5 THIRD PHASE

THE INEVITABLE

With the exit of the Jat power under Nawalsing, after its rout at Gowardhan (5th of April 1770 A.D.) at the hands of the Marahtas, from the politics of Delhi and with the entry of Mahadaji as Vakil-ul-Mutlak (November 1784 A.D.) subsequent to the treaty of Salbye with the English, the Maratha-Rajput relations entered into the last phase of severe contest in which both sides, disregarding that they belonged to the same religion, culture and land, fought with the determination to annihilate each other. This was the strange culmination of the relationship that started with the friendship that between Bajirao and Sawai Jaysing. But such an end though shocking was inevitable.

With his embarrassing financial needs, with the tremendous task of managing the fallen House of the Mughals with its scanty resources unequal to check the jealous enemies that surrounded him on all sides, it was natural for Machhedi in his camp, to instigate him. It was the scheme of the latter to replace Pratapsing, the ruling king of Jaypur, by Mansing, to use him as a puppet in his hands. The price for the help for such a change was 50 lakhs of rupees, that the needy Mahadaji could hardly afford to miss. The result was Mahadaji’s invasion of Jaypur in 1786 A.D. long with the Emperor in his camp.

With the possibility of bringing Jaypur under his complete sway like Gwalior, Gohad and Khichiwada, Mahadaji started with an extravagent demand of 3 crore (1) and 40 lakhs of rupees. It clearly explains his high tone of approach and also his wrong notion of the fabulous riches of the tiny Rajput State of Jaypur. When the Jaypurians saw that Mahadaji was committed to the side of Rao Raja, who was clearly bent on the destruction of Jaypur State, to meet his selfish ends, they gathered around their king and prepared to face the aggressor till last, With this view, they adopted delying tactics to tax Maahadaji’s poor resources and patience to his complete destruction, while strengthening their side at the same time.

The Kachhwahas and the Rathods rightly felt that Mahadaji’s efforts aimed at ending the means of their livelihood and this sense of survival aroused, as if by miracle, a strength into the same State which seemed completely spent up not only to Mahadaji but to all in 1785 A.D. the same Pratapsing who was despised (2) for indulging in insane practices of dancing into women’s apartment in the garb of a woman, then marched with manly courage at the head of a host of about 50 thousand Rajputs and banished Patil Baba with his supreme dignities and De Boigne’s artillery, not only from Jaypur territory but from the politics of Delhi for a complete year, causing thereby unseen and unheard degradation of the House of Babar at the hands of Gulam Kadar. Lalsot proves onces more the eternal truth that no individual with whatsoever superior strength, is ever capable to stand the might of a united nation that has determined to face injustice at all costs.

Nothing can be said against Mahadaji as a politician and a diplomat, it he desired to bring the prostrate State of Jaypur under his control in 1786 A.D. Even Najib Khan (3) had previously desired the same thing. But without pursuing the atter to extremity, he had returned after accepting the settled dues from Jaypur. But having once brought the Emperor with him in 1786 A.D. to Jaypur to awe the Jaypurians, Mahadaji had lost the retreating ground, even though he strived hard for a rescue from the complicated affairs, wherein he saw few chances of an easy success that he had expected previously. But now the shrewd Rajputs realizing his difficulties, dragged him on and thoroughly crippled him at Lalsot in 1787 A.D. Lack of valour was not the cause of Mahadaji’s ruin which was mainly caused by the loss of resources. This dishonour of Mahadaji at Lalsot made the final subjugation of the Rajputs at Patan and Medta inevitable on his part.

But however Mahadaji as a politician was justified to invade Jaypur in 1786-87 A.D., he can not escape blame from one point of view. He was a prominent Sardar of the Peshwa and the Vakil-ul-Mutlak of the Emperor. But his Rajput policy, that was rash at the outset and lacked moderation completely, had neither the sanction of the Peshwa (4) nor any approval of the Emperor (5). By his shortsighted policy towards Jaypur he was neither serving the Peshwa nor the Emperor, but his own designs at the instigation of Rao Raja. There is not a single instance where any Peshwa has hinted to extinguish any Rajput State. What the Peshwa ever expected from his Sardars was “Sardari” i.e. tactful menagement of the affairs without deep involvement, always keeping an eye on the profit and nothing more. Even, Holkars never meant to extinguish any Rajput State and hence with their sober out look they were comparatively more popular with the Rajputs in comparison with the Shindes. Mahadaji’s policy, without any sanction or any possibility of immediate support from Deccan and with his unreliable Northern forces, had little chance of success in 1786-87 A.D. A severe chastisement at Lalsot at the hands of the same Rajputs whom he had despised in 1785-86 A.D. for their weakness, was the inevitable culmination of his hasty action.

Vijaysing was still on the throne of the Jodhpur in 1785 A.D. and utilized the same policy adopted by him in the pre-Panipat days. He called Taimur Sah on promise of 20 lakhs of rupees for his help against Mahadaji and tried to create a confederation wherein the Mughalias figured prominently under Ismail Beg. The battles of Patan and Medta were fought in 1790 A.D. for the same reason of opposing the Maratha supremacy at Delhi, for which Najib Khan forming a grand opposition had been the cause of the defeat of the Marathas at Panipat in 1761 A.D. It does not mean that the Rajputs were not religious minded, But it only stresses the point that when politics comes to forefront, religion plays but an insignificant part.

The Rajputs faced the Marathas at Patan and Medta in 1790 A.D. apparently to reject to territorial demands of the Marathas but in fact there was a deeper meaning to their opposition. It was a challenge to the Maratha supremacy at Delhi as like the Mughalias they felt their political existence threatened by the firm establishment of the Maratha rule at Delhi. The Rajputs who regarded themselves to the pillars of the North, looked with envy, at the predominance of the Marathas over them. It was not the real fact that they regarded Tukoji or Ali Bahadur as more favourable to them, but it was the fact that they dreaded the perfect dominance of Mahadaji as compared to the rest of the Maratha Sardars. Mahadaji on his part was following the same policy of Maratha expansion that Bajirao had pursued some 40 years before him. Bajirao’s march on Delhi in 1737 A.D. was made a reality by making the Emperor his prisoner by Mahadaji. By way of forced association, the Rajputs, though reluctantly, had adjusted themselves in the role of the mansabdars of the Mughals, but when the Deccani Marathas began to play the role of the masters by substituting the Mughals, the Rajputs ego was hurt. In their heart of hearts, they had not forgotten for the past five centuries that they had been once the masters of the North before the coming of the Turks. This Rajput pride was fully exhibited in the attitude, deeds and utterances of Vijaysing and retention of Ajmer became the symbol of his pride. For Ajmer he did every thing that was possible for him. Jayappa was done away with his life for Ajmer and had Mahadaji been less cautious, he would have also followed the same path. In a way, the struggle that continued from Lalsot and seemed to end at Medta was all for Ajmer. Rajputs with Vijaysing at their back would have never acknowledged a willing subordination to the Marathas, unless Mahadaji had crushed their pride. And from this point of view also the battle of Patan and Medta were inevitable.

Patan and Medta were soon followed by Lakheri (1793 A.D.). This time it was the two Sardars of the Marathas that were bent on destroying each other. But in fact it was Mahadaji who wanted to remove the obstacle of the Holkars from his path to predominance. Dominance demands submission and after the submission of the Rajputs, Tukoji’s pride and interference could not be tolerated by Mahadaji for a long time. Lakheri was the result of the past injuries of some 50 years back that were nourished in the bosoms by both the parties. Holkars being equal in position to Mahadaji, insisted scrupulously to have their say in framing the Maratha policies and especially the Rajput ones in the North. And being inferior in strength as compared to Mahadaji, they felt most acutely the disegard they met with, on the part of Mahadaji and his Sardars. They had in their memory the past practices when Malharrao shared the far inferior after Panipat in strength to the formers. But Mahadaji had little patience to tolerate one whom he thought to be nothing but a hindrance to his policies. With the same force that crushed the Rajputs, he silenced Tukoji who fled to Indore burning with a wrath of a powerless person. The Holkars suffered the penalty of mismanagement for a long time resulting into lethargy and thereby causing them to lag far behind their superior colleague who utilized Holkar’s incompetence to further his own advancement in the North. The Holkars tried to avoid the impending blow for a long time by pleading their case at Poona but in vain ! In the long run they had to face the inevitable. Lakheri proves that politics is not always the game of justice but it is one of strength and power. With their complete collapse at Lakheri the Holkars, learnt this lesson by heart and after 9 years under Yashwantrao, preparing themselves thoroughly, charged the Shindes at Hadapsar near Poona in 1802 A.D., with a desperate courage and repeated the same performance which Mahadaji had enacted at Lakheri. But that had a disastrous effect not only on the Shindes, but on the whole Maratha power. What was sown at Lakheri in Jaypur territory in 1793 A.D. bore sufficiently ill fruits to destroy the Maratha Empire in the long run. In a way it was also inevitable.

Foot Notes (Description)

(1) Dil, Raj. I-163.

(2) M.D. I-19, ‘Mar, Riyasat (U.V. Vol. II), p. 115, ‘New Hist. Vol. III, p. 151.

(3) ‘Jaypur Draft Kharitas 15-11, 25, 97, 104, 106, 107, 180, 16-21, 22, 71, 81, 135, 150, 151, see ‘Appendix’.

(4) ‘Hist. Papers’ - 509.

(5) 25th July 1787. Mahadaji’s generals received Emperor’s letters urging them to “persuade Patil Bahadur” to make peace with the Rajputs, who were “old Khanazads” - ‘Shinde Regent of Delhi’, p. 8.

THE RESTORATION (1772 A. D.)

The Jat Aggressions

The Chief, Jawaharmal, seeing that the Maratha Army under Raghunathrao, had retired from the North, started his aggressions with new vigour (1). He entered Bhind and captured Bhadawar. Then crossing Sindhu River with fifty thousand Bhadawar force, he captured Kachhwadhar in June 1767 A.D.(2). By November 1767 A.D., Kalpi, Kachhwadhar, Bhadawar, Tomardhar, Sikharwar, Dandroli, Khitoli passed under his rule and practically the whole of Bundelkhand (3) was lost to the Marathas.

But due to various reasons, the Peshwa was handicapped to accept the Jat challenge. After the death of Malerao, the only son of Ahillyabai, it took some time (4) for the house of Holkar to stand again on its legs. The Shinde Sardari was also in dispute (5) due to the differences between Kedarji and Mahadji. Moreover, after the return of Raghunathrao to the south, the Peshwa was forced to face his rebellion (6) and he was not free till he defeated him at Dhodap (10th of June 1768 A.D.). Due to this domestic dispute, Peshwa’s Sardars were in south and thus 1767 and 1768 A.D. the two years were wasted. The Peshwa hence could do little to help the Maratha Chiefs in the North who implored him for immediate succour, least all would be lost.

But fortunately for the Marathas, the aggressive Jat Chief suffered a severe defeat (7) at the hands of Madhaosing of Jaypur. It took place in the following way:

Coming over the Alwar fort, the Jat Chief Jawaharsing requested Madhaosing to allow him to march through his territory since he intended to visit Pushkar for a holy bath. But he went there with his full force. Vijaysing, the Raja of Jodhpur, had also come there. He had inclined (8) towards the Jat Chief as taking the side of Ramsing, Madhaosing was threatening him to place Ramsing on the throne of Jodhpur. It was a preplanned meeting of the two. They entered into an agreement to invade Malwa with full preparations, soliciting the cooperation of the rest of the Rajput Chiefs, to give a common stand to the Marathas.

Thus settled, Vijaysing sent the son of Deosing Chapawat, the Thakur of Devina to Mahadeosing to request him to join the common front. But being the determined opponent of the Jats, the disapproved Vijaysing’s act of joining hands with Jawaharsing and further reminded him that the Deccanies were not far off and once they came, it would be difficult for them, thousand Maraha force. He sent Raja Sadashi Bhat to Sambhar, where Vijaysing and Jawaharsing had moved from Pushkar. Sadashio Bhat told the Jodhpur Raja to refrain from interfering in the Jaypur-Jat struggle. The latter tried to win over the Maharao of Kota to his side but he failed in that attempt too.

With a determination to punish the Jat Chief who had dared to enter his territory with his powerful army, Madhaosing called all his forces and paid them in cash. He sent letters to the Chiefs of Sopara, Karoli, Khichi, Bundi and Kota. In return, Rao Raja Umedsing sent his son with two thousand men. Indrasing of Sopar joined the Jaypur foce with his army. King Balbharasing of Khichi joined with his army at the time of battle. The Maharao of Kota sent his brother Scrupling with Gopal |ramkrishna and his men and a big force came from the Ranaji of Mewad under Raghurao Zala. All Shekhawats, Narukas, Rajwats and Kait Thakurs assembled under his standard making thereby a host of forty to fifty men.

The Jodhpur Raja had no wish to fight with Mahadeosing over the Jat cause. He therefore returned to Marot in his territory giving a detachment of two thousand Rathod men to the Jat Chief, and asked Sadashio Bhat to allow the Jat Chief, unmolesled, to return to his territory. The Jat Chief also started for his territory from Sambhar.

Madhaosing, there upon sent his army under harsahji Musaheb and Thakur Rajsing Hamirde with artillery and full war equipment with clear instruction to obstruct him. Being well informed that the Jat Chief had advanced from Nimbarni to his territory, Thakur Rajsing and Raja Harsahji sent two thousand men in advance to check him and themselves hastened to follow them. The Rajput advance force fell upon the Jat force under Kriparam Purohit and they were soon followed by all the rest of the Rajput host of twenty five thousand men. Jawaharsing could not avoid fighting with honour. He fell two kos back and arranging his guns, got ready to face the on-coming Rajput onslaught.

A fierce battle was faught at Maonda on the Jat frontier on 14th December 1767 A.D. The Rajputs suffered heavily the terrible gunfire from the Jat side. But with grim determination, they raised all at one time and felling upon the artillery, destroyed it completely. They then engaged the Jat army in hand to hand fight and within six hours annihilated it so thoroughly that Jawaharsing could escape only with two to four thousand men. After this discomfiture, he did not survive for a long. He was assassinated in July 1768 A.D. (9), by a soldier, who revenged himself on Jawaharsing for some previous wrong. Madhaosing had also died a few months previously on 21st December 1767 A.D., leaving behind him a chaotic legacy for his successor Prithvising, who followed him on the throne of Jaypur. The Peshwa sent the “Tika” (10) for the new king with Niloba Gasavi.

Never the less, the Jat menace to the Maratha territory continued under their commander Danshah (11). In many 1768 A.D., the Jats captured Ater and Bhind and laid siege to Lahar. The Jat advances were dreaded even in Malwa (12). Vishwasrao Lakshman, Subhadar of Zashi wrote (13) (4-2-1769 A.D.). “The armies (from Deccan) did not come here for the last two and a half years. Days passed in vain, in waiting for them. The Rangadas (Jat, Gujars etc.) have become bold, having no fear of the Deccanies and do as they like. They are dividing the (Marathas) territory among them.”

Marathas in the North Again

After he had disposed his uncle finally, the Peshwa got an opportunity for the first time to think of the North (14). Early (15) in January 1768 A.D., he ordered the forces belonging to Tukoji Holkar, Mahadaji Shinde, Trimbak Shiodeo and Khanderao Pawar to march to the North. They were followed by Ramchandra Ganesh and Visaji Krishna with full preparation (16) after Janoji Bhosle’s affair was settled by the treaty of Kanakpur (March 1769 A.D.).

When Peshwa was decending the Washim-Mangrol ghat, while on his march on Janoji Bhosle, he received letters from Mahadji (17), stating justification for Ratansing’s claim on the throne of Udaypur in whose cause he was to march on that city.

Arising was then the Maharana of Udaypur. He had come to the throne in 1761 A.D., after the death of his nephew Rajsing. But by his harsh actions he had grown unpopular with his Chiefs, and the Umraos. Fourteen out of the Sixteen Umraos, leaving his side, had taken up the cause of Ratansing a boy of some eight years the posthumous son of Rajsing. They were sided even by Vijaysing of Jodhpur and Prithvising of Jaypur, who had sent their forces to assist them. They had approached Yashwantrao Wable from the Shindes and Sadashio Gandhar from Holkar who took up their sides and thus all of them combining together, marched to Udaypur and laid siege to it.

