4 ABHĀSAVĀDA AS THE BASIS OF THE TRIKA THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

ABHĀSAVĀDA AS THE BASIS OF THE TRIKA THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE.

Preliminaries and Presuppositions.

ĀBHĀSAVĀDA AND PRACTICAL LIFE.

Abhinava very clearly says, as has already been stated in the first chapter, that the practical utility of this system is that it explains the real nature of phenomenal existence and so enables its followers to recognise the Ultimate Reality. It is, therefore, meant for only those who are seeking the truth, who want to understand the real nature of the ‘apparent’. As for those, who are completely engrossed in the worldly activities of momentary interest and, therefore, seek the explanation only of the apparent nature of the apparent, the view point and the method of the Naiyāyikas is the best. The Abhāsavāda holds that each object, as we perceive it, is a momentary collocation of a certain number of abhāsas; that the individual is in reality identical with the Universal Self and as such has no independent will of its own, but acts and moves as the latter makes it do; that whatever is, is ever one with the Universal Self and even when a thing appears to have a separate existence, it is as little independent of the Ultimate as the objects of a dream are of the dreaming self and that the difference between the real and the illusory i. e. between the silver appearing at the sight of a mother-of-pearl and the real silver or between the objects of a dream and those of the wakeful state, is purely conventional; both of them are equally real or unreal; the difference between them is of

1. P. V., I, 25.

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degree and not of kind. But does a practical man of the world require the knowledge of all these philosophical concepts ? Can such a knowledge help him in achieving what he has set his heart on ? Abhinava’s statement: “In practical every-day life the view point of the Naiyāyikas is the best” seems, therefore, to have been inspired by the following words of Lord Krṣṇa :

“The enlightened should not disturb the minds of the unenlightened, who are given to active life, by talk of knowledge (jñāna)"

Bh. G., III, 26. In this respect he follows Sankara who in his commentary on the very first Sūtra says :

“We maintain that the antecedent conditions are the discrimination of what is eternal and what is non-eternal; the renunciation of all desire to enjoy the fruit of one’s action both here and hereafter ; the acquirement of tranquillity, self restraint and the other means and the desire of final release. If these conditions exist, a man may, either before entering on an enquiry into active religious duty or after that, engage in the enquiry into Brahman and come to know it, but not otherwise."

(V. S., Th. 12).

The philosophical knowledge of the phenomena of the external world is of as little use to the practical man of the world as the scientific knowledge of the mechanism of cinema is to one who goes to cinema simply for diversion.

Looking, however, at the world with a philosopher’s eye and trying to explain it from the point of view of the Trika, we find that it represents only two kinds of manifestations (ābhāsas) of the Universal Consciousness, and that both of them are of limited nature. The one is sentient (jīva) and the other is insentient (jada). And because the perception,

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on which all our ideas of the external phenomena are based, presupposes both, therefore, before attempting an exposition of the theory of perception, we state here the Trika concept of both jīva and jada.

THE LIMITED SENTIENT ĀBHĀSA. It forms one of the thirty-six categories of this system. We have, therefore, already dwelt on it at some length in the preceding chapter. It may, however, be pointed out here that consistently with the postulate of the Universal Consciousness, the Trika holds, as the strict logic requires, that the limited self has no independent existence and as such has no freedom of will or action. It is the Universal Self that wills and acts through every mind and body. On this point also this system seems to be in agreement with the Vedānta Sūtra and the Bhagavadgītā. Compare, for instance,

“Isvaraḥ sarvabhūtānām hrddeśerjuna tiṣthati

Bhrāmayan sarvabhūtāni yantrārudhāni māyayā.”

Bh. G., XVIII, 61.

and also

*Avidyāvasthāyāt kāryakāranasanghātavivekadarśino

jīvasya avidyātimirandhasya satah parasmādātmanah karmādhyakṇāt sarvabhūtādhivāsāt sākṣiṇas cetayiturīśvarāt tadanujñayā kartrtva bhoktrtvalakṣaṇasya samsārasya siddhih."

S. Bh., 552.

It has, as already pointed out, two aspects, the permanent and the transitory. The consciousness, with the beginningless impurities (malas) and six covers, (kañcukas), which is free from association with body and vital air and is capable of retaining the effects of the external stimuli, received at the time of perception, represents the permanent aspect of the individual consciousness. It is a determinateTHE BASIS OF THE TRIKA THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE 259

consciousness inasmuch as it is limited, though the limitation is not of any particular kind and, therefore, may be said to be as imaginary as describing a bare piece of land as a place without jar (śūnyam bhūtalam ghaṭābhāvah).

This limited consciousness momentarily identifies itself at one time with body, as, for instance, when one has the consciousness “I am fat” at another with vital air as when one feels “I am strong” and at still another with Buddhi as at the time of determinate knowledge “I know this.” Even a lay man knows this identification to be momentary, for, the soul gets dissociated, as all know, from the body in the deep sleep state and from the vital air and the buddhi at the time of a fainting fit. Philosophically speaking, however, the dissociation of self from the object of identification is taking place literally every moment. For, according to the Trika, as according to the Bauddha, every object is momen tary and both the psychological and the physical activities presuppose the identification of the self with the momentary manifestation of the body and the mind. How can, therefore, the activity of either kind be possible unless the renewal of the identification be admitted to be taking place every moment ? Hence the self in its aspect of identification with body etc. is represented to be transitory.

The fact is that the Trika has accepted the Bauddha theory of momentariness of both the subject and the object and has fitted it in with its own conception of the All-inclusive Universal Consciousness, a conception which differs from the Vedāntic conception of the Brahman only inasmuch as the latter, according to Abhinava, is pure light (Suddha prakāśa), while the former is not only Prakāśamaya but also has Vimarśa, the perfect power of control over what is Prakāśa (Prakāśa vimarśamayah). Abhinava has not tried to hide this fact. He has very clearly stated in his Brhatī Vimarsinī

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that if dualistic doctrine were given up by the so called Agamikas; if Māyā were to be taken as the power of the Brahman by the Vedāntins; and if the two Vijñānas, the ālayavijñāna and the pravíttivijñāna, were to be admitted to be the manifestations of the Atmeśvara or Maheśvara, the Universal Consciousness, by the Bauddhas, all differences between the Trika on the one hand and the Agamikas, the Vedāntins and the Bauddhas on the other disappear. The latter become the exponents of the Trika philosophy :

“Āgameṣu dvaitavyākhyāmapāsya, Brahmavāde avidyām māyāśaktīkrtya vijñānadvayam ātmeśvarābhiprāyeṇa nirūpya siddhyatyeṣa janah”

and also

“Pārameśvareṣu tāvadāgameṣu saivavaiṣnavarahasyeṣu Vedānteṣu ca spaṣta evoktoyam asmaduktorthah, Tadanusāriṇaiva sugatenoktam Cittamātramidam, yaduta traidhātukamiti tadatra vivarana kārair durabhi niveśavaśena vipratārito janaḥ. Idameva tu tattvamiti tu tātparyam.”

We may add here one interesting argument in support of the momentariness of the bodily and the intellectual selves. It is generally admitted that at all hours of the wakeful state some kind of knowledge or another is taking place; that knowledge is simply an affected state of consciousness due to an external stimulus and that a determinate knowledge is invariably preceded by an indeterminate. As we pass from knowledge of one thing to that of another, the transition is not usually sharp. One act of knowledge fades gradually into the next. If, for instance, we look at a coin for several moments, we feel that we have not had a single continuous perception. First we have the knowledge of the coin as a rupee, then that of the figure on it, then of its roughened edge and then of its date and so on. These acts of knowledge

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so run into each other that it is ordinarily not possible to say exactly when one act of knowledge begins and the other ends. Another noteworthy point in this connection is that the Trika, like the Vedānta, holds that all is one with the Universal Self at the time of the indeterminate knowledge.

(Aindriyake nirvikalpake sadāśiveśvaradaśābhyudayāt).

Now if a new determinate knowledge is accepted to be taking place every moment and if it is invariably preceded by an indeterminate one, in which all is in a state of unity with the Universal Self?, the irresistible logical conclusion from all this naturally is that the limited perceiver is mani fested anew every moment a knowledge takes place.

