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Abhinava wrote on a number of subjects and was recognized to be a reliable authority on each one of them. He worked on poetics, only during the short period of transition from the Tāntrika to the Philosophical period. The number of his works on poetics is, therefore, much smaller than that of his philosophical treatises. The value, however, attributed to the former, has overweighed that which scholars in general have attached to the latter. Hence he is better known as an able exponent of the theories of Rasa and Dhvani than as the greatest authority on the “Realistic Idealism” or “Trilca” as the system is technically called.

The reason is not far to seek. The system of philo sophy, he has attempted to formulate and to elaborate, is non-vedic; not because its doctrines are fundamentally opposed to those of the vedic systems, but because it does not recognize the Veda as the final authority. It was, therefore, ignored by the Brāhmaṇa community, which alone has kept alive the literary traditions connected with various schools of Indian thought as a matter of religious duty.

This non-vedic trend of thought, however, was very popular among the Brāhmaṇas of Kashmir who had the opportunity of knowing it better than those elsewhere. It had a succession of learned writers about whom we have already given the necessary information in the first part. But, for more than a century, it has been neglected even in the land of its birth. Its literary tradition is, therefore, practically dead in Kashmir too, where it primarily existed.

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The local Sanskrit scholars, however, even to-day, hold a very high opinion of it. In fact they, without knowing why, declare it to be the best of all systems of Indian Philosophy.

Our attempt, therefore, in the following pages is to present this system of Saiva philosophy as clearly as it is possible with the help of the material available at present. Fidelity to the original text is our guiding principle. Our attempt is not to present the system in terms of modern philosophy, but simply to give an exposition to Abhinava’s ideas about some of the persistent philosophical problems, and to explain, so far as possible, how he came to form them. Let us, therefore, not be misunderstood if some of the arguments, stated in these pages, do not appeal to the modern minds and some of the views, set forth here, are not in consonance with the doctrines of modern science.

ABHINAVA’S CONTRIBUTION.

Indian philosophers, however original their works, have never claimed originality for themselves; their attempt has always been to show that whatever they say is based upon an ancient authority. This holds good in the case of both the Vedic and the non-vedic systems. Sankara declares in unmistakable terms that the only test of correctness of a view is its harmony with the teachings of the Veda and that the argument has value and is to be relied upon only in so far as it supports the principles laid down in the Veda.1 Similarly, Somānanda, the author of the śivadrṣti and so the real founder of the Pratyabhijñā School, emphatically states that his śivadrsti is not a pure creation of his mind but is based upon Sāstra, though his pupil, Utpalācārya, holds that it shows a new path to final emancipation. A

S. Bh., 8.

I. P. V., II, 271.

Pragmatie Real Idealism weld be le ten

il shayaruditis vien. 2.txt stwold to pensound transeandertal shout

Techin te aantata in should lector he callad e ‘stalo PRELIMINARY C Live

167 realisation Prof. Padit… study of Abhinava’s works shows that he also, in this

respect, followed the tradition of his learned predecessors.

If we take into consideration, for instance, three of his most important works, on which his reputation chiefly rests, we find that two of them, the Isvara Pratyabhijñā Vimarsins and the Isvara Pratyabhijñā Vivrti Vimarsinī, are simply commentaries on Utpalācārya’s Isvara Pratya bhijñā Kārikāl and Tīkā respectively, and the third, the Tantraloka, professedly follows the authority of the Mālini Vijaya Tantras. It is, therefore, not possible for us to attribute the authorship of any particular theory to Abhinava as we can do to Kant or Hegel. This, however, does not mean that he did not contribute anything to the “Realistic Idealism” of Kashmir. The fact, on the contrary, is that the philosophical system of Kashmir, with Abhinava’s contribution to it, left out of consideration, loses most of its importance. His contribution to the “Realistic Idealism” is of the same nature as that of the great Sankara to the monistic Idealism of the Vedānta.

The aim of philosophy all over the world at all times has been to explain the what, the why and the wherefrom of the phenomena of knowledge. The chief distinctive feature of Indian philosophy in general and of this system in particular is that it deals not only with the experiences of wakeful, dream and deep sleep states but also with those of the transcendental (Turīya) and the pure (Turīyātīta) states : i. e. it tries to explain not only those experiences which are due to the working of the mind, the intellect and the sense-organs collectively or severally, but also those in which they are perfectly at rest and in which, therefore, consciousness is free from all kinds of affections,

I. P. V. V., (MS.)

I. P. V., I. 3. T. A., I, 35.

This is not perhaps the correct milepretation

of the color verde del referred to.

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To Indian philosophers the two states, the transcendental and the pure, are not mere myths. They are realisable truths. In fact, the aim of the higher systems of Indian philosophy is to point out an easy way to the realisation of these states. The importance of a philosophical work to the Indian mind, therefore, is commensurate with the degree to which the author is believed to have personally realised them through spiritual experiments. For, he alone can be a sure guide, who is familiar with the path. Abhinava’s philosophical works are considered to be very important, because people have reason to believe that the statements on supersensuous matters, contained therein, are based upon the author’s personal experience, gained through spiritual experiments, which he carried on for years, as we have attempted to show in his biography. To personal experience he gives the first, to reason the second and to ancient authority only the third place as the basis of his views on supersensuous matters", the revelations of the Turiya and the Turīyātīta states. In fact the charm that this system had for his contemporaries and successors, the popularity that it enjoyed and the high esteem in which it is held even now by the Kashmir Pandits was and is due mostly to the labours of Abhinava both as a scholar and as a spiritualist (yogin).

