(Source: TW, translation by @mdmitri91)
One of my comrades who came back from the frontline for reorganisation asked to briefly and clearly (without going into depths of warfare science) to sum up and express my thoughts that I listed in a discussion with him, revolving around my ‘pessimism’ towards the success of the ‘second stage’ of this SMO (Special Military Operation). - He believes someone might find this useful. I think that no one from those making decisions will pay any attention, but I made a promise, so here it is. In short, let’s evaluate the operational situation:
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From our side, after the ‘successful completion of the first stage of the operation’ (which ended with a large-scale RETREAT from Kyiv, Chernihiv and Sumy Oblasts), a relocation and concentration of the forces in the Donetsk region of the frontline has occurred. Most likely (and according to the official statements of the political command of RF), this is precisely where they are planning to conduct the ‘second stage’, and complete the objective of totally clearing the territories of L/DPR of the enemy’s formations. Obviously, they count on creating 2-3 offensive groupings with enough manpower, which, with concentrated support of all available aviation and the majority of artillery forces, will ‘break through’ the Ukrainian forces (which are still for some reason not appreciated highly enough), and destroy them in one large battle.
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From the UAF side: the plans of RF AF are very clear to the enemy, and they do not at all consider their defeat inevitable. In fact, the opposite - UAF are planning to defend in their highly fortified positions, relying on old and newly created (RF AF gave them plenty of time for that) positions at assumed directions of the Russian Forces strikes (which are obvious - just look at the map).
Let’s ask a question - can the supremacy of Russian AF in aviation and heavy weaponry guarantee a victory over the enemy (for whom the offensive plans are obvious?), who is prepared for defence, possessing a high moral spirit? My answer is - NO, not guaranteed.
Why?- My answer:
The ‘supremacy’ of Russian AF in aviation and artillery is quite relative. Since the enemy has a well-equipped and numerous military Anti-Aircraft capabilities, which severely limits actions of the tactical aviation capable of supporting its own troops on the battlefield. The enemy holds AN ADVANTAGE in terms of field and artillery reconnaissance (UAVs of various classes on nearly squad level). Their artillery has great weaponry and excellent trained personnel. And fighting against numerous Russian armoured vehicles - UAF (in defence) is quite capable of this due to massive amounts of anti-tank weapons among infantry (ATGM).
In conditions where Russian troops will have to storm one city agglomeration after another, numbers of troops come to the foreground. And in this regard, neither RF AF nor L/DPR AF have a serious advantage, unfortunately.
Let’s imagine that the first line of defence of UAF south of Izyum and near Huliaipole is broken and our forces begin offensive in convergent directions. Can they quickly link up in deep Ukrainian rears, creating two encirclement rings (inner and outer)? With a guarantee that the enemy won’t break them immediately and won’t create their own ‘salients’ for the advancing forces? (Germans did this on multiple occasions in 1942 with our forces).
I doubt it. Why?
- Because for that you need A LOT of detachments aimed not only for breaking through but also for firmly establishing in the territories. You also need a large amount of supply detachments. If the enemy had innumerous forces - you could partially ignore defence of communications. Yet UAF (thanks to mobilisation) have enough forces comparable to our own numbers.
- Moreover, the enemy has the ability to reduce the frontline and transfer freed forces towards endangered directions - RF does not have complete supremacy in the air simply due to a lack of numbers in attack aviation, and tiny numbers of attack UAVs. At the same time, the frontline near Donetsk can be held by the enemy with relatively small numbers thanks to excellent engineering equipment, developed over years, while our genius politicians were ‘chewing Minsk snivel’.
With this in mind, I presume that the general lack of forces will not allow the Russian command to conduct a ‘deep envelopment in Dnipro region’. They simply don’t have enough manpower for this. So the offensive will be carried out in the shortest directions - in the north towards Slovyansk-Kramatorsk (at best, towards Barvenkovo), in the south - on the Uhledar-Kurahovo line. Both mentioned operational lines will inevitably lead our troops to face the large, highly fortified, and well-prepared defensive garrisons in numerous city agglomerations. In fact, the enemy still retains control over roads between them, which they can use to continue supplying their troops.
