4 THE SECOND PHASE : (1743 TO 1766 A. D.)

THE MARCH OF THE MARATHA EMPIRE

The Change in the Relationship, Reasons

There existed nothing but cordial relations between the Rajputs and the Maratha till 1743 A.D., but within less than 10 years, the former turned into the most bitter enemies of the latter and conspired with Najib Khan Rohilla and the Durani Chief Ahmad Shah Abdali for their destruction. And even though this enmity turned into a friendship for a temporary period of a few years during 1764 to 1769 A.D., it was the effect of the Jat ascendancy and the individual policy of Malharrao Holkar in befriending the Rohillas and the Rajputs persistently played the role of the opponents of the Marathas, throughout the latter half of the 18th century. What was the reason that turned the friendly Rajputs into the deadly enemies of the Marathas?

The Maratha-Rajput friendship started on the background of Malwa politics, due to the need of coming together against Nizam-ul-Mulk Asaf Jah and the Turani party. Nizam’s role in Delhi politics after 1720 A.D. till 1723 A.D. was that of the Sayyads before him. In fact even from Deccan, it was ever possible for him to dominate Delhi with his powerful Turani supporters and create untenable situation for the weak Emperor. Even in 1741 A.D. (1), the Nizam in Deccan told the Peshwa Balajirao that he would send a word to fulfill his demands for the grant of Sanad for Malwa and 20 lakhs from Emperor’s treasury.

Emperor Muhammad Shah had the misfortune to behold the loss of provinces from his empire one after another. His inglorious career turned him a revengeful man. He forgot nothing and forgave none. He ended the powerful Sayyads by conspiring with the Nizam but when he saw that he had only added to the tyranny of the Turani faction thereby, the Nizam became his next target. The latter, thereupon, left Delhi for Deccan and created an independent kingdom for him. This was the first direct blow to the solidarity of the Mughal Empire and Mohammad Shah never pardoned the Nizam for his grave crime. As an effect, much of the development in Gujarat and Malwa during 1724 A.D. to 1735 A.D. was the result of the Emperor’s revengeful policy towards the Nizam (2). For this, he nearly ignored Kamruddin Khan, the Turani Wazir, and the nearest relative of the Nizam, and relied much on Khan Dauran, the Mir Bakshi, and the friend of Sawai Jaysing of Jaypur. The main politics centred at Malwa, so as not to allow it to fall into the hands of the Nizam, Khan Dauran naturally wanted Jaysing to be the Subhadar of Malwa but since the Marathas had to be introduced as an opposing element to the Nizam, it was they in the long run, who put aside Sawai Jaysing to be the Subhadar of Malwa but since the Marathas had to be introduced as an opposing element to the Nizam, it was they in the long run, who put aside Sawai Jaysing and became the masters of Malwa by 1732 A.D. The Marathas did not halt there, but with in a few years crossed Chambal and entered Ajmer and Agra Subha. To save the Mughal Empire from the threat of the Marathas, the Nizam was at last called to Delhi in 1737 A.D., which resulted into his defeat at the hands of Bajirao resulting into the complete hold of the Marathas on Malwa. But even after the Nizam’s coming to Delhi, friendship among the Emperor, the Mir Bakshi and Sawai Jaysing continued till the death of Khan Dauran in 1739 A.D. And even after his death the Emperor needed Sawai Jaysing’s support, when the Nizam and the Turani Party created a threatening situation (3) for him after Nadir Shah’s departure.

But with the departure of the Nizam from Delhi in 1740 A.D.(4) to face his rebellious son, Nasir Jang, in Deccan, the threat of the Turani party to the existence of the Emperor came to an end. The energies of the old Nizam were absorbed in maintaining his hold in Deccan against the powerful Marathas, and the possession of Malwa by the Maratha was ever a bar to his coming to Delhi. This was so effective that when later on Nasir Jang conspired with the Emperor against the Marathas and the Wazir Safdar Jang, the barring Maratha armies in Malwa, did not allow him to cross even the Narmada (5). It is enough to say hence that even though the Nizam held his ambition of dominating Delhi as Wazir till last, the prospects of his coming to Delhi as opposed with the exit of the powerful Turani faction in the Court with the Delhi Court dwindled and there ended the political necessity for the Rajputs of the Friendship of the Marathas as before.+++(5)+++ In another way, with the acquisition of the Sanad of Malwa by Balajirao, the Malwa politics came to an end.

Ajitsing and Rana Sangram were dead long before. Bajirao died in 1740 A.D. Sawai Jaysing followed him after three years. With the departure of these Hindu Chiefs from the political stage, the generation that had witnessed or heard of the religious atrocities of Aurangzeb, came to an end.+++(5)+++ After 1739 A.D., the Mughal Empire at Delhi was a mere shadow of its former self and could scarcely be held as the symbol of the oppose of Hinduism. Thus the Hindu element in the politics of the North vanished after 1740 A.D. and there remained no necessity of Maratha-Rajput friendship on this score.+++(5)+++ On the contrary with the diminishing Mughal Empire the aggression of the Maratha imperialism became a real source of anxiety for the Rajputs.

In 1736 A.D., the Rana of Udaypur was perturbed to save his honour in the meeting with Bajirao Peshwa who courteously accepted a seat below the one of the Rana and thus the Rana’s exalted position was saved. But the Marathas advanced in power with such rapidity that the king of Jaypur (6) felt honoured in 1751 A.D. when he was carried to throne seated on the same elephant by a Sardar of the Peshwa. By 1751 A.D., the Peshwa had been all-in-all in the Maratha also was dead. The Peshwa mainly looked to the Maratha expansion in the South and his Sardars Shinde and Holkar looked to the affairs of the North under the Guidance of the Peshwa. The Maratha Empire from the South to the North and from the West to the East had come into existence. Sardars like Gayakwad, Shinde, Holkar, Bhosale, Patwardhan, Raste, Pethe and so many others were active in different spheres. Inevitably, the Rajputs became the payers of regular Khandani to the Marathas. The former equality of the Rajputs gave place to subordinate position in their relationship with the Marathas.+++(4)+++

With the departed Mughal Empire, the prospects of being appointed as Subhadars of Gujarat, Malwa, Orissa or Kabul vanished forever for the Rajputs.+++(4)+++ Their vision became limited by the boundaries of their own territories. Their vanity never allowed them to be one with the Maratha Empire as they had been one with the previous Mughal Empire.+++(4)+++ With dwindling prospects of political opportunities and limited sphere at home, Civil wars started in most of the Rajput States one after another. Each side resolutely tried to win the coveted object and approached the Maratha Sardars for help. They vied with each other in raising the sum in return for the help sought. The Marathas were ever in need of money to feed the huge armies and maintain administration.+++(4)+++ It is no wonder that they fell a victim to the alluring bait. The subsequent result was that they were held deceitful, dishonest, and greedy and a bad element by the party that suffered at their hands.

By now the Marathas had grown too powerful and their help was sought by the Wazir against the Rohillas (1751 A.D.) and by the Emperor against his Wazir (1753 A.D.) The remaining provinces of the Emperor were handed over to them under Chauth or Subhadari. The Rajputs, who had departed from the former friendship, grew jealous of their position. They felt bitterly for the cession of the Subhas of Agra and Ajmer by the Emperor to them (1752 A.D.) Meanwhile, the Maratha demands were raised to territory besides Khandani. The Rajputs saw no justification for these demands. They became the bitter enemies of the Marathas and looked to the Rohillas and the Pathans, the enemies of the Marathas, as their saviours from the wanton Maratha aggressions.+++(5)+++

Had the Rajputs a mind to look, there was much with the Marathas, that they could have appreciated. The Maratha spear, crossing Doab, had entered even Oudh (7)(1751 A.D.). Bengal had seen enough of their velour and as a result Orissa was ceded to them (1751 A.D.). In the North, Punjab had come under their Chauth, though Abdali hardly allowed them to collect it. In the South the Nizam had been rounded off by 1760 A.D. and excepting the Nawab of Karnatak (8), the rest of the South had nearly come under their sway. In 1758 A.D., they had reached Sindhu at Atak and their gaze (9) had reached Persia to finish off Abdali in between them. As a Hindu power, the Marathas had gained enough to be proud of. With this expansion of their Empire, they never lost sight of relieving the Hindu holy places of Kashi, Prayag, Gaya and Mathura from the hands of the yawanas. This was the constant demand of the Peshwa to his Sardars even after(10) the defeat of Panipat.

But the Rajputs, after Ajitsing, Abhaysing and Sawai Jaysing, never exhibited any religious outlook touching other spheres than their own.+++(4)+++ To them the Rohilla Najib Khan and the Brahman Peshwa of Poona were alike. They sided with the former and opposed the latter on political grounds alone. Hence inspite of the heart burning massacres of the Hindus and the destruction of the holy places like Mathura, Vrundavan in 1757 A.D. at the hands of Abdali, they could be one with his schemes in destroying the Marathas.+++(5)+++ The Marathas and the Rajputs differed fundamentally in their religious zeal in 18th century. The former had from the first till last opposed the Muslims, and their association with the Mulsim rulers was an exception. Whereas with their long association, though forced, with the Mughals from Akbar (with the lonely exception of Mewad) much of the Rajput opposition by the end of 17th century and in the first quarter of 18th century was reactionary to the Islamic rule of Aurangzeb and hence was mostly restricted for the first Rajput generation of 18th century. This period of the Rajput opposition to the Muslim rule co-incided with the career of Bajirao I, and hence we find the Rajputs and the Marathas standing on the same footing of religion. But once the Marathas took firm hold of Delhi, the Rajputs, consequently losing all broader out-look consumed their energies in regional feuds and cared little for the Hindu ideals of Sawai Jaysing (11) and had little to appreciate in the religious zeal of the Marathas.+++(5)+++ They only looked towards them as aggressors from the political point of view. The errors on the part of the Maratha Sardars added fuel to the fire and the Rajputs traversed rapidly from dislike to revengeful attitude towards them.

Malharrao Holkar Shapes the Rajput Policy

Even when Bajirao was alive, the Sardars, Holkar and Shinde, had become famous in the North India, Sawai jaysing complained of their harassing activities to the Peshwa and hinted (12) that one day they might grow too powerful even for him.

Malharrao(13) , from the first had created his own sphere, rather independent of Peshwa (but with his understanding) at Bundi. His activities there became a source of anxiety to Sawai Jaysing, a friend of the Peshwa. In a letter to a Udaypur Chief, Peshwa Bajirao I asked to ignore Malharrao (14), whose activities were coming in between the Maratha-Rajput co-operation in 1739 A.D.

After Bajirao’s death and with the coming of the young Peshwa Balajirao’s to Peshwa-ship, Malharrao took liberty to shape the Rajput policy. It was he (15) who brought pressure on the inexperienced Peshwa, to ignore the arguments of Ramchandra Baba putup in favour of Ishwarising and raising his demands (16) left no way open for Ishwarising but to fight. For Kachhwada hatred of the Marathas in 1751 A.D. and onwards, Malharrao’s hasty and shortsighted policy was responsibly to a greater extent.

What the Sardars did in respect of the Rajputs till 1740 A.D., was what the Peshwa planned or guided. But what the Sardars did after that till 1766 A.D., was not all that was desired by the Peshwa.+++(5)+++ As has been explained already, there were certain political and other reasons that were responsible for the change of Rajput attitude towards the Marathas, but after stating this much, let it be said that the blunders of the Sardars at Jaypur or Jodhpur were also equally responsible for the Rajput feeling that ran so high that they preferred foreign Abdali to the Brahman Peshwa from Deccan. In both these cases, Peshwa’s instructions to his Sardars, were reasonable, just and moderate ones.

In the last days of Ranoji Shinde (17), his relations with Malharrao, were far from cordial. Peshwa was then at a loss to understand how to keep them together. After Ranoji’s death Jayappa and Malharrao soon parted company with each other and the Peshwa had to reprimand Malharrao (18) for not cooperating with Jayappa in Bundelkhand. Jayappa’s Marwad affair (1754 A.D. to 1766 A.D.) was in a reaction to Malharrao’s Jat policy. It was a selection of a special sphere for himself just as Agra Subha was a selected sphere by Malharrao for himself. Just as the Peshwa had again and again desired that Ishwarising’s affair should not go beyond control (19), he also proposed (20) to Jayappa that after placing at different places both Ramsing and Vijaysing, he should release himself of the complications and take up other urgent tasks like relieving Kashi, Prayag etc., from the Muslim hands. It will not be too much to say that the delay of two years (1754-56 A.D.) in Marwad affair not only cost the Peshwa a Sardar of repute, but also frustrated his plans that needed to be carried on keeping other political developments into consideration. This had definitely damaging repercussions on the great battle of Panipat. Moreover they spoiled the relation of those two Houses namely the Shinde and the Holkar beyond healing. Jankoji suspected the hand of Malharrao in Jayappa’s murder and refused to see him at poona (21) . One reasonably feels that besides the trap of Madhaosing in not allowing him to depart for the succour of Dattaji, the personal ill feeling must have played to some extent a part in the delay of Malharrao in responding to the urgent calls of Dattaji in December 1759 A.D.

There was a lot of difference between the out-look of these two Houses towards the Rajput policy. During this phase (1743 A.D. to 1766 A.D.) the Shindes seem to have been comparatively much more loyal to the interests of the Peshwa and exhibited little individuality in the execution of the orders of the Peshwa (22) who was equally confident of their support, and relied mainly on them, whereas he was at pains to see that Malharrao was equally loyal to his master’s cause. The reason for this difference in the apt language (23) of the Peshwa, was that the Shindes were soldiers whereas Malharrao was a Sardar. The former were more sensitive, more manly and more consistent to their given words, whereas the latter could assist Madhaosing after 1763 A.D., against the Jat and the Sikhs in spite of his dishonesty in 1751 A.D., and his siding Najib Khan and Abdali in 1761 A.D., and was unscrupulous to the extent of helping Najib Khan and calling him his “adopted son” (Dharmaputra) inspite of the fact (24) that the letter was an avowed enemy of the Marathas.+++(5)+++ Malharrao’s policy was to maintain his Sardari, to avoid extremes and to serve his purpose by a mere show of power and prestige as far as it was possible by a mere show of power and prestige as far as it was possible(25) to do. In the Panipat episode three of the brave personalities sacrified themselves for their nation’s cause with the whole of the Shinde army that cripped the Shinde Sardari at least for 8 years, whereas Malhrarao, though old, was nearly intact with all his force after Panipat and was active till his death in 1766 A.D., serving his State while keeping his own policies before him.

