Source: Rob Lee on TW
Shifting aims
It seems Russia’s goals in Ukraine have gone through three phases:
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- Regime change (probably lasted through the first 1-2 weeks)
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- Compellence
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- Medium to long-term occupation of more Ukrainian territory
Worth noting that a long-term occupation of more Ukrainian territory comes with serious risks and costs for Russia. It has committed the vast majority of its ground units to the war in Ukraine. The Russian military isn’t in a great position to respond to other crises.
In addition, a declaration of war and mobilization raises the personal stakes for Putin. Failing to win would place his position at even more risk. Ultimately, it depends what Putin’s objectives are now. Occupying more of Ukraine isn’t a long-term sustainable solution as long as Ukraine continues to fight. So Russia would have to make this war unsustainable for Kyiv. Continued NATO/EU support would be even more critical.
US Resupply
One of the points I made before the war is the US lacks many of the weapons that would be most useful for Ukriane, such as long-range loitering munitions like the Harop, 30km-range Spike NLOS ATGMs, and ground-based short and medium-range air defense systems. The US military lacks those weapons because its has a dominant air force, but that means the US doesn’t have many of the right weapons to equip a military that lacks a strong air force.
Planning errors
Low notice
I thought Russian soldiers would have been given more than a few hours notice they were going to war. It is hard to overstate the ramifications of that decision. Logisticians didn’t have time to plan (e.g. fuel, food), vehicles were sent without proper maintenance, ground guys didn’t talk to air guys, adjacent units didn’t coordinate, they didn’t ensure comms were solid. etc.
One important factor is that few in Putin’s inner circle are veterans. Many were intelligence officers, but few have military experience, including Shoigu. They clearly thought opsec was more important than allowing the military to properly prepare. A serious mistake. There is a lot of evidence from different sources that the units were given little warning, including captured documents published by the Ukrainians, statements from Russian POWs from different units/military districts, weak OPSEC steps taken by soldiers before the war. etc.
Force ratios and opening days
I’m very interested in looking at force ratios from this war, but Russia’s invasion force was far smaller than the numbers here suggest (probably 80k troops in the 125 BTGs) and Russia’s strategy didn’t mass its forces at critical points. So it often did not achieve 3:1 or 2:1. One of the biggest failures of Russia’s strategy in Ukraine is that it failed to achieve favorable force ratios for the key objectives in this war (e.g. Kyiv).
Ukrainian forces smartly retreated back to more defensible terrain and cities during the opening stage of the war. Once Russian forces progressed farther into Ukraine, its forces became more dispersed and less supported, and they couldn’t achieve numerical superiority.
In some ways, we’re only seeing a useful force ratio comparison in the fighting in the Donbas where Ukrainian forces are defending and Russian forces are conducting a deliberate, and better supported, offensive. But Russia doesn’t appear to have a numerical advantage there.
Internal Criticism
Some dark sarcasm is Russian military propagandist Aleksandr Sladkov’s commentary. Soldiers need to show heroism because someone has miscalculated Donbas offensive, he suggests. Russian security milieu is transiting into its habitual “empire is betraying its soldiers” mode.
Sladkov is embedded with Russian forces and has covered several Russian wars. He’s very well-sourced (he was the first person to be invited to an SSO exercise). Sounds like he shares Girkin’s pessimism for the second stage of this war.
Attrition
There was a question whether Russia suffered too much attrition in its maneuver units over the first 6 weeks to still be able to conduct a successful offensive in the Donbas and hold areas of Kherson and Kharkiv. You can only compensate so much for these losses with artillery. These issues underline how Russia had to achieve its goals quickly in Ukraine to have success. Russia invaded with 75% of its maneuver battalions (probably 80% now) + Rosgvardia. The US invaded Iraq in 2003 with 37% of its maneuver battalions, which meant it had units to rotate.
Russia doesn’t have a well-trained reserve, and its conscripts only serve for one year. Right when they become competent at their jobs, they are demobilized. Not clear how useful such a force would be, particularly without well-trained NCOs (who are currently in Ukraine). Conscripts are mostly trained at their units, but the vast majority of ground regiments/brigades are partially deployed to Ukraine.
Coordination problems
Tanks are vulnerable when a combined arms component is missing or weak. Russia doesn’t have enough infantry to protect its tanks from ATGM teams, and they’re struggling to suppress/destroy Ukrainian artillery that is locating them with commercial UAVs. Russia decided to reduce the motorized rifle battalion in tank regiments to a 75-man company, and then decided to not mass its forces properly in Ukraine. I don’t think this war has demonstrated that tanks are any more vulnerable than previously known.
US Intel
“There has been a lot of real-time intelligence shared in terms of things that could be used for specific targeting of Russian forces,” said a former senior intelligence official familiar with the situation. The information includes commercial satellite images “but also a lot of other intelligence about, for example, where certain types of Russian units are active.”
…Ukraine continues to move air defenses and aircraft nearly every day with the help of American intelligence, which is one reason Russia has not been able to establish air dominance. In some cases, Ukraine moved the targeted air defense systems or planes just in time, the officials said.
Many people have been asking why so many Russian senior officers have been getting killed. Well, if we extrapolate from this article, “Ukrainian forces have used specific coordinates shared by the U.S. to direct fire on Russian positions,” might have something to do with it.
Economics
Russia’s 🇷🇺 Ministry of Economy expects 8.8% contraction in 2022 (earlier expected 3% growth) with negative scenario of 12.4%. This is worse than 2008 GFC of -7.8% and comparable to 1992 of -14.5%.