THE FIRST PHASE : (1720 TO 1743 A.D.)
THE PHASE OF FRIENDSHIP (1720 TO 1743 A.D.)
Intro
The Marathas, The Rajputs and The Nizam
The factions at the Court of Delhi after the death of Aurangzeb, especially from the beginning of the reign of Farrukh Siyar till 1720 A.D., made the Emperor a puppet in the hands of either the Sayyad brothers or the Nizam who was the head of the Turani party. And every time the Emperor reacted, by trying to set himself free from the grip of the former or the latter, it only added to the disintegration of the Mughal Empire. Actuated by selfishness(1), every Courtier of eminence and every thief tried to secure a share for him out of the spoil. The Marathas had secured the Sanads (2) of the Chauth and Sardeshmukhi of the six subhas of Deccan (March 1719 A.D.) and had begun to cast their covetous eyes on the Subhas of Gujarat and Malwa(3). The Rajput chiefs were also not lagging behind. The House of Jodhpur had fixed its gaze on Ajmer and Gujarat whereas Agra and Malwa were the expected possessions for the House of Jaypur. The Rajput Chiefs in fact had lost all interest in the survival of the Mughal Empire(4), and their contact with the Court was merely to secure the coveted provinces with the Imperial sanction.
There was still one more claimant for these provinces of Gujarat and Malwa, namely Nizam-ul-Mulk(5). He had equally grasped the situation of the collapsing edifice of the Mughal Empire and had aimed at creating an independent Empire for himself, if it could be possible, to the south of Chambal. He was successful in effecting the downfall of the Sayyad brothers and as an effect of the same, became the Wazir of the Emperor(6). He then obtained for himself the provinces of Gujarat and Malwa alarmed the Emperor. The out-come(7) was the rebellion and the consequent independence of the Nizam in the six Subhas of Deccan, after his victory at Sakharkherda, on 11th October 1724 A.D. But the Nizam never took his eyes off from these two Subhas. In Gujarat(8), he took recourse to armed opposition, and it was only after his uncle Hamidkhan was overpowered by Sarbuland Khan, that he gave up its possession. For Malwa, he was constantly(9) writing to the Emperor and once again in 1737 A.D. got its possession on the plea of driving away the Marathas(10).
Thus for the acquistion of Gujarat and Malwa the Rajputs(11) were laying their claims through the Mughal Court, the Nizam was endeavouring to acquire it by dint of the pressure of his renowned personality, aided by diplomacy and the leadership of the Turani party at the Court, and the Marathas were trying to penetrate, with the force of their arms. The interplay of these three powers in relation to Gujarat and Malwa is the history of Maratha-Rajput relations during 1720 to 1743 A.D.
Role of Religion in the friendship of the Marathas and the Rajputs
Aurangzeb’s death definitely marks a change in the political atmosphere of India, that was not congenial to the survival of the Mughal rule in general.
During the last years of the reign of Aurangzeb and after it, the anti-Hindu policy of Aurangzeb, enkindled the flame independence in the hearts of Rajput Chiefs and the phase of Mughal predominance(12) over Rajasthan as under Akbar, Shah Jahan or even Aurangzeb, became a thing of the past, Especially from the reign of Farrukh Siyar, the Mughal Empire lost its integrity as it lost the loyal supporters(13), who would care for the existance of the Empire.
A history of 18th Century, excluding the religious feelings behind the political and religious activities, at least up to 1739 A.D., until when the Mughal rule as Muslim rule had not lost all its vigour, is complete in itself. The first act (14) of Ajitsing, when he declared independence after the fall of Sayyad, was to ban cow slaughter in both the Subhas of Ajmer and Ahmadabad. The appointment of Abhayasing as a Subhadar of Gujarat even in 1730 A.D. was acclaimed by the Hindus of Ahmadabad with joy as he belonged to their religion. “They compared Abhayasing and his brother with Ram and Laxman and recited songs in their honour.” The Muslim Historian laments that, “Under Maharaja’s rule, the prestige of Islam declined(15). Cows were forbidden to be slaughtered and temples came again into honour”.
From the first entry of the Marathas in Malwa (16) , they were regarded not as invaders but as the saviors from the detested Mughal rule. And hence there is no wonder that “to their first invasion of Malwa (17) , we are told by every Persian or Hindu writer, that notices the subject, hardly any opposition was given and we possess many testimonials to show that they chiefly attributed their success on this occasion to the action of religious feeling.” The first act (18) of the Hindus rule in Malwa was to reinstate the worship of Hindu God in the temple previously converted into a mosque.
When Rafi-ul-darjat(19), the Emperor, installed after the dethronement of Farrukh Siyar, abolished, Jazia and the taxes levied in places of Hindu pilgrimage, on the advice of Ajitsing, it was moment of joy for the Hindu world. One this occasion, the following letter was addressed to Ajitsing by Sangramsing II, the Maharana of Udaypur. It goes a long way to reveal the prevailing religious sentiments of the Rajput Chiefs and their selfconfidence that reflected the changed political conditions of Delhi.
“Maharana Ajitsingji (20) at Delhi should accept the complements from Maharana Sangramsing of Udaypur. We all are doing well and you should inform us about your own welfare. You are great, You would continue showing more and more intimacy. Consider this Stte your own and do not see any difference in any matter. Your letter received. You wrote that by putting Rafi-ul-darjat on the throne (of Delhi) got the Hindusthan freed from Jazia and the restrictions imposed in sacred places. I am very glad to learn all this. No one like you had taken birth among the Hindus up till now, nor is expected in future. May God give you more success? This is a great gain for us all. Until this day the Muhammedans were more powerful, but now they seek our support.
The shortsighted Mughal (Emperor) would do nothing in future without careful consideration as he has lost his prestige. You should consider this place as your own house. Please let me know if I may be of any service to you. On account of you all Hindusthan is safe and especially ourselves. What more should I write?”
The Rajput chiefs began to pride themselves as Hindu Rajas & had little interest in calling themselves as mansabdars of the Mughal Court. The titles & deeds of Ajitsing (21) & the rest of Rajput Chiefs, amply explain their religious outlook. The murder of Ajitsing in 1724 A.D. was lamented, because besides other things, in him a supporter of the Hindu religion & a competent opposer to the Turks was lost(22) .
The Nizam had taken a lesson from the long-drawn struggle of Aurangzeb with the Marathas (1862 to 1707 A.D.) (23) and had fully realized their strength in Deccan. Being a shrewd politician, he deemed it wise not to differentiate between a Maratha and a Muslim as his subject, for the survival of his newly created kingdom(24). But apart from diplomacy, at heart he was the true follower of Aurangzeb and opposed the Marathas and the Rajputs on religious grounds and detested their predominance either in Deccan, or in the North. His religious attitude behind his politics is obvious from the following letter.
ASAF JAH TO ABDUL NABI KHAN, APRIL 1731(25)
“The accursed Bajirao finding the province of Gujarat unoccupied by defenders laid siege to Baroda a city that is in the hands of dispersed (i.e. mutually antagonistic people). I reflected that if, God avert it, this rebel got Baroda, it would be a great disgrace and loss and our work would be ruined, while his disturbance would become perpetual in that Subha and utter ruin would seize the prevalence of the religion of Muhammad. Therefore, in the spirit and pride of Islam and fidelity to the (Emperor’s) salt, I decided upon this religious duty, that after crossing the Narmada I should engage at the full gallop in rooting this black wretch out, and thus perform the tasks of a holy war and cutting off the roots of disturbance.”
It was the ambition of the Rajput Chiefs of Marwad and Jaypur to have the Subhas of Gujarat and Malwa respectively for themselves. But when they realized that they could not maintain these provinces in opposition to the Maratha strength and the designs of the Nizam and the Turani party, they drew back and helped the Marathas (26) in the acquisition of these provinces, lest they should fall into the hands of the Turani party and the Nizam.
Beyond doubts, Jaysing was the patron of Hindu religion and culture. It was his ambition his kingdom from Yamuna to Narmada(27). There was nothing unnatural in it as after the fall of Farrukh Siyar, every Mughal Chief tried to create and independent position for himself, even Giridhar Bahadur(28) in Malwa was not an exception to this rule. It is correct to say that in calling the Marathas into Malwa in 1728 A.D.(29) , his action was motivated by self interest. But when he saw that he could not retain Malwa for himself, he was not sorry to leave it into the hands of the Marathas, because in the view of the Rajpurts of the generation of Sawai Jaysing there was definitely a difference between the Malwa under the Maratha Government and the Malwa under the Mughal Government. Had it not been the fact then Sawai Jaysing would have been the enemy of the Marathas especially after 1736 A.D. when their hold on Malwa was established beyond doubt.
After the defeat the death of Giridhar Bahadur at the hands of Chimaji Appa, Sawai Jaysing congratulated Nandlal Mandloi (30) thus, “You have defended our religion in Malwa and crushed the Muhammedans(31) , establishing Dharma. You have fulfilled my desire.” He was ambitious no doubt but he was religious minded as well. And hence his ambition could not carry him to extreme limit in opposing the Marathas for the possession of Malwa, so as to join hands with the Turani party. He would have certainly liked to retain Malwa for himself to fulfill his cherished dream of the expansion of his kingdom. And he did all efforts to achieve it. But he was sufficiently religious minded to see that in the acquisition of Malwa by the Marathas he was leaving that province to another Hindu power that was nothing but friendly to him. It is a well-known fact that he was the well wisher and supporter of Bajirao till the death of the latter.
There should be no doubt about the fact that Sawai Jaysing saw the “Establishment of Dharma”, in the victories of the Maraths over the muslims (32) had he called the Marathas for his personal gain alone, the story would not have continued from 1728 A.D. till the cession of the Subha of Malwa to the Maraths . It is through him that the demands of the Bajirao (33) relating to Malwa reached the Emperor and it is through his efforts that Balajirao-Bajirao’s son-got the Sanad of Malwa in 1741 A.D. It was due to this partiality of Jaysing towards the Marathas that Sadat Khan gained the confidence of the Emperor in 1735 A.D(34) . This common factor of Hindu religion between the Rajputs and the Marathas was known even to the Emperor. He feared that if Jaysing were displeased, he, being a Hindu, would join Bajirao(35) .
The object of the Maratha expansion (36) in the North was to safe-guard the Hindu religion. One of the demands of Bajirao not accepted by the Emperor in 1736, was the grant of Jagir of Prayag, Kashi, Gaya, and Mathura(37). His whole career stood for the protection of Hinduism(38). In the conquest of Malwa, he had secured the alliance of Hindus, in his war against Siddis, he was avenging the desecration of Hindu temples, in his war against the Portuguese he was undoubtedly fighting for Hinduism, in as much as the inquisition of Portuguese India made it impossible for Hindus to profess their faith in peace. And when the Bundela Chief found his principality threatened by the Pathan Nawab of Farrukhbad he hurried for protection to Bajirao as the acknowledge leader of the Hindus in India."
Even outside Maharashtra, Bajirao was regarded as the supporter of the Brahmins and the incarnation of Parshuram(39). He had no equal as a successful General in his time. He victories over the renowned Turani leader Nizam-ul-Mulk, and his dash upon Delhi in 1737 A.D. were the greatest triumphs for the Hindus(40) who had received nothing but defeats at the hands of the Muslim Generals with a few exceptions, in the previous centuries. It is no wonder that the Hindu(41) North centered its attention on him for his able leadership in the calamity of Nadirshah in 1739 A.D.
There are ample proofs to show that Bajirao and Sawai Jaysing had come closer(42) . Hence it is correct to say that “Unity of faith and religion strengthened the bounds of amity between Bajirao and Raja Jaising and his circumstance was a source of additional power and influence to the former (i.e. Bajirao)”.
The Phase of Friendship
The relations between Sawai Jaysing and Abhayasing were not always cordial and at a time, the latter leaned towards the Turani party(43). But even then, Abhaysing’s activities never seriously hampered the harmony that existed between the Marathas and the Rajputs during this phase of friendship.
The Rajput opposition to the Turani party and their consequent support to the Maratha-cause are the two sides of the same coin. Allowing full consideration for the play of self-interest on the part of Rajput Chiefs, there are ample proofs to prove that common religion and culture played a dominant part between the relations of the Marathas and the Rajputs during 1720 to 1743 A.D.
Though the Rajputs were affected by the ravages of the Maratha horse(44) or were asked to pay ‘Khandani’ or were pressed for a grant of patta by the Marathas (45), they showed no ill felling towards the Marathas during this phase in spite of the conference at Hurda in July 1734 A.D.
With the common element of religion in their minds, with a sincere appreciation for the heroic deeds of the Marathas (46), with the practical need of soliciting help against the Turani party led by Nizam-ul-Mulk and Kamrudding Khan at the Court, the Rajputs during the period of 1720 to 1743 A.D., regarded the Marathas as their ally and an indispensable element in Delhi politics, in to which, they advocated their entry, pleaded (47) their case before the Emperor, called (48) them in the North with all the urgency and felt relieved when their support was assured(49)
Even though the Marathas hardly needed any invitation for the invasion of Malwa, where their raids were not unknown previously, let it be noted that in the initial stage of their friendship, it were the Rajputs who called them across Narmada(50), promised them expenses (51) to the amount of a lakh and fifty thousand per month, believed them to be honest(52) and trust worthy and honoured(53) them by offering elephants of palankins and expressed gratification (54) at the brotherly feeling exhibited by the Maratha Chief towards them.
It was the grand beginning of the combination that was unfortunately destined to end in deadly enmity in the last quarter of the 18th century!
Foot Notes (Description)
(1) ’ Later Mughals’, Vol. II, p. 244.
(2)‘Later Mughals’, Vol. I, pp. 406,407, ‘Munt. Lubab’ in E.D. Vol. III, p. 468.
(3) S.P.D. 10-1.
(4)‘Central India’, Vol. I, pp. 53,54.
(5) “Nizam-ul-Mulk’s ambition was to break away from the Empire and secure for himself an independent position in the Deccan with, if possible, Malwa and Gujarat added to it. For Malwa was the doorway to the South. He began with this object to consolidate his position but in this daring plan, he encountered opposition not only from the Marathas but also from the two Rajput rulers, of Jaypur and Marwar, who coveted for themselves Malwa and Gujarat respectively”. - New Hist., Vol. II, p. 84.
(6)‘Munt. Lubab’, in E.D. Vol. VII, p. 518.
(7) Ibid, pp. 523 to 527. ‘The Cambridge Hist. of India’, Vol. IV, pp. 349, 350.
(8)Ibid, pp. 350,351.
(9)“I have been writing during all these years on the pressing necessity of the destruction of the Marathas (in the provinces of Gujarat and Malwa). But it had no effect. In writing as I did, I had no other view than that of discharging my duties, and serving the Emperor faithfully. But the contents of letters had no effect. On the other hand, the replies were vague, and had no relation to the questions, which I had raised”"".“Extract from Nizam’s letter, Eighteenth Century Deccan, p. 145.
(10)‘Tarikh-I-Hindi’ in E.D. Vol. VIII, p. 57.
(11) ‘Jaypur Records-Maratha Papers’, 206,209,210.
(12) Mark the confident tone in the following writing of Ajitsing - “We thought that after mounting an elephant, the other conveyances are below our dignity and as we could dethrone and imprison Farrukh Siyar and after releasing the other one of our choice from prison, put him on the throne, this Jaysing, does not deserve our attention.”
(13) ‘Central India’, Vol. I, pp. 53,54.
(14) ‘Munt. Lubab’ in E.D. Vol. VII, p. 517. ‘Later Mughals’ Vol. II, p. 103.
(15) ‘Mirat-o-Ahmadi, quoted in Hist. of Guj. Vol. II, p. 435.
(16) “The Rajputs, especially Sawai Jaising, were allies of the Marathas, and actually called them in order to weaken the detested Mughal rule” - ‘Later Mughals’, Vol. II p. 244.
(17) ‘Central India’, Vol. II, pp. 53,54.
(18) ‘Holkar Shahi’ I-51.
(19) ‘Munt. Lubab’ in E.D. Vol. VIII, p. 479.
(20) Letter of Maharana Sangramsing II to Maharana Ajitsing of Marwad, dated 11th day of the dark half of Vaishakh, Samvat 1775 (1719 A.D), ‘Glories of Raj.’ Pp. 110 to 112.
(21) The title of Ajitsing was, “blessed, adorned with many auspicious qualities, protector of Hindus, Emperor, Sovereign ruler, king of Kings, Maharaja Shri Ajitsinghji”. - From Glories of Rajasthan.
(22) “Oh Bakhta, in evil hour Why slew you Ajmal, The puller of Hindus The lance of the Turks” - The Annals, Vol I, pp. 383. 384. “The Gods above exclimed, “Dhanya Dhanya Ajit” who maintained the faith and overwhelmed the Asuras - From Raj. Roopak in Annals. Vol. II (1957) p. 73.
(23) “The Emperor Aurangzeb forced armies and treasuries against them. But the resources were found to be insufficient”, - Extract from the letter of Nizam, Eighteenth Century Deccan, pp. 142, 143.
(24) Ibid, p. 95 - “I had to go and tell him that diplomacy was entirely a different matter. I have won over these people (marathas) Otherwise, they were the Zamindars of this country”.
(25) Extract from the letter Nizam, New Hist. Vol. II, p. 142.
(26)“The Rajput princes and Chiefs of Jaypoor, Marwar and Mewar, so far from continuing to be the defence of the empire were either secretly or openly the supporters of the Maratha invaders”. - ‘Central India’, Vol. I, p. 53.
(27)‘Malwa in transition’, p. 194.
(28) ‘Later Mughals’, Vol. II, p. 244.
(29) S.P.D. 13-10.
(30) ‘Later Mughals’, Vol. II, p. 243.
(31) Even though Giridhar Bahadur and Daya Bahadur were Brahmans, they were treated to be the men of the Muhammedans, See - “A fight took place Daya Bahadur, - from Muhammedan side.” - S.P.D. 13-27.
(32) Dr. Raghubirsingh writes in his ‘Malwa in tran’, (p.194) : ‘The policy of Jaysing to favour the Maratha cause was not dictated by any religion motive but self - interest and personal gain.”
(33) Even in September 1738, the ‘Farman’ from the Emperor in respect of a Jagir, Mansab and Mahal from Malwa, received by Bajirao was under the seal of Sawai Jaysing - S.P.D. 15-p. 86.
(34) S.P.D. 14-27.
(35) S.P.D. 15-29390,391,441.
(36) Hingne 1-15.
(37) S.P.D. 15-p. 96.
(38)‘Mil. System-pp. 58, 59.
(39) S.P.D. 14-1
(40) S.P.D. 9-22
(41) ‘Ait. Charitra’, 4. ‘New Hist.’ II, pp. 178, 179.
(42) “Tarikhi Ibrahim Khan” in E.D. Vol. VII, p. 261.
(43) S.P.D. 14-39.
(44) S.P.D. 30-108.
(45) Ibid, 128, S.P.D. 9-12.
(46) S.P.D. 10-66.
(47) S.P.D. 14-39, 47.
(48) S.P.D. 30-134, 143.
(49) ‘Satara Ait, Lekh’, 2-263.
(50) S.P.D. 13-10.
(51) S.P.D. 14-47.
(52) S.P.D. 10-66.
(53) S.P.D. 30-pp. 322 TO 326.
(54) S.P.D. 15-23.
MALWA, 1720 TO 1733 A.D.
Malwa during 1699 to 1713 A.D.
The strenuous Deccan war in which Aurangzeb was entangled during 1682 to 1707 A.D. was a part of his religious policy that affected adversely the provinces of the North, including Malwa. “Any disturbance in Berar or Gondwana (1). Bundelkhand or the Eastern Rajput States would immediately spread by contagion to Malwa.” The people lost all attachment to Mughal rule (2) and gave expression to their opposition in revolts. “The local disturbances (3) of peace in Malwa in the closing years of the reign (of Aurangzeb) were too many to be counted.”
It is no wonder that when the Marathas invaded Malwa, under such circumstances, they were not regarded by the people of Malwa as invaders but were looked upon as their supporters to oppose the detested Mughal rule(4) . The Marathas during their successive raids did nothing to alienate the sympathetic attitude of the people of Malwa. “The Marathas(5) carried the war against of Government. They had taken a large share of the revenue but did not destroy like the barbarous invaders the source from which it was drawn. They were in this, acting with the concurrence and aid of the Hindu chiefs of Malwa.”
When Rajaram (6) was the Chhatrapati of the Marathas, the first Maratha invasion of Malwa, took place in 1699 A.D. under Krishnaji Sawant. After crossing Narmada, he ravaged some places near Dhamoni. Tarabai, the regent, also carried the policy to plunder Mughal-territories as a war strategy, after the death of Rajaram in 1800 A.D., the Maratha bands penetrated in Malwa as far as Mandsor and Sironj(7), which places they invested. From Sironj they passed to Bundelkhand, where Chhatrasal was fighting for his independence. They were in close touch with him. Mohansing, the Zamindar of Awasgadh, guided a Maratha detachment near Mandu. The Kolis and Bhils also rebelled. The effects of the Maratha invasion of 1703 A.D. were so disastrous; that Bidar Bakht the Governor (august 3, 1704 to September 1706 A.D.) reported (8) that half of Malwa adjacent to Khandesh was devastated.
With the coming of Shahu from the Mughal camp in 1708 A.D., a civil war broke out among the Marathas in which ultimately Shahu was victorious. After that the Marathas again resumed their contacts with Malwa (9) .
The three factors in the politics of Malwa
With the coming of Farrukh Siyar to the throne of Delhi, Jaysing rose in his estimation day by day. He was appointed Subhadar (10) of Malwa in February 1713 A.D. and continued in that capacity till November 1717 A.D. i.e. nearly for 5 years with a population predominated (11) by the Rajputs, and with most of the Chiefs being Rajputs, having connection with the ruling Houses of Udaypur, Jodhpur and Jaypur, Malwa had closer contacts with Rajasthan on the basis of race, religion, culture and geography. With the losing grip of the Mughal administration all-round. It was natural for Swai Jaysing to think to creatinga kindom strectching form Yamuna to Narmada, and he never lost touch with Malwa, which remained always an integral part of his ambition. When Nizam was removed from Malwa and Gujarat from 1725 A.D. due to this rebellion he tried to secure both these provinces(12) for him but was unsuccessful, as the Emperor was not prepared for that.
On February 18, 1718 A.D. Farrukh Siyar was disposed and the supremacy of Sayyads was ensured. The Nizam (13) was sent to Malwa as the Subhadar, by the Sayyads to remove him from Delhi. With two successive deadly strokes the Nizam affected the downfall of the Sayyads consequently, on the death of Muhammad Aminkhan, he was appointed as Wazir by the Emperor Muhammad Shah, on February 4, 1721 A.D. With a break of about nine and half months (14), the Nizam was the Subhdar of Malwa from 20th February 1719 to 2nd June 1725 A.D., and even though the province was taken away from him by the Emperor in 1725 A.D. due to his rebellion, like Sawai Jaysing the Nizam too, never lost sight of Malwa (15) , and it should be noted that it was in the capacity as the Subhadar of Malwa, that he measured, for the last time his strength with Bajirao at Bhopal. This was the last severe fight in the career of Peshwa Bajirao over the issue of Malwa. His success in it removed the last hurdle in the possession of Malwa.
With the Sanads of six Subhas of Deccan, when the Marathas started their invasions of Malwa afresh under the able Peshwa Bajirao I, they added a third factor in the history of Malwa where they had already numerous friends and supporters and a few out-posts(16).
Bajirao was invested with the robes of Peshwaship on 17th April 1720 A.D. Not very long before, in 1719 A.D., he had been with his father to Delhi (17) and had seen the degenerated political conditions prevailing there. Being filled with an ambition of the expansion (18) of the Maratha rule from the very beginning of his career, he clearly judged that the time was ripe to strike at the roots of the Empire boldly, and hence, directed all his energies towards the North. The first object of his ambitious schemes was naturally Malwa.
Early in 1723 A.D. the Peshwa crossed Tapi river and entered Nemad, the Southern division of Malwa. On 13th February 1723 A.D. he met the Wazier Nizam-ul-Mulk, who was on his way to Gujarat, at Badaksha (19) in Zabua paragana near the borders of Malwa and Gujarat. After a week, he took leave of the Nizam and procceded to Deccan.
The Nizam’s Rebellion
Disgusted with the Emperor, the Nizam left Delhi by the end of December 1723 A.D. “Having been accurately informed by his agents at Delhi of the Nizam’s activities (20) , Bajirao left Satara in January 1724 A.D. and passing some time in north Khandesh, organising his forces, crossed the Narmada on 8th May and arrived in close proximity to the Nizam’s camp at Sihore”. The Nizam then met Bajirao for the third time at nalcha, near Dhar on 16th May 1724 A.D.
On 30th September 1724 A.D. the Nizam won the battle of Sakhar Kherda against Mubariz Khan, and founded an independent Kingdom of Deccan at Haidarabad. The immediate reaction of the Emperor Muhammad Shah was to remove all the officers appointed by him from their posts and to deprive him of the two Subhas of Malwa and Gujarat.
The rebellion of the Nizam greatly facilitated the Marathas to tighten their hold during 1724-25 A.D. on Gujarat as well as on Malwa. In 1724 A.D., Indore was assigned as Mokasa to Chimnji Ballal, for the maintenance (21) of his cavalry force and the Mandloi and the Kanungo were asked to pay the ‘Chauth’ to him, During 1725-26 Ambaji Trimbak (22) realized nearly 2 lakhs of rupees as Chauth from Malwa and Gujarat. On 10th October 1726 A.D. Ram Chandra Malhar (23) was granted the mamju of Sardeshmukhi for Malwa.
Giridhar Bahadur (24) as the Subhadar of Malwa on his part tried to check the collection of chauth and Sardeshmukhi by the Marathas in Malwa.
During these years (November 1725 to April 1727 A.D.) the Peshwa had accompanied Fattening Bhosale to Karnataka(25) . As soon as he returned, he was involved in a severe struggle with the Nizam whom he humbled at Palkhed (February 1728 A.D.)(26). This victory of Bajirao made his name famous in Hidusthan and established a fact that the Marathas were a strength capable to check even the Nizam. The party opposed to Nizam in the Court of the Emperor did not fail to take a note of it.