The writers of this system, who flourished before Abhinava, wrote only minor treatises, dealing with certain aspects or branches of the system. The books, for instance, which include the word “Spanda” in their titles, deal with what is referred to as “Caitanya” or “Vimarśa” (consciousness) in the śiva? Sutra and the Isvara Pratya bhijñā Kārikā respectivelys, and point out three ways to the realisation of the ultimate reality, the Sambhava, the śākta

T. A., 149.

I. P. V., I, 200.

I. P. V., I. 208-9.1.4.p.

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and the Anava. They are mere dogmatic statements of the fundamental principles of the Spanda branch of the Trika. They do not enter into an exposition of the reasonings which can be adduced in their support; nor do they cite any accepted scriptural authority on which they are based. They are, therefore, so brief that all of them taken together would cover hardly more than fifty pages of a printed book. Similarly, those books, which are named after Pratyabhijñā, attempt to establish the existence of an all-including universal Self and point out a fourth way to freedom from I. worldly troubles, through Pratyabhijñā or recognition. Although they are argumentative and expository and consequently twenty times more voluminous than the former, yet, being concerned with only a branch, they could not bring out the full importance of the Trika system as a whole. Moreover, the literature on both the branches, referred to above, is equally silent on the rituals of the system. It was Abhinava, who, for the first time, took up the system as a whole for a rational and exhaustive treatment in his great work, the Tantrāloka ; gave the philosophical conceptions of the different branches a proper place in the whole; showed the comparative merit of all the four means of Mokṣa, Anupāya, Sāmbhava, śākta and Anava ; exhaustively dealt with the monistic Saiva rituals; supported the philosophical and the psychological theories of the system with strong and convincing arguments as well as with extensive quotations from the āgamas of accepted authority and elucidated the existing texts with learned commentaries, like the śivadrstyālocana and the two Vimarsinīs.

EXPLANATIONS OF THE NAMES OF THE SYSTEM.

It is a misnomer to call this system of philosophy “Pratyabhijñā” or “Spanda” as much as it would be to call

T. A., I, 50.

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India “Calcutta” or “Bombay”. They are parts and very important parts, but severally they do not present the whole. The word Trika refers both to the authority on which the system is based and to the subject-matter which forms the distinctive feature of this system. It is called Trika for the following reasons :

(I) In all, there are ninety-two Āgamas recognised by this system. Of these the triad, (Trika) consisting of the Siddhā, the Nāmaka and the Mālinī, is the most important. The system is called Trika because its chief authority is this triad (Trika).

(II) According to this system, there are three triads, the higher, the lower and the combined (Para, Apara and Parāpara). The first consists of śiva, Sakti and their union; the second of śiva, Sakti and Nara ; and the third of three godesses Parā, Aparā and Parāparā. It is called Trika because it deals with all the three triads.

(III) It is called so for another reason also, namely, that it explains all the three aspects of knowledge, viz. absolute oneness (abheda), predominent oneness (bhedābheda), and duality (bheda) in the light of its monistic theory (abhedavāda).

It is also called ṣadardha Sāstra," (literally, the school of half of the six) for the following reason :

This system holds that the Devanāgarī or the Sāradā alphabet represents the process of manifestation of ideas (Parāmarśodayakrama). The first six vowels, a ā ii u ū, for instance, represent the order of succession in which the powers of Anuttara, Ananda, Icchā, Iśana, Unmeṣa and

T. A., I, 35. T. A., 1, 7-21. T. A., I, 3.

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Urmi arose from the Highest Reality. Of the above, those, represented by long vowels, are due either to the association of those, represented by short ones, with their respective objects, as in the cases of Isana and Ormi, or to the union of two, as in that of Ananda’. The former, therefore, are dependent upon the latter and hence are not considered to be of equal importance with them.. Thus it is called ṣadardha Sāstra, because it counts as ‘principal’ only three of the six powers shown above, namely, Anuttara, Iccha, and Unmeṣa, which are also referred to as Cit, Icchā and Jñāna

It has been given the name of Kashmir Saivaism, because almost all the writers of the available literature on this monistic school of Saivaism belonged to Kashmir.

FOR WHOM IS THE SYSTEM MEANT ?

Unlike the Vedic systems, this school of thought knows no caste restriction. It is meant for all in whom desire for knowledge and liberation has arisen. A distinction, however, is drawn between following the teachings of the system in life and getting its fruit on the one hand and studying the system and understanding its philosophical intricacies on the other. Any one with a firm determination can follow the teachings: no literary qualification of any kind was, therefore, considered necessary for following it by its early authorities. The case with study, however, is different. It requires a trained and well-informed mind. This system criticises almost all the important schools of thought which came before it. Its proper understanding, therefore, pre supposes, according to the learned tradition, contained in the

T.A, 11, 81-6. 2. T. A., II, 186. 3. T. A., II, 233. 4. I. P. V., II, 276.