But at this time a breach came among the Maratha side. The same Vishnu Mahadeo, about whose mischievous activities Sadashio Ballal had complained to Nanasaheb Peshwa in 1757 A.D. wrote to the Peshwa Madhaorao in favour of Arising and the Peshwa ordered Ragoram, the Maratha Sardar, to help Arising. Hence Ratansing and his Umraos, approached Mahadaji at Ujjain. Hearing of this move, the party of Arising also approached Mahadaji who now looked to the affair from purely a practical point of view. The party of Arising promised him twenty lakhs of rupees, whereas the party of Ratansing promised him fifty lakhs of rupees ant the payment of all the previous dues of the Peshwa. Mahadaji hence taking up Ratansing’s cause pleded to the Peshwa that besides monetary profit, Ratansing’s party stood, comparatively more chances of success as it had the support of almost all the Chiefs of Udaypur and was also sided by the Rajas of Jodhpur and Jaypur. Under such circumstances, Mahadaji wrote, that even if Arising paid the Maratha dues, he had little possibility of continuation on the throne, as immediately after the departure of the Marathas, his opposition would definitely dethrone him, which act would be harmful to the name of the Peshwa. For these reasons, Mahadaji wrote that he had taken up the cause of Ratansing and he was soon he march to Udaypur. He was expecting about twenty five thousand men to join him from the two Rajas of Jodhpur and Jaypur and was confident of Ratansing’s success. He asked the Peshwa what was the exact sum to be recovered from Udaypur.

But Tukoji Holkar was equally interested in Udaypur affair. Not long before, in 1767 A.D., when Malji Holkar was alive he had plundered Mewad (18) in the name of realizing Khandani. Hence, with a determination not to allow of free hand to mahadaji alone, he hastened (19) with a contingent of two thousand men to Udaypur (July 1769 A.D.) keeping his main army under Naro Shankar at Sopara in Khichiwada. The rival parties tried to win-over them both or either of them to their sides and thus this affair had created a new source of income for both the Sardars. In the absence of any settled Rajput policy, the inevitable outcome was the breach of opinion between Mahadaji and Tukoji. The latter took up the cause of Arising as opposed to the former who stood for Ratansing. For tunately for the Marathas, time had not yet come for these two Sardars to face each other on Rajput issue and avoiding taking the matter to extreme end, Tukoji left for Khichiwada leaving the field open for Mahadaji.

But this does not mean that Mahadaji was sincerely attached to Ratansingh’s cause. In fact his attitude was indecisive (20) throughout. The reason was that he had begun to doubt the recovery of (21) promised money from Ratansing’s party and hence even though he could have taken Udaypur by assault at any time for Ratansing, he was not keen on the caputre of that city. Grain was sold two rupees a seer and only five thousand men were left there. But Mahadaji neigher raised the siege batteries nor any gun was being operated. He was all the while pressing Ratansing for the recovery of money and till then he had no mind to place him on the throne of Udaypur. At last leaving (22) the cause of Ratansing, the accepted sixty four lakhs of rupees as Khandani from Arising. Besides jagirs worth 11/3 and five lakhs were provided by Arising to Ratansing and Mahadji respectively.

After the settlement of Udaypur affair, Mahadji proceeded for Khichiwada (September 1769 A.D.) where Tukoji Holkar was engaged in besieging Raghogadh. The Chief of Raghogadh at least came to terms and visited Holkar. The next target was Jatwada. All the Maratha armies amounting to seventy five thousand assembled on chambal (October 1769 A.D.). From here, Ramchandra Ganesh (23) and Visaji Krishna ordered Niloba Gosavi, who had carried the “Tika” for Prithvising the new king of Jaypur from Peshwa, to bring pressure on the new king to realize sizable Khandani and to send a force of ten thousand under a renowned Sardar for the help of Peshwa’s army against the Jats. The Jaypur force (24) accordingly joined the Maratha army.

Nawalsing Jat was holding the South bank of Yamuna. Unless he was dislodged from there, the Marathas could not either enter Antarwad or reach Delhi. In a well-contested battle, the Jat Chief was routed at Gowardhan (25) (5th of April 1770 A.D.) by the Marathas and thus they created a very good impression of their strength on the Northern potentates.

But before effecting a treaty with the Jats, the Marathas entered Antarwad (26) as per the suggestion of Najib Khan who had come over to them to avert the calamities (27) he apprechended, dreading their recollections of sons and brothers slain at Panipat (1761 A.D). But at heart he was the real enemy of the Marathas and hence did not desire (28) that they should come to understanding. The Marathas and the Rohillas then attacked and plundered the Jat territory (29). Being disgusted at the opposition of Tukoji Holkar who, faithful to the legacy of Malharrao Holkar supported Najib Khan Rohilla, Mahadji left the army for Marwad (30). He was however, pacified and called back by Ramchandra Ganesh. Najib Khan also died soon on 31st October 1770 A.D. and the trouble was over.

The Marathas then affected a treaty (31) with the Jats (8th of September 1770 A.D.) and captured all the Maratha territory in Doab by defeating the Rohillas. Then they drove away Zabita Khan (32) " the son of Najib Khan " from Delhi (10th of February 1771 A.D.). This Maratha success encouraged the Emperor (33) to leave the English porotection and come over to them. On 6th January 1772 A.D., the Emperor was restored to his ancestral throne at Delhi. The Marathas, then crossing Ganga, attacked the Rohillas in their home province, and taking their fort Fattargadh (34), destroyed them completely.

The Peshwa Madhaorao, on his death bed at Theur near Poona heard the joyous news of the victories of his Sardars (35) in the North, and having thus cleared the stigma of the defeat of Panipat, died a peaceful death on 18th November 1772 A.D.

But the Marathas were not destined to dominate Delhi this time. The murder of the new Peshwa Narayanrao on 31st of August 1773 A.D., and the subsequent development at Poona compelled them to return to the South.

The domestic trouble at Poona soon took an alarming form and the Marathas were involved in the most strenuous struggle with the English during 1775 to 1782 A.D. During these hard times, when the child Peshwa was at the heat, all the energies of the Maratha nation were consumed for the preservation of their nation and hence during these years the Rajputs were left free to their lot.

It was some sixteen years from the battle of Gowardhan, where the Jaypur army cooperated with the Marathas against the Jats, that Mahadaji Shinde, as Vakil-ul-Mutlak, looked to Jaypur affairs in 1785 A.D. Till then the Rajputs got complete respite from the Maratha-encroachments and their vexing demands.

Foot Notes (Description)

(1) ‘Revival’ - 102, 106.

(2) Ibid - 112 to 116, and 118.

(3) Ibid - 128, 132, 133, S.P.D. 29-152, 169, 171, 207, 215.

(4) Ibid - 157, 176, 180.

(5) Ibid - 180, 184, S.P.D. 39-84, 85.

(6) M.I.S. XII 44, 45, 47.

(7) Revival - 139, S.P.D. 29-192.

(8) S.P.D. 29-17.

(9) S.P.D. 29-233 and 234.

(10) Ibid - 248.

(11) ‘Revival’ - 148, 151 to 159.

(12) S.P.D. 29-210, to 212 and 22.

(13) Ibid - 232.

(14) S.P.D. 29-219. 222, 224, 229.

(15) ‘Revival’ - 145, S.P.D. 22-187, 188.

(16) ‘Revival’ - 170 and 174.

(17) S.P.D. 38-185, S.P.D. 29-239.

(18) S.P.D. 39-97.

(19) S.P.D. 29-234, 243 and 245.

(20) Ibid - 238.

(21) Ibid - 87.

(22) S.P.D. 29-243, 245.

(23) S.P.D. 29-248. ‘Jaypur Draft Kharitas’ 13-126, 127.

(24) ‘New Hist. Vol. II, p. 526,’ Marathai Riyasat-Madhaorao -p- 124.‘Jaypur Draft Kharitas’ 13-126, 127.

(25) S.P.D. 29-261 and 262, ‘Jaypur Kharitas’ 1-8.

(26) Ibid - 253, 260 and 261.

(27) ‘Grant Durr’ II-p. 159.

(28) S.P.D. 29-555 and 262.

(29) Ibid - 262, 260.

(30) S.P.D. 29-252-253, ‘New Hist.’ II-p. 533, Marathi Riayasat’ (Madhaorao) -p. 125.

(31) S.P.D. 29-260 and 261.

(32) Khare - IIIG, p. R.C. 3-544, S.P.D. 29-265.

(33) S.P.D. 29-89, ‘Jaypur Kharitas’ I-20, 22.

(34) ‘Grant Duff’ II-p. 162, S.P.D. 29-270 and 271.

(35) S.P.D. 45-pp. 116 to 124.

MAHADAJI ENTRAPPED IN JAYPUR

Mahadaji Enters Delhi Politics

As a result of the murder of Peshwa Narayanrao at Poona on 30th August 1773, the Marathas who had restored Shah Alam II to the throne of his ancestors, (January 1772) retired to the South. They were soon involved in a vexatious was with the English resulting out of the ambition of Raghunathrao, the uncle of the late Peshwa, that continued consuming their whole energies for seven years, till the treaty of Salbai in May 1782.

During these years Delhi was" ably administered by Najib Khan, who had gained supreme position in the Emperor’s Councils and retained it till his death on 22nd April 1782. Thus when the Marathas (and especially Mahadaji) had freed themselves from the said war, a favourable position for their re-entry in to the politics had been created at Delhi, where a scene of confusion and treachery had set in due to the quarrels amongst Mirza Shafi, Mohammad Beg Hamdani, Afrasiyab Khan and Najaf Kuli, the disciples of the late Najaf Khan.

And yet, there was another power that was equally anxious to bring Delhi under its sway and it was that of the English. They had tried to frustrate the Maratha plans in 1771 and now having been freed from the engagement with the Marathas, their diplomacy was active at Delhi where a section of the Courtiers was always favourable to them. Even the Emperor (1) was contemplating seriously to put the administration in their-hands after the murder of Mirza Shafi (23rd September 1783), having been disguested completely with the followers of Najaf Khan. Warren Hastings (2) had come to Lucknow for the same purpose with a force of thirty thousand men and had sent letters to the Kings of Jaypur, Jodhpur and Mewad and the rest. (March end 1784).

Mahadaji had already met Mirza Shafi (3) on 9th September 1782, but then he had no serious thought of entering Delhi politics before subduing his enemies on his road to Delhi. Before that he wanted to secure a firm base in Bundelkhand. But he was with suspician watching the English efforts towards Delhi. Nana Fadnis (4) was constantly urging him not to allow the English (5) to enter Delhi, for once they got hold of it, he feared that no place would be left for the Indian powers. Mahadaji had already kept contacts with Afrasiyab Khan, the successor to Mirza Shafi, through Anupgir Gosavi who was then the staunch opponent of the English and they had decided to give no quarters to the English by even controlling the Emperor. By the end of February 1784 the Rana of Gohad (6) surrendered and Mahadaji was free to meet the Emperor who had now inclined towards him as the English (7) had seduced a Prince and had kept him with them.

But Mahdaji’s embarrassing problem was money, even in 1782, before he was engaged with Gwalior and Gohad, his pressing need was thirty two lakhs of rupees. After two years of continuous campaigning and when the need to prevent the English from gaining control over Delhi arose, the situation had aggravated further. Mahadaji wrote to Nana (8), “The Monetary " difficulties here are not such as can be explained by writing. I have been continuously busy in campaigning for the last five years since I came from Deccan and hence money has been scarce. (If I take the new venture in may hand) the Emperor will have to be paid monthly for his expenses and his countries will have to be brought round by keeping them pleased, the Sikhs and the rest will have to be subdued as per the desire of the Emperor. No money can be realized here due to draught. If others are not to be allowed to enter Delhi politics, Money is the foremost requirement. If arrangements for the same are made by the Government, I shall not fail in may duties.”

But no arrangement was possible in this respect from Poona as after his treaty with the English at Manglor (11th March 1784), Tipu (9) had turned towards the" Marathas for the part they had played against him and an army needed to be despatched against him (September 1784). Mahadaji was to see the Emperor and his was a stand against the English and hence a probability to stand to face them had to be taken in to consideration. And for this a new army was badly need (10). But from where was the money to come for that? As he wrote helplessly (11) “he could neither withdraw his step nor had he any strength to step forward.” He reminded (12) finally that if the Government did not send sufficient help, we would have to leave the Emperor to his fate."

Mahadaji Accepts the Post of Vakil-Ul-Mutlak

Mahadaji’s visit with the Emperor (13) was a success (13th November 1784). Shaking off his connections with the Englishsh the Emperor appointed Mahadaji as the Nayab (14) of the Peshwa to exercise the post of Vakil-ul-Mutalk and Mir Bakshi.

The gain of the most of Vakil-ul-Mutlak (15) was an achievement in itself," Mahadaji was empowered to remove even Wazir and Mir Bakshi and could confer dignities on any one he chose. Delhi was thus brought under the Marathas sway who began to dream again to reach Atak by capturing Lahor. But looking at the tremendous tasks the post imposed and the jealous atmosphere the Maratha success had created, the acceptance of the post on the part of Maratha was nothing but a rash daring as compared to his small number of Deccani force (16), worn out by constant warfare and non-payment of salaries.

It was the force of circumstances (17) that Mahadaji had to rely on the Mughila force with questionable loyalty to his cause. Further, for want of ready money he was compelled to assign “Saranjams” to his Chiefs (18). The Emperor questioned him how he would be able to pay his monthly salary if he disposed off thus the small territory left with him. But there was no alternative. The provinces (19) he administered on behalf of the Emperor were all desolate, no crop could be seen from Chambal to Mathura due to shortage of rain for the last three or four years. Thousands had died and were dying of hunger. No money hence could be procured. And inspite of this the adminstration had to be run (20) . By June 1785 he was indebted to the amount of (21) eighthly to eighty" five lakhs of rupees. All his personal money of about twenty" five lakhs was spent up and no further debt wad available. The Emperor’s salary (22) had begun to fall into arrears (February 1785) and he was angry for that with Mahadaji. To retain his position at Delhi, money was the foremost concern of Mahadaji.

His eyes very naturally fell on the Rajput States of Jaypur and Jodhpur who had paid nothing of the Emperor since the death of Najaf Khan and to the Marathas since 1769. Mahadaji had particular reason to be angry with the Jaypur king (23) who had killed Mahadaji’s Sardar Yashwantrao Wable with his son. Maratha detatchments were hence sent to Jaypur and after the damage of territory for a month, the king of Jaypur through Anupgir Gosavi agreed to pay as the “Nazar” of the Emperor (24). Two lakhs were paid in cash, two lakhs were paid in jewels and six lakhs were to be realized from the Pataits" (Chiefs) along with the expenses on army for realization, and for remaining ten lakhs the Mahals of the king of Jaypur were assigned till the money was recovered (25). (Januray 1785).

Kruparam Joshi (26) and Lalji Meheta, were the Vakils of Jodhpur with Mahadaji. He was pressing them for arrears. The king therefore sent a hundi of two lakhs of rupees and a lakh in “Bharna” (i.e. in camels, horses, jewellery worth fifteen thousand rupees and cloth). Agra fort was then under siege, hence the Vakils withheld the payment. But when the fort was captured on 26th March 1785, they had no alternative but to submit. Mahadaji asked them to pay all the previous arrears and the new payment for the month of Vaishakh (May) or they would be driven out of the camp. The Vakils informed their king that Patil Baba was in this ascendancy and would hear nothing. Mahadaji got information through Bhawaniram Bhandari, the Vakil of Mewad, about the intentions of Jodhpur King to avoid payment.

The Divided State of Jaypur and the Raoraja of Machhedi

The region of Madhaosing (27) came to a close after his glorious victory over the all-dreaded Jawaharsing Jat and his throne passed to his elder son Prithvising, a boy of about six years. (6th March 1768). The regency was held by his widowed queen, a daughter of Jaswantsing Chundawat of Deogadh in Mewad, who also came to Jaypur after the death of Madhaosing and began to wield the regency with his daughter on behalf of his grandson.

Naturally the proud Kachhwah nobles-Nathawats and Rajawats refused to accept a woman’s rule supported by an outsider and conspired to overthrow it. These factions aggravated by the rebellions of ever unruly Shekhawats created chaotic conditions that made the State an easy target of Mughal greed under Najaf Khan.