The grief-stricken Peshwa, while departing to Deccan gave his sole authority in the Northern affairs to Malharrao Holkar. At Poona he soon followed his beloved brother and faithful Sardars to heaven. The new Peshwa was quite young and though energetic, was handicapped to do sufficient justice, to the Northern affairs due to Nizam, Bhosale, the aggressive Haidar and ambitious uncle at home. With no Shindes to check him, Malharrao was the sole arbitrator of the Maratha policies in the North, including the Rajput policy after Panipat.

The generation of Bajirao Peshwa, under whom he had served, had gone. The following generation of Balaji Peshwa nearly perished in the national calamity of Panipat. The enemies in the North rose from all quarters, but old and infirm Malharrao was firmly facing the onslaught that came from all directions, like an old tree that heroically maintains against many a changing seasons. With his death in 1766 A.D., the IInd phase of the Maratha-Rajput relations rightly closes in.

Foot Notes (Description)

• (1) ‘Hingne Daftar’ I - 19.
• (2) “Alas! Alas! The heedless Emperor is after an innocent person like me. If only I had been assured of the satifactory conduct of the Emperor, even to a small extend, God is witness, that within the course of one year I would root out these wretches (the Marathas) from the provinces of Deccan.” “The Emperor, however was day and night platting to lay his hands on Nizam-ul-Mulk. He offen asked his nobles to embark on a campaign against him.” -
• (3)‘Hingne Daftar’ I-13,15,17.
• (4) Ibid - 19.
• (5)‘Purandare Daftar’ I-157, 220
• (6) S.P.D. 2-31.
• (7) ‘Patre Yadi’ - 83.
• (8)‘Marathi Riyasat’ (Peshwa Balajirao), pp. 146 to 149.
• (9)S.P.D. 27-218, ‘Marathi Riyasat’ (Peshwa Balajirao), pp. 314, 315
• (10) S.P.D. 29, 118.
• (11) ‘Hingne Daftar’ I-15, 17, 19
• (12)S.P.D. 14-47.
• (13)‘Purandare Daftar’ I-185.
• (14)B.I.S.M (July 1920)
• (15)S.P.D. 2-1, 25, S.P.D. 27-17, 18 and 19
• (16)‘Purandare Daftar’ I-185, 196.
• (17) ‘Purandare Daftar’ I-157, 159.
• (18) S.P.D. 21-15.
• (19)S.P.D. 27-26.
• (20) ‘Patre Yadi’ - 121, 141.
• (21) M.I.S. Vol. VI-318.
• (22)‘Patra Yadi’ - 92-127, 166.
• (23)Ibid - 141.
• (24)M.I.S. Vol. I-48, ‘Fall of the Mughal Empire’ by H. G. Keene, pp. 80 and 81, ‘marathi Riyasat’ Vol. VI, p. 30.
• (25)‘Holkar Shahi’ I-226 and 227, ‘Panipat’ - p. 26.

THE JAIPUR EPISODE

Ishwarising the King of Jaypur

In Janurary 1744 A.D. the Peshwa sent the robes, elephant and horses for the occasion of “Tika” for Ishwarising. He deputed Bapuji Mahadeo Hingne on his behalf to Jaypur. Ishwarising and Rajamalji had sent him letters (1)in which friendly feelings were expressed and assistance of army was sought. Peshwa was favourable to him and wrote to his Sardars in the North to take up the cause of Ishwarising (2) against his brother Madhaosing. Jagatsing, the Rana of Udaypur, had taken up the cause of Madhaosing and, with an intention of fighting, had marched upto Jamoli near Jahajpur at the end of 1743 A.D. There upon Ishwarsing had promised to give a fief to his brother Madhaosing.

As per the orders of the Peshwa, Rachandra Baba (3) and the Sardars asked Ranoji to handover Madhaosing to their care and promised to give him a fief worth five lakhs, besides Rampura and some cash (Janurary 1745 A.D.). But no settlement could be affected as Madhaosing was hardly satisfied over this much share. His ambition was to snatch away half of the kingdom from Ishwarising. His second attempt in 1745 A.D., also met with a failure and he and his maternal uncle had to save himself by running back to Udaypur.

Malharrao Pleades for a Changes of Side

Judging correctly (4) the strength of Ishwarsing in his friendship with the Marathas, the Maharana approached the right person for his cause among the Marathas, namely Malharrao Holkar who inclining favourably dispatched Keshao Pancholi, Jaysing Sekhavat from Ranaji’s side and Kaniram from Madhaosing to Peshwa to secure Maratha help to the side of Madhaosing (December 1747 A.D.).

But Ramchandra Babu, the Diwan of Shinde, was opposed to such a move of change of side. He wrote, “Madhaosing’s offer is false. There is no chance of getting any money from him. People here know that we have up till now supported Ishwarsing. It would now be scandalous to shift our ground”.

But Malharrao had already committed himself to Madhaosing’s cause. Ranoji being already dead, he was the only elderly person left in Peshwa’s Sardars. With experience in warfare, and constant success he had grown over-confident and was in no position to hear such an opposition to his policy. He vehemently pleaded his case before the Peshwa. He wrote (5) to the Peshwa not to mind the writing of Ramchandra Baba since he was interested in Ishwarising. He further added that Ramchandra Baba was too proud of his own judgment, to care little for the Peshwa’s work even if it would be ruined thereby. He informed the Peshwa that Ranaji had promised him to pay 20 lakhs as “Nazr” if Madhaosing was assigned a jagir of 25 lakhs. He further assured the Peshwa that there was no chance of any trouble since all the Amirs of Delhi were favourable to Madhaosing’s cause and with the Hadas and the Rathods on their side, Ishwarising had no way but to come to terms. He also urged the Peshwa to take the cause of Umedsing the son of Budhsing of Bundi, so that the issue be not tackled successfully by Ishwarising himself, if they delayed to intervene in the matter.

Malharrao viewed the whole affair from practical point of view. He was sure of forcing a settlement (6) on Ishwarising of granting a fief of 25 lakhs to Madhaosing by sheer weight of combination. Thus the Marathas would get 20 lakhs of rupees by a mere show of force. It never entered in his mind that Ishwarising or the people of Jaypur would oppose the proposal of the partition of their kingdom. Sawai Jaysing never wished Madhaosing to be the king of Jaypur, inspite of his assurance at Pushkar (1709 A.D. to 1710 A.D.). Madhaosing has been all the while with his maternal uncle at Udaypur and Ishwarishing had already become the king of Udaypur. It was not only unjust but also immoral to force a partition on Ishwarising who had proved he to be a capable ruler. But practical Malharrao hinted to the Peshwa that if they neglected the chance of interference into the internal affair, the Rajput Chiefs would decide the matter amongst themselves and thus the Marathas would be not where. But if they only chose to take up the lead in the matter, not only they would be monetarily profitted, but the Rajputs would come under their influence.

He assured the Peshwa that he was capable enough to settle the issue between the brothers, Ishwarising and Madhaosing avoiding any possible mishap and for that he was ready to take a pledge. He urged the Peshwa not to be carried away by the writing of Ramchandra Baba who was trying his best to prove him a false man. He finally wrote that the Peshwa knew that he would stand for his pledge and that he should not take it to be a mere writing. (August 1747 A.D.)

Thus, as opposed to Ramchandra Baba (7) , Malharrao made Madhaosing’s affair a prestige point at the cost of rightful Ishwarising and plunged the State of Jaypur into a civil war making the Maratha name of to suffer for the first time in the North Indian politics.+++(5)+++ For all the affair-effects of this shortsighted policy, only Malharrao was responsible with his pride, his recklessness, his greed for money and his under-rating of the Rajput character, chivalry and valour.

The Role of the Peshwa

Even though the Peshwa needed money badly to pay off the debt of Satara, he was not a greedy man like Malharrao who could not convince him of the justness of his policy. Infact Peshwa agreed fully with Ramchandra Baba. Malharrao, feeling that he was losing ground with the Peshwa, wrote finally (8) that it was not good for the Peshwa (9) to insult him by following the advice of Ramchandra Baba and that he had not undertaken Madhaosing’s cause for the destruction of the Maratha cause.+++(5)+++ Matters had reached the extreme limit. After all, the Peshwa could not displease Malharrao. He tried to soothe him by writing that there was no need of so much dejection (10) on his part. What they were expected to do was not to encourage any strife in the Kachhwah family by their actions. The Peshwa hinted that if the matter went to extremity, it was Malharrao in the long run, who would be obliged to settle the issue. He urged Malharrao to view Ranaji and Ishwarising in the same light. According to him, the problem needed to be solved thoughtfully and with due pressure. (January 1747 A.D.).

Malharrao Takes Up the Cause of Madhaosingh

Malharrao viewed Madhaosing’s affair as a challenge to his capacity as a Sardar in the same way some forty years hence Mahadaji took up the challenge of the insignificant Jaypur Darbar.

Malharrao (11) effected a treaty with Ranaji by which it was settled that :

• The paraganas of Tonk, Toda, Malpura and Newai with a total revenue of 18 lakhs were to be handed over to Madhaosing.
• Bundi was to be given to Umedsing, who should be loyal to Ishwarising and pay the dues to the Marathas.
• Nenwe, Samadhi and Karwar paraganas were to be with the Rao Raja and Pratapsing Hada.
• With this understanding, he sent Khanderao Holkar to Ranoji and Nimbaji Khatke, Ramrao Munshi and Bakshi Ram to Ishwarising for soliciting his approval to the treaty.

Ishwarising was then engaged in a fight with Shivsing Sakhtawat but hearing of the designs of the Rana and Malharrao he effected a settlement with Shivsing and made him his adherent. He assambled all the Rajputs in his kingdom and prepared for the coming fight (February 1747 A.D.).

The Battle of Rajmahal (1747 A.D.)

Ranaji sent his army under Bharatsing towards Jaypur. Khanderao joined thim army on the border of Jaypur and Mewad. The Chiefs of Kota and Shahapur were to join them soon. Ishwarising, hearing of it, sent Narayandas with full preparation to oppose the Rana’s army and was to send Rayamalji on the Chiefs of Kota. But suddenly Rayamalji died (9th of February 1741 A.D.) causing a national grief. However this did not deter Ishwarising who asked Narayandas to fall upon the Ranaji’s army under Bharatsing before he go reinforcements. Raja Narayandas accordingly encamped 2 kos from the Rana’s army with an intention to give a fight.

But dreading further complications, Narayandas decided to come to terms in order to avoid the battle. He went back to Jaypur and tried to convince Ishwarsing. He told that even Malharrao wanted amicable settlement and it was better to avoid the battle since Malharrao’s son had joined the Rana’s army. Not only the Rana, but the Marathas would become their enemy, moreover no Rajput would lend a willing support and hence, he proposed that conciliation was the best possible way out. But Ishwarising had thought over the matter more perfectly and hence was not ready to succumb to any pressure. He said, “I should rule, if I am destined for it. Whatever may happen, a fight is essential. Rajamalji is dead, Vidyaadhar is confined to bed, Rajputs are lukewarm and you (Narayandas) advise me for a compromise. It clearly means that ultimately, I have to make myself ready to bear the burden and hence whatever may happen, I have to move.” Thus speaking he entered the tents and joined his army.

The fight (12) between the armies of Ishwarising and Ranaji was a severe one and continued for two days. Khanderao Holkar and Bhopatrao came from Bundi had not taken any part in the fight, but when they tried to loot the baggage, the Shekhawats kept to guard the same, defended themselves successfully. Finally the Rana’s army gave way and fled away. Not only the expectation of Malharrao, that Ishwarising would listen to his proposal thought sheer weight of the combination, had proved false, but also that he had won a battle in the presence of Khanderao to the opposite side. The matter had gone now beyond the reach of Malharrao since Maratha name was involved in the defeat.

“The Kingdom is the Gift of god”

But the Peshwa (13) still wanted peaceful settlement and hence wrote his envoy (April 1749 A.D.) at Jaypur that he wished nothing but the well being of Ishwarising and hence desired that the would come to a peaceful settlement with the Sardars and end the dispute. Ishwarising there upon addressed Govind Tamaji thus,

The friendly relations between the House of Jaypur and the Peshwa are hereditary and exceptional. Sawai Jaysing and Bajirao had been friends and Balajirao knows the things doen by Sawai Jaysing for the Srimant. Even now we value the word of Balajirao. But this is a family feud and moreover we are kings, we are bound by the policy followed through generations. This is a quarrel over land. How can it be given? I have given (to Madhaosing) whatever was possible in the name of service. If pressed for more, how can it be given without a fight? By handing over the territory to a younger brother, whole of my kingdom? Srimant and the Sardars are determined to give him more, but that will not take place. Kingdom is a gift of God. He alone will get it on which God bestows it. But the Marathas have changed side.

Thus firm in his attitude, Ishwarising assembled his forces and destroying all the supplies so that they should not be of use to the Marathas, he go ready to receive them. Very soon the Peshwa (14) came to the North, in connection with his assistance to the Emperor against Abdali. On his way to Deccan, he halted at Newai (15) 39 miles south of Jaypur ( 21st may 1748 A.D.). Madhaosing met him there. But Ishwarising shut himself up in Jaypur feeling humiliated for his flight from Manpur, where he had gone to assist the imperial army against Abdali. He sent Keshaodas, son of Rajamal to the Peshwa. This proved to be his mistake, for it made Peshwa lean completely on the side of Madhaosing. Peshwa sent his agents to Jaypur and demanded 50 lakhs of rupees from Ishwarising and desired him to accept the demand of half the territory for Madhosing. Ishwarising was ready to pay 25 lakhs to the Peshwa, but was not ready to divide his kingdom as per the Peshwa’s demand, as he regarded the kingdom as the secred trust of his ancestors. No settlement (16) hence was possible.

Battle of Bagru- Ishwarising Defeated, (August 1748 A.D.)

The Jaypur question now entered into the last phase. Malharrao (17) entered Jaypur in July 1748 A.D. and occupying Tonk, Toda and Malpura, handed the same to Madhaosing. He advanced further. Umedsing Hada and Durjansal Hada joined him. They met no opposition till they were faced by Ishwarising at Bagru, 23 miles east of Sambhar. Surajmal Jat was on the side of Ishwarising.

The battle raged for 6 days inspite of heavy rains. The Maratha cut the supplies of Jaypur force and Gangadhar Tatya lockaded the way towards Jaypur and looted the territory up to Sambhar. Ishwarising, being overpowered, took shelter in the fort of Bagru in distress. Through Keshaodas he agreed to give five paraganas for Madaosing and Bundi to Umedsing. He then met Holkar an 9th of August and pledged for friendship. The next day the Marathas and their allies returned to Malpur Todiya accompained by Ishwarising’s men namely Harnathsing, Mahabatsing, Sawantsing Naruka to evacuate the places. Ishwarising went back to his capital.

