+2 From V P Singh to P V Narasimha Rao

From V. P. Singh to P. V. Narasimha Rao. Mandal versus Mandir.

Demolition of the Babri Masjid. Rage, riots, and pogroms. (1989–1993)

In November 1989, the long-awaited general elections were held, together with a series of assembly elections, some of them in sensitive constituencies. At the Centre, the Congress Party had to pay dearly for its past errors. It had to make room for a triumphant coalition of sorts, around a «messiah», V.P. Singh, whose recently born National Front included a number of lobbies and regional parties, and had even the support of the BJP and of the Communist parties. However, tensions soon developed within the Front and externally: over the policy concerning peasants; over Kashmir; and over the «Babri Masjid issue.» To counter these developments, the prime minister held a trick up his sleeve. On August 7, he announced that he was to implement the pending and controversial recommendations of a conveniently forgotten commission, the Mandal report, advocating «affirmative action» and quotas in favor of the OBCs (Other Backward Classes). For the BJP, it was unacceptable, as it would ruin the «Hindu Nation», dividing it into thousands of warring sub-castes. A strong counter-fire was urgent. The only way for the BJP was to revive the Mandir (temple) issue as forcefully as possible (Jaffrelot 1996: 449–481).

One year earlier, the shilanyas (sacred brick processions) had made a deep impression and brought together crores of people (1 crore = ten million). Now it would be a giant Ram Rath Yatra (God’s chariot procession), with the strong man of the BJP, L. K. Advani, leading on a colorful truck with the Ram idol on its front, and again crores of devotees, from all shades and castes, offering flowers, and even, at times, their own blood.

The yatra left Somnath (Gujarat) and its famous temple on September 25, 1990. The procession was scheduled to reach Ayodhya (Uttar Pradesh) after some 10,000 kilometers of ecstatic crowds but, also, predictably, leaving a bloody trail in its wake (Engineer 1991c).

Obviously, this flamboyant procession was not sufficient for the Sangh Parivar: at the same time, another yatra marched, carrying torches and lights in various UP cities (the Ram Jyoti Yatra). It was met with the same enthusiasm and the same violence. As was the case in 1989-but this time more systematically-one city after another fell prey to rioters. Each of these riots, of course, had its own story, starting with rumors and being fed by various agents, Hindu networks, local rivalries, communal irritants, and political ambitions. Ultimately, it underlined the major role that is devolved in India to the administration, to the police (largely pro-Hindu), and to local DMs (district magistrate), whether they know their districts well or not (in the case of a recent transfer, for example). Each one displays either courage or passivity (Saksena 1990).

It should be noted that several CMs (chief ministers) had taken strong measures, with preventive arrests, as was the case in West Bengal, where the Left Front, with its CPM (Communist Party of India [Marxist]) chief minister, Jyoti Basu, had a good opportunity to demonstrate its secular commitments (Zins 2001). In Bihar, the recently elected Janata leader, Laloo Prasad Yadav, showed his determination by putting an end to L. K. Advani’s yatra at the border between Bihar and Uttar Pradesh. In November 1990, in Uttar Pradesh (UP) itself, the CM Mulayam Singh Yadav (later called «Maulana Mulayam» by grateful Muslims-[maulana means Islamic scholar]) managed to save the Babri Masjid, at least temporarily, from two successive kar sevaks (Hindu volunteers) assaults. There were however a number of casualties (around twenty), and a fresh opportunity for the VHP to organize a new yatra, the Asthi Kalash Yatra-a procession carrying the ashes of «martyrs.» Passions were dramatically revived and, in spite of V.P. Singh’s conciliatory efforts, the BJP withdrew its support from the Central government.

The Mandal–Mandir affair had got the best of «messiah» V. P. Singh (P. S. Jha 1990). He had to make room for a Janata dissident, Chandra Shekar, who became the new prime minister, and whose government depended entirely upon the support of the Congress Party. It did not last.