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following verse, the knowledge of the six vedic systems of philosophy and of the Veda with its six branches of learning as an antecedent condition :

“ṣaṭśāstravid yo vedasya ṣadangajñaśca vedavit s& eva śrīpratyabhijñādhyayanedhiksto bhavet.”

It requires also a previous study of all the Agamas, a knowledge of the arguments of other dualistic and monistic systems and a command over grammar :

“Yodhīti nikhilāgameṣu padavid yo yogaśāstraśrami Yo vākyārthasamanvaye krtaratih śrīpratyabhijñāmrte Yastarkāntaraviśrutaśrutatayā dvaitādvayajñānavit Sosmin syādadhikāravān kalakalaprāyah pareṣām ravah.”

THE AIM.

The aim of this system, like that of the Vedānta, is to help the individual in self-realisation: and the means also, by which this end is to be achieved, is the same as that of the Vedānta, viz., removing the veil of ignorance, But they differ in their conception of self-realisation, because their ideas of the apparent, (abhāsa) the universe, are different. While the Vedānta holds that the universe (jagat) is unreal, the Realistic Idealism maintains it to be real, because it is a manifestation of the Ultimate. Therefore, while, according to the former, all that we know disappears at the time of self-realisation exactly as, in the case of an illusion, the snake vanishes when the rope is perceived as a fact : according to the latter, the objective universe stands even when the Self is realised, but is known in its true perspective or in all its aspects or bearings. This kind of realisation is spoken of as ‘Recognition’ (Pratyabhijñā).

I. P. V., I, 35.

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Thus, for the Vedānta, the realisation of the Self is coincidental with the negation of facts of experience in the same way as the perception of the rope as a fact is with that of the snake in the well known illusion. For the Trika, on the other hand, self-realisation brings with it an understanding of the world of experience in its true relations and perspective. There is no negation of the Universe but a new interpretation and appreciation. For this system, therefore, self-realisation is nothing but self-recognition (Pratyabhijñā).

WHAT IS RECOGNITION ?

Recognition is an act by which we endeavour to recall! and reunite the former states of consciousness and is a kind of reasoning by which we ascend from a present conscious ness to a former one. It differs from remembrance but slightly. Remembrance is a knowledge which is born of mental impression (samskāra) alone. But in recognition, though the mental impression is an important factor yet it is not the only factor as in the case of remembrance; it is necessarily always coupled with the direct perception of the object which serves as an operating cause. Suppose, for instance, that a certain person was, on one occasion, very much impressed by the sight of a king riding an elephant : and suppose also that some time later he sees the elephant alone; naturally at such a time, because of the law of association, his former impression of the king will be revived and there would arise a picture of the king before his mind’s eye. Remembrance is thus nothing but a purely mental perception of a former object of sense-perception. But recognition is not a purely mental perception due to the revival of a past impression. In it the object recollected is actually present before the eyes and the novelty of perception consists in identifying the object, now perceived, with the one, seen before. When a person, for instance, on seeing

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Devadatta, recollects the previous perception of him and identifies the mental image with the one present before his eyes in the judgment:“it is the same Devadatta as I saw on that occasion,” the actual perception of the object is as much a cause of knowledge as the impression left on the mind by the former perception of the same. Recognition, thus, requires not only previous perception of the object but also its presence at the time when it takes place.

The previous knowledge of the object, which is an essential condition of recognition, is, in some cases, as of one collocation of the object and its attributes, while in others they (the object and its attributes) are known separately. Thus, while in the former case, there is only one mental image of the object with all its qualities, in the latter, side by side with one, caused by the direct ocular perception, there is another also, which is a vague creation of mind and as such is hardly anything more than a mere embodiment of the heard qualities. To illustrate the latter case, which seems to be rather a complicated one, let us suppose that a lady, on hearing the excellent qualities of a certain gallant, fell in love with him even before she had an occasion to see him; and suppose also that that person chanced to pass incognito before her many a time so as to be noticed well enough and to leave the impression of his person on her mind. In such a case, the mind naturally draws a picture of the object of love, which is hardly anything more than a mere embodiment of the previously heard excellences which were responsible for the rise of the passion of love. This image, of course, will be distinct from that, left by the real object of love who passed incognito so many times before her. It will thus be clear that recognition in this case is not so simple an act as in that in which the object and its attributes are known as one collocation, as in the illustration of Devadatta, given above. In the present case recognition

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is not at all possible unless the veil be removed and the real qualities of the person be revealed so as to make the identification of the imaginary object of love with the person present before her possible. Thus, in the former case the failure to recognise is simply due to forgetfulness on the part of the perceiver. For instance, it is often seen that a big man, like a king, fails to recognise an ordinary person, who was properly introduced to him on a former occasion and who, even now, in all respects, is the same as he then was. To enable the king to recognise the person before him does not require any thing more than reminding him of the past occasion. But in the latter case the failure to recognise is due not to forgetfulness, for, then the passion of love would disappear, but partly to the veil and partly to the existence of a vague mental image, which, as has been said before, is hardly any thing more than a mere embodiment of the previously heard qualities, as distinct from the image of the known object who is really their possessor. Thus in this case recognition requires not only the removal of the veil but also the identification of both the mental images with the unveiled object.