So, after a certain time, in this area, the same situation will repeat as in Rubezhnoe-Severodonetsk, Popasnaya, Avdeevka and Maryinka, where united forces are advancing extremely slowly and with huge losses (especially among infantry), or not moving at all (Avdeevka).
The enemy is more than happy with such a way to conduct combat operations. Why? - Because UAF need 1,5-2 (at best, 3) months to prepare significant reserves - not in the form of constant reinforcements into existing forces (they are already happening, supporting on a very decent level the numbers of troops directly engaged in combat), but in the form of detachments that can be used in other strategic directions, while Russian forces are ‘bleeding’ storming fortified cities in Donbas.
In the worst case scenario, we can repeat the situation similar to one that happened for the Wehrmacht during operation ‘Citadel’. While Germans were slowly gnawing through the deeply reinforced defence of soviet troops, wasting time and their saved reserves, Soviet command concentrated in the north (around Belgorod and Oryol) a large group of own troops not engaged in the battle. When it started a counter-offensive, Germans ‘suddenly found out’ that there was not enough power to simultaneously continue operation ‘Citadel’ and defend from counter-offensive of soviet troops.+++(4)+++ The operation had to be ended and battered troops had to be returned to their original positions. And then, more or less orderly retreat (which did not always happen for Germans) behind Dnipro.
With this in mind, I would also remind you that the so-called ‘ukraine’ is finishing its THIRD STAGE OF THE TOTAL MOBILISATION. They have manpower (200-300 thousand people) and equipment (a huge stream of all kinds of weapons from Europe and USA) to not only support a decent number of their own troops at the frontline, but also create new reserves. And create them in ’numbers’ (even 100,000 people is around 50 BTGs, including reinforcements and rear infrastructures - so around 10 full-bodied divisions).
What about us? We are conducting recruitment into various private military organisations, recruiting contractors in enlistment offices, and… and that’s all. L/DPR (in terms of mobilisation) are completely drained, and those who are ‘still to be caught’, will only replenish existing and future losses. Let’s say, thanks to private companies we are able to create 10 (even 20) various squads and BTGs. And then? Losses taken in Donbas (storming more fortresses will result in these being VERY HIGH) will need to be compensated somehow.
In general, HOW can the Russian command in two-three months ‘parry’ a concentration of fresh UAF forces, for instance, at the borders of Kursk and Belgorod Oblasts? And if they start an offensive - what will we have to defend them? Police, ‘alcoCossacks’ (all real Cossacks are already on the frontline), or regional militia? This regional militia has not yet even been created! No one is speaking about this…
Or did our military ‘arranged in advance’ with the enemy that they (the enemy) will act strictly within the plans of our Orthodox General Staff? In the first stage of ‘SMP’ this did not seem to happen at all. With serious losses for the participants. I don’t think the second stage will be much different - Ukrainians are definitely not planning to act as ‘boys for beating’
So, drawing a conclusion, I note:
Without conducting at least a partial mobilisation in RF it is impossible to conduct deep strategic advancing operations in so-called ‘ukraine’, impossible and extremely dangerous. We need to prepare for a long and difficult war, which will require all human resources, which are now uselessly wasted to have ‘another flag over a city council’ (Hostomel and Bucha, showed how quickly the flags can be changed).
And yes, I would really like to be mistaken in my predictions for the operation that has started (the ‘second stage’). But the grande with which these hedonists that shat themselves on many occasions, these lying babblers, and mediocrities, are presenting it - is not giving me extra optimism. NO CONCLUSIONS from the failures of the first two months - in a strategic sense - have been made.
Criticism
Strelkov predicted in 2015 that Russia would suffer a humiliating defeat in Syria if it didn’t start mobilization & that saving Assad’s government is impossible.