Najm-Ud-Din Ali Khan
The Emperor’s attention (27) was dominated by the idea of reducing the power of the Turani faction at the Court especially after the rebellion of the Nizam in 1724 A.D. It was after sufficient deliberation that the he appointed the Subhadars Sadat Khan (28) as the Subhadar of Malwa and Abhaysing (29) as the Subhadar of Gujarat. Then he thought of appointing Sayyad Nijam-Ud-din Ali Khan (30) as the Subhadar of Malwa. Finally he appointed Giridhar Bahadur and Sar Buland Khan as the Subhadars of Malwa and Gujarat respectively. He could never forgive the Nizam (31) for detatching a great part from the Empire and for his designs over Malwa and Gujarat. Much of the policy, of the Emperor in respect of these provinces, for more than a decade, hereafter, was directed by his desire to chastise the Nizam.(32)
Ambition was the dominant factor in the character of Sawai Jaysing and hence, the Nizam’s (33) as well as Giridhar Bahadur’s (34) interests in Malwa clashed with those of him. Even after the appointements of Giridhar Bahadur (35) and Sar Buland Khan to the Subhas of Malwa and Gujarat respectively, he was contemplating to take possession of both the Subhas that gave an income of 50 lakhs, by paying off 20 lakhs of rupees to the Marathas, And hence the maintained direct contact with them.
Under such circumstances, if the Marathas, with whom Sawai Jaysing was in close contact, were induced to invade Malwa with a big army, they would serve the purpose of both, Swai Jaysing and the Emperor. Their disturbance would have paved the way for the removal of Giridhar Bahadur to make room for Swai Jaysing and the despatch of the armies to suppress the so called Maratha disturbance would afford a chance to take revenge on the Nizam to the entire satisfaction of the Emperor, And the choice fell upon Sayyad Najm-ul-din Ali Khan who was capable to accomplish the task.
Najm-Ud-din Ali Khan (36) had taken active part in deposing and blinding Farrukh Siyar and was in prison since the battle of Hasanpur (37) in which he had fought against the Emperor Muhammad Shah most heroically along with his brother Sayyad Abdulla. As one of the Sayyad brothers he was naturally the deadliest enemy of Nizam-ul-Mulk.
After the province of Gujarat was taken away from him (38) , the Nizam asked his uncle Hamid Khan, who represented him in that province, to oppose any new Subhadar, whom the Emperor might appoint. Sarbuland Khan was the new Subhedar chosen and he begged for the aid of Sayyad Najm-ud-din Ali Khan was then in the prison. In the summer of 1725 A.D. he and Giridhar Bahadur, who was going to take charge of the Government of Malwa, left the Capital together, followed closely by Sayyad Najm-ud-din Ali Khan, who had been appointed second-in-Command of a large force. Their appointments to the Subha of Gujarat forced Hamid Khan to take refuge with his nephew Nizam-ul-Mulk in Deccan.
The gallant Sayyad Najm-ud-din Ali Khan was then appointed as a reward for his services in Gujarat, to the Government (39) of the province of Ajmer and as the Faujdar of Gwalior (40) , Nod-shahbad and Dhamoni.
As Sawai jaysing had been the partisan of Farrukh Siyar, he was opposed to the Sayyads and as such as did not like the elevation of one of his former foes to power. Naturally the appointment of Najm-ud-din Ali Khan at Ajmer and other places gave rise to troubles. There was even occurrences of armed clashes (41) . Meanwhile Dadorao Bhimsen, the Peshwa’s agent, came to the scene and intervened. The effect was the friendship between Sawai Jaysing and Najm-ud-din Ali Khan to whom Swai Jaysing recommended for the task of marching upon the Nizm. The following letter of Dadorao Bhismsen, makes the whole plan clear.
The letter from Dadorao Bhimsen to Bajirao Pant Pradhan and Chimaji Appa (42)
“Hearing the news of the treaty (43) , I had dispatched both the couriers to you. But it has been four months since then that no reply from you is received. I came here as per the letters of Khoja. Koki and Roshan Daula are the influential persons here. The opposite group is powerless before them. The Emperor does nothing without their counsel. The opposite party had tried to raise the question of Sarbuland Khan, but they were frustrated in it and hence they felt the humiliation. Sekhaji and Kesharao Ray have been sent. I am informed that, “I shall surely do the work. I am only watching for the opportunity. Rest assured”. Sawaiji has taken full interest in cause. You will know from his letter to you. As for Sayyad all the Chiefs were opposed to the Emperors policy to favor him. When he was in Kota, the Emperor paid him three lakhs of rupees per month. Then the provision for the Subhadari of Gujarat was made but Kamruddin Khan opposed the proposal. The Emperor then assigned him the territory of Gwalior, Kalanbag, Dhamoni and Jortalab. Keeping an army of 20 to 25 thousand, the Sayyad destroyed the robbers and established his posts in the territory. Sawai then sent some force to assist the Chief of Gwalior. Nijm-ud-din Ali Khan attacked the force re-established his post. Hearing of it, force came again. Meanwhile I reached there, and spoke about the Sayyad and removed the differences in the minds of both of them. Robes, and a horse were sent with a trusted man and they were made friends by taking oaths. After that, Sawai Jaysing wrote once or twice about the Sayyad to the Emperor. “If the Nizam’s work (44) is to be done it should be entrusted to Sayyad. He will do it.” The Emperor called Sawai’s Vakil Rao Jagram who is an influential person being six hazari, and asked him about the provision made by Sawaiji for this enterprise. Sawaji had written in detail t Rao Jagram who explained it all to the Emperor. On that, Sawaji received an order to come to the Court immediately without loss of time. The Rajput Mansabdars have about 25 to 30 thousand force. Najm-ud-din Ali Khan is asked to raise 25 thousand troops and a park of artillery. The Emperor is going to provide him for the expenses of twenty thousand forces and the artillery. All this is being done in the name of Gujarat but really it aims at Deccan (45). Sawaji has whole-heartedly taken the side of Sayyad. This he has done on the support of Swami. The name of Swami is famous in Hindustan. Previously also their had been great Sardars, nobody did like this (46). The Sayyad also depends on the Swami. The credit goes to Swami. I am also willing for the same.” A letter should also be written to Chhatrasal Bundela. He is fighting with Bangash. He should be assured that “our force will come to that province after Dasera. You will get succour”. He will pay for the expenses. For this work Durgadas, a man of trust is sent. He will explain all; Sawaiji has ordered, “send your force forthwith into Malwa. If this is done the Emperor will grant all your demands. The force should create disturbance in Malwa”. I am forwarding Swai immediately. A courier from Sawai Jaysing and Moropant from me, have been dispatched to the Sayyad. He will come soon for this work. Send a letter assuring your help to Sayyad Najm-ud-din Ali Khan. An answer from Khoja also had been received today. He writes, “Write to Maharaja immediately to send Maratha armies forthwith into Gujarat and Malwa, go that under the same pretext we shall dispatch Sayyad. Any how the arrangement is made for the army to reach Malwa”.
The Plan
The important thing to note about the plan is that it was originated by Sawai Jaysing and was matured in full consultation with the Emperor. Sawai Jaysing personally wrote to Bajirao to send Maratha forces immediately into Malwa to create disorder, assuring him that, “The Emperor would be pleased to grant all the Maratha demands if the forces would be dispatched without loss of time”. The Marathas were to be used as a means to prove incapacity of Giridhar Bahadur to check them. This was further to serve as an excuse (47) for sending the expedition of Sayyad Najm-ud-din Ali Khan into Malwa. Thus, the main object of the plan was to check Nizam’s pretentions over Gujarat and Malwa and to crush him if possible. Accordingly (48) the Sayyad marched with Khanderay, the Sardar of Sawai Jaysig for Malwa. (14th January 1729 A.D.)
The most curious thing to note in the phase of the Maratha expansion towards the North, is the fact that they were invited by the consent of the Emperor himself to create disorder in his own province namely Malwa. The main figure behind this plan was Sawai Jaysing who depended on the sympathy and support of Bajirao for the success of the plan. In doing so, Sawai Jaysing, the Emperor and the Courtiers, opposed to the Turani Party, had no reason to dream that this invitation to the Marathas in Malwa would be the cause of terrific consequences later on.
But it seems that the Nizam suspected the designs of the Emperor and Sawai Jaysing behind the move of the appointment of Najm-ud-din Ali Khan to Malwa he wrote
I have received (49) the Farman of the following effect. The Marathas were spread in the province of Malwa. Najm-ud-din Ahmad Khan has been deputed to assist Raja Giridhar Bahadur in putting down the Marathas. Orders have been issued to the Governers of Gujarat and Malwa to take their posts on the banks of Narmada with their contingents and be ready to join me when required and cooperate with me in imperial matters. My work in fighting against the Marathas has been appreciated. The isue of these orders is due to the kindness of His Majesty. I am extremely thankful for the same.
Rajadhiraj (Sawai Jaysing) had informed that the Marathas had spread in the province of Malwa. Request had been made that an army of 40,000 would be required to be posted in Malwa to put down the Marathas. At present the Governors of Gujarat and Malwa have received considerable sums of money to put down the Marathas. Now that the Rajadhiraj has been appointed he must have received not less than one crore rupees. This is in addition to the troops posted in the Province. Under these circumstances, I have undertaken this campaign solely out of my sense of duty. My income is limited. The expenditure in heavy. Where I could realize ten previously I can realize only one. I would request your Majesty to grant 50 lakhs of rupees. Until such time as the amount is not received by me the Mahals of the province of Gujarat and Malwa may be granted to me. I am making this request only for support in this holy war. I hope my request will be granted.
The Nizam got a firman from the Emperor (50) and the Amir-ul-Umara (Khan Dauran) also wrote a letter. The Nizam thereupon wrote most courteously, “I am in receipt of the Firman “Mir Ahmed Khan Bahadur (later Nasir Jung) has been honoured with a title, a plalanquin, robes of honour and two items of jewellery. I am thankful for these kindnesses.” But in spite of all these, he refused to be entrapped in the plan on the plea. “The income from the provinces is limited while the expenditure is heavy. I had asked that the income from the provinces of Ahmedabad and Malwa be spent towards meeting the cost of the Jihad (Holy war against the Marathas). The Khan had written to me to put in exertion in this war. My request for the income of the above provinces was due to my anxiety to cope with the war. There was no other alternative the income is small and the cost of meeting the salary of the army is very great. The expenditure has gone up now ten times.”
Finally he declined to cooperate stating his inability in the following way. “I have received (51) your Majesty’s Firman. The Marathas have spread into Malwa. Raja Giridhar Bahadur had applied to you for reinforcements. You had appointed Najm-ud-din Muhammad Khan to put down the Marathas. You have issued instructions to the Governor’s of Malwa and Gujarat that their deputies should with their contingent, take their posts on the banks of the Narmada, be vigilant, be at my (Nizam-ul-Mulk) back and call and put in their best exertions to put down the Marathas. I have received your Majesty’s Firman to the above effect. Roshanuddowlah Bahadur too has written to me In detail”. In the previous years numerous armies, renowned generals and mansabdras, countless artillery and other equipment and the treasure of India were spent on the warfare in the Deccan. My resources are limited” I have written the details to Roshanuddowlah. Your Majesty will receive that letter. May the sun of the empire shine in all splendor.”
Maratha Victories in Malwa and Bundlekhand
Exactly as per the instructions in the above letter of Dadorao Bhimsen, two armies started from Poona - one towards Malwa and the other towards Bundelkhand without losing a moment after the ned of mansoon. The former marched through Khandesh and Nemad under Chimaji while the latter by the eastern route led by peshwa Bajirao, through Nagpur and the former central provinces (52). Both maintained contact with each other throughout the campaign.
Chimaji, having left Poona, towards the end of October 1723 A.D. (53) with swift marches fell upon Giridhar Bahadur, the Subhadar of Malwa, near Amzera, and killing him in a bloody encounter (54), looted his whole camp and captured 18 elephants (29th November 1728 A.D.). Bajirao, on his way to Chhatrasal from Washim (55) in Berar, congratulated Chimaji on his grand victory, on receiving his letter from Amzera (20 miles south west of Dhar) dated 30th November 1828 A.D. He asked him at the same time to march to Ujjain and attach all the Jagirs of Giridhar Bahadur for the payments of debt.
These dramatic achievements raised immediately the reputation of the Marathas and for the first time Delhi was convinced that it was power to be reckoned with. The success, of Chimaji Appa was soon followed by the victory of the peshwa over Muhammadkhan Bangash in Bundelkhand in April 1729 A.D. Completely disorganized; he gave a pledge never to molest Chhatrasal again.
Thus within six months from their march from Poona in 1728 A.D., the horizon of Maratha ambition was pushed on practically to the banks of Chambal and Yamuna (56).
Sawai Jaysing appointed as Subhadar of Malwa for the second time
From December 1728 to April 1729 A.D. Chimaji was active in Malwa (57). Large sums were exacted from the paragnas of Jawad, Nawalai, Dhar, Ratlam, Badnawar and the city of Ujjain (December 1729 A.D.) . Then he moved on the Bundi-Kota. In March 1729 A.D., he was in the paraganas of Bhanpur, Mandsor, Jawad, Sutoda and Dahod. In the middle of April, he was on Narmada and on 4th of May 1729 A.D., he was back to Poona.
Bahwaniram, the son of Giridhar Bahadur was the new Subhadar of Malwa during 1728 end to 1729 November, but the supremacy of the Marathas, was established beyong doubt. Along with some Mahals in Gujarat, Udaji Pawar and Anandrao Pawar got a saranjam of 54 Mokasa Mahals in Malwa in 1729 A.D. (58) , and the same was contiuned in 1729 A.D. On 3rd October 1730 A.D., Malharrao Holkar was assigned a saranjam of 74 paraganas (59) in Malwa. He was informed that Malwa had been handed over to him. He was to realize the Khandani of Malwa through Krishnaji Hari, an agent of the peshwa, who was to be paid Rs. 1500, annually by Malharrao. By 1730 A.D. the arrangement for the possession of Malwa was thus complete (60).
As it was evident (61) that Bhawaniram was incapable to face the Marathas, Rajadhiraj Sawai jaysing was appointed the Subhadar of Malwa at the end of November 1729 A.D. Khan Dauran Amir-ul-Umra had an active hand in this appointment. Sawai Jaysing was asked by the Emperor to open negotiations with Raja Shahu for the peaceful settlement in respect of Gujarat and Malwa, so that no Maratha invader should cross Narmada.(62)
Jaysing left the capital on 23rd October 1729 A.D. (63) for Malwa. While he was on the way to Ujjain, Malharrao Holkar and Udaji Pawar entering Malwa, captured the fort of Mandu (64), in November 1729 A.D. Sawai jaysing hastened to Malwa and a skirmish took place between him and the Maratha forces. But hearing of his coming into Malwa, Shahu Chhatrapti (65) informed Chimaji Appa, Udaji Pawar and Malharrao Holkar on 18th March 1730 A.D. that, “Sawai Jaysing has come to ujjain province. Treat him with respect, in view of the old hereditary friendship between the two Royal families. Give him Mandu fort, if he asks for it.”
A mission to Satara
By 1730 A.D. the Marathas had firmly established themselves in Malwa and to a greater extent, Sawai Jaysing himself was responsible for their success. Besides other things his self interest in the Subha of Malwa was apparent. When he got it in 1729 A.D., he wanted to retain it for himself. As a subhadar of Malwa,it was his duty to see that province was free from the Maratha invaders, while as a hereditary friend of Shahu’s family, he wanted to retain their friendship. A way out would have been possible after a full discussion with the Maratha Chiefs. And hence, at the instigation of the Emperor, but much with his own initiative (66), Sawai Jaysing decided to send a deputation to Satara, to know the nature of Maratha demands and to effect a peaceful settlement with them. After consulting Rana Sangramsing of Udaypur, Deepsing, Manasaram Purohit and were fixed as the personnel of the mission, which reached Satara in August 1730 A.D. During September, they consulted the Chief persons including the Chhatrapati and the Peshwa and after finishing the work, proceeded to Aurangabad, where they were received with hospitality.
But from the point of view of its results, the mission was failure, for the Emperor did not wait even for its coming back to Delhi, but removing Sawai Jaysing from the post appointed Muhammad Khan Bangash in September 1730 as the Subhadar of Malwa (67). But besides the questions of the settlement of the Chauth, the real object of sending this mission to Satara by Jaysing was to know the position of Bajirao Pandit Pradhan. His name had been famous in the North for his velour. But Jaysing wanted to know whether he was really a worthily person having diplomatic talents and organizing capacity and whether he was respected in the Maratha State and was honored by the Maharaja of Satara. From this point of view, the object of the mission was highly successful, for Deepsing who was the nominee of Jaysing himself, was convinced that Bajirao was fully trust worthy from every point of view and not only he was respected by Raja Shahu, but was the only person who pre-eminently ruled the Maratha Court.
The Nizam expressed his grave doubt about the faith of Deepsing in Bajirao. But the latter emphatically answered him that Bajirao would never deceive them as there had been good relations between them since the days of his father. It was a bitter experience for the Nizam to hear so much praise of Bajirao, for Deepsing scarcely left any attribute in the praise of Bajirao who was in his opinion brave, upright, honest, truthful and trusted by his men as superman. As for Shahu, Deepsing considered him to be a capable ruler, who was considerate, wise and knew his craft well.
This recorded opinion of one, who was deputed to judge Bajirao (68) and the Marathas in general in their homes, and expressed behind them, before one who was averse to their praise, deserves a special attention. In the name of Chauth, the Marathas were busy in their process of Empire building in Gujarat and Malwa. At times, they were harsh in exacting money. But there is no glimpse of any bitterness in the attitude of Deepsing who seems to have been highly impressed by the ambitious ‘Pant Pradhan’ and the ‘Chhatrapati’ of the Marathas. This can be treated as the prevailing opinion about the Maratha of Jaypur Court and of all the open minded Rajputs who could read the meaning of the Changing times.
The Nizam’s plans frustrated
While the Mission visited the Nizam, the latter was busy in formulating a grand plan to oust Bajirao and the Maratha completely from Deccan. He plainly told Deepsing that he meant to chastise Bajirao. Deepsing remarked that it was improper for the Nizam who was considered to be a rebel by the Emperor, to create enmity with Bajirao, who could assemble a lakh of force under him if he meant. But this piece of advice was in vain for the Nizam who had advanced too much in his scheme. The reason was that the victories of Chimaji Appa and Bajirao in 1728-1729 A.D. had raised the prestige of the Peshwa to preeminence which consequently had raised a challenge for the ambitious Nizam. As an effect, the Nizam had grown extremely jealous of Bajirao (69) . By October 1730 A.D., taking the advantage of the breach between Bajirao and Trimbakrao Dabhade, he had been successful in seducing most of the prominent Maratha Sardars of Shahu’s Court (70) . At the same time he arranged a meeting on Narmada (71) with the new Subhadar of Malwa, Muhammad Khan, whom he met in March 1731 A.D. But mean while Bajirao had taken the offensive and defeated and killed Trimbakrao Dabhade at Dabhoi on 1st April 1731 and frustrated the hole plan of the Nizam. Had he been successful, then perhaps he would have been not only the master of Deccan but of Gujarat and Malwa as well, and thus he would have been a genuine threat to the Emperor himself.
It is very clear, hence, that in checking the Nizam in Deccan, the Marathas were helping the cause of the Emperor (72) in another way. It will not be incorrect to say that had there been no strong Maratha State in Deccan to check the Nizam, he would have either displaced Muhammad Shah or thoroughly crippled him by acquiring most of his fertile territories. This relative importance of the Marathas was the main factor that affected the imperial policy toward the Marathas during 1730 to 1740 A.D. especially.
The policy of Delhi towards the Marathas
The appointments of Abhaysing and Muhammad Khan Bangash to government of Gujarat and Malwa in 1730 A.D., removing Sarbuland Khan and Sawai Jaysing respectively, clearly meant that the Emperor and Khan Dauran did not approve (73) a policy of appeasement towards the Marathas by paying them the Chauth of the two Subhas of Gujarat and Malwa. In the same way the appointments of Sarbuland Khan in 1725 A.D. in Gujarat and Muhammad Khan Bangash in 1730 A.D. in Malwa, were mainly with an object to chastise (74) the Nizam. Thus in 1730 A.D. the policy of the Court of Delhi centered round the two factors of the Marathas and the Nizam, and the Court felt sufficiently strong enough to check them both. The success of this policy of opposing them both depended to some extent upon the sincerity of the Subhadars of these two provinces in their attachment to the cause of the Emperor, and mainly on the fact that the Marathas and the Nizam remained at varience with each other.
In 1730 A.D. to 1731 A.D. the Nizam tried to profit by the dessensions in the Maratha Sardars by building up a common front against Bajirao. But the latter proved to more than a match to him. The Nizam being thorough diplomat now won him over by explaining to him the policy of Delhi towards the Marathas by showing him the secret orders of the Emperor to the Subhadar of Gujarat, Malwa and himself. He then arranged aa meeting with Bajirao on 27th December 1732 A.D., which was highly successful. Writes Bajirao (75), “I had made before now three visits to the Nawab, but those were only formal with no opening of hearts. This time, however, we discussed many questions openly, cementing our mutual goodwill and friendship. Whatever suspicions and fears had existed formerly, have have now been completely removed. The Nawab repeatedly expressed a desire that our cordiality and pleasant relations would go an ever increasing.”
Had the Nizam been allowed to keep Bajirao on his side, a threat to Delhi (76) would have been severe. A conciliatory policy towards the Marathas was hence a necessity. Khan Dauran (77) had nothing to do with the success of the Marathas cause in 1730 A.D. or in 1736 A.D. His change of policy in being willing to pay them the Chauth of Gujarat and Malwa after 1732 A.D.(78) was a reaction to the diplomacy of the Nizam and hence even though opposing the Marathas as per the orders of the Emperor, we find Khan Dauran and Jaysing advocating the policy of paying off the Chauth to the Maratha to subside their trouble.
But thus, the coming closer together of Khan Dauran and Bajirao in this way was looked with suspicion by the Nizam who kept a constant watch on Delhi politics and urged the leaders of the Turani party at Delhi, not to allow the pretensions of Bajirao to be successful (79). This conciliatory attitude of Khan Dauran continued til the Marathas became too strong to threaten Delhi itself in 1737 A.D. Khan Dauran, then gave way and consented to invite the Nizam to meet the Maratha challenge on behalf of the Emperor.
Thus, the factor of the Nizam must be taken into account while dwelling on the Maratha expansion towards the North as well as their relations with the Rajputs.
The object of the Maratha invasion of Malwa
Depending on the ample references to be collection of money in the letters sent by Bajirao and others (80), Dr. Raghubirsing in his ‘Malwa intransition, first phase’, infers n respect of “the real cause of the Maratha invasion of Malwa” as follows :
“A primary cause of the invasion on Malwa” was that “The Peshwa was deep in debt and he wanted money to pay it”. (p. 186) “Gujarat and Malwa were nearer to Deccan, but the former had been dominated by Maratha general Dabhade, which left Malwa alone to the Peshwa.” (p. 186) “Even after the successful invasion of Chimaji, the Peshwa did not appear very keen on having full control over the province if he could be assured of smooth payment of the Maratha dues.” (p. 192) 4. “The Maratha statesmen hoped to get the subsidy regularly from Raja Jaysing, and therefore, Raja Shahu ordered the surrender of the ‘Mandu fort to Raja Jaysing.” (p. 192) “The Maratha statesmen hoped to get the subsidy regularly from Raja Jaysing, and therefore, Raja Shahu ordered the surrender of the ‘Mandu fort to Raja Jaysing.” (p. 192) “In 1730 A.D., when by the order of the Emperor, Jaysing opened peace negotiations, Raja Shahu promised not to allow his generals and army to cross the Narmada, if 10 lakhs were regularly paid to him.” (p. 192-93) Thus above inference, if taken for granted, go a long way to deny the very objectives for which the Marathas stood. They state that the Marathas had no other objective than the recovery of money to pay off the debt.
I have to state, with due deference to Dr. Raghubirsing, that I would refute, the above statements one by one.
(1) Maratha expeditions from Bajirao till Sawai Madhaorao, and the recovery of money for the payment of debts, are two inseparable things. All the Marathas Sardars including the Peshwa, from Bajirao to Mahdaji Shinde, were worried till last over the repayment of debts. As for Bajirao it was his huge army that was responsible for his debts. It is too established a fact that the Maratha demand for ‘Chauth’ was the for-runner of Maratha possession of the territories. Gujarat, Malwa, Central India, passed under their rule through the same process. Even in Rajasthan, the demand of ‘‘Chauth’ was soon followed by the demand of territory, which was infact the primary cause of Maratha Rajput rivalry later on.
(2) To state that Bajirao invaded Malwa, because Gujarat was closed to him due to the predominance of Dabhade, is totally incorrect. Bajirao able Sardar Baji Bhivrao (81) (and probably Bajirao himself) invaded Gujarat in early 1725 A.D. Hereafter, the encroachments of the Peshwa through Chimaji Appa, and his Sardars continued vigorously. In 1727 Chimaji Appa (82), penetrated as far as Dholke within 25 miles of Ahmadabad. At the end of 1729 A.D.(83), Chimaji again entered Gujarat with a considerable force and captured the hill fort Pavadh in January 1730 A.D. This Gujarat expedition of Chimaji lasted had established a considerable hold on Gujarat. It is enough to prove that in 1729 A.D. Gujarat was also open to the Peshwa like Malwa (84).
(3) As for the Charge of Peshwa not being very keen on having full control over the Province of Malwa even after, “Chimaji’s successful invasion” the letter of Bajirao himself and of others will speak for themselves.
(a) An extract (85) from the letter of Bajirao to Chimaji Appa, after the latter had been successful in killing both Giridhar Bahadur and Daya Bahadur, from Deogadh on his march to Bundelkhand. “Keep collectors (Amaldars) if they are ready, in the territory under our control. If any new Subhadar is dispatched from Delhi, keep an eye on him and if it is within your reach, destory him by advancing on him. Leave no scope for the (Mughal) forces in Malwa. If a strong force is sent from Delhi, and is beyond your strength to face it, and if your think it proper that we should combine to face it, write to us. We shall join you forthwith and shall consider the plan (of attack).”
The above extract from the Peshwa’s letter, clearly indicates his determination not to tolerate any new Mughal Subhadar in Malwa. Was this all for the assurance of the smooth payment of Maratha dues? It was clearly for the possession of Malwa.
(b) The letter of Pillaji Jadhao (86) to Narayan Dixit, dated 4th April 1729 A.D., “Muhammadkhan Bangash, Subha of Prayag, Marched (upon us) with an army for 20,000 men. He is surrounded completely after his discomfiture. Grain is sold three rupees a seer in his camp. All provisions have been stopped. We shall destroy him within a week, or if he comes to terms, after affecting a treaty, we are soon returning to our country. After meeting the Swami, details will be supplied. With the blessing of the Swami, our rule has been established upto Yamuna.
© The innumerable congratulatory letters (87) that poured on Bajirao and Chimaji over their victories, reveal the writer’s immense joy over the ‘Digvijaya’ (conquest). They reveal the real spirit behind the invasion of the Marathas, which aimed at the conquest of territories Does the following letter for e.g. express joy merely at the prospects of getting only huge sums of money in Malwa ?