THE LIMITED INSENTIENT MANIFESTATION

JADĀBHĀSA. An objective limited insentient manifestation is ordinarily called? Jaļābhāsa: a jar, for instance. It forms the basis of one idea and as such is expressible by one word and has to be separately taken through the whole cognitive process in order that it may be cognised. It is momentary, because like the sentient limited manifestation, it is manifested a-new at the time of every cognition. But if we carefully analyse our knowledge of the jar we find that, though ordinarily taken to be one ābhāsa, it is made up of many; it embodies as many ābhāsas as there are words which can be used with reference to it by various analytical perceivers, looking at it from different points of view. To an ordinary perceiver it is a combination of ābhāsas of roundness, materiality, externality, blackness and existence. But, if a scientist were to do an atomic analysis of the same, how many acts of perception will

I. P. V., II, 66. I. P. V., II, 69-71.

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he have to do and how many words will he require to describe the results of his analysis ? Can any body say that the atoms of different kinds are not the constituents of what is ordinarily taken to be one thing ? The Trika, therefore, holds that each ābhāsa, as we perceive it, is a collocation of a certain number of Abhāsas, each of which requires a separate perceptual acti vity for its perception, that the causal efficiency (artha kriya kāritva) of each depends upon its being determinately cognised and that the determinate cognition also depends upon the will, the immediate need and the analytical capacity of each perceiver

Imagine, for instance, a farmer hitting upon an oval piece of stone in the course of his farm work and suppose that it is a very precious stone, but that its brilliance is obscured by clay that has been covering it for centuries so that no eye but that of an expert jeweller can see its hidden value. Now the question is: will this piece of precious stone have the same causal efficiency of arousing certain ideas or feelings in the case of the farmer as in that of an expert jeweller? If not, why? Let us ask the facts of common experience for a reply. And what reply do we get but that which has just been stated above, viz, the stone is a collocation of a certain number of Abhāsas: its causal efficiency differs according as a greater or a smaller number of the constituent Abhāsas is perceived, according to the perceptual capacity etc. of the individual perceiver.

Thus each individual lives in a world of his own, a world consisting not of shadows and apparitions, as the Vivartavāda would have us believe, nor of the momentary creations of the beginningless Vāsanā of the individual, as the subjectivism of the Vijñānavāda would represent it to be, but of Abhāsas, the apparent objects of perception or conception which

I. P. V, II, 85-6.

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have got a separate existence from himself. Let it, however, not be forgotten that the world is not exclusively his own, as it would be if the Subjectivist’s explanation of the universe be accepted, but that it has much in common with similar worlds of others. These are the common factors or the common elements in each individual world of Abhāsas which make possible all the worldly transactions, which depend upon the cooperation of many.

The phenomenon of knowledge has been described in the 2nd chapter as very much like the rise of two waves, one subjective and the other objective, in the sea of the Universal Consciousness. The former has nairmalya, the capacity to receive reflection, so that when it rises facing the latter and receives the reflection of the same, the phenomenon of knowledge takes place. This phenomenon is of various kinds. It is not always that the objective wave affects only one subjective wave, nor is it that even when it affects more than one, the affection that it causes, is always the same in all cases. The objective wave is a collocation of ābhāsas and, therefore, only those constituents of it are reflected on a particular subjective wave which are in relation of knowability to the latter.

Buddhi is held to be like a mirror. The analogy of mirror, therefore, will clear the point in hand. If we take four mirrors and place them in different positions facing an object, we find that the reflection in all cases is not the same, though in each case there is enough common element to give us the idea of the reflecting object being the same in all cases. Why is there this difference? Is it not because of the difference in the position of each mirror ? And if so, then the same can be said to be the cause of reflection of only some of the constituent ābhāsas of an objective wave on a certain subjective wave.

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Imagine, for instance, two persons, one purchaser and the other seller, looking at the same thing, as we would ordinarily say. Does the article appear to be the same in every aspect to both ?1 Do both the persons have the same perception and conception of the object as a whole and in its parts ? Experience says “no” to this and the Abhāsavāda explains by saying that the constituent Abhāsas of a collocation which cast reflection, differ according to the will, the need, and the motive force of the perceptual or the cognitive activity, in short, the point of view of the percipient.

THE CONSTITUENT ĀBHĀSAS.

Each constituent ābhāsa is a separate entity and as such it is ever the same. All the talk of change refers only to combination. And the difference in the causal efficiency of a collocation depends upon the ābhāsa with which it is combined or associated. The idea will become clear if we were to bear in mind that, according to this system, each idea, for which a word stands, is a separate ābhāsa. Thus “seeing”, tembracing” (ālingana), “present”, “past”, “far”, “near”, etc. are separate ābhāsas. Suppose, for instance, that a person is in love with a lady. He meets her in one fine moon-lit night in a beautiful garden. They remain together for a few hours. Now the question arises : will the causal efficiency of the lady in arousing certain feelings in the mind of her lover be the same throughout this time? Will there be no difference in her causal efficiency at the moment when she is embracing her lover from that when she sits apart, with her eye-brows knit? Will she not please her lover in the former and pain him in the latter case? If she

I. P. V., I, 261. 2. I. P. V., I, 320. 3. I. P. V., I, 322.

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will the question arises, why? Ābhāsavāda replies that it is not because of any change in the individual ābhāsas, but because of difference in the combination. In the first case, when the lady is a source of pleasure, she, as a colloca tion, is combined with the “embracing” and the “near”, but in the second case, with the “frowning” and the “far”. What we mean to point out is this, that in both the cases, when the lady is embracing and when she is frowning, the mode, the form that consciousness assumes, is the same in respect of the lady, but the difference lies only in this, that in the former case she is combined with the ābhāsas of “embracing” and “near”, but in the latter with those of “frowning" and “far”. Thus the difference in the causal efficiency of the principal ābhāsa in a combination depends upon the constituent or the associated ābhāsas. In fact, the causal efficiency also is a separate ābhāsa. Just like the causal efficiency the externality (bāhyatva) also does not constitute the essential nature of the manifested. In both the states, viz., of internality and externality i. e, at the time when it is within the Universal Consciousness and that when it is manifested as apparently separate from it, an object is essentially the same. Externality is simply an associated abhāsa. And for the unification of these abhāsas, as also for their manifestation, it is the Lord’s will, the element of the will power in the Universal Consciousness, that is responsible.

The above statement makes it clear that one cognisable ābhāsa is a collocation of many, that its causal efficiency differs with difference in the constituent or the associated ābhāsas and that the combination of abhāsas is the work

I. P. V., I, 329-30. 2. I. P. V., 1, 330.

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of the Lord’s Svātantrya sakti. Here it may be asked: if each cognisable ābhāsa is a collocation of many why is it called one and if the unification of abhāsas by the Lord’s will is a necessary antecedent condition of all cognitions, is there any limit to this unification? In reply to this Abhinava says that the ordinarily innumerable uncognizable ābhāsas forma cognizable one exactly in the manner in which innumerable unilluminative particles of light form an illuminating flame and, therefore, just as the latter is spoken of as one because of one causal efficiency, namely, that of dispelling darkness, so, for the same reason, the former also is so spoken of. A jar, for instance, though it is made up of many abhāsas such as big, round, bright, golden and heavy etc. yet, because it is conceived as having one causal efficiency at the time of cognition, it is spoken of as one. As regards the limit in the unification, he says that only such ābhāsas are united as are not of a conflicting nature. The ābhāsa of air, for instance, will not find union with that of form. 1

REFUTATION OF THE RIVAL THEORIES OF

PERCEPTION.

In the philosophical works of Abhinava where he criticises rival theories, the Pratyabhijñā Vimarsinī, for instance, the Bauddha figures as the chief opponent. In fact, the whole of the Pratyabhijñā Vimarsinī, with the exception of the Agamādhikāra and the introductory Ahnika, is practically a reply to the Bauddha objections, recorded in the second Ahnika of the first chapter. The Sāökhya theories also have been criticised at places both in the Pratyabhijñā Vimarsini and the Tantraloka, but that is only by the way. Here we propose to follow our author’s maxim that to begin with the refutation of the rival theories, is the

I. P, V., II, 96.

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best way of establishing one’s own. Therefore, before taking up the Trika theory of perception for an exposition, we first briefly state and then refute the Sārkhya and the Bauddha theories mostly with the help of the material collected from Abhinava’s own works.