The Triagic End of Ishwarising

Bagru had convinced Ishwarising that he could not continue the fight against the combination for a long. As the opposition was gaining ground, frustration seized his heart. He grew suspicious. Meanwhile his mind was being poisoned by Hargovind Natani against Keshaodas, as he was jealous of the latter. Ishwarising was convinced that Keshaodas was the man of Malharrao. One day (18) he called Keshaodas to his persence and gave him poison to drink. Invain Keshaodas pleaded his innocence, but it was of no avail. At last uttering “Govind, Govind” he drank the poison, immediately fainted and died. When the people of Jaypur knew about this incident (19) , they felt very much for the innocent minister. (August 1750 A.D.)

Keshaodas was a devoted minister who had served his master faithfully on many trying occasion. He was well acquainted with the Maratha way of living and according to the poet Suryamal he could speak Marathi very well.

The death of Keshaodas made the position of Ishwarising worst. Hardly any sagacious advisor was left with him. Vidyadhar (20) was nearly invalid, and Shivnath Bhayya was thrown into prison with his entire family, wives and children. He was nearly forsaken by all even by his prudence.

Malharrao in Deccan came to know about the death the Keshaodas from his commandar in the North, Rajerao. He determined to avenge the death of Keshaodas. Starting from Deccan, he reached Betwad (September 1750 A.D.) and halted there in expectation of the arrival of Jayappa Shinde. Maharao Durjansal (21) of Kota, sent his agent Veiram Bhat to see Malharrao, as the latter came on the Narmada. Malharrao then reached Indore and waited there for the rest of the Sardars to join him (October-November 1750 A.D.).

Ishwarising’s position had grown weaker still. Deserted by all his allies, driven to desperation, he expected nothing but vengence at the hands of Malharrao over the death of Keshaodas.

On 19th of November 1750 A.D., (22) Malharrao and Gangadhar Tatya reached Mukundara Ghat. On 28th they seized Nenwe and turned it into a Maratha post by turning out the queen of the Chief, and handed it over to Balaji Shamraj Kamavisdar of Bundi. At Nenwe they halted for 10 days. From there they advanced towards Jaypur. When they were at a distance of three days march from Jaypur, Malharrao met the envoy of Isharising with two lakhs of rupees, but he was highly displeased at the little sum offered and paying no heed to the request resumed his march.

The frightened envoy wrote the king that Malharrao meant to avenge the death of Keshaodas. Now Hargovind Natani and Vidyadhar, previous ministers, who had been removed from their posts by the king, advised him to collect force and meet Malharrao either in the field or from the protected city. Ishwarising now was not his former self. He asked his men to pacify Malharrao by paying 4 to 5 lakhs of rupees. But nobody was ready to approach Malharrao for fear of being killed by him in revenge for Keshaodas’s death. They implored the king to kill them but not to send them to Malharrao. This shows the dread Malharrao had created in the hearts of Ishwarising’s supporters. The king felt helpless. He kept silence and began to brood over his lot.

On December 12 1750, news came by the evening that Malharrao was only 20 miles away from Jaypur. But Ishwarising had nothing to face the Maratha challenge. The sun that set in the West was the last one for Ishwarising to behold. His end was drawing near. It was impossible for him to humble himself before Malharrao. That was worse than death. He asked his servant to procure live Kobra and Somal-Khar to prepare medicine. In the dead of night, the king swallowed the poison and bit the kobra to himself. His three queens also drank the poison. Thus Ishwarising paid back for the life of Keshaodas and for the thoughtless pleadge of Sawai Jaysing given at Pushkar (1709-10 A.D.). The four corpses lay unheeded in the palace nearly for four “Prahars” of the day. This was what Malharrao achieved by the pledge (23) he had given to Peshwa. Ishwarising had preferred death to accepting division of his territory. He thought like a true Rajput and died like a true Rajput. Malharrao had no business to interfere in his family affair.

There is no parallel example in the whole of Maratha History where Maratha influence-directly or indirectly-effected such an unlucky mishap. Malharrao knew only one thing and that was the force of the sword. He was hardly capable of going into the thought of Ishwarising who treated the kingdom as heavenly inheritance.

This hideous act from which the Marathas could never shake off their responsibility, had many repercussions in future in the Maratha-Rajput relations.+++(5)+++ It sealed forever the character of the Marathas in the eyes of the Rajputs. From hereafter common religion and culture played but a little part in their relationship. This was the starting point of the deadly enmity that the Rajputs bore towards the Marathas throughout the 18th century that resulted into cowardly murders and ruthless devastation. The brotherly feeling created by the first Peshwa was scarified for ever, as hereafter the Marathas had little time, chance, patience or foresight to heal up the wounds of the Rajput mind. The latter actions of Madhaosing and the Rajputs prove that they were acting, besides other things, under the spell of the tragic death of Ishwarising, who was a victim of Maratha aggession in the eyes of Kachhawa State.

Madhaosing Made the King of Jaypur

On 13th of December 1750 A.D., the advance party of the Marathas under Khanderao Holkar and Gangadhar Tatya appeared before Jaypur and Malharrao with the rest of army encamped 6 miles away from the city. There was no reaction to the Marathas either from the king or his ministers till the noon. At last the servant revealed the truth of the suicide of the king and the whole city was plunged into grief. Hargovind and Vidyadhar pacified the people and went outside the city to meet the Maratha Chiefs. The sad news was despatched to Malharrao who came near the city from the camp by the evening. He sent his men to ascertain the truth. The corpses were still lying there, the next day till evening. Malharrao managed to send the required material for the funeral ceremony, which took place in the palace garden. With Ishwarising his three queens and 20 concubines burnt themselves on the funeral pyre.

Next day on 14th of December 1751, a courier was dispatched to Madhaosing immediately. On 29th of December, he came and was welcomed by Malharrao as the king of Jaypur and was carried to the palace on his own elephant.

Jayappa Shinde arrived with his army on 6th January 1751 A.D. it was agreed that the city should be given protection on receipt of money. But the Maratha demand (24) of one third or at least one fourth of Jaypur territory annoyed the king and his ministers.+++(4)+++ On the background of recent tragedy a feeling of retaliation seized the heart of Madhaosing. A big army of Shekhawats ??

Nothing (25) but a total destruction of the Marathas was what he aimed at. He persistently called the Maratha Chiefs for a dinner. At first Malharrao agreed but when Jayappa flatly declined, he also cancelled his going. It was a providential relief, and the Maratha were saved, for Madhosing had mixed poison with food as well as with drinking water.

Another trap to destroy the Marathas was hatched the next day. Madhaosing called the Maratha Chiefs including Gangadhar Tatya for a talk to his palace. It was pre-planned that as soon as the palankins were inside the city, the gates should be closed. But the Maratha Chiefs luckily came separately and this attempt also failed. But Madhaosing had still another scheme in his view and he succeeded, at last in bringing the Marathas in his trap.

Massacre of the Marathas in Jaypur City

Jaypur with its fine construction, beautiful temples and huge places was then a brilliant city in India. On 10th of January the Marathas entered the city gates, having no suspicion of any treachery, on the contrary, with a feeling of confidence, as it was Madhaosing on the throne of Jaypur, whom they had placed there. Treachery is highly successful when the victim is in complete ignorance of its existence. The unsuspected Marathas had come to have a leisurely look at the beauty of the city and to make purchases of horses, camels and the rest of articles of soldiers of this group belonged to Jayappa who had least connection with the fateful incident of 13th December. A few of these soldiers had palankins, that indicated their high ranks. There were young men as well as old, women as well as children, in the group.

All of a sudden, the doors of the rampart were closed at the instance of Madhaosing and a general massacre of the bewildered Marathas began, that continued for 12 hours, from midday to midnight. Madhaosing got ample satisfaction of revenge on those who had recently helped him to rise to the exalted position. About fifteen hundred (26) men were killed outright, one thousand were wounded, only seventeen returned safely. Most of the wounded had broken their limbs in their attempt to jump from the rampart. Among those who were killed, many were higher officers of Jayappa’s army, about a hundred were Brahmans, many lady servants and there were even small children.+++(5)+++ A thousand fine horses, ornaments of gold, pearl necklesses and other valuables were lost to the plunderers.

If it was all in the name of revenge for Ishwarising’s death, what was the punishment for Madhaosing himself whose hands were equally stained with the blood of Ishwarising? It Malharrao Holkar had been greedy and hasty in the affair; it was Ranaji and Madhaosing who forced him with alluring inducements to forsake the cause of Ishwarising. But, nevertheless, it was a lesson to Malharrao indeed. In opposition to Ramchandra Baba, he had placed Madhaosing on the throne of Jaypur and the latter had paid him in right coins for his short-sighted-policy.

The outcome

The reaction of the deadly on slought in the city was highly detrimental to the safety of the Marathas outside. As if a racial hatred seized the hearts of Rajputs, Roads were closed to them and their men (27) , carrying news letters were killed. After two days (i.e. on 12th of January 1751 A.D.) the Marathas leaving the vicinity of Jaypur, encamped 8 miles away from it. Madhaosing, sent his envoys to them, pleaded innocence and requested for a peaceful settlement. The Maratha Chiefs knew all but could do little to retaliate. They had no force sufficient to storm the city and hence they deemed it wise to consent to the request of Madhaosing and the settlement was effected on the following terms:

• All the horses captured, should be returned to the Marathas.
• All the plunder be returned.
• The bankers of the city be asked to pay off the settled fund.

But Madhaosing was hardly sincere. He avoided the payment on this or that pretext for three weeks. Meanwhile as all supplies were cut off, the Maratha camp suffered from scaricity of grain.

At this time, Safdar Jang, the Wazir (28) was engaged in a fight with the Rohillas of the Doab, and was hard pressed by them. He had sent his envoys, Ram Narayan and Raja Jugal kishor, who were present in the Maratha camp and pressing them to start for the assistence (29) of Safdar Jang. On 7th of February Malharrao was 24 miles away (30) from Jaypur. After a few days (31) (12-2-1751 A.D.) he resumed his regular march towards Oudh.

The Kachhawas got a new king and the Marathas a new enemy. They got nothing out of the expected fund excepting 25 to 30 elephants and 50 to 75 horses that were carried in the Maratha camp after the suicide of Ishwarising (32) . The Kachhawas, the Hadas and the Rana united against them and a new chapter (33) began in the history of the Maratha-Rajput relations.

Foot Notes (Description)

(1) ‘Hingne Daftar’ I-28.

(2) Ibid - 27.

(3) Ibid - 29.

(4) S.P.D. 21-27.

(5) S.P.D. 27-18, 19.

(6) S.P.D. 27-28.

(7) S.P.D. 2-25

(8) ‘Purandar Daftar’ I-199.

(9) S.P.D. 2-25.

(10) S.P.D. 27-26.

(11) S.P.D. 2-1, 3.

(12) S.P.D. 21-24, S.P.D. 2-4.

(13) S.P.D. 2-11.

(14) S.P.D. 2-9, Purandare Daftar I-168.

(15) S.P.D. 27-30, M.I.S. Vol. VI-190, 191, 581, Purandare Dafter I-168.

(16) S.P.D. 27-35.

(17) ‘Hingne Daftar’ I-30, M.I.S. Vol, VI, 291, 648, ‘Purandare’ I-185, 196.

(18) S.P.D. 21-34. S.P.D. 2-15, 19.

(19) “????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????

(20) S.P.D. 2-15.

(21) S.P.D. 21-34

(22) S.P.D. 2-31.

(23) S.P.D. 27-28.

(24) S.P.D. 27-64.

(25) S.P.D. 2-31

(26) S.P.D. 27-64, M.I.S. Vol. VI-291, S.P.D. 27-65-Hari Vithal while reporting (12-2-1751) Bhausaheb, states the figure for 5 to 6 hundred. S.P.D. 27-67, Sardars also report to Antaji the figure to be from 500 to 1000.

(27) S.P.D. 2-29, S.P.D. 2-3.

(28) S.P.D. 27-65.

(29) S.P.D. 21-38, 40, S.P.D. 2-26, 28, 30.

(30) S.P.D. 27-64.

(31) S.P.D. 27-65, ‘Jaypur Kharitas’ 7-2

(32) S.P.D. 2-31.

(33) S.P.D. 2-30, S.P.D. 27-67.

CIVIL WAR IN DELHI

Sardar Jang Seeks Maratha Help Against the Pathans

Wazir Safdar Jang held the Subhas of Allahabad and Oudh. The Rohillas of Barelli and the Bangash Pathans of Farrukhabad were his bitter enemies. They were fanatic Sunni Musalmans and hated the Shia Wazir. They had close contacts with Ahmed Shah Abdali of Kabul who always entered the plains of Northern India at their call (1). These Pathans were the hereditary foes of the Mughals and dreamed of the, “restoration (2) of their rule at Delhi, and failing this, they wished to coerce the Emperor, so far as to secure for themselves the posts of Wazir and the Mir Bakshi, doing away with Safdarjang’s power.” The Emperor was also opposed to his Wazir and had attempted to depose him with the help of the Turani party and had called Nasir Jang from Deccan for the same purpose. But Safdar Jang was successful in frustrating his plan with the help of the Marathas (3) .

The Pathans rose against the Wazir in 1749 (4). The next year, they suddenly attacked his camp near Farrukhabad and on 3rd of August, killed his Bakshi Nawalray and plundered his whole camp. Safdar Jang fought (5) a severe battle near Farrukhabad on 12th September 1750, to save his territory, but the Pathans defeated him thoroughly. They then plundered (6) his capital, Lucknow, burnit and plundered the city Allahabad, took possession of Jaunpur and Gazipur and then marched on Benaras by crossing Ganga.

In sore distress Safdar Jang sent his personal agents Rajaram Narayan (7) and Jugul Kishor to the Marathas inviting them speedily for his help. After settling their work at Jaypur Malharrao and Jayappa proceeded (8) to join him and met him on 2nd March 1751 A.D. It was settled that they should be paid rupees 25 thousand per day (9) for help.

In March and April 1751 A.D., the Marathas exerted so vigorously that the Rohillas and the Pathans were routed (10) completely. Wrote Govind Pant bundele (11) , “Ahmad Khan met the fate he deserved on the banks of Ganga. Had he not been so routed, the Marathas would have lost their labours and acquisitions of former years. The most faithless of all the Pathans, Turai Khan had joined Ahmad Khan Bangash and was killed with all his followers.”