An extract from, the letter from Govind Krishna (88), Peshwa’s mutalik at Srivardhan to Chimaji Appa, “Enveloping the sky, conquering the North, subduing the South, humbling the pride of all, the Swami has achieved such a success, that is too much for the earth to contain.”
(4) Raja Shahu ordered the Surrender of Mandu fort to Raja Jaysing not with the expectation of getting regular payment of Subsidy from him, but out of regard for him, and in view of the hereditary friendship that existed between the two Royal families (89).
(5) And as for the promise of Shahu to Jaysing, that he would not allow his generals army to cross the Narmada, it should be remembered that when Jaysing was ready to pay, 11 lakhs for Malwa and 15 lakhs for Gujarat (S.P.D. 10-56), Shahu had no reason to disagree to the settlement. As for the promise, that he would not allow anybody to cross the Narmada, it should not be taken literally. In 1730 A.D., the Marathas had tightened (90) their hold both on Gujarat and Malwa and had no desire to slacken it on both the Provinces. As for Malwa, even while the mission of Deep-Chand had just finished its discussion, Malharrao Holkar was assigned a Saranjam of the Mokasa Mahals in Malwa with the under standing that Malwa (91) had been handed over to him from that very movement. On 25th October 1730 A.D. Kusaji Ganesh was appointed as a Vakil at Ujjain. All this arrangement was in the light of establishing Maratha administration in Malwa, “for the benefit of Rayat and the officers of Peshwa, both.”
Sawai Jaysing appointed Subhadar of Malwa for the third time
For a time the new Subhadar Muhammad Khan Bangash seemed to succeed, as Bajirao hastened to Satara after the battle of Dabhoi for the internal settlement before Shahu. But when Ranoji Shinde joined Holkar after Dabhoji, Bangash(92)realized how difficult it was to face the Marathas. He sent urgent appeals to the Emperor for reinforcement and funds. But since Khan Dauran and Kamrudding Khan wre opposed to him from the beginning, sand moreover he had roused the suspicion (93) of the Emperor by his meeting with the Nizam, no reinforcements came, on the contrary, he was removed from his office and once more Jaysing was appointed Subhadar of Malwa by the end of September 1732 (94) , which office he held till August 3-1737 A.D. Jaysing reached Ujjain in December 1732 A.D..
After routing Trimbakrao Dabhade at Dabhoi, and attending the consequent home settlements at Satara, Bajirao was involved in the complicated affair of the Siddis of Janjira from 1732 A.D. From this long drawn struggle (95), he could free him self in December 1733 A.D., by patching up a temporary understanding with the Siddi, to be free once more to took to the North.
But this does not mean that meanwhile the Malwa affairs were neglected. In latter part of 1732 A.D. Malharrao Holkar and Rawaji Shinde, along with other Sardars, reached the Narmada, starting from Kansul (96). On the Narmada the Maratha army was divided into two. One section under Anandrao Pawar and Vithuji Bule was sent towards Malwa. Another led by Malharrao and Ranoji, entering Gujarat, captured Champaner, strengthened Pawagad and sacked one or two places. Meanwhile Jaysing had arrived in Malwa (early 1733 A.D.) and a fight between him and Chimaji was expected. Chimaji hence wrote to Udaji Pawar and Malharrao to repair to Malwa.
Accordingly Udaji Pawar joined him marching through the territory of Mohansing. Malharrao and Ranoji also went to Malwa after finishing their work in Gujarat. Jaysing was at Mandosr (97). The Maratha light forces encircled him and stopped all his supplies. Jaysing tried to seduce Krishnaji Pawar and Udaji Pawar from the Maratha side. But Shinde and Holkar, brought pressure on the Pawars, to leave his side, by disgracing them for such defection. Sawai Jaysing then tried to give a bold stand to the Marathas. But he was hardly a match for them. His half hearted attempts proved futile and in the long run, he admitted to pay them six lakhs of rupees in cash and the ‘Khandani’ already recovered by them in the 28 paraganas. All this business was handled by Malharrao Holkar as Chimaji was at Orchha in bundelkhand (98). Chimaji reached Poona in June 1733 A.D. (99) from this expedition of Malwa and Bundelkhand.
Foot Notes (Description)
(1) ‘Aurangzeb’, Vol V, p. 281.
(2) “A preponderantly Hindu province with a study population, was not likely to take Aurangzeb’s policy of temple destruction and poll tax on the Hindus with tame submission” Ibid - p. 381.
(3)Ibid - 390.
(4) ‘Central India’, pp. 50-51. ‘Malwa in tra.’ P. 32.
(5) ‘Central India’ pp. 60-61.
(6) ‘Aurangzeb’ Vol. V, p. 382.
(7) ‘Munt Lubab’ in E.D. Vol. VII, p. 315, Aurangzeb Vol, V, p. 384.
(8) ‘Malwa in Tra’, p. 65.
(9)
“Early in 1715 A.D., Dawlji Somwanshi, invading Malwa, recovered a sum of Rs. 25,000 from Nandlal Mndloi”. ‘Malwa in Tra’, p. 709. On Jan. 24-1717 A.D. Shahu granted Mokasa rights of 28 Paraganas of Ujjan and 15 Paraganas of Nemad, 14 Paraganas of Handia, 17 paraganas of Ujjain and 15 Paraganas of Bhilsa with Deshmukh Vatan of 5 Mahals of Nemad and Sarkar Handia to Kanhohi Bhosale. S.P.D. - 30-17 A and 17 B.
(10) ‘Malwa in Tra.’, p. 99.
(11) ‘Jaypur Recods Maratha Papers,’ 206.
(12) ‘Later Mughals’, Vol. I, pp. 336 to 339, 405
(13) From August 30, 1722 to May 15, 1723 A.D. Giridhar Bahadur was the Subhadar of Malwa, ‘Malwa in Tra’, p. 144.
(14) S.P.D. 27-10
(15) S.P.D. 27-10
(16) “The short sighted local magnates and their tenants sided with the Marathas” - ‘Later Mughals’ ? Vol. II, p. 244. ‘Holkar Sahi’, I, 1 to 5, 15.
(17) M.I.S. Vol. II, 14, ‘New Hist,’ II, p. 50.
(18) ‘Life of Shahu’’ by Chitnis, p. 45, ‘New Hist.’ Vol. II, p 82.
(19) S.P.D. 30 - entries on pp. 266 to 268.
(20) ‘New Hist.’ Vol. II, p. 85.
(21)‘Holkar Shahi’ I, p 9.
(22)S.P.D. 30-280, 281.
(23)Ibid, 278.
(24)Letter of Keso Mahadeo (4-3-1726 A.D.) . “Giridhar Bahadur is obstructing the collection of chauth and Sardeshmukhi in Malwa” S.P.D. 13-5.
(25) ‘New Hist.’ Vol, II, p. 98.
(26)Ibid, pp. 108. 109.
(27) “The Emperor, however, was day and night plotting to lay his hands on Nizam-ul-Mulk. He often asked his nobles to embark on a campaign against him” ‘Ahwal-I-Khawaquin’ in ‘Studies in Maratha Hist.’, Vol. II, p. 95. Also ‘The Cambridge Hist of India’, Vol, IV, p. 105.
(28) ‘Jaypur Records-Marathas Papers’, 205.
(29)Ibid, 210.
(30) Ibid, 209.
(31) S.P.D. 10-66, “Every year it was rumored that the Emperor hac’ ordered a campaign against the Nizam, But none had the courage to undertake the campaign” Ahwal-I-Khawaquin’ in ‘Studies in Maratha Hist.’, Vol, II, p. 96.
(32)
“Sarbuland Khan was recalled from Gujarat as Muhammad Shaha’s hopes that through him, vengeance would be wreaked upon Nizam-ul-Mulk had vanished”. ‘Later Mughal’, Vol, II, p. 204. “According to prevalent rumor Muhammad Khan Bangash when accepting the Government of Malwa had secretly bound himself to lead a campaign against Nizam-ul-Mulk as soon as the Marthas had been sufficiently dealt with”. Ibid, p. 251. “After a few years Muhammad Bangash was appointed the Governor of Malwa. He secretly promised to carry out appointed the paign against the Nizam. He said , “I will first establish myself in Malwa. Once I raise and have artillery according to my heart’s desire. I will embark on the campaign”. Accordingly Muhammad Bangash reached the province of Malwa. After he had equipped his army, he proceeded against the Nizam. Nizam-ul-Mulk became aware of the aim of Muhammad Bangash”. ‘Ahwal-I-Khawaqin’ in ‘Studies in Maratha Hist.’, Vol. II, pl. 95. “It is in the minds of the Empero.” And Sawai to Chastise the Nizam, It will be done accordingly” from the letter of Chimaji, dated 2nd of June 1740. Ingne Dafter, I-15.
(33) ‘Jaypur Kahritas Udaypur’, 22 to 24.
(34) ‘In 1725 A.D. Raja Giridhar Bahadur was appointed as the Governor of Malwa. He cherished the idea of establishing his dynasty like Nizam-ul-Mulk had done in deccan’ ‘The First Nizam’ by Yusuf Husain’ p. 153, ‘Later Mughal,’ Vol. II, p. 244.
(35) ‘Jaypur Records-Maratha Paper’ - 231, see Appendix - A.
(36)‘Munt. Lubab’ in E.D. Vol. II, p. 478.
(37) ‘The Cambridge Hist. of India’, Vol. IV, p. - 345.
(38)Ibid, 350.
(39) ‘The Cambridge Hist. of India’, Vol. IV, p. 345.
(40)‘Jaypur Records, Maratha Paper’, 215.
(41)Ibid 215,216,219, S.P.D. 13-10
(42)S.P.D. 13-10
(43) Ibid, pp. 25,26.
(44)
(45)
(46) The reference is obviously to victory of Bajirao at Palkhed over Nizam-ul-Mulk, who was the renowned General of his age.
(47) Writes, Dr. Raghubirsing (Malwa in Tra, p. 162) , “The continuous Maratha inroads in Malwa had caused great consternation at the Mughal Court. Jaysing was summoned to the capital, while arrangements were made to send armies to Malwa, and Gujarat Jaysing however, preferred to stay at home and asked Dado Bhimsen, Peshwa’s agent in North (in Aug. 1728) to request his master to send the Maratha armies to Malwa at an early date for wtihout a display of force the Emperor would not yield”. As per the source (S.P.D. XIII-10) on which Dr. Raghubirsing has based his above statement, it is quite evident that Jaysing was called by the Emperor not for sending him to Malwa, but to have a consultation with him on his (i.e.Jaysing;s) project of sending armies to Malwa and Gujarat on the plea of suppressing the Maratha disturbance. The letter clearly says, “The Emperor called Sawai’s Vakil Rao jagram who is an influential person being ‘six hazari’ , ans asked him about the provision made by Sawaiji for the plan “. This will be quite clear from the letter itself given above.
(48) ‘Jaypur Records-maratha Papers’ - 211.
(49) ‘Gulshane Ajaib’, Nizam-ul-Mulk’s Letter in ‘Studies in Marathas Hist.’ Vol. II, p. 74.
(50) ‘Gulshane Ajaib’, Nizam-ul-Mulk’s letter in ‘Studies in Maratha History’, Vol. II, pp. 75, 76.
(51) Ibid, p. 82.
(52) S.P.D. 22-as per entries on page 13.
(53) S.P.D. 23-7.
(54) S.P.D. 13-15, 27, 29.
(55) Ibid, 23.
(56) “As blessed by Swami, our rule has been established till the bank of Yamuna.” Pilaji Jadhao to Narayan Dixit 4th April 1729, S.P.D. 13-45.
(57) ‘Studies in Rajput Hist’, by Qanungo, p. 64.
(58) S.P.D. 20-pp. 293 to 295.
(59) S.P.D. 30-pp. 300, 301.
(60) As per entries on p. 304 of S.P.D. 30, it is clear that Chanderi, Narwar, Orchha, Datiya, Bundelkhand upto Kalpi had come under the Maratha sway by 1730 A.D.
(61) ‘Malwa in Tran,’, p. 176.
(62) S.P.D. 10-66.
(63) ‘Malwa in Tran.’ P. 178.
(64) S.P.D. 29-46 , S.P.D. 30-p. 297.
(65) Vad. I- p. 95. Fall I-p. 246.
(66) ‘New Hist.’ II, p. 124.
(67)S.P.D. - 10-66. Said the Nizam to Deepsing. “You have lost Malwa, for Bangash has been appointed as the Subhadar there.”
(68)S.P.D. 10-66.
(69) S.P.D. 66-72.
(70) S.P.D. 10-61, 65, 67-70, 73-76
(71) ‘Later Mughal’ Vol. II, p. 251.
(72) S.P.D. 10-1. (Item No. 9)
(73) Even in 1735 A.D. when Khan Dauran had purchased peace of paying off the Marathas, the Emperor ensured him for that. S.P.D. 14-39.
(74) ‘Later Mughal’ Vol. II, pp. 204 and 254, ‘Traikh-I-Hindi’ in E.D. Vol, VIII,p. 49.
(75) ‘New Hist. II, p. 156, ‘Later Mughals Vol,’ II, p. 252.
(76) Even in 1740 A.D. the Nizam being being at Delhi, the Emperor was alarmed, hearing the news of the understanding of Bajirao with nasri Jang in Deccan. - Hingne Daftar I-15.
(77) Samsam-ud-daulsh said “Your majesty had remarked at the time when Nizam-ul-Mulk was coming to the court that the enquiry that Bajirao was making was not without a meaning. If he had not enrolled Bajirao among the servants of the Emperor. It would not have been possible for Nizam-ul-Mulk to come to Delhi. Nizam-ul-Mulk had to be reconciled to this. What I have to say is that both Bajirao and Nizam-ul-Mulk are hostile to the empire. We must plan in such a way that one of them dies. This should strengthen the foundations of the empire. Otherwise, affairs would become very difficult. ‘Ahwal-I-khawaqin’ in ‘Studies in Maratha History’ Vol. II, p. 111.
(78) Up till 1732 A.D. the Niza had met Bajirao for six times and his last meeting in 1732 A.D. was much successful. - ‘New Hist.’ Vol. II, pp. 155 and 156.
(79)S. P. D. 14-43.
(80) S.P.D. 10-13 TO 15, 17 to 23,25,29,30 and 33.
(81) S.P.D. 30-312.
(82) ‘A Hist. of Gujarat Vol. II, p. 426.
(83) S.P.D. 30-pp. 295 and 296, S.P.D. 12-12.
(84) Ibid - I,
(85) S.P.D. 13-30.
(86) ‘Vakil Reports’ I, 955,960.
(87) S.P.D. 13-17, ,25,31,37,38,43 and 46
(88) S.P.D. 13-47.
(89) “Sawai Jaysing has come to Ujjain Province. Treat him with respect, in view of the old hereditary friendship between the two Royal families, Give him Mandu fort, if he asks for it.” Vad I, p 95, Fall I p. 246.
(90) S.P.D. 30-pp. 293-95.
(91) Ibid : pp 300-301.
(92) ‘Later Mughals,’ Vol. II p. 253.
(93) “Accordingly Muhammad Bangash reached the provinces of Malwa. After he had equipped his army he proceeded against the Nizam. Nizam-ul-Mulk became aware of the aims of Muhammad Bangash He hurriedly arrived on the banks of the Narmade river, What miracle ! Every one expected war to break out, but what happened was that peace was established. The conferences lasted for nearly 12 days. Every one was surprised at this change from talks of war to talks of peace.” - ‘Ahwai-I-khawaqin in ‘Studies in Maratha Hist.’ vol. II, P. 95. ‘Later Mughals’ Vol. II, p. 254.
(94) ‘Framans, Manshurs and Nishans.’ P. 61-42, Gul-I-Ajaib,’ in ‘Proceedings of the Indian Hist. Congress,” 1933 A.D. A.D., p. 617, also Fall I, p. 246.
(95) S.P.D. 22-16 to 19.
(96) S.P.D. 14-1.
(97) Ibid-2.
(98) S.P.D. 15-6, ‘New Hist.’ II, p. 157.
(99) S.P.D. 14-11, 12.
THE IMPERIAL RESISTANCE
The Maratha Involved in Delhi Politics
From the letter of Mudhaji Hari (1), written from Banda, to Bajirao (dated 28th July 1733 A.D.) we learn about the developments in Bundelkhand (2) after Chimaji’s invasion of 1733 A.D. in that province. Of the two brothers (sons of Chhatrasal) Hirdeshah was more favorable to the Marathas. It was he who had encouraged Chimaji Appa to march to Orchha in his expedition to Bundelkhand. He had designs on Orchha and Datiya. When Chimaji had marched on Orchha, the king of Orchha had called Kamrudding Khan to assist him and accordingly the latter had come with an intention to fight with Chimaji, but he had already gone to Deccan. Kamruddinn Khan, being a friend of the king of Orchha, was hence opposed to Hirdeshah. The Amirs of Delhi had been by now convinced of the Maratha strength. Just as due to his vested interests in Bundelkhand, Kamrudding Khan was opposed to the Marathas, some new friends at Delhi were desirous of seeking their support, and Sadat Khan, strangely enough, was one of them.
He was a deadly enemy of the Nizam. He had heard of the meeting of Bajirao with the Nizam (27th December 1732 A.D.)(3) And as such was doubtful, whether Bajirao would be friendly towards him. He hence sent his overtures through Hirdeshah, knowing his friendship with Bajirao. He informed that the (Sadat Khan was ready to form friendship with Bajirao. He was prepared to appoint the persons of Bajirao’s choice as the Subhardars of Deccan and of Malwa to meet the constant demand of the Marathas from early 1734 A.D. i.e.(4) from the rebellion of the Nizam against the Emperor. He was prepared to fulfil other demands of Bajirao and was ready to meet him in Malwa or at Orchha but it was detemination (5) to finish Nizam-ul-Mulk.
This letter clearly explains why the Nizam was so much watchful over the activites of Bajirao in the North, and why he took pains to be in constant touch with the Amirs of Delhi. Bajirao’s success in getting his names accepted as the Subhadars of Malwa and Deccan meant practically his political extermination.
The Under Currents of the Delhi Politics
The Court of the Emperor Muhammad Shah was divided house in itself. Its policies were shaped due to the impact of ambitious rivalries of the four personalities in the main. They were thus:
(1) The Wazir Kamrudding Khan : He was the leader of the Turani party and was a determined apponent of the Marathas. In all the actions fought between him and the Marathas during 1734 A.D. to 1736 A.D., we see him operating in Budelkhand, which seems to be his special sphere of interest. With the adherance of the Orchha King and one Ramchandra, it was his effort to prevent the Maratha from creating a base in Bundelkhand (6) . He was the nearest relation of the Nizam-ul-Mulk and as such accepted his lead in opposing the Hindusthani party led by Khan Dauran.
(2) Sadat Khan : He was the Subhadar of Oudh. The Subha of Agra also belonged to him, before it was transferred to Sawai Jaysing by Khan Dauran (7) in 1723 A.D. He was ambitious and desired the first place in the Court of Muhammad Shah. He was naturally opposed to Khan Dauran and Jaysing. But being a Shia, his natural place was not the Turani party, Inwardly he was a deadly opponent of Nizam-ul-Mulk and to oppose him, he desired friendship with Bajirao. Among the Courtiers of Muhammad Shah, he alone seems to have the capacity to oppose the Marathas. Being a rival of Khan Dauran and Sawai Jaysing. There was no question of him coming in closer contacts with Bajirao in spite of his overtures through Hirdeshah. He finally lost ground with the Emperor and left the Court in disgust (8) when it was decided that the Nizam should be called to save Delhi from the threat of the Marathas in 1737 A.D. His rivalry with the Nizam carried him to such extremity (9) that he brought the calamity of Nadirshah on the people of Delhi. Finally he had to relieve himself by swallowing poison (10)
-
The Nizam-ul-Mulk : From 1724 A.D. onwards he was continuously held as a rebel by the Emperor, till he was called to save Delhi against the Marathas in 1737 A.D. He was never content with the independent Kingdom he had created in Deccan, but ever cherished the ambition of being the dictator (11) of the Mughal Empire as its Chief minister. With the conciliating policy of Khan Dauran and Sawai Jaysing towards the Marathas since 1732 A.D. onwards, he was particular in watching the movements of Bajirao in the North, lest his activities might endanger his position. With his association with Kamrudding Khan and the Truani party, he was really a powerful factor in Delhi politics.
-
Khan Dauran, Amir-ul-umra : He was the leader of the Hindustani party and a sincere friend of Sawai Jaysing (12) . Along with Sawai Jaysing, he was mainly responsible for the Maratha advance in the North. His opposition to Nizam-ul-Mulk and Turani party was the key point behind his attitude of conciliation towards the Marathas.
The success of the maratha expansion towards Delhi, within a shor to period of 12 years after the fall of Giridhar Bahadur, under Bajirao Peshwa, was due to Bajirao’s skilful handling of the situation, a result of his thorough knowledge of the currents and undercurrents of the Delhi politics.
The Maratha Offensive of 1734 A.D.
By the end of 1733 A.D., Bajirao had freed himself from the engagement with Siddi. Early in 1734 A.D. a powerful Maratha army crossed the Narmada (13). This year the vigorious activities (14) of the Marathas extended from Gwalior to Ajmer and to the Subha of Agra beyond Chambal(15). A favorable Bundelkhand (16) served as the base for these Maratha activities, which continued without any fear (17) of the Mughal forces. The object of this invasion was to realize ‘Khandani’. Pilaji Jadhao, Malharrao Holakar and Ranoji Shinde were active in collecting dues from Bundi-Kota, Narwar, Ahirwada, Gwalior, Datiya and Orchha(18). After consulting Govind Ballal for the management of Bundelkhand, Pilaji proceeded to Deccan before rains. Malharrao and Ranoji, from Ahirwada, went to Bundi and captured (19) it for budhasing on 12th April 1734 A.D. But after their return to Deccan before rains, Sawai Jaysing took it back from Budhsing.
Bundi Affairs, and the attempts of Sawai Jaysing to check the Marathas
Sawai Jaysing wanted (20) to expand the limits of his kingdom, in keeping with the tradition of the great ancient kings of India. He knew that the time was favourable especially after the fall of Farrukh Siyar. He seized Bundi from Budhasing Hada and transferred it to Dalelsing, the second son of Salimsing Hada of Karwar. (September 1729 A.D.) Budhsing’s attempt to recover Bundi failed in April 1730 A.D. Jaysing crowned Dalelsing as the king of Bundi and gave his daughter in marriage to him. Thus Bundi (21) came under his over lord ship. (May, 1730 A.D.)
The defeated Budhsing, who took refuge in Udaypur and then at Begham, go an unexpected ally in Pratapsing, the elder brother of Dalelsing Hada, the new ruler of Bundi. Budhsing’s queen sent him to Satara to bring Maratha and against Dallying. Accepting six lakhs of rupees for the help, Malharrao Holkar and Ranoji Shinde attacked and captured Bundi from Salem sing, the regent of Bundi on 12 April 1734 A.D. Budhsingh’s queen tied(22) the secred thread, ‘Rakhi’ round the wrist of Malharrao Holkar, and become his sister. Thus the first Maratha invasion of Rajasthan was welcomed by one of the Rajput Chiefs. But the success was short-lived, recaptured. Bundi Marathas had gone, a strong Jaypur force, recaptured Budi back for Dalelsing (23).
But Jaysing knew that in the Bundi affair, it was not Budhising or his able son Immersing, that he had to deal with. He had faced Malharrao and Ranoji in early 1733 A.D. and now once more they had threatened his designs of expansion. In the oposition of the Marathas, Dalelsing’s throne was insecure.
We can very well imagine the feelings of Sawai Jaysing, towards the Marathas. He urged the Emperor (24) to send him additional troops with funds and supplies under Muzaffer Khan, the Mir Atish and the brother of Khan Duaran. But the Khan returned to the capital without fighting the Marathas, who had gone to Deccan before the Monsoon. Jaysing then tried to enlist the co-operation of the Rajput Chiefs in October 1734 A.D. at Hurda, in driving out the Marathas beyond Chambal. But nothing came out of it (25).
Due to the opposition of the Marathas, Plans of expansion of Sawai Jaysing with respect to Malwa and Bundi, were upset. At the same time, he was powerless to check them. Hence he was dejected and complained about the activities of Malharrao and Ranoji to the Peshwa. He expresses his desire to meet him and showed his willingness for the comporomise (26) . However partial Sawai Jaysing might be for the Marathas as opposed to the Turani faction at the Court, it is impossible to believe that he was ready to compromise his personal interests to win over their friendship.
Hence, when the year 1735 A.D. opened with a trial of the strength between the Emperor and the Maratha, there is no reason to believe that Sawai Jaysing was Luke-warn in his support to the Emperor’s cause against the Marathas. It should not be inferred from the easy victories of the Marathas over the Imperialists, that they were due to the halfhearted attempts of Khan Dauran and Sawai Jaysing. The Marathas were victorious, because they surpassed (27) in guerilla tactics, and there was hardly any general to match them in the unweidly Mughal army which amounted nearly to two lakhs as per the Maratha letter(28).
What is needed to be understood is that the compaigns of 1735 A.D. led by Khan Dauran and Sawai Jaysing were not carried on for the sake of any formality. If the Marathas could have been defeated, there is no reason to believe that out of any policy or partiality (29), Sawai Jaysing and Khan Dauran would have spared them. After all it was a fight on the part of Sawai Jaysing to retain Malwa and his leading position in Rajasthan in general and Bundi in particular.
But after saying this much let it be said that even though finally over powered by the Marathas, Khan Dauran and Sawai Jaysing had no will to carry on the issue to extremity by supporting whole-heartedly Kamrudding Khan and the Turani party. They knew that in the final suppression of the Marathas, they themselves would be the losers in the politics of Delhi where they had to face the powerful opposition of the Turani party and hence while opposing the Marathas, they could never afford to allow the Turani party to grow more stronger so as to threaten their political existence in the Court of Delhi. In fact for Khan Dauran it was a fight on two fronts. But the ultimate effect was the gain of the Marathas who were shrewed enough to utilize (30) this under current for their Northen expansion. Finally the more the Maratha arms were victorious against the imperial generals, the more Turani Party gained in the confidence of the Emperor and consequently the losing Hindusthani party leaned more towards the Marathas.
Imperial Campaign of 1735 A.D.
In early 1735 A.D., a formidable Mughal army in two seetions, well equipped with guns and ammunition, marched against the Marathas. The one under Kamruddin Khan by way of Agra encountered Pilaji Jadhao near Orchha (beginning of March 1735 A.D.) Pilaji Jadhao succeeded in capturing two to three hundred camels and horses from the Mughal army, then he went to Pohri Shivpur (31) , while Kamruddin Khan was at Narwar, Pilaji then proceeded to Deccan via Bundelkhand, Chanda, and Deogadh route.