SÄNKHYA THEORY OF PERCEPTION. According to the Sārkhya, the Buddhi is made up of three qualities, Sattva, Rajas and Tamas. It is predominated by the Sattva and, therefore, is possessed of the natural nairmalya, the capacity to receive reflection on all sides. And though, in the condition of bondage, it is shrouded by the tamas, yet it can partly receive the reflection of external objects, because the shroud of the tamas is partly removed by the activity of the rajas. It is insentient, because the qualities of which it is made are so, but still, being partly capable of receiving reflection, because of the working of the Rajas, as just pointed out, it receives light from the self-luminous self within. Thus a person is said to be knowing when the light of the self within, falling on the jada Buddhi, comes in contact with the reflection of an external object falling on the same. Knowledge, (jñāna) therefore, according to the Sārkhya, is nothing else than a form which, like a mirror, Buddhi assumes because of its being a meeting place of both, the light of the self-luminous self within and the reflection of an external object without.

THE NECESSITY FOR SUCH AN ASSUMPTION.

The subject and the object are of fundamentally opposite nature. The former is self-luminous but the latter is devoid of all light. The one is changeless but the other is changing. Therefore, if the puruṣa, who is unaffectable pure

I. P. V., I, 71.

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light, be the illuminator of the objects which in themselves are devoid of all light it would be difficult to explain why things are perceived in succession and why a jar shines (prakāśate) as distinct from a piece of cloth :

“Sa ca prakāśa ityetāvat svabhāvaḥ svabhāvāntaram aprakāśarūpam bhogyam………… Sa ca prakāśamātra syabhāvatvenaiva yadi viśvasya prakāsaḥ tarhi viśvam yugapat prakāseta ghataprakāsopi pataprakāśaḥ syāt iti viśvam samkīryeta”

I. P. V., I, 74.

The supposition of the self-luminousness of the object cannot explain the phenomena of knowledge. For, in that case it would be difficult to account for the limit and the degree of the individual kuowledge. If every thing is self-luminous why should it not, like the self-luminous self, be always equally known to all ? Even the supposition that the percep tion is consequent upon the illumination of the object by the light of self cannot improve the position ; for, in that case also, when the object has once become illuminated, it is difficult to find reason why it should not become equally manifest to all. About the sense contact as the cause of perceptibility of the object to some and not to all and its refutation by Abhinava, we shall write in the course of our treatment of the Prakatatāvāda of the Mīmāṁsaka. The Sānkhya, therefore, puts forward the Buddhivrtti theory of knowledge, as explained above.

REFUTATION OF THE SANKHYA THEORY.

The above theory of the Sankhya is not sound, firstly, because the analogy of mirror and jar, on which it is based, requires the reflecting and the reflected to be similar in their nature ; but Buddhi and self are of fundamentally opposite nature; the one is sentient, but the other lacks sentiency; secondly, because, ordinarily that which is less bright castsTHEORY OF PERCEPTION

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its reflection on what is more so, but even the Sankhya will not be prepared to admit that in point of nairmalya buddhi exceeds self (But what about the reflection of a flame in a mirror or that of the sun in water ? It is perhaps because of the consciousness of this defect in his above argument that he puts forth another, the last and strongest) and thirdly, because the Sankhya cannot satisfactorily answer the question that naturally arises in this connection as to whether buddhi, in consequence of the reflection of the light of self, itself becomes light or not. In the latter case it will not be able to illumine the object exactly as the material light, reflected in a mirror, cannot, and, therefore, even when there is the reflection of the light of self on Buddhi the external object will not be illuminated (nārtha prakāśatā) Hence perception will be impossible. But if the case be the former i. e. Buddhi itself becomes an illuminant, the postulate of an illuminating Puruṣa becomes useless, because then all the objections to remove which a separate Buddhi Tattva is assumed by the Sankhya will stand as before.

BAUDDHA THEORIES OF PERCEPTION AND THEIR

REFUTATIONS. Out of the four schools of Buddhism only two, the Sautrāntika and the Vijñānavāda, have been taken up for criticism by Abhinava in connection with the theory of perception.

SAUTRĀNTIKA THEORY. According to the Sautrāntika, every thing is momentary. The subject, the self-luminous consciousness (Bodha), is no less momentary than the object. But each of these gives rise to another, which, in its essential nature, is similar to itself, in the second moment. Thus a jar of the preceding

I. P. V., 1, 77,

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moment, being in touch with a sense organ, eye, for instance, gives rise to knowledge in the following moment which, in form, is similar to the object which casts its reflection. But the fact that the external object exists and that it is of a certain form, is a matter of inference only, drawn from the form of knowledge itself, because direct touch with it is not possible. Every thing is momentary and so must be the jar also. Logically, therefore, it ceases to exist immediately after casting its reflection. But the direct touch requires the coexistence of the object and the affected consciousness which is the effect of the reflection of the former (sākāram cittam jñānaśabdavācyam). How can the two co-exist? The one is the cause and the other is its effect. The cause must precede the effect ; therefore, if the object, which is the cause of the affected consciousness, precedes the existence of the latter, as it must, it cannot remain in existence at the time of its effect. The direct touch with the object, therefore, is not possible*.

THE NECESSITY FOR SUCH A SUPPOSITION.

The chain of momentary self-consciousness, called ālayavijñāna, is of the nature of pure light. It is uniform in its nature and is devoid of all diversity :

“Anumātramapi na rūpāntaram asya asti iti abhinno bo dhah”.

But the object is admittedly of the opposite nature and as such is not self-luminous. How is then the phenomenon of the varying knowledge to be accounted for? It cannot be said that it is the very nature of the limited consciousness to assume a variety of forms in succession ; for, in that case, it would not be possible to explain such an unaffected state

*S. D. S, Abhyankar’s edition.

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as we experience at the time of deep sleep or as a yogin does in the state of Samadhi. Therefore, the explanation of the occasional varying affection of the limited consciousness (vicitrābhāsa) that the Sautrāntika gives is that it is due to the reflection of the external object on the self due to the contact of the latter with the former. The object, however, that casts the reflection, is momentary and therefore, is not directly perceived as we have already stated. For this reason this school is also known as Anumeyārthavāda?.

ITS REFUTATION.

All determinate cognitions presuppose the direct percep tion of their respective objects and so does the inference, because it is a determinate cognition. We, for instance, can infer fire from smoke, but not without first knowing their universal concomitance from daily perception of fire and smoke together in kitchen or elsewhere. Therefore, if the external object is never perceptible no inference either can be possible of it.

The Bauddha may say here that an inference does not always presuppose the direct perception of the inferred, because it is unnecessary in the case of a generic inference, (sāmānyatodrsta) where the nature of an invisible thing is inferred from a previously known general law such as that of causality. Soul, for instance, is inferred by the Naiyāyikas from the necessity that Buddhi and other qualities must reside in a substance, according to the general law that every quality must have a substratum. Similarly, to take another instance, senses are inferred from the fact of perception, because of the general law that every event must have a cause, though senses as such are never directly perceived. But it can be pointed out to him

I. P.V., 1, 166.

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that in the case of the generic inference also the inferred is held to be not such as has never been directly known. Rather the fact is that it is always maintained to be as it has directly been perceived. If we take the instance of the inferred senses, we find that they are inferred not as of some definite nature, but simply as certain causes which are responsible for the events of perception; and the cause as such we daily perceive directly, as for instance, when we see a seed change into a sprout or threads into a piece of cloth’. And even if, for the sake of argument, it be admitted that an inference can be drawn even in the case of the unperceived, how will it be possible for the object, which is external to and in nature opposite from the self, to shine (abhāsate) in the latter ; because, as we have pointed out in the 2nd chapter, when we divide the subject from the object, the question of building the bridge from one to the other becomes difficult”.