To illustrate this point let us suppose that a person, while in India, hears of the excellences of a certain lord. He goes to England and there often sees that lord, without knowing him as such, walking like an ordinary man in a garden. He then, on one occasion, goes to the House of Lords, sees that person among the members and recognises him to be the same person as he had so often met in the garden. And let us also suppose that this lord is the same as he had heard about in India and that the former shows many of the qualities of the person, he was so anxious to see. Now, the question, that we have to ask ourselves, is, whether, under these circumstances, the lord will be recognised as such and if not, why not? The answer is

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simple. He has failed to recognise the ord as the one about whom he had heard, because the latter has not yet been pointed out as such by any responsible person.

There are other minor distinctions between one kind of recognition and another, but we are not immediately concerned with them. We have drawn the above distinction to show what part the present system of philosophy has got to play in self-recognition.

As in the case of the recognition of the lord so in that of the Self, there are two distinct images in the mind of the recogniser (pratyabhijñātr). In the former case one is caused by the reports, heard in India, and the other by the sight of the lord in a garden in England. In the latter case also similarly, one, that is, of one’s own limited self, is due to intuitive knowledge that every body has of himself and the other is created by the descriptions of the Maheśvara or the universal Self that one reads in the sacred books such as the Purāṇas and the Agamas?. When one studies philosophy, there arises the third image, which is different from both the previous mental images. This third image one identifies with one’s own self. much as the gentleman of the above illustration identifies the person, whom he frequently saw in the garden, with the lord in the House of Lords. The other image, in both the cases, however, i. e. the image caused by reports heard in India in the one and that created by the description given in the sacred books in the other, will still remain unidentified. Thus, just as the identification of this image in the illustration, as we have just pointed out, depends upon a word from a responsible quarter, so, that of the universal Self as revealed by the study of philosophy, depends upon

I. P. V., I, 20. 2. I. P. V., I, 21.

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spiritual instruction. The intellectual knowledge, got through the study of philosophy, is called Bauddhajñāna and the spiritual knowledge, that comes from preceptorial instruction, (Dīksā) is called Pauruṣajñāna. Of these the former is more important, because it is this that qualifies a person for the latter.

To make the point a little clearer let us add here that the limited self also is a manifestation. It is characterised not only by obscuration of its perfect Will Power (Svāntantrye sakti) but also by ignorance thereof. That is, the innate limitation of the individual self is twofold. Not only is its perfect power of will hidden from it, but it is also ignorant of the fact that that power really belongs to it, though obscured, for the time being, by Māyā, the principle of obscuration?. In order that there may take place a perfect self-recognition, there is the necessity of the removal of both, of the veil which hides the perfect power of will and of the ignorance which is responsible for the imaginary distinction between the individual and the supreme Self and which stands in the way of recognition even when the veil is removed. The work of philosophy is simply to remove the veil and to expose what it hides, and thus make self recognition possible, as does the appearance of the lord of the above illustration in his lordly form and place. But this alone does not make the recognition an accomplished fact. Therefore, just as in the case of the illustration of the lord a word from a responsible quarter is needed, so in the present case there is the necessity of Dīkṇā to remove the imaginary distinction and to bring about the identification of the individual with the universal Self.

T. A., I, 83. T. A., 1, 55. 23

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Here it may be asked: if the individual self is really identical with the Supreme, how can recognition or non-recognition of this fact affect its causal efficiency ? Does the recognition of a seed as such or the absence thereof affect its causal efficiency to develop into a sprout ? The reply is that the causal efficiency (artha-kriyā-kāritva) is of two kinds :

(i) External, which does not affect the mind in any

way; for example, the development of a seed into

a plant. (ii) Internal, which does affect the mind; for instance,

the causal efficiency to give delight. The former does not presuppose recognition but the latter does. To illustrate this point we give below Professor Cowell’s translation of Utpala’s passage in the Isvara Pratyabhijñā Kārikā, quoted in the Sarva Darśana Sangraha :

“A certain damsel, hearing of the many good qualities of a particular gallant, fell in love with him even before she had seen him, and agitated by her passion and unable to suffer the pain of not seeing, wrote to him a love letter descriptive of her condition. He at once came to her, but when she saw him, she did not recognise in him the qualities, she had heard about, he appeared much the same as any other person, and she found no gratification in his society. So soon, however, as she recognised those qualities, as her companion now pointed them out, she was fully gratified.” Similarly though the individual self is identical with the Supreme, yet we cannot get the happiness of this identity unless we are conscious of it.

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one’s ear by a certain religious man. It is rather an act whereby spiritual knowledge is imparted and the bondage of innate ignorance is removed.

One more point is worthy of note in this connection, viz., that, according to this system, Dīkṇā, the spiritual instruction which makes self-recognition an accomplished fact, is not indispensable for mokṣa. It is a matter of common experience that even when recognition is due to the removal of the veil and consequent exposure of the hidden qualities and identification of both the mental images with the object present before, it does not always require a word from an authoritative person, as for instance, when the object of recognition reveals some such unmistakable sign? as makes identification of the imaginary vague image with the object present before possible. Saiva writers had observed this and had given the name of Prātibhajñāna to that faculty which enables a person to attain self recognition without the help of Dīkṇā.

SAKΤΙΡΑΤΑ.