The other section under Khan Dauran, (32) Sawai Jaysing and Abhaysing and Malharrao Holkar and Ranoji Shinde in Rampura. But the Marathas completely surrounded the host of the Mughal army and totally stopped the supply of grain and folder. Then leaving the unwieldy Mughal army behind they descended Mukundara and marching through Bundi and Kota, entered into the territory of Sawai Jaising and Abhaysing. On February 28 (33), they plundered the rich commercial town of Sambhar. The Mughals ran after them. Khan Dauran halted at Bundi, where as Sawai Jaysing went to Jaypur to save hiss territory from plnder. Malharrao was ten Kos beyond him.
Holkar and Ranoji (34) then come to Bundi, while Khan Dauran was at Kota. There the Maratha Sardars met Khan Dauran through Sawai Jaysing. After affecting a successful (35) treaty with Khan Dauran and Jaysing, both Ranoji and Malharrao went to Deccan and reached Poona on 6th July 1735 A.D.
It is definite that Khan Dauran had to pay a certain (36) sum to the Maratha in the name of Chauth of Malwa, but there is no mention of the exact sum received by them in the available Marathi record.
Generally (37) it is held that the Marathas got in cash or promise, a sum of 22 lakhs of rupees.
Thus even with the Wazir and Mir Bakshi in the campaign, the Mughals met with a grand failure. The Emperor (38) was displeased tohear it. Especially, he was pained to learn that Sawai Jaysing and Khan Dauran purchased the peace by paying off the Marathas.
Sawai Jaysing Loses the Subhas of Malwa and Agra
Having been proved incompetent to check the Marathas beyond the Narmada, Jaysing was afraid that he would lose the Subhas of Malwa and Agra. His fear proved to be true (39).
The Emperor was convinced by now that the appeasement policy of Khan Dauran and Sawai Jaysing was incapable to check the tide of the Marathas and was intending to hand over the two provinces of Malwa and Agra to Sadat Khan.
Sawai Jaysing, called the Peshwa’s agent (40) with Srichand Diwan and Vyaharidasji for a confidential talk (August 1735 A.D.). He told the agent that he had up till then tried to raise the prestiage of Bajirao because he had no faith in the Turks. He knew that had they been victorious over the Marathas, they would have thought little of the Rajputs. He told the agent that he and Khan Dauran were of one mind. But Sadat Khan and Sarbuland Khan had been successful in gaining an upper hand over them by convincing the Emperor that Jaysing had ruined the Empire by siding with the Decanis. Sadat Khan demanded the Subhas of Malwa and Agra and told that while others demanded crores (for driving away the Marathas) he demanded nothing for his treasury was full. Jaysing told the agent that Sadat Khan was in league with the Nizam who had written to the Emperor, that he would not allow the Marathas to cross the Narmada. Khan Dauran and Jaysing pleaded that they had adopted the policy of appeasement because they were convinced that the Marathas could not be defeated in fighting. They had promised the Emperor, that they would affect a treaty with the Marathas so that either Bajirao or his brother Chimaji Appa would come to the presence, and having got their demands satisfied, no further trouble would be caused to the Emperor’s territory by them. Khand Dauran and Sawai Jaysing further had hinted that if Sadatkhan and the Nizam were united, they would place another Prince on the throne. The Emperor seemed to be convinced by the trught behind the argument but Jaysing could trust him no more.
Sawai Jaysing Plans to Retain Malwa
He told the Peshwa’s agent that he was prepared to pay 20 lakhs in cash, instantly, if the Peshwa would come to him, with his Sardars, without devastating his territory. This amount was to be paid in lieu of the amount received by the Marathas in Malwa, Sironj, Datiya, Orchha and from the talus of Pilaji Jadhao. Besides, he would pay 5 thousand rupees per day for expenses (after the Marathas had crossed the Narmada). After meeting with Sawai Jaysing, if any settlement was to be effected at the Court through Khan Dauran, Bajirao was to visit the Emperor or he was free to return to Deccan.
This was the last effort of Sawai Jaysing to retain the two Subhas of Malwa and Agra. The object of calling the Maratha force to Jaypur was three fold. Firstly it would bring moral force on the Emperor and would help Jaysing and Khan Dauran to retain their positions at the Court against the combination of Kamruddin Khan, Abhaysing, Muhammad Khan Bagash and Sadat Kha. Secondly, it would serve the immediate purpose of Sawai Jaysing of the retention of the Subhas in question. The acceptance of money in cash by the Marathas, meant the end of their direct contact with the territories beyond the Narmada for the realization of the dues. (Had the Marathas accepted the proposal, their position would amount to nothing more than an auxiliary force subordinate to Sawai Jaysing). The last object of calling htem was his personal safety. He was in danger of being attacked by Sadat Khan (41), who was also a rival of Khan Dauran (42)
The Maratha agent hesitated to commit anything to the plan of Jaysing. By accepting 20 lakhs in cash, without ‘Makta’ they would lose the right of possession of the conquered territories beyond the Narmada till Chambal. However, Jaysing was prepared to permit them to collect in their usual manner dues in Gujarat, which was not under him. There was little possibility of the acceptance of the plan as it was, by Bajirao. It was the policy of the Marathas to accept ‘Patta’ (fief) in preference (43) to accepting annual dues in cash. Sawai Jaysing had not realized the true aim of Maratha penetration (44) in to the North, which behind the apparent object of collection of dues to feed the army, was nothing less than possession of the territory.
Mean while another letter came from Sadashio Ballal (45) dated 10th of January 1735 A.D., who had been to Muhammad Khan Bangash to arrange for the safe journey of Radhabai, Peshwa’s mother.
It was reported as told by Bangash, that Sadat Khan had demanded 4 Subhas and 2 crores of rupees for the expulsion of the Marathas and that Khan Dauran’s brother and Muhammad Khan Bangash would be deputed to Malwa against the Marathas. Bangash had no desire to obstruct the Marathas collection in Malwa, but only expected concession in that respect to his Jagir in Malwa. He was further prepared to co-operate with Bajirao in destroying the ‘mawa’ (robbers) in Malwa on the basis of equal division of the freed territory. Sadashio Ballal then came to Jaypur. Rajadhiraj was expecting a reply from Bajirao to his proposal. He urged the envoy to convince Bajirao of his sincere friendship to wards him. He was confident that if Sadat Khan became the Subhadar of Malwa, Bajirao (46) would certainly defeat him. While Sadashio Ballal was still at Jaypur, news came, that the Emperor had agreed to the proposal of Sadat Khan and had assigned him the two Subhas (Malwa and Agra) and granted him two crores of rupees for the expedition and sent Laxshmi Narayan Vakil with the customary robes for Sadat Khan. Sadashio Ballal, then, proceeded to Udaypur.
Thus Sawai Jaysing was finally deprived of the two Subhas. But Sadat Khan had yet to justify his appointment as the Subhadar (47) of Malwa by displacing the Marathas from there. His appointment as Subhadar of Malwa was totally disagreeable to Khan Dauran who was one with the cause of Sawai Jaysing. Thus with Khan Dauran and the Rajputs (excepting Abhaysing) completely on the Maratha side, Sadat Khan had little chance of getting success against them. It appeared that nothing but a whole-hearted reception awaited (48) Bajirao in the North, if he accepted the invitation of Sawai Jaysing.
Very soon (October 1735 A.D.) a letter came from amyaram the Peshwa’s Vakil at Delhi, confirming the news previously received and communicating the plans of the opposition of the Emperor. The Emperor had conciliated Abhaysing (49) with Kamrudding Khan (Sadat Khan) to whom he entrusted the Subhas of Agra, Malwa and permitted him to punish Sawai Jaysing, if the latter did not join the Mughal army with his force. The Emperor had been highly displeased with Khan Dauran and Jaysing for their compromise with the Marathas by paying them money. Khan Dauran tried to explain his Maratha policy by stating that he had given them only that portion in Malwa as Jagir, which was infested with the robbers and the Rohillas and had asked to disturb the Mughal territory no more. He told that Bajirao was ready to serve the Emperor and had sent his mother on pilgrimage, which showed his confidence and oneness with the Empire. Thus Khan Dauran tried but invain. An invitation was sent to Sadat Khan to repair to Delhi. He further asked for himself the Subha of Patna and some jagir and the Subha of Prayag (Alahabad) for Muhammad Khan Bangash, so that he would recover the lost territory by punishing Chhatrasal (i.e. sons of Chhatrasal). The Vakil further-stated that the Emperor himself intended to March with all his forces after the floods were over. Amir-ul-umrao (Khan Dauran) with Sawai Jaysing were to march Via Jaypur, whereas Kamrudding Khan, Abhaysing and Sadat Khan were to march by Gwalior route.
Bajirao Proceeds to the North (Ocotober 1725 A.D. )
By the 1st week of October 1735 A.D.(50) Bajirao prepared himself for the big enterprise of his life which was full of promises (51) as well as obvious dangers. He ordered him prominent Sardars like Pilaji Jadhao, to enter tents for the coming expedition to the North. Bajirao’s well wishers advised him (52) to step into the matter after a full thought and adequate preparation as the issue was a complicated one. Kamrudding Khan, the Wazir was expected to march in person to Malwa, and even the Emperor might come to his help, and the Nizam was still there to add to the complications.
The Nizam was at Ajantha (53) in November 1735 A.D., and was suspicious hearing about the march of Bajirao to the North. He was in constant touch with Sadat Khan whom he instigated to beat down the prestige of Bajirao. It was also rumored that he would march towards Burhanpur. But finally he declined to go, as Bajirao and Pilaji both were in the North.
Bajirao issued from Poona during the Divali (54) of 1735 A.D. By the time he had crossed Tapi, Sadat Khan (55) on his way to Agra had given a fight with Bhagwantsing the Jamindar of Adaru and had killed him. But the contest had been a severe one and even Sadat Khan had to lose 16 Chiefs on his side. This crippled him so much that he had to leave aside his intended march on Sawai Jaysing. (November 1735 A.D.) The relation between Sawai Jaysing and Sadat Khan had strained beyond limits and dreading an assult from Sadat Khan, Sawai was anxiously awaiting Bajirao’s arrival in the North.
On 10th of December 1735 A.D. Bajirao had crossed the Narmada (56) and was at Jaypalpur in Malwa. In January 1736 A.D., after capturing Kulasis (57), Bajirao was marching through Dongarpur Banswada in Mewad. His march to the North effected favourably on the position of Khan Dauran and Sawai Jaysing in the Court and the opposition party toned down. Bajirao sent Mahadeo Bhat Hingane to Sawai Jaysing who sent along with him and Raja Malji two lakhs in cash, besides jewellery, robes, five horses and an elephant all told five lakhs of rupees and called the Peshwa to Jaypur without losing time. Sadat Khan had reached his distination. Rajoji Shinde and Ram Chandra Shenwai were active in formulating a treaty. It was proposed that Peshwa should get after meeting the Emperor 20 lakhs of rupees in cash, a jagir of 40 lakhs in Malwa and the subsidy was to be assigned on Dost Muhammad Khan of Bhopal.
While Bajirao was marching through Mewad, one of his Sardars Baji Bhivrao had marched to Datiya, Orchha (58) and by the end of january 1736 A.D. had realized dues from both these states. He then proceeded to Bhadawar and Jatwad territory (59). He came to know that in Delhi politics, Khan Dauran (60) and Jaysing were on one side and Sadat Khan, Kamruddin Khan and the rest were on the other side. He suggested to Bajirao that unless Sadat Khan and Kamruddin Khan and the rest were defeated, his plan had no chance of success. He further wrote Bajirao that there was no possibility of getting money for him after crossing the Chambal. Whatever, he might get, was from Jaysing only. He further advised Bajirao not to hurry to the Emperor relying on the vastness of his forces, for Delhi was a powerful place and it was yet dangerous for Bajirao to venture to go there. He should be, under the circumstances, cautious and should not hanker after money too much. He should not bring undue pressure on Ranaji for exacting money but should see that he was kept pleased. Also he should be satisfied with whatever Jaysing would do for him. He should not try to gather the whole world in a single day.
Baji Bhivrao was one of the most sincere adherents of the Peshwa. His letter depicts the sober Maratha policy towards the Rajputs in the first phase of their friendship. Had there been such dashing and beloved peshwa in future times and sincere friends like Baji Bhivrao, one feels that much wanton bloodshed would have been averted.
The Rana’s Anxiety Over the Question of a Fief
After capturing Kuksi Mawasi (61) and realizing ‘Khandani’ from lonwada Dangarpur, Bajirao entered Mawad (62) proper by the end of January 1735 A.D. and was about to ascend the Ghat. He learnt that Nijyabat Alikhan from Khan Dauran and Ayamalgi from Sawai Jaysing were approaching him with money. The Peshwa informed his mother on he return from the pilgrimage, that the Emperor was inclined for a peaceful settlement and that a favourable treaty was in sight.
Having learnt that the Peshwa had entered his territory, the Ranaji (63) sent Kesharsing to receive him. Bajirao, sent the bulk of his army to Shahapur and taking to eight thousand men with him went to meet the Rana (64) (February 1736 A.D.).
It seems that by 1734 A.D. the Rana of Mewad had definitely come under the sway of the Marathas. Full contacts had been established of the Court of Udaypur with that of Satara. One the occasion of the coming to throne of Jaysing, after the death of Maharana Sangramsing in 1734, Nagraj the foster brother (Dhybhai) of the new Rana and Somaram Munshi requested for ‘Tika’ (recognition) from the Chhatrapati at Satara, through the Pant Pradhan. Accordingly robes suited for the occasion, an elephant and other customary things were sent to the new Rana (65).
Peshwa had in his view a recovery of a fief (Patta) amicably from the Rana since 1729 A.D., when Chimaji Appa sent Chinto-Girmaji to the Rana for that work from Gujarat(66). But since the Rana and his Court disliked to alienate land from their territory in this way, the demand remained unattended. But with the coming of the new Rana to throne, the matter was taken up again by the Peshwa, who sent Sadasho Ballal to the Rana’s Court to effect a settlement in respect of the fief. Sadashio Ballal advised his master that the Rajputs would pay the dues for a year or two, but once a fief was got, it would be a thing for ever. Atlast after a stay for a year Sadashio Ballal came to the conclusion that the land would not be acquired unless recourse to force was taken (68). < check this para >(67)
Hence, even though the political situation in the North necessitated that the Marathas should be on the side of the Rajputs and even though Byanaridas (69) the minister of the Rana of Udaypur was a party to the calling of the Marathas by Sawai Jaysing, the Rana was not as happy as Sawai Jaysing, overcming of Bajirao to his Court. He wrote to his minister Byaharidas (70) Pancholi. “The Deccani question you have settled well, but if a meeting is to take place (with Bajirao) let it be byond Deola, nearer is not advisable”. He wrote furthe “Bajirao has come, and he will derive reputation from having compelled a contribution from me, besides his demand of land. Malhar came last year, but it was nothing. Bajirao is (more) powerful. But if God hears me, he will not get my land”. Samvat 1792. (1736 A.D.) (71)
Peshwa Meets the Ranaji
Champabag (72) palace was reserved for the accommodation of Bajirao in Udaypur. The next day after his arrival, the Peshwa was honoured in the open Darbar, where two gold embroidered seats were arranged for the guest and the host. Bajirao was shrewd diplomat, he politely declined to accept the position of equality with the Rana and occupied a seat just below. Dresses and presents were offered and entertainments took place for five days from 3rd to 7th of February 1736 A.D. Bajirao visited various sights and monuments (73) like Jalmandir (74) at Udaypur and then left for Nath-Dwara. The Rana agreed to pay a lakh and a half annually as Chauth Bajirao did not insist for the (Patta) land as was suggested by his adviser.
At Nath-Dwara Bajirao and his wife Kashibai offered their joint devotion to the celebrated deity and proceeded further.Malharrao Holkar, Ranoji Shinde, Kanthaji Kadam and Anandrao Pawar had been dispatched towards Marwad as all the host of Maratha forces could not be fed in the territories of friendly Ranoji and Sawai Jaysing. There was alsoanother object in sending these forces into Marwad. It was to bring pressure on Abhaysing who had joined the party of Kamrudding Khan (75) (October 1735 A.D.). This more satisfied Sawai Jaysing who was displeased with Abhaysing for his joining hands with the Turani Party(76)
The Maratha forces (77) then marched upon Medta (February ary 1736 A.D.) guided by Pratapsing Hada, who went within the town of Medta and met the Chief, Umedsing, but as no settlement could be effected, the Marathas occupied the town on the very first day and laid siege to the fort. The garrison made repeated sorties on the trenches and heavy exchange of fire went of from day to day.
In another theatre of war (78), Bagash was facing Baji Bhivrao, south of Chambal, posted in a ravine created by the confluence of the Kosi river with the Chambal. The latter waited in vain at his base at the Nurabad, 15 miles north of Gwalior, hoping that Bangash would leave his difficult position and come out to measure strength. Finally he reported the Peshwa that Bangash was coward.
But as peace overtures were received (79) from Delhi, through Sawai Jaysing, Bajirao sent orders to suspend hostilities and the State of war came to an end by the first week of March 1736 A.D.
Bajirao’s Meeting with Sawai Jaysing
Bajirao and Sawai Jaysing (80) had their first meeting at Bhambhola near Kishangadh on 4th of March 1736 A.D. They arrived both ridding on their elephants, and as soon as they sighted each other, they dismounted, embraced each other and sat as the same Mansad in an open Darbar. This visit lasted upto 8th March. Presents and tributes poured upon Bajirao from all quarters.
There were plentiful demonstrations (81) of Joy and respect for Bajirao during February to April on the part of the Rajput Chief’s since he entered Udaypur. But the settlement was to be effected not with Sawai Jaysing but with the Emperor. The Peshwa sent Mahadeo Bhat Hingane, Yadgar Khan munshi with Jaysing;s envoy Kriparam to Delhi, with his demands, with instructions to sent the reply about the settlement within 20 days. But even though Bajirao (82) waited eagerly for 2 months (April and May 1736 A.D.) no reply came, nor did he learn anything about the proposal or about the envoys.
Bajirao Returns Disappointed to the South
Thus even though Bajirao’s march to North during 1735 A.D. to 1736 A.D. was a success in establishing cordial relations with the Rajput Chiefs, it was not productive of any substantial gains. Even though it was proposed that Bajirao should get rupees 20 lakhs (83) in cash and a Jagir of 40 lakhs in Malwa, the entries reveal that he did not get more than a lakh from Khan Dauran (84). Add to this rupees two lakhs in cash (and three lakhs in kind) sent by Jaysing (85), and all told about half a lakh sent by way of presents by the various Rajput Chiefs. Delhi was more liberal in assurances but hardly so in actual payments. This was to be the experience of the Marathas onwards.
It was difficult (86) to feed the host of 50 to 60 thousand men with friendly territories all around. The season had advanced enough, and there seemed no immediate prospects of any reply about the settlement from Delhi. Bajirao was dejected at heart at the delaying tactics of the Court and in the long run, losing all hopes to get any money, was compelled to return south so that at least the army should not be destroyed (87) for want of funds.
Bajirao’s left Malwa, by the end of May 1736 A.D. keeping Malharrao Holkar, Ranoji Shinde, Tukoji Pawar and Yashwantrao Pawar withan army of 15 thousand. He returned to Deccan with the rest of army to save it from starvation. Nothing had been received from Delhi and Bajirao had grave doubts whether the Court would keep its promise.
Foot Notes (Description)
(1) S.P.D. 14-9.
(2)S.P.D. 30-pp 307 to 311.
(3)‘Later Mughals’ Vol. II, p 252, ‘New Hist.’ Vol. II p. 156.
(4) S.P.D. 10-1.
(5) “??????????????????????????????????? " - S.P.D. 14-9
(6) S.P.D. 14-9
(7) ‘Farmans, Manshurs and Nishans’, p. 58-27. ‘The Cambridge Hist. of India’, Vol. IV, p. 346.
(8) S.P.D. 15-29
(9) ‘Ait. Charitra’ - 3. S.P.D. 15-75, M.I.S. 6-137.
(10) S.P.D. 30-229, ‘Later Mughals’, Vol. II, p. 356.
(11) ‘Later Mughals’, Vol. II, p. 297. ‘Hingne Dafter’ I - 19, 23.
(12) S.P.D. 14-17, S.P.D. 15-30.
(13) S.P.D. 14-10, 11, 13 S.P.D. 30-61 (The date of this letter is 17th December 1733 A.D. and not 17th December 1734 A.D. This letter corresponds to letter No. 10 of S.P.D. 14th of December 1733 A.D.).
(14) ‘Later Mughals’, Vol. II, pp. 277-78.
(15) Shiwaji Shankar Odhekar, a Maratha Sardar, after realizing Khandani from Kasba Sipri and Kularas in Subhas Agra, marched upto Kasha Sopar in Ajmer Subha, S.P.D. 14-15.
(16) Ibid - 12, ‘Later Mughals’, Vol. II, p. 281.
(17) S.P.D. 14-16, “Even if the Emperor’s forces approach us, we shall feed by moving to the left or right as would suit us”.
(18) Ibid - 13.
(19) ‘New Hist.’ , Vol. II, p. 158.
(20) ‘Satara Ait. Lekh’ 2-270, “Rajadhiraj, assuming to be the servant (of the Emperor) seizes the territory as far as possible”, Fall I, p. 250.
(21) Fall I, p. 251.
(22) Fall I, p. 252.
(23) ‘Farmans, Manshurs and Nishans’, p. 60-41
(24) ‘Later Mughals’, Vol. II, p. 279, ‘New Hist.’, Vol. II, p. 158.
(25)Fall I, p. 252.
(26) S.P.D. 30-108
(27) ‘Later Mughals’ Vol. II, pp. 283 and 284.
(28) S.P.D. 14-23.
(29) Writes Sir Jadunath (Fall I, p. 255) “In Rajputana, Khan-I-Dauran, after wasting many weeks at Bundi, in utter inaction, listened to Jaysing’s advice and induced the Marathas to retire beyond the Narmada by promising them, on behalf of the Emperor, 22 lakhs as the Chauth of Malwa.”
Now compare this statement with the following :-
(a) “During January and February several Rajput princes headed by Khan Dauran fought many stiff battles with Shindia and Holkar near Rampura, Sindia kept them engaged while Holkar moved rapidly in to the North, devastated the territories of Marwar and Jaypur,” Jaysing and the Emperialists found thas, that they paid Rs. 22 lakhs in cash and purchased peace”.” New Hist.’, Vol. II, pp. 158 and 159.
(b) “In a short time, all suplies of grass and grain were cut off. The horses were no longer able to stand. When a Regiment of Ahadis-mostly of Baluch and Mughal race-some 1000 to 1500 marched out without harm and was busy collecting anything they could lay hands upon in the villages about 8 miles from the camp, were surrounded was cut-off to pieces. It was three days before Jaysing could collect the dead bodies.” ‘Later Mughals’, Vol. II, pp. 283 and 284.
(30) ‘Bramhendra Swami Charitra’ - 7.
(31) S.P.D. 14-21 TO 23, and 28
(32) Ibid - 21 and 23.
(33) “Tarikh-I-Hindi’ in E.D. Vol. VIII, p. 51.
(34) S.P.D. 14-24, 26, 27, S.P.D. 22-284.
(35) S.P.D. 22-293390,391,441.
(36) S.P.D. 14-39.
(37) (a) “Raja Jaising, gave the enemy in the district of Kishangarh a sum of twenty lacs of rupees on the part of the Emperor to induce them to return to Dakin” - Tarikh-I-Hindi’ in E.D. Vol. VIII, p. 52. (b) “An annual sum of 22 lakhs of rupees from Malwa was promised”, ‘Later Mughals’, Vol. II, p. 280. © “22 lakhs were promised as the Chauth of Malwa”. Fall I, p. 255. (d) “They paid 22 lakhs in cash and purchased peace.” ‘New Hist.’ , Vol. II, p. 159. (e) “On behalf of the Emperor, Khan Dauran offered the Marathas, 22 lakhs as the Chauth of Malwa” - ‘Malwa in Tran’, p. 232. Thus the total revenue of Malwa during 1719 A.D. to 1725 A.D.under the Nizam, as the Subhadar of Malwa, was 30 to 40 lakhs of rupees a year, the ‘Chauth’ of which comes to 10 lakhs. Deepsing had also promised Chhatrapati Shahu 11 lakhs as the Chauth of Malwa, (S.P.D. 10-66) Hence it is clear that 22 lakhs could never be the ‘Chauth’ of Malwa. In similar circumstance, Jaysing had paid six lakhs of rupees and the ‘Khandani’ of 28 paraganas already recovered in 1733 A.D. (S.P.D. 14-2) to the Maratha. In 1734 A.D., the Marathas had exacted their dues with vigorous movement. (S.P.D. 14-10, 11, 13, 18) . In all probability the sum paid by Khan Dauran in April 1735 A.D. cannot exceed rupees 12 lakhs.
(38) S.P.D. 14-29.
(39) S.P.D. 14-31.
(40) Ibid - 47, 31.
(41) S.P.D. 30-143, S.P.D. It is clearly stated that Sadat Khan was permitted to attack Sawai Jaysing, if the latter did not join the Mughal army against the Marathas. - Ibid-42 Sadat Khan had marched with all intention to fall upon Sawai Jaysing, also Fall I, p. 259..
(42) S.P.D 30-134.
(43) S.P.D. 30-128.
(44) S.P.D. 14-31 ( especially the half of the letter ) S.P.D. 30-301, also 325.
(45) S.P.D. 30-134.
(46)(46) “??????????????????????????????????????????”
(47) S.P.D. 14-39
(48) “Shivdas the Nayab Subha of Agra told Sadashiv Ballal that Raya’s (Bajirao’s) prestige had attained such a level that if he intended to capture the Empire of Hastinapur (Delhi) and handed it over to Chhatrapati of Satara, it was possible” . -
(49) S.P.D. 30-134.
(50) S.P.D. 14-39.
(51) Writes Sir Jadunath (in Fall I, p. 267) “At the close of 1735 A.D. when peace talks broke down. Chimaji advanced with large army towards Gwalior by way of Sironj and Bundelkhand”. Now, the first thing to be noted here is that Bajirao’s march into the North at the close of 1735 A.D. was not due to any break down of peace talks but due to the invitation from Sawai Jaysing (as per S.P.D. 14-31, -47, S.P.D. 12-76 and S.P.D. 30-134) to serve the purpose of Khan Dauran and Sawai Jaysing, and the second thing to be noted is that Chimaji did not accompany Bajirao is this expedition to the North. In 1735 A.D. he was in Deccan and from March to July 1736 A.D., he was in kokan - M.I.S. II, p. 27.
(52) S.P.D. 14-35, S.P.D. 10-19.
(53) S.P.D. 14-40, 41, 42.
(54) Ibid, 39, 43, S.P.D. 30-144, 158.
(55) ‘New Hist.’ , II, p. 162.