In lieu of their expenses and dues the Marathas obtained a large territory in Doab by the treaty of Lucknow. (February 1752 A.D.).

Kanauj Agreement (12th April 1752 A.D.)

Meanwhile the Pathans had invited Abadali to put down their enemy Safdar Jang and his Maratha allies. In response to the call, Abadali had reached the vicinity of Lahor, leaving Kabul in December 1751 A.D. In fear, the Emperor sent urgent summons to his Wazir to repair at once to the Capital with the Maratha contingents to save the situation. Safdar Jang at once saw Shinde and Holkar at Kanauj as they were about to leave for Deccan. He effected with them a formal agreement for their support to the Emperor’s cause, on behalf of the Emperor, on 12th April 1752 A.D. The agreement contained the following terms (12) .

• That the Peshwa should defend the Emperor from his internal enemies like Pathans, the Rajputs and other Rebels, and from external foes like the Afgan king Abdali.
• That the Emperor should pay 50 lakhs to the Marathas for their help, of which 30 lakhs was to be paid on account of Abdali and 20 lakhs for internal foes like the Pathans.
• That in addition, the Peshwa was given the right to levy Chauth from the Punjab, Sindh and Doab.
• That if Peshwa could not come personally to serve the Emperor, he should depute his Sardars for the purpose.

To put this contract into execution, Safdar Jang, with Shinde and Holkar immediately went to Delhi. But before they reached Delhi, an agreement was signed by the Emperor by which the two Subhas of Lahor and Multan had been delivered to Abdali in order to prevent his march on Delhi (13) . (23rd April 1752 A.D.)

The main cause for which the Maratha help was sought was over. But the Marathas would not move out of Delhi, unless they were paid their promised 50 lakhs. At this very moment, a call to the Sardars from the Peshwa, to repair to South (14) with Gaziuddin, came. The Emperor granted Gaziuddin, the Subhadarship of Deccan for which he paid 30 lakhs as Nazar. The same amount was paid to the Marathas as part payment of the amount promised and the Sardars (15) with Gaziuddin left for Deccan on 14th May 1752 A.D.

The Wazir, The Jat and The Rajputs Combine Against The Marathas

The friendship of Safdar Jang with the Marathas did not last for a long. Antaji (16) informed that though he spoke in a sweet tone with the Sardars, he was conspiring with Salabat Jang the Nizam to engage the Marathas in the South so that he would come to Malwa with the Jat and the Rajputs. Antaji had intercepted letters from Salabat Jang to the Wazir in which he had stated that even if he was forced to conclude peace with the Marathas for the time being, he would see them again, when their forces would be away on some errand.

The reason for the change of attitude of the Wazir towards the Marathas was that the Emperor had appointed Imad-ul-Mulk the son of late Gaziuddin (17) (who accompanied the Sardars to Deccan on 14th May 1751 A.D., and who was poisoned on 16th of October 1752 A.D.) as Mir Bakshi and had conferred on him the Suibhadari of Deccan and given him the title of Nizam-ul-Mulk, inspite of the fact that Safdar Jang had been pressing the Emperor for the appointment of his son as Mir Bakshi and to assign the Subha of Agra to Madhaosing and Surajmal Jat.

The Emperor told Antaji that Ajmer and Agra belonged to the Peshwa as per the previous agreement (12th April 1752 A.D.) and that he had appointed the son of Gaziuddin as Mir Bakshi in view of Peshwa’s wishes.

The natural outcome of this appointment was the unity of Safdar Jang, Surajmal Jat, Madhaosing and Salabat Jang the Nizam.

As Gaziuddin II was the Maratha nominee, appointed against the wish of Safdar Jang as Mir Bakshi, it was natural that Safdar Jang should go against the Marathas. Jats and the Rajputs were the natural enemies of the Marathas over the question of the acquisition of the Subhas of Agra and Ajmer respectively (and for Agra Subha, Jaypur and the Jats were again the natural rivals.) It is very clear, hence, that the Maratha-Rajput rivalry in the second phase of their relations, was a natural outcome of the political advancement of the Marathas towards supremacy. And hence, even if the Maratha-Jaypur relations had not been strained due to the mishap of Ishwarising and the subsequent massacre of the Marathas in Jaypur city in January 1751 A.D. the Rajputs and the Marathas would never have been friends for political reasons (18) . Even though the Kachhwah, and the Jat rivalry was inevitable for Agra Subha, they tended to unite against the powerful Marathas, their common enemy.

Surajmal Jat met Madhaosing and Bakhtsing and then the Wazir at Delhi and told him that the Nawab (Gaziuddin) had handed over the Empire to the Marathas. The Emperor and the Peshwa had become brothers exchanging their turbans and asked him where lay his Wazirship (19) . He resented that he had given Agra and Ajmer to the Marathas, as a result of which their (Jat and Rajput) places had also gone to them. He proposed that under such circumstances, when the Maratha forces were engaged in Deccan (against the Nizam in 1752 A.D.) they should do away with the Nawab (Gaziuddin II) and carrying away the Emperor to Agra, all united, should drive away the Marathas. Thus it was settled (July 1752 A.D.).

The Anxiety of the Emperor

The Emperor grew anxious over the intrigues of his all-powerful Wazir. Meanwhile Bakhtsing died (21st September 1752 A.D.). The Emperor seems to have faith in him, for, on hearing of his death, he told Bapuji Hingne that he had none on his side excepting the Peshwa. He (20) sent urgent calls to Madhaosing to proceed to Delhi. It seems he had no knowledge about Madhaosing’s friendship with the Wazir, who had sent Muhammad Alibeg to Madhaosing with a “Tika”. Madhaosing was to proceed to Delhi after his junction at Jaypur with Vijaysing who was near Ajmer with a force of 5 thousand. At the same time he was waiting for the news from Deccan about the struggle between the Peshwa and Salabat Jang. North and South thus alienated against the Marathas. Surajmal Jat was in Delhi with the Wazir. Even the mother of the Emperor sided with the Wazir (December 1752 A.D.).

Meanwhile Abdali had crossed Atak (21) and sent his envoy to Delhi to demand 50 lakhs of rupees. The Emperor was afraid that either Abdali would march on Delhi which being a divided house was unable to stand against him, or he would occupy his three Subhas of Kabul, Multan and Lahor worth rupees 10 Crores. He asked his counselors the way out. They all retorted him that he should ask that question to the Marathas whom he had given the fine Subhas of Ajmer and Akbarabad and the “Chauth” of 22 Subhas. The Rajputs, the Mughlia party, and the Jats had all become jealous of the Marathas and hated them (22) for their predominance at Delhi.

Civil War in Delhi (March to November 1753 A.D.)

The Rajputs tried to profit at the dissension between the Emperor and the Wazir. Both the parties were trying to enlist co-operation of Madhaosing. The Emperor had good opinion about Madhosing who tried to utilize the situation for the gain of Ranthambhor (23) .

The Jat Chief (24), Madhaosing and Bakhtsing (then alive) pressed the Emperor, for the Subhas of Ajmer and Agra when the Sardars were in Deccan but he did not listen to them in this respect and prepared a force of 25 thousand men with the help of Bapuji Mahadeo Hingne and Imad-ul-Mulk (Gaziuddin II). Salabat Jang’s wakil was pressing for the “Farman” of the Subhas of Deccan through the Wazir, but the Emperor turned him away saying that they belonged to Imad-ul-Mulk under the guidance and supervision of the Peshwa and that Salabat Jang at the most should accept Bhaganagar and serve Imad-ul-Mulk and should not interfere with the rest of the five Subhas.

This alienated completely(25) the Rajputs and the Jats who sided with the Wazir. With their support, and with the divided Turani party, the Wazir became too powerful for the Emperor. The question involved in the civil war was the grant of “Chauth” of the rest of India excepting Lahor, Multan and Kabul, and the Subhas of Ajmer and Agra to the Marathas. The Emperor naturally depended mostly on the Peshwa whom he and Gaziuddin wrote pressing letters for support, offering one crore of rupees (26) and the two Subhas of Oudh and Allahabad in return for help.

The Peshwa in return despatched Raghunathrao along with Shinde and Holkar from Poona. But before they could reach Delhi, the civil war was over. Madhaosing and Surajmal exerted effectively for a treaty which was concluded finally on seventh November 1753 A.D. Safdar Jang after that, departed for Lucknow.

Foot Notes (Description)

(1) Patre Yadi - 83, ‘The first two Nawabs of Oudh’ - p. 177, ‘New Hist.’ Vol. II - p. 376.

(2) M.I.S. Vol. III-160.

(3) ‘Hingne Daftar’ I-34, 38 to 41, S.P.D. 2-12a to 12e, 13, 14.

(4) S.P.D.2-15.

(5) S.P.D. 21-31.

(6) S.P.D. 2-20 to 24.

(7) S.P.D. 2-26, 28, 31, S.P.D. 27-65, 67, S.P.D. 21-38.

(8) ‘Jaypur Kharitas’ - 3-7, S.P.D. 21-40, 41, ‘Hingne Daftar’ 1-58.

(9) ‘New Hist.’ Vol. II, p. 375.

(10) ‘Jaypur Kharitas’ 3-14, S.P.D. 2-32, S.P.D. 21-43, ‘Holkar Shahi’ - I-79, 80, 84, 145, M.I.S. Vol. III-384, ‘Patre Yadi’ - 79, 83.

(11) M.I.S. Vol. III-160

(12) ‘Jaypur Kharitas’ 3-18, ‘New Hist.’ Vol. II-p. 379, M.I.S. Vol. VI p. 82, ‘Kota Daftar’ I-86.

(13) ‘New Hist.’ Vol. II-p380.

(14) ‘Hingne Daftar’ I-54.

(15) ‘Holkar Shahi’ I-88, ‘Jaypur Kharitas’ 3-31, 32.

(16) S.P.D. 24-44, 45.

(17) Ibid - 45, Hingne Daftar I-58.

(18) The Maratha relations with Jaypur strained after the ‘Kanauj pact’ - See ‘Jaypur Kharitas’ - 3-24,27,28,33,35,41,47,62., ‘Hingne Daftar’ I-57

(19) S.P.D. 21-50.

(20) S.P.D. 27-68.

(21) S.P.D. 21-45.

(22) S.P.D. 21-53.

(23) ‘Hingne Daftar’ I-81, 82.

(24) S.P.D. 21-57.

(25) Ibid - 55.

(26) ‘New Hist.’ Vol. II-p.383

The MARWAD AFFAIR

Ramsing Seeks Maratha Help

Abhaysing of Jodhpur died on 10th of June 1749 A.D., leaving his son Ramsing to succeed him to the throne. Bakhtsing, the brother of Abhaysing, was the king of Nagor and was far away from friendly terms with thim while he was living (1), and now after his death, determined to capture the throne of Jodhpur and for that started a civil war with Ramsing. In December 1749 A.D., a battle (2) was fought between the two near Medta in which Ramsing was victorious. Bakhtsing then sought the help of Salabat Khan, Mir Bakshi of the Emperor, whereas Ramsing called Ishwarising to his side. But as both the supporters had little interest (3) in the cause, nothing came out of it (September 1750 A.D.).

Nevertheless, Bakhtsing (4), being powerful as compared to Ramsing, was successful in capturing Jodhpur and Ajmer and was crowned as the king of Jodhpur. Most of the Rathod chiefs joined him and Ramsing was left with a force of 3 to 4 thousand at Medta (July 1751 A.D.).

Ramsing, being legally the King of Jodhpur, was not prepared to leave his cause unattempted. Ranaji (5) of Udaypur was inexperienced having just come to the throne and hence to seek help from him was out of question. Madhaosing, had no desire to follow the policy of Ishwarising towards Jodhpur, Bakhtsing’s Wakil was already in his Court and the approach of Ramsing’s Wakil to him for help was totally a disagreeable thing for him. Delhi had little interest in this strife and would have acknowledged any one who would have been victorious, as the king of Jodhpur. The only power capable to help him, was the Marathas, who had just saved the Wazir from the clutches of the Rohillas. But they had not yet freed themselves from the Rohilla-affair. He sent his Wakil-Purohitji- to them promising daily expenses for 10 thousands force, with an advance of expenses for 2 months, for their help to his cause.

There could be no other agreeable offer to the Marathas than this. Ramsing’s cause was taken up by Jayappa as he wa specially interested in Ajmer Subha. But as he was busy in carrying Gaziuddin to Deccan, he sent a small contingent of 6 thousand under Sabaji Shinde and Ranoji Bhoite to Ramsingh. But it was easily routed by Bakhtsing at Ajmer. The Marathas then returned from Marwad. Meanwhile Bakhtsing died on 21st September 1752 A.D. and was succeeded by his equally able son Vijaysing.

The Marathas (6) came up again to the North, at the invitation of the Emperor, to help him against his Wazir. Raghunathrao, the Peshwa’s brother, entered Jaypur (7) territory in November 1753 A.D. At Kharopada, Madhaosing’s envoy Hargovind, met him (16th December 1753 A.D.), in respect of the arrears he had to pay the Marathas. Madhaosing, in fact, had no desire (8) to pay his dues and only wanted to evade the demand and Raghunathrao could little afford to go deep into the matter. At Nayke, near Jaypur, Ramsing met him on 26th December 1753 A.D. (9) and requested him to help him. Raghunathrao assured him to help after the Jat affair at hand was over.

Jayappa in Marwad

After concluding the Jat affair, the Marathas went to Delhi On 1st of June, 1754, Waziri was given to Gaziuddin II, and a new Emperor Alamgir II (10) , was installed on the throne deposing the previous Ahmad Shah, on 30th June 1754 A.D. Jayappa then left Delhi for Marwad. Malharrao’s attack on the Jats (January 1754 to May 1755 A.D.) and Jayappa’s attack on Marwad (1754-1755 A.D.) taking the cause of Ramsing, were initiated by the same desire i.e. for bringing the Subhas of Agra and Ajmer grated to them by the “treaty of Kanauj (1752 A.D.), into the Maratha-possession.

Success seemed to crown Jayappa from the very beginning. On 12th July he reached Narnol, on 25th he reached Sambhar. Leaving Ajmer, which was far off from his territory, Vijaysing had fallen back on Medta on the border of Marwad. Hence laying siege to Ajmer, and capturing Kishangadh, 18 miles north-east of Ajmer, Jayappa, with Ramsing, reached Medta on 6th August 1754 A.D. Raghunathrao had given ten to twelve thousand Hujarat force with him. At Medta, Shivsing Rathod from Kota, joined him with a thousand men.