VIJÑANAVĀDIN’S THEORY. The sensationalists (Vijñānavādins) do not believe in the existence of the external world. According to them, there is a chain or stream of momentary self-consciousness, called alaya vijñāna santati or dhārā. This differs in the case of every individual and has an existence exclusive and independent of the rest of the innumerable similar chains which are ordinarily known as souls. It has got a certain power, technically called vāsanā, the capacity to give rise to the innumerable presentments (pravrttivijñāna) or sensations which constitute the variety of daily cognitions. This vāsanā also is momentary, like the stream of self-conscious ness, and each vāsanā of the chain thereof has got an independent capacity to give rise to a certain presentment.

I. P. V., I, 188. 2. I. P. V., 1, 190

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In fact, the presentment is due to the maturescence (Paripāka) of a link of the chain of vāsanā. Thus, according to the sensationalists, a cognition is nothing but, as said just now, a presentment brought about by mature scence of a link of vāsanāl.

S ITS REFUTATION. According to the Vijñānavādin, the existentiality is of two kinds, real and apparent, (paramārtha sattvam and Samvṣti sattvam). The vijñāna alone is real and all that appears in it (abhāsate)has only an apparent existence. Now, although the apparent may be spoken of as unreal, yet its cause has, of necessity, to be admitted to be real, because, how can one reasonably speak of what is non-exis tent in reality, as the cause of the apparent. How can, what is nothing in itself, be the cause of something? But if to get out of this difficulty the Vijñānavādin were to admit the separate real existence of the vāsanās, which are the cause of all that appears, he ceases to be Vijñānavadin; his theory, in that case, would be no better than that of the Bahyārthavādin who believes in the existence of the external world as the cause of variations in consciousness. The only difference which then remains is that he calls what is external by the name of vāsanā and not by that of artha (object) as the Bāhyārtha vādin does. Nor can the opponent say that these vāsanās are the cause of presentments in that aspect of theirs in which they are real (yena rūpena satyatā tena kāraṇatā). For, vijñāna, which, according to the opponent, represents the real aspect of vāsanā, has no variety in itself; the plurality of vāsanā in its real aspect, therefore, is out of question. How can then the variety in the presentment be explained ? And even if, for the sake of

I. P. V., I, 167. 2. I. P. V., 1, 167-8,

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argument, variety in vāsanā be admitted, then also, there being nothing like time, place or object, which may serve as the immediate cause of maturescence of a certain vāsanā, how can the rise of only a certain presentment at a certain time to the exclusion of all the rest be explained ??.

Moreover", if each stream of self-consciousness is different from all the rest ; if the sensations (pravrtti vijñāna) of each, being caused by its own vāsanā, are exclusive and independent and if each soul is living in a world of its own, how can the collaboration of many persons be possible in respect of the same object, as for instance, in lifting up of a heavy log? Thus the Vijñānavadin’s theory fails to explain both the varying experiences of an individual and the common experience of a group. In fact, if we accept the Vijñānavādin’s theory our world should be no better than the one, if there can be such a one, in which every soul, being, as it were, under the influence of a certain spirit, is living in a world of its own creation and, therefore, being completely cut off from the rest, is incapable of any attachment to or coopeation with any other.

TRIKA THEORY OF PERCEPTION. The defects in the theories of knowledge of the rival systems, as pointed out above, are that the Sankhya and the Anumeyarthavādin leave a gulf between the subject and the object by holding them to be mutually exclusive and perfectly independent; and the Vijñānavādin fails to explain the common and the individual experiences on which depend all worldly transactions. The Trika, therefore, holds that the phenomenon of knowledge owes its

I. P. V., I, 168. 2. I. P. V., I. 174.

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being solely to the will power of the Universal Cons ciousness which at the time of each cognition manifests externally anew the subject, the object and the means of cognition very much Ike a yogin who brings immediately into existence the innumerable objects, which he desires, by sheer force of will, without the assistance of any external thing whatsoever. In fact, if, in order to satisfactorily account for the phenomena of knowledge, the objects are to be admitted to exist, as they must be, if the facts of experience have not altogether to be ignored. they have necessarily to be admitted to be the creation of the Universal Subject. The modern philosophic thinkers also hold this to be the only sound philosophical view of the subject-object relation as the following statement of Prof. Radhakrisnan shows :

“When we divide the subject from the object the ques tion of building the bridge from one to the other becomes difficult. Either we have to hold that the object is the creation of the subject or that there is no object at all"

(I. Ph., Vol. I, 135)

Abhinava has justified the above conclusion as follows:

The object is not self-luminous (svātma vasenaiva na tāvadvyavatiṣthate). For, had it been so, like self, it would have always been equally manifest to all and would not have stood in the relation of knowability only to some per cipient or percipients at a particular time as the following judgments indicate:

“This is now known to me”.

“This shines (avabhāsate) to Caitra”. It has, therefore, to be admitted that manifestedness of the object depends upon some entity which is not only perfectly independent of but also of fundamentally opposite nature from the object inasmuch as it is self-shining. For,

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otherwise, it would as little help in the illumination of the object as one blind man can another. Again, this self luminous entity, the subject, cannot be supposed to illumine the object without any connection with i. e. without being affected in any way by, the latter; for, in that case, its unaffectedness with regard to all being the same, it would be difficult to account for its illumining only some and not others. It is, therefore, held that when the self-luminous self faces some object or objects it throws its light on the latter. This light being reflected back by the obstructing ob ject, the sensory image, forms an image of the latter on the mirror-like Buddhi which, according to this system, is nothing else than a state of the limited self?.

(Sopi yadi suddho nirviśeṣo na tarhi nīlasyaiva vyava sthāhetuh bhavet pītādāvapi tasya tathātvāt, tadasau nīloparakto nīlonmukho nīlaprakāśasvabhāva ityābhāsah san nilasya vyavasthāpakah, tatprakaśasvabhāvataiva hi tadvya vasthāpakatā.

te (I. P. V., II, 65).

The illumination of only certain object or objects at a time to the exclusion of the rest, presupposes an apparently separate existence of both the subject and the object from the Universal Consciousness ; for, if it be supposed to illumine the object which is one with the Universal Self, oneness of all with the latter being the same, the illumination of one to the exclusion of the rest will be inexplicable. Again, the illumining subject also, in order that the illuminable object may have separate existence from it, must itself be at least apparently separate from the All-inclusive Universal Conscious ness ; for, otherwise, there being nothing outside the Universal Consciousness, the talk of separate existence of the

T. A., VI, 156. 2. P. H., 11-2.

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illuminable from the illumining would be meaningless. But how can the separate existence of the subject be possible unless the Universal Consciousness itself were to assume some limitations and so to manifest its limited form separate both from itself and the manifested object ?

Here it may be asked : If the subject and the object are so separate from each other, what is it that connects them, what is it that places the latter in the relation of knowability to the former, or, in other words, what is it that brings about the phenomenon of knowledge ? The Trika says in reply that it is the means of knowledge (Pramāṇa). It is, as we pointed out above, the light proceeding from the self-luminous self facing the object, the light which comes in touch with the object and being affected by the latter in a certain way, is reflected back and so gives rise to image in the Buddhi; the light which transforms into a psychic state the stimulus of an external object on the sense organ which is resolved into a form of mechanical contact. About the momentariness of the subject and the object we have already spoken. They being so, the momentariness of the means of knowledge is a matter of course, because it will naturally change, as said above, according as it will be affected by the object which changes every moment even from the point of view of an ordinary observer, at least in respect of time, if in no other respect. Thus, according to this system, both, the creation, which is an act of the Universal Consciousness to manifest without, as apparently separate from itself, what exists within, and the dissolution, which is nothing but merging back in the Universal Consciousness of what is so manifested, are taking place every moment.

I. P. V., II, 66. 2. I. P. V., II, 144.

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INDETERMINATE AND DETERMINATE KNOWLEDGE.

Indeterminate knowledge is that which is not characterised by genus, admits of no specification and has no attribute of time, place and form etc. in common with any thing else?. It has no variety, because one knowledge can be said to be different from another only when the use of language is possible with regard to them ; but it is impossible in the case of indeterminate knowledge. The first experience of the world by a just born baby is generally accepted to be a typical instance of this kind of knowledge. Determinate knowledge is the reverse of the indeterminate. The substitution of the negative part of the definition of the latter by the positive assertion gives a clear definition of the former.