(56) S.P.D. 14-43.
(57) Ibid, 50.
(58) Ibid, 48, 52, S.P.D. 15-14.
(59) S.P.D. 14-54.
(60) S.P.D. 14-54.
(61) S.P.D. 30-158.
(62) S.P.D. 14-51.
(63) S.P.D. 30-160.
(64) Writes Sir Jadunath (Fall, I p. 260.), “The agreement of 22nd March 1735 A.D. (A promise of payment of 22 lakhs as the Chauth of Malwa-Fall I, p. 255) not having been ratified by the Emperor, Bajirao planned a grand campaign under his own command in the coming winter. The failure of the entire force of the Empire. In the first quarter of 1735 A.D. had convinced the Rajputs in particular tat the Marathas were invincible. The news of coming of the Peshwa in prson threw all Rajputana into and despair.” (i) It has been already stated that Bajirao was going to the North, of the invitation of Sawai Jaysing besides his object of obtaining the ‘Sanad’ of Malwa, and hence his visit had nothing to do with the agreement of 22nd March 1735 A.D. (ii) Bajirao’s march was to assist to maintain the position of Sawai Jaysing at the Court of the Emperor. He was going to the North as the friend of the Rajputs and hence no question arises of the feeling of alarm or dispair in Rajputana. The particular letter of the Rana to Biharidas Pancholi, is in connection of a grant of fief, which the Rana was averse to grant. Instead of a feeling of alarm or despair, the reception given to Bajirao by the Rajput Chiefs, display a feeling of Joy and friendship, (S.P.D. 30-p. 321-26).
(65) S.P.D. 14-20
(66) S.P.D. 12-32
(67) S.P.D. 30-128, S.P.D. 9-12
(68) S.P.D. 30-142.
(69) S.P.D. 14-47.
(70) ‘Annals’ Vol. I (1960), p. 335. Fall I, p. 261.
(71) The above letter do not exhibit a felling of alarm and disperse as Sir Jadunath Sarkar infers (Fall I, p. 260) but a false anxiety of losing the dignity by way of meeting one who was superior in power but lower in dignity from his own pint of view and a determination to save from the demand of land.
(72)S.P.D. 30-32
(73) Marathi record is silent over the suspected trap of murder of Bajirao in Jalmandir palace Udaypur (Fall I, p. 262.), Sir Jadunath states that as fine 7 lakhs was agree, out of which 3 lakhs were paid in cash. Sardesai ( New Hist. Ii, p. 163) makes no mention of the episode. The only sum that seems to have been promised was of a lakhs of rupees for the feast (‘mejawani’) and forty five thousand rupees for a village, Utall in Banheda paragan, for the payment of which Bajirao had to remained devichand Pancholi, the surety-B.I.S.M letters from Vyas family-5.
(74) S.P.D. 14-54
(75) S.P.D. 14-39.
(76) S.P.D. 13-49 (February 1736 A.D.) Sir Jadunath places this letter (S.P.D. 13-49) wrongly in April 1735 A.D. He writes (Fall I, p. 255 footnote). “But before this, in April 1735 A.D. Holkar and Shinde invaded Marwad, under orders of Bajirao to punish Abhaysing for his recent hostile actions. The orders were to spare the territories of Jaypur and Mewad with scrupulous care. Bajirao wrote this to his master that this would please Jaysing.” Now (I) Abhaysing had not committed any hostile action by joining. Kamrudding Khan ‘recently’ i.e. before April 1735 A.D. but he certainly had committed a hostile action ‘after the said campaign was over’, in Oct. 1735 A.D. (S.P.D. 14-39). (II) In the campaign of early 1735 A.D., Abhaysing was with Khan Dauran and Sawai Jaysing in Malwa, and hence the question of sparing “territories of Jaypur and Mewad with scrupulous care” and “to punish Abhaysing for recent hostile actions” did not arise in April 1735. (III) It was not Bajirao who wrote that “this would please Jaysing”, but it was written by Purandare to Bajirao, communicating Shahu’s approval of the letter’s action. (IV) The political situation with Mewad and Jaypur being friendly to the Marathas and Marwad being hostile occurred in the campaign of early 1736 A.D. and hence this letter must be of February 1736 A.D. Because the Peshwa then only could askhis Sardars to punish Abhaysing for his ‘recent’ hostile action.
(77) S.P.D. 14-14, 56, S.P.D. 30-151 (1936 A.D.) - Sir Jadunath writes (Fall I, p. 266-foot-note), “This letter (S.P.D. XIV-14) is dated Ist April 1736 A.D. by the Editor but as Sambhar was sacked on 28 February 1735 A.D., that year is most likely for this letter.” But that year is most unlikely for this letter. In early 1735 A.D., with a host of Mughal army amounting to two lakhs with Artilary and ammunition carts beyond count in the rear in Malwa (S.P.D. 14-23), It seems unreasonable that malharrao and Ranoji Shinde would commit to siege operation of such severty. It was only possible in early 1736 A.D., with the backing of the powerful Maratha army under Peshwa himself in the North. Secondly as per S.P.D. 14-56, Baji-Bhivrao from paragana somavali enquires Bajirao before the latter’s meting with Sawai Jaysing (8 March 1736 A.D.) Whether the forces from marwad had been recalled or not further suggested that they should be ordered to join him with out loss of time. Hence this reference to Marwad campaign in S.P.D. 14-56, and the above conclusins make it obligatory to place this letter (S.P.D. 14-14) in February 1736 A.D.
(78) S.P.D. 14-55, Fall I, p. 26.
(79) S.P.D. 14-53, 56.
(80) S.P.D. 30-156, also p. 322, ‘New Hist’ Vol. II, p. 163.
(81) S.P.D. 30-pp. 322 to 326. On 4th of March 1736 A.D. sawai Jaysing paid rupees five thousand for feast, presented an elephant with its accessories and 35 camels (all told worth rupees 13,500). In return the Peshwa presented him with a palanquin wth the accessories. On 17th March 1736 A.D., Gopalsing of Keroli presented Bajirao various guns and articles, on 7th of April. Roop Ray, the son of Bhagwantsing of Adaru presented the Peshwa a ‘Baj’ bird. On 30th of April, the kings of Nagore and Datiya presented various decorated guns.
(82) Bajirao’s letter to Mahadeo Bhat Hingne, ‘Hingne Daftar’ I-6.
(83) S.P.D. 14-50.
(84) S.P.D. 30-pp. AND 22.
(85) S.P.D. 14-50.
(86) ‘Hingne Daftar, I, -6.
(87) Wites Sir Jadunath (Fall I, p. 264) , “It was settled in the meeting (with Jaysing) that the time was not favourable for Bajirao’s intended attack on Delhi. However Jaysing promised to use his influence at the imperial Court to secure for Raja Shahu the grant of Chauth and cession of Malwa from the Emperor”. Firstly: - This was not at all the cause of Bajirao’s return to Deccan. Secondly :- No where it is stated that this march of Bajirao to the North at the close of 1735 A.D. was to attack Delhi. And Thirdly :- When Jaysing was himself in the anxiety to save the two provinces of Malwa and Agra, and when his influence was at the lowest ebb in early 1736 A.D. the statement of Bajirao’s return to Deccan on receiving the promise of jaysing in nearly meaningless. Infact the breakdown of talks meant the defeat of the last effect of Khan Dauran and Sawai Jaysing to retain their positions with the Emperor, through the medium of peaceful settlement with the Marathas. For the first time, diplomacy had go a set back, and the Maratha strength and prestige came face to face with the grim determination of the Emperor and the Turani party, to retain their remaining Empire against the eneroaching Marathas.
BAJIRAO AT HIS MISSION
Break Down of Peace Settlement - The Real Cause
Hopes had been raised that if the Peshwa meant it could be possible for him to capture Hastinapur (Delhi) (1) for the Chatrapati of Satara, what actually he was promised and for what he was expecting a favourable (2) reply from Delhi, was "
(1) Five lakhs of rupees for expenses. (2) A Sanad for, a Jagir in Malwa (3) A “Khilat” with the accompanying articles. (4) A promise of asistance in the joint enterprise for the recovery of territory under the Rohilas in Malwa and (5) A Sanad of the Subha of Malwa within 4 months.
But the Peshwa after waiting hinvain for two months had to return to Deccan to save his army from utter starvation.
The main reason for the breakdown of peace talks was not any high tone in Bajirao’s behaviour or any excess in the demands but the unpreparedness (3) of the Delhi Court for the parting of the Subha of Malwa. Even though Malwa passed (4) under the Marathas from 1732 A.D. (excluding the forts held by the officers of the Emperor) the Turani party and the Emperor were not prepared for handling over the Subha of Malwa to Bajirao in 1736 A.D.
The appointment of Bajirao as the Subhadar of Malwa was quite a different thing from the appointment of Giridhar Bahadur in 1725 A.D., or Sawai Jaysing for the third time in 1732 A.D. or even of the Nizam in 1737 A.D. as Subhadars of Malwa. It was a legal recognition for the actual possession of the Marathas. The Emperor was not prepared yet for such a deed. Even Khan Dauran could not go beyond (5) granting a jagir to Bajirao in the territory of the Afgans, which was obiviously a shrewd policy that needs no further explanation (6). Delhi was nt prepared to grant legally the Subha of Malwa to Bajirao and hence was employing delaying tactics in order to avoid an unpleasant deed.
It was clear for Bajirao in Deccan that unless force was applied, the Court would not be ready for a compromise. On 6th July 1736 A.D., Bajirao (7) got the much eagerly awaited letter from Hingne. Yet the Sanads were under preparation. As for the expenses, the Court had sent a Hundi of a lakh rupees, which dejected Bajirao mostly as it was sufficient to meet the expenses of the Malwa-force for a week only.
How to meet the daily expenses was great question before the Maratha army in Malwa. Nothing had come out of the 5 lakhs that were expected within a fortnight. Ranoji (8) wrote Hingne that for want of money for expenses, Bajirao had gone to the South with all the army excepting himself. He asked Hingne to press with urgency for expenses, Sanad for 25 lakhs and the Sanad of Malwa as per the settlement. The real object of keeping the Maratha force in Malwa was to bring pressure on the Delhi Court for the grant of the Sanad.
June 1736 A.D. (9) came to an end. The Maratha force in Malwa had done its assigned work. The money problem was acute. The Maratha army in Mlawa required rupees 25 thousand for expenses per day. Ranoji lost patience and wrote Hingne that he should stay there only if they were really going to hand-over the Sanad of the jagir, the promised expenses, and the Sanad of the Subha or he should come back. In fact he had lost all hopes that the Mughals would keep the word.
Instead of the news of the expected Sanad, a stern warning of a new Mughal campaign against the Marathas came through the letter of Hingne. Taking offence at a (false) news received in the month of June 1736 A.D., Khan Dauran told Hingne that the Marathas, professing friendship, had captured treacherously the fort of Ujjain and hence he had cancelled sending the proposed money and the Sanad. He further warned Hingne that the Emperor had enough force and treasury to meet the treacherous (10) challenge of the Marathas.
Ranoji (11) wrote Hingne, in reply to above charges, that he should keep in mind that the Marathas had been exerting for the last two years so that he should get success. It was not in their nature either to care for or to serve anybody. God was favourable to them. In fact they were worried only in the time of peace with the Mughals. They were quite happy in a state of war. Bajirao wrote that he had already left his army in Malwa and it would not take much time for him to repair to the North again.
It was proved that the Marathas were to get nothing by a peaceful (12) settlement. For the first time they were opposing a grim determination of the Mughal Court to save Malwa from there clutches. Nothing but a repetition of the miracle performed in Malwa in 1728 A.D. was needed. Diplomacy had come to an end and they were face to face with the Malwa problem for the first time.neverth-less, they were determined to reap what they had sowed in 1728 A.D. Under such circumstances, the question of the Rajput influence in the Court of Delhi in their favour did not arise at all. The Rajput sympathy was on their side no doubt, but as Chimaji (13) had written once, it was their own strength that was to pay them in the long run. The last chapter of the battle for Malwa at the gates of Delhi had begun.
Bajirao’s March on Delhi
After making his full preparations Bajirao left for the North on 12th November 1736 A.D.(14), met Ranoji (15) on 5th December at Bhilsa which was under siege. After realizing dues from Bhilsa, the Peshwa moved to After which was besieged and captured. The plunder was enormous. From Ater, the Peshwa once more moved to Sironj. The Nizam was watching his activities from Makodi District, to the south (16) of Narmada.
Abhaysing (17) with an army of 15 thousand was at Maujabad. He remained aloof from the ensuing contest. On receipt of the letters from the Emperor and Sadatkha, Sawai Jaysing entered tents without going to Jaypur, and instantly proceeding 9 kos with fifteen thousand men and artillery, towards Agra, halted at Jambaroli. He was to reach Agra soon. But actually he never reached Agra but halted at Gadhasi (18) 20 kos from Jaypur. His joining the cause of the imperial army was infact a mere show. He had written everything for the knowledge of Peshwa.
Taking leave of the Peshwa (19) in the middle of October 1736 Baji Bhivrao proceeded to Datiya (20) and Orchha and realized the dues. Himmatrao and Krishnaji (21) from the Bundelas joined him with 5 to 6 thousand men. Meanwhile, he realized udes from Suklora Gujrola, Pachor, Uchat, Jatwada, and Banwar. Bhadawar (22) was given a warning to clear off everything. He sent an expedition with the Bundela force of 2 thousand and a half into Antarwed (23) and prepared to join Bajirao (24) with his detatchment with Hirdeshah the Bundela Chief as per the orders of the Peshwa.
By the end of January Baji Bhivrao had reached Yamuna. Delhi was not far away from him. He informed Bajirao that Khan Dauran and Jaysing were on the side of the Marathas whereas Kamruddin Khan, Turebaz Khan, Sadat Khan and Abhaysing were in league with the Nizam who was keeping constant touch with them. Delhi was most unfavourable to ways and means without marching to proper Delhi, which was taking advice of (25) its leader Nizam. The Turani party was definitely against an amicable settlement between the Emperor and Bajirao.
By March 1737, Maratha advance detachments had reached Chambal (26) . News came that Kamruddin Khan was to start from Delhi to affect a junction with Sadat Khan at Agra. By the end of March 1737, Bajirao was 8 kos away from Agra. He sent a picked force of 10 to 12 thousand men under Pilaji Kadhao(27), Malharrao Holkar, Ranoji Shinde and Baji Bhivrao across Yamuna to plunder the territory. Accordingly this force sacked completely two towns of Antarwad. But the Marathas had no idea that Sadat Khan with his main army was near at hand, about 5 kos from them. He dispatched his nephew Mansur Ali Khan with 15 to 20 thousand men. The Marathas were caught unawares. The fight was a severe one and the Marathas lost about 1000 to 1500 men in the fight and many of them were drowned while crossing back the river in haste. Fortunately for the Marathas, all the Sardars with the remaining army reached safely and joined the main army. Even though it was not a big victory as Sadat Khan reported to the Emperor, it was not an insignificant one as well.
Sadat Khan (28) had reported to the Emperor that he had destroyed the main army of the Marathas, and hence it was a point of prestige for Bajirao to show that the Marathas were still there. He dispatched the “Bungas” (camp followers) to Malwa and with 50 to 55 thousand men, he prepared himself for the dash.
Two (29) ways were open to Bajirao, either to attack Sadat Khan or to fall upon Delhi itself. But as Sadat Khan would not venture out of Agra, he took the latter course. Avoiding the main Mughal concentration near Agra, he rapidly advanced through the Mewati territory while Khan Dauran and Bangash marched towards Agra, and joined Sadat Khan on 23rd of March.
In two long marches Bajirao reached Delhi on 28th March and encamped outside the city. He wisely gave up the idea of setting fire to the adjoining Suburbs, as this wanton outrage would have cost him permanently the sympathy of the Emperor and would have further made it difficult for Khan Dauran and Jaysing to plead his case. In fact, the presence of the Maratha army itself was sufficient to strike terror in the minds of the inhabitants of Delhi. On 30th March, he crushingly defeated a force of about 8 thousand sent by the Emperor. News came that Wazir Kamrudding Khan was closing upon him. Bajirao’s purpose was already served. He had practically desolated the environs of Delhi. While returning he was met by Kamruddin Khan and a severe fight took place on 31st March(30). But it was soon dark and the Marathas retired. News came that all the combined Mughal army was coming upon them. Bajirao, avoiding them marched towards Rewadi and kotputali. Leaving Jaypur territory then, he proceeded towards Gwalior for the collection of arrears. Such was the outcome of the great offensive.
While in Jaypur territory, he received a letter from Vyankatram (31) who wrote, I read to him (Sawai Jaysing) every word of your letter, after which he replied, “We are the Peshwa’s loyal servants, it behooves him to take care of us in every possible way. His revered mother has given us her blessings and he must continue to do the same.” Jaysing was in his camp at Gandhhasi (32) 20 kos from Jaypur. He took no part in this compaign. Khan Dauran wrote letter after letter to Sawai Jaysing to send reinforcement. He accordingly started with a force of 15 to 16 thousand men and artillery and arrived at Basava. He intended to visit Khan Dauran. Jaysing was zealous in communicating to Bajirao that he was gratified at the brotherly attention exhibited by the latter towards him. He requested him through Vankatram, the Peshwa’s agent in his camp, not to molest his territory. He had not yet sent his army to Agra. Bajirao got supplies of grain and fodder on his way from Sawai Jaysing. From Gadhhasi, Jaysing went to Amber and then to Jaypur. He sent handiest of a lakh of rupees to Bajirao. Abhaysing was at Jodhpur.
Sadat Khan (33) went to Delhi after the Marathas had left it. He assured the Emperor that if the four Subhas of Agra. Gujarat, Malwa, and Ajmer were given to him, he would not allow the Marathas to cross Narmada. But the Emperor knew that Khan Dauran would never like this, moreover it would displease Sawai Jaysing. He feared that the Rajputs and the Marathas both being Hindus would thereby unite against him. Moreover, he knew that Khan Dauran had also sympathies for them. Hence Sadat Khan’s proposal was not accepted and he went to Oudh disappointed. Abhaysing also took leave of the Emperor (34) and was expected to see Bajirao.
But Mughal side stiffened after this onslaught of Bajirao, even though he opened negotiations with Samsamuddaula in the Capital.“By this time (35) opinion prevailed that Nizam-ul-Mulk was the only man who could save the monarchy and steam the oncoming flood of Maratha invasion.” Even Khan Dauran became in a advocate of reconciliation with Nizam-ul-Mulk The Emperor was soon brought over to the same view and pressing letters of invitation were sent to the Nizam.
Expecting that Bajirao was coming to Agra, Bangash, Khan Dauran and Kamrudding Khan proceeded there. Nizam-ul-Mulk had started from Burhanpur after receiving the invitation of the Emperor(36) . Sawai Jaysing sent his force under Rajamalji (37) towards Agra, and also sent his munshi Mushkhas chand to the Nizam.
Nizam was jealously watching (38) the Maratha advances into the North for the last foru-five years. Meanwhile he was writing constantly to the Emperor about them. Recently (39) (Ocotober 1736 A.D.) he had sent 12 selected horses worth two and a half lakhs and jewellery worth a lakh of rupees to him. After Bajirao had proceeded to the North in October 1736 A.D., Nizam left Aurangabad for Burhanpur and waited there for further development. At the invitation of the Emperor, he proceeded to the fort of Handia (40) to cross Narmada in the month of April 1737 A.D., leaving Nasirjang at Aurangabad, he went to Sironj (41), and waited there to know by what route bajirao was coming to South, avoiding a clash with him. A shrewd diplomat, he declared (42) that he was going to Delhi to remove the blemish on his character that he had rebelled against the Emperor and that he had sided with the Marathas. Bajirao, even though, he fully knew his intentions, avoided an open clash with him in that hot season (close of May 1737 A.D.) as his troops were already worn out by the arduous campaign of several months and further were eager to reach their houses in Deccan to deposit the booty they had collected. From Sironj Nizam-ul-Mulk proceeded to Delhi. The Emperor and the whole Court accorded him a hearty welcome. The highest title that a subject could bear, that of “Asaf Jah”, was conferred (43) upon him.
Vyankojiram wrote (44) from Delhi on 10th August 1737 A.D. “Nizam-ul-Mulk had demanded from the Emperor the Government of the five Subhas in addition to a crore of rupees, for removing the Maratha pest from North India. The Emperor has freely granted him all that he asked for. His son Gazi-udding has been given the Subhas of Agra, and Malwa. The three Subhas of Allahabad, Ajmer and Gujarat are being bestowed on the nominees of the Nizam.”
" " " " " " Nizam-ul-Mulk left Delhi in October 1737 A.D. with 30 thousand select-troops and a powerful park of artillery, and proceeded to Malwa. Bajirao took his departure (45) from the South on 18th October 1737 A.D., stationing Chimaji Appa at Varangaon on the Tapti to prevent Nasir Jang from proceeding beyond Burhanpur. Bajirao crossed the Narmada early n December 1737 A.D. From the beginning of December the Maratha bands started hovering about the Mughal camp, harassing them from a distance. The Maratha (46) tactics soon proved effective and the Nizam was trapped (47) in the fortified town of Bhopal. The siege commenced from 14th December and within less than a week the Nizam finding his position intolerable tried to move out with his whole camp under shelter of his guns. But after nearly a fortnight of intense pressure,he was forced to beg Bajirao for terms of peace.
" " " " " " Wrote Bajirao to his brother, “Fortified as the Nawab (48) was with a strong artillery and with the Bundela and the Rajput princess as his staunch allies, I accepted your advice and agreed to much lower terms than could have been exacted. You can realize what a severe mortification it must have been to Asaf Jah to sign a document with his own hand parting with Malwa and the rights therin of Chauth and Sardeshmukhi of which he never allowed even a mention till then.”
" " " " " " Jaysing minister Ayamalji (49) had arrived on behalf of the Nizam with Sayyad Lashkar Khan and other agents to Bajirao to arrange terms of peace.
Nizam-ul-Mulk affixed his signature to the following terms (50)” on 7th January 1738 A.D. at Dorahe Sarai about 84 miles north of Sironj :
(i)” " " " Nizam-ul-Mulk solemnly undertook to grant the Marathas a formal cession of Malwa under the imperial seal (ii)" " " " To deliver to them all the territory between the Narmada and the yamuna and; (iii)" " " To pac them 50 lakhs in cash from the imperial treasury by way of expenses.
" " " " " " When the negotiations were completed, Bajirao left he vicinity of Bhopal and proceeded to Kota, whence he exacted (51) 10 lakhs of rupees. He then returned to Poona.
" " " " " " Even though it has been stated in “Tarikhi ibrahim Khan” that, “Malwa was bestowed on Bahirao through the mediation of Khan (52) Dauran”, in 1738 A.D., the victory seems to be barren from the point of view of getting the “Sanad” of Malwa. What Bajirao received (53) on 8th September 1738 A.D. was a “Farman” with the seal of Sawai Jaysing, of a Jagir and Mansab-mahals of his “Vatan” with robes of honour with accompanying due articles. There is no record to show that Bajirao ever go “Sanad” of Malwa from the Emperor. This naturally disappointed him. He regarded the Nizam a deceitful man and one of his motives in marching on Nasir Jang (December 1739 A.D.) was to avenge his disappointment(54).
The Invasion of Nadirshah
The next momentous happening in the North was the invasion of Nadirshah. Lahor was lost to him on 12th January. On 13th February 1739 A.D.+++(Julian date)+++, the imperialists attacked the persians from their base at Karnal but were easily repulsed with great slaughter(55). Khan Dauran, the Mir Bakshi, received mortal wound and died two days later. Sadat Khan was wounded and captured. Nadir Shah would have accepted 50 lakhs as offered by the Nizam on behalf of the Emperor, and would have retired, but being instigated by Sadat Khan out of jealousy for the Nizam, decided to advance on Delhi for the recovery of the proposed 20 crores.
Making the Emperor, Kamrudding Khan and the Nizam, his captives, proceeding to Delhi, Nadirshah took possession of the city on 7th March 1739 A.D. Being pressed to procure for the Shah the promised 20 crores, Sadat Khan (56) ended his life by swallowing poison.
The Rajputs (57) not only kept aloof from the Mughal Emperor at the time of his distress, but they were happy at the discomfiture of the Mughal Empire at the hands of Nadirshah. The Rajpurts and especially Sawai Jaysing thought it a proper time to unite with the Marathas and Bundelas to assert as Hindus; Abhaysing (58) caputred Sambhar and was thinking of Communication between the Rajput Chiefs began with vigour and a creation of Hindu Monarchy flashed before the eyes of some. But soon the news came that nadirshah was too powerful and it was felt that in him a calamity had befallen the Chiefs of the North.
The Mughal rule in Delhi collapsed completely, and with it there arose all confusion in the North. Everbody believed that the Mughal rule (59) had ended once for all. Bajirao wrote (Dated 31-3-1739 A.D.) (60) from the vicinity of Burchanpur to his brother Chimaji Appa, “Apprehend the magnitude of the situation. A foreign rule is disastrous for all!”." He asked Chimaji to start preparations and expressed his determination to face nadirshah on Chambal with all the forces from Deccan and the North. It was reported that after setting affairs at Delhi, Nadirshah was to proceed towards Ajmer to visit the “Peer” there. Hearing of it, Jaysing sent the families to Udaypur. In case Nadirshah marched, it was impossible for him to oppose him and hence in this" case he would have to go to Udaypur. He started employing courageous men like Umedsing of Shahapur and called Ranaji with his army 20 kos towards Jaypur to have a juncture with the army of Jaypur. But Ranaji was not confident about the success against Nadirshah depending on the Rajput strength along. He ws ready to join after the coming of Bajirao. In case, he did not come, Ranaji contemplated to go to the hills to avert the calamity. It is very clear that being nearer to Delhi, the have created by Nadirshah had created consternation in the hearts of the Rajput Chiefs and Bajirao had become a national hero, in whom all hopes of safety for the Hindu religion were concentrated. The common danger had united the Rajputs completely with the Marathas as Hindus.
A Plan to Create Hindu Empire at Delhi
Dhondo Govind (61) wrote from Delhi to Bajirao :
Nadirshah is no God, that he could destroy the earth. He possesses sense enough and knows business. He will not break with you, but will effect a friendly understanding when he knows that you are strong enough to oppose him. I don’t expect actual hostilities to break between him and you. Jaysing and yourself aided by the Bundela Chiefs will be quite a strong Hindu front which providence will surely crown with success. Jaysing is anxiously waiting for your arrival to take the lead. Nizam-ul-Mulk is playing a mischivous game. Some of his spies, found roving about prying into Jaysing’s secret counsels, were captured by him. They confessed that they were deputed by Nizam-ul-Mulk. All voices agree that the two noblest - Nizam-ul-Mulk and Sadat Khan alone induced nadirshah to undertake the invasion of India. Victory at this moment crowns the Peshwa alone. Many here desire that the Rana of Udaypur should be seated on the throne of Delhi and made Emperor of the Hindus. The Northern Rajas are anxiously expecting the Peshwa’s arrival, a momentous change appears to be in sight.