With a woman’s rule at the head and a minor king encouraging confusion due to factions, the time was favourable for any ambitious person and such awas Pratapsing of the Naruka branch of the Kachhwas, who was originally a petty vassal of Jaypur State, Rapidly seizing territories round the nucleus of his ancestral area and building a number of forts therein, he created a small kingdom for himself between Shekhawati, Mewat and the Jat-land. Then by shrewdly siding with Najaf Khan against the Jats, he secured for himself the confirmation of all his usurpations and the title of Rao Raja, a high imperial “Mansab” and a formal recognition of independence of his overlord, the king of Jaypur.

He then raised his power foremost in the State by skilfully ousting the father and the brother of the queen and the rest from the management of the State. But in his rise he had very naturally made every one his enemy and hence being in danger of assassination, he had to flee from Jaypur in 1777.

But a faction of Jaypur Chiefs, who disguested with the behaviour of the new king and his friends, was always favourable to him. He was now determined to remove Pratapsing from the throne of Jaypur and enthrone Mansing, the son of late Prithvising, who was carried to Kishangadh to his " maternal grand " father’s house to save him from nay mishap. With Mahadaji’s coming to the post of Vakil-ul-Mutlak, Rao Raja thought of approaching him to seek help to fulfil his cherished ambition. In fact he had already met him once and told about the state of affairs at Jaypur (28), when Mahadaji was still in the region of Gohad (1783).

Sawai Pratapsing, the King of Jaypur

Sawai Pratapsing (29) was a mere boy of 13 years, when he came to throne of Jaypur on 16th April 1778. In 1785, he was a youth of twenty years, fully engrossed in sensual pleasures, without any care for the administration that naturally fell into discorder.

His man of confidence was Daulatram Haldiya by caste, who was his Bakshi, He was the brother of Khushaliram Haldia who ws treacherously murdered in the imprial camp near Fatehpur Sikri on 12th of November 1784. His Chief minister was Rodji Khawas, a tailor by caste, who was formerly his personal attendent. Another minister was Khushaliram Bohra, a Brahman by caste, an opponent of Haldia, and whom Madhaosing raised to high position from his low position of waterman.

These ministers were loyal to the king, inspite of their personal rivalries especially between Haldias and Bohra, but the hereditary nobles of Jaypur king looked upon their social status with contempt and refused to either serve under them or come to the Capital to receive instructions from them and hence the king had no hereditary army behind him till 1786.

With indifferent king at the head and the ministers, devoid of any social status, the administration reached the lowest ebb, due to the inefficiency and unpopularity of the government (30) .

Hence, there was nothing as a State in Jaypur when Pratapsing of Machhedi came to Mahadaji in his camp with Najaf Khan in May 1785 (31). He convinced Mahadaji that Pratapsing was unfit to be a king, having degraded himself by his unmanly acts like dancing in woman’s dress in the ladies" apartment and moreover he was not the rightful ruler of Jaypur. He promised to pay fifty lakhs of rupees for assistance in placing Mansing on the throne of Jaypur removing Pratapsing. There was least possibility (32) of any resistance had Mahadaji undertaken such an enterprise. Moreover the prospects of getting fifty lakhs of rupees were too much for his precarious financial position to reject the offer (33) . Acordingly Rao Raja and Najaf Khan were despatched to Jaypur (August 1785).

The king of Jaypur soon came to know of the designs of Rao Raja. He sent his men to Vijaysing of Jodhpur, his father-in-law, for help. He also sent his Vakil to Lucknow and promised (34) the English to pay twenty five lakhs in return of help against Mahadaji. It was heard in Mahadaji’s camp that Jaypur Raja and sent assassins to end his life like Jayappa and hence strict vigilence was maintained in the camp. (September 1785).

Mahadaji despatched vithoji Ingle (35) , the brother of Ambaji Ingle with two thousand force (cavalry and infantry), to help Rao and Najaf Kuli in Jaypur. All these forces began to seize territories and capture fortresses in the name of realizing the dues to be recovered as per the previous settlement. The king of Jaypur, thereupon sent a “Hundi” of twenty five thousand for the time being. Rao Raja brought Mansing from Kishangadh and kept him in his camp at Sanganer and sent a word to Mahadaji to start immediately to place him on the throne of Jaypur (36). (January 1786).

Mahadaji’s First Invasion of Jaypur (March to June 1786)

Accordingly Mahdaji began his march on 3rd January 1786, taking the Emperor with him. Arriving near Dig, he halted there for over a month (10th January to 15th February). From Dig he sent four contingents of the Peshwa with him in advance under chimanaji Khanderao in the service of Shivaji Vital. While Mahadaji was at Dig, the envoys of Jodhpur came to see him, as Vijaysing knew that Mahadaji was equally angry with him. Mahadaji (37) had already sent his Vakil Ganesh Chakradeo from his camp at Gwalior to Jodhpur to realize the yearly sum of two to three lakhs of rupees imposed as a penalty for the assassination of Jayappa, that had run into arrears due to default for many years. After waiting in vain for four months he had returned without doing any thing. The king Now at Dig, the Vakils (38) paid rupees fifty thousand in cash and (April). Mahadaji then told the envoy that he was marching on Jaypur along with the Emperor and that they should not join hands with Jaypur. The envoy on Mahadaji’s insistence Jaypur. Mahadaji then leaving Dig on 15th February 1786, arrived near Lalsot on the 1st of March (39). He immediately sent his men to seize Jaypur territory. His men began to establish Maratha posts and started civil " administration by appointing Kamavisdars. Rao Raja was soon to come to visit Mahadaji who decided to place any one on the throne of Jaypur who would pay him more. (March 1786).

The king of Jaypur (40) sent Khushaliram Bohra and Balanand Mahant, the Guru of Madhosing, to Rao Raja for the settlement They stated that Jaypur had paid three lakhs in cash and for the ten lakhs they had handed over Hindaul and other Parganas. They were to pay ten lakhs no doubt and they were ready to pay the same but they demanded deductions for the damage of crops done by the men of Malak Muhammad Khan and the returen of Narnol and other Parganas seized by Rao Raja and Najaf Kuli. However, they said that they would agree to whatever Patil Baba would decide in the matter.

Khushaliram Bohra (41) , Mahant Balanand and Rao Raja Pratapsing, then came for settlement of Mahadaji’s camp at Lalso. After the formal receptions on both sides were over, the talks began in earnest. Mahadaji demanded rupees three crores and forty lakhs for the previous dues towards Jaypur. Khushaliram answered that the haveli (Palace) of the king had not even so many pebbles, how then could they pay so much. Mahadaji, thereupon, grew angry and ordered the Jaypur Vakils to be driven out of the camp. He then declared that he would directly march on Jaypur (April 1785).

The Forced Settlement

Three or four days after the above incident, Rao Raja came again with Jaypur envoys and settled the affairs on behalf of Jaypur, at sixty lakhs and three lakhs were for Darbar expenses. The amount was to be realized in the following way :

• Rupees ten lakhs in cash
• Rupees ten lakhs to be paid after six months
• In place of twenty lakhs, certain Parganas of the Jaypur king were to be handed over to Mahadaji.
• The remaining twenty" two lakhs were to be realized from the Thakurs of the Jaypur king.

It should be borne into mind that the very Rao Raja, whose aim was to seize Jaypur kingdom by removing Pratapsing from his throne, had taken the lead in his settlement which had in fact given him all powers under " and (d) above, to seize the territories of the Jaypur king and his Thakurs for the forty two lakhs to be recovered from the land. Had the king consented to fulfill the terms of this settlement faithfully and then had he been allowed to remain on the throne, he would have been in all probability a puppet in the hands of the all powerful Rao Raja who could have then at any time removed him to place Mansing on the throne, had he tried to resist him. There was no mention by the settlement of Narnol and the rest of Parganas seized by the Rao Raja, behind this settlement, to exploit the weakness of Jaypur and the need of Mahadaji for money, to satisfy his own designs.

Khusaliram Bohra (42) and Mahant Balanand had nothing to do, at this stage, with Rao Raja’s selfish designs. They were quite sincere to the cause of the Jaypur king in agreeing to the settlement effected. They were conscious of the fallen state of affairs in Jaypur and hence wanted to save the State from the wrath of Mahadaji by coming to terms with him and faithfully following them.

But the bankrupt State of Jaypur, where trade and commerce had ceased since long, and where it was all unrest due to the presence of the Maratha armies since last year, could have hardly afforded to pay these sixty-three lakhs of rupees faithfully. Economically it would have been the ruin of Jaypur as there was no possibility of the returen of the lands seized by the Marathas or Rao Raja as per the terms of the theaty. Moreover, even that would not have settled the problem permanently for the Jaypurians knew that Mahadai viewed Jaypur only as a source of recovering money and would have liked it to be helpless for ever to serve his purpose. Hence, inspite of Khushaliram’s sincerity in his object to end anarchy in Jaypur, by satisfying Patil Baba, the prospect of peaceful life in Jaypur was impossible as long men like Rao Raja were in the counsels of Mahadaji. The question involved thus was that of the very existence of Jaypur State.

The king had no confidence in the settlement effected by Khushaliram whom he though to be the man of Rao Raja. And he had reasons for that. It was Khushaliram (43) who had carried the child, Mansing of six months to Kishanbadh and for that Pratapsing had imprisoned him and inflicted physical punishment upon him. His coming to power as the Minister of Jaypur, this time, must have been against his wish as it had close connection with the invasion of Mahadaji in Jaypur. The settlement hence was a mere farce, having no backing of the Jaypur Darbar in which Sawai Pratapsing, Daulatram Haldia and Rodji Khawas formed the nucleus. Daulatram had already sent his family beyond the Yamuna and raising a new army of ten to twelve thousand, remained with it outside the city.

Hence, when Rao Raja and Balanand Mahant sent Khushaliram (44) to Jaypur to manage for the first installment of eleven laks, and after he had explained every thing to the king, the latter answered that as he was thoroughly incharge of all the affairs, he was empowered to manage to pay the installment as he thought fit. But the very same day, Pratapsing called Daulatram Haldia and after consulting him, gave him leave to depart. He went outside the city at night, by riding a horse, remained for about two hours in the camp and then went with about four to five hundred cavalry to Jodhpur and met Viajysing there. Then with about one hundred fifty cavalrymen given by Vijaysing, he crossed Yamuna and taking his family with him, went to Lucknow. His departure was the direct result of Khushaliram’s coming to power.

Govind Purushottam Hingne (45) describes the helpless conditions of Jaypur State thus (10th of May 1786 A.D.) " “Camp Lalsot, twenty kos near Jaypur. The Emperor and Patil Baba are in the camp. The settlement with Jaypur has been effected. Out of the first installment, two lakhs in cash and jeweler worth a lakh, have only been received. To pay the rest, Khushaliram Bohra and the Ministers of Jaypur have gone with a promise to return with money within eight days. But twenty days have passed and no money has been received. Patil Baba hence advanced four kos (towards Jaypur). If the money is received within a day or two, both will return or if they take days together to pay, they will further advance to a distance of twelve kos near Jaypur. It is heard that there is no money at Jaypur and no man of influence (to raise it)” the king has no army. The Chiefs have gone to their places, having settled their affairs with Rao Raja, who attaches the territories of the rest who have not seen thim and has taken possession of the personal lands of the king. No energy is left in Jaypur State. Just as the Jat kingdom was seized by Najaf Khan, Jaypur kingdom is to face the same fate. If the camp remains here this year, Jaypur will come under (Maratha) sway without much difficulty."

Khushaliram Saves Jaypur

Meanwhile Khushaliram (46) had begun his administration efficiently as the Chief Minister of Jaypur. He imprisoned the Ministers that were responsible for mismanagement, released all those were imprisoned (unlawfully), opened the shops that were closed till then due to disorder and resumed trade and commerce. By forcing rich people that had amassed wealth byillegal means in previous administration, he raised about five lakhs of rupees in cash and jewels, out of the remaining eight lakhs of the first instalment, and sent the same to Patil Baba. But as Rodaji Khawas, the man of the king was still there, he was handicapped to raise any more money.

Mahadaji, in his camp, was eagerly waiting for the full compliance of the first installment. The delay in payment was adding to his difficulties. He was in arrears of the monthly salary of the Emperor for the last six months and the displeased Emperor was pressing for his march to Delhi before the commencement of rainy season. The Rohinis were over and Mahadaji infact would wait no more. He was about to start for Jaypur, when Khushaliram came to him. Four lakhs were to be paid out of the first instalment. For two lakhs Balanand Mahant stood as guarantee and for the remaining two lakhs five horses and ten elephants and some fine cloth was given. Thus the first instalment having been cleared, Khushaliram Bohra and Mahant Balanand took their leave for Jaypur. Rao Raja and Najaf Kuli also took their leave keeping Mansing with Mahadaji. They (47) were asked to remain in Jaypur territory with Rayaji Patil for the recovery of second instalment and the assignments on the Chief’s estates and ceded Districts. Thus having settled the business, Mahadaji Started his return journey on 4th of June with a decision to march again on Dasara day if the Jaypurians defaulted in the payments as per the settlement, and to place Mansing on the throne to recover all arrears from him. He reached Dig on 16th of June with the Emperor. From there he proceeded to Mathura on 22nd June.

Jaypur Attitude Stiffens

The incapacity of the immature king at the head and dissensions among the Chiefs of the State aggravated by the selfish designs of Rao Raja, had brought the State to the brink of ruin. But with Mahadaji’s return (48) the conditions begas to change rapidly, Daulatram Haldiya’s visit to Jodhpur (May 1786 A.D.) had borne fruits and Jodhpur Darbar assured to stand by Jaypur Daulatram Haldiya had gone to Lucknow and remained there fo eight months to seek English help. And though the new English Governor General Lord Cornwallis forbade to interfere in these quarrels (and particularly as be aimed at a treaty with the Marathas against Tipu Sultan) some local English officals, being jealous of Mahadaji’s rise to power, encouraged Daulatram’s hopes and he returned to Jaypur in January 1787 A.D. at the call of Pratapsing to accept premiership. It was the signal of the end of pro-Maratha influence in Jaypur Darbar.

In the middle of January 1787 A.D. (49), the discontented and unpaid Generals of Jaypur State had agreed to open the gates of Jaypur city to admit Maratha troops for a bribe of eighty thousand rupees. But the plan cound not mature. The king of Jaypur and his anti-Maratha Ministers, seeing that Khushaliram was acting in the lines of Rao Raja and both were working in the interests of Mahadaji, ordered Ranawat a Chief of Jaypur State, to capture and kill Khushaliram when he would approach for settlement with Rayaji Patil. It was reported that Khushaliram (50) was accordingly killed. Another report was that he was imprisoned by" the same Chief. But Khushaliram was fortunate to escape unhurt to Maratha camp. Mahadaji complained of this unfriendly act on the part of Jaypur king to Jodhpur Vakil in his camp at Palwal two marches from Delhi.

With the removal of Khushaliram Bohra (51), the Pro-Maratha group in Jaypur Darbar was crushed and Daulatram Haldiya came to power (20th January 1786 A.D.) with the defensive alliance between the two States of Jodhpur and Jaypur against the Marathas, and on the strength of the rumours that the English were coming to the ehlp of Jaypur, with their threatening attitude on the Doab borders and with the assemblage of troops from all sides, the Jaypur Darbar changed its policy and the Chiefs were ordered to refuse payments assigned on them as per the last year’s treaty. This increased the difficulties of Rayaji Patil in collecting the dues. Mahadaji sent Mughliya contingents under Najaf Kuli and Muhammad Beg Hamdani to assist him. But" the Rajputs began to seduce them on payment of arrears of salaries. Rayaji Patil’s position became so hopeless that in February 1786 A.D., while assaulting the fortress of Duhi near Jaypur he lost seven hundred of his men, while the fortress was not captured. At last marching further, he divided his force and the contingents of the Peshwa with him into three section and encamped at a distance of two to three kos before the three doors of Jaypur city to stop the supply of grain. But he could be hardly successful in this attempt. The presence of the confederate armies and the common rumors made his situation so alarming that he daily urged his master to advance speedily for his support.

Mahadaji Marches into Jaypur: (March 1787 A.D.)