THE PROCESS. The Trika makes a very clear distinction between the physical and the psychological activities involved in percep tion. It recognises the optical sense to be separate from the eyeballs. It believes that not only the optical sense but others also receive the reflection of their respective external objects and that an image, that is formed on the retina, is different from that on the real optical sense. Further, an image that is formed on a particular sense is different from another similar image on the Buddhi. The former is the cause and the latter is the effect; one is physical and the other is psychological. Therefore, when we speak of the object of illumination of the light of the self-luminous self we mean thereby the image on the sense.

What happens, when a certain perception takes place, is that the mind (manas) sets a certain sense to work ; so

I. P. V., I, 53-4. 2. T. A., II, 45-7. 3. T. A., II, 50.THEORY OF PERCEPTION

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long as there is no prompting by or the cooperation of the mind, the object, though reflected on the external sense, retina for instance, does not cause any sensation. The sense comes in touch with its object which is nothing but the reflection of the external object on sense organ and recei ves its reflection, which may be said to consist of a number of sensations. This physical image is illumined by the light of knowledge proceeding from the self-luminous self, and casts its reflection through the medium of that very illuminating light as explained above, on the Buddhi. The latter may be called a psychological image in contrast to the former. This gives rise to the indeterminate consciousness i. e. the consciousness of the light of knowledge having been affected. It is called indeterminate knowledge, because it is not possible to say at this stage as to what exactly is the cause of the affection of the pure light of knowledge.

The psychological activity involved in perception corresponds to the physical in almost every way. It is, therefore, admitted by the Trika that the so called one act of perception is not really one action but a large number of them taken to be one because of their leading to one result, the judgment (pramiti) :

(Na ekaikatah pramāṇāt sā pravsttih api tu

pramāna samūhādeva.) Taking, for instance, the physical action, the formation of an image on the retina, for a critical analysis, we find that it is caused not by a simple but a complex action ; an action which has clearly marked divisions, though they are not ordinarily recognised. It is admitted that no object is perfectly smooth nor every

T. A., II, 47-8. 2. T. A., VI, 223. 3. T. A., VI, 224.

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part thereof has the same reflecting power, Naturally, therefore, different rays of the illuminating light meet not only different objects in succession, according to the respective distance of each of them from the source, but the various parts also of the same object in the same way. Different rays then undergo different changes due to partial absorption of light by the objects or parts thereof and similar other causes. Thus they, (different rays) because of their meeting obstructions at different points of time, howsoever imperceptible, are reflected back in succession and so come in touch in the same succession with the object, on which the image is formed. Now, since the reflected rays are responsible for the formation of an image on the retina, it has naturally to be admitted to have taken place not all at once, without any order or succession, but gradually, point by point, in the same order in which each of the points is formed by a separate affected and reflected ray coming in touch with the retina. It is another matter that owing to the tremendous velocity of light time-lag between one ray and another is imperceptible. We are here simply pointing out its theoretical existence which can, by no means, be denied.

Suppose a person is having three or four things in his fist and is showing them to another person by exposing them to the latter’s view for the shortest possible time that the quickest movement of fingers can make possible. In such a case the percipient will get no idea whatsoever of the things so exposed. And suppose that next time he keeps the fist open for a little while so that the perceiver can have just a vauge idea of its contents, and so on. Now the question is what is it that gives rise to various kinds of perception, according as the things are kept exposed for shorter or longer time? Is it not because at different times the light rays, responsible for the rise of images on which the perceptual

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judgement is based, are affected differently because of the contact with different things or different parts of the same thing, which alone could be touched, because of the com parative shorter or longer exposure ?

Thus, according to the Trika, whatever appears, what. ever is capable of affecting the light in any way and so of contributing something, it may be a point, to the formation of an image on the retina, of causing a separate sensation, of being distinctively imaged in the Buddhi and ultimately, at the time of the most analytical determinate knowledge, of being referred to by a separate word, requires a separate perceptual activity from the time it affects a particular ray of light to that when it is cognised to have got a separate existence and is given a name :

“Tatra ca pratyakṣam pratyābhāsam prämānyam bhajate vimarsalakṣaṇasya pramitivyāpārasya ekaikaśabdavā. cyerthe viśranteh, tadanusāritvācca pramāṇasya”

I. P. V., I, 188-9. It may be pointed out here that these innumerable percep tions, which take place within that which prompts the percipient to some kind of motor response, are not always conceived separately. Their separate conception as such depends upon, as we pointed out before, the individual will, liking and analytical capacity.

THE DISTINCTIVE PROCESS OF THE DETERMINATE

KNOWLEDGE. The whole process from the time of illumination of the object by an external light to that of its mirroring on the Buddhi, leads only to an indeterminate knowledge which consists in the consciousness of the Buddhi having been affected ; a consciousness with regard to which the use of language is not possible. After this, begins the process which is distinctive of the determinate knowledge.

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When a person says “I am seeing a jar” it is not that he sees the jar alone. There are many other objects which are reflected on the Buddhi through the retina. Of these also he has some sort of consciousness, which, of course, is different from that of the jar. Why then does he make a definite statement about the jar to the exclusion of the rest of the presentation? The Trika replies that it is because on that part alone of the whole of the presentation the mind has acted, because that alone has been carried through the process leading to determinate knowledge.

The determinative process begins with the selection by mind (manas) of some points out of the mass reflected on the Buddhi. It is like carving an image out of a big piece of stone. This is not all. For, every time a person sees a jar he does not feel it to be an altogether new thing ; he sees many points in it in common with his previous perceptions; he knows it to belong to a familiar class, gives it a name, conceives liking or dislike for it and accordingly tries to gain or shun it. How does all this happen? The explanation, which the Trika offers, is that soon after the carving out of an image from the block or mass of points or sensations there takes place a revival of the memory of a similar object perceived before; then, because of the law of association, wakes up the memory of its name and the feelings that it aroused in the past (Eka sambandhi jñānam apara sambandhi smārakam bhavati), then follow the comparison of the presented and the revived images, the classification of the former with the latter and finally the attribution of the latter’s name and qualities to the former and consequent liking or aversion for it according as it is associated with pleasant or unpleasant memories.

I. P. V., II, 40-1
I. P. V., 11, 54-5.

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This is what takes place in the case of the perception of an extremely familiar object. The determinative process in the case of the unfamiliar is a little more complex inasmuch as it involves elimination. Suppose a fossil botanist has to classify a new fossil, the structure of which has no marked similarity with any, known before, so that there is no clue as to its class. In such a case, there arise many images of previously perceived fossils which may have some similarity with the present. And although ultimately it is identified with only one of them, yet the judgement is not reached till after the identification with the rest has been found to be unreasonable as a result of a careful comparison

DETERMINATE KNOWLEDGE AND EXTERNAL OBJECT.

Determinate knowledge has no direct reference to the external object. (Arthāsamsparsino vikalpāh). This is in reality a Buddhist idea. But it has come into the Trika as a logical consequence of its having accepted the Buddhist theory of momentariness as far as the ‘apparent’ is concerned. If the object is momentary and the determinate knowledge follows the indeterminate, it is obviously inconsistent with the theory of momentariness to say that the object of the indeterminate knowledge exists at the time of the determinate ; still more so is the notion of its forming an object of the latter. But the Trika holds this view for an additional psychological reason, namely, that the determina tive process consists in a reaction of the mind on the sense data recorded (to speak figuratively) on the Buddhi, in making a selection of a certain group of points from the whole mass, in adding to the selected something from the old store of memory and in giving it a definite shape and name. It is the second process which leads to the

I. P. V., I, 240. I. P. V., II, 103

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judgement in regard to the object of perception, a process, without which no subsequent recollection of a simply sensed object is possible, as, for instance, in the case of the innumerable objects, sensed through the window of a mail train when she is running at a speed of fifty miles per hour. Thus the determinate knowledge is quite different from sensation which precedes it ; and as such it is purely internal and is in no way directly connected with any thing that is external.