The question of creating a Hindu Empire took firm hold. The Rana of Udaypur was fully prepared now for this proposal, when Bajirao had undertaken to stand behind it. The Rana sent Gumansing (62) to Sawai Jaysing, who told him that Raya wished to place Ranaji on the throne of Delhi. Ranaji had told that all his wealth (for this purpose) belonged to Raya and that Raya and Sawaiji were his men of trust. Gokulchand was sent to Abhaysing and Bundelas were expected to join the union. Thus by the end of May 1739 A.D., the Rajput Chiefs prepared themselves for the drastic change and were eagerly expecting Bajirao’s arrival in the North.
Bajirao was at Burhanpur (63) at the time of the sack of Delhi, by Nadirshah. About the question of creating a Hindu monarchy at Delhi, Shahu informed him his sentiments in a letter dated 31st May 1739 A.D. The letter reads (64) ,
that it should be our duty to resuscitate the falling Mughal Empire, that the Chhatrapati, as you are already aware, does not aspire to secure the imperial position for himself, that he considers it a higher merit to renovate an old dilapidated edifice than to build a new one. If we attempt the other course (i.e. a Hindu monarchy) it would involve us in enmity with all our neighbors with the consequence that we would be exposed to unnecessary dangers and court a crop of trouble all round.
Shahu was moderate in his aims and desired to secure only the administrative management for the Marathas in the capacity of the Amir-ul-Umara of the Mughal Empire. It was his desire that by supporting whole-heartedly Muhammad Shah’s regime, they should collect the revenue of the Country and after recovery of the expanses for the troops, should pay the balance into the Imperial treasury.
But even though the Peshwa complied finally with the commands of the Chhatrapati, he was really much more ambitious and definitely a Hindu State was in his mind (65).
See the following clearly worded letter of Bajirao depicting his future plans to oppose Nadirshah by the united front of the Hindus, dated 23rd March 1739 A.D.
I am enjoying (66) good health till this day. You must have heard the happenings at Indraprastha (i.e. atrocities of Nadirshah). It is time for us to assert. As per the directions expressed in the letter from here, try to induce Diwanji so that he takes the cause of the protection of our religion. Otherwise, if we remain inactive overpowered by the strength of enemy, it will be detrimental for us not only for the good (“Kalyan”) of this but for the next world also.
I am very much glad to know that Diwanji is giving you importance. This is the proper time (hence) for you to exert to achieve something by serving Diwanji, so that the opportunity he gave you is well served, as well as, for me who wish to achieve the object of my life. You will know much more (about our plans) from Ranawat Khumansing and Vijaysing and the letter we have sent to Sadasiv Pandit. You should form friendship with the Rajput Chief like Sawai Jaysing and gather the armies of all the Hindus which would be a force of one and a quarter of lakh. After our (Maratha) armies unite with it, that would be a total force of two lakhs. Then we should try to defeat the enemy. If we fail in this, it would mean that the courage of the Hindus and their religion have both departed from them.
You have complained about Mathar Pandit, but we shall punish Malharrao, when he comes over here. When great things are to be achieved through our friendship, what about such trifling things? Whatever you have in your mind, will be got through.
Bajirao had to restrain his hand as the Chhatrapati aimed at only renovating the fallen edifice. However he was determined not to allow Nadirshah (67) to cross Chambal if he intened to march South. For that he called Chimaji Appa after finishing off the business at Wasai. But fortunately Nadirshah departed to his native land on 1st of May 1739 A.D., issuing emphatic commands to India potentates to render obedience to Muhammad Shah (68) whom he had restored to the throne of Delhi.
The Nizam’s Move
It was well-known, then, to the political circle (69) that the Nizam and Sadat Khan were responsible for Nadirshah’s invasion of Delhi. Even though Muhammad Shah was still on the throne, the invasion had terribly shaken the foundation of the Mughal Empire which lost all the glory and with it the remaining strength to preserve it. From this moment the Chiefs began to treat themselves as semi-independent, besides, the Nizam, the cause of the whole ruin, was still there in Delhi.
Khan Dauran, throughout his career as Mir Bakshi, successfully opposed the Nizam and never gave him a chance to dominate the Delhi politics. But he was killed and even Sadat Khan was no more. Having at his back the Wazir kamrudding Khan and the Turani party, the ground was thus clear for the Nizam to dominate.
Even though the Nizam had always professed to the true to the salt of the Emperor, it was he who had openly rebelled against the Emperor and had carved out an independent State in the Deccan. He had never lost touch with the politics of Delhi. His ambition (70) was a threat to the existence of Muhammad Shah as Emperor, who was warned for the same by Khan Dauran during his life time and even by Nadirshah (71) .
Even though the Emperor had called him to Delhi to oppose the Marathas in 1737 A.D., he had known him fully well and after Nadirshah’s invasion, wanted to chestise (72) him for the damage he had done to the Empire.
From his letter and actions, it is very clear that the Nizam detested the Marathas thoroughly and desired their complete destruction. He had tried by all means to thwart their progress but at Bhopla he learnt a lesson that it was beyond his power to subdue them. A shrewd diplomat and a worthy politician as he was, he tried to substitute diplomacy for force in his relations to the Marathas. Instead of trying to destroy them, he desired to use them as a force to secure his own ends to gain supremacy at Delhi. Only the Marathas were there to hinder him to achieve his objects. He had seen the rise in the friendly feelings of the Marathas and Rajputs he was a determined opponent of the Rajputs (73) and wanted to punish them. The Rajputs would have been nowhere, if the Nizam would have been successful in detaching the Marathas from them. For separating the Marathas he was ready to pay all that was offered by the Rajputs to the Marathas. With these objects in his view, he sent Sayyad Lashkar Khan .(74) to Bajirao who had already effected a settlement and had come to an understanding with Nasir Jang in Deccan.
With Nasir Jang in Deccan, with the powerful force mobilized at the time of battle of Bhopal (1738 A.D.), with the full support of the Turani party at Delhi, and none to oppose, there was nothing difficult, as he wrote, for the Nizam to achieve.
The Emperor Woos Bajirao
The Emperor and Sawai Jaysing felt anxious on hearing the move of the Nizam. But the Marathas were no auxiliary force as the Nizam thought" them to be. They had their own policy and their aims to achieve. Bajirao (75) informed Jaysing
That he was his friend. The latter with great relief (76) informed the Emperor that Bajirao had decided to accept their party. The Emperor in joy wrote back to Jaypur, that after the necessary assurance from Jaysing, the work (of Bajirao) would be done.
On receiving the letter from the Emperor, Jaysing called Bajirao to Ujjain and told the envoy that 5 lakhs out of the promised 15 lakhs would be sent forthwith, and the remaining 10 lakhs would be sent in the rainy season. He reminded the Peshwa’s envoy that in order to create a breach between the Emperor and the Peshwa, the Nizam would promise more than what was promised by the Emperor but the Peshwa should not mind it but should stick up to the Emperor’s side which would be profitable in the long run.
Jaysing told the envoy that after sending 5 lakhs of rupees with Ayamal and the envoy (Hingne) he, along with the Rana, would proceed 20 kos to meet Bajirao after which deliberations would be made on the plans approved by the Emperor.
But when his life mission was about to be fulled, when the Maratha-Rajput combination was nearing maturity, and when he was to shine as the savior of the shattering Mughal Empire, Peshwa Bajirao died suddenly on 28th of April 1740 A.D. at River on the south bank of Narmada.
The Life Mission of Bajirao
It was the lot of Chimaji Appa (77) to answer to the call of Sawai Jaysing. The following is the relevant portion from Chimaji Appa’s letter (June 1740 A.D.) to Mahadeo Bhat Hingne at Jaypur which throws ample light on the role played by Bajirao in his North Indian politics, and states clearly the aims of the Maratha rule in general.
Read the details of your letter. The objects of the late Rao for the last eight or ten years were to please the Emperor by way of integrating the Imperial rule by bringing back to Imperial fold the Semi-Independent Amirs who cared little for the Emperor’s orders at their posts and thus to strengthen the administrative forces (resulting into peace and properity) and to gain thereby the good will of the rayat, the poor and the needy, to enhance the Imperial treasury and thus to acquire highest fame and the esteem of the Emperor. For all this he had kept constant touch with Nawab Khan Dauran thorugh Sawai Jaysing, and many schemes had been planned.
The Emperor’s help to meet the (daily) expenses and the repay the debts incurred, could not be received in time and hence the grand schemes envisaged could not be materialized for the lack of money, besides there were though the Nizam Asaf Jah sent Sayyad Lashkar Khan with promises (to bring him over to his side) he did not yield. It was not in his nature to change words for a trifling gain of money, rather he was prepared to receive less (in comparison) from the Emperor and stick to his word. The Raya was to go to Malwa (as per the invitation) he sent you (Hingne) to Sawai and afterwards left Burhanpur"but after he crossed Rewa (Narmada) he fell ill and died at Vaishakha Shuddha Trayodashi. The Almighty did most unjust thing in this, but there is no remedy to it.
The late Nana (Balalji Vishwanath) aiming at the welfare of the people at large, destroyed the bad elements in the society and encouraged revalidation in the region that seemed like forest. Nana died and Rao became Pradhan. Nana had to his credit the good-will of the people and the blessings due to the establishment of Gods and Brahmins. Those blessings Nana handed over to Rao (as his legacy). Raya also aimed at the welfare of the people, the establishement of Gods and Brhamans, and renovation of the great centres of religion like Kashi. He strived hard by that path, protected, where great religious centres were renovated. His fame reached North (but he soon died). It was his desire (till last) to restore Vishweshwar at Kashi. Raya’s fame shown in the world ten fold in proportion to that of Nana. Rao was brave, and a creator of new world.
The Emperor and Sawaiji desire a chastisement of the Nizam. The same will be done. But he (Sawai Jaysing) should stick to the terms settled with Raya, nay, he should do much more. This is in fact proper for him (since Bajirao is dead). He was about to send 5 lakhs out at of 15 lakhs to Raya. Manage to send the same without losing time by asking Sawaiji. After full preparation, the army and one of us (i.e. either Chimaji or Balaji) will come over to meet us with Rayamalji. Then arrange for the meeting of Sawaiji and Ranaji and if the both of them think it proper even Abhaysing may be called. Thus after gaining strength, we shall perform whatever task the Emperor assigns us. Meanwhile, if the Nizam and the rest, thinking short-sightedly, that we have been reduced to nothing after the death of Raya, and march on us, we shall bring them round with in no time, with a lakh of army and the brave Sardars at our disposal. Sawaiji knows us too well to entertain any low opinion about us. He knows too what Rao stood for, and what he was striving for, we and the Sardars stand for the same.
Rao was the great asylum of the Hindus. There was none equal to him in the Deccan and the whole of Hindustan. Be as it is, but after all what did Rao carry with him? He left all behind him. The rest and we have been with the Rao from the first, and are still there. The enhancement of the success and the fame attained by Rao, is the only objective (before us). By the grace of God, and the blessings of the strenuous and virtuous life led by Rao, we intend to punish all those who behave improperly towards the Emperor. If Sawaiji, Ranaji, Abhaysing and we are one, what is impossible there fore us that we intend to attain ?
Foot Notes (Description)
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(1) S.P.D. 30-134.
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(2) Hingne Daftar : 1-6, M.I.S. Vol. VI - 95.
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(3) S.P.D. 15-33, see Appendix - D.
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(4) “Tarikh-I-Hindi” in E.D. Vol. VIII p. 50.
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(5) S.P.D. 14-39.
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(6) As per a Marathi saying it aimed at killing a serpant at the hands of (uninvited) guest.
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(7) Even in 1741 A.D., when the Subha was finally handed over to Balajirao, the Emperor had prepared for an armed resistence, which was practically impossible for the Mughal strength then. - S.P.D. 13-4, M.I.S. Vol. VI, 97.
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(8) Ibid - 95
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(9) M.I.S. Vol. VI, 96, 97.
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(10) ‘Hingne Daftar’ I-5, 7.
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(11) Ibid - 7.
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(12) Writes Sir Jadunath (Fall I, p. 268), “As the Delhi Court had inclined towards peace, the Marathas withdraw from Malwa-March 1737 A.D.” - The truth was just the opposite.
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(13) S.P.D. 12-27.
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(14) S.P.D. 12-341, M.I.S. Vol. II, p. 75.
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(15) S.P.D. 15-5, S.P.D. 30-192, M.I.S. Vol. II, p. 75.
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(16) S.P.D. 15-31.
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(17) Ibid, 18.
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(18) Ibid, 29.
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(19) S.P.D. 14-38.
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(20) S.P.D. 15-12 to 14.
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(21) Ibid, 10, 16
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(22) Ibid, II, 90.
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(23) Ibid, 32.
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(24) Ibid, 35.
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(25) S.P.D. 15-99, 91.
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(26) S.P.D. 30-196.
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(27) S.P.D. 30-198, S.P.D. 15-27, 28.
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(28) Ibid, 22.
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(29) “Pawar Sadhane” - 75, Letter of Bajirao to Brahmendra Swami, ‘Brahmendra
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(30) ‘Later Mughal’ Vol. II, p. 297.
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(31) S.P.D. 15-23, ‘New Hist.’ Vol. II, p. 167.
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(32) S.P.D. 15-529, ‘Later Mughals’ Vol. II, p. 298.
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(33) S.P.D. 15-29.
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(34) S.P.D. 15-30.
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(35) ‘Later Mughals’ Vol. II, p. 299.
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(36) S.P.D. 15-33.
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(37) Ibid, 29.
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(38) S.P.D. 10-91, 92.
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(39) Ibid, 101 (Oct. 1736)
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(40) S.P.D. 15-25, 26, 29.
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(41) Ibid, 42
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(42) S.P.D. 10-34.
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(43) ‘Later Mughals’ Vol. Ii, p. 301.
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(44) S.P.D. 15-53.
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(45) S.P.D. 22-262.
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(46) ‘Holkar Shahi’ I-34, M.I.S. Vol. VI-107, 117.
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(47) S.P.D. 30-207, ‘New hist.’ Vol. II, p. 170.
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(48) M.I.S. Vol. VI-114, ‘New Hist.’ Vol. II, p. 172.
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(49) Later Mughals Vol. II, p. 366.
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(50) S.P.D. 15-p, ‘Later Mughals’ Vol. II, p. 306, ‘New Hist.’ Vol. II, p. 171.
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(51) S.P.D. 15-68.
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(52) “Tarikhi Ibrahim Khan’ in E.D. Vol. VIII, p. 262.
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(53) S.P.D. 15-p. 86.
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(54) M.I.S. Vol. VI, p. 85.
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(55) S.P.D. 15-71, 75.
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(56) S.P.D. 30-229, ‘Later Mughals’ Vol. II, p. 356.
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(57) ‘Itihasa Sangraha’ - Letters of Dhondo Govind.
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(58) ‘Satara Hist. Papers’ Vol. II, 270.
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(59) S.P.D. 15-75, ‘Purandare Daftar’ III - 183. M.I.S. Vol. II, p. 133, 134, ‘Satara Hist. Papers’ Vol. II-266.
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(60) S.P.D. 15-72.
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(61) ‘Itihasa Sangrah, Aitihasik Charitra’ - 4, ‘New Hist.’ Vol. II, p. 178, 179.
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(62) ‘Itihasa Sangrah - Aitihasik Charitra’ - 7.
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(63) ‘Brahmendra Swami Charitra’ - p. 118, S.P.D. 15-72, 75, S.P.D. 30-229 M.I.S. Vol. VI, - 133, 134..
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(64) ‘Satara Hist.Papers’ Vol II-268, ‘New Hist.’ Vol. II, p. 180.
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(65) For the present Tohmast Kuli (Nadirshah) has won the fight. But if all the Hindus take to courage (and unite) and if our greaty armies reach North (it is a lime) for the Hindu Empire to come into existence. " ‘Brahmendra Swami Charitra’, p. 118.
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(66) From Bajirao Ballal Pandit Pradhan to Dhayabhai, dt. 23-3-1739, B.I.S.M. (July 1920), from the collection of letters from the family of Vyas of Udaypur.
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(67) ‘Brahmendra Swami charitra’ , p. 118.
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(68) S.P.D. 15-80.
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(69) ‘Itihasa Sangraha, Atitihasik Charitra’ 3., S.P.D. 15-75.
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(70) “Nizam-ul-Mulk was a very ambitious person. In addition to the extensive province of the Deccan, he at one time controlled the provinces of Gujarat, Malwa and Agra, either directly or through his kinsmen. He was even at is revealed in his letters.There is no doubt, that if he had had his way, Nizamulmulk would have ended by becoming the dictotor of the entire Mughal Empire. " - p. Setu Madhava Rao in Preface of ‘Eithteenth Century Deccan’ , p. ix.
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(71) “The Cambridge Hist, of India’ , Vol. IV, pp. 362. 363.
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(72) “The Emperor and Sawai Jaysing desire a severe chastisement to the Nizam. It will take place accordingly” - From the letter of Chimaji Appa in ‘Hingne Daftar’ I-15.
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(73) Ibid, 19
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(74) ‘Hingne Daftar’ - I-13, 15.
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(75) Ibid, 13, 15
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(76) ‘Satara Hist. Papers’ , Vol. II - 264.
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(77) ‘Hingane Daftar’, I -15
JAISING KEEPS HIS WORD
The Nizam Plays Mischief
The Sudden death of the able Peshwa in the prime of his age, was really felt to be a set back to the Maratha cause by all their well wishers. It was no wonder (1) that their foes at Delhi were over Joyed and wanted to profit by the dissension (they expected) created thereby. Sawai Jaysing informed (2) Chimaji that Nizam especially wanted to play mischief and create trouble and hence urged him to station the Maratha army in Malwa. But the arrangement had already been made and Vithaji Bule had already been kept and Pilaji Jadhao, Ranoji Shinde and Malharrao had been asked to remain in Malwa and probably all were to be there. Chimaji again remainded Jaysing to sent to promised 5 lakhs from the Emperor treasury immediately and the remaining 10 lakhs in the rainy season. Sawai Jaysing and the Marathas were completely in accord with each other this time. (1740 A.D.) Chimaji and the young Peshwa regarded him as an elderly person from their family and looked to him for guidence and moral support due to the sudden death of Bajirao. Even though all felt the loss of Bajirao’s personality, the Marathas were well prepared for any task having their full loyalities with the young Peshwa. When it was known that Ajmal Khan (3) was to be deputed from Delhi by the Nizam to snatch away Malwa from the Marathas, Ranoji Shinde wrote to Mahadeo Bhat Hingne, “Even previously the servants of the Peshwa used to defeact the enemies, hence even now there is nothing to worry about, God is kind and whoever will come down here will be received happily”. Malharrao (5) wrote in the same manner. But the union
Of the three Hindu rulers of the North with the Peshwa from the South never took place. It seems that opportunity, once lost, never comes again, in the same agreeable from. The moment to assert the Hindu element for managing Patshahi and establishing (Hindu) religion in all " India politics departed forever. Soon Nizam came to Deccan to meet the threat of his rebellious son and even Sawai Jaysing (6) was involved in a quarrel with Abhaysing on the question of Bikaner.
The Young Peshwa at Work
But the young Peshwa (7) did not even get the parental protection of his uncle Chimaji Appa for a long. The latter died on 17th of December 1740 A.D. (8) at Poona and followed his beloved brother within eight months.
Meanwhile the Nizam had hastened to Deccan, (August 1740 A.D.) to face the rebellion of his son Nasir Jang. As per the Peshwa, it was the time of the Nizam to lose all, as “Nasir Jang was young and was backed by a strong army and guns and was confident of success”. It was quite clear (9) that the side which the Peshwa would join, would only win and hence both sought his assistance. But the young and inexperienced Peshwa (age 19) decided to side with Asaf Jah on the childish ground that”. Had I helped him (Nasir Jang), after achieving success he would have boasted of his own velour and people would have thought that we” had taken his side thinking that he was powerful. It was better for our prestige to help the weaker party and looking at the plight of Asaf Jah, I decided to help him”. The effect was the complete discomfiture of Nasir Jang against such a powerful combination.
The letters (10)and the deeds of Nizam-ul-Mulk clearly reveal the fact that he had been a deadly opponent of the Marathas throughout his career. This fact must" have been known to the Peshwa. He must have known that Bajirao had a mind to destroy the Nizam (11) completely. He was equally an opponent of the Rajputs and wanted to chastise (12) them. Again it was quite clear from the recent letter received from the envoy at Jaypur (13) that the Nizam was among those who were overjoyed at the sudden death of Bajirao and wanted to profit by the disadvantageous situation that they expected. He also knew that Bajirao and after his death Chimaji Appa had taken the side of the Rajputs especially against the Nizam. Leaving all this, the Peshwa sided with Asaf Jah. There is no wonder that the reception given by the Nizam to the Peshwa, “was more grand than the ceremony of the meeting of the late Rao”. But decisions of great political importance like this are hardly taken in the way the Peshwa had taken. Perhaps the young Peshwa was not mentally prepared to face the revolutionary situation that would have been created after the defeat of the Nizam, or perhaps the diplomacy of Nizam must have been more successful. But one thing is certain; that had the Peshwa not sided the Nizam the political career of the latter would have certainly come to an end. What the Peshwa ought to have done, was only neutrality, the rest of the work would" have been performed by Nasir Jang himself.
The Nizam Opens His Heart to the Peshwa
One good turn creates expectation for another one. The Nizam once nearly freed from the home-trouble, thought of utilizing the favourable opportunity to his full advantage. He informed the Peshwa (14) through Baburao Malhar thus : “When I was at Delhi, I had in my mind the question of the re-establishment of the Emperor’s rule and I had written accordingly to Bajirao Peshwa, but (unfortunately) he had then few days to live. I also had to come to Deccan for (home) management. Due to your (Peshwa"s) help, the trouble has come to an end and everything being set right properly, no trouble is left now. I have grown old and wish once more to got to Delhi for the management of the Emperor’s administration. Afterwards, whatever may be in the store of the fate, may happen. You (Peshwa) are in debt,” it must be paid off. Due to Nadir Shah’s invasion, the Emperor’s treasurty has been swept of it also needs attention along with the re-establishment of the Emperor’s authority. All this is in my mind. By re-establishment of authority I have in my mind, the Rajputs, who have since long grown wealthy out of the (illegal) acquisition of the Emperor’s territories. When the calamity of Nadir Shah befell the Emperor, he had a (vain) hope that the great armies of the Rajputs might reach him (in times of danger). I had also (up till then) heard much about the dexterity of their swordsmanship and desired to see its display (against Nadir Shah). With this object, I sent them letters of join forthwith. But nobody came, inbattle was lost due to Khan Dauran and Sadat Khan. But the Emperor has in his mind the treacherous conduct of the Rajputs. I have also a mind to recover the hoard of money from them to fill up the Emperor’s treasury. For al these things, if you and I combine, then nothing is impossible."
The Nizam pormised the Peshwa, if he accepted the friendly proposal,
- (1)To pay him 15 lakhs of rupees from the Emperor’s treasury and 5 lakhs more,
- (2)To procure the Sanad for Malwa, the territory to the south of Chambal and the taluqas from Agra,
- (3)To manage for the expected meeting of the Peshwa with the Emperor,
- (4)To grant the jagir of Waranashi and
- (5)To secure an order for the discontinuance of the collection of tax from the religious centre of Prayag, and
- (6)To recover money from a few rich places to pay off the debt of the Peshwa.
Thus the Nizam once more promised to fulfill all the known demands of the Peshwa to secure his assistance to achieve supermancy at delhi.
The Peshwa Sticks to Rajputs Friendship
But even though the Peshwa had helped the Nizam against his son, he knew his artful nature fully well (15) and refused to fall a victim to his enticing trap. This he did because the change of side from Sawai Jaysing to the Nizam was unthinkable for him. He had seen for years the existence of brotherly feeling in all their dealings between Sawai Jaysing and Bajirao. He still remembered the dutiful attitude of an affectionate son that Sawaiji exhibited towards the Peshwa’s mother while She was on her pilgrimage (in 1735-36 A.D.), and he had known thoroughly the common objects Sawaiji and Bajirao namely " the regeneration of the great Hindu centers of religion like Kashi and Prayag from the rule of the Yawanas (the Muslims), which was also the ideal of the young Peshwa. As for the practical gains, he believed that Jaysing was much more campetent to the Nizam, for the fulfilment of the Maratha demands through the Emperor.
The Peshwa Proceeds to Meet Sawai Jaysing
With this firm belief, rejecting the friendly overtures of the Nizam, he proceeded to meet Sawai Jaysing in the territory near about Orchha and Datiya and reached Nemad region in January 1741 A.D., with his full force. But the most urgent thing for him besides the procurement of the Sanads, was his pressing need of the money. The peshwa urged Sawai Jaysing, to manage to pay the promised 15 lakhs from the Emperor’s treasury and as it would take some time, requested him to provide the same, for the time being, from his own treasury to be adjusted later on.
Shinde and Holkar were already operating in Malwa. On 5th of Jauuary 1741 A.D., Malharrao Holkar captured Dhar(16) from the Mughal keeper. Malharrao then entered Rampura about which Sawai Jaysing complained (17) to the Peshwa. Holkar
Kar was accordingly told by the Peshwa, to crease troubles in Rampura as many things were to be got doen through Sawaiji and hence it was improper to displease him. (19)
Besides the pressing question of the recovery of 15 lakhs from the Emperor’s treasury, another question to be decided with Sawai Jaysing was of Ater. Jaysing had placed Humanizing on the throne of this principality with the consent of Bajirao who regarded this privilage of placing or dethroning any one to the South of Chambal, to be of the Marathas. Bajirao had a mind to acquire " of the territory worth 20-25 lakhs of rupees of Ater. But this question remained undecided during his remaining lifetime. Now after his death, Ajmulla Khan had replaced Bhimsing by certain Raysing. But since the new Peshwa was on his march with his army to the North, Sawaiji decided to place once more Bhimsing on the throne and accordingly the Peshwa, who took the occasion to put forth the previous demand of the " territory and the place of Ater for the Marathas.