Mahadaji’s (52) haughty behaviour and hasty action in Jaypur case, mainly a result of his chronic financial stringency and the apparent helplessness of the State, had at last brought him into dangerous situation. He could hardly afford to march to Jaypur to assist Rayaji Patil, leaving the Emperor and Delhi unprotected with the threatening activities of the Sikhs, the apparent hostile intentions of the English whose battalions had approached Daranager and Itawa near Maratha border. But when Jaypur king had refused payments as per settlement and had shown ample signs of resistence, Mahadaji as Vakil-ul-Mutlak had no other alternative but to march. In a way he had himself hurt his case essentially “by abandoning his expedition last year (1786 A.D.) Against Jaypur (State), after he had fairly manifested his intention to reduce it and having even proclaimed a new Raja. He had thus given the Rajputs time to recover from the alarm and to unite against him.” Unlike his first invasion in the previous year, his march to Jaypur in March 1787 A.D. at the call of Rayaji Patil was the force of circumstances, that were beyond his control from the very start and Mahadaji himself must have been conscious of this fact, however bold face he put up ignoring the Emperor’s suggestion (53) not to advance beyond Dig, with the bulk of his army, lest the English would swoop down upon the defenseless Delhi, to enthrone some Prince, Mahadaji left Dig on 16th of March and making daily marches without a halt, reached Daosa (32 miles to the east of Jaypur) on 24th. From there he marched to Moti Tekdi, seven kos from Jaypur, while Rayaji Patil was at Sanganer seven miles to the South of Jaypur.

Rao Raja (54) Pratapsing of Machhedi, Khushaliram Bohra (now completely alienated to the cause of Pratapsing, King of Jaypur) and Ramkrishna Mahant came to Mahadaji. They proposed that if he handed over the fort of Daosa to them, they would stand as guarantee for the payment of “Khandani” from Jaypur.

Rodmal Khawas also came from the Jaypur king. He stated that they were to pay twelve lakhs out of the previous year’s settlement. Out of that they were ready to pay four lakhs immediately but after receiving the same, he (Mahadaji should depart to Delhi, two lakhs would be then paid in Shrawan (July) and for the remaining six lakhs they were ready to hand over a few Taluqs. The Jodhpur Vakil also took part in the discussion and requested Mahadaji to accept the sum and offered themselves to stand as guarantee for the next year’s dues.

Vijaysing of Jodhpur

However earnest and polite the Jaypur and Jodhpur Vakils appeared from their talk, what they were asking Mahadaji was plainly to retire to Delhi instantly by accepting four lakhs in cash. The reason for such a hold proposal was the knowledge (55) they possessed of Mahadaji weakness and the relative strength they had gathered.

A firm union with Jodhpur was the strength of Jaypur. Vijaysing opposed Mahadaji (56) on the question of the possession of land. He told his Minister Umrao Maheshdas that “Patil Baba aims at seizing the land. For that he had destroyed two Rajas of Khichiwada and Gohad. If Jaypur is also destroyed, next term will be ours. Hence, he should be defeated in Jaypur province so that he should not come here.”

Thus to destroy Mahadaji in Jaypur territory for the protection of Jodhpur, was the strategy of Vijaysing. For that he left no stone unturned. His Vakils, alongwith the Jaypur Vakils, had already approached Zabeta Khan (before his death on 21st of February 1785 A.D.) and Shuja Uddaula and pleaded that both the Rajput kings were the rulers of the North India, but the Maratha aimed at seizing their lands. If they were thus destroyed, in that case only the Rohillas in the North and the Bengal to the East would then remain. Unless they all combined and made another Panipat, no security would remain for them. Thus the contact with all the enemies of Mahadaji was maintained by the Rajputs and particularly by Vijaysing throughout.

He sent Dalelsing, the brother of Maheshdas of Shekhawati to Jaypur. He also wrote letters to Kachhwa Jagirdars, as a result of which the host of about twenty to thirty thousand Rajputs assembled in Jaypur to defend their motherland. He dispatched his Bakshi Bhimsing with ten thousand men " five thousand cavalry and five thousand footmen, who encamped at Sambhar in readiness to join the Jaypur force, in case Mahadaji decided to march on Jaypur. He resumed treacherous correspondence with Muhammad Beg Hamdani and Najaf Kuli, through Mogal Ali Khan, whom he promised Vazirship after the total extinction of the Marathas from the North. Finally he sent four thousand Minas, the hereditary thieves, to commit theft in the Maratha camp and if possible to make an end of Patil Baba. They performed the task excellently to make th camp life unbearable. Some of them were arrested, but they revealed nothing. They were finally executed.

The Rajputs Force a Battle on Mahadaji

From Balabas (57), ten kos from Jaypur, Mahadaji had demanded twenty five lakhs as the arrers and current tribute and the fort of Ranthambhor, but he could have readily accepted a moderate sum, that would have not compromised his prestige as Vakil-ul-Mutlak, had the Rajputs meant to come at a settlement. But he was not slow to realize that “by their steadfast behaviour, with very low or rather insulting terms, they meant to bring the dispute to the issue of a battle”, which, they knew very well, he could hardly afford to face.

If Mahadaji was hasty and shortsighted in his first invasion of Jaypur, he was cautious (58) this time. He could not be blind to his innumerable difficulties and shortcomings. He was anxious for the safety of the fickle-minded Emperor who was displeased with him for the nonpayment of his arrears for the past six months. His anxiety was further aggravated by the threatening activities of the English on the Doab border. He knew that the very base of his power, his army, was displeased (59) with him for the delay in paying their arrears. Moreover, the very small proportion of the Deccanis, were worn out by the constant warfare, as compared to the large number of the North Indians, who could hardly be trusted, in his army. Especially the artillery and the trained battalions could be hardly trusted. There was, besides, no immediate possibility (60) of any kind of help-monetary or military " from the Deccan where the most difficult and expensive campaign against the powerful Tipu had been just completed, taxing the resources of the Poona Darbar (March 1787 A.D.) Under such circumstances, had he chosen to engage himself with the Rajputs, then there was every likelihood of losing Delhi, where he had a few friends and many enemies, especially the Nazar, Raja Dayaram and Maulavi Attaulla, the men about the person of the Emperor. They were desirous of Mahadaji’s ruin with the threatening Sikhs (61) at the gates of Delhi and the ever watching Gulam Kadar, who was ever-ready to take advantage of his slightest discomfiture.

But the more Mahadaji was desirous (62) of withdrawing from the disadvantageous situation the more the Rajputs made low and restricted offers to make it impossible for him to dislodge himself with honour from the situation. It was the Rajputs (63) in fact this time, which were dictating Mahadaji either to accept whatever terms they proposed and return or be ready for a fight.

On 7th of April Balanand Mahant (64) with the Vakil of Jaypur and Jodhpur slipped away from Mahadaji’s camp without coming to any settlement or even taking any formal leave. Mahadaji in anger expelled every Jaypur agent and news writer from his camp and next day made a rapid march west-wards to Bhankri, only thirteen miles from Jaypur, to overawe the Jaypurside. Rayaji Patil advanced from his post of Sanganer to the gates of Jaypur.

But this demonstration of force failed to produce any desired effect on the Rajputs and Mahadaji stooped down to invite Jaypur envoys back to his camp at Bhankri. They came on 17th of April and offered to pay the first installment immediately but stated that they would pay the remaining balance of the tribute after Khushaliram Bohra was surrendered to them. This meant the final breakdown of the peace settlement. Mahadaji refused to deduct any thing on the ground of damage or to surrender khushaliram Bohra. The Rajputs were thus successful in forcing a battle on Mahadaji.

Mahadaji Faces Critical Situation (May, June 1787 A.D.)

The Rajputs (65) now boldly came out of the city and encamped the South of it (1st of May 1787 A.D.). The Jaypur king also joined the camp next day. Bhimsen Bakshi from Jodhpur also joined the Jaypur force. Judging it unsafe to remain near the city, recalling Rayaji Patil from Sanganer, Mahadaji fell back from Bhankri to Sawali, some twenty miles to the South and twenty miles to the West of Lalsot. Moving further, seizing fortresses of Nawai and Jhilai and reducing them to dust, realizing contributions, he reached Banas river, near Sarsop close to Bundi frontier. Meanwhile his Hindusthani and Mughalia troops who were seduced by Daulatram Haldiya, being bitter at Mahadaji for their unpaid salaries, began to desert him every day in small numbers. On 6th of May, Zulfikar Ali Khan and Mansur Ali Khan, the two eminent captains also went over to Rajput side with their forces.

Seeing Mahadaji (66) retreating before them, the Rajputs advancing from Sanganer, spread throughout the territory of Rao Raja and the territories then under the Marathas and began to capture the posts. The whole country was in tumult. All roads leading to the Maratha camp become unsafe and the caravans carying grain began to be looted on the way.

Mahadaji (67) position was shaken still further by the defection of the renowned Mughalia General of the day " Muhamad Beg Hamdani, who joined the Rajputs on 25th May. He was promised a daily allowance of rupees three thousand a day. Mahadaji could not trust a single Hindusthani soldier hereafter. The Rajputs thus had created a critical situation for him. A thought of retreat was impossible for him as that would have been an end of his newly created power. He sent away the families of his Chiefs and that of Chetsing of Banaras with surplus bag and big guns to Gwalior under the charge of Vithoji Shinde by the route of Karaulic. He issued urgent calls to Khanderao Hari in Bundelkhand (68) and Ambaji Ingle in Karnal District, in Punjab and appealed to the Emperor to join his camp to lend prestige to his Regent’s action. He then marched to Lalso paragana (15th of June), cleared the ghats and put them in charge of Afzal Khan Rohilla, the uncle of Zbita Khan and ordered his men to attack the foraging parties of Jaypur.

Vijaysing had corresponded (69) with Hamdani and Najaf Kuli through Mughal Ali Khan. After Hamdani joined the king of Jaypur, Vijaysing was very much pleased with Mughal Ali Khan whom he promised Vazirship after the final defeat of the Deccanis. He boasted of ending their rule from all the provinces of Hindusthan. He suggested Pratapsing (70) to distribute the four " five lakhs of rupees that he had laid aside to pay as tribute to Mahadaji. This suggestion was followed faithfully to seduce the Mughalia and Hindusthani troops of Mahadaji. For example Malik Muhammad Khan, a Mughalia Sardar coming from Rewadi, at Mahadaji’s call, went off from the way and joined the Jaypur army on receiving a letter from Hamdani. He got a “Hundi” of ten thousand rupees for expenses and was granted a daily allowance of rupees ninety by the king of Jaypur. At the same time all the supplies of Mahadaji’s camp were looted on the way to starve him in his camp. A Rajput force reached Jhilai and set up their control there, while Lalji, the foster brother of Jaypur king, with ten thousand horse, arrived in paragana Hindaun and set up his out posts and began to plunder the lands under Maratha rule to stop Mahadaji’s provision of supplies. On 10th of June the Rajputs occupied Madhaogadh, seventeen miles North-West of Lalsot. Two days later, they despatched a strong detachment towards Daosa. With this stroke, they cut Mahadaji’s connections with Agra and Delhi, via Balahari and Dig and at the same time laid the kingdom of Rao Raja, Mahadaji’s friend, utterly defenceless.

From 25th of May, till 23rd of June, when Khanderao Hari’s divisions from Bundelkhand, consisting of ten thousand veterans, was expected to join him i.e. for a month, Mahadaji was facing the most critical time of his life. It is in times of distress that his excellent qualities of leadership shone brilliantly. Being completely enveloped by the Rajputs who were superior in number and strength, and with the untrustworthy Hindustani soldiers in his camp, he was simply biding his time by firmly keeping back his Generals from engaging with the enemies. This was in fact the best chance that was afforded for the Rajputs to strike at Mahadaji before reinforcement reached him. But they lost it. They (71) on their part were planning to deliver the battle on rainy day, when the gun powder would be less effective. Another alternative that was discussed by them was that five thousand Rathods, vowed to court death, should fall upon to load again. It was clear that even though they were superior to Mahadaji during these critical days, they dreaded his artillery most.

Foot Notes (Description)

• (1) Hist. Paper - 270. Per. Records I pp. 120, 126, 147 to 149.

• (2) Hist. Papers - 285, 292, 294, 297, 316.

• (3) Hist. Papers - 339, 350.

• (4) Ibid - 311, 318.

• (5) P.R.C. I - p. 20.

• (6) Hist. Papers - 283.

• (7) Ibid - 313, 318.

• (8) Hist. Papers - 297, 318.

• (9) “Tipu being freed from the British pressure and elated by his success, now undertook the task of punishing the Marathas for having deserted his cause.” New Hist. III - p. 177.

• (10) While condemning Nana for not helping Mahadaji in times of his need Sardesai goes to the extent of saying that Nana purposely sent armies on Tipu to bring Mahadji in troubles (Mar. Riya, U.V. II-p. 112). But he forgets that he himself, wrote in the same book “Poona Darbar despatched forces towards Tipu’s border as per the instance of Mahadaji.” Thus Tipu’s threatening the Marathas was really the effect Mahadaji’s presisting Nana to despatch forces on Tipu - (Mar. Riya, U.V. II-pp. 163, 263. )

The fact is clearly stated in Nana’s letter which reads as follow - “Letters from Patil Baba were received stating that force ought to be despatched (from Poona) on Tipu otherwise the (Mahadaji) would have to go with the English and hence (as per his wishes) force has been sent. The Government has to pay much as arrears of pay to the soldiers. There is no money. Borrowing as much as was possible something was raised and they were dispatched” early 1784 - Hist. Papers - 335.

• (11) Sadashio Dinkar states “Due to four years’ campaigning, the army is totally unfit to stand - Men have been starving even in this campaign, they have been compelled even to sell their clothes. They will, it seems, make an uproar for money-it is very difficult to say, how (Patil Baba) would stand in the coming Delhi affairs! (May 1784 ) Hist. Papers - 322, also 323, 339.

• (12) Ibid - 339, Dil, Raj. I-137.

• (13) Per, Records I-pp. 149, 150, M.B. II-78, Satara Hist, Papers II-238.

• (14) Dil. Raj. I-106, Hist. Papers - 401.

• (15) Dil. Raj. I-128, 133, 152, Hist. Papers-342, Satara Hist. Papers I-91, 93.

• (16) The turbulant Sikhs were threatening Delhi and Antarwed, the Mughalia Chiefs wre too strong with powerful force and artillery and with Saranjams to maintain them and could not be either removed or relied upon, the disappointed English, whose plan to bring the Emperor under their sway was frustrated by Mahadaji, were intriguing with Anupgir Gosavi and Narayandas Kashmiri the Diwan of late Afrasiyab Khan, whom Mahadaji treated as his Counsellors much against the wish of the Emperor, the forts of Agra and Aligadh were still held by the previous Muslim officers who refused to surrender them, being backed by the sympathies of the Muslim world along with the Emperor who felt that they had lost every thing to the Hindus and lastly there was trouble with the Khichis, that barred the way from Deccan towards Agra Dil. Raj. I-131, 134, 140, 147, 171, Hist. Papers - 351, 352, 363, 370, 381, Satara Hist. Papers I-96, M.B. II-89.

• (17) Hist. Papers - 339, Dil. Raj. I-131, 137.

• (18) Hist. Papers - 358, 412, 607, Satara Hist. Papers I-98.

• (19) Hist. Papers - 406, Per. Records I-p. 137, Satara Hist. Papers I-96.

• (20) Ambuji Ingle was sent against the Sikhs at Panipat in February. After a severe siege Agra fort was captured in March. Khanderao Hari was despatched to Bundelkhand in April. In October, besides Panipat, his four armies were engaged in Khichiwada, Bundelkhand, Jaypur and Ramgadh respectively. Dil. Raj. I-131, 140, Hist. Papers -352, 354, 265, 407, 411.

• (21) Ibid-391.

• (22) Per. Records I-p. 152.

• (23) Hist. Papers - 406, 351.

• (24) Hist. Papers - 406, 351.

• (25) Sadashiv Dinkar remarks “For the present this much could be done, in future if (Patil Baba) gets chance, he is determined to destroy Jaypur. This has been known even to them.” Hist. Papers - 351.

• (26) Jodhpur letters - 2.

• (27) Fall III-pp. 230 to 234.

• (28) Jodhpur Letters - (S) 2.

• (29) Dil. I-165, 173, Per. Records - 149. 150.

• (30) Sadashio Dinkar reported Nana Fadnis in his letter that the king’s friends killed the rich men of the city at the night to rob them of their riches - Mar. Riya. U.V. II-p. 116.

• Hingne in his letter (11th April 1787) to Nana describes how Nawab Salarjang and his grandson from Oudh were robbed of their jeweler worth 7 to 8 lakhs of rupees at the instigation of the king of Jaypur - Dil. Raj. I-209.