That divine will which leads a person on to the path of spiritual knowledge is called Saktipāta. It may be spoken of as divine grace. It is independent of human action and is the only cause of self-recognition. On this point there is complete agreement between this system and the Vedānta. The latter also says that the Self cannot be realised by means of intellectual power or through the

T. A., I., 80. 2. I. P. V., II, 275. 3. T. A., VIII, 107. 4. T. A., VIII, 173. 5. T. A., VIII, 163.

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study of the Vedas or even through spiritual instruction, It can be realised by him alone whom He favours and to whom He reveals himself:

“Nāyamātmā pravacanena labhyo Na medhayā na bahunā śrutena Yamevaiṣa vrṇute tena labhyo Yasmai vivrṇute tanum svām. THE CAUSE AND THE NATURE OF BONDAGE.

It is a common belief of all the schools of Indian philosophy that ignorance is the cause of bondage and that knowledge is the only means to liberation. The opinions, however, greatly differ in regard to the exact nature of both. Abhinava has tried to explain and harmonise this difference in his comprehensive study of the system. How he has done So, we shall show as we proceed. Let us first state his, or more correctly, the Saiva, view of these.

When in the Saiva literature “ignorance” is spoken of as the cause of bondage, it does not mean a total absence of knowledge. For, such a state is to be found only in insentient objects, such as bricks and stones, which, because of the absence of life and feeling, cannot at all be represented to be in bondage. It means simply imperfect knowledge, such as is found in ordinary mortals. It may further be pointed out that in such a context it stands not for the intellectual (bauddha) but for the innate (pauruṣa) ignorance which is technically called āṇavamala (innate impurity). As such it is represented to be the cause of another impurity, called kārmamala (impurity of Karma). (For details on

T. S., 5. 2. T. A., 1, 58. 3. T. A., I, 56.

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this the reader is requested to refer to the 5th chapter). The latter also, in its turn, is said to be the cause of still another, namely, impurity of transmigratory existence? (Māyiya mala). The self is covered with these three impurities [of innate ignorance, of Karma and of trans migratory existence (Anava, Kārma and Māyīya malas) ] exactly in the manner in whicho an ovule (kaṇa) is with nucellus (kambuka), integument (kimśāruka) and husk (tuṣa). These covers are responsible for the transmigration of the individual self as nucellus, integument and husk are for the development of ovule. Although these impurities are said to be related with one another by causal relation, yet no idea of succession in their coming into being is intended to be implied. For instance, when the innate ignorance is spoken of as the cause of the impurity of Karma, and the latter of transmigratory existence it does not mean that one follows the existence of the other. It simply means that without one the other cannot exist, i. e., the existence of each of the preceding in the above list is an indispensable condition for that of the following. The existence of the body pre supposes that of the Karma’; and the effectiveness of the latter depends upon the existence of the innate ignorance. Thus if there be no innate ignorance the other impurities will automatically disappear. It is because of this that at one place the innate ignorance is spoken of as the greatest and innermost cover; the six sheaths, consisting of Māyā, Kalā, Niyati, Rāga, Vidyā and Kāla, as the inner and subtle cover; and the body as the gross and outer cover,

T. A., 1, 54. 2. P. S., 55, 57. 3. T.A., VI, 111. 4. T. A., VI, 82-3.

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MALAS OR IMPURITIES DEFINED.

1 ĀṇAVAMALA OR

INNATE IGNORANCE.

Innate ignorance is one of the manifestations brought about by the universal Willi Power (Svātantrya sakti). It conceals the real nature of the Self. It is a mere consciousness of the supposed imperfection and limitation which is responsible for the rise of countless individual selves?. It is beginningless though destructible. It is the instrumental cause of the impurity, called Kārma mala, inasmuch as the power of Karma, to affect the soul, depends upon its presence.

ITS DISTINCTION FROM INTELLECTUAL IGNORANCE

We have already pointed out that the word “ignorance”, whether used in reference to the individual self or the intellect, refers not to a total absence of knowledge but to a limited knowledge which is the same thing as determinate knowledge, i. e. consciousness of something as such to the exclusion of all other things (Sarvo vikalpah samsārah). The intellectual ignorance (bauddha ajñāna) is an affection of the limited self caused by a stimulus. The stimulus is of two kinds, internal and external. The former is due to the revival of old impressions. But the latter arises from the contact of a certain sense with a certain external object. The spiritual ignorance is altogether different from its. It is simply a consciousness of self-limitation, not as associated with the body, the mind or the intellect, but above all of them ; a consciousness which is present in the

T. A., VI, 61. 2. T. A., VI, 60. 3. T. A., VI, 76.

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transcendental state of the individual self, a state in which the self rises above the material body and all that is con nected with it, so that there is no experience of any thing that happens to the body; a state in which there is no experience of pain of any kind even if the body be cut; a state in which not only the senses and the mind cease to work but the vital airs also suspend animation. It is that element in the consciousness, which is responsible for the automatic break of that state (svato vyutthāna). It is not always that there is conscious association of this limitation with the self. It can remain even in a sub-conscious state. That state of the individual self in which this innate ignorance or limitation is in a sub-conscious state is technically known as the state of purity (Turīyātīta). This state does not automatically cease. It requires some external agency to break it. But when the self is perfectly free from it, there is no break or resumption of connection with the body etc.