The capture of Dhar by the Marathas, seriously upset the Emperor who once more thought of offering them armed opposition (18) . The Marathas had devastated Doab in the previous year and hence fearing that they would do the same this year too, the Emperor ordered all his Amirs, and Amir Khan, the Subha of Prayag and Mansur Ali Khan, the Subha of Ayodhya to co-operate with Sawai Jaysing to check the Marathas from crossing into Antarwed. Knowing of the plan, the Peshwa sent Awaji Kawade and Govind hari with detachment, by the South bank of Yamuna upto Prayag. This move effectively checked Mansur Ali Khan and Amir Khan from coming over to Jaysing. Sawai Jaysing who had come to Agra in fact wanted no quarrel with the Peshwa. Declaring that it was impossible for him to face the Marathas, he sent Ayamal to the Peshwa who came to Dhawalpur to the North of Chambal with Ranoji Shinde. Malharrao Holkar and Pawar. Infact the Emperor could neither displease Jaysing nor evade the Marathas. Mahadeo Bhat Hingne pressed the Maratha demand for the Subha of Gujarat and Malwa. Jaysing proceeded to Agra and met the Peshwa
Between Agra and Dhawalpur. The visit (20) lasted for a week from 12th to 19th of May 1741 A.D An agreement was reached on the following points viz.
(i)The Peshwa and Jaysing should act in complete friendship and help each other in all circumstances.
(ii)The Marathas should be strictly loyal towards the Emperor and
(iii)The grant of" Malwa for the Peshwa should be secured by Sawai Jaysing within six months.
Having accomplished his objects, the Peshwa, returned to the South and reached Poona on 7th of July 1741 A.D
(vi) Closure of the Friendly Chapter
The “faman” was issued on 7th of September 1741 A.D entrusting the whole management of the Subha of Malwa to the Peshwa as Deputy to Shah Jada Ahmad, the Subhadar of Malwa (which was all nominal), including the civil and criminal jurisdiction. tHus from the first i.e. calling the Maratha in to Malwa, till the final grant of Subha of Malwa to the Marathas, Sawai Jaysing was connected with the affair. The manipulation for the grant of the Subha a Malwa for the Peshwa was the last act of Sawai Jaysing in favour of the Marathas.
This renowned ruler of Jaypur, for a along a great figure in Rajputana and Delhi, Court, the patron of Hindu-learning and religion, died on 23rd of September 1743 A.D at the age of 55. The death of Bajirao in 1740 A.D followed by the death of Sawai Jaysing within three years, mark the end of the epoch of the friendly relations between the Marathas and the Rajputs. With the change of personalities, there came a sudden change of political situation, with the result that the Marathas and Rajputs departed from their common aims to different directions never to meet again on the same plain of friendship.
When Sawai Jaysing called the Maratha armies (21) into Malwa in 1728 A.D, on behalf of the Emperor, he regarded them as not more than an auxiliary force. But with the knowledge of their political institutions (22) and the character and ideals of the personalities a work, a gradual understanding came about the Marathas with their persistant efforts to expand in all directions. The common background of religion and culture facilitated the development of social contacts which brought him nearer to the Marathas in general and the Peshwa family in particular.
In fact as a subordinate of the Emperor and the Subhadar of Malwa, Jaysing was duty-bound to oppose the Marathas. But he very skillfully changed the Phase of opposition into that of concilation and exerted to justify the same before the Emperor. The Marathas perfectly understood the situation in which Jaysing was placed and assisted him in his policies that were in fact favourable to them. This partiality of Sawai Jaysing towards the Marathas cost him the enmity of Sadat Khan and the Nizam. The former called him a traitor to the cause of the Emperor (23) and the latter was alwaysa claimant for the Subha of Malwa and disliked him thoroughly (24).
It is to be noted that from the murder of Farrukh Siyar till the end of his career, Sawai Jaysing exhibits complete independence of actions, though he had never severed his connections with the Emperor, on the contrary he was closely connected with him along with Khan Dauran. From the fact that even when he was asked to join the imperial forces against Nadir Shah, he remained aloof, it is quite clear that he had no attachment for the cause of the survival of the Mughal rule (25) . His attitude towards the shattering Mughal Empire in fact differed little from that of Bajirao and hence both had come closer together. Like the Marathas, he aimed at the enlargement of his dominions and wanted to retain the Subha of Malwa for himself. But when he saw that the powerful Marathas would not allow him its peaceful acquisition and having no strength and will to resist them, he sided with them in its possession, lest it Should fall in the hands of the crafty Nizam, who had been persistently trying for the same.
Certainly Sawai Jaysing had his political ends to meet behind his friendship with the Marathas. He was convinced that the days of the Mughal rule were numbered and was still convinced by 1736 A.D that the Marathas were the power to substitute it. He had no love lost for the ambitious Sadat Khan or the Turani party headed by Nizam-ul-Mulk (26) and Kamruddin Khan. The Emperor was a non-entity. In the intricate and changing power politics of Delhi, he wanted the Maratha force at his back to use it was a shield against the possible attacks of the powerful faction of the Court (27). Their moral support was definitely of use to him in 1736 A.D when Sadat Khan was expected to fall on him. Similarly after the invasion of Nadir Shah when all the remaining power of the Emperor had departed from him, when the Nizam created a threatening situation with Kamruddin Khan, (28) that was dangerous to the Emperor and himself alike, the choice of Bajirao to side with his party was of hearty relief for him (Sawai Jaysing). Inspite of their apparent marches even at the gates of Delhi, the role in general played by the marathas during 1724 A.D to 1740 A.D was that of a safeguard for Sawai Jaysing, Khan Dauran and even the Emperor and hence the letters calling Bajirao to the presence of the Emperor 29) or calling his forces in Malwa (30) and hence the Maratha’s pressing demands of payment at the treasury of the Emperor.
But political aspirations in the dealings of a king and a politician of the first mark like Sawai Jaysing are quite justificable
Be, for he was not a sage so as not to use the Maratha friendship for his own self when the Maratha themselves were profited by his taking their side.
But leaving this practical side, we have to admit that there was definitely more genuine, more sublime part in the attachment of Sawai Jaysing towards Bajirao and his family. Letters writen by Chimaji Appa (31) and Balaji Bajirao Peshwa do reveal to us that they had come from the heart where" ever they touched to brotherly feeling that existed between Sawai Jaysing and Bajirao. There were certainly strong reasons besides political necessity, between the friendship of the Marathas and the Rajputs. Culturally and religiously they stood on the same plain. History must record that after the invasion of Nadir Shah there definitely had come into the minds of the Hindu Chiefs (32) of the North and the South, an idea of creating Hindu predominance at Delhi for the regeneration of Hindu ideas in the society. The premature death of Bajirao gave a blow to such ideas of mutual assistance. With all the Maratha raids in Rajputana during Bajirao’s time, there existed nothing but a regard for the name and fame of Bajirao in the hearts of Rajputs, who looked to him as a tower of strength at the time of danger.
The political situation after Bajirao’s death changed rapidly at Delhi. Sawaiji’s relations with Abhaysing were strained beyond repairs. Even though the Emperor (33) was constant in his favors towards him, he had really lost a supporter at Delhi in the death of Khan Dauran. Moreover, Bajirao’s death certainly disabled him. Sawaiji’s last days were clouded with the apprehension of a civil war in Jaypur after his death on the question of the succession to the throne of Jaypur.
The friendly chapter in the relations of the Marathas and the Rajputs closes after the death of this apparently dependent but really independent Hindu Chief of Jaypur. It only stresses the point that personalaties do count in the course of history.
Foot Notes (Description)
- (1) M.I.S. Vol. VI - 145.
- (2) ‘Hningne Daftar’ I-17.
- (3).“Tarikh-I-Hindi” in E.D. Vol. VIII, p. 67.
- (4) ‘Hingne Daftar’ I - 18.
- (5) ‘Holkar Shahi’ I - 48.
- (6) ‘Hingne Daftar’ I - 17.
- (7) Peshwa Balaji was invested with the robes of the office of Peshwa on 25th of June 1740. ‘Purandare’ I - 147.
- (8) Ibid - 148.
- (9) ‘Hingne Daftar’ I - 20.
- (10) ‘Eighteenth Century Deccan’ pp. 135, 198.
- (11) (I) “Bajirao marched upon Aurangabad in Jan. 1740 - to annihilate the Nizam in Deccan”. M.I.S. Vol. II - 85. (ii)“If the king orders all the forces to join, it is the time, that Mughal (Nizam) would be destroyed completely..” - Bajirao. B.I.S.M. 6 - ‘Purandare Daftar’ I - 139.
- (12) ‘Hingne Daftar’ I-13, 15, 19.
- (13) Ibid - 17-18.
- (14) ‘Hingne Daftar’ I-19, 23.
- (15) “Behind his sweet words, it was his intention to take all the credit of the things, the Emperor was going to do for us, with his own accord”. Hingne Daftar’ I - 19.
- (16) S.P.D. 13-4. ‘New Hist.’ I - p. 213.
- (17) ‘Hingne Daftar’ I - 24, M.I.S. VOL. VI-151.
- (18) ‘Hingne Daftar’ I - 21.
- (19) S.P.D. 13-4.
- (20) ‘Purandare Daftar’ I-149. M.I.S. Vol. VI, 152, ‘New Hist.’ Vol. II p. 214.
- (21) S.P.D. 13-10.
- (22) Deepchand’s mission S.P.D. 10-66, also see Appendix B.
- (23) S.P.D. 14-47.
- (24) See Nizam’s letter about Jaysing - ‘Elighteenth century Deccan’ p. 141.
- (25) ‘Hingen Dafter’ I-19.
- (26) The discomfiture of the Nizam of the hands of Nadir Shah highly pleased Sawai Jaysing - ‘Itihas Sangraha, Ait Charitra’ - letter of Dhondo Govind.
- (27) (a) “he (Jaysing) wants the Marathas to be his allies. In this he has two aims, that disturbance should subside, and the Marathas should be shielded”. - From the letter of Nizam, ‘Eighteenth Century Deccan’ p. 141. (b) “He desired to combine his duty to his sovereign with his friendship with the Marathas. He also wanted to use the latter as auxiliaries”. - ‘Central India’ p. 88.
- (28) ‘Hingne Daftar’ I-13-15.
- (29) S.P.D. 15-pp. 87 to 89.
- (30) S.P.D. 13-10, ‘Hingne Daftar’ - 17.
- (31) ‘Hingne Daftar’ I-15, 17 and 19.
- (32) ‘Itihasa Sungraha, Ait. Chartra’ - letter of Dhondo Govind, ‘Hingne Dafter’ I- 15, ‘New Hist.’’ - II-p-180-Shahu’s letter in this respect.
- (33) ‘Fermans, Manshurs and Nishans’, p. 61-43 and 44.
ABHAYSING IN GUJRAT
Gujarat During 1720 A.D. To 1725 A.D.
Khanderao Dabhade was appointed “Senapati” (1) by Chhatraati Shahu on 11th of January 1717 A.D., and was assigned the province of Gujarat and parts of Khandesh as the sphere of his activities. Kanthaji Kadam Bande, Damaji Gayakwad, his nephew Pilaji Gayakwad (from 1719 A.D.onwards) were his famous commanders, who established by almost annual incursions into Gujarat, the Maratha claim to “Chauth” of Gujarat. But it was the civil war for a year (1724 “25 A.D.), waged in defiance of the commands of the Central Government, by the Nizam’s deputy Himid Khan, that really helped them to exact “Chauth” from all the paraganas North (2) of the Mahi river.
The fall of Sayyad brothers was an act of great consequences that affected the Mughal administration in Malwa and Gujarat particularly. Nizam-ul-Mulk, the prime actor behind the plot, naturally became the Wazir of Delhi (February 1722). He replaced Ajitsing Rathod, the Subhadar of Gujarat, being the nominee of the Sayyads, by Haidarkuli Khan and asked him to depart to his province without loss of time. But not long after wards, he himself assumed the Subhadarship of Gujarat by dimissing Haidarkuli Khan and appointed his uncle Hamid Khan to act as the deputy Subhadar of Gujarat (February 1723 A.D.)
But events followed too rapidly. The ambitious Nizam himself rebelled against the Emperor and established an independent Kingdom in Deccan after the battle of Sakhar-Kherda (30th September 1724 A.D.) (4) As a result, the Emperor deprived Him of his provinces of Malwa and Gujarat. In Gujarat, Sarbulad Khan Mubariz-ul-Mulk was appointed as Subhadar in his place. With this appointment, the above-mentioned civil war started in Gujarat.
Instigated by the Nizam, Hamid Khan (5), who represented him in Gujarat, defeated and killed Shujat Khan (17th December 1724 A.D.) the deputy of Sarbuland Khan near Ahmedabad, seeking the help of Kanthaji Kadam Bande and Pilaji Gayakwad. A second attempt, by the brother of Shujat Khan, also met with the same fate. Thus two armies were defeated within a short period of less than three months with the help of Marathas, who naturally profited thereby.
Realizing the gravity of danger from the Turani faction led by Nizam-ul-Mulk, the Emperor asked Sarbuland Khan to depart to his province in person. Hamid Khan at last became powerless, with the coming of Sarbuland Khan (6) in Gujarat in December 1725 A.D., but as legacy, he had left the Marathas powerful in Gujarat. It was impossible for even Sarbuland Khan, to continue the struggle with the numerous Marathas for a longer time with all his resources. He, in 1726 A.D. came, to terms with Kanthaji (7) and agreed of the river Mahi, with the exception of the Capital and Haveli paragana.
The Peshwa Enters the Politics of Gujarat
A new addition to the complicated situation of Gujarat was made when Peshwa Bajirao invaded Gujarat in early 1725 A.D. (8) to secure the right of “Chauth” for himslef. Hereafter, the encroachment of the Peshwa through his brother Chimaji Appa and his Sardars continued (9) vigorously. In 1726 A.D., Udaji Pawar entered Gujarat from Dhar in Malwa, and tried to snatch Dabhoi (10) from Pilaji and Kanthaji, but failed. Never-the-less Peshwa’s hold on Gujarat was sufficiently established (11). In 1727 A.D. Chimaji Appa, entering Gujarat, penetrated as far as Dholke, within 25 miles of Ahmedabad. He sent his representatives to the viceroy to negotiate about the “Chauth” but for various reasons, the terms could not be settled (12).
At the end of 1729 A.D., Chimaji again entered Gujarat with a considerable force. Laying siege to the hill fort of Pavgadh in January 1730 A.D. (13), he captured it in the first week of February 1730 A.D. Some of his halts in this expedition (1729 “30 A.D.) were " Nadiyad, Dhawalake, Viramgaon, Godai, Bichwa, Sabarmati, Tarapur and Petlad (14). In May 1730 A.D., but due to the opposition of the Khan’s Counsellers, it could not (15) take place. By the end of 1729 A.D., Peshwa’s hold on Gujarat was considerable (16).
(iii)Treaty of Sarbuland Khan with the Peshwa. (1730 A.D.)
With no help from Delhi, as the monthly subsidy of three lakhs of rupees for the maintenance of his troops had been cut off, (17) the powerful army of 1725 A.D., had mostly been dispersed. Having left no resources to carry on the administration and the struggle with the Marathas, and espeically as the activities of Kanthaji and Pilaji had been supplemented by the Peshwa’s troops under Chimaji, Sarbuland Khan had no other remedy but to enter into a formal treaty (18) with the Peshwa on 23rd March 1730 A.D.
Meanwhile new changes had taken place at Delhi. To break the Turanian faction, Kamruddin Khan had been dismissed from his post, and Khan-Dauran had succeeded (19) him as Wazir. The new Wazir refused to recognize the treaty effected by Sarbuland Khan with the Peshwa granting him “Chauth” and “Sardeshmukhi” of Gujarat, and relieving him of his office appointed Abhaysing, the Maharaja of Jodhpur, in his place as he believed that the great Hindu Rajas were the proper person (20) who could effectively confront the onrush of the Marathas.
Maharaja Abhaysing Appointed as Subhadar of Gujarat
Maharaja Abhaysing was the third ruler of Rathod dynasty to hold this imperial office. He was granted eighteen lakhs (21) of rupees from the royal treasury for his expenses. Leaving Delhi, he reached his own Capital Jodhpur and enlisted 20,000 well-trained Rathod cavalry from Marwad and Nagor. His total army consisted of 30,000 horses and 10,000 foot and his military expenses came to seven lakhs of rupees per month. With this army and accompanied by his brother Bakhtsing, and his minister Ratansing Bhandari, he advanced towards Gujarat. When the new of his arrival at Jalor reached Sarbuland Khan at Ahmedabad he prepared to resist him. A sharp battle took place between the two sides, opposite the Capital, in which Sarbuland Khan was defeated. But by the intercession of friends, a reconciliation was effected and the ex-Viceroy left the Capital on receiving from his successor a lakh of rupees for the expenses of his journey.
Decline of the Mughal Rule in Gujarat
On the departure of Sarbuland Khan, Abhaysing applied himslef to the ardous task of driving the Marathas from Gujarat. His own letter (22) to his agent Bhandari Amarsing and Purohit Vardhaman, at Delhi reveal the true picture of the devastated conditions prevailing then in Gujarat.
“Nothing is left out of the Kharip crop. Nawab (Sarbuland Khan) has squeezed every pie of the income, whether it was given willingly or under pressure. As regards the income from customers, it can only be realized when the trade flourishes and that can only be collected when people will re-inhabit their homes"the Nawab (Khan Dauran) is fully aware of the forces kept here and the expenditure required, while the Emperor provided us in all 15 lakhs of rupees, 40 guns, 200 maunds of gun-powder and 100 mounds of lead"A person like Sarbuland Khan was the Governor of this place, who, inspite of receiving a crore of rupees as well as a large amount of military assistance from the Emperor, sat idle in the city while the enemy devastated the province, and he dared not come out, but being overpowered, and he dared not come out, but being overpowered paid “Chauth”. This shows the strength of the enemy ! They are not even satisfied by the levy of “Chauth”, but Badoda, Dabhoi, Jambusar etc., yielding a revenue of 30 lacs, have also passed under their control. Surat including 28 districts is under the away of Pilu and any remittance of their revenue depends upon his sweet-will.
Pavagadh is held by Chimana (Chimaji Appa) and the fort of Champaner is under the possession of Kantha (Kanthaji Kadam Bande). They pretend to be lords of the land, and collect “Chauth, “Deshmukhi” , “Peshkashi” and administer some of the places also. Such is their audacity.. the enemy, if not fully crused, will again raise his head. This is the reason why we have to keep a force at an approximate cost of Rs. 5,00,000 per month and accordingly will require 40 lakhs of rupees for the coming period of 8 months. In Gujarat, the winter crop has been damaged, and the condition of the crop of rainy season has already been narrated. A dispute sbout the “Chauth” between Kantha and Chimaji is going on, hence they both will returen here.”
Peshwa - Dabhade Rivalry in Gujarat
Khanderao Dabhade, who had retired from active service from about 1723 A.D., and his son Trimbakrao, who had been already exercising his father’s powers, was invested with Senapati’s dignity on January 9, 1730 A.D. Gujarat (23) and parts of Khandesh had been assigned by the Chhatrapati, as the special sphere of activity of the Dabhades. It was they, who had taken the foremost part in the conquest of Gujarat. Their lieutenants Bandes and Gayakwads had established the right to collect “Chauth” to the North and South of “mahi” , since the days of Hamid Khan (1725 A.D.).
Naturally Trimbakrao resented Peshwa’s interferance and the agreement between Chimaji Appa and Sarbuland Khan concluded on 23rd March 1730 A.D. His stand that the Peshwa should restrict himself to Malwa, which was assigned to him by the Chhatrapati, was based on justice. Had he insisted upon this point with the Chhatrapati, there is no reason to doubt, that the Chhatrapati would not have listened to his arguments (24). But, instead, he preferred to settle the issue, taking recourse to armed conflict, and for that entered into negotiations with the Nizam. The fact was, that the Peshwa’s interference had provided only on outward cause for the Dabhade-Peshwa conflict, which infact had been aflamed due to the personal jealousy (25) felt by Trimbakrao and many other Maratha Chiefs for the enterprising Peshwa who had forced all of them into secondary position by raising his own armies and bravely leading them against the enemies of the Marathas from success to success
The Nizam-Dabhade Combination
Smarting under the humiliating defeat at Palkhed (28th February 1728 A.D.) the Nizam had since then regarded Bajirao as a dangerous rival (26) to his policies of consolidating Muslim rule in Deccan. Such dissensions among the chief Sardars of Shahu were a gift from heaven and as such were eagerly welcomed and encouraged by him. Thus once having got the opportunity to thrust his had into Maratha’s internal politics, the Nizam never slackened his hold but determined to utilize the opportunity to fulfill his cherished ambition of making himself the supreme authority not only in Deccan but in Malwa and Gujarat as well, by removing Bajirao from his exhaled position in Maratha politics.
With perfect diplomacy and patience of a shrewd politician the Nizam labored over the plan. Many prominent Maratha Sardars who had their personal grievances against the Peshwa, were seduced through assurances that suited the occasion. Thus besides Dabhades, the Pawars, the Bandes, the Gayakwads and many other Maratha Chiefs joined him against the Peshwa in the common front.
The Peshwa was well informed of these activites, for example in one of his reports in November 1730 A.D. writes the Peshwa’s agent to him, (27) “Kanthaji, Udoji and Kanhoji are freequent visitors here and are being seduced by Anandrao Sumant who has assured the Nizam that the King Shahu would not be sorry at all if Bajirao is put down and that not a dog would bark at such a result.” He further stated, " Dabhade and Bande have wirtten to Nizam asking for assurance for shelter"They contemplate making Sambhaji the Chhatrapti, Dabhade his Senapati and Kanthaji Bande his Sarlshkar” upon which the Nawab (Nizam-ul-Mulk) declared that such a chance has been presented to us without our asking, which of the two, Shahu or Sambhaji loses, is immaterial, one opponent will be less for us. Therefore we won"t reject the proposal.”
To ensure the success of these ambitious designs the Nizam left no stone unturned and by way of strngthening his position arranged a meeting (28) on Narmada, with Muhammad Khan Bangash who had been recently as Subhadar in Malwa, to enlist his co-operation in the coming enterprise.
Had the Peshwa hesitated in striking the blow at the most appropriate time, in all probability, this combination would have been fatal to the rising Maratha-Raj and as such Trimbakrao and his Maratha associates were playing with nothing but fire. Even though, initially truth was on his side, Trimbakrao had forfeited his claims to justice having placed personal jealousies above his duties to State. Shahu’s letter of strong remonstrance to him in which he wrote, “You have been a loyal Hindu servant of the State and as such we have all along dealt with you most kindly. You have nevertheless deserted us, to side with the enemy, taking offence at something we are not aware of. You must know what fate traitors meet with. We urge you, therefore, to forget all wrongs and to remember how your ancestors behaved and served the State, instead of the enemy, so that the nation may be proud of your conduct”.you have to subdue the nation’s enemies and not to join them. You must work to extend the Maratah-raj. This warning is addressed to you in full confidence that you will remain a loyal servant of the State and not molest the poor, innocent rayats.”
The fact is that Shahu was all the while trying to settle (30) the issue amicably. At a time he thought of issuing “Sanad” in favour of Dabhade by paying some cash to the Peshwa so that he should cease to interfere in Gujarat. When (31) asked by Bajirao, Chimaji consented to such an arrangement but insisted that Dabhade’s claims should be" removed by the Chhatrapati if he joined the Nizam. Shahu sent special messengers (32) and in the long in league with the Nizam and in one of his letters through Gayas Khan (33) (1st November 1730 A.D. ) he had urged the Nizam thus, “we do not demand any thing from you except your support, on which we shall destroy Pradhan Pant giving him a battle. If he succeeds, grant us a Jagir and Mansab. It we are successful, in that we are destroying the kingdom of Shahu declaring that it is the king who is instigating us to fight with the Peshwa. After the kingdom of Shahu is destroyed, Sambhaji should be placed on the throne and Trimbakrao and Kanthaji be made Senapati and Sarlashkar respectively. In it the fame of the Nawab (Nizam) would be enhanced”" Shahu (34) seems to be ignorant of these dangerous designs of Trimbakrao, for had he known them, it is impossible to believe that he would have cancelled the Mokasa of half of Gujarat assigned by him to Chimaji and transferred it to Trimbakrao on 15th December 1730 A.D. only a fortnight before the battle of Dabhoi.
Shahu’s letter produced little effect on Trimbakrao. He was uncompromising (35) and was not prepared to lose even a village of his territory. The Nizam (36) had already left Aurangabad to follow Bajirao. Dabhade had assembled a force of 10 thousand at Talegaon and was to follow him soon. In fact he had gone too far in his plans to destroy Bajirao, to listen to any suggestion of Shahu or Bajirao. It is no wonder, hence, that the efforts of Chhatrapati Shahu to bring Dabhade in his presence at Satara met with little success (37) (December 1730 A.D.).
Bajirao could not be deaf to the reports that poured upon him from his agents about the gathering of the clouds against him and did not deem it wise to wait till they got time to burst upon him.
Along with Chimaji he marched towards Khandesh leaving Poona on 10th October 1730 A.D. Leaving Chimaji (38) to watch the movements of the Nizam in Khandesh, Bajirao proceeded to Badoda (December 1730 A.D.) . Chimaji soon joined him, having made sure that the Nizam, who had proceeded to meet Bangash, would probably bring large forces including those of Bangash to help Dabhade.
Towards the end of November 1730 A.D., (39) the Nizam started from Aurangabad to meet Bangesh on Narmada. He Informed Dabhade not to engage with Bajirao rashly until a fully concerted plan was arranged between them all (40). The meeting took place on Narmada (41) at Akbarpur ferry near the fort of Mandavgadh from 17th to 28th of March 1731. Bajirao’s success to a greater extent depended on keeping himself fully informed of the enemies movements and hence he had posted Malharrao Holkar in the vicinity of Narmada.
Malharrao harassed the Bangash during the said conference and at the same time sent vital information to his master in Gujarat from time to time (42).
The Role of Abhaysing in the Conflict
On his arrival near Badoda, Bajirao wrote a letter to Maharaja Abhaysing (43), who deputed the faujdar of Bhadoch to meet him on the Mahi. Thereafter the Peshwa and his brother advanced to Ahmadabad and encamped at the Chandola tank. Negotiations were carried on through Ratansing Bhandari. A meeting took place at Shahi-Bag between Bajirao and Abhaysing when terms of agreement were settled. (February 1731 A.D.). The Maharaja agreed to pay 13 lakhs of rupees in lieu of “Chauth” of Gujarat, 6 lakhs of which were paid down immediately and the remaining amount was to be paid after Kanthji and Pilaji (44) were expelled from Gujarat.
As per the agreement (45) a body of Rajputs joined Bajirao to secure Badoda from Pilaji. The combined army laid siege to Badoda fort, which was ably defended by the Gayakwad’s general. But the Peshwa could not remain there for a longer time and had to raise the siege on receiving the grave news of the arrival of the Nizam on the Narmada with his army, intending to march into Gujarat.