The siege of Medta commenced. Vijaysing gallantly defended the place. On 15th of September, a free battle raged from morning till night in which Vijaysing was completely defeated. He then left Medta for Nagor (33 miles away to the north-west of Medta). Jayappa and Ramsing entered Medta on 17th of September (11). Jayappa then marched to Nagor forthewith and besieged it.

Peshwa Cautions Jayappa

Peshwa (12) enquired Jayappa on 3rd September 1754 A.D. about his progress, the strength of his opponent, the general Rathod support to Ramsing whose cause he had taken, and cautioned him that the Marwad affair as if had burst all of a sudden on him. It was a grave affair as the Marwadi Rajputs were extremely proud and had not been yet humbled by the Marathas. But, (the Peshwa further wrote) “by the grace of God, you are a brave soldier and a born commander and know how to bring pressure for getting the things done. I am sure you will achieve what looks impossible. If they are ready to cede half of Jodhpur kingdom, accept it.” In the last, he cautioned him to be alert always, and to use force only when it was essential, for it was the policy of the great.

Peshwa’s anxiety was to avoid repetition of what took place at Jaypur in 1751 A.D. Moreover (13) he could not afford a sardar like Jayappa to be entangled at one place. Those were the days of Maratha success and many a works needed immediate attention. Rana of Gohad had siezed territory in Gwalior region, he needed to be chastised. The Rohillas had grown again powerful in Doab, they were to be looked at, Safdar Jang of Oudh had recently died. That afforded a chance to recover large sum from his son Shujauddaula and the release of the holy places like Kashi, Prayag on which the Peshwa had set his heart from years together.

Jayappa’s March to Victory

But Jayappa (14) himself knew the situation very well and was cautious. In fact, it was impossible that Vijaysing could have accepted the division of Jadhpur kingdom with Ramsing. But about this Jayappa had no reason to be anxious. He was concious of his own strength. Unlike Malharrao in Madhaosing’s case, his cause was just. Ramsing was the rightful master of Jodhpur and a faction of Rathods was on his side.

Along with Nagor (15) , Jodhpur also was invested by the men of Ramsing and the Marathas under Jagannath Purohit and Santaji Wabale. All supplies of the besieged places were stopped. A tank at Nagor dried up and there remained only one tank there. Articles of daily use became scarece. Grain and salt were sold at a very high cost. Opium, which was badly needed by the Rajputs, was sold 20 rupees a seer. Fuel was used up. People began to desert the town. Zalor, 100 miles to the south west of Jodhpur, where the hereditary treasury of the Rathods was stored, was the centre of severe struggle. It was again recaptured by the Rajputs. On 21st of January, a section of Maratha army attacked Ajmer fort.

Peshwa (16) was happy to receive the news of the success of Jayappa. He complimented Jayappa for having nearly completed the work of placing Ramsing on the throne of Jodhpur by defeating Vijaysing and his Marwadis who were famous swordsmen. He gave the credit of this success to the devotion of Jayappa to the cause of his master. He asked Jayappa to arrange for the meeting of Ramsing with the prominent Rajput chiefs and to free himself from the complicated affair. He further wrote that if he determined to root out Vijaysing, it would take considerable time, as it was a serious affair. Raghunathrao had not much force with him and hence it was better for him to handover that part of Jodhpur kingdom of Abhaysing, to Ramsing. Then after conciliating them with each other, he should look to the Maratha profit from Vijaysing, and recover the amount from Ramsing as per the settlement. Thus getting himself relieved he should join Raghunathrao as early as possible as all his hopes were with him (15th November 1754 A.D.).

But it was impossible for Jayappa to relieve himself from his job so easily. Vijaysing (17) was not ready to cede anything, far from accepting Nagor which was the kingdom of Bakhtsing. Moreover complete success seemed not far away. The siege of Nagor was pressed to extremity. It was expected that it could not be held long. The problem of water with the Marathas was solved by capturing Usar, a place near Nagor, where water was in plenty. Jagannath Purohit and Santaji Wable were investing Malharrao were on their way to Marwad after finishing their work at Delhi. It was generally held that the important Subhas of Ajmer was captured by Jayappa.

Madhaosing in alarm was collecting all his forces. Udaypur had grown powerless due to the internal strife with Nathaji. Ranaji was warned by the Marathas to comply with the terms settled in respect of Nathaji and even though money was spent the trouble was not over. In Marwad, the Rathods were on the verge of collapse. Delhi had not cleared the dues towards the Marathas, but Maratha rule was virtually established in parts in four paraganas of the Empire. Rupnagar was very soon to be converted into a Maratha post. In Sambhar Mukasdar from Rathod (Ramsing) had been placed. After the expected division of territory, the Mahals from Marwad were to come under the Maratha possession and by the yearly coming of the Maratha forces; probably Ajmer was to be the centre of Maratha camp. With Ajmer in Maratha possession, not only Malwa, but Gujarat and the rest of the Provinces of the North would be dominated by the Deccanis. Such was the anxiety of Madhaosing (18) .

The Peshwa’s letter (19) , advised Jayappa not to entangle himself further in the affair by carrying it to extremity and to conclude it in whatever possible way, and to join Raghunathrao. Jayappa answered that Ajmer was captured (21st February 1755 A.D.) and that influential persons were trying for a compromise which would not take much time. Raghunathrao had reached Pushkar and was 25 kos from him.

After effecting a settlement with the Emperor and the Wazir (beginning of March 1755 A.D.) Raghunathrao entered Jaypur (20) territory through Rewadi. Madhaosing sent 4 to 5 lakhs of rupees with Kaniram to save his territory from devastations. Raghunathrao then marched through Narnaul and reached Lohgadh as per the request of Madhaosing, but warned him that unless the dues were paid in full, he would not leave(21) Jaypur territory. Madhaosing had to pay rupees sixteen and a half lakh (22) (February end, 1755 A.D.)

Malharrao Holkar (23) and Sakharampant came to Sambhar (February end) and were about to proceed to Nagor to help Jayappa but he informed them that his work was nearly finished and hence instead of coming to Nagor, they should take up the work of Rupnagar in their hand. Jayappa was determined not to give any scope to Malharrao in Marwad affair.

Meanwhile Raghunathrao also reached Sambhar. Here, Vijay-Bharati, from Vijaysing met him in connection of the settlement-talks. Hearing him, Raghunathrao decided to end the Marwad affair by establishing Ramsing on the throne of Jodhpur and conciliating Vijaysing with Jayappa and with this intention he started for Pushkar, and wrote to Malharrao Holkar to join him there. But when he reached Pushkar (3-3-1755 A.D.), he received a letter from Jayappa informing him the news of recent victories. That, Ajmer was made Maratha post, and the fort of Zalor, wherein lay the hereditary treasury of the Rathods and for the defence of which Vijaysing had tried hard, was captured by the men of Ramsing. Nagor was about to fall and thus finishing the work there, he would join him soon and till then he should take up the task of punishing the Chief of Rupnagar. Accordingly, Raghunathrao gave up the idea of going to Nagor and proceeded to Rupnagar. Meanwhile, seeing that he could not escape from paying the dues this time, Madhaosing sent Diwan Kamiram to Raghunathrao (24) .

Sakharam Bapu (25), rightly cautioned Jayappa not to be hasty, as haste would have only killed the people. He again remineded him not to be entagled in the affair like Kumbher, for in that case the work would be spoilt.

After concluding (26) his work at Rupnagar by the end of March 1755 A.D., Raghunathrao started for the Deccan via Bundi Kota. In the middle of April he was in Kota state, in June in Malwa, by the 1st week of July he had reached the Narmada, by July end he had reached Nashik Trymbak and on 10th of August, he had reached Poona.

Even though Vijaysing’s cause was nearly ruined as accepting Nagor he had lost all, he held on still. After making it sure that the main Maratha army had definitely reached Deccan, he now decided to swoop down (27) on the Marathas by collecting all his forcces. The talks of negotiating peace terms were continuing still, but that was only as a part of his scheme. The question involved was not of giving Ramsing his rightful share of the kingdom, but handing over the possession of the whole of Ajmer Subha to the Marathas and to this the Rahods as well as Kachhawahas were not prepared. Feelings ran so high, that when Jayappa (28) demanded Madhaosing 22 lakhs of rupees and warned him that if he failed to send the sum, he would have to march straight to Jaypur to recover it, Madhaosing replied in the same tone that he need not take that much trouble for he himself was coming over there (to Nagor). Vijaysing at last had found out a stratagem to make a short work of the oppressive Marathas.

The Rathod envoys were often coming and going from the fort of Nagar to Jayappa’s camp on peacock lake (Taus-sar), about seven miles from Nagor, for peace talks. On the morning of Friday, 25th of July +++(Gregorian date)+++ (Ashadh Vadya 2 ) the Jodhpur Vakil Vijay Bharati Gosavi accompanied by Rajsing Chauhan and Jagneshwar came with armed and disguised assassins as beggars to Jayappa’s camp and held long discussions over the terms. Rawat Jaitsing Sisodiya Vakil of Udaypur, who used to be in the camp was also rows+++(??)+++. About 11 o"clock in the morning, as it was time for a bath, Jayappa went out and finished it in open, seated on a wooden stool and was drying his hair with a towel as usual. Suddenly two assassins, dressed as beggars, who had been loitering there on the pretext of picking up the horse grain, got the opportunity for which they were waiting, stabbed, wounding (29) him mortally.

A great cry was raised and the ambassadors and the members of the party were at once cut to pieces. In confusion that ensued, the innocent Vakil of Udaypur, Rawat Jaitsing was also killed. All the Rajputs of the camp were held as suspects and killed. Sardarsing of Rupnagar only could save himself. Before his death, Jayappa gave full instructions to his brother Dattaji and son Jankoji for avenging the wrong without being disheartended due to his death.

Leaving Jayappa (30) in his wounded condition, the Marathas had to rush to the flag, for the Rathods had marched on them to make the best use of the critical moment, Killing two to three thousand Rathods, the Maratha forced them back into the fort. Meanwhile Jayappa had died. Dattaji and Jankoji coming from the field performed his funeral ceremony. Thus ended the valiant Dattaji, a true soldier till last, due to the foul play (31) of the Rajputs.

The Rajput Reactions

As soon as the news of Jayappa’s murder (32) reached Jaypur, Madhaosing imprisoned Govind Tamaji, Peshwa’s Vakil at Jaypur in his house and kept his guards on it. To save himself from dishonour, the Vakil ended his life by swallowing poison. Madhaosing (33) then sent his Vakil to Delhi and informed the Emperor that he had killed the Maratha (Govind Tamaji). He urged the Wazir and the Emperor to encamp outside Delhi so that he would join them, there. When the Wazir expressed his inability, as he had yet to pay his soldiers, Madhaosing assured them that if they only encamped outside the capital, he would pay the expenses for the campaign on the Marathas.

It fell on Dettaji and Jankoji to carry on Jayappa’s work to completion. They rose to the occasion and carried on the way still more vigorously. Wrote Jankoji (34) to Hingne brothers (August 1755 A.D.) “Jayappa wanted to place both the Rathods (Ramsing and Vijaysing) in Marwad. But Vijaysing treacherously committed a foul act. I have determined to destroy Nagor in revenge. God will help me in this.”

The Peshwa’s Anxiety to Rescue Dattaji

It was a great blow for the Peshwa to hear of the treacherous murder of Jayappa. He consoled Ramji (35) Anant the Diwan of Shinde in the following way,

God had done great injustice and there is no remedy for it. It was never expected that a Sardar like Jayappa would meet his death by such foul means. Be it so. Dattaji Shinde is brave and capable and you all are safe and sound. Console Dattaji and carry on the task undertaken by Jayappa to successful completion by crushing the enemy. Dattaji is a soldier and hence his actions in anger at times would be a cause of further trouble. But guide him properly at such times. If the Rajputs are ready for a treaty on the lines they were speaking to Appa, accept it. But they must have been now puffed up and hence be cautious in every way. Even if they march on you with 25 to 40 thousand men, face them by guerilla tactics for three months, till the armies reach there. By the grace of God, everything will be set right.

To Dattaji (36) , while assuring him his sincere interest in the cause of late Jayappa, he gave some practical hints in the following way,

The distance (of Marwad) is great (from here). The troops from hindusthan come here after two years. It takes time to prepare and send them for another expedition. It is no time now for collecting the troops and the way is long, hence there will be (some) delay in sending you reinforcements. But by the grace of God, within a month and a half, a force of 5 to 6 thousand will reach there. Afterwards Khasa (from Peshwa’s family) would come there with an army of 20 thousand. We have full interest in the work you have undertaken. Appa, as if destined in spite of my cautioning letters, entangled himself in the affair, and met his death as soldier. But he failed as a Sardar. After he had won a great battle like Bhara-war, had he accepted a treaty, taking into consideration the danger involved, he could have relieved himself and could have been useful by releasing the territories like Kashi, Prayag, Khechiwada etc. to the profit of the Government. But there is no remedy for what has taken place. You have also behaved till now like a soldier. Now look to the affairs like a Sardar and manage the business successfully with prudence. Show bravery as a soldier, only when it is essential. God is ready to help you and I am blessed by Him. He will never fail to help you.

The members of your family have been the faithful servants (of the Government) for three generations. It will never happen that you would be neglected and especially when your services (to State) are highly essential. Be at ease on that score. Take decisions thoughtfully as the occasion would demand. The armies from here will reach there without delay.

The Vakil of Vijaysing was ready to pay 50 lakhs of rupees and some place for Ramsing for his maintenance. But after the (foul) deed was done, we informed leave to depart. The Rajputs might have adopted hightone, and since the middlemen were killed, in the scuffle, no body might be forthcoming for the job (of negotiating peace settlement). But even now, if they are ready to cede territory worth 15 to 20 lakhs of rupees for Ramsing, and are ready to pay 10 lakhs besides the affair. This is befitting a diplomat. Act as the occasion demands. We are sending the army for your help. What more?

(18th September 1755 A.D.)

As the Peshwa had rightly judged from the South, the murder of Jayappa had emboldened the Rajputs in general. Madaosing was busy in collecting all the forces in the North India that were opposed to the Marathas. Letters (37) were sent, besides the Emperor to the Jat Chief, the chiefs of Karoli, Kota, Bundi and the Chiefs of Malwa. As a result, Nagarmal son of Jat Chief and Gopalsing of Karoli reached Jaypur with armies. Wazir (38) was already displeased with the Marathas for seizing the territory in Antarwad. He was contemplating to assign a jagir of 18 lakhs to the Jats, to hire their help against the Marathas. Thus the general jealousy felt by the North Indian potentates for the Marathas, added with the persistent efforts of Madhaosing bore and the Emperor (39) and the Wazir encamped outside Delhi. As there was no Maratha force then near Delhi, the allied forces intended to march towards Nagor to drive away Dattaji from Marwad. (September 1755 A.D.)