• (31) Hist. Papers - 381, 411, 432, 439, 470, 476, Dil. Raj. I-162, 176, M.D.I. 19. Mar. Riyasat (Uttar vibag-II), p. 115.

• (32) The maternal grand-father of Mansing, Birdhising, who was opposed to Vijaysing and Pratapsing, also had written Mahadaji to oust Pratapsing. Mahadaji had many sources from Rajput side to know the exact state of affairs in Jaypur. His estimate of the probable reaction failed finally as the Rajputs and particularly Vijaysing, took alarm thinking that if Mahadaji was once successful in Jaypur, took alarm thinking that if Mahadaji was once successful in Jaypur, no place would have been left any where for them. - Jodhpur letters - 3.

• (33) “Selfishness blinds even the intelligents to facts and they even go by the route wishful thinking. His (Mahadaji’s) own finances are extremely embarrassed and he finds great difficult in satisfying July 1786, P.R.C. I-p. 24.

• (34) Satara Hist. Papers - I - 60, Hist. papers - 411, 415.

• (35) Satara Hist. Papers - II - 243.

• (36) Jadunath Sarkar, writes in a way to suggest as if Mahadaji marched into Jaypur after having tried from Dig “to secure a peaceful settlement through the mediation of Naruka and Bohra.” He invaded Jaypur (as per Jadunath) because “throughout the year 1785, the Jaypur Raja paid only three lakhs, when he saw Mahadaji fully absorbed in a struggle with the refractory officers of Afrasiyab Khan and not yet firmly established as the executive head of Delhi Government”. (Fall III-p. 241.)

• But this is not the real case; Sadashio Dinkar clearly states (Hist. Papers - 315, 358) that even at the time of the Nazar (January 1785) Mahadaji’s aim was to destroy Jaypur. His marching into Jaypur was clearly as per the instigation of Rao Raja. Jaypur was in no position in 1785, either to refuse Mahadaji or to take the advantage of his engagements in other fields. In fact Mahadaji’s armies under Rao Raja, Najaf Khan Kuli and Balaji Ingle had been already active and were devastating Jaypour territory. Reports James Anderson - P.R.C.-13. “Patil Baba and the king of Jaypur have differences on the mode of payment on the part of the later. The king is ready to pay Rs. 25 lakhs whereas Patil Baba demands 30 lakhs and the Paraganas as were given to Holkar.”

• (37) Hist. Papers - 351.

• (38) Dil. Raj I-155. Jodhpur Hath Bahi 2-p. 139.

• (39) Hist. papers - 439, 470, 476, Dil. Raj. I-176, M.D. II-116, 124.

• (40) Dil. Raj. I-162, 176, Jaypur Draft Kharitas 18-159.

• (41) Ibid - 163.

• (42) Hist. Papers - 476.

• (43) Jodhpur letters - 2.

• (44) Hist. Papers - 476.

• (45) Dil. Raj. I-165.

• (46) Dil. Raj. I-161, Hist. Papers - 476, Jaypur Draft Kharitas 20 (B) 11,17.

• (47) ‘Holkar Shahi’ I-172, Dil. Raj. I-168 and 169, ‘Satara Hist. Papers II-244.

• (48) Dil. Raj. I-220, ‘Holkar Shahi’ I-186, P.R.C. I-86, Per. Records - p. 153.

• (49) P.R.C. I-71, 82.

• (50) Dil. Raj. I-173, Per. Records I-153.

• (51) P.R.C. 1-71 and 82, Dil. Raj. I-173, 199 and 211, Per. Records - p. 153.

• (52) Dil. Raj. I-163. 199, 201, 213, 220, ‘Hist. Papers - 446, ‘Satara Hist. Papers’ I-118, P.R.C. I-99.

• (53) While marching on Jaypur, Mahadaji uttered that he would vacate Jaypur as he had vacated Gohad (March 1786), Dil. Raj I-210.

• (54) It is quite clear that the cause of Mansing was lost by now.

• (55) After his former success against the Sikhs and the capture of Agra fort (February-March 1785 A.D.) Mahadaji became confident. He neither cared for the Emperor nor informed about his plans to Poona Darbar. On the contrary he felt irritated at the question of Nana Fadnis. Gradually he began to talk loosely in open Darbar where all were not his friends. Sadashio Dinkar. Nana’s envoy, pointed out the folly by saying that “If the Rangdas know all about this, It will be a dangerous thing. You are neglected them, as they seem to you docile and devoid of any valour. But if they know your differences with Shrimant, they will hardly listen to you” - Hist. Papers -395.

• (56) Jodhpur letters - S. 1 and 2

• (57) Per. Records I - 155.

• (58) “Sindia was not hasty but cautious. He had always to think to the menace of the English at hand. His difficulties were more numerous”” ‘James Anderson, P.R.C. I-43.

• (59) Dil. Raj. I-128, 131, 133, 134, 137, 199, M.D. I-143.

• (60) Dil. Raj. I-205m M.D. II-72, Hist. Papers - 445, 459, ‘Holkar Shahi’ I-177, 186, 188, ‘Satara Hist. Papers’ II-245, M.D. I-126.

• (61) Dil. Raj. I-206, 208.

• (62) Jadunath Sarkar States (Fall III, p. 250) “Rana Khan and Rayaji Patil pressed him (Mahadaji) to accept a moderate tribute by way of compromise and to return immediately from Rajputana so as to avoid the increasing summer heat and to over come his many secret enemies.. But the Rao Raja and Khushaliram appealed to Mahadaji’s vanity by pointing out that after coming to the gates of Jaypur in person, he could not consistently with his dignity, retire with only the small tribute which had been offered to his servants before. Faced by these two rival counsels in his inner circle, Mahadaji’s political vision and sense of reality seem to have been clouded””

• Not only Rao Raja, but even Mahadaji and all his Chiefs must have felt the humiliation in accepting such a proposal. But it will be wrong appreciation of Mahadaji to regard him vain at a stage when he was in danger of losing all that he and gained. From March 1787 A.D. when he was forced to take the decision of Marching into Jaypur, till he returned to the South in 1792 A.D., Marhadaji was his ownself - shrewd, ever-alert to his interests, calculating and ruthless in striking a blow inspite of the reverses he suffered. He was subject to errors of judgment more in prospritythan in adversity. He finally had to accept the Rajput challenge, as the Rajputs themselves did not desire his escape. Grant Duff (V. III-p. 15) clearly states, “On approaching Jeypoor, Sindia endeavoured to negotiate but his overtures were disregarded.” W. Kirkpatrick in his report to Earl Cornwallis (P.R.C. I) Dated 20-4-1787 A.D. is more" clear when he states “Negotiations between Sindia and Rajputs languish exceedingly. Desirous as the former secretly is of concluding a speedy accommodation, the very low and restricted offers of the latter, in which they persist with remarkable steadiness, offer him no opportunity of dislodging himself from his embarrassments with any advantage or reputation.”

• Had the Rajputs left him, having thus cornered him, they very well knew that he would return again in better circumstances, Mahadaji knew that a refused to fight meant his political end. No Rao Raja or Khusaliram could play upon his vanity when he was himself facing the question of the survival of his political life.

• (63) ‘Hist. Papers’ -511.

• (64) Dil. Raj. I-201, 211, P.R.C. I, p. 169, ‘Per Records’ I-p. 155, M.D. I-114.

• (65) Dil. Raj. I-200, 220, 221, P.R.C. I, pp. 180 to 186, ‘Per Records’ I-p. 155.

• (66) P.R.C. I-115, 118 and 119, ‘per. Records’ I-p.156

• (67) ‘Per Records’ I-156.

• (68) ‘Hist. Papers’ - 500.

• (69) Jodhpur letters - S.I.

• (70) ‘Per. Records’ I-p. 155.

• (71) Fall III-p. 256.

THE LALSOT AND THE MIRACULOUS RECOVERY

Mahadaji Begins His Forward March

Three miles south of Lalsot, lay the Maratha base camp. North of Lalsot is the “pass of Lalsot”. Three miles beyond the pass, was the village Didwana. Four miles further north " west from the village, lay the village and fortalice of Ramgadh. Four miles further, from the north " west the path crossed the Morel river, opposite the village and fort of Bidakha. Beyond the river, path was hard to traverse for cavalry and even for infantry, as there was a nala on one side and a hill on the other for a mile. After that a clear plain stretched north-westward for six miles till the village Tunga was reached. Here the Jaypur camp lay on an elevation with hillocks and nalas on three sides and hence a hard place for any night attack. The Jaypur King was encamped still further two miles towards north-west at Madhaogadh. The battle of 28th July was fought on the plain between Tunga and Bidakha, the Marathas having the nalas and the river Morel at their back.

Mahadaji began his forward movement on 23rd June (1) when Khanderao Hari’s force was expected to join him the next morning. On 24th, Ranakhan, who was the head of the Maratha Army, occupied Lalsot pass, the Rajput having vacated it to fall back on Ramgadh. On 26th Khanderao Hari, rode into the camp with 3,000 Deccani horse, De Boigne’s two battalions (1,300 strong), 2,000 hired Naga monks and some 300 Gujar infantry (from simthar). This reinforcement ended the perilous situation, Mahadaji was facing till then, but he was still waiting for Ambaji Ingle, who had started at the urgent call of Mahadaji from Patiala on 7th June.

On 30th June Ranakhan advanced three miles further beyond the pass and encamped below the Jowana hill at Didwana. On 10th July, he made a further advance towards Ramgadh. Dharrao Shinde and Jiwaji Bakshi, the vanguard of the Maratha army reached Morel river by 12th July. Now Skirmishes began between the advanced posts of the rival sides. Pushing back (2) the Rajput Posts, the Maratha vanguard crossed Morel on 13th July. But even though his generals were advancing thus, Mahadaji held them in check (3) from engaging with the Rajputs, till the troops, traversing 25 kos that day, leaving his men, provisions and camp at Piplai. On 23rd July Ranakhan captured the fort of Bidakha on a strong hillock from the Rajputs and dismantled it to have no hindrance to Maratha movements. The two armies now stood face to face the front skirmishing began.

The Rajput Confederacy

The forward movement of Mahadaji began on 23rd June but the final action was fought on 28th July, more than a month later on. Mahadaji was during this time waiting for the coming of Ambaji (4) , moreover, it was his expectation that the illknit confederacy of the Rajputs would dissolve either from inaction or from non-payment of regular salary to the mercenary Mughalia and North Indian soldiers, as it was reasonably expected that it would be impossible for the exhausted and tiny State of Jaypur to bear such a huge burden of war expenses for long.

Mahadaji’s expectations even quite reasonable (5) , were not fulfilled, far from it, the Rajputs grew more formidable by receiving reinforcements on one hand and effectively reducing his strength on the other.

Vijaysing, the vigilant King of Jodhpur, stood watchfully behind the Rajput Confederation and quickly made good the possible cracks therein and did not allow it to dissove as per Mahadaji’s expectations. He was active throughout and on all fronts. On 16th July when Mahadaji was reinforced by Ambaji Ingle, he sent promise of more assistance to Muhammad Beg Hamdani (6), with orders to Bhojraj Bakshi to do as the Jaypur Raja bid him. He informed that more troops were being sent and urged the Jaypur King to deliver the battle immediately and to do “Pakka” whatever he intended to do. He sent 7 to 8 thousand Rathods, horse and foot, towards Sambhar and wrote letters to Bundi, Kota and Bikaner Rajas urging them to send aid to Jaypur. All these forces with those from Raghogadh Khichi joined the Jaypur (7) army on 26th and 27th July. The Jaypur King, who ws held worthless and foresaken to his fate by most of his Sardars and thus having no army to defend his State the previous year, was successfully challenging Mahadaji the Regent of the Emperor with about 50 thousand army, this was in itself a miracle. The Rajput (8) appeal to save their land at the threat of aggression was the reason behind it, which was the reaction of Mahadaji initial folly of treating Jaypur so negliable as to think of placing any one on its throne, who would pay him more in cash and territory.

While keeping the road of negotiations (9) still open to their advantage, and forcing thereby on Mahadaji a role of aggressor, the Rajputs, being in their territory, effectively applied all the means of force, diplomacy, seduction and starvation by cutting all his supplies of grain to force him to give a battle (10).

The blockade was so thorough and the means so effective (11) that on the day of the fight grain in Mahadaji’s camp was sold four seers a rupee. It was another Panipat for the Marathas with a superior force in number to face, and an atmosphere of starvation and suspicion in their camp. It is no wonder that with every day adding to his difficulties, Mahadaji grew bitterer vowed never to accept money but to devastate Jaypur (12) and Jodhpur both.

On 19th July Mahadaji received a written challenge from Jaypur King (13), calling him to fight a pitched battle into open, out of the shelter of guns. Mahadaji told Rana Khan, Ambaji, Khanderao and the rest that if he made terms with the Jaypur Raja, he would not be able to show his face in all Hindusthan “A man will not live for ever; come what may!”. The Sardars said that unless he paid money, the soldiers would not fight well, up till then they had paid their soldiers by selling their property and equipment. Mahadaji paid rupees 20 thousand to them but non-would accept.

On 22nd Ambaji sent Daulatram’s letter (14) to Mahadaji but he returned it saying “If after bearing the heavy expenses for six months in such humiliation, I accept tribute from Jaypur Raja, the other Rajas too would behave in the same way. Without fighting a battle tribute can not be accepted.”

On 27th July Rana Khan (15) sent the Jaypur Raja’s letter addressed to him to Mahadaji. Its purport was “I have always behaved like a Zamindar, and never acted contrarily. I am ready to pay contribution. But if you want to seize my Raj and will not accept money, why are you delaying to fight? Come on tomorrow, and I too shall be ready.”

The Challenge was accepted. Mahadaji ordered all his troops to get ready and assemble one “ghadi” before dawn.

The Battle of Lalsot (16) (28th July 1787)

In the morning of 28th July, Mahadaji woke up four ghadis before dawn, performed his bath and puja and rode to Rana Khan’s former camp.

Skirmishing between the rival posts began. Rana Khan with all his troops and guns advanced two miles towards Tunga, after crossing the river, and drew up his line of battle in the plain, west to east, for the length of a mile, raising batteries and placing guns on them. Behind the guns in centre stood Rana Khan and Vitthalrao with the untrustworthy Hidusthani sipoys. On the left wing stood Appa Khanderao and Rajaji Patil and on the right stood Ambaji Ingle with Rao Raja and his troops.

The Rajputs also advancing two miles from their base, similarly marshalled their troops with the artillery infront, behind earthwork. The Rathods, who had taken a vow not to return alive without victory, were to their right side under Bhimsing. At the centre, infront of Rana Khan, was the king in person with his Kachhwa army and to his left was Muhammad Beg Hamdani with the deserted Mughalia and Hindusthani soldiers of Mahadaji.

The battle of cannonade began. But the Rajput guns were larger; their shots reached the Maratha ranks and killed many men with cannon balls weighing five to fourteen seers, whereas the Maratha guns being comparatively lighter ones, their shots hardly reached the enemy ranks. (Later on, it was revealed that this was the result of treachery.) Mahadaji hence sent four big guns to Rana Khan. Isamil Beg rallying his uncle’s troops, led such a furious charge on the Maratha right that the troops under Rao Raja and Ambaji Ingle were driven back in disorder. Mahadaji sent Bapuji Vitthalrao and other Sardars to reinforce them. Thus encouraged with the success of their left wing, the famous Rathod cavalry charged the Maratha left under Appa Khanderao and Rayaji Patil with all furiousness.

At about 11 O’clock, the battle passed from cannonade to fighting at close quarters. Mahadaji then rode at near Bidarkah; and keeping information of the whole field, instantly sent reinforcement, where they were needed mostly. A camel courier brought the news that four thousand Rathods had fallen on the artillery of Appa Khanderao and pushed back the Nagas and Mughalia Sardars killing hundreds of the troops however, reformed his lines and began to fire his guns, but the Rathods heeded it not.

Ramji, Patil, Ambaji Ingle and Bapuji (Shivaji) Vitthal, and Dharrao Shinde hastened to reinforce them. The risala of the sons of the late Murtza Khan Barach dismounted and began to fight a hand to hand encounter. Rana Khan sent some guns and kept a deadly fire on the Rajput center so as not to allow the Kachhwas to come to the help of the Rathods on whom the entire Maratha army charged by now. Having got no support from behind, the Rathods fell back on their front, the Marathas, who were pushed back recovered their trenches.