The Senapati with the help of Kanthaji, Pilaji and Udaji had collected an army of about 40,000 men including the Nizam’s (46) contingent of about 5,000 under Muhammad Yar Khan and Kuwar Bahadur, on the plain of Dabhoi and Bilapur. Bajirao sent his repeated messages (47) from Savli to Dabhade to proceed to Satara and have the dispute settled amicably in" the presence of Chhatrapati, reminding him that it was not proper that the two prominent Servants of the king should engage in a personal contest. But Trimbakrao was in no mood to listen to such proposals. Probably he was waiting for the definite instructions from the Nizam as to the time of his action. In fact the Nizam and the Bangash needed sometime more before they were to unite their forces with those of their Maratha allies. But It would have been a dangerous folly on the part of Bajirao had he waited more. The Peshwa was too foresighted and too quick in his action to give the Nizam and his allies enough time to mature their plans. As Trimbakrao had refused his overtures of peace, the Peshwa fell upon him with a comparatively smaller force of about 20,000 horse at the village of Bhilapur, between Badoda and Dabhoi on 1st of April 1731 A.D. Dabhade fought with determination and courage, but a chance shot, probably from his maternal uncle killed him instantly. There upon his troops broke and fled, which completed the victory of the Peshwa in this civil struggle. He wrote thus about the victory to his Guru Brahmendra Swami. “Dabhade with his allies came forward for an encounter on 4th Shavval. Trimbakrao himself, Jiwaji Dabhade, Maloji Pawar and Pilaji Gayakwad’s son Sabhaji were killed outright. Udaji Pawar and Chimmaji Damodhar were captured. Pilaji Gayakwad and Kuvar Bahadur escaped wounded. A large booty was secured. Out side too lost a few brave ones in the battle (48).
Before Nizam could render any help to Dabhade, Bajirao had disposed him of. He did not wait a moment after the battle but returned with all haste to Satara. On the way, he had a brush with a party of Nizam’s troops near Kador. After receiving
The news of Peshwa’s victory, the Nizam had advanced from Nandurabar upto the neighbourhood of Surat and attacked the retiring army under Bajirao, capturing some of its baggage (49). The Nizam boasts of this victory in the following way:
Asaf Jah to Abdul Nabi Khan (50) " April 1731 A.D., “Immediately on hearing rumours of the approach of the Islamic army by way of All Mohan, (the enemy) in utter bewilderment quickly crossed the Narmada and entered the limits of Deccan.
Therefore, this follower of Mustafa’s from the ford of Akbarpur, near the fort of Mandu, sent off his baggage and camp with the big guns to Burhanpur, and with great rapidity arrived at Nandurbar, and reached the environs of Surat in a few days. We surprised the Marathas when they were sleeping in great negligence and ignorance of our whereabouts and they fied away in utmost disorder. The dead were countless. Out troups made spoil of their property and the wretches suffered total losses.
The Subha of Gujarat has been freed from the disturbance created by Bajirao and the Subha of Malwa too has remained safe from that wretche’s mischief making, and the holy port (of Surat) has been saved from falling into the cloches of the villain.”
It is to be noted that the Nizam does not make any mention of the Victory of Gujarat, on the contrary he speaks of Gujarat being, “unoccupied by defenders.” He boasts of having saved Gujarat, Malwa as well and the port of Surat from falling into the hands of the Marathas. His pretensions over Malwa and Gujarat are quite obvious from the above letter. He very conveniently connives at the great victory of Bajirao over Dabhade and puts it as if Bajirao fled from Badoda on hearing the approach of the muslim army.
Let us see the version of Abhaysing (51) about the victory of Bajirao over Dabhade. “There was fight between the armies of Trimbakrao Dabhade and those of Bajirao and ours. Trimbakrao, Mughal Mominyar Khan the commander of Nizam’s army, and Mula Pawar were killed. Pawar Uda, Chimma (Chimanaji Damodhar) and Pandit of the side of the Nizam and Pilu’s son were captured, and we were victories. You must have imparted these news to the Nawab (khan Dauran).
Pilu, Kantha, Anandrao and others have fled with their armies. Pilu fled to Dabhoi and his brother is at Barods. We have dispatched our armies to both these places and hope to get them vacated soon. As Kantha had fled to Nizam-ul-Mulk, you should ask the Nawab to inform the Emperor and get his orders issued to Nizam with a strict warning, that he should comply with the commands of the “Darbar” (Maharaja) and should not give shelter to Kantha, Pilu and others.
The army of the Nizam too is destroyed and if he comes again to this place to avenge himself, there will be a battle with him.
This time Bajirao has rendered meritorious services to the Emperor. So a robe of honour, a “Farman” and an elephant should be bestowed upon him as well as Raja Shahu and a robe of honour on Chimna. Further, after explaining everything to the Nawab, also arrange for the bestowal of a “Mansab”.
Sometime back we wrote about the case of Bajirao, but owing to the verbal or written misrepresentations, the Nawab could not grasp the reality and has informed to Emperor that Bajirao, only being afraid of Trimbakrao, has joined us in this way, and therefore he could not help us in any biggest task. These days there was a large concentration of the forces of the enemy, and both the armies arrived here. When we failed to see any provision being made by adverse result, it was we who would be blamed for it, as no one would say that the Nawab did not do any thing in the matter. In these circumstances we tried hard to bring Bajirao to the side of the Emperor, and giving him every assurance dispatched him with our forces equipped with strong artillary to punish Kantha, Pilu and others. We have thus created a split among them and managed to crush the rising.
We thought that the Nawab would appreciate our action but instead of that he has written to us to punish Bajirao, drive him away and give him no help what-so-ever. It appears that the Nawab has written to us at the instigation of the Nizam. Is it fair that the Nawab should act on the advice of others when the task has been entrusted to us? Only consider that though kantha and Pilu had been usurping the land of Gujarat for the last eight years, he (Khan Dauran) favours them and gives no weight to winning Bajirao over to the side of the Emperor. Tell all these facts to the Nawab plainly and inform that we have done all this with full faith in him. But it he does not care, we are not prepared to keep this province. What advantage can one have in Gujarat these days? On the contrary though we have to bear all the expenses from the revenue of Marwad, he has neither done anything for our own jagir or for that of Rajadhiraj (Baktsing).
Recently the enemy threatened us again and therefore we managed the affair in this way. He writes to Nizam to punish Bajirao, while we brought him whole-heartedly to our side and sent him to punish the Nizam. It appears that though the Nizam wants to create misunderstanding between the Nawab, and us yet he has no courage to advance. Had he come forward, he would have been punished, and further if he thinks of advancing against us, he shall be punished.”
Top and side lines in Maharaja’s own hand writing: “May Almighty always protect us. By the grace of God we have achieved victory. The helping force of the Nizam-ul-Mulk, which too was with the enemy has also been destroyed. But Bajirao has not been favoured with thanks and assuance for his help. If the Nizam himself comes here, we are prepared to deal with him. Also arrange to remit money soon. Here there is no source of income, and therefore, inform the Nawab and arrange to send money without fail, we belong to the Rajput race and therefore believe that whatever the Almighty desires will happens, but the Emperor will lose the province.
As Abhaysing puts it, there was no source of income for the viceroy in Gujarat. He could not continue for a long his expenses in Gujarat at the cost of revenue of Marwad. Money was the necessity without which hs was unable, “to manage the affaris of the province even for a single day.” The Maratha menace to Gujarat as Abhaysing puts it correctly, had been in existance for the past eight years i.e. from 1722 A.D. Even Sarbuland Khan was unsuccessful to face the Maratha tide. Confronted with great concentration of Maratha troops in combination with the Nizam, Abhaysing had no other means to save the province ghand to enter into an alliance with Bajirao, who had been won over to the Emperor’s side and was supplied with artillary and troops to face the enemy. But his diplomacy was” not appreciated by the Nawab Khan Dauran, far from it, he had written to punish Bajirao. Abhaysing felt that it was not fair for him to write in that way. He strongly recommanded due recognition for the meritorious services rendered by Bajirao and even a “Mansab” also. Finally he wrote that if his polices were not accepted, he was not prepared to keep the province for himself.
Even though Abhaysing was conscious of the fact that by winning over Bajirao to his side, he had created a split among the Marathas, his joy over the success of Bajirao seems to be more unrest than what is warranted of a shrewd and practical diplomat. In fact, it was not he who had won over Bajirao against Dabhade, but it was due to the common interest that they both and come together. But there was something more. Even though he was not a through observer of the Maratha internal politics like the Nizam, the sense of self interest must have warned him that in the success of the Nizam Dabhade combination against Bajirao, lay a dangerous threat to his existence in Gujarat. Hence Bajirao’s men were his men and his victory was “Our Victory”. His choice of the party of Bajirao was not accident. Since Ajitsing, the House of Rathod belonged to anti-Turanian group and even then Abhaysing was a partisan of Khan Dauran and as such was naturally opposed to the politicizes of Nizam whose pretensions to Gujarat under any form were jealously resented by him (52).
After Dabholi
Being doubtful about the policy of the Emperor (53) and as per the agreement (54) with the Chhatrapati Shahu, Bajirao here after did not personally (55) interfere in the polities of Gujarat and hence Abhaysing’s alliance with the Peshwa was short-lived. But, nevertheless, it had not been barren of fruits. In main, it had put down the ambitious plans of the Nizam, which if successful, could have stirred the political atmosphere not only of Deccan but also of the whole Hindusthan. The success of the Nizam would have up set the chance of Rajput dominance as they had then, in the politics of Delhi.
After his defeat at Dabhoi at the hands of Bajirao, the reputation of Pilaji Gayakwad, suffered considerably. Nevertheless, by his hold of Songadh fort and his recent acquisitions of Badoda and the fortress of Dabhoi, he had made himself still more formidable. However, Abhaysing was determined to secure the territory lost to the Marathas. With little resources left in Gujarat, the task was beyond his power to perform. Fully realizing this, Abhaysing thought to take recourse to baser methods and managed Pilaji to be assassinated at Dakor, on 14th of April, 1732 A.D.
With satisfaction the Maharaja wrote to Amarsing Bhandari, his Vakil at Delhi, in a letter dated 26th March 1732, “By the grace of Goddess, Pilu has been killed”. The reason was “without dong away with him, we cannot take Badoda, as he would never fight a pitched battle”. As per the details given in the letter, a contingent of two thousand selected cavalry, was specially despatched to fall upon the camp, after the treachery was successful. Pancholi Ramanand, Bhandari, Ajabsing and Inda Lakhdhir entered into negotiations with Pilaji at Dakor, the famous place of Hindu pilgrimage and when the latter had little suspicions of any foul act, affected his murder. At once, the two thousands Rathod horse fell upon the confused Maratha camp two hours after the dark. Pilaji’s brother, along with five to seven persons of note, were killed, Five hundred Marathas fell on the spot and a great amount of botty was taken, including 700 horses and a large number of heavy fire locks. The Maharaja then marched to Badoda, which was abandoned by the Marathas in confusion.
Occupying Badoda, the Maharaja laid siege to Debhoi where the Marathas had retired. But owing to the unseasonable rains he failed to capture it and subsequently retired to Ahemadabad (1732 A.D)
But by now the Marathas (56) had fully recovered from the shock. The Kolis, Bills, Waghris and other wild tribes enraged at the murder of Pilaji rose every where against the viceroy, Pilaji’s brother, Mahadaji, marched from Jambusar on Badoda and took it by storm. In 1733 A.D, Umabai Dabhade (57), widow of the Senapati Khanderao, accomapnied by Kanthji Kadam Bande and Pilaji’s able son Damaji Gayakwad, with an army of 30,000 troups approached Ahmadabad to avenge the death of Pilaji. The threatening Marathas encamped at the Shahwadi about three miles from the Jamalpur gate of Ahmadabad. Being impossible to face them, the Maharaja was foreced to pay a ransom of 80,000 rupees over and above the “Chauth” and “Sardeshmukhi” of the province (58).
Shortly after this, the Maharaja left Ahmedabad for Jodhapur leaving Ratansing Bhandari as the deputy Subhadar of Gujarat and hence during 1733 A.D to 1736 A.D his contact with the Marathas in Gujarat was through his deputy who tried to oppose them in vain.
By 1736 A.D, the Maratha hold on Gujarat was nearly complete except for the capital Ahemadabad and the seaports bhadoch. Surat and Cambay. In 1736 A.D, the Emperor appointed Momin Khan as the Successor to Maharaja Abhaysing as Subhadar of Gujarat.
The deputy Subhadar informed Abhaysing about the “Farman” received by Momin Khan and about his intended march to the capital with the help of the Marathas. Taking offence at his supersession, the Maharaja left the Court. As Ratnsing refused to surrender Ahemadabad, as per the orders of his master, Momin Khan and his Maratha ally Rangoji (59), the agent of Pilaji Gayakwad, laid siege to Ahemadabad. From the end of August 1736 A.D to the end of May 1737 A.D, for nine months. Ratansing with considerable capacity and resource-fulness, defended Ahmadabad against the combined strength of the enemy. But during this trying period, the Maharaja failed to send him any help in men or money. At last for lack of provisions, the Bhandari and his Rajputs abandoned the defence and left for Marawad (60) on 25th of May 1737 A.D
(x) The Relations of Abhaysing with the Marathas from 1733 A.D Onwards
Maharaja left Gujarat in 1733 A.D and went back to Jodhpur because that was the only honourable way left for him. Owing to the constant Maratha raids, the revenue of the province had dwindled and a horrible famine which ravaged the land made the economic condition all the more pitiable (61) and yet the Imperial Court did not send the expected help in men and money, even on repeated demands. Under such circumstances, the Maharaja was convinced, as he had previously written, that the province was lost to the Emperor. Hence he left his deputy to look after Gujarat affairs, as far as it was possible and returned to Jodhpur having left all interest in the defence of the Mughal Empire hereafter.
In 1734 A.D he attended the assembly of the Rajput Chiefs at Hurda along with the rulers of Jaypur, Udaypur, Kota, Bikaner and Kishangadh. All signed a pact of mutual assistance. But the pact could be of little use in prevalence of mutual jealousies among the Chiefs.
Inspite of the foul murder of Pilaji at his instance in 1732 A.D, Abhaysing was not opposed in general to Maratha cause from the point of view of his policy. He blonged to the party of Khan Dauran and hence was much more inclined (62) towards them. His moral support to Bajirao in 1731 A.D, against the combination of Kanderao Dabhade and the Nizam was definitely of consequences (63). Later on also, his participation in the campaigns against Bajirao during 1734 A.D to 1736 A.D was only nominal.
But his influence with Khan Dauran dwindled by degrees as the threats of the Marathas to the security of the Mughal Empire increased in seriousness since 1736 A.D In the longrun, Khan Dauran was disillusioned in his high opinion about the Rajput Rajas that their appointment to the Subhas of Malwas and Gujarat would effectively check the tide of Maratha aggression. With the attack of Bajirao on Delhi, the idea to call Nizam for the defence of the Empire got root, even Khan Dauran sided with it, and with the coming of the Nizam at Delhi in 1737 A.D, Abhaysing nearly lost all his interest in Delhi Politics.
He died in 1749 A.D and was definitely a strong Hindu minded ruler like his illustrious father Ajitsing.
Foot Notes (Description)
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(1) ‘New Hist.’ Vol. II pp. 134 and 135.
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(2) ‘History of Gujarat’ Vol. II, p. 413.
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(3) ‘Munt Lubab’ in E.D. Vol. VII, p. 517, 518, 527.
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(4) ‘Munt Lubab’ in E.D. Vol. VII, pp. 526.
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(5) Ibid, pp, 528, 529.
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(6) ‘A Hist. of Gujarat’, Vol. II, p. 424.
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(7) Ibid, p. 426.
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(8) S.P.D. 30-312 :- Bajirao’s expedition into Gujarat. His comprador Baji Bhivrao was active in the territory of Khambayat in Feb. 1724 A.D. It is doubtful whether Bajirao personally invaded Gujarat this time. ‘Pehswas’ Shakawali’ (M.I.S. Vol.II, p. 24) states that during January to March 1725 A.D., Bajirao was in Malwa, whereas in No. 312 to S.P.D. 30, it is clearly stated that Baji Bhivrao was in Gujarat along with Rajashri Pant Pradhan. ( ????????????????????????????????????????????????????
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(9) S.P.D. 30-p. 272 : Half of Bagad, in Gujarat, was assigned for expenses of the contigent of Gajaji Dewakate, under Chimaji, on 19th July 1724 A.D. Ibid, p. 277 : Malhar Govind was appointed ‘Chitnis’ to collect ‘Sardeshmukhi’ and ‘Babti rights’ in Gujarat by Chimaji. Ibid pp. 280, 281 : The day to day collection of ‘Chauth’ from Gujarat (along with Malwa) by Tryambak, agent of Pilaji Jadhao, Convinces the gradual hold of the Peshwa on Gujarat during 1725 - 26 A.D.)
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(10) ‘A Hist. of Gujarat’ Vol. II, p. 426.
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(11) A circular order from Raja Shahu to Pilaji Gayakwad, Kanthaji Kadam and Ambaji Pant, (23-4-1726 A.D.) states that Ambak, Mutalik of the Peshwa, had settled with Sarbuland Khan for the surrender of ‘Chauthai’ and ‘Sardeshmukhi’ of Gujarat and directed them not to interfer with its payment to Chimaji and Trimbakrao Dabhade. Baroda I.
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(12) “Bajirao I and” Maratha Expansion” (1944 A.D.) p. 30, ‘A Hist. of Gujarat’. Vol. II p. 426.
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(13) S.P.D. 30 - entries on page 426.
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(14) S.P.D. 30 - pp. 295, Itinerary of Chimaji Appa.
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(15) S.P.D. 12-32 (The date of letter should be 22-5-1730 and not 22-5-1729 as the editor has wrongly stated, for the abvous reason that Chimaji had just returned from his Malwa expedition on 4th May 1729 A.D., (Itinerary of Chimaji Appa - Item No. 10, p. 6 of S.P.D. 22.). Daniel Inners’s letter, dated 25th March 1730 A.D., in Hist, of Gujarat, Vol. II, p. 427 reproduced from the ‘Gaikwad of Baroda’ 1-10 Reads as follows: - “The Ganims under Chimaji Raja, it is said, before they left Petlad, got from the town nearly two lakhs of rupees, whence they moved off Dholka way, they have pillaged the greatest part of it, the loss sustained cannot as yet be known but must be great multitudes say a crore of rupees, others more moderate, say half at least. "
Now compare this ‘it is said’ , with the reality : Letter from Chimaji Appa to Bajirao dated 22nd May 1730 A.D. from Pavgadh, - “We have returned from Viramgaon. Sarbuland Khan had agreed to a meeting with us when Anandrao Pawar had been there. But he did not come as his men opposed the meeting. We then went to Dhawalake Petlad. At present we art at Pavagadh. The provisions are to be made in the fort. Anandrao Pawar thinks of staying more. If we stay, the (captured) territory and the fort will be retained. But (if we decide to stay) how to feed this army is the great questions. No money has been recovered to pay off the creditors. Hence, the difficulty from both the sides. If we decide to stay, the bellies will have to be filled and if we leave, the territory is lost. Hence we are (still) here. After making due provisions, and making one or two, halts to have time to take further decision about our plan, we shall write (to you) definitely. "
Thus when the anxiety of Chimaji was how to retain the territory and at the same time feed his army, the contemporary writer Daniel Innes puts up the exacted ransom from a crore of rupees to 50 lakhs as a moderate estimate. There is hardly any need to add anything more in his respect!
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(16) S.P.D. 30 - entries on pp. 293, 294. Dated 16th September 1729 A.D., reveal that along with other Mahals from Malwa, Udaji Pawar and Anandrao Pawar, were assigned a saranjam of 29 Mokasa-mahals in Gujarat.
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(17) ‘A Hist. of Gujarat’ Vol. II, p. 426.
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(18) S.P.D. 15 - pp. 84, 85 (The date given is 9-2-1728), ‘Grant Duff’ - I (1921) p. 374. Bajirao I & Maratha Expansion (1944) ; pp. 32, 33.
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(19) ‘The Cambridge Hist. Vol. IV ; p. 351, ‘A Hist. of Gujarat’ , Vol. II, p. 430.
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(20) ‘Later Mughals’ Vol. II, p. 205, ‘A Hist of Gujarat’ Vol. II p. 430.
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(21) ‘Later Mughals’ Vol. II, p. 205.
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(22) Relevant extract from the Maharaja’s letter, dated 10th November 1730 A.D. - from ‘Gloriess of Marwar’ , pp. 144 to 148.
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(23) ‘New Hist.’ Vol. II, p. 135.
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(24) S.P.D. 12-39, Letter of Chimaji to Bajirao in which the former consented to the settlement of Gujarat, proposed by Shahu.
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(25) S.P.D. 14-32, Letter of Purandare to Bajirao, which reveals the jelousy felt by Fattesing Bhosale (& the Pratinidhi) who complains, “Rajashri Pradhan Pant is engaged in military exploits and therefore his name is renowned, also he has a (big) army. We have been sitting idle at home and hence have no connection with the army and thus have been disabled from every point of view.”
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(26) S.P.D. 10-27, 61, 65, 67 to 70, 72 to 76, S.P.D. 12-44.
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(27) S.P.D. 10-72.
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(28) ‘Later Mughals’ Vol. II, p. 251.
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(29) S.P.D. 17-12, New Hist. Vol. II, p. 137.
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(30) (A) Dr. V. G. Dighe, in his unrestrained remarks over Shahu (Peshwa Bajirao I and Maratha Expansion; pp. 33 to 35) states that “the weak and vacillating monarch who had risen to authority by the prowess of others, was incapable to pacify his warring chiefs, the more so, as he was specially indebted to Bajjirao and his father for his exalted position not hence could wield but nominal control over his activities. " (B) Writes Sardesai, “When he (Trimbakrao) found that Shahu was too soft to control Bajirao effectively, he began open preparations for an armed conflict,” (New Hist. Vol. II, p. 123). These remarks save Trimbakrao from much of the blame; his treacherous conduct deserves, and places it on the powerful Peshwa who could not be controlled by the Chhatrapati as per the above remarks. But this is nothing but injustice to both the Chhatrapati and his Peshwa.
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(31) S.P.D. 12-33, 39.
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(32) Ibid, 35.
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(33) S.P.D. 10-72.
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(34) S.P.D. 30-p. 229.
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(35) S.P.D. 12-42.
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(36) S.P.D. 10-75
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(37) S.P.D. 12-35, 42.
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(38) ‘New Hist.’ Vol. II, p. 139.
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(39) S.P.D. 10-75.
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(40) ‘New Hist.’ Vol. II, p. 138.
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(41) ‘Later Mughals’ , Vol. II, p. 251, New Hist. Vol. II, p. 139.
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(42) New Hist. Vol. II, p. 139
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(43) ‘Hist. of Gujarat’ Vol. II, pp. 438.
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(44) ‘New Hist.’ Vol. II, p. 140.
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(45) S.P.D. 12-27.
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(46) “What makes the action greater is that Chimaji (Bajirao) had but 15,000 or 16,000 horse and the joint force of Pilaji and Kanthaji are said to have been upwards 50,000.” A letter from Daniel innes at Canebay to the Chief of the factory of Surat dated 7th April 1731, quoted in “A Hist. of Gujarat” Vol. II, p. 140.
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(47) ‘New Hist.’ Vol. II, p. 140, ‘Kincaid and Parasnis’ p. 229.
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(48) S.P.D. 12-46, Bajirao’s letter of his victory to Krishnaji Kadam of 2nd of April 1731 A.D.
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(49) :“A Hist. of Gujarat” Vol. II, p. 443.
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(50) ‘New Hist’. Vol. II, pp. 142 and 143.
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(51) Relevant extracts from Abhaysing’s letter to his envoy at Delhi dated 10th April 1731 A.D.
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(52) The Nizam was conscious of the opposition of Abhaysing to his policies. He wrote to the Emperor. “If Maharaja Abhaysing does not give protection to Bajirao and abstains from treacherous collusion, your servant (Nizam) by the help of Almighty will be able to destroy and capture. If Abhaysing acts in accordance with your Orders and undertakes to chastise the enemy in his province, the faction of Bajirao will be dispersed and he will be absolutely ruined.” Citecd from - ‘The porceedings of the Indian Hist. Congress’ 1938, p. 617.
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(53) Abhaysing wrote to his agent at Delhi from Ahmadabad, dated 10th of April, in which he has stated that, relying on the words and commands of the Maharaja (Abhaysing) he has served the Emperor whole-heartedly in the battle against Trimbakrao and others. But the Nizam-ul-Mulk has recently sent him the original ordersof the Emperor, communicated to him (Nizam) , to Bangesh and to us (Abhaysing) and informed him that while such are the orders of the Emperor, he is weakening the side of the invaders by fighting against his own men. On whose assurance is the doing all this? The Emperor has already ordered for his capture and punishment. This information has dishearted him. Though he was already getting such news from different sources, we retained him by giving assurances. At present after reading the original letters, he is perplexed and relies more on the news and intends to leave us. We had already written to the Nawab (Khan Dauran) to send a ‘Farman’ , but the same has not been yet received. Therefore arrange immediately to dispatch the ‘Faman’ etc., as was stated in our previous letter”.‘Glories of Marwad’, pp. 162 to 164. But the good relations continued, for e.g. a letter dated 13th October 1731 A.D. (Baroda Vol. I) states that “It is essential for the Peshwa to maintain the friendly relations with Rajashri Abhaysing and hence Rajashri Yashwantrao Dabhade Senapati, Pilaji Gayakwad and Kadam Bande he informed not to molest Gujarat.” It seems that after the treacherous murder of Pilaji by Abhaysing, it was impossible for Bajirao to continue the friendly relations with him.
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(54) M.I.S. Vol. II, p. 62.
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(55) As per S.P.D. 14-2, dated 16-3-1732 A.D. Malharrao and Ranoji had been to Gujarat, captured Champaner, provided Pavgadh and then went to Malwa.
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(56) The Maharaja wrote, “All the Southern people have been hostile to us and we have left no stone untured to serve the Emperor. We have captured 24 fortresses"the rest of the possessions of the enemy will be speedily takne"by the grace of God the enemy does not stay within 50 miles of us”.” Again, “we have conquered the forts of Badoda and Jambusar and the siege of the fort of Dabhoi is in progress” - ‘Glories of Marwad’.
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(57) ‘A Hist. of Gujarat’ Vol. II, p. 446.
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(58) S.P.D. 14-1.
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(59) M.I.S. Vol. II, p. 80.
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(60) ‘A Hist. of Gujarat’ Vol. II, pp. 459 to 465, ‘Glories of Marwad’ pp. XLV-XLVIL.
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(61) ‘A Hist. of Gujarat’ Vol. II, p. 457. ‘Glories of Marwad’ Maharaja’s letter p. XLIV.
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(62) His appointment as Subhadar of Gujarat, was to detach him from the Turani party - ’later Mughals’ Vol. II, p. 205.
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(63) ‘New Hist’. Vol. II, p. 140.