefore, unreasonable to represent it to be the cause of their cessation also. Nor can the Lord’s will be said to be responsible for the said maturity, for, He is free from all partiality, and, therefore, if He be admitted to be the cause of destruction of ignoraace it would be dif ficult to explain why He frees only some and not all. Fur ther, according to the dualist, the ignorance is beginningless and causeless. Assumption, therefore, of its destruction, whatever be its cause, is against our common experience;

T. A., VIII, 30.

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for, there is no instance of another thing which though both beginningless and causeless is yet destructible. The not-being of a thing before it actually comes into being, (prāgabhāva) has, of course, to be left out of consideration, because it is a non-entity and as such belongs to a different category from that of the ignorance which is an entitative being and possesses causal efficiency. It cannot be said that there is no destruction of ignorance but that its power falls into abeyance, like the fatal biting power of a snake in a charmed circle, because then there would follow simultaneous liberation of all and there will also be the possibility of all coming again back to bondage at the revival of the concealing power of ignorance.

There is a further question : how and what does the ignorance conceal ? Souls are eternal and unchangeable. The ignorance, therefore, cannot be supposed to affect them in any way, for, such a supposition would bring them down to the level of transitory things. Therefore, if it be said to conceal powers of knowledge and action by its mere presence in the proximity of the self, then there is no reason why it should not do so in the case of śiva and other liberated souls. Moreover, if it conceals the powers of the self it conceals the very being of self, because self is nothing more than the said powers. How can then we know the very existence of the self?

DUALIST THEORY OF KARMASĀMYA

Now, leaving aside the question how and what the concealing power of ignorance conceals, if we were to take into consideration the question, “why does it fall into abeyance ?” we find the dualist’s position no better. They hold that the Lord’s will, prompted by the equili brium or equipoise of karmas (karma-sāmya), puts in

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abeyance the concealing power of ignorance. The karma sāmya, according to them, is a state of maturity of two equipotential karmas of opposite nature. In this state each of the two karmas is equally mature for fruition, but is prevented from yielding its fruit by another which also is equally mature and is trying to push its way to fruition. Because both are equally strong, therefore, neither can assert itself over the other. And the result is that not only neither of these two can fructify but others also, which would have borne their fruits in ordinary course, are prevented from so doing, because of their way to fruition having, as it were, been stopped by the struggle of the two equipotential karmas. It is a case like that of two equally strong wrestlers trying to push their way through a small door through which only one person can pass at a time. The result is, as we often see at the opening of a barrier to a third class railway booking office window, that neither can pass; and while they are fighting, each trying to assert his right over the other to purchase his ticket first, other poor passengers have helplessly to wait behind. This state is marked by the absence of feeling of both pleasure and pain alike. The reason is obvious, Mind can have only one experience at a time (Yugapaj jñānānutpattir manaso lingam). The fruition of a karma is nothing but an experience. And because two experiences are not simultaneously possible, reasonably therefore, two karmas cannot be supposed to fructify at the same time. Karmasāmya, therefore, according to the dualists, is both natural and logical.

REFUTATION OF KARMASĀMYA.

There are three kinds of action, pious, sinful and mixed. Two fructifiable actions cannot take place simultaneously. Because an action, in order that it may have its necessary result, according to the law of karma, must have the

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cooperation of mind, must be associated with some idea. In fact, the moral fruition of an action depends not on the action itself so much as on the associated idea. It is because of this that motiveless action (niskāma karma) does not fructify. As the mind can have only one idea at a time so naturally two fructifiable actions cannot take place simultaneously. The performances of actions being in succession, their maturity also must necessarily be in succession. How can then two actions simultaneously attain maturity and produce karmasāmya ? Further, even if simultaneous maturity of two equipotential actions be admitted, there arises a very important question as to whether other actions do or do not fructify after the karmasāmya. In the former case, inspite of this karmasāmya, the bondage of karma will remain. In the latter case, cessation of the fruition of all actions being necessary, even those actions, which are responsible for the existence of the body, the life, and other circumstances of the liberated, should necessarily stop fruition and, therefore, there should be instantaneous death of the freed. Further, if the equilibrium of two actions can prevent the fruition of all other actions, what does there remain for the Lord’s will to accomplish, what is then the Saktipāta assumed for ? Even if saktipāta be assumed to be necessary, the karmasāmya being the same in all cases, it is difficult to account for difference of saktipāta in different cases. The life of renunciation and other religious practices cannot explain it, because the limited selves cannot be assumed to be indepen dent in their performance. For, if it were so, it would be difficult to explain why all do not perform them. If, therefore, it be supposed to be dependent on something else,

T. A., VIII, 49.

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335 that also logically will require something else still as a prompting cause and so on ad-infinitum.

The Trika, therefore, holds that, while obscuration and liberation are the works of the independent will of the Lord, creation, maintenance and destruction are dependent upon innate ignorance and karma, and that this ignorance is not an insentient independent entity, as conceived by the dualists, but is a production of the Lord’s will.1

T. A., Comm., VIII 75.