In the close fighting Malharrao Pawar, Chimnaji the Diwan of Vitthalrao Rao Raja’s brother’s son, Gazi Khan the brother of the late Murtza Khan received mortal wounds and were killed. Sambhaji Shinde a high Sardar Cavalry were slain. Nearly there were a thousand casualties on the Maratha side and their two hundred and fifty horses were carried off. The losses from the Rathod side were about two hundred men killed with Shobaram Bhandari, Bhimsing Bakshi’s brother-in-law and two or three other prominent Sardars, about four to five hundred men wounded and one hundred horses captured by the Marathas. It is quite evident from the Maratha losses that the Rathod onslaught was a terrible one. On Maratha side great exertion and bravery was shown by the Telangas, the Turk Sawars, Murtza Khan’s son, De Boigne’s paltan, Bapuji Vitthalrao and Pawars, otherwise there would have been a defeat.

The Rathods made three or four more attempts to fall on the Maratha guns but got no opportunity like the first one. At three quarters of the day, when Muhammad Beg Hamdani was coming to the support of the Rathods, he was killed by a cannon ball that hit his breast. This broke the spirit of the Rajput army. The Marathas were mainly on defensive for fear of treachery of the suspected Hindusthani force. There was little fighting due to the death of Hamdani on Rajput side and the coming of rain’s in afternoon made the movements of artillery difficult. Keeping their patrols, both sides retreated to their respective camps at the nightfall, even though the cannonade was kept on till two ghadis after that. About two to three thousand men fell on both the sides. At one watch after nightfall (17), Mahadaji returned to his own tent. The Deccani soldiers agent stated that nearly five hundred costly horses had been slain and many more were wounded. All Officers demanded money for their troops and rewards for those who had fought well (especially Murtza Khan’s sons). He paid rupees 25 thousand to his Sardars as price of ointment (18) and granted gold bracelets, money and robes to the Shiledars. Mahadaji gave sixty horses to those whose horses had been slain and two thousand rupees to the troops of the late Murtza Khan Barach for their heroic fighting. His Sardars urged him to deal a final blow two days later to finish off the business.

The King of Jaypur paid a visit to the tents of Aga Najaf Ali, the son of the deceased Hamdani and Mirza Ismail Beg, his nephew and condoled them. He gave rupees 4000 for the wounded besides jewels and robes.

Then he visited the Rathod camp. They complained that, while fighting desperately, they were not supported by the Kachhwas. The King of Jodhpur, on hearing this news, sent another contingent of 5000 Rathods to aid Jaypur and also sent twenty pairs of gold bracelets, twenty pearl necklaces, and twenty swords for his Sardars. Nearly one thousand mercenaries from Multan, contingents from Bikaner and Daudputri (Bahawalpur) came to the assistance of the Raja of Jaypur who sent a letter on 29th to Mahadaji through Sulaiman Beg Khan, praying from the postponement of the battle for two days for the fatiha of the 3rd day of Muhammad Beg’s death. On Tuesday (31st July) he assured to come out for a pitched battle.

Neither Marathas nor the Rajputs held the battle fought on 28th July as the decisive one, which was a victory for none. Inspite of the Rathod valour and the treachery in Mahadaji’s camp, the Rajputs were not successful in destroying Mahadaji’s camp, whose artillery still stood a formidable strength from their point of view. On 28th July, Mahadaji could not be but on his defensive for fear of treachery but from the fact that the next day his forces had again appeared in the field and waited there for three quarters of the day, it was evident that he was in high spirits and decided to end the business as he expressed confidently in his letter to Nana Fadnis, giving him the account of the battle. He wrote (19) (29th July),

The Rajputs came out from their camp for a fight, after havng joined by Hamdani, with a total number of 50 thousand and 60 pieces of gun. We (also) marched on them after the junction of Khanderao Hari and Ambaji Ingle, whom letters had been sent, on Shrawan Shuddha Chaturdashi (Saturday, the 28th July) with all our force and artillery. At first the battle began with gun fire on both the sides that continued till noon. Then the Rajputs divided themselves into three groups (right, center and left). Their left fell on Ambaji Ingle thinking his a weaker side. Ingle facing them boldly cut their “gol” into two. On our left, Shivaji Vitthal Bapu, Dharrao Shinde, Rayaji Patil and Khanderao Hari, rode into the thick mass of the Rathod horse and pushing them back, followed them for one and a half miles. Rana Khan, opening a deadly fire on the King in person and Hamdani before him, made it impossible for them to come to the help of the Rathods. Hamdani was about to march, when he was killed by one of the cannon balls from our fire. We would have pushed on further to their camp but we had to think of the nala in their front and the ravines besides. The battle raged for three quarters of the day. (At the time of fighting) water was not available near at hand, that needed to be carried from the rive, one and a half miles behind the front, and hence our horses and men suffered greatly for want of drinking water and hence the Rangadas were saved. But by the valour of Shirmant, the Rangadas are greatly punished. The Rathods and the Kachhwas left a thousand corpses behind the field. Men of prominence were killed and moreover two thousand went away wounded. Shivaji Vitthal Bapu’s men exerted well. Forces of Jodhpour and Jaypur had marched in unity with full preparation, but (inspite of that) due to the valour of Shrimant, they were punished. Next day also (29th July) our army marched on them, but they did not come out of their camp. As the place is difficult (for assault) with a nala infront, a hillock behind and ravines on both sides (they are saved). But by the valour of Shrimant, the enemy will be destroyed completely.

But no sooner Mahadaji dispatched this letter on Monday the 30th July, than the matter began to take such an ugly form that he lost complete control over the situation and had to make a hasty retreat before the formidable enemy to save the whole Maratha camp from destruction. This was the culmination (20) of the chain of effects, that originated in his utter lack of money for the task he had undertaken as Vakil-ul-Mutlak, the ill luck of having famine affected and devastated territories under him that could hardly make good his vast need, the large armies he had to employ irrespective of his scanty resources, forcing on him an indebtedness that swallowed up the capital of all the available bankers leaving none to pay him, ultimately compelling on him a short sighted policy to look to the immediate present, which was the main reason of his folly. Lalsot proved that he was still formidable for the Rajput confederacy but like a devouring disease, Rajput treachery had eaten up his power inwardly and had brought him to a stage of complete ruin. This could be possible only cause he was unable to pay long standing arrears of pay of his Mughalia and North Indian sipoys, still with him. Besides other things, lack of money was the only powerful reason that turned the Lalsot campaign into a defeat for Mahadaji.

Mahadaji Decided to Retreat Before the Rajputs

On 30th July (21) news came that a Maratha forage party of 6000 pack of oxen and 700 camels from Karauli side via Khushalgadh was attacked by the Rajputs and 14 to 15 hundred oxen and camels were carried off due to the utter cowardice of the escort " a thousand Deccani horse and foot. Afzal Khan’s and Shujaet Khan’s men fought well and hance the rest of the grain convoy and the money coming from Gwalior were safely brought to the camp. Mahadaji praised the two Khans and gave them some money. The Jaypur Raja’s Dhayabhai blocked the eastern road from Khushalgadh, while Rodaram Khawas, closed the southern road from Ranathambhore. Next day supplies were entirely stopped “A rupee could ot by even four lbs of flour or six lbs of Dal. All the troops, especially the sipoy battalions, clamoured for their pay. Mons. Lasteneau came to Mahdaji and reported that the Mughalia troops that had previously gone over to Jaypur side were seducing his sipoys by promising to pay up their dues from the Jaypur treasury”.

All the trained sipoy battalions (22) and especially a group of 7000 Telangas took up arms, and imprisoning their Commandants, stood up in a line saying that “If we get our past dues for seven or eight months in full and four annas daily for the future, we shall serve or else shall go over to Jaypur Raja with our artillery.” Rana Khan urged Mahadaji a quick settlement of their claims but Mahadaji replied “If I pay the salary of the Telangas today, then the Hindusthani tomorrow and the Deccani horse the next day, will ask for the dues. Six lakhs is what their monthly salary amounts to”. At last Mahadaji agreed to pay them for one month and rest later on. They demanded five months’ salary. Mahadaji offered them three months pay and promised to pay the rest after the final battle with the Rajputs was over. The rest of the paltan accepted the offer and Mahadaji at night paid rupees two thousand nine hundred to the gunners of the Camp and rupees one thousand to Lasteneau and rupees ten thousand to the sons of Murtaza Khan.

But the 7 thousand Telangas would listen to none. News came from Jaypur camp that seven more guns had come from Jaypur and the King had planned to plant these bigger guns infront of Mahadaji’s artillery and assault the Maratha army from three sides. Mahadaji grew deeply anxious. He offered jewels to the Campoo. But they refused saying, “Of what use would this be ? Give us cash. The Jaypur Raja has sent rupees fifty thousand to us”. Throughout the 30th and the forenoon of 31st this tumult raged in the Maratha camp. All the efforts of Mahadaji failed to pacify the soldiers. They had with them one hundred twenty five guns, turning the muzzles of them, they threatened to carry the guns if the payment was not made.

At three quarters of the day, they marched off with all the guns, their entire munition carts and forage and planted their standard on the river. They sent back the envoys sent by Mahadaji to soothe them. Mahadaji called Shivajipant Bapu, Rao Raja and the rest for consultation. News came that all the Rajput camp was preparing for a fight. They said, “All the paltans had demanded money. The seven thousand have winded off, but the rest of the Mughalia and Hindusthani are with us. Who can believe in them now? Hence a battle is not advisable at present. There will be confusion in the camp (at the time of battle) and there will be another Panipat. Campoo is carrying guns, let them carry”. Thus saying they sat there.

Meanwhile the Campoo had marched three miles. Ismail Beg and Malik Mahmud Khan, advancing from the Jaypur army, welcomed them. Daulatram Haldia gave them twenty-five maunds of sweets and seven thousand Ashraps and promised one lakh five thousand next day.

Their departure had created all alarm in Mahadaji’s camp. News came to them that the Rajputs and all Rathod forces were coming to fight. Another news followed that Daulatram and Pahadsing had advanced forward, but the King had not come. Grain was sold four seers a rupee in the Maratha camp. Many Shiledars had no meals and even then, all Sardars with their forces hastened to the field and stood in readiness to face the Rajputs. Mahadaji also became ready. After four five ghadis at night, a salvo was heard and all thought that the Rajputs and news also confirmed the same thing. But as the Rajput army with the pared to meet them saying “whatever God has settled will happen”. But another news came that the Rajputs had gone to their camp keeping five hundred to one thousand men on the post. Marathas also keeping men on their post, returned back to their camp. Shivajipant Bapu, confidentially spoke to Patil Baba and Rana Khan said, “conditions appear like that of Panipat. Nothing but death was before us, had they come. All the Kachhwas and Rathods are to march tomorrow. They have been emboldened as our paltans and guns have gone to them. Our men are (consequently) disheartened. There are (yet) Rangadas, Mughalias and Hindusthanis in the enemy. They can’t be believed. Definitely they will join the enemy. There is no need of any proof now. We know the number of Deccani fauj. The grain is sold four seers a rupee. No supplies are coming. Shiledars have died of hunger. Horses have died. On what strength will you take fight? It is better that we retreat was decided. In the last quarter of the night keeping the light forces on the Rajputs, camp followers were sent back to the main camp.

The Retreat to Dig

Mahadaji ordered his Captains (23) to send quickly off the camp and baggage towards Pimplai. Sixty troopers of the sons of Murtza Khan and five paltans of Najib had gone over to Jaypur King. Mahadaji ordered Murtza Khan’s sons to put their baggage in the centre and march heedfully to the rear. He kept ten to twelve thousand horse with the paltans of De Boigne and Lesteneau and seventeen guns with Rana Khan in the pass and himself marched to the rear, three hours before dawn.

In the morning of 2nd August, he was standing on the Dongri hill when the spies reported that the Jaypur army had come out for a battle and Rana Khan in battle formation was retreating step by step. A courier brought the news that on hearing of Mahadaji’s march ot the rear, the Jaypur Raja made great rejoicings.

The camp followers from Rambagh advance camp had joined the main camp at dawn. Every one was in a hurry, packing his baggage. In what confusion a powder chest exploded mostly through accident or through mischief as was held lateron, with a terrific blaze and roar. The time itself was of running away and such incident had taken place. The men thinking away and such incident had taken place. The men thinking that the treacherous Hindusthanis turning their guns had fired on their Deccani comrades, Terror seizzed their hearts and they ran away with whatever they had collected, leaving the rest in the camp. With no fight, the men ran away leaving the grain of the merchants, cloth, tents and carpet loads and the cooking utensils of Mahadaji himself. Amidst the tumult and confusion the thieves and Pendharis of the camp got a chance to loot the bazar of Afrasiyab Khan. When Mahadaji came to the camp, he saw that all had run away. Sending the loads of camels, he asked the men around, to carry on as much they could and burnt away the rest. Leaving Rana Khan on Dongri, and asking him to retreat in battle formation slowly, Mahadaji left the camp.

Coming three kos away, Mahadaji halted and swore, “If I live I shall reduce Jaynagar and Jodhpur to dust. I shall halt at Dig and see what I can do.” The camp reached Pimplai at three quarters of the day, traversing sixteen or seventeen kos from the advance camp and twelve kos from his base camp near Lalsot. Mahadaji entered his tent one kos near Pimplai and waited for Rao Raja’s arrival. After about six ghadis at night, Rana Khan joined the camp with is troops and artillery.

On 3rd August, the spies reported that the Rajput army was occupying Dongri and Daulatram Haldia and others were encamped in Lalsot pass. Another news came that a 15000 Jaypur army under Ismail Beg, Pahadsing and Daulatram Haldia was coming after them. Mahadaji mounted on his horse and made his army hurry on cautiously, the Sardars guarding the two flanks with the baggage and camp in the centre. After marching four kos, he halted by the side of a nala and took his breakfast. Leaving Rana Khan and others there, he pushed on and halted opposite Udai. On hearing that Rana Khan had arrived one kos behind, he resumed his march, went six kos further and entered his tents. The Rajputs had followed him up to Pimplai but returned from that place. The people were bewildered with constant rumors of the coming of the Jaypur army behind them.

On 4th August, the camp halted at Sikhuda, one kos from Hindaun. It was humiliating for Mahadaji to have run away before the pursuing enemy. He told his Courtiers that he had not lost any gun in the battle nor suffered a disaster, but had retreated because his troops had lost heart. After reaching Dig, as soon as froces came from Deccan, he would punish the Jaypur Raja. The Kamavisdar of Khshalgadh came running road to Karauli was thus blocked, road to Dig was taken up.

With many of his horses, camels and oxen perishing from leanness in every day’s march, under constant threat of the Rajput attack, amidst appalling difficulties, Mahadaji led his terror-stricken army with tireless exertions and eternal vigilance to Dig in eleven days.

Reaching Dig, all felt relieved for having escaped from a situation like Panipat. Mahadaji had kept too much confidence in Naubatray, the Chief of artillery. It was suspected that the treachery was not the result of one day and he must have been in the know of it. He was kept under arrest and the search began. Mahadaji sent all families, baggage and camp followers to Gwalior, and became light. As days passed on, he repented for what had taken place and especially having kept so much faith in the Hindusthanis. He hence dismissed (24) them all and told them to go away from his camp. Badal Beg Khan and Khadin Husain Khan (the sons of Afrasiyab Khan) went to Delhi. Murad Beg Khan, a Mughalia Sardar had already left him during the march and joined to Jaypur Raja. Only Ala Yar Beg Khan, Kasim Khan and another two or three Mughalia Sardars with great entreaty got permission to stay with him.

The Collapse of Mahadaji’s Power

Hearing the news of Mahadaji retreat from Lalsot (25), Gulam Kadar issued from Gausagadh and established his rule from Gadhamukteshwar to Yamuna. He then marched on Delhi. Lodoji Deshmukh and Shah Nizamuddin tried to face him but due to the defection of Maniyarsing they lost the fight and fled from Delhi (24th August). The helpless Emperor then invested him with the robes of Mir Bakshi (5th September 1787 A.D.). Thus the immediate effect of Lalsot, was the loss of Delhi.