SUPERSENSUOUS EXPERIENCE OR

ANUBHAVA. What we have said above in regard to the psychic movements consequent upon the reflection of an external object on a sense, say, optical, in short means that knowledge or cognition is the result of a causal action of an external object on the self, that all its contents are purely subjective states of the cognising self, that the causal objective manifestation does not form a part of knowledge and that knowledge, if it reproduces reality, can contain only copies of the real and not the objects themselves. Thus it is clear that the self never comes in direct touch with the external object. It knows only the copies of the real and not the real. It cannot satisfy itself that the copies are true by comparing them with the original. Therefore, according to the psychic process described above, it is not possible to be certain that our knowledge is correct. Further, if all that the self can know are the reflections on the retina which, being proportionate to the dimension of the eye. ball (in the case of an ocular perception, for instance) are much smaller than the original, how can the above explained theory of perception satisfactorily account for our common experience of such a huge thing as a mountain ?

I. P. V., I, 141-2.

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It cannot be said to be a matter of inference, because inference presupposes the direct knowledge of the inferred and, according to the above theory, the real is known only through the copies. The theory of the All-inclusive Universal Consciousness may explain the fact of self and not-self coming together much in the same way as the sea accounts for the meeting of two logs which are floating on it, but it cannot explain the above difficulties.

Abhinava, therefore, holds that the all-inclusiveness of the Universal Consciousness consists not in its being simply a substratum of things of diverse kinds and of opposite nature, but in its being the essence of all that has existentia lity (satta) exactly as the earth is of all that is earthy. He asserts that just as earthiness of a jar depends upon its being essentially earthy i. e. being made up of earth; and that just as jar, in order that it may have its being on earth must essentially be earth, so all that is indicated by the word “all” in “All-inclusive Universal Consciousness”, in order that it may have its being in the Universal Consciousness, should essentially be itself consciousness. This is what a strictly logical explanation of the phenomenon of knowledge requires. This is what Professor Radhakrishnan seems to imply when he says in his Indian Philosophy :

“If truth means agreement of ideas with reality and if reality is defined as that which is external to thought what is not thought or made up of thought then truth seeking is a wild goose chase”.

In the above quotation the learned professor seems to imply not only what we have already stated but also that the ascertainment of the correctness of our idea of the external, requires the object to be within the thought or consciousness to make the comparison possible. In this he seems to echo Abhinava’s view on the matter. Abhinava

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holds that before the commencement of the above described psychic process, that is, at the time of rise of desire for perception, the cognising self becomes pervasive as far as the object or objects of perception and that the objects also appear in their essential nature of being made up of con sciousness and become one with the self much in the same manner as the reflection does with the object that has the capacity to receive it. Thus a phenomenon of knowledge may be said to be a union of the subjective and the objective waves of consciousness in the sea of the All-inclusive Universal Consciousness. This supersensuous knowledge is technically called ‘anubhava’, which implies the subject’s becoming what the object is. Just as when we say that Devadatta imitates Yajñadatta (Devadattah Yajñadattam anukaroti) we mean that the former does the same or similar thing as does the latter, so when we say “John experiences (anubhavati) a jar,” it means, if we take the word “anubhavati” literally, that John becomes what the jar is. This is exactly what Abhinava has said in slightly different words in the Brhati Vimarsinī quoted in a foot note in I. P. V., I, 42 as follows:

**Tathā ca ghato mama sphuratīti korthah, madīyam sphuranam spandanam āviṣtah madrāpatāmāpanna leva

cinmayatvāt." To clear the point let us quote Bhāskarakantha’s explanation of Abhinava’s text on which the above statement is based :

“Grahanasamaye bhāvasya māyayā bhāvatvena bhāsita

nijam sahajaśuddhaprakāśākhyam svarūpameva pra mātāram prati sphuṭībhavati, yatah tadā pramātā tadvastu prati diděkṣāsamaye vyāpakībhavati yaduk tam :

“Didrkṣayeva sarvārthān yadā vyāpyāvatiṣthate Tadā kim bahunoktena svayam evāvabhotsyate”

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Vyāpakībhavamśca tadvastu svātmasātkaroti tanmayī. bhāvāsādanañca vastunah suddhaprakāśarūpatvāsāda nameva pramātuḥ śuddhaprakāśamātra rūpatvāt.”

CRITICISM OF THE RIVAL THEORIES.

The typical rivals of the above theory of subject-object union, as propounded by Abhinava, are the Mīmāmsakas and the Naiyāyikas. The rival theory of knowledge of the former is known as Prakatatāvāda and that of the latter as Kārana tāvāda. We take them here separately for criticism.

PRAKAṭATĀVĀDA. This theory is said to have been founded by Bhatta Kumārila. He holds that a phenomenon of knowledge pre supposes some kind of relation between the subject and the object. This relation is brought about by the move ment of the knowing self and is an object of internal perce ption (mānasapratyakṣa) alone. His conception of know ledge is that it is simply an act of the cognisor, which produces cognisedness (jñāta tā) or manifestedness (prakaṭatā) in the object. The action of the agent, the cognition, is not directly perceptible; it can only be inferred from the quality of cognisedness produced by it in the object.

(Ittham tadvādah :

Jñānam nāma kriyā, sā ca phalānumeyā phalam ca prakaṭatākhyam viṣayadharmah saiva vedyatā iti Kaumārilah procuh

I. P. V., I, 155). He is a dualist and, therefore, in order to maintain the independent existence of the object, he denies the self-luminosity to knowledge. He cannot either admit the cognition to be directly cognisable, for, it would then require another cognition to cognise it and that too another still and so on ad-infinitum. His theory, therefore,

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in short is that the objects are known through cognition which has the capacity of manifesting them, though in itself it is only inferrable.

ITS REFUTATION.

If the subject and the object have an exclusive existence even at the time of cognition and if manifestedness, though produced, belongs to the object exactly as do the other qualities such as blackness, for instance, in the case of a jar, it is difficult to explain why it is manifest only to some and not to others. If it gets manifestedness i. e. if it is made manifest, there is no reason why it should not become equally manifest to all. But, if the Mimāṁsaka were to say that mere manifestedness of an object does not necessarily mean its connection with all perceivers so as to give rise to the particular consciousness “It is known to me” in each case, he has to be asked :-“Is the manifestedness of the object self-confined ?” Of course, it is not reasonable to suppose that the mere being of a thing makes it known to a perceiver without the subject’s being connected with the object in some way; for, if it were so, all should be all-knowing. If, therefore, he were to admit the manifestedness of the object to be self-confined he will still find his position much the same, because then the object will not be known even to the person whose cognitional activity has produced cognisedness. For, the manifestedness of the object would be as much self confined for him as for any one else. There should, therefore, be perfect ignorance of the objective world according to the Mīmāṁsaka theory. Nor can it be said that the relation of causality will determine the relation of knowability, that is to say, the object will have manifestedness, will shine, to him only whose cognitive activity has given it manifested ness; because, our experience tells us that an effect, after it has come into being, need not depend for its existenceTHEORY OF PERCEPTION

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upon or shine only to him, who has been instrumental in bringing it into existence. For, if it were so, a jar, made by a potter, should have no existence independent of him and should shine only to him, just as the Mīmāṁsaka would wish the manifestedness to be manifest only to its creator. Mīmāmsaka theory of knowledge, therefore, is not acceptable, because it cannot explain the fact of individual experience.

THE NAIYĀYIKA THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. We are not here concerned with the Naiyāyika view of the process involved in perception. The point under discussion is the part that an object plays in the production of a phenomenon of knowledge. We, therefore, state here only that part of the Naiyāyika theory of knowledge which has immediate bearing on the question in hand. According to the Naiyāyika, the relation between knowledge and its object is that of the illuminator and the illuminated, much the same as between a lamp and the object on which it sheds its light.

(“Jñānasyārtha prakāśatvam nanu rūpam pradīpavat”

I. P. V., 1, 156).

He also holds that variety in cognition is caused by variety of the instruments and objects.