✓ It will thus be clear that the intellectual ignorance is dependent upon the connection of the individual self with the body, with which it co-exists, but the spiritual ignorance is independent of it. It is because of this difference that this system holds that liberation (Mukti) cannot be got through the intellectual knowledge only. The intellectual knowledge can effect salvation only if it is accompanied by the spiritual knowledge.

This innate ignorance is different from “Rāga”, which, according to the Sāūkhya, is the cause of bondage. For, while the latter is simply a quality of Buddhi responsible for the attachment of the individual to certain object or objects, the former is a mere consciousness of an imperfection

Ś C., 455, (Bhumikā.)

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because of which the self is subjected to all kinds of later limitations. Rāga Tattva, on which we shall speak in the third chapter, is still a different thing. It is a desire for something undefined. Both of these, the Rāga of the Sānkhyas and the Rāga Tattva of the Saivas, are further manifestations of the innate ignorance.

This impurity of innate ignorance is independent of the other two impurities. It continues to exist even after they have been destroyed. It passes through four states before reaching that of total annihilation. And it is the association of one of these states with each of the five classes of beings of pure creation that constitutes the chief point of difference of each one of them from the rest.

It may briefly be stated here that, according to this system, creation is of two kinds, the pure and the impure.2 From Māyā down to Earth, the creation is impure inasmuch as the knowledge of duality predominates in it. And from śiva to Suddha Vidyā the creation is called pure, because the experiencing entities of this creation are the universal beings who realise themselves actually as such and have for their experience the whole of the universe in different forms, but free from all limitations which characterize the determinate knowledge.

There are eight kinds of experiencers. Five belong to the pure creation, two to the impure and one to the transitional stage between the two. It is the association of one or more of these impurities with the individual self which distinguishes each one of the eight experiencers from the rest. Two, Sakala and Pralayākala, belong to

T. A., VI, 57-9. 2. T. A., VI, 56.

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the impure creation. Every mortal in the state of creation (srṣti-daśa) is Sakala, because there are all the three impurities in him. These very mortals in the state of dissolution (Pralaya) are called Pralayākalas, because at that time they have no mortal coils, the body, which, with all that it can be associated with, is called the impurity of Māyā. Thus Pralayākalas have only two impurities. The experiencers of the transitional stage between the impure and the pure creations are known as Vijñānākslas.

(Māyordhve Suddhavidyādbah santi vijñānakevalāh). These possess only one impurity, that of innate ignorance, which is inclining towards destruction in their case.

This impurity of innate ignorance passes, according to Saiva view, through four states before reaching that of total annihilation. Hence the remaining five subjects, who belong to the pure creation, Sambhava, Saktija, Mantra mahesa, Mantrega and Mantra, are represented to have the distinguishing mark of having the same perishing impurity but each in a different state?; in śiva, for instance, it is in the state of non-existence (Dhvasta). Abhinava has given a large number of synonyms of Mala, each indicative of one of its functions in T. A., VI, 73-9.

KĀRMA MALA.

It has to be distinguished from karma-sachskāra, which is simply an effect left on the self by various kinds of mental and physical actions. It is essentially a mere objectless desire which is responsible for the countless associations of the self with other creations of Māyā.

T. A., VI, 77, 81. 2. T. A., VI, 80.

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Its effectability and even its very existence depends on the innate ignorance. We shall revert to this topic in dealing with the Saiva theory of Karma.

MĀYIYA MALA.

All that the self is associated with because of both, the Kārma-mala and the karma-samskāra, is called Māyīya-mala’.

THE MEANS OF LIBERATION FROM BONDAGE.

The perfect knowledge, not intellectual but spiritual, of the Ultimate Reality of the knowable (jñeya), the knowledge which is free from all limitations? and from the idea of duality in any form, is the means of liberation.

THE INTELLECTUAL AND THE SPIRITUAL KNOWLEDGE.

A distinction has to be drawn here between the intellectual and the spiritual knowledge (Bauddha and Pauruga jñāna) similar to that as has already been pointed out between the intellectual and the innate ignorance. The spiritual knowledge is that perfect knowledge which dawns upon & person, who has reached the highest stage in the spiritual development through the total annihilation of the innate ignorance. It transcends the limit of language and is, therefore, to be known only through experience. Similarly, intellectual knowledge is that perfect knowledge by virtue of which a person transcends the difference between this and that, and sees only one whole and that too, as a manifestation of himself. The former comes from the Dīksā® and the latter from the study of the monistic

T. A., 1, 56. T. A., I, 79.

T. A., 1, 72.

T. A., I, 78-9.

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philosophy. The latter is more important than the former, not so much because it can liberate a person right in his life time, as because the Dīkṣā is inefficacious in bringing about salvation without the assistance of the Bauddha jñāna”.

There are four ways to liberation, Anupāya, Sāmbhava, śākta and Anava. Each of these does not directly lead to the realisation of the Ultimate Reality. Each of the Succeeding, in the above order, leads to that which immediately precedes. It is the first alone which can be called the direct means. The difference, however, between the first and the second i. e. Anupāya and Sāmbhava, is very slight. The former, therefore, is not counted as a separate way in some authoritative books of the system. In fact it is regarded as the highest stage of the latter (Sāmbhava).