Rana Khan (26) and the rest requested Patil Baba that for the time being, the Jaypur Chief has grown powerful and we have not enough of armed strength and more over there is little money. To face the situation, let us be in Gwalior region by crossing the Chambal. The force will be fresh and after writing to Shrimant, assistance would come from that side. Ahillya Bai also has written that she is sending a force with the Pendharis. Thus gathering all forces, we should start after Dasara to punish the Kings of Jaypur and Marwad. Patil Baba spoke,

I conquered the whole of Antarwed, Jatwada, Mewat and the territory up to Panipat. I took over the forts of Dig, Agra, Ramgadh and Kishangadh etcc., worked as Wazir of the Patshah and sat in “Nalki”. All these things have gone from me, and I have come to the present situation. Now it is proper for me to vanquish the Jaypur King with (whatever) army is at my command. Even if the army leaves me, I shall try to reduce Jaypur with the remaining four five hundred Rauts with me but I shall never leave Jaypur (territory) now.

Bapuji Vitthal (27) wanted to go home, but Mahadaji went to his tent and entreated him (to say). He (Bapuji Vitthal) Wrote secretly to Jaypur king to make peace with Shinde or else his dominion would be devastated. But the King offered to make peace provided Rao Raja Pratapsing was surrendered and Shinde remained in his own territory. He was, moreover, ready to pay only the tribute settled in the time of Mirza Najaf Khan. A letter of the same purport also came from the Bakshi of Jodhpur. Mahadaji refused to surrender Rao Raja who had always sided him and who had taken a refuge with him. Setting aside the peace proposal, he said, “The Raja of Jaypur will know my capacity. When I have gained such a victory over him, I shall make peace”.

It was clear that Patil Baba had felt the retreat from Lalsot as a great humiliation, which he had taken to his heart. His return to Delhi, was an essential stp to shoe Jaypur his capacity. The Rajput Maratha relations, henceforth entered round one figure Patil Baba, for whose present plight, it was Jaypur, as he felt, that was responsible.

Rao Raja of Machhedi (28) invited Mahadaji to Alwar fort, where he would have plenty of provisions of fodder etc. it was a fort that could not be taken by less than a year or two of fighting. Here he proposed, Mahadaji should stay at ease, pending the arrival of reinformcement from Deccan, and in the mean time plunder Jaypur territory so as to force the Jaypur Raja to make peace. The Machhedi Raja’s Wakil Ramchandra told Mahadaji in private that his master would pay him some money for his troops.

Rana Khan and Bapuji Vitthal, who were from the first opposed to Rao Raja’s designs regarding Jaypur, opposed the idea of marching to Alwar fort. At that time Jaypur army was marching towards the Rao Raja’s forts of Rajgadh and Lachhmangadh. Thus it was quite clear that by giving invitation ot Mahadaji at Alwar, it was Rao Raja who was really going to be profitted by his presence. They proposed that they should stay in Dig for some times or else they would not march with him to Alwar. Mahadaji replied that he would march to Alwar alone; others might do, as they liked. They all accompanied him to Alwar. The Rao Raja welcomes them. Mahadaji visited and inspected the interior of the fort and encamped under its walls.

On 18th of August he wrote to Nana thus (29):

For the present only light forces are kept with the intention to harass the enemy with the predatory war. The financial difficulties have created a problem for me. The Emperor’s dues are in arrears for the last nine months. If he comes to me at this (critical) time, every thing will remain in hands. Otherwise (Delhi) will be a place for all sorts of politics. The Emperor is fickle-minded and greedy. No banker is available. Hence I request you to manage this time to send me money through the Government. If help is sent in money and army, that will have a desirable effect on all (the enemies). The English, Wazir and all have gone against us. We have come near Alwar in the territory of Rao Raja. From here the force has been sent in Jaypur territory and hence the Rathods and the Kachhwas are upset. Hamdani’s nephew Ismail Beg married the daughter of Hamdani. He has been sent with forces and guns by the Rangadas to Agra. Rayaji Patil has been despatched behind him. He pushed him thrice. But Mon. lesteneau’s paltan from the fort treacherously joined Ismail Beg and hence he could not be defeated. At present defections have spoiled the politics. There is no money. There is no scope any-where.

Sadashio Dinkar was more explicit in his report to Nana He wrote (30)

Patil Baba would never utter a word of fear, as that is like a death for him. He only says that the succor should be sent as early as possible, but the situation is highly depressing. Unless a formidable army is sent, nothing can be done. For the present, the days are passed only because, Rao Raja gave shelter, otherwise every thing would have been over by now. Chambal was flooded and the enemies were on all sides. Where to go was the problem. Rao Raja gave refuge with full support and hence he was saved. Now, he is eagerly watching for the reinforcement from the Government. Once he spoke “In our house of Shinde all men have died while performing Government duty. All advise me to leave the present politics for a few days and move on to Gwalior. But is not death preferable to running for life avoiding the enemy in the field? What have I to gain by surviving? I have no hopes (31) for future. I am this time in danger, in that case I am sure, and the Government will assist me and will not neglect me”. Thus he spoke. If help in army and the rest is sent, Sardar and Sardari will be saved, otherwise if delay is made in this respect, there is no possibility of any survival”. this time Sardar is in great danger. A lakh of (enemy) army has assembled from all sides and in the midst the thousand Deccani men are entrapped. Here the days are like those of Gajendra (32). All are watching for the coming of the succor from the Swami (Nana), from all sides the enemies are pressing.

Nana (33) promptly assured Mahadaji that rupees five lakhs were being sent and a force under Tukoji Holkar and Ali Bahadur would be despatched quickly for his succour. Mahadaji (34) felt grateful for the brotherly attitude of Nana Fadnis. When the news reached the camp that a big army was coming from Deccan, guns were fired in joy.

As the Deccan (35) reinforcement were not expected to reach in the rainy season and as it was impossible for Mahadaji to abandon Hindusthan from where all the Maratha rule had ended, even Ajmer was lost to the Rathods, and Agra fort was under siege, he proposed to stay at Alwar for some months. He sent his Deccani horse to ravage Jaypur territory to relieve himself from the daily wrangle of his troops, for their pay and not to allow Jaypur King to enjoy peace, Ambaji, Jiwaba Bakshi and Bapu Malhar were sent towards Thana, Gazi etc. to raid the neighborhood of Jaypur.

The Rajput Advances

On the retreat of Mahadaji (36), the Jaypur King gained a new life as it were, and fired a salutation. Daulatram gave, as promised, fifty thousand rupees to the paltans that had come from Mahadaji on 1st of June and removed their one hundred twenty guns to his own park. He placed these paltans under Najaf Ali Kha, Hamdani’s son.

Daulatram advised the king not to think first of expelling Mahadaji from Hindusthan but to attend to the administration of the mahals he had conquered from Mahadaji and wrest the forts, around, belonging to Machhedi Raja. He took two or three fortalices of Rao Raja and reached the fort of Lachmangadh, fourteen kos from Mahadaji’s camp and also besieged the stone fort of Jamrauli.

Mirza Ismail told the Jaypur Raja, “Send me with a sufficient force towards Agra and Dholpur so that I may occupy that country and expel the Marathas.” The Raja, hence, keeping Najaf Khan Hamdani with himself, sent Ismail Beg with ten thousand horse and foot and sixty guns to Agra.

The king at the same time wrote (37) about the overtures of friendship from Najafkuli to Vijaysing and waited for his reply. Rayaji Patil (38) with four or five thousand Deccani horse, and the paltan of Mons. Leateneau and the contingent from the bharatput Raja, arrived to oppose Mirza Ismail. Lakhwa Dada with two thousand men joined the army from the fort. On 14th, 15th and 16th September, a servere battle was fought between Mirza Ismail and Rayaji Patil. On 17th September in the thick of the fight, Mons. Lesteneau, abandoning the side of Rayaji Patil went over to Ismail Beg. Hence, defeat fell on Rayaji who fled to Bharatpur while Lakhwa entered the fort. Mirza Ismail entered the city of Agra and then setting up his entrenchment at the Jami Masjid, began to attack on Agra fort. At the same time he established his administration in the Mahals of Dholpur and Agra. Mahadaji was greatly grieved on hearing the news and said “The kingdom of Hindusthan has gone out of my hand, in the same way, that it had come. But by the grace of Peshwa it will be reconquered and I shall make my enemies realize (my power).”

Mahadaji (39) knew that his entire fate depended on the retention of Agra fort. But lack of money and inferiority of his force were his greatest drawbacks. In dire need he sent Bhau Bakshi to the English offering to let them set up a factory in Agra if they sent a large force to join him in governing the Empire in mutual co-operation. The income of the Subha would be spent in supporting the armies of the two allies. But the English declined to interfere in any way.

The Jaypur King sent Murad Beg Khan, a Mughalia Sardar to Mewat and Kishangadh Jilhas, where he began to set up his administration. Mahadaji sent Jiyaram Jat, his old adherent to strengthen Kishangadh. A Jodhpur army reached Ajmer District. All the Maratha Mokasdars of that region were bewildered and were in dispair. The Rajputs captured the town without any resistance on Shrawan Shuddha Chaturdashi (27th August 1787 A.D.). The Maratha Subhadar was in the fort, which was sure to fall.

Vijaysing’s Wakils (40) were with Taimur Shah in Kabul Kandahar. On hearing Mahadaji’s much upon Jaypur, the Shah, at the request of the King, had despatched Bakshi Maddu Khan with 15000 horsemen and 2000 Uzbegs, who reached the Peshawar pass. But as the Sikhs prevented them from crossing Sindhu, they had to return back.

Viajaysing (41) vigilantly maintained the anti-Maratha atmosphere throughout. He had contacts with all the Chiefs of Hindusthan. A new envoy from Mewad reached his Darbar. Also Wakils from the son the Shuja Uddaula, from the English, and also from Gulam Kadar were with him. At the same time, he justifies his case with the Peshwa throwing all blame on Mahadaji. Calling the envoy of the Peshwa he told, “We are paying the regular dues to Patil Baba and also paid two to four lakhs in addition on demand. But Patil Baba came with the intention to destroy Jaypur and Jodhpour making use of the old Ministers of Jaypur, Khushaliram and Machhediwala, as he had destroyed Khichiwada and Gohad. Thirteen lakhs out of sixty-three lakhs were to be paid, and when the negotiations were under progress, he marched into Jaypur at the instigation of Rao Raja. He was about to capture Jaypur and hence being helpless, a fight was given. When (Marathas) established their rule over the whole of India, we thought that Hindu-Raj and especially that of Peshwa’s Brahman Raj was preferable. We are the Jamindars of Hindusthan from ancient times. We had saved our land, ever when Pat Shahi was powerful.”

Krishnaji Jagannath (42) wrote to Nana “Had Patil Baba decided to capture Jaypour, when he had come there for Khandani, it was possible then. But since then, the Rajput Chiefs have grown powerful. If the Peshwa desires, that the relations with the Rajput Chiefs, should be in his hand, then these Chiefs are willing. Whoever Sardar is sent by the Peshwa, he would be able to transact the business. But if Swami wishes that the business should be transacted by the Sardar alone (i.e. Patil Baba) then the question is a different one. (In that case) Unless a force of fifty thousand is sent to the help of Patil Baba, these Chiefs would not listen, for they have as if measured the strength of Patil Baba. At present, the strength of the Rathods has increased. All the Rajput Chiefs are with him.”

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Mahadaji’s Heroic Efforts Fail to Maintain

Mahadaji (44) could wait no more. In early November, leaving Alwar, he came marching towards Rewadi, thirty kos from Delhi, with a view to attending on the Emperor. He sent Ambaji Ingle to Delhi. On 15th November Ambaji came with two hundred men to the Emperor who blamed Shinde for having wrought his own ruin by disobeying the Emperor’s order not to attack the old faithful house of Jaypur. He further remarked that when Shinde was unable to maintain his own troops, how could he conduct the administration of the State? It was clear that unless Mahadaji was strong enough to withstand his enemies, the Emperor, even though he favoured him, could not call him. Ambaji’s mission was hence unsuccessful.

Mahadaji then took counsel. Rana Khan and Bapu Vitthal advised him to march and save Ajmer and other old possessions, which were slipping out of his hands, abandoning Hindusthan for the time being.

Taking ten to twenty thousand rupees as loan from the paragana of Rewadi, Mahadaji turned back. On the way, he plundered the paraganas of Kanti, Narnaul etc. belonging to Najafkuli Khan and arrived beyond Narnaul when he got the news that the King of Jaypur with his own army and the contingent of Jodhpur Bakshi had turned back from Alwar territory to Jaypur frontier, while another Rathod army had reached th Sambhar and Ajmer Districts, with an intention of fighting. Hence Mahadaji decided to return to Dig and Agra in order to attack Mirza Ismail who was besieging Agra fort with a small force, with the expectation that the Rajputs would not be able to come to his aid in a short time. His turning back from Narnaul distric decided the fate of Ajmer which capitulated to Vijaysing on 24th December, without making the least defense. The Killedar and his wife were dead.

Mahadaji turned back again via Kishangadh to near Alwar, the Mewatis robbing his army as before. Then by way of Alinagar and Bhusawat, he arrived near Dig. Next day, he marched to Bharatpur. The Jat Raja’s son and Rani Kishori joined him on the way from Bharatpur to Agra. Mahadaji with his and Jat Raja’s forces encamped seven kos from Agra city. Ismail came with 5000 horses, 10000 infantry, besides paltans and 70 guns and halted three kos from the Maratha camp. From 8th to 14th December every day the troops from both the sides rode out and exchanged fire, but the Deccanis could not attack the Mirza due to his large number of guns. In fact, the Deccani forces were equal in number to that of the Mirza but they had lost heart since the retreat of Lalsot, and hence were incapable to face Ismail. Meanwhile Ismail was collecting troops from all sides Gulam Kadar, postponing the siege of Aligadh was coming to his help. Before his juncture with Mirza’s forces, on 14th December, Mahadaji fought a severe battle. But all his charges failed enface of the shower of balls from Mirza’s guns. The battle raged for full three quarters of the day but the victory lay to the side of the Mirza.

At night getting exact reports that Gulam Kadar was about to reach the bank of Yamuna, Mahadaji decided to retreat to wards Gwalior. On 17th December, he crossed Chambal and encamped near Gwalior.

On 21st December 1787 A.D., he explained (45) the reasons of his retreat in a letter to Raghunath Hari, in Bundelkhand thus “We were marching on Agra to punish Ismail Beg. One or two fights took place with him. He has (a powerful park of) artillery and hence it was our plan to draw him away from that protection. But even the Emperor siding him, despatched the Prince and Gulam Kadar with their forces to his succor. The kings of Jaypur and Marwad are also in league with him. Hence seeing that all Hindushthan having gone against us, I decided to avoid them for a few days and came to the south bank of Chambal. Here, with our territory at the back, it is my intention to devastate and burn the territory of the enemy to harass him, till reinforcements from Deccan reach here, while remaining here I can subdue the rangadas of the Gwalior region.”

Thus the heroic exertions for five months, after his retreat from Lalsot to maintain against the combined might of the Rajputs, Mughalias and the Rohillas failed at last. This was mainly because he had no funds and because, the small number of half hearted Deccani force, eager to return their homes, was worthless to face the powerful and emboldened enemies that dominated him. By the end of 1787 A.D., with his retreat beyond Chambal, the eclipse of his power that thad begun with the Rajput threat that compelled him to give a fight and then retreat from Lalsot, was complete. Even though, he never lost hopes of regaining power and teaching a lesson to the Rajputs, the possibility of the fulfillment of his determination was remote unless a strong army came to his assistance from Deccan. Now he had nothing beyond Chambal excepting the fort of Agra, held precariously and his two friends namely the Rao Raja of Machhedi and the Jat Raja of Bharatpur who were both threatened by the Jaypur King and the Mughalias respectively for their friendship with him.

The Rajputs Fail to Dominate Delhi

After Mahadaji had (46) finally crossed Chambal, the Jaypur King with the Jodhpur Bakshi, was busy in reducing the Rao Raja’s forts of Harwa, Basi and Satur and setting up posts in his mahals. He was encamped at Sursi, thirty kos from Delhi, in the District of Narnaul.

Having detached from Mahadaji, Rao Raja and clung to his former friend Najafkuli, who was equally the enemy of Jaypur, having created for himself a principality in Narnaul region, at the expenses of the Shekhawati districts of Jaypur kingdom. Both had taken possession of Mewat and established their posts there. The five battalions, that had joined Jaypur King, deserting Mahadaji at the time of Lalsot, now joined Najafkuli by deserting the Jaypur king for non-payment of their salary. Thus Najafkuli had come face to face with the Jaypur King in Narnaul. Strongly enough, Jodhpur King and his Bakshi were the warm supporters this time of Najafkuli.