Peshwa got the news of these movements in the South. He strived hard from Deccan to save Dattaji and at the same time to crown his expedition with success. What appeared a moment of complete dominance(40) over the North had turned, as if, with a foul stroke to be a critical time for the Maratha army in Marwad. All those powers, that bore hatred towards the Marathas due to the strength of their army, had got a chance to unite and strike a blow. The Peshwa wrote Hingne (41) to use his personal friendship with the Jats to refrain him from joining Madhaosing. He asked him to remind the Jat that it was unbecoming of him to assist Madhaosing against the brother of Jayappa who had saved him at the time of Kumbheri (1754 A.D.). He also asked him (Hingne) to inform Madhaosing that all his misdeeds would be kept in mind and that he would not be spared after the Maratha forces reached the north. He also suggested to him to speak at length with the Wazir and to remind him of the assurances of friendship he had givne to Dada (Raghunathrao) and to tell him that (as a friend) it was expected that he should help Dattaji (42) against Madhaosing and the rest of Rajputs. He informed Hingne that Samsher Bahadur and Yashwantrao Pawar had been sent to the succor would be coming with sufficient army to the North. Finally he asked him to watch the situation till the armies reached the North and see to it that the opposite forces were not united to create trouble for Dattaji and be writing to him often about the situation.

To Ramji Anant and Dattaji he informed that Antaji Mankeshwar had been dispatched for his help and Samsher Bahadur, and Yashwantrao Pawar had been sent with a force of 10 thousand and that they would reach Marwad without delay. “Khasa” was also preparing to come over there. He advised further, “Among the Rajputs, the Jats should be kept conciliated. Some should be kept on friendly terms with sweet tongue, while others are on inimical terms. All should not be made enemies at one time.”

Jayappa’s murder had shaken the Peshwa. Hence he tried diplomacy, tact, prestige and force alike to save Dattaji in Marwad from Deccan. In 1755 A.D., the Maratha strength was a reality. No force was equal to them in India. The Shinde were courageous and brave soldiers. With a watchful and interested master at the back, they rose to the occasion and destroyed the Rajputs even before reinforcements had reached Marwad.

Madhaosing Crippled

Vijayram Purohit (43) from Vijaysing was sent to Madhaosing for requesting him to sent help. Madhaosing there-upon had assembled his army at Ramgadh under Jagannath Saha and under Aniruddhsing at Narayangadh. But hearing of the poor strength of the on coming Marathas under Ranoji Bhoite, Aniruddhsing went to Ramgadh and united there all the Rajput forces. All the Sardars of Madhaosing Shekhawants, Rajawants, narukas, Kubhawanis, Nathawants, Chauhans had gathered there under Aniruddhsing. They were further joined by men of Umedsing of Shahapur, men of Bahadursing of Rupnagar, men of Gopalsing of Karoli, Deepsing Hada-brother of Umedsing of Bundi, men from Gaud Sopar, Bakhtwarmal Diwan of Bikaner and men from Vijaysing. All told a host of 25 to 30 thousand marched towards Nagor to drive away Dattaji from Marwad (15th October 1755 A.D.). Hearing of the Rajput strength, Narsingrao Shinde, Kanhoji Jadhao and Sawai Ram Bhandari from Ramsing were sent by Dattaji to reinforce Ranoji Bhoite.

They faced the Rajput force as it entered the Marwad territory on 16th October early in the morning. In spite of the heavy fire from the enemy, the Marathas boldly marched on and silencing the guns, cut down about seven to eight hundred Rajputs by sword. About twelve hundred horses, two guns and eighty camels were carried by them as spoil. The casualties on the Maratha side were 53 men killed, 43 wounded, 25 horses killed and 45 horses wounded. It was grand victory for them.

Aniruddhsing then leaving the way to Nagor, proceeded to Didwana (44) , protecting his men with his guns. The Marathas harrassed them at every step and carried away bullocks, and carts. Hence the Rajputs could march only 5 miles a day with great difficulty. On the way, the wells were filled in and the tanks were held by the Marathas and hence many men, horses, oxen and camels from the Rajput side perished due to thirst.

The Marathas then attacked the exhausted army for the second time. Three to four hundred Rajputs were killed and one hundred (45) and twenty-five horses were carried away by the Marathas. On the Maratha side two men were killed, and twenty-three were wounded, twenty-five horses, were killed, and thirty-five horses wounded. Aniruddhsing could save complete destruction only by entering Didwana (20th of October 1755 A.D.). Vijaysing’s men from Didwana and Dipalpur, total of 5 thousand joined him. But he lost all courage to proceed further. The Marathas completely blockaded them. All supplies were cutdown. Supplies coming from Bikaner were looted at Daulatpur 6 miles to the South-East of Didwana. 100 men from the party were killed and the rest ran away to Daulatpur. Grain and foddere became scarce at Didwana. Letters from Aniruddhsing and Bakhtwarmal Diwan of the king of Bikaner were intercepted. They revealed the miseries the Rajputs were put to. Aniruddhsing had no strength to proceed further or to go backward. When he learnt that the Marathas were to assault him for the third time with guns, with hundred men he saw the Maratha Chiefs and sued for peace.

Thus Dattaji on his own strength had destroyed the force of Madhaosing that had marched on him with high hopes. No way was hence left for Vijaysing but to surrender. He had fared ill on other front too.

Collapse of Vijaysing and Treaty of Nagor

It was the strategy of Vijaysing to attack the Marathas from all sides at once so as to destroy them by dividing their strength before any reinforcements reached them. While Aniruddhsing was marching on Nagor, another (46) army marched on Jodhpur under Bhatis of Jaisalmer, men of Pokharan with men of Vijaysing from Zalor. Hearing of the approach of the Rajputs, Santaji Wable, Malji Shinde, the Hujarat of Shinde, men of Jiwaji Pawar and Tukoji Pawar marched to meet them keeping Jagannath Purohit, Janrao Wable, and Satwoji Bande at Jodhpur. They met the enemy at Godawar, 32 miles north-east of Zalor. Defeating them completely they were forced into Godawar. Guards were placed around the place and all the supplies were stopped. Grain was sold two seers a rupee. While the Rajput army was thus locked into Godawar, Jodhpur was held by Jagannath Purohit, Janrao Wable and Satwoji Bande.

Siege of Nagor continued with usual vigour whereas the Marathas were successful in crushing the Rajputs wherever they tried to raise their heads. Thus Dattaji and Jankoji proved more than match for the Rajput combination (November 1755 A.D.). Jayappa’s murder could help Vijaysing in no way.

Antaji Mankeshwar (47), who was at Kalpi, started for the succor of Shinde with a force of ten thousand as per the orders of the Peshwa and urgent letters of Shinde. It was a feat in itself to march to Marwad avoiding the forces of the Jat and Madhaosing that barred his way to Marwad. By forced marches of 12 kos at a time by way of Indragadh, Khatoli and through mountainous region of Lakheri, Antaji entered Jaypur territory avoiding them near Niwai and devastating Jaypur territory reached Didwana. With his coming Dattaji’s position grew stronger. Vijaysing had left Nagor on 12th of November at 300 foot and 100 horse intending to join Kachhwahas at Didwana, but seeing that place surrounded by the Maratha, he drew back and ran to Bikaner. There also he could do nothing.

Maratha strength had prevailed at last. Vijaysing had tried to oust them in everyway. He had sent 5 lakhs as Nazar to the Emperor and asked him and his Wazir to come to Ajmer, promising 10 thousand rupees per day for expenses. He had also called the son the Mansur Ali (Suja-Uddaula) and the Pathan and the Rohillas to help him. He had sent letters to the Chiefs of Bundi, Kota and those of Malwa and Bundelkhand. He had also sent his Vakil to Abdali at Lahor, calling his aid on payment of expenses.

But all these efforts were of little use for Vijaysing. Finally he bowed down to the inevitable and in January 1756 A.D. met Dattaji and sued for peace. By February end (48) , the Marwad expedition of the Shindes was over by the treaty of Nagor (49) by which :

• Fort of Zalor with half of Marwad went to Ramsing.
• Vijaysing agreed to pay 50 lakhs of rupees to the Marathas, out of which 25 lakhs were to be paid in cash and the remaining 25 lakhs were to be paid in next 2 years and
• Ajmer was given to the Marathas.

After realising money Dattaji (50) and Jankoji went to Rupnagar (51) (March, April 1756 A.D.). Samsher Bahadur sent by the Peshwa joined them there. They laid siege to the forth. After placing the Chief Samantsing of his choice and realising dues, Dattaji then went to Ujjain (beginning of June 1766 A.D.). But before that he had visited Kota (52) and realised substantial Khandani from that State on the occasion of the new Chief on the throne of Kota.

The two-year expedition of Jayappa and Dattaji produced nothing but the death of Jayappa, deadly enmity with the Rathods and Kachhwahs, loss of money and men and the differences between (53) the Shinde and Holkar. Ajmer (54) had come under the Maratha possession no doubt, but with the fear of Abdali’s invasion looming large over North India, the Maratha held on Rajasthan in 1756 A.D. was all but precarious.

Foot Notes (Description)

(1) ‘Proceedings of the Indian Hist. Congress,’ 1949, p. 196 - Letter of Bakhtsing to Khan Dauran, ‘Hingne Daftar’ I-32.

(2) S.P.D. 2-15.

(3) S.P.D. 2-16, 17, 22, S.P.D. 21-25, 27, 32.

(4) ‘Hingne Daftar’ I-59. ‘Holkar Shahi’ I-143.

(5) Pratapsing II, succeeded Rana Jagatsing on 6th June 1751 A.D.

(6) ‘Jaypur Kharitas’ 3-40.

(7) S.P.D. 27-70

(8) ‘Jaypur Kharitas’ 3-40, 41, 42, ‘Hingne Daftar’ I-83.

(9) Sardesai and Sarkar both state ‘17th December’ as the date of this meeting. But as per the itinerary of Raghunathrao (S.P.D. 27- P. 73) the date seems to be 26th December 1753.

(10) ‘Hingne Daftar’ I-93, S.P.D. 21-60, 85.

(11) ‘Patre Yadi’ - 143

(12) ‘Patre Yadi’ - 125.

(13) ‘Shinde Shahi’ - 3-59, 61, ‘Patre Yadi’ - 141.

(14) ‘Shinde Shahi’ - I-117.

(15) S.P.D. 21-66, 67, 69.

(16) ‘Patre Yadi’ - 131.

(17) ‘Shinde Shahi’ I-117.

(18) A general picture of the Sound position of the Marathas in North reported by Govind Tamaji, Peshwa’s envoy at Jaypur (February 1755 A.D.), S.P.D. 27-106.

(19) Ibid - 105.

(20) ‘Jaypur Kharitas’ 3-52, 55., S.P.D. 27-p. 75.

(21) Ibid - 105.

(22) S.P.D. 27-18, ‘Jaypur Draft Kharitas’ 5-47.

(23) S.P.D. 27-107, ‘Hingne Daftar’ I-145, ‘Shinde Shahi’ I-131.

(24) Jaypur Darbar was to pay Rs. 16,50,000 being the total arrears of Khandani. Even after the settlement Rs. 16,25,000 remained to be paid, which means that Raghunathrao go actually in cash Rs. 1,25,000 - ‘Jaypur Draft Kharitas’ 5-47, of “b”” P"“a 2, P}. 1810.

(25) ‘Patre Yadi’ - 135.

(26) S.P.D. 27-PP. 77 and 78.

(27) Ibid - 112.

(28) S.P.D. 2-48.

(29) S.P.D. 27-116, S.P.D. 2-48, 52, M.I.S. Vol. III-152 ‘Hingne Daftar’ I-161, ‘Shinde Shahi’ I-140, 141, ‘Shinde Shahi’ III-320, ‘New Hist.’ Vol. II, p. 398.

(30) Patre Yadi - 143.

(31) “Sir Jadunath’s efforts to prove (Fall II, p. 129) that the murder was not plotted deliberately in advance, but was the effect of Jayappa’s insolent utterness during the discussion, based on Tod, ‘Vamsha Bhaskar’, are all in vain. The presence of armed and disguised assassins in the party of the ambassadors is a complete refutation of the defense.” - ‘Marathai Riyasat’ Vol. VI P. 280.

(32) ‘Hingne Daftar’ I-169, S.P.D. 21-27, M.I.S. Vol. III-152.

(33) S.P.D. 21-73.

(34) ‘Hingne Daftar’ I-161.

(35) ‘Patre Yadi’ - 139.

(36) ‘Patre Yadi’ - 141.

(37)

S.P.D. 27-119.

(38) Ibid - 129, ‘Hingne Daftar’ I-157, 167.

(39) Ibid - 159, 163, 171.

(40) S.P.D. 27-106.

(41) ‘Hingne Daftar’ I-171, 172, 177.

(42) S.P.D. 27-120.

(43) S.P.D. 21-74, 77 S.P.D. 2-50, 51, 54 55, S.P.D. 27-117, ‘Shinde Shahi’ I-p. 129, ‘Patre Yadi’ - 143

(44) Didwana is 38 miles to the west of Ramgadh and 55 miles to the North east of Nagor.

(45) S.P.D. 2-55. (Jankoji gives this figure as four hundred) ‘Shinde Shahi’ I-143.

(46) S.P.D. 2-49.

(47) S.P.D. 2-52, 54, 56, S.P.D. 21-70, 79, S.P.D. 27-119, ‘Patre yadi’ - 143.

(48) Writing from Rupnagar Antaji Mankeshwar on 29-3-1756 A.D. clearly states that it was one month before, that the treaty of Nagor was effected - S.P.D. 21-83.

(49) S.P.D. 27-127, 128, S.P.D. 2-58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, ‘Hingne Daftar’ I- 189,

(50) S.P.D. 21-82 and 83. (50) ‘Marathi Riyasat’ Vol. VI p. 285.

(51) S.P.D. 2-63, S.P.D. 21-85, ‘Shinde Shahi’ I -136.

(52) S.P.D. 2-65 and 66, ‘Shinde Shahi’ I-179.

(53) ‘Marathi Riyasat Vol. VI, p. 285. ‘New Hist.’ II, p. 400.

(54) ‘Jaypur Kharitas’ 3-65.

THE PANIPAT AND THE RAJPUT ROLE

Invasion of Abdali : (1757 A.D.)