ITS REFUTATION. If the light of knowledge is to be taken as different from the object it has of necessity to be supposed to be uniform in its nature; because, it is the common element in all the multifarious cognitions, such as those of the red, the blue and the black. The red etc. cannot be considered to be the very forms of knowledge, for, then all the notion of independence of the object becomes baseless. If, however, they are taken to be separately existing entities the question arises : if it is with the help of the light of knowledge

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that we know the difference between the black and the blue, and if that light of knowledge is one and uniform in its nature how can the blue be known as blue with the help of that very light, by means of which the black is known as black ? The opponent cannot say that the difference in knowledge is caused by that in the objects; because, that is just the point under discussion. The objects, as they have no luminosity of their own, cannot be apprehended as different from one another. As for knowledge, it is admittedly of uniform nature. How can, then, the variety of consciousness, which is a matter of every body’s experience, arise ? Moreover, how can, what is not shining, be made to shine ? Because, causal action of the agent presupposes, on the part of its object, the capacity for that action which the former makes the latter do. For instance, when a driver makes a horse go, he does so because the horse has itself got the capacity to go. Therefore, if the luminosity of the object of knowledge is to be taken to be the result of causal action of the light of knowledge, the object must be supposed to have some luminosity of its own. And if it be admitted to have that, there would cease to be any essential difference between the Naiyāyika and the Abhāsavādin. The acceptance of this would mean giving up by the Naiyāyika of his original theory of essential difference between knowledge and its object.

The analogy also of a lamp to show the manner in which an object is illuminated by the light of know ledge, is not quite appropriate. Because, while & lamp shines independently of all objects, knowledge does not. Moreover, a lamp casts its light on the object and thus imparts to the latter its own luminosity, so that the appearance of the object varies with the light; but the opponent does not hold that knowledge affects its object in any such way.

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THE POINT OF DIFFERENCE. The chief point of difference between the theory of knowledge of the Abhāsavāda and the rival theories of other systems discussed above, is, that, while, according to latter, the object is separate from the subject and is related to the latter by some such relation as that of the instru mental cause with the effect or that of the illuminator with the illuminated ; according to the Abhāsavāda, subject and object are essentially one and the phenomenon of knowledge is simply a result of their unification, i.e. merging of the object in the subject. It has been pointed out in the preceding chapter how everything is essentially of the nature of consciousness, object being no less so than the subject, and, how phenomenon of knowledge is due to the momentary rise of the subjective and the objective waves, in the sea of the Universal Consciousness.

Now the question may be asked: if the object is essentially of the nature of consciousness why is it not equally manifest to all the subjects? To this Ābhāsavāda replies that a phenomenon of knowledge is not the result of mere existence of the subject and the object but that of the unification of the two by the relation of identity (tādātmya sambandha). We know that a thing, which is connected with another by such relations as the Mīmāmsakas and the Naiyāyikas suppose to exist between the subject and the object, can exist independently of the related, but not certainly what is connected by relation of identity. This explains why an object always shines on the back-ground of the cognising self, and why, though self-manifest, it is not equally manifest to all.

REMEMBRANCE. The Trika psychology hinges on its central theory of the permanence of the experiencing self. In fact, the psychological

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problems are introduced in the philosophical works of the system only to show that their satisfactory explanation is not possible without the assumption of permanence as one of the most essential attributes of the self. The phenomenon of remembrance is supposed to be one of the strongest proofs in its support. In this case also, as in that of the perception, the Buddhist theory is pointed out to be wholly unsatisfactory. We have seen what an important part the remembrance has to play in the determinate perception and so in practical daily life; how the image, which is cut out of the block of sensations, received from an external stimulus, and which as such, is no better than the one on a canvas or in a cinema show, is made into a living one with the material supplied from the already existing stock in the memory; how, unless this image be associated with the past experiences of a similar object, it can neither give rise to any feeling nor to the consequent activity either to gain or to shun it; and lastly, how, without remembrance, no use of language of any kind is possible with regard to any thing whatsoever.

BUDDHIST THEORY OF REMEMBRANCE. Remembrance is a representative consciousness; it is a mere reproduction of a former state of consciousness. Unlike the indeterminate and the determinate cognitions, it has no object of its own; its object is the same as that of the former experience. For, if it were to have an object of its own it would cease to be remembrance, because, then the consciousness would not be expressible as “that” (sah).

Here the question arises : if knowledge is a momen tary phenomenon every experience would naturally pass away the very next moment after its coming into being :

I. P. V., I, 60-1.

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how can then there be a representation of a former state of consciousness so as to make the phenomenon of remembrance possible? The assumption of a permanent self cannot explain it. For, even if the self be permanent its experiences shall still have to be admitted to be momentary. This is what the facts of common experience require. Because in remembrance the consciousness of its object is associated with the idea of its absence. We refer to the object of remembrance as “that” and not as “this”. But how can we have the idea of absence if the experience together with its object as such be having a continuous existence from the time of its production to that of its reproduction ; or to say the same thing in other words, how can there be any talk of its reproduction which is the characteristic feature of remembrance? The former experience, therefore, with its object, being no more at the time of remembrance, what we require to produce the characteristic consciousness of remembrance is some such thing as can reproduce the object. It is, therefore, assumed that when we have a certain experience, a link of the chain of self-consciousness is affected in a certain way; and because each momentary self-consciousness before its destruction produces a similar one in the next moment, naturally, therefore, the subsequent self-consciousness carries a residual trace (samskāra) of the past experience. This residual trace, when revived at a later time because of a subsequent cognition, which has some common element with a past experience, has the capacity of placing the subject-consciousness of that particular moment in the same relation to the object of the former experience as that in which it was when that experience first took place, exactly as that particular capacity, which is ordinarily known as elasticity, places

I. P. V., I, 63. 2. I. P. V, 1., 64.

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the branch of a tree, which is perforce kept down for some time, back in its former position as soon as it is let off.

BAUDDHA CRITICISM OF THE NAIYAYIKA THEORY.

The Bauddha raises the following question to refute the Naiyāyika theory of the self as & permanent substratum of saṁskāra, which as a quality, cannot exist independently: Does the self change as a result of the production of the samskāra or not? In the former case it ceases to be eternal, because eternality and changeability cannot coexist. In the latter case the assumption of sarskāra is useless. But if it be said that it admits of no other change than that of samskāra and as such is different from other changing things, then it is nothing else than a chain of consciousness which, as has been said above, being affected by a stimulus, retains its residual trace and being combined with other factors produces the particular phenomenon of knowledge, called remembrance, at a subsequent time.

REFUTATION OF THE BAUDDHA THEORY. There are two points to be noted in connection with remembrance here; one, that the consciousness of remem brance is expressed in judgement as “that” and not as “this”; and the other, that all our subsequent activities with regard to the object of remembrance are determined not by mere consciousness of the object as such, but by that of the pleasant or unpleasant experiences with which it was associated at the time of its former knowledge. Thus, if we accept the Buddhist explanation of remembrance as due to mere revival of residual traces of the former knowledge, not only we shall not have its characteristic consciousness “that” but also there will be nothing to determine our subsequent action ; because, the only thing that the residual traces can do is to place the subject in its former relation with that particular object the residual trace

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of which has been revived, and if so, there is no reason, why the former subject-object relation having been restored there should not consequently be the former consciousness expressible as “this”. Moreover, the residual traces! can represent the object alone and not its former experiences also ; this consciousness, therefore, would lead to no action. The reason is obvious: we try to gain or shun an object according as we know it to have been the cause of pleasure or pain. This knowledge depends upon the representation of the past experience which, according to the Buddhist theory, is not possible. It cannot be assumed here that the residual trace will represent the past experience also, because, according to the Buddhist, self being nothing but knowledge (jñāna), it cannot have the former experience, which is but a form of knowledge, as its object; because, knowledge is self-luminous and cannot become an object of another knowledge (Drk svābhāsā nānyena vedyā). Nor can the Buddhist say that although the experience does not form an object of remembrance yet it seems to do so exactly as an object does in an erroneous perception ; because, the chief feature of remembrance is the true reappearance of the object of former experience in all its associations. Therefore, if the appearance of the object in remembrance be taken to be false, remembrance would cease to be remembrance. It would become an erroneous perception.

REMEMBRANCE AND ERROR.