The reason for this breach between Jaypur and Jodhpur was the envy felt by Jodhpur Bakshi for Himmat Bahadur Gosawi, who was with Jaypur King and who had been given a preference to the said Bakshi, by the Jaypur King. This Himmat Bahadur was an ambitious man, desirous of dominating Delhi politics by making use of some agency. It was he, who was the man who facilitated the compact of Mahadaji with Afrasiyab Khan in 1784 A.D. His friendship and subsequent enmity with Mahadaji was due to the powerful personality of the latter, who allowed no place for the meddling of the former. Now after the eclipse of Mahdaji’s power, he had come again to the Rajputs, who had been directly the cause of Mahadaji’s failure. It was the aim of himmat Bahadur in collusion with Daulatram Haldia and Ram Ratan Modi, to raise the Rajput power to enter Delhi Politics, due to the vacuum created by the withdrawal of Mahadaji.

At Delhi (47), Prince Akbar was to march to the Subha of Ajmer to regulate it, now having been vacated by Mahadaji. He appointed Badal Beg as his deputy. But all the mahals in Doab having been seized by Gulam Kadar. There was no means for the Emperor to subsist upon. Just then a timely letter came from the Jaypur King, requesting to wait on him. A secreat letter from Himmat Bahadur assured the Emperor that if he case the Emperor came over to Rewadi, he would induce the Jaypur King to pay him a substantial Nazrana. The Emperor could hardly afford to reject such an offer in his sore need and on 4th January 1788 A.D., he left Delhi with Akbar Shah and other Princes with twelve thousand horse and foot for Rewadi.

Agra city (48) was held by Ismail Beg on behalf of the Jaypur King and the fort held by Lakhwa Dada was under his siege. But hearing that the Emperor had bestowed the Subha of Agra on Prince Jahandar Shah, Ismail Beg set up the imperial red banner removing the five coloured flag of the Jaypur King. He complained to Udaram, the paternal uncle of Daulatram Haldia, that the Jaypur King had not only failed to appreciate the devoted service of Daulatram but had sent him no aid, while he was busy in the fight with Mahadaji Shinde. Finally, he remarked that nothing could be expected from such a king.

On receipt of the Emperor’s letter, the Jaypur King started from Basai Mansur, for Rewadi and on 28th January encamped one kos from the Imperial camp. On receiving a conciliatory letter from the Emperor, Najafkuli also marched with his compoo and encamped two kos from the imperial camp, at Bhandawas. On reaching there, he sent a message to the Emperor, “You ought to grant me audience first and thereafter to Jaypur Raja. I have arranged for a lakh of rupees for your Majesty I shall bring the Machhedi Rao to you and make him pay two lakhs. Do not agree unless the Jaypur Raja promises to pay a satisfactory amounts as tribute and all the things he took away from Shinde (at Lalsot) because myself, with the Machhedi Raja and Bakshi Bhimsing are present at your Majesty’s service.”

Himmat Bahadur Gosawi (49) came from the Jaypur King and had an audience of the Emperor on 27th January. The Jodhpur Bakshi asked the Jaypur king to make terms with Najafkuli and take him to the Emperor along with him. Najafkuli, on his part vowed that he would teach a lesson to those who were turning the Emperor’s mind against him. The Emperor on his part wanted money from the Jaypur King and the possession of Rewadi and Gokulgadh from Najafkuli. Under the circumstances, it was impossible that, all would unite and march on Mahadaji and drive him further and finish the problem of the Marathas, once for all.

The Jaypur King was presented to the Emperor, by the Nazar on 3rd of February 1788 A.D. As for the demand of money, his Wakil told the Emperor that his Raja had been utterly impoverished due to the cost ov maintaining a large army for two years against Mahadaji to save his honour and kingdom and the Marathas were still devastating his territories. Finally, when pressed, the Jaypur King paid him in all fifty thousand rupees, partly in cash and partly in cloth, and on the invitation of Jodhpur King, he left the Emperor for Pushkar, where the grand daughter of Vijaysing was to be Married to him. Without being able to do any thing against Najafkuli, the Emperor also marched back to Delhi on 23rd March. Thus two months were wasted for nothing.

In North India, (50) there were two forces that were opposed to the Marathas; the first being the Rajputs and the other one was that of the Mughalia and the Rohillas. It was clear from the above effort of the diplomats at Jaypur, Jodhpur and Delhi, that the Rajputs were unable to take the position of Mahadaji with the Emperor. The Rajputs, having lost his chance it was very natural that the Mughalias and the Rohillas should profit at the opportunity created and lost by the Rajputs. In 1788 A.D. hence, we see both the Kings located in their own territories, with their full sympathies with Ismail Beg (51) and Gulam Kadar, but taking no active part either for the capture of Agra fort or in the heroic struggle of Ismail Beg and Gulam Kadar against advancing Mahadaji. One feels that even at this stage (March 1788 A.D.) a solution in Rajput affairs could have been attained. There is no reason to doubt the truth in what Bhimsing Bakshi told Peshwa’s Wakil Hingne before leaving Rewadi for Pushkar that, “We do not want the Muslim Emperor’s rule. Our king does not like their anti-religious treatment. For this, we are ready to pay if Shrimant asks for a few rupees more as Khandani, (in fact) that is agreeable to us than serving the Yawanas. But if some one (i.e.Mahadaji) is bent on dethroning us and snatching our land, then we are compelled to die.”

Mahadaji in Distress

When the new reached Mahadaji’s camp that a big army from Deccan was coming to their help in North, guns were fired in Joy. But months passed and inspite of his constant urging and the receipt of hopeful letters from Nana (52), that the armies were coming, there was no army. The Rajputs began to jest and were sure that no armies were going to come to Mahadaji’s succour. On 21st January 1788 A.D. Mahadaji finally wrote that thinking that the army was not coming to his help, had he crossed Chambal earlier, he could have at least saved his honour and the name of his Government.

In reply Nana wrote the real reason of delay thus “Thinking that unless a Sardar joined his tents, the men would not follow, Ali Bahadur was sent out side the city in tents in Shrawan (on 8th September 1787 A.D.) and messages wre sent to Saranjami force to assemble quickly for the northern march. Haripant Fadke had recently arrived from Karnatak and had given leave to the forces. Men had suffered in that campaign due to constant pressure of the enemy and scarcity and hence it was impossible for them to be ready immediately. If another force was to be engaged, great amount of money was needed, whereas even previous amount was yet to be paid"Due to all this it took time than what was expected by Patil Baba.” Finally Nana informed that Ali Bahadur had started for North on Margashirsha Shuddha Panchmi (14th December 1787 A.D.) and that he would reach Patil Baba soon. Further Nana hinted (53) Mahadaji “Now a days, it is learnt that you speak of completely annihilating the (Rajput) principalities and hence all feel threatened. They know what you talk and hence wai tfor the day of your defeat. It is the way of a diplomat not to speak any thing, what ever is in one’s mind, till the day comes.”

But still the army did not come. The personal force brought from Jamgaon, that had reached ujjain, was directly sent to Mewat (February 1788 A.D.) Equally (54) his efforts by writing in detail the story of his difficuties and dangers in letter to Ahilyabai failed to produce any tangible effect. The pious lady hardly took any notice of his precarious conditions and answered in such a way as seemed a mockery. Finally he left writing to her.

News came that Ismail Beg (55) and Umraogir Gosari were intending to cross Chambal to drive Mahadaji stil further (March 1788 A.D.) Appajiram in distress wrote to Nana, “Now even debt is not available here, hence it is up to God to save us!.” The conditions in Mahadaji’s camp (56) were so depressing that at times even Mahadaji had to go without food and it was impossible to face the oncoming enemy and remain there. In bitterness Mahadaji wrote, “If the Swami had no intention to send help, he ought to have written plainly. Letters from Shrimant and Nana were received stating that Ali Bahadur was being sent with force and keeping faith in it, we waited here till now. Now we have no money and the men also are not under control; and the enemy is powerful. Hence what are we to do next? I had faith in the brotherly feeling of Nana and hence I could gather strength. Now Chaitra (April) has come and no force is seen. And now (even if it comes) what is the use of its coming? Now Hindusthanis will clearly understand that force from Deccan is not coming to the succour of Shinde.”

Finally with nothing except Agra for beyond Chambal, with no prospects of any help from any quarters all felt that leaving all hopes of regaining North India, they had to retreat further towards Ujjain.

The Miraculous Recovery of Mahadaji

Nearly for an year Mahadaji (57) was hearing about the coming of Ali Bahadur to North. Meanwhile he had suffered from all hardships and anxieties from starvation to the possibility of total political extinction, but even in dispair he had never lost heart to regain Delhi again.

The force from Jamgaon (58), that was sent in February 1788 A.D. in to Mewat, captured the posts of Mathura, Vrundawan, Mot and Mahaban and fell into Antarwed crossing yamuna (June 1788 A.D.). Threatening Agra city (59), he forced the Mughalia and Rohilla forces to fall back for its defence. Then by a master strategen he forced the Rohilla Chief (60) to leave Ismail Beg at Agra and to hasten to save his territories from devastations. Then timely (61) provisioning the Agra fort, collecting all his forces, he destroyed Ismail Beg so thoroughly that he had to flee for his life with only twenty five men (18th June 1788 A.D.). The eclipse ended and the tide definitely turned in his favour from this moment. On 4th July, (62) he was back again in his camp at Mathura. The reckless and revengeful Gulam Kadar (63) with Ismail Beg then captured Delhi, before sufficient forces from Mahadaji could reach there, and blinded Shah Alam (64) after collecting all his riches and dishonouring the Royal family (July 1788 A.D.). But Mahadaji’s forces soon expelled him from Delhi for and restored Shah Alam (16th October 1788 A.D.) Gulam Kadar was punished and captured and was executed to the entire satisfaction of Shah Alam (4th March 1789 A.D.)

The wholehearted help of the Jat Chief of Bharatpur was invaluable to Mahadaji. But it must be noted that it was his strength of mind and tenacity that stood the trial in the long run. Mahadaji’s miraculous recovery was not due to any political mistake or accident on the part of his enemies, but was the effect of his excellent planning and rare qualities of leadership (65). The long-awaited grand army from Deccan did not reach Mahadaji till he captured Delhi. It was with about thirteen thousand men that Ali Bahadur (66) joined him in November 1787 A.D., and was of use in capturing Gulam Kadar.

Foot Notes (Description)

(1) P.R.C. I-124, Dil RAj I -202, Sindhia as REgent- p.2

(2) Sindhia as Regent - p. 4, P.R.C. I-p. 204.

(3) E.G. - Mahadaji’s message to Rana Khan “let non go hear the river (Morel), but fight any one who comes over to this side of it” 6th July, Ibid - p. I.

(4) Ibid - p. 5.

(5) 14th July, Jaypur news : the Raja was ready with all his troops, but the skirmishing was done by the Rathods and isamil Beg only. At this Muhammad Beg Khan told the Raja “if such is the valour of the Raja’s men, that leaving every affair on our shoulders, they would remain aloof, then all affairs should be entrusted to me. If today, the Rajputs had bravery exerted, the battle would have been decided”. Sindhia as Regent-p. 4.

(6) Ibid - p. 5.

(7) Ibid - p. 9.

(8) Jodhpur letters - 3.

(9) The King of Jodhpur wrote Mahadaji through Rana Khan

Jaypur and Jodhpour are both the kingdoms and Hindus. Till now, even the Musalmans have not disturbed us. Your are a Hindu. We also wish that there should be a Hindu rule (at Delhi) and our kingdoms be protected. But your are seizing our kingdoms. This is no good. You should take (your) Khandani and take back your force from our kingdoms.

• Mar. Riya. Vol. II (U.V.) - p. 12

(10) M.D. II-147.

(11) This will be more clear by a few of the news-reports (Sindhia as Regent pp. 2 to 5) :

8th July :Mahdaji’s Camp - Ranakhan reports “through starvation 150 men are leaving me daily and you are not attending to it.” Camels were stolen by the Minas from every Sardar’s misl."

10th July :Mahadaji’s Camp - At night two risaldars with 5000 horsemen, went off to Jaypur Raja. The Minas plundered three carts of grain in the nala behind the camp.

11th July: Jaypur News - The Raja has ordered 5 to 6 thousand men cut off Mahadaji’s grain supply from Kerauli.

12th July :Mahadaji’s Camp - 150 bullocks of grain carried off by the Minas from the rear.

14th July: Jaypur news - The Raja wrote to the Kerauli Raja, threatening him if he did not stop sending provisions, to Mahadaji.

15th July: News - Jaypur detatchments sent to loot (coming) provisions, towards - Kama and towards Raghogadh (in Rao Raja’s land).

(12) Sindhia as Regent - p. 8, P.R.C. I -p. 207

(13) Ibid - p. 6.

(14) bid - p. 7.

(15) Ibid - p. 9.

(16) Sindhia as Regent - pp. 9, 10, P.R.C. I-135 to 137. Ait. Patre - 261, Dil. Raj. I-224, M.D. II-147-150, Chandrachud-71, Hist. Papers - 500, 503, Per, Records - p. 157, Jarypur Draft Kharitas 19-6, 32, 42, 53. 68.

(17) Sindhia as Regent - p. 11.

(18) Per. Records I-157.

(19) Hist. Papers - 500.

(20) M.D. II-152.

(21) Sindhia as Regent - pp. 11, 14, Jaypur Draft Kharitas 19-6, 31, 42.

(22) Per. Records I-158, Sindhia as Regent, pp. 11, 12, Hist. Papers - 503, M.D. II-147, 150.

(23) Sindhia as Regent - pp. 12 to 15, Hist. Papers - 503, P.R.C. I-137, 142 to 144, 151 to 156, M.D. II-149.

(24) Per. Records I - p. 163.

(25) Per. Records I-pp. 158, 159, 163.

(26) Satara Hist. Papers I-121.

(27) Per. Records I-p. 163.

(28) Ibid - p. 163, Satara Hist. Papers I-121.

(29) Hist. Papers - 54, Mar. Riya. U.V. Vol. II - pp. 126, 127.

(30) Mar. Riya. U.N. Vol. II-p. 127.

(31) Mahadaji had no issue.

(32) Refreence is here to the Mythological story of the Gajendrea (elephant) who was saved by God vishnu from the cluthches of the crocodile who had caught the leg of the said Gajendra.

(33) Satara Hist. papers I-122, 124, 125.

(34) Hist. Papers - 505, Satara Hist. Papers - 126.

(35) Satara Hist. Papers I - 123., Per. Records I - 164. Hist. papers - 506.

(36) Per. Records I-p. 164, 165., Jaypur Draft Kharitas 19-53, 68.

(37)

Sindhia as Regent - pp. 13, 15., Jaypur Draft Kharitas 19-25.

(38) Per. Reocords I-p. 165., Dil. Raj. I-296., M.D. II-155, Jaypur Draft Kharitas 19-24.

(39) Per. Records - pp. 166, 167. M.D. II-160.

(40) Ibid - p. 167.

(41) Jodhpur letters - 3.

(42) Satara Hist. Papers I-120, Mar. Riya. U.V. Vol. II-p. 134.

(43) Per. Records I-p. 167, M.D. II-154, P.R.C. I-192.

(44) Per. Records -P. 168, Dil. Raj. - 280., Jaypur Draft Kharitas 19-8.

(45) Hist. Papers - 512. Mar. Riya. U.V. Vol. II-p. 138.

(46) Per. Records I-pp. 175, 179, Dil. Raj. I-278, 331, 279.

(47) Per. Records I-pp. 172, 173, 177 to 179.

(48) Per. Records I-p. 175., Jaypur Draft Kharitas 19-24.

(49) Per. Records I-pp. 179, 181, 182, Dil. Raj. I-262, 274, 279, 281, 307.

(50) Hist. Papers - 518.

(51) When Vijaysing heard about the death of Gulam Kadar, he was so upset that he did not take his food. - Jodhpur letters.

(52) Hist. Papers - 514 to 516, Satara Hist. Paper I-126.

(53) Hist. Papers - 511, Dil. Raj. I-277, 287, 289, 293.

(54) H.D. II- 148 to 154, Mar. Riya. U.V. Vol. II-p. 143.

(55) Hist. Papers - 516.

(56) Hist. Papers - 518.

(57) Hist. Papes - 521, 516, 518.

(58) Ibid - 516, 521, to 525, 527., Dil. Raj. I-278.