Antoner. Billeder At some places the word “Samāveśa’ is found substituted 9 for “Upāya” It is defined as a merging into its ultimate form, the highest reality? of that which, being apparently separate from the Ultimate, is limited. This gives us some idea of the chief point of distinction between one of the ways and the rest. The word “Samāveśa” literally means “complete or perfect immersion”. l. There are four such immersions. Beginning from the last, each one leads to the preceding one, up to the first, which alone is considered to be the direct way to salvation i. e. the realisation or the recognition of the Ultimate Reality. This process of immersion appears to be a complete reversal of that of emergence. Or, to put it more clearly, the process involved in Mokṣa is the complete reverse of

T A., 1, 81-2. 4. T. A., 1, 255-6. 7. T. A., I, 205.
T. A., I, 83. 5. T. A., 1, 203.

T. A., I, 258. T. A., I, 182.

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that of Abhāsa or manifestation. We know that, according to the Trika, creation is nothing but manifestation without of what is within; that, in the order of sucession in manifestation, Ananda, Icchā, Jñāna, and Kriyā follow one another in their respective order; and that these stand for successive states of the universal consciousness in the process of manifestation. We also know that, corresponding to these very states in manifestation or emergence, there are four states leading to complete immersion (samāveśa) as stated above. In fact two of these, namely, the śākta and the Aṇava, are also called Jfiānopāya and Kriyopāya respectively, because they are mostly concerned with the manifestations of the powers of Jñiāna and Kriyā respectively And from the nature of description of the remaining two it is clear that Abhinava meant them also to be called Anandopāya and Icchopāya respectively. Thus, just as in the course of successive manifestation of Ananda, Iccha, Jírāna and Kriyā, each of the preceding leads to that which immediately follows, so in the course of the gradual immersion (krama-samāveśa or mukti) these very powers similarly merge into one another in the reverse order. For, mokṣa is nothing but, broadly speaking, an individual dissolution and, therefore, the opposite of manifestation.

The various stages in manifestation from Cit to Kriyā are admitted to correspond to those from the state of deep sleep to that of action. It would not, therefore, be wrong to say that the four stages leading from the mundane exist ence to the complete immersion in the Highest Reality, similarly correspond to those which are experienced in falling into sleep from the state of activity. If we carefully analyse our successive experiences from the time when we

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attempt to sleep to that when we actually fall asleep, we find that ordinarily there are four well definable stages. The first three are marked by the suspension of the physical, the mental and the volitional activities respectively and the fourth by the loss of distinct individual self-consciousness. If the distinctive features of the above four stages be kept in mind there will be very little difficulty in understanding the nature of the activity involved in and the result reached by, the four successive means to the final emancipation.

KRIYOPĀYA OR ĀṇAVOPĀYA. Kriyopāya is that path in which the external things, such as repetition of a certain religious formula (Mantra), which are nothing but creations of imagination (Kalpanā), are used as means to self-realisation. It is called Kriyopāya, firstly because to the follower of this path both the conscious ness of self and that of the objective universe are equally prominent as in the characteristic experience “I am this” of the Sadvidyā? (Kriyā) stage of universal manifestation, and secondly, because the physical activities, such as repetition of a mantra, as said above, play an important part in it. Shall we say that the repetition of a religious formula plays the same part in bringing about the liberation as does a lullaby in putting a child to sleep, a state of physical quiescence ?

JMĀNOPĀYA OR SĀKTOPĀYA. Jñānopāya is the second of the four ways in which repeated attempts have to be made to rise from the stage of the Knowledge of duality to that of unity. When, for instance, & man begins with thinking “The self alone is all this” (Atmaivedanh sarvam), and by the repeated attempt at

T. A., 1, 235.

T. A., I, 18 6.

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elimination is able to rise to the unshakable knowledge of oneness (Nirvikalpa Jñāna) in the form the self”, he is said to follow the path of knowledge. It is called Jñānopāya because the mental activities of meditation are the most important factors in it. The activity involved in this may be compared to our autosuggestion in our attempt to sleep which brings mental quiescence.

SAMBHAVA MĀRGA OR ICCHOPÄYA.

It is a path in which the perfect knowledge, the knowledge of the Ultimate Reality, comes through mere exercise of the will power, without any serious mental effort at unification (Anusandhi) of ideas or elimination thereof; much in the same manner in which the knowledge of the real worth of a gem comes to an expert jewellera at the very first moment of its sight without any great careful examina tion. It is called Sambhava mārga or the path of Icchā, because in it the exercise of will power is the important factor. The stage reached by this means is the one in which the world of experiences loses its definiteness and, therefore, may be compared to that which immediately precedes sleep and is marked by the presence of only vague ideas such as are conceived in desire.

ANUPAYA-MĀRGA OR ANANDOPĀYA.

It is the same as we have discussed above under “Pratyabhijñā”. It is called Anupāya, not because there is no use of any means whatsoever*, but because the elaborate means are but of little importance. It is that path by following which the Ultimate is realised even without Bhāvanā. The realisation of the Ultimate comes to the

T. A., I, 235. 3. T. A., Ah. II, 39.40.
T. A., I, 186. 4. T. A., Ah. II, 3.

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follower of this path in consequence of just a word from & responsible quarter as in the case of complex recognition described above. The stage attained by this way may be compared to deep sleep, in which consciousness is free from all affections.