With the Maratha armies in the South, Abdali descended on Delhi on 22nd of January 1757 A.D. (1), at the call of Najib Khan Rohilla, who joined him before he reached Delhi. Najib Khan was too ambitious (2) and aimed a pathan Empire at Delhi. Madhaosing and Vijaysing had joined him in this enterprise, in order to relive themselves from the clutches of the detested Marathas.

Nobody (3) could withstand Abdali. Even Wazir Gaziuddin was forced to see him personally (16th of January 1757 A.D.). With the Jat sympathy on his side, Antaji Mankeshwar (4), a Maratha Sardar; with insufficient force dared to give him stand single-handedly, but he too was over-powered.

Meanwhile, Raghunathrao, who had been deputed to the North by the Peshwa, had reached Indor on 14th of February 1757 A.D. Abdali was then looting Delhi (5). Peshwa, himself, had gone to the south, on Shrirang Pattan (6), and he could not provide Raghunathrao, with adequate force. He had only 15 thousand men with him, and contingent (7) of Samsher Bahadur, Naro Shankar, and Antaji had not yet joined him. Hence it was natural for Raghunathrao to wait till sufficient army was assembled. Antaji (8) pressed Raghunathrao from Mathura again and again to move towards Delhi, to bring pressure on Abdali, leaving the (in-significant) job of capturing petty fortresses in Jaypur territory. Even though (9) his letters revealed a confident tone of his determination to annihilate Abdali, Raghunathrao showed no sign of moving on and facing Abadali, with his insufficient force. Consequently with Raghunathrao near at hand in Jaypur territory, Abdali committed atrocities in Delhi and its vicinity, uninterrupted by any one. It was felt that the Pathans (10) had grown too powerful even for the Marathas. This affected adversely the prestige of the Maratha rule in the North in general and Doab (11) in particular. But the Jats (12) in Agra Subha, leaving the enmity with the Marathas, sympathized with them and made a common cause against Abdali. They held firm for (13) a considerable time but at last were over-powered and were obliged to take shelter in their forts.

The Rajput Attitude

A curious fact to note is that the real cause of the Jat and Rajput opposition to the Marathas was the same, namely the question of territorial acquiring by the Marathas in the Subhas of Agra and Ajmer respectively.+++(5)+++ The Jat Chief was afraid of the stand that would be taken by the Marathas and the Wazir after departure of Abdali. Even then he co-operated with the Marathas mainly on the ground of religion. The Jats always distinguished religion from politics and never sided with the Rohilla Pathas against the Marathas but strangely enough whenever the Rohillas stood against the Marathas after 1752 A.D., they had the Rajputs on their side.+++(5)+++

For no reason, not even for facing the Maratha aggression of Rajputana, can be Rajput stand to ally with Abdali be justified. On calling Abdali to their aid, the Indian Pathans (14) aimed at dominating Delhi. Being bigoted Sunnis, they had no reason to feel for the loss of Hindu lives and culture at the ravages of Abdali. But what could the Rajputs gain by destroying the Marathas at the hands of Abdali? It would only lead to the replacement of one foreign master by another foreigner, medieval in outlook and barbarous in actions, alien to their religion and culture (15). The Rajput policy towards the Marathas during the time of Abdali’s invasions (1757 to 1761 A.D.) of India, depicts a clear lack of any foresight.

No convincible justification is ever possible for any imperialism, neither of Alexander the great nor of Akabar. There is nothing wrong, hence, if Maratha imperialism is criticized mercilessly by the historian like Sir Jadhunath in his “Fall of the Mughal Empire” at length. But it will be unbecoming of a worthy historian to deny facts and observe sarcastically (16) thus,

True, the Marathas, after sucking the Delhi-Agra region and the Doab on the other bank dry for three years, had fled away. Not a single Maratha bled in defense of the holiest of Vaishnave Shrines; their Pan-Indian suzerainty (Hindupad Padshahi) did not involve the duty to protect.

There are innumerable proofs available in Marathi sources that give the religious (17) centered activities of the Peshwa and his Sardars. In a way, the object of Maratha Raj was the release of the Hindu (18) religious centre in general and Kashi, Prayag, Mathura and Gaya in particular from the clutches of the Yawanas. It was the unfulfilled desire of the Peshwa from Bajirao to Madhaorao. Upheaval (19) of the Hindu religion was the main aim behind the incessant activities of the Marathas. Ali believed that it was the only power to check Abdali and save Hindusthan.

The harrowing accounts of Abdali’s attrocities (20) at Mathura, Varundawan and the rest of places within about a hundred miles radius from Delhi, in the lines of Changiz Khan and Taimurlang, are even today most painful to read. But the terrible wail of grief and cries of the sufferers, were unable to move the Rajput sympathy to action against Abdali like this Jats. Far from it, not a finger was raised nor a word was spoken.

The racial bitterness against the Deccani Marathas, over looking the common bond of religion that had served once the strongest link between the two, had so completely cptured the hearts of Madhaosing and Vijaysing that forgetting the Rajput stand of defending their religion and culture for which their fore-fathers had shed ample blood, they were busy in inviting Abdali and were blind to his barbarous acts. And all this was done within less than ten to fifteen years from the deaths of Abhaysing and Sawai Jaysing who could have never acted on these lines, not even for driving away the Maratha aggressors. Sacrificing the innocent people of Delhi, Agra, Mathura and Vrundavan for saving Rajasthan from the clutches of the Maratha was a queer solution indeed!

The Marathas in Jaypur Territory (1757 A.D.)

“Maratha Empire 1758 A. D. " Map

Raghunathrao reached Jaypur territory from Indor via Mewad. The presence of Abdali at Delhi, and the Maratha weakness in not facing him forth-with, encouraged Madhaosing to take a bold stand inspire of the presence of Raghunathrao and Malharrao in his territory.

Meanwhile a siege was laid to Barwada fort (21) (20 miles to the west of Ranthambhor). Madhaosing contacted (22) his Chiefs and decided to appose till last.

The Maratha Sardars (23), now began to gather. Thus in April 1757, Antaji Mankeshwar had joined Raghunathrao, Samsher Bahadur was to join soon, Naro Shankar was expected to join within 15 days and thus the Maratha strength numbered 30 thousand.

Raghunathrao (24) now took a sterner view and demanded Madhaosing 40 t0 50 lakhs of rupees. In addition he demanded the fief of Ranthabhor worth 14 lakhs of rupees assigned to Madhaosing by the Emperor year before last (i.e. in 1755 A.D.), along with Ramputa, bhanpura, Tonk Toda and the fort of Hinglag. Mahdaosing showed his readiness to give the usual dues at the most but Raghunathrao prepared to remain in Jaypur territory till the recovery of 40 to 50 lakhs of rupees. But even though three months were wasted nothing could be accomplished due to the strange behaviour (25) of Malharrao Holkar. At last Raghunathrao accepted eleven lakhs of rupees (26), out of which six lakhs were paid in cash, and left Jaypur territory for Delhi.

The Marathas Retaliate

Meanwhile Abdali had left India (27) with immense loot, due to unbearable summer heat and the outbreak of terrible epidemic of cholera in his camp. Raghunathrao then marched to Delhi and captured it.(28) (6th of September 1757 A.D.) Najib Khan was driven from Delhi but was spared for all his mischief’s (29)due to the intervention of Malharrao Holkar.+++(4)+++ Antarwed (30) was cleared (December 1757 A.D.) Raghunathrao then marched to Lahor (20th of April 1758 A.D.) and capturing Punjab (31) came back to Jaypur territory. The Maratha victory of Punjab created a feeling of awe over the Chiefs of the Northern India. Abdali’s impressions of his excesses (January to March 1757 A.D.) were completely wiped out. Hindus (32) were overjoyed at the success of the Peshwa and it was held that the Peshwa had taken a revenge over Abdali (33) for his atrocities of the previous year.

Jankoji reached Kota (middle of May 1758 A.D.) starting from (34) Ujjain. Then he went to Mewad and settled the affair of Umedsing Sisodia of Shahapur, a “Patait” of the King of Udaypur (July 1758 A.D.), Then he went to Jaypur territory to meet Raghunathrao, who had returned there from Lahor. The envoys of Marwad had seen Raghunathrao, but he decided to entrust the Marwad affair to Jankoji, after meeting him, as news had reached that Vijaysing was threating to oust Maratha posts in Marwad.

In October 1758 A.D. Jankoji looked after the affairs of Marwad (35), Jaypur and Kota from Pushkar. He then left for Delhi. On his way to Delhi, Dattaji, who was coming from Deccan, met him at Rewadi (November 1758 A.D.). From Delhi, the Shinde went to Punjab and placing Sabaji Shinde at Lahor (36), they returned to Delhi (May 1759 A.D.). It seemed that the Marathas had nearly accomplished everything, and that they had really attained glory (37).

The Rohilla Pathan and The Rajput Combination

In 1759 A.D. it seemed that the Marathas had reached their goal of All-India supremacy. But they were not destined to attain it as their enemies were already active (38) against them. Madhaosing had sent Har Jasrao to Taimur Shah and through him established his contacts with Abdali in December 1759 A.D. The Shah now informed him that taking advantage of his absence in Iran, where he had led his forces, the Marathas had thrown the whole of Hindusthan into disorder and hence he was forced to turn his attention to Hindusthan. The Shah asked Madhaosing to join hands with Vijaysing and stop the passages of the Marathas towards Deccan and to keep him informed of everything. He was assured that, “Najibuddaula has impressed me of your sincerity, fidelity and devotion and God willing, you will attain pre-eminence and distinction greater than the days of preceding sovereigns of Hindusthan.”

Thus Madhaosing (39) began his active participation in the designs of Najib Khan and Abdali, for the downfall of the Marathas, and it continued throughout till the object was achieved on the fatal field of Panipat, in 1761 A.D. For that, Madhaosing was kept well informed by Abdali” and Najib Khan of all the developments during 1759 to 1761 A.D. and in return he kept the Durani fully acquainted with what was happening on his side. He was praised for his fidelity, encouraged over his successes and contantly asked to repel the Marathas from his dominion. For that he was asked to stop the ways and passages to the South, to be in close contact with Vijaysing and to cooperate fully in wiping out the traces of the Marathas from the North to prevent the possibility for them of raising their heads again. Madhaosing was equally a firm ally of Rahilla-Pathans. He sent the copy of the letter sent by him to Pant Pradhan, to the Durani Chief for his knowledge, engaged Malharrao in Jaypur territory when his help was badly needed by Dattaji in December 1760 A.D. rejected the overtures of Gaziuddin and Jankoji Shinde and also the friendly had of the Peshwa (40), and did everything to promote the Durani cause excepting the actual participation against the Marathas. The last act he did not do only because he was not sure of Abdali’s disposition (“If only his promise of safety could be relied upon, the Rajputs would certaily wait upon him” " Badrinath, son of Keshwada) when finally the plan succeeded at Panipat, Abdali himself in a long letter informed Madhaosing about his victory over the Marathas. Vijaysing also was equally in sympathy with Abdali (41).

The Marathas were ignorant of these activities till last. They realized of the conspiracy against them when Abdali dashed into Punjab driving away Sabaji Shinde from Punjab and when the latter arrieved with his wornout soldiers in Doab in 1759, November A.D. Govind Ballal wrote from Ganga in Nowad conspired for the last two years to bring Abdali once more to uproot the Maratha rule (in the North). Thus the secret correspondence continued. Vakils were active in their reciprocal visits. We had no knowledge of all this till no. we” (recently) knew of it, when everything was clear (42).

Dattaji Trapped in Doab

After his return (43) from Punjab in May 1759 A.D., Dattaji decided to go the Bengal, post haste before the Monsoon had set in, through the territory of Shujauddaula for conquering the North-Estern provinces. As per the suggestion of Malharrao, he thought of using Najib Khan, who even though was the originator (44) of the conspiracy against the Marathas, professed to be sincere to their cause, and agreed to help in building a bridge over Ganga and to accompany him with troops to Bengal. But Najib Khan with his delaying and promising tactics completely foiled his plan. No bridge was constructed even though the were over. Thus the conspiracy against the Marathas with the help of Abdali, backed (45) by Emperor Alamgir, Malika Zamani, Madhaosing and Vijaysing, was complete as Abdali had starrted from Kandahar. The whole project was carried on in such secrecy that the Marathas had no idea of the internal correspondence carried on for two years. Finally realizing fully that he was duped by Najib Khan (46) Dattaji in rage, besieged the post of Kunjpura of Najib but he had to raise the siege to meet Abdali, who had reached Punjab by now from where he had driven the Maratha outposts (47). (December 1759 A.D.).

Malharrao Holkar (48) was deputed by the Peshwa to go to Dattaji’s help. But Madhaosing having full knowledge of these happenings on his part held Malharrao Holkar (49) in his territory Jotsing (50) Nathawat with 4 thousand horse and foot marched on Malharrao at Lakheri. In the battle that ensued, Malharrao routed the Rajputs killing 20 Kachhawa Sardars from the Nathawat, Rajawat, Shekhawat clans.

Even though (51) Malharrao knew that Madhaosing was in league with Abdali, he seems to be ignorant of their plan. His conduct in not realising the gravity of the situation and falling an easy victim to Madhaosing trap, had an effect of putting the whole brunt of the Rohilla Pathans on Dattaji alone (52).

Dattaji gave a final call to Malharrao before he left Doab to defend Delhi against Abdali. Malharrao accordingly prepared to start for his help but the Rajputs made it impossible for him to leave Jaypur territory without giving them a fight. He, at last (53) laid siege to Barwadi fort which was ably defended by Vikramsing and other captains of Rajawat and Shekhawat clans and the Rajput-Pathan strategy to pin down Malharrao in Rajputana was fully accomplished. Dattaji, who was expecting Malharrao to reach soon for his assistance was forced to face Abdali single handedly and was killed on Barrari-Ghat (54) on 10th of January 1760 A.D.+++(4)+++ Malharrao (55) at last leaving the task unfinished started for Dattaji’s help on 1st of January 1760 A.D. But he was too late. He met the disheartened (56) and running army of the Shinde with wounded Jankoji at Kotputali on 15th of January. Delhi had fallen into the hands of Abdali. Malharrao and Jankoji then thought of facing him by guerilla tactics.

Abdali (57) now asked Madhaosing to see him personally or to send him money and force. But Madhaosing had no will to do either, as he did not believe in him. Abdali then proceeded towards Jaypur with an intention to reach Ajmer to bring pressure on the Rathod, Kachawa and Mewad Chiefs. Even though Madhaosing was his ally of whose sincerity and attachment he was fully convinced, he ransomed the small local Rajas of Kadhake and Kobari and slaughtered the inhabitants of the resisting Mahwat but spared those of Baswa as they offered ransom for their town. (Third week of February 1760 A.D.).