Let us, for the sake of clearness, point out the distinc tion between remembrance and erroneous perception. In the former case the object of mental reaction or inner perception (adhyavasāya) is the same image as was produced by former perception or sense-contact and is associated with all the then experiences. What happens is simply this that the psychic image of the object, which was cognised with

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all its distinction of time and place and name and form at the time of the former perception, does not merge again in the Universal Consciousness soon after the perception, but remains with all its associations of time, place and the then momentary manifested perceiver, under a veil as it were, in the permanent aspect of the individual self. The existence of the objective manifestation (Bhāvābhāsa) in this condition is technically known as Samskāra, and its revival consists simply in the removal of the veil from over it, so that as soon as the veil is removed, the object shines in all its past glory and associations. Thus, it is because of the reappearance of the object in all its former associations, particularly that of the time, that the consciousness is expressed as “that”. But in the case of the perceptual error what appears is a new form and as such has no association with the past time land, therefore, is referred to as “this”. The fact is, as we have already pointed out, that the mind is very quick in its work of carving an image out of the block of sensations and completing it in an unspeakably short time with the material taken from the old stock of memory. Thus, the image that appears in the mirror of Buddhi at the time of an erroneous perception is erroneous, not because it has no existence, nor even because it is not made up of the material supplied by an external stimulus, but because the material taken from the old stock of memory is so much that the little that is taken from the block of sensations may be considered to be too insignificant to justify its being called and considered to be an image of an external object. It is this little material taken from the immediate sensations which accounts for only a certain kind of affection of consciousness at the sight of a certain object even in erroneous perception ; but for this, it would be difficult to explain why at the sight of a mother-of-pearl there is the erroneous perception of silver only and of nothing else.

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To clear the point in hand further, it may be pointed out here that imagination is still a different thing from both remembrance and erroneous knowledge, because it is due neither to unveiling of an already existing image with all its associations, as in the case of remembrance, nor to building up of an image with material mostly taken from the old stock of memory, but a perfectly independent creation of the mind without any element taken from the immediate external stimulus, if there be any, and without any clear association with the past time. It is because of the new presentations in the erroneous perception and the imagination that their objects are conceived as “this”. But the consciousness of the object of remembrance is expressed as “that” because it is a mere representation.

THE TRIKA THEORY OF REMEMBRANCE. Remembrance is a complex phenomenon. It requires an object, not a new presentation but a reproduction or representation of what has already been an object of some kind of determinate cognition. Further, in order that this object may lead to the characteristic judgement of remembrance that”, and determine the activity of an individual rememberer with regard to itself, the remembrance requires the represented object to be associated with the time of its former perception and with the feelings of pleasure or pain which it then aroused. The Buddhist explanation, based on the assumption of samskāra, can place the momentary subject-consciousness in the same relation to the object in which it was on the occasion of the perception, but it can neither account for the characteristic judgement “that” nor the future activity with regard to the remembered. The Trika, therefore, puts forth the theory of unification of the abhāsas.

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THE REMEMBERING SUBJECT.

The limited individual self, as we pointed out before, has two aspects, the momentary and the permanent. The first dissolves with the dissolution of the momentary identification with the body etc. ; but the second lasts even through universal dissolution (Pralaya). And the objects of determinate cognition, i. e. the images made up of the material taken from the sense presentations and the old stock of memory, are also of two kinds. Some merge back into Universal Consciousness soon after the cognition but others continue to have separate existence with their associations of time, place and limited momentary individual perceiver, with which they were manifested as separate from the Universal Consciousness at the time of the former perception. They remain wrapped up, as it were, in the veil of darkness, (Shall we say they exist in a subconscious state ?) in the permanent aspect of the individual self exactly in the manner in which the ābhāsas which get merged back into the Universal Consciousness live there. An object in this state is technically called samskāra as we have already pointed out.

(Yo bhāvah pūrvam anubhavakāle taddeśakālapramā trantarasācivyena prthak krto na ca ahantāyām eva vilīni krtah sa tādrg eva tamasevācchádya avasthāpitah samskāra sabdavācyah

I. P. V., I. 118-9).

(Etena punah smặtiviṣayam anāgatya bhāvajātam ahantāyām eva līyata iti dyotitam. (Bhaskarī)

The remembering subject has got full power to unite or disunite the ābhāsas of which it is a permanent abode just as the Universal Consciousness has over those which it contains withinTHEORY OF REMEMBRANCE

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THE REMEMBERED OBJECT.

Remembrance is a determinate knowledge and as such cannot have an object of its own, because all the determina tive activity is a kind of reaction on what has already been mirrored on Buddhi (grhīta grahaṇa svabhāvatvāt). Its object is the same as that of the former experience. From the time of the direct perception to that of remembrance, this object, this psychic image, has a separate veiled existence in the permanent limited perceiver and, being revived at the sight of something similar, reappears.

THE OBJECTIVITY OF THE REMEMBERED EXPLAINED.

The remembered is not an object in the sense that it is illumined by the light proceeding from the remembering self, because it is an essential part of the experience itself, which, being a kind of knowledge Jñāna), is self-luminous and as such cannot be the object of another knowledge. Now naturally the question arises: if not in the above sense in what sense is it an object, or rather if the experience is self shining and so is the object, how is it connected with remembrance ; in short, how does the phenomenon of remem brance arise ? The Trika replies that when the revival takes place the object shines as associated with the time of its former perception and the feelings of pleasure or pain which it then aroused. This is united with the momentary self-luminous self as identified with the body or the vital air etc. according to the nature of the thing remembered.

This remembering self also has its own limitation of time of its manifestation. Thus when the constituent and the associated ābhāsas of the object of former experience are united with those of the limited self of the time of remembrance there arises a new phenomenon, called remembrance, similar to! that which is produced by hundreds of small lights shining

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together at one place. The object of the former experience is called the object of remembrance because at the time of remembrance it shines in the additional light of the self luminous remembering self. It is called object of remem brance exactly in the manner in which an object, though illumined by various lights, is said to have been illumined by the one which illumines it in such a manner as is necessary for the immediate purpose.

This unification of abhāsas is responsible for the peculiar consciousness of the object as that", because in remem brance there is the consciousness of both the times i.e. the time of the first appearance of the object in the past perception and that of its reappearance now in the additional light of the momentary remembering self as associated with the present time :

Tadānīntanāvabhāsana prthakkrta sarīrādi sambandham anavadhūyaiva hi tatprakāśaḥ. Tataśca idānīntanāvabhāsana kālaparāmarsopi na nimilati iti etat parāmarsa bhitti prādha nyena pūrva kāla parāmarśaḥ, iti viruddha pūrvāpara parāmarśa svabhāva eva “sa” iti parāmarśa ucyate.

I. P. V., I, 119. Another point of interest in this explanation is that, according to this system, the object of the former experience can reappear with all its associations of past feelings of pleasure or pain, that it then generated, and be a prompter of the subsequent activities of the perceiver without involving the violation of the principle that one knowledge does not shine as an object of another ; because, the Trika theory of unification of ābhāsas as the cause of remembrance does not place the former experience in the relation of an object to remembrance. According to this, the self-luminousness of the experience, which reappears at the time of remembrance,

I. P. V., 1, 124.

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remains as much unaffected as the light of a lamp does remain even at the time when it illumines its former object in conjunction with other new lights. This unification of ābhāsas is the work of the permanent limited perceiver, who is no other than the Maheśvara, now called by a different name, because of his appearing as the remembering self, which retains within, all the former experiences with their associated objects, and appears at the time of remembrance", as identical with the body or the vital air etc. according to the need of the occasion.

Thus the Trika seems to give a satisfactory explanation of English words “recollect” and remember" which stand for the activities of the self) involved in the production of the phenomenon, we are discussing. It is a recollection, because it requires the old separately manifested ābhāsas to be collect ed again as we pointed out above. And it is a remembrance because it involves the reunification into one whole of the old ābhāsas of the time of perception with the new ones of remembrance i. e. the old ābhāsas which formed constituent parts (members) of the former complex ābhāsa which served as the object of perception, are again made the necessary constituents of the new complex ābhāsa of remembranee.

I. P., V., I, 119-20. I. P. V., I. 129.