TRIKA CONCEPTION OF MOKṣA.

Mokṣa, according to the Trika, is nothing but the state of perfect purity of consciousness. It is the realisation of the Self, the Para Samvit or the Supreme Consciousness, which is beyond the reach of both thought and language and is the ultimate source not only of both of them but also of all that they imply or involve. It is purely subjective and, therefore, is both unilluminable (aprakāsya) by any external light and unknowable (ajñeya) by any means of knowledge. It transcends all ; it surpasses all ; it is the ultimate aim of all aims. It may be called consciousness, not such as we ordinarily have, but that which is a matter of experience of the Yogins in the pure or post-transcendental state of consciousness.

OTHER CONCEPTIONS OF MOKṣA FROM THE TRIKA

POINT OF VIEW.

This system believes in 36 categories or Tattvas. We shall deal with them in the third chapter and shall explain why only thirty six, neither more nor less, are accepted. Here we are concerned only with pointing out the view of the Trika about the conceptions of Mokṣa of other systems and with stating as to which of the 36 categories some of the prominent ones among them reach because of their peculiar philosophical conceptions. In the 1st Āhnika of his Tantrāloka, Abhinava criticises the conceptions of Mokṣa

T. A., I, 62.

T. A., I, 192

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of three systems, the Idealistic and the Nihilistic schools of Buddhism and the Sānkhya, as follows :

VIJÑANAVĀDIN’S CONCEPTION OF MOKṣA. The Citta (mind or self ?), the Vijñānavādins hold, is extremely pure by nature. Because of the beginningless ignorance, however, it is covered up with adventitious im purities which are the cause of the appearance of the transitory world phenomena. And because all the experiences of the phenomenal world are entirely due to the impurities, the former, therefore, automatically cease with the cessation of the latter. Thus the nirvāṇa is nothing but freedom from the impurities. It is to be attained through constant deep meditation and other practices enjoined in the Buddhist scripture.

ITS REFUTATION. The defects of the above conception of nirvāṇa are apparent. It conflicts with the well known Bauddha theory of momentariness. If all that exists, is momentary, so also must be the mind. And if so, it cannot have existence long enough to be affected by Bhāvanā and, therefore, there can be no possibility of Mokṣa which is simply its effect. Moreover, according to the Idealistic Buddhism, each moment (kṣaṇa) gives birth to another which is similar to it in all respects. How can then the veiled original moment produce one which is dissimilar to it, i.e., free from the veil ?

NIHILIST’S THEORY OF MOKṣA AND ITS REFUTATION.

According to the Nihilistic Buddhism (Sūnyavāda), even the Vijñāna of the Idealists has no existence: and Mokṣa is nothing but the realisation of this nihility. But this is

T. A., I, 64.

T. A., 1, 66.

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an impossible position. For, if nothing exists what can be realised and by whom? But if, in order to get out of this difficulty, the existence of the realiser’ be admitted, that would mean the abandonment of the fundamental principle. The Nihilist’s conception of Moksa is thus as inconsistent with his fundamental principle as that of the idealist.

SANKHYA CONCEPTION OF MOKṣA AND ITS CRITICISM.

The Sānkhya conception of Moksa is no better. The Sāökhya holds that the whole universe is an evolute of an eternal principle, called Prakrti ; that Puruṣa, the self, is altogether passive and simply looks indifferently on the work of the former ; and that freedom from worldly bondage can be attained through the correct knowledge of the twenty-four categories of the Sārkhya system as distinct from the self. But the question, that the Trika raises against this theory, is, how and where can this knowledge of distinction take place ? The Prakrti is insentient and, therefore, no knowledge such as “I have been seen and, therefore, let me not work for him” can reasonably be attributed to her. The case of puruṣa is no better. He is perfectly passive (nirlepa). The supposition, therefore, of any such affection in puruṣa as that involved in knowing the distinction between himself and the twenty-four Tattvas would mean selfcontradiction.

These systems have thus failed to render a coherent account of the position they have attempted to maintain. Their founders and exponents have not been able to understand the true nature of the Ultimate Reality They are not, however, as far away from the truth as the materialists. They have made approaches to it with varying degrees of success, some being a little nearer it than others. Each one of them has been able to grasp the real nature of

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some one or the other of the higher Tattvas which he has taken to be the ultimate reality. The Bauddha, for instance, has understood the real nature of the Buddhi Tattva, the Sankhya that of the Puruṣa? Tattva, and the Pātañjala that of the Niyati Tattva.2 These systems, there fore, can surely help in the attainment of the respective Tattvas which they fully explain. But none of them can bring about the complete self-realisation, the full recognition of the Ultimate Reality.

The followers of these systems however, do rise above the level of the common man inasmuch as they get liberation, though partial, from the impurity, called Māyīyamala. But they cannot be spoken of as liberated (mukta) in the real sense of the term, because the remaining two impurities, namely, the kārma and the āṇava malas, remain associated with them even after the realisation of what they consider to be the ultimate reality. The perfect freedom, therefore, the Trika holds, can be got only through the Pratyabhijñā.

T. A., I, 69. 2. T. A., I, 70.