To add to the uneasiness felt in Muslim circles who had lost the support of V. P. Singh, the First Gulf War was clouding their sympathies: Saddam Hussein was extremely popular among them, but they hardly dared express their support for him (Wright 1982). At home, the sinister list of riots was becoming longer and longer, especially after the bloody Ram Navami (festival celebrating the birth of Ram) in March 1991. In April, with an incredible display of strength at the Boat Club in Delhi, the VHP launched a new «battle for Ram» and, with mid-term general elections in view, every leader, every group, every action committee ensured that its voice was heard. Just before the first round of elections could be held, violence swept Uttar Pradesh.

Then came Rajiv Gandhi’s tragic assassination on May 1991, at the hands of the LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, activists from Sri Lanka). The nation was deeply shocked, and this helped the Congress party to win a thin majority at the polls in the tenth Lok Sabha elections.

The new Prime Minister, Narasimha Rao, was a Brahmin from South India. Together with a first-rate economist, Dr. Manmohan Singh, he managed to completely change India’s economic landscape. Unfortunately, he would not demonstrate the same clear views and determination on the communal front, and this, at a time when the UP political scene was entirely new (Graff 1997): the BJP had won the Assembly elections; the secular Mulayam Singh Yadav had to leave the gaddi (throne) in Lucknow, and the new CM was a Hindutva man, Kalyan Singh, who, it should be noted, did not belong to the upper castes but to the OBC (Other Backward Classes). It was an additional challenge.

The BJP had won in UP but also in Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Himachal Pradesh. Violence diminished, then resumed in various places (Saharanpur, Varanasi, Meerut in UP, and even Badhrak in Orissa and Trivandrum in Kerala, among others). In UP itself, Kalyan Singh appeared cautious and obviously willing to negotiate. In September 1992, his government acquired 2.77 acres of land adjoining the Babri Masjid, supposedly for tourism activities, although the VHP held part of the ownership. Obviously, a new stage had been reached.

The land acquisition was challenged by the Supreme Court, and feverish talks followed (between various Action Committees, the National Integration Council, lawyers, and other concerned actors). However, the VHP-RSS were determined to proceed. A symbolic Kar Seva (religious gathering) was to be held on December 6. A confrontation was in the offing, as, in the last weeks of November, a massive mobilization of Hindu activists, police, and the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) had taken place around Ayodhya. Tragedy struck the very same day. Within a few hours, the mosque was demolished right under the eyes of the Sangh Parivar leadership, razed to the ground, and Hindu idols were «returned to their due place» in a makeshift temple.

It is impossible here to give more details about these fateful days. The shock and rage of Muslims were amplified by «live» images shown repeatedly on the BBC channel. They shouted their anger when, at the same time, triumphant Hindus were chanting victory slogans. Violence erupted, even in Calcutta, and took a tragic turn in many places. Bhopal was bad, Surat awful, Bombay tragic, with horrifying murders, followed by systematic massacres. Events there unfolded in two sequences, a «classical» eruption in December 1992 and, afterwards, in January 1993, a real pogrom, with the well-organized perpetration of atrocities on the part of Hindu activists (Heuzé 1993). It could have lasted whatever the forms. It stopped suddenly, due in large degree to a signal being sent on March 12, 1993 by the Gulf Muslim mafias, in the form of several bomb blasts that were set off in major public places in Bombay. The message seemed clear enough to most, although it was never acknowledged as such.

In any case, the general madness was decreasing. The communal frenzy had reached such paroxysmal levels that it could not reasonably carry on. The violence diminished. President’s rule had been imposed on the four BJP states. Opinion surveys showed that few people still supported the Ramjanmabhoomi movement. As for the Central Government, no matter what was said about its responsibilities, it was not that passive (Jaffrelot 1996: 464–478). Still, it would pay dearly for the whole drama in the 1996 general elections. Muslims would never forgive Narasimha Rao. He was dubbed a «traitor», as formulated in the Urdu press.