The Maratha guerilla campaign started on 25th of January. But they soon realized that Abdali (58) was too powerful for them. Seeing Abdali’s march towards Jaypur, they began to plunder Doab. Abdali hearing of the threatening activities of the Marathas towards Delhi, left the direction of Jaypur to save Delhi and Daob from the Maratha raids. His strong detachment under Jehan Khan, caught the plundering Maratha division unawares near Sikandarabad (59) and dispersed it with heavy slaughter on 4th of March 1760 A.D. With this, the Maratha guerilla tactics came to an end, and retreating towrds the borders of Jaypur territory they encamped in the vicinity of Bayana. Nevertheless, their activities had saved not only the Jats, but also the Rajput provinces (60).+++(4)+++

Panipat and After-Math

Full reports of these occurrences reached the Peshwa who sent a strong army with efficient artillery under Sadashiorao Bhau (61) to the North to recover the lost ground. With their full sympathies on the side of the Rohilla-Pathans, the Rajputs watched the combat between the two. At Panipat on 14th January 1761 A.D., the Marathas suffered (62) a terrible defeat in which they lost nearly 75 thousand men and all their fine artillery; elephants and other property fell to the victor.

The Peshwa, who had come to the North, with an intention to reinforce Bhau (63), go the terrible news of the crushing defeat, at Bhilsa on 24th January. The complete destruction of his huge and splendid army, along with his promising son, his beloved brother, and twenty Sardars of eminence including Jankoji, making thereby the debt of 50 lakhs of rupees in vain (64), plunged the Peshwa into grief. From Bajirao I, the Marathas had heard nothing but he news of success in their enterprises. This was hence a stunning blow to their prestige and power, which nearly crippled (65) his delicate body and mind. For days together he centred his hopes on the coming of Bhau and Jankoji alive from the carnage. Panipat was indeed a national calamity (66) for the Marathas.

Nevertheless, the Peshwa’s presence in Malwa for more than two months helped to re-establish Maratha prestige in Malwa, Bundelkhand (67) and Doab. But the Peshwa himself seems to have lost all hopes of retaining the territories of Bundelkhand and the North and imparted instruction to his Sardars how to retreat southwards. Even in defeat, he stood for the Hindu ideal. He wrote (68),

If it is confirmed that Bhau is no more in this world, Hindusthan (North) is lost to us. Our hopes, centred on his coming, will vanish within a fortnight. And then the force at hand will be ineffective either to face Abdali or to subdue the rebellious Chiefs of this region, not a man will remain with you. If Bhau is lost, this territory is lost. In that case, the region beyond and to the South of Gwalior should not be allowed to be occupied by the Jats and the Muslims, but should be handed over to the Hindu Chiefs of Orchha, Datiya or to the son of Khanderaya.

In the background of Rajput attitude towards the Marathas during Panipat episode, the Peshwa’s attitude is worth our attention.

Peshwa Reminds Madhaosing to Know the Meaning of the Times

On 29th of January 1761 A.D., Abdali made a formal entry into Delhi. But he could not rest at peace till he left Delhi on 20th of March for Afganisthan. His troops openly mutinied for their pay for the last 18 months. Najib, being helpless to relieve the Shah suggested an attack on the Jats to recover treasury. Being hard pressed Abdali forced Madhaosing for money through letters and men. As the pressure of Abdali for money grew intense, Madhaosing wrote letters to Peshwa who was at Pachhor (32 miles North of Bhilsa) to come to Bundi to give a united stand against Abdali. The Peshwa thereupon wrote to (69) Nana Purandare, then at Gwalior, and referred in it Madhaosing’s plight thus,

Abdali has sent his men to Madhaosing and asked him to repair to his presence with a cross of rupees. Hence, being frightened, he is writing to me (Peshwa) daily and has called me to Bundi, where he proposes to join me with all his Rajputs. I wrote to him to meet Bhau first at Ajmer (Peshwa believed that Bhau was at Ajmer) and bring Vijaysing with him. Bhau had given him an assurance of Ranthambhor and had asked Malharrao to forgive his misdeeds. (Still, Madhaosing had not joined the Marathas at Panipat) But, let us forget whatever had taken place. If you (Madhaosing) meet first Malharrao and Bhau, your Hindu force immediately becomes strong. Your father in those days used to be friendly and co-oprated in such occasions. But you believed in him (Abdali). Be it so. After all Rajputs are Hindus know the meaning of times. Previously when Khan Dauran and Kamruddin Khan captured Madhaogadh, they thought us to have been destroyed and driven to the Narmada. We are least afraid of Abdali. After 4 months Dada (Raghunathrao) will come to the North with 20 thousand forces, then they will come to know Maratha strength. Thus I have written.

Death of Nanasaheb Peshwa

Peshwa had only 10 thousand men with him and as he was striken with grief he had least energy to undertake such a venture. His hopes (70) having vanished of the safe arrival of Bhau by the first week of March and having heard that Abdali (71) had left Delhi for his country, he decided to start for Deccan. He entrusted (72) all powers to Malharrao Holkar who was at Gwalior and told him to encamp for two months at Gwalior and then at Indor. He asked him to conciliate Madhaosing (73) by promising Ranthambhor, (even though he had full knowledge of his mischief from July), keeping, an eye on the change of times. Again and again he urged him to capture Gohad. With these instructions, leaving everything to the destiny of the Hindus (74) at large, the Peshwa retraced his steps to Deccan (22nd of March) and reaching Poona about 5th of June died a broken hearted man at Parvati on 23rd of June 1761 A.D.(75). After the funeral rites were over, his son, Madhaorao, received the Peshwa’s robes from the Chhatrapati at Satara on 17th of July 1761 A.D.

Foot Notes (Description)

(1) S.P.D. 21-101, 106, 107, S.P.D. 2-71, ‘Marathi Riyasat’ Vol. VI-288, Fall-

(2) S.P.D. 27-144.

(3) S.P.D. 21-95, 96,101, 105 and 106.

(4) S.P.D. 21-99.

(5) S.P.D. 21-104, 105 S.P.D. 27-‘Marathi Riyasat’ Vol. VI, 303,

(6) S.P.D. 21-106.

(7) Ibid - 107.

(8) S.P.D. 21-100, 105, 110 and 111, ‘Hingne Daftar’ I-193.

(9) ‘Hingne Daftar’ I-195, 197, S.P.D. 27-147.

(10) S.P.D. 21-117 and 119.

(11) S.P.D. 27-147, S.P.D. 2-68.

(12) S.P.D. 21-96, 100, 105.

(13) Fall II - S.P.D. 2-72, 80, S.P.D. 27-152, 155, S.P.D. 27-107, 111 MIS Vol. I-3.

(14) S.P.D. 27-144.

(15) Abdali gave clear orders to his men that, “Mathura and other places are holy cities of the Hindus. It is your sacred duty to kill as many non-Muslims as you can and make heaps of their severed heads”, promising that he would pay them Rs. 5 for each head. Mathura had no fortifications and fell an easy victim to the enemy’s ferocious swords. Several houses were burnt down; idols in the temples were broken to pieces and trampled under feet. During the week of the spring festival of the Hindus, (5th to 12th March), the Afghans squirted the blood spray to imitate Hindu gaiety. They plundered Mathura, Brindavan and Gokul and filled the roads literally with corpses. For days together the roads were impassable. Several thousand Hindus were cut down, Jahan Khan alone being responsible for slaying three thousand Bairagis and pilgrims. ‘New Hist.’ II pp. 404 and 405.

(16) Fall II - p-82.

(17) (a) On 18th of June 1751 A.D. a Maratha agent writes,

Malharrao has pitched his monsoon camp in the Doab. He intends to pull down the grand Musjid near Dnyanwapi of vishweshwar (built by Aurangzeb) and restore the original temple (of Kashi Vishweshwar at Kashi) and if another cruel emperor comes to the Throne, he will kill the brahmans of Kashi. Hence they are extremely terrified at such move, for they know the Muslim strength in these places. They even cannot oppose the move, as it would be a sin to oppose the renovation of the God. What the holy Ganga and the protector Vishweshwar can ordain will come true. If they begin to demolish the Masjid, the Brahmans are going to send an appeal to the Peshwa (against any such attempt of his Sardar).

• M.I.S.Vol. III-397.

(b) “The object of the Marathas in all these undertaking was religious as well as political. They particularly intended to get the holy places of Prayag and Kashi back into Hindu possession.” - ‘New Hist.’ Vol. II, p. 377.

(18) ‘Patre Yadi’ - 165, 166, 167, S.P.D. 27-114, 153, 178, 209, 240, 242; S.P.D. 2-69, S.P.D. 21-163, ‘Bramhendraswami Charatra’ p. 118, ‘Hingne Daftar’ I-17, 19, ‘Ajit Lekh Sangrah’ - 1035.

(19) ‘Ait. Sahitya 3-262, S.P.D. 21-163. S.P.D. 2-27, S.P.D. 21-104., 107, 108, 111, 117, 118, Fall II, pp. 82 to 87

(20) S.P.D. 2-27, S.P.D. 21-104, 107,108,111,117,118, FALL II , pp. 82 to 87

(21) S.P.D. 27-153.

(22) S.P.D. 21-120,121.

(23) S.P.D. 21-152 (a)

(24) ‘Jaypur Kharitas’ - 3-63.

(25) S.P.D. 21-138.

(26) M.I.S. Vol. I-71, for the remaining money Raghunathrao had to write from Deccan. See Appendix.

(27) S.P.D. 27-146, S.P.D. 2-71.

(28) S.P.D. 27-194, S.P.D. 21-136.

(29) S.P.D. 21-148, S.P.D. 2-79, ‘Marathi Riyasat’ Vol. VI p. 306.

(30) S.P.D. 2-79, 84.

(31) S.P.D. 21-162, S.P.D. 27-218.

(32) “The disgrace of the Muslims is a credit for the Hindus”. S.P.D. 27-219.

(33) S.P.D. 27-220.

(34) S.P.D. 2-87, S.P.D. 21-162, S.P.D. 27-221.

(35) S.P.D. 2-96, 101, S.P.D. 27-236, 239, ‘Jaypur Records Maratha Papers’ - 253, 255.

(36) ‘Ait. Tipane 2-41. S.P.D. 2-83, 104, ‘Hingne Daftar’ I-198, 199 ‘Jaypur Records Maratha Papers’ - 107.

(37)

God has bestowed on Maharaja, the kingdom of the world, surrounded by occeans. Such valour has never been heard of anyone among the Brahmans. The Emperor of Delhi, his Wazir and princes, due to ill luck and discord among themselves, have been ruined. Who can have a hold on the ‘Time’ for all the time? Now, it seems, that the God intends to feed the whole world through the hands of Maharaja. Excepting the eastern territory, the Subha of Lahor up to Atak of 10 crores, has come under the possession of Mahraja. Now Multan and Kabul to the west and Bengal, Ayodhya and Prayag to the east are (only) to be acquired. Even from that many a regions are already under Maharaja’s rule. What is the reason now of Yawana name at Kurukshetra, Prayag, Waranasi and Gaya? When the Maharaja is there to protect cows and Brahmans, the whole world should come under him. What remains is the work of a year only. The Sardars, having not gone to Deccan due to dearness, are in the camp. If they are ordered, the work can be taken for granted to have been accomplished (by them).

S.P.D. 21-163, also S.P.D. 2-83, 104, Hingne Daftar I-198, 199.

(38) S.P.D. 2-106. (4) Madhaosing-Abdali negetiations and his activities, are based on Persian manuscript of a collection of letters (1759 to 1761 A.D.), from the Records of the former Jaypur State, published in the ‘Pro. Of the Indian History - Congress’, 8th session 1945, pp. 257 to 269, also Jaypur Draft Kharitans 5-168. (39)

In a way it may be called a contest between Hinduism and Islam, the former being represented by Marathas and the latter by one individual, Najib-ud-daulah. It was not the fault of the Marathas that the Rajputs, the Jata, and the Sikhs or even Ahirs did not join them. It was the defect of Hinduism.

• Dr. Hariram Gupta in ‘Preface’ to ‘Marathas and Panipat’ , p. xiii.

(39) "

(40) ‘Jaypur Draft Kharitas’ 7-76.

(41) ‘Farmans, Manshurs and Nishans ’ - p. 48-14, 15, 16.

(42) S.P.D. 40-126.

(43) S.P.D. 2-104, Panipat, p. 14.

(44) S.P.D. 21-176.

(45) S.P.D. 27-245.

(46) S.P.D. 21-176, S.P.D. 2-144-u

(47) S.P.D. 2-107.

(48) S.P.D. 21-117.

(49) S.P.D. 2-115, 116.

(50) S.P.D. 21-115, 177.

(51) S.P.D. 21-116, 117, 177.

(52) Ibid - 178, 181, ‘Holkar Shahi’ 1-147.

(53) S.P.D. 21-177, 180.

(54) Ibid - 114, S.P.D. 2-112, 114.

(55) ‘Holkar Shahi’ I-151, S.P.D. 21-177, 183, S.P.D. 2-13.

(56) S.P.D. 21-181, 182, S.P.D. 2-114, ‘Jaypur Draft Kharitas’ 7-52, 70.

(57) S.P.D. 21-186, 187, S.P.D. 2-118.

(58) S.P.D. 21-185, 186, 188, ‘Jaypur Draft Kharitas’ 7-144, 8-76,

(59) S.P.D. 2-21.

(60) ‘Panipat’ p 30.

(61) ‘Jaypur Draft Kharitas’ 8-36.

(62) ‘Jaypur Draft Kharitas’ 7-79, ‘New Hist.’ Vol. II, p. 459.

(63) ‘Purandare Daftar’ I-39.

(64) Ibid - 399, 400, 403.

(65) Ibid - 415.

(66) Ibid - 397, 417, 425.

(67) ‘Hingne Daftar’ I-107, 218.

(68) ‘Ait. Sankeerna Sahitya’ - 25.

(69) ‘Purandare Daftar’ I-402.

(70) ‘Purandare Daftar’ I-400, 405.

(71) Ibid - 410, 418, ‘Hingne Daftar’ I-205, 210.

(72) ‘Purandare Daftar’ I-411, 413, 416, 418, 419, ‘Hingne Daftar’ I-202, 205, 210.

(73) ‘Purandare Daftar’ I-402.

(74) Ibid - 403. “???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????”

(75) S.P.D. 2-147, ‘Hingne Daftar